Table of Cases and Authorities
Statement of the Case
Statement of the Facts
I. The trial court correctly ruled
that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 158-7.1 is unconstitutional as violating Article
V, Section 2 (1) of the North Carolina Constitution.
II. The trial court correctly ruled that, in addition to being unconstitutional
under Article V, Section 2 (1) of the North Carolina Constitution, the statute
is also unconstitutional because it is impermissibly vague and ambiguous,
is without reasonably objectinve standards, and is incapable of reasonably
III. The trial court properly found facts relating to the issues raised.
Certificate of Service
1. Did the trial court correctly hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 158-7.1
is unconstitutional as violative of Article V, Section 2 (1) of the North
2. Did the trial court correctly hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 158-7.1
is unconstitutinal becuase it is impermissibly vague and ambiguous, is without
reasonably objective standards and is incapable of reasonanbly certain interpretation?
3. Did the trial court correctly find facts relating to the issues raised?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-appellee has set forth his statement of the case in his opening
brief as Plaintiff-Cross Appellant filed with the Court on November 30,
1995. In the interest of brevity we respectfully refer this Court to that
brief. This Brief responds to both defendants' and intervening defendant's
briefs as appellants, as well as the various briefs of the amici.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In order to avoid repetition, we refer to our detailed statement of facts
contained in our opening brief. A brief summary here will place our argument
Since 1990, Winston-Salem and Forsyth County have spent or committed some
$13,000,000 in public funds for or in behalf of private corporations as
"incentives". These payments purportedly induce the corporations
to locate in Forsyth County, or, if already in Forsyth County, to expand.
More than half of these funds have been given to private corporations which
have had a base of operations in Forsyth County since their beginnings many
decades ago (Wachovia Bank, Reynolds Tobacco and Sara Lee, successor to
the Hanes companies) or are otherwise a permanent fixture in the community
(Wake Forest University). (R pp 190-191)
Winston-Salem Business, Inc., a private corporation, has negotiated many
of the incentive "deals" in behalf of the City and the County.
The chief or former chief executive officer of several of the benefitted
corporations have been chairman or on the executive committee of Winston-Salem
Business, Inc., while that entity was negotiating the deals in behalf of
the City and County.
The projects involve direct grants of cash to pay moving expenses (PX 8-d,
App 12 ; R pp 190 - 191) , the upfitting of buildings for private owners
to make them suitable for rent (Id.), the payment of parking fees for employees
of Southern National Bank for a period of twelve years and the paying of
a substantial portion of the rent for Southern National Bank (PX 7-c, App
5; R pp 190), the building of roads and the installation of utilities to
serve the company involved (PX 25-f, App 102; R pp 190-191), the building
of a parking lot for Reynolds Tobacco (PX 10-d, App 29; R p 191), the payment
of one-half of the salaries of employees of corporations for a specified
period of time (PX 16-b, App 74), the financing of loans to private entities
(PX 15-b, App 70), and the payment of "spousal employment assistance"
expenses (PX 7-c, App 5; PX 7-g, App 8).
In connection with some of the "deals", so called "economic
impact studies" were sometimes done. These consisted of the ultimate
of simplicity: they simply divided the amount of the grant by the estimated
annual taxes. The result was the number of years it would take to recover
the "investment" -- and this was the total conclusion of the "economic
impact study." Neither defendant ever addressed the other side of the
ledger, i.e., the added costs of government. Indeed, no such analysis was
ever attempted until shortly before the trial of this case and because of
it. A man whose degree is in history and political science (DX 55 at p.
7, App 231), and whose masters is in city and regional planning (Bleakly
Dep. p. 5, App 247), testified that, based on estimates made by him on one
project, there should be a net positive on all projects. However, he did
not know, for example, the cost of building a school, or of operating one,
and his resource materials consisted entirely of an unsubstantiated listing
of "job creation projects", the guidelines allegedly followed
by Winston-Salem and Forsyth County, and newspaper articles. (Bleakly Dep.
at p.9, App. 251)
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATING ARTICLE V, SECTION 2(1) OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
Assignment of Error Nos. 5, 7, 8 (R p 210)
Assignment of Error No. 3 (R p 211)
We hasten to correct an impression made by defendants and their amici in
their briefs. It is argued, in various forms, that by reason of legislative
enactments, and otherwise, the people of this State have professed their
support for the concept of what Winston-Salem and Forsyth County have done
in this case, and that this Court should therefore endorse what defendants
claim is the manifest will of the people by giving its stamp of approval
to the writing of checks to some of the wealthiest corporations in the world
in the name of "economic development". The position is presumptuous
-- and very incorrect. We ask the Court to take judicial notice of the fact
that, just two years ago, in November 1993, the same interests who are defendants
and amici in this case were successful in getting on the ballot a proposed
constitutional amendment which would have authorized local governments to
spend tax money in the name of "economic development". Of course,
there was public debate of the issue and the proponents made great efforts
imploring the citizens of this State to amend their Constitution to allow
their tax monies to be doled out to other citizens for economic development.
