EconWar




PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S BRIEF




INDEX


Table of Cases and Authorities

Questions Presented

Statement of the Case

Statement of the Facts

Argument:
I. The trial court correctly ruled that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 158-7.1 is unconstitutional as violating Article V, Section 2 (1) of the North Carolina Constitution.

II. The trial court correctly ruled that, in addition to being unconstitutional under Article V, Section 2 (1) of the North Carolina Constitution, the statute is also unconstitutional because it is impermissibly vague and ambiguous, is without reasonably objectinve standards, and is incapable of reasonably certain interpretation.

III. The trial court properly found facts relating to the issues raised.

Conclusion

Certificate of Service
[Contents]

QUESTIONS PRESENTED


1. Did the trial court correctly hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 158-7.1 is unconstitutional as violative of Article V, Section 2 (1) of the North Carolina Constitution.

2. Did the trial court correctly hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 158-7.1 is unconstitutinal becuase it is impermissibly vague and ambiguous, is without reasonably objective standards and is incapable of reasonanbly certain interpretation?

3. Did the trial court correctly find facts relating to the issues raised?
[Contents]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE


Plaintiff-appellee has set forth his statement of the case in his opening brief as Plaintiff-Cross Appellant filed with the Court on November 30, 1995. In the interest of brevity we respectfully refer this Court to that brief. This Brief responds to both defendants' and intervening defendant's briefs as appellants, as well as the various briefs of the amici.
[Contents]

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS


In order to avoid repetition, we refer to our detailed statement of facts contained in our opening brief. A brief summary here will place our argument in context.

Since 1990, Winston-Salem and Forsyth County have spent or committed some $13,000,000 in public funds for or in behalf of private corporations as "incentives". These payments purportedly induce the corporations to locate in Forsyth County, or, if already in Forsyth County, to expand. More than half of these funds have been given to private corporations which have had a base of operations in Forsyth County since their beginnings many decades ago (Wachovia Bank, Reynolds Tobacco and Sara Lee, successor to the Hanes companies) or are otherwise a permanent fixture in the community (Wake Forest University). (R pp 190-191)

Winston-Salem Business, Inc., a private corporation, has negotiated many of the incentive "deals" in behalf of the City and the County. The chief or former chief executive officer of several of the benefitted corporations have been chairman or on the executive committee of Winston-Salem Business, Inc., while that entity was negotiating the deals in behalf of the City and County.

The projects involve direct grants of cash to pay moving expenses (PX 8-d, App 12 ; R pp 190 - 191) , the upfitting of buildings for private owners to make them suitable for rent (Id.), the payment of parking fees for employees of Southern National Bank for a period of twelve years and the paying of a substantial portion of the rent for Southern National Bank (PX 7-c, App 5; R pp 190), the building of roads and the installation of utilities to serve the company involved (PX 25-f, App 102; R pp 190-191), the building of a parking lot for Reynolds Tobacco (PX 10-d, App 29; R p 191), the payment of one-half of the salaries of employees of corporations for a specified period of time (PX 16-b, App 74), the financing of loans to private entities (PX 15-b, App 70), and the payment of "spousal employment assistance" expenses (PX 7-c, App 5; PX 7-g, App 8).

In connection with some of the "deals", so called "economic impact studies" were sometimes done. These consisted of the ultimate of simplicity: they simply divided the amount of the grant by the estimated annual taxes. The result was the number of years it would take to recover the "investment" -- and this was the total conclusion of the "economic impact study." Neither defendant ever addressed the other side of the ledger, i.e., the added costs of government. Indeed, no such analysis was ever attempted until shortly before the trial of this case and because of it. A man whose degree is in history and political science (DX 55 at p. 7, App 231), and whose masters is in city and regional planning (Bleakly Dep. p. 5, App 247), testified that, based on estimates made by him on one project, there should be a net positive on all projects. However, he did not know, for example, the cost of building a school, or of operating one, and his resource materials consisted entirely of an unsubstantiated listing of "job creation projects", the guidelines allegedly followed by Winston-Salem and Forsyth County, and newspaper articles. (Bleakly Dep. at p.9, App. 251)
[Contents]


ARGUMENT


I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATING ARTICLE V, SECTION 2(1) OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION.