The proposed constitutional amendment to allow tax funds to be used for
economic development was defeated more decisively than anything in recent
memory: 651,190 citizens of this State voted against the proposal -- 176,762
voted for it! To now argue, as defendants do, that economic incentives have
the support of the people of North Carolina ignores both the voters who
voted for the public purpose clause in our Constitution -- at least twice
-- and the voters who resoundingly voted against changing it in 1993.
There is no reason to believe that public sentiment is any different today
than it was two years ago. Indeed, as discussed below, it appears that public
resentment against the practice is even greater today than it was in 1993
-- and accelerating.
We are living in a time of an extraordinary shortage of confidence in government.
For defendants and amici to argue that the people did not mean what they
said in November, 1993, that they actually support the opposite of what
they said, and regardless of what they said, the idea should nevertheless
be forced on them by this Court, is a terrible misconstruction and misreading
of the public will. Having failed to persuade the people to change the Constitution,
they now ask the Court to do so. The effort is symptomatic of the cause
of voter resentment, cynicism and rejection of government. Contrary to the
argument of defendants, our mission here is not to consider policy making
by the judiciary, but to interpret a Constitution in accordance with ironbound
principles of constitutional law and stare decisis.
Defendants and their amici also profess that this Court, on behalf of all
North Carolinians, should make what amounts to a policy reversal, notwithstanding
our Constitution, because all of the other states in our country are doing
otherwise and that, unless we are to be grossly out of step with all others,
we should see the wisdom of abandoning our old and narrow ways. It is not
an argument worthy of this Court. We reviewed each of the decisions from
other states cited by the Attorney General and relied on by defendants.
The result is both fascinating and astounding.
As set out below, 29 of the decisions from some 45 states cited and relied
on by defendants, address the propriety of industrial revenue bonds -- in
virtually identical design to Article V, Section 9 of the North Carolina
Constitution. The classic industrial revenue bond case involves bonds issued
by a financing authority created by the challenged legislation. The bonds
and the interest on them will be paid for by revenues from the project.
In all but two of the 29 cases, (where the government guaranteed the bonds
or payments were made in lieu of taxes), public funds were not involved
or even exposed. The courts considering these cases have found that the
bonds do not constitute a lending of the governments' credit, or do not
violate the "public purpose" clause of the Constitution (many
of the states do not have a public purpose clause in their Constitution)
or are otherwise within the "police power" or "public welfare"
provisions of their Constitution. In some cases, the court took a very technical
approach, finding, for example, that the constitutional prohibition was
directed only to subdivisions of government -- and the financing authority
was not a subdivision of government.
Article V, Section 9 of the North Carolina Constitution explicitly sets
out the classic industrial revenue bond methodology considered in almost
all of the 29 cases from other states. In other words, if defendants were
arguing this case in any other state, they would cite North Carolina as
one of the "other" forty-nine states because our Constitution
specifically allows industrial revenue bonds. It is misleading, therefore,
to paint the picture, as defendants do, that North Carolina stands alone.
It stands with the vast majority of all states.
Of the remaining cases cited by defendants, the issues vary (e.g., California,
public funds for campaign activity; Washington, collection of child support;
Texas, public funds to prosecute violators of private land use restrictions.)
Cases from Iowa (economic development), Kansas ("blighted" areas),
Oklahoma (university), Massachusetts (urban renewal), Colorado (no direct
prohibition in the Constitution) and Utah (aid to small business) address
a variety of industrial or economic development or financing issues not
involving revenue bonds.
Our review of the out of state cases relied on by defendants are set out
in the order contained in the Attorney General's brief, as follows:
[state by state review omitted]
* * * *
To leave the impression, as defendants and their amici do, that North Carolina
stands alone is simply incorrect. Each state has its own Constitution and
few, if any, are alike. Some states permit one form of economic development
and deny others -- as does North Carolina. In this case, it so happens that
North Carolina, while permissive in other ways, prohibits the paying of
tax funds for the benefit of private corporations -- even if in the process,
it may benefit some members of the public.