Assignment of Error Nos. 5, 7, 8 (R p 210)
Assignment of Error No. 3 (R p 211)

We hasten to correct an impression made by defendants and their amici in their briefs. It is argued, in various forms, that by reason of legislative enactments, and otherwise, the people of this State have professed their support for the concept of what Winston-Salem and Forsyth County have done in this case, and that this Court should therefore endorse what defendants claim is the manifest will of the people by giving its stamp of approval to the writing of checks to some of the wealthiest corporations in the world in the name of "economic development". The position is presumptuous -- and very incorrect. We ask the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that, just two years ago, in November 1993, the same interests who are defendants and amici in this case were successful in getting on the ballot a proposed constitutional amendment which would have authorized local governments to spend tax money in the name of "economic development". Of course, there was public debate of the issue and the proponents made great efforts imploring the citizens of this State to amend their Constitution to allow their tax monies to be doled out to other citizens for economic development.

The proposed constitutional amendment to allow tax funds to be used for economic development was defeated more decisively than anything in recent memory: 651,190 citizens of this State voted against the proposal -- 176,762 voted for it! To now argue, as defendants do, that economic incentives have the support of the people of North Carolina ignores both the voters who voted for the public purpose clause in our Constitution -- at least twice -- and the voters who resoundingly voted against changing it in 1993.

There is no reason to believe that public sentiment is any different today than it was two years ago. Indeed, as discussed below, it appears that public resentment against the practice is even greater today than it was in 1993 -- and accelerating.

We are living in a time of an extraordinary shortage of confidence in government. For defendants and amici to argue that the people did not mean what they said in November, 1993, that they actually support the opposite of what they said, and regardless of what they said, the idea should nevertheless be forced on them by this Court, is a terrible misconstruction and misreading of the public will. Having failed to persuade the people to change the Constitution, they now ask the Court to do so. The effort is symptomatic of the cause of voter resentment, cynicism and rejection of government. Contrary to the argument of defendants, our mission here is not to consider policy making by the judiciary, but to interpret a Constitution in accordance with ironbound principles of constitutional law and stare decisis.

Defendants and their amici also profess that this Court, on behalf of all North Carolinians, should make what amounts to a policy reversal, notwithstanding our Constitution, because all of the other states in our country are doing otherwise and that, unless we are to be grossly out of step with all others, we should see the wisdom of abandoning our old and narrow ways. It is not an argument worthy of this Court. We reviewed each of the decisions from other states cited by the Attorney General and relied on by defendants. The result is both fascinating and astounding.

As set out below, 29 of the decisions from some 45 states cited and relied on by defendants, address the propriety of industrial revenue bonds -- in virtually identical design to Article V, Section 9 of the North Carolina Constitution. The classic industrial revenue bond case involves bonds issued by a financing authority created by the challenged legislation. The bonds and the interest on them will be paid for by revenues from the project. In all but two of the 29 cases, (where the government guaranteed the bonds or payments were made in lieu of taxes), public funds were not involved or even exposed. The courts considering these cases have found that the bonds do not constitute a lending of the governments' credit, or do not violate the "public purpose" clause of the Constitution (many of the states do not have a public purpose clause in their Constitution) or are otherwise within the "police power" or "public welfare" provisions of their Constitution. In some cases, the court took a very technical approach, finding, for example, that the constitutional prohibition was directed only to subdivisions of government -- and the financing authority was not a subdivision of government.

Article V, Section 9 of the North Carolina Constitution explicitly sets out the classic industrial revenue bond methodology considered in almost all of the 29 cases from other states. In other words, if defendants were arguing this case in any other state, they would cite North Carolina as one of the "other" forty-nine states because our Constitution specifically allows industrial revenue bonds. It is misleading, therefore, to paint the picture, as defendants do, that North Carolina stands alone. It stands with the vast majority of all states.

Of the remaining cases cited by defendants, the issues vary (e.g., California, public funds for campaign activity; Washington, collection of child support; Texas, public funds to prosecute violators of private land use restrictions.) Cases from Iowa (economic development), Kansas ("blighted" areas), Oklahoma (university), Massachusetts (urban renewal), Colorado (no direct prohibition in the Constitution) and Utah (aid to small business) address a variety of industrial or economic development or financing issues not involving revenue bonds.

Our review of the out of state cases relied on by defendants are set out in the order contained in the Attorney General's brief, as follows:

[state by state review omitted]

* * * *
To leave the impression, as defendants and their amici do, that North Carolina stands alone is simply incorrect. Each state has its own Constitution and few, if any, are alike. Some states permit one form of economic development and deny others -- as does North Carolina. In this case, it so happens that North Carolina, while permissive in other ways, prohibits the paying of tax funds for the benefit of private corporations -- even if in the process, it may benefit some members of the public.