In Mitchell v. North Carolina Industrial Development Financing Authority,
273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968), this Court was called upon to determine
whether taxpayer funds could be used to start up the administration of the
North Carolina Industrial Development Financing Authority. The legislative
purpose in creating the authority was to attract new business and enhance
economic development. The business had to make a significant contribution
to the economic growth of the city involved. The Legislature expressly found
that the purpose of the statute was a public purpose, i.e., to promote industry,
etc., in this State. Tax free bonds would be issued by each "municipal"
authority with the proceeds of the bonds used to provide facilities to industry.
The governor could transfer funds out of a Contingency and Emergency Fund
for the first two years of operation of the Authority. The governor allotted
$37,000 from the Fund for the use of the Authority for the ensuing fiscal
year. As here, the parties basically stipulated to the facts. Plaintiff
challenged the allocation by the governor as unconstitutional. Id. at 138
- 43, 159 S.E.2d 746 - 49.
Justice Sharp wrote the majority opinion -- one of the more learned decisions
in our State's judicial history. The opinion was prefaced by a basic proposition
inherent in our system of Constitutional government:
If there is any restriction implied and inherent in the spirit of the American
Constitutions, it is that the government and its subdivisions shall confine
themselves to the business of government. . . .
Id., at 145, 159 S.E.2d at 751. The Court struck down as unconstitutional
not only the statutory authority of the governor to provide tax funds from
the Contingency and Emergency Fund, but also the bond financing portion
of the statute. 273 N.C. 159, 159 S.E.2d 761.
The holding of this Court in Mitchell was succinct, and it is controlling
If public purpose is now to include State or municipal ownership and operation
of the means of production -- even on an interim basis; if we are to bait
corporations which refuse to become industrial citizens of North Carolina
unless the State gives them a subsidy, the people themselves must so declare.
Such fundamental departures from well established constitutional principles
can be accomplished in this State only by a constitutional amendment.
We hold that the Authority's primary function, to acquire sites and to construct
and equip facilities for private industry, is not for a public use or purpose;
that it may not expend the challenged appropriation of tax funds for its
organization; and that the Act which purports to authorize the expenditures
violates Article V, § 3 of the Constitution. (Emphasis added).
273 N.C. 159, 159 S.E.2d 761.
The arguments made by defendant in Mitchell, and addressed by this Court
in that decision, bear striking resemblance to the arguments made by defendants
and their amici here: (1) In Mitchell, defendant argued, and this Court
noted, that a vast majority of jurisdictions, either by decision or Constitutional
amendment, authorize the expenditure of tax funds for private development.
Id. at 147, 159 S.E.2d 752; Defendant Appellee's Brief in Mitchell at p.
12, App 283.
(2) Defendant in Mitchell complained that invalidating the type of industrial
financing at issue in the case "could serve as a serious deterrent
[to industrial expansion in North Carolina]." Defendant Appellee's
Brief in Mitchell at 9, App 281) and that the legislature had specifically
found that government financing of industrial development was necessary
"in order to meet the challenge of attracting new industry." (Id.
at 18, App 286).
(3) Defendant in Mitchell argued that the economy of the State was changing,
becoming more industrial and less agrarian and, hence, more dependent on
industrial development for its economic well being. (Id. at 7, App 280)
(4) Defendant in Mitchell contended that the expenditure of public funds
for private industrial development served a "public purpose" because
[i]t is clear that the purposes of the Act are to promote the industry and
natural resources of the State, increase employment and purchasing power,
improve living conditions, advance the general economy and otherwise contribute
to the prosperity and welfare of the State and its inhabitants. These are
the objectives which induced the General Assembly to enact the legislation.
The benefits that may be conferred upon private industry under the Act are
in fact incidental to such basic purposes and did not in any way motivate
the enactment. These purposes are within the public purpose concept, and
the Act therefore is not unconstitutional as authorizing the use of public
funds for other than a public purpose.
Id. at 21, App 287.
In fact, all the arguments made by the defendants and their amici in this
case were made before this Court in Mitchell. We refer this Court to the
brief filed by the state of North Carolina in that case. (App 276 - 299)
It was argued there, as it is here, that most all other states allow economic
incentives; that North Carolina should do it also; and that if we do not,
serious economic hardship will befall the State.