In Mitchell v. North Carolina Industrial Development Financing Authority, 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968), this Court was called upon to determine whether taxpayer funds could be used to start up the administration of the North Carolina Industrial Development Financing Authority. The legislative purpose in creating the authority was to attract new business and enhance economic development. The business had to make a significant contribution to the economic growth of the city involved. The Legislature expressly found that the purpose of the statute was a public purpose, i.e., to promote industry, etc., in this State. Tax free bonds would be issued by each "municipal" authority with the proceeds of the bonds used to provide facilities to industry. The governor could transfer funds out of a Contingency and Emergency Fund for the first two years of operation of the Authority. The governor allotted $37,000 from the Fund for the use of the Authority for the ensuing fiscal year. As here, the parties basically stipulated to the facts. Plaintiff challenged the allocation by the governor as unconstitutional. Id. at 138 - 43, 159 S.E.2d 746 - 49.

Justice Sharp wrote the majority opinion -- one of the more learned decisions in our State's judicial history. The opinion was prefaced by a basic proposition inherent in our system of Constitutional government:
If there is any restriction implied and inherent in the spirit of the American Constitutions, it is that the government and its subdivisions shall confine themselves to the business of government. . . .

Id., at 145, 159 S.E.2d at 751. The Court struck down as unconstitutional not only the statutory authority of the governor to provide tax funds from the Contingency and Emergency Fund, but also the bond financing portion of the statute. 273 N.C. 159, 159 S.E.2d 761.

The holding of this Court in Mitchell was succinct, and it is controlling here:

If public purpose is now to include State or municipal ownership and operation of the means of production -- even on an interim basis; if we are to bait corporations which refuse to become industrial citizens of North Carolina unless the State gives them a subsidy, the people themselves must so declare. Such fundamental departures from well established constitutional principles can be accomplished in this State only by a constitutional amendment.

We hold that the Authority's primary function, to acquire sites and to construct and equip facilities for private industry, is not for a public use or purpose; that it may not expend the challenged appropriation of tax funds for its organization; and that the Act which purports to authorize the expenditures violates Article V, § 3 of the Constitution. (Emphasis added).

273 N.C. 159, 159 S.E.2d 761.

The arguments made by defendant in Mitchell, and addressed by this Court in that decision, bear striking resemblance to the arguments made by defendants and their amici here: (1) In Mitchell, defendant argued, and this Court noted, that a vast majority of jurisdictions, either by decision or Constitutional amendment, authorize the expenditure of tax funds for private development. Id. at 147, 159 S.E.2d 752; Defendant Appellee's Brief in Mitchell at p. 12, App 283.
(2) Defendant in Mitchell complained that invalidating the type of industrial financing at issue in the case "could serve as a serious deterrent [to industrial expansion in North Carolina]." Defendant Appellee's Brief in Mitchell at 9, App 281) and that the legislature had specifically found that government financing of industrial development was necessary "in order to meet the challenge of attracting new industry." (Id. at 18, App 286).

(3) Defendant in Mitchell argued that the economy of the State was changing, becoming more industrial and less agrarian and, hence, more dependent on industrial development for its economic well being. (Id. at 7, App 280)

(4) Defendant in Mitchell contended that the expenditure of public funds for private industrial development served a "public purpose" because

[i]t is clear that the purposes of the Act are to promote the industry and natural resources of the State, increase employment and purchasing power, improve living conditions, advance the general economy and otherwise contribute to the prosperity and welfare of the State and its inhabitants. These are the objectives which induced the General Assembly to enact the legislation. The benefits that may be conferred upon private industry under the Act are in fact incidental to such basic purposes and did not in any way motivate the enactment. These purposes are within the public purpose concept, and the Act therefore is not unconstitutional as authorizing the use of public funds for other than a public purpose.

Id. at 21, App 287.

In fact, all the arguments made by the defendants and their amici in this case were made before this Court in Mitchell. We refer this Court to the brief filed by the state of North Carolina in that case. (App 276 - 299) It was argued there, as it is here, that most all other states allow economic incentives; that North Carolina should do it also; and that if we do not, serious economic hardship will befall the State.