At page 10 of that brief, the State of North Carolina raised the specter
of North Carolina being "ringed with industries on its borders"
necessitating workers from North Carolina to commute back and forth, and
resulting in taxes from the industries "flowing elsewhere" and
"therefore the plain facts of the present case show an economic necessity
that the State be given equal inducements to those of its neighbors."
(Emphasis added) At page 8, the State referred to economic incentives as
an "impelling necessity to keep industrial expansion at the pace needed
to provide employment to those who live within the State, to provide a tax
base necessary to support the schools and other governmental activity. .
. ." (App 281)
In passing, we note that the dissent in Mitchell embraced those arguments.
However, the greatest of all tests -- time -- has proven the arguments wrong.
Currently, it is common knowledge that North Carolina has recently been
recognized as the most attractive State in the country for corporate relocation.
It is in the top five with respect to economic growth. In short, nothing
has happened since 1968 to suggest any reason for reversing Mitchell and
its progeny. Further, it is the nature of our court system that we decide
cases on the basis of facts in the record. In this instance, we have an
abundance of contentions that there is or will be an economic crisis unless
G.S. § 158-7.1 is sustained -- but there is not one whit of evidence
to sustain the contention. To the contrary, all the evidence shows that
North Carolina is and has been economically healthy. There is not one iota
of evidence to suggest that the continuance of programs such as those undertaken
by City and County are necessary for, or even that they help, continued
Defendants and their amici go to great lengths attempting to distinguish
Mitchell and its progeny, and the judicial reasoning of this Court which
both preceded and followed the decision. It is argued that stare decisis
does not apply with respect to Mitchell, or that after twenty-seven years,
Mitchell is a judicial antique, or that it is just plainly wrong and ought
to be changed. None of the arguments are sound.
Distilled to its essence, this case involves the authority of the Legislature
of this State, the Board of Alderman of Winston-Salem and the Board of County
Commissioners of Forsyth County to override constitutional decisions by
this Court. The Mitchell decision was a well reasoned and carefully written
opinion which followed a long line of precedent. It struck down a statute
which allowed government to provide public funds to private corporations
to stimulate business as being violative of the public purpose clause of
our Constitution. This Court clearly pronounced that if the voters of this
State wanted such expenditures to be legal, a Constitutional amendment would
have to occur.
Following Mitchell, a proposal to amend the Constitution to allow bond issues
to finance capital projects for industry was defeated by the people in 1974.
In 1976 the people approved Article V, Section 9. It provides the limited
authority to issue industrial revenue bonds. It prohibits the use of public
Just two years ago, in 1993, the Legislature and the proponents of incentives
again attempted to amend the Constitution to broaden the types of financing
projects state and local governments could undertake in the name of economic
development. The people rejected it with hammer like force. The incentives
at issue have not been authorized by Constitutional amendment and, hence,
remain illegal as being violative of the law which has been on the books
in North Carolina since at least 1868.
This Court has an exemplary record of holding that our Constitution means
what it says. The current issue, whether tax funds can be used to subsidize
private corporations in order to hopefully cause economic development, has
already been decided by this Court. The decisions on the subject very wisely
withhold judgment on what constitutes "public purpose" for the
obvious reason that it is impossible to anticipate the many myriad concoctions
which may come before the Court. However, this does not mean that the Court
should revisit the identical issue with no demonstrable or evidentiary reason
to do so. We believe that the decisions of this Court leave the answer to
the present legal issue too clear for reasonable argument.
It is argued that, regardless of the prior decisions of this Court and the
resounding sentiment of the voting public against the idea, it is nevertheless
good policy to force tax monies from our citizens and use the monies to
subsidize the businesses of other citizens or corporations. It is thus argued
that it is perfectly appropriate for government to use its taxing power
to subsidize one competitor versus another, either in products produced
or in labor employed, or both.
In response, we raise the question that, if this is to be the law, what
are the limits to it? Will a business person who is forced out of business
because of government subsidies to his competition have remedies? Against
the government? Against the competitor who received the tax funds? Or will
we simply say to the defunct competitor that he has no remedy -- or that
his remedy is to run for office, as argued by defendants? Does it constitute
a taking of property by government? Is it sufficient to say to the injured
business person that his competitor was given the subsidy and financial
advantage because it was large enough to provide more jobs or a larger tax
The policy change for which defendants now argue is not a good or a sound
policy change for a variety of reasons. The first is that we obviously do
not need it, and the evidence in this case simply does not show that we
do! Second, the fad of writing checks to private industry in the name of
economic development which has grown to such a frenetic pace in the last
few years, is now getting a bad name. The 1994 Annual Report of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (PX 101, App 135, 139) describes the practice
as an "economic war among the states" which should be stopped
by Congress. It points out that the practice disrupts the economy, creates
artificial forces in the economy and is simply unfair to competitors and
to the citizens who pay the bills.
In all of our research on this issue we have not found one qualified economist,
respectable or otherwise, who endorses the practice as good from an economic
standpoint. Neither did defendants enlighten us or the trial court on the
subject. There is, however, a very recent comprehensive, thorough and very
helpful study of the subject contained in the summer 1995 edition of "The
Urban Lawyer", the national quarterly on state and local government
law . The exhaustive study leads off with a statement that "[s]purred
by tight economies, as well as public resentment of industry hand-outs and
industrial flight, politicians, community activists, and even some judges
are increasingly recognizing the need to limit smokestack chasing."
(Id. at p. 428, App 314)
While directed to the growing strategy of using legislation to make business
accountable for incentives it receives, the study is valuable here for the
message that incentives are increasingly unpopular for sound reasons.
Equally noteworthy (and irresistibly grim) are the anecdotal examples of
continued smokestack chasing and the incentive wars it creates.
Id. at p. 431, App 317.
At the same time, the preponderance of the literature on the use of development
incentives cast doubt on their effectiveness. First, the economic literature
offers at best a tepid endorsement of the use of incentives. Second, research
in political economy attributes the continued use of tax breaks and other
development incentives more to the potential for political gain and bureaucratic
need to avoid risk than to any proof that such policies spur economic growth.
Finally, recent literature heralding a "third-wave" of economic
development policy regards incentives, especially when offered uniformly
to any firm, as an outmoded and even counter-productive approach to economic
growth in a global economy. (Emphasis added)
Id. at p. 432, App 318.
The article concludes that the payment of incentives is only a remote factor
in relocation or expansion decisions. Some of the observations made in the
study are simply common sense, such as the fact that "business incentives
may be granted to enterprises that would have located in the area or gone
ahead with expansion without assistance". Or that "the failure
to invest in public schools, especially schools and physical infrastructure,
may in turn be counterproductive to attracting businesses." Id. at
p. 433, App 319.
For the same reasons, incentives are increasingly in ill repute internationally.
In April 1995, the United Nations held a conference on trade and development
in Geneva, Switzerland. A study, "Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment",
was presented to the conference. (App 380 - 439) The report is critical
of incentives and urges more controls. Incentives, the report rightly says,
disrupt economies, create artificial economic forces, result in unfair competition,
and it is highly questionable as to whether there is a net good. The United
Nations Report says:
It is not in the public interest that the cost of incentives granted exceeds
the value of the benefits to the public. Otherwise put: the costs should
not be greater than the value of the wedge between private and social returns.
But, as governments compete to attract FDI [Foreign Direct Investment],
they may be tempted to offer more and larger incentives than what would
be justified to cover the wedge. How to measure the costs and benefits of
incentives is complex and problematic; and even when this can be done, the
implementation and administration of a calibrated incentives programme is
often very difficult. There is also the larger question as to whether national
welfare gains enhance world welfare or are at the expense of the welfare
of one's neighbor.
* * *
One policy response to this situation would be to do away with FDI incentives
(Id. at 44-45, App 423 - 424)
Over the past century, our society has become increasingly more alert to
social justice. Those organizations which dedicate themselves to promoting
social justice are taking an increasing interest in the unfairness of corporate
incentives and how, for example, such incentives deprive our society of
adequate funds for education and other critical needs (including our court
system). There is a very current study, comprehensive and in depth. It is
due to be published in the Fordham Urban Law Journal in the January, 1996
edition. The project resulting in the study was financed by the Maurice
and Jane Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice.
To say the least, this study is extremely critical of "corporate welfare"
in the form of incentives. The tone of the study is set out in the introduction:
The most significant cost of these agreements between cities and companies
to bring in or maintain jobs is the loss of a substantial amount of public
money to corporate pockets, with little or no return. To make matters worse,
in the current legal realm, municipalities have little ability to hold corporations
to the job creation promises that they make in exchange for the tax incentives
granted to them. . . . Though abuse of the welfare system is relatively
minuscule, tax breaks for corporations are draining our cities and states
by taking much needed revenue from essential public services.