At page 10 of that brief, the State of North Carolina raised the specter of North Carolina being "ringed with industries on its borders" necessitating workers from North Carolina to commute back and forth, and resulting in taxes from the industries "flowing elsewhere" and "therefore the plain facts of the present case show an economic necessity that the State be given equal inducements to those of its neighbors." (Emphasis added) At page 8, the State referred to economic incentives as an "impelling necessity to keep industrial expansion at the pace needed to provide employment to those who live within the State, to provide a tax base necessary to support the schools and other governmental activity. . . ." (App 281)

In passing, we note that the dissent in Mitchell embraced those arguments. However, the greatest of all tests -- time -- has proven the arguments wrong. Currently, it is common knowledge that North Carolina has recently been recognized as the most attractive State in the country for corporate relocation. It is in the top five with respect to economic growth. In short, nothing has happened since 1968 to suggest any reason for reversing Mitchell and its progeny. Further, it is the nature of our court system that we decide cases on the basis of facts in the record. In this instance, we have an abundance of contentions that there is or will be an economic crisis unless G.S. § 158-7.1 is sustained -- but there is not one whit of evidence to sustain the contention. To the contrary, all the evidence shows that North Carolina is and has been economically healthy. There is not one iota of evidence to suggest that the continuance of programs such as those undertaken by City and County are necessary for, or even that they help, continued economic health.

Defendants and their amici go to great lengths attempting to distinguish Mitchell and its progeny, and the judicial reasoning of this Court which both preceded and followed the decision. It is argued that stare decisis does not apply with respect to Mitchell, or that after twenty-seven years, Mitchell is a judicial antique, or that it is just plainly wrong and ought to be changed. None of the arguments are sound.

Distilled to its essence, this case involves the authority of the Legislature of this State, the Board of Alderman of Winston-Salem and the Board of County Commissioners of Forsyth County to override constitutional decisions by this Court. The Mitchell decision was a well reasoned and carefully written opinion which followed a long line of precedent. It struck down a statute which allowed government to provide public funds to private corporations to stimulate business as being violative of the public purpose clause of our Constitution. This Court clearly pronounced that if the voters of this State wanted such expenditures to be legal, a Constitutional amendment would have to occur.

Following Mitchell, a proposal to amend the Constitution to allow bond issues to finance capital projects for industry was defeated by the people in 1974. In 1976 the people approved Article V, Section 9. It provides the limited authority to issue industrial revenue bonds. It prohibits the use of public funds.

Just two years ago, in 1993, the Legislature and the proponents of incentives again attempted to amend the Constitution to broaden the types of financing projects state and local governments could undertake in the name of economic development. The people rejected it with hammer like force. The incentives at issue have not been authorized by Constitutional amendment and, hence, remain illegal as being violative of the law which has been on the books in North Carolina since at least 1868.

This Court has an exemplary record of holding that our Constitution means what it says. The current issue, whether tax funds can be used to subsidize private corporations in order to hopefully cause economic development, has already been decided by this Court. The decisions on the subject very wisely withhold judgment on what constitutes "public purpose" for the obvious reason that it is impossible to anticipate the many myriad concoctions which may come before the Court. However, this does not mean that the Court should revisit the identical issue with no demonstrable or evidentiary reason to do so. We believe that the decisions of this Court leave the answer to the present legal issue too clear for reasonable argument.
[...]
It is argued that, regardless of the prior decisions of this Court and the resounding sentiment of the voting public against the idea, it is nevertheless good policy to force tax monies from our citizens and use the monies to subsidize the businesses of other citizens or corporations. It is thus argued that it is perfectly appropriate for government to use its taxing power to subsidize one competitor versus another, either in products produced or in labor employed, or both.

In response, we raise the question that, if this is to be the law, what are the limits to it? Will a business person who is forced out of business because of government subsidies to his competition have remedies? Against the government? Against the competitor who received the tax funds? Or will we simply say to the defunct competitor that he has no remedy -- or that his remedy is to run for office, as argued by defendants? Does it constitute a taking of property by government? Is it sufficient to say to the injured business person that his competitor was given the subsidy and financial advantage because it was large enough to provide more jobs or a larger tax base?
The policy change for which defendants now argue is not a good or a sound policy change for a variety of reasons. The first is that we obviously do not need it, and the evidence in this case simply does not show that we do! Second, the fad of writing checks to private industry in the name of economic development which has grown to such a frenetic pace in the last few years, is now getting a bad name. The 1994 Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (PX 101, App 135, 139) describes the practice as an "economic war among the states" which should be stopped by Congress. It points out that the practice disrupts the economy, creates artificial forces in the economy and is simply unfair to competitors and to the citizens who pay the bills.

In all of our research on this issue we have not found one qualified economist, respectable or otherwise, who endorses the practice as good from an economic standpoint. Neither did defendants enlighten us or the trial court on the subject. There is, however, a very recent comprehensive, thorough and very helpful study of the subject contained in the summer 1995 edition of "The Urban Lawyer", the national quarterly on state and local government law . The exhaustive study leads off with a statement that "[s]purred by tight economies, as well as public resentment of industry hand-outs and industrial flight, politicians, community activists, and even some judges are increasingly recognizing the need to limit smokestack chasing." (Id. at p. 428, App 314)

While directed to the growing strategy of using legislation to make business accountable for incentives it receives, the study is valuable here for the message that incentives are increasingly unpopular for sound reasons.