The study is replete with citations to other studies concerning the different
problems caused by incentives. The study concludes that, generally, incentives
simply do not work and that there is little evidence that tax subsidies
influence corporate decision making about site location. Quoting from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, "Investment is a long-term profit-oriented
decision, and virtually no amount of special incentives. . . is likely to
attract and a keep a firm in an area in which the long-term profitability
criteria are not present." Id. at p. 9. The study continues, "Such
profitability criteria include access to high powered universities, transportation,
quality of public education, general business climate, infrastructure quality,
energy supply, political and physical stability, and personal preferences
of corporate decision makers." Id. at p. 9-10.
As further evidence of the rising tide against incentives, writers across
the country are bringing the concept to task. The writings frequently include
a listing of horror stories about corporations which did not do what they
promised and left the community hanging, or the incentives took something
critical away from essential government services -- often the schools. There
is also a growing awareness that taxing one business to subsidize a competitor
is simply wrong and a misuse of the power of government.
Not only are incentive packages ineffective and open to rife abuses, but
they are terribly unjust. A city taxes business. It then uses some of that
tax money to lure outside companies. Every business in the city thus contributes
to its own potential harm by subsidizing its competition. Incentives - crazed
politicians don't seem to realize that businesses compete for more than
customers. They compete for a limited pool of qualified employees, land,
shopping mall space, and so on. (App 311)
In short, there is no economic crisis, or even any sign of economic distress,
to justify the local governments in this case in interfering in the free
enterprise system and using tax funds to bribe corporations to locate or
expand. Although our adversaries argue to the contrary, there is not one
whit of competent evidence in this case which shows, or even suggests, either
that their projects resulted in a net good for the community or that they
were otherwise needed. Judge Rousseau, having carefully considered all the
No evidence was presented that the incentives paid or committed by the City
and County improved the unemployment rate or that they otherwise resulted
in meaningful economic enhancement. No evidence was presented that the incentive
grants made by the City and County reduced the net cost of government or
resulted in a reduction in the amount or rate of property taxes paid by,
or the level of services rendered to, the Citizens of Winston-Salem and/or
Forsyth County. (R p 193)
It is not meaningful to talk about increased tax revenues without talking
about the increased costs of government, or about the number of jobs lost
unless we also talk about the number of jobs gained during the same period
of time. Indeed, the statistics from the Department of Labor introduced
by plaintiff show that the unemployment rate in Forsyth County has hovered
around 4% during all of the times in question. (R p 192; PX 147, App 213
- 221) In view of full employment, when our adversaries speak of "new
jobs" they are in fact speaking of shifting of jobs from one local
industry to another. And obviously, the shifting of jobs is to the "new
industry" which is able to lure employees away from established industries
with the use of tax funds supplied in part by the established industries.
The only crisis of any sort before this Court is not economic. It arises
out of the fact that over the past several years we have created a new industry
in this State, i.e., the industry of "economic development", involving
people whose jobs and offices exist for the purpose of promoting other businesses.
The people who clamor for government incentives are too often in the business
of locating industries. They are paid a fee or commission out of the incentive
tax dollars, or their livelihood is dependent on the funneling of such public
moneys. They are therefore in favor of incentives. In fact, there is no
better manifestation of this new industry than the amici briefs filed in
We respectfully submit that both wisdom and stare decisis require that §
158-7.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes be declared unconstitutional
because it violates Article V, Section 2 of our Constitution. Our people,
with whom the covenant of government is made, have voted three times on
the issue; in adopting the Constitution of 1868, in the rewrite of the Constitution
in 1970 and in the resounding vote of the people on November 2, 1993 which
emphatically defeated the idea.
Economic incentives as done in this case are unconstitutional, illegal,
wrong, unfair and simply bad government
For the reasons cited herein, this Court should affirm the trial court's
factual determinations and its determination that G.S. § 158-7.1 is
This the 2nd day of January, 1996.
William F. Maready PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
Michael L. Robinson State Bar No. 9438
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
ROBINSON MAREADY LAWING & COMERFORD, L.L.P.
370 Knollwood Street, Suite 600
Winston-Salem, NC 27103
Telephone: (910) 631-8500
Telecopy: (910) 631-6999
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