Equally noteworthy (and irresistibly grim) are the anecdotal examples of continued smokestack chasing and the incentive wars it creates.

Id. at p. 431, App 317.

At the same time, the preponderance of the literature on the use of development incentives cast doubt on their effectiveness. First, the economic literature offers at best a tepid endorsement of the use of incentives. Second, research in political economy attributes the continued use of tax breaks and other development incentives more to the potential for political gain and bureaucratic need to avoid risk than to any proof that such policies spur economic growth. Finally, recent literature heralding a "third-wave" of economic development policy regards incentives, especially when offered uniformly to any firm, as an outmoded and even counter-productive approach to economic growth in a global economy. (Emphasis added)

Id. at p. 432, App 318.

The article concludes that the payment of incentives is only a remote factor in relocation or expansion decisions. Some of the observations made in the study are simply common sense, such as the fact that "business incentives may be granted to enterprises that would have located in the area or gone ahead with expansion without assistance". Or that "the failure to invest in public schools, especially schools and physical infrastructure, may in turn be counterproductive to attracting businesses." Id. at p. 433, App 319.

For the same reasons, incentives are increasingly in ill repute internationally. In April 1995, the United Nations held a conference on trade and development in Geneva, Switzerland. A study, "Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment", was presented to the conference. (App 380 - 439) The report is critical of incentives and urges more controls. Incentives, the report rightly says, disrupt economies, create artificial economic forces, result in unfair competition, and it is highly questionable as to whether there is a net good. The United Nations Report says:

It is not in the public interest that the cost of incentives granted exceeds the value of the benefits to the public. Otherwise put: the costs should not be greater than the value of the wedge between private and social returns. But, as governments compete to attract FDI [Foreign Direct Investment], they may be tempted to offer more and larger incentives than what would be justified to cover the wedge. How to measure the costs and benefits of incentives is complex and problematic; and even when this can be done, the implementation and administration of a calibrated incentives programme is often very difficult. There is also the larger question as to whether national welfare gains enhance world welfare or are at the expense of the welfare of one's neighbor.

* * *

One policy response to this situation would be to do away with FDI incentives entirely.

(Id. at 44-45, App 423 - 424)

Over the past century, our society has become increasingly more alert to social justice. Those organizations which dedicate themselves to promoting social justice are taking an increasing interest in the unfairness of corporate incentives and how, for example, such incentives deprive our society of adequate funds for education and other critical needs (including our court system). There is a very current study, comprehensive and in depth. It is due to be published in the Fordham Urban Law Journal in the January, 1996 edition. The project resulting in the study was financed by the Maurice and Jane Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice.

To say the least, this study is extremely critical of "corporate welfare" in the form of incentives. The tone of the study is set out in the introduction:

The most significant cost of these agreements between cities and companies to bring in or maintain jobs is the loss of a substantial amount of public money to corporate pockets, with little or no return. To make matters worse, in the current legal realm, municipalities have little ability to hold corporations to the job creation promises that they make in exchange for the tax incentives granted to them. . . . Though abuse of the welfare system is relatively minuscule, tax breaks for corporations are draining our cities and states by taking much needed revenue from essential public services.

The study is replete with citations to other studies concerning the different problems caused by incentives. The study concludes that, generally, incentives simply do not work and that there is little evidence that tax subsidies influence corporate decision making about site location. Quoting from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, "Investment is a long-term profit-oriented decision, and virtually no amount of special incentives. . . is likely to attract and a keep a firm in an area in which the long-term profitability criteria are not present." Id. at p. 9. The study continues, "Such profitability criteria include access to high powered universities, transportation, quality of public education, general business climate, infrastructure quality, energy supply, political and physical stability, and personal preferences of corporate decision makers." Id. at p. 9-10.

As further evidence of the rising tide against incentives, writers across the country are bringing the concept to task. The writings frequently include a listing of horror stories about corporations which did not do what they promised and left the community hanging, or the incentives took something critical away from essential government services -- often the schools. There is also a growing awareness that taxing one business to subsidize a competitor is simply wrong and a misuse of the power of government.

Not only are incentive packages ineffective and open to rife abuses, but they are terribly unjust. A city taxes business. It then uses some of that tax money to lure outside companies. Every business in the city thus contributes to its own potential harm by subsidizing its competition. Incentives - crazed politicians don't seem to realize that businesses compete for more than customers. They compete for a limited pool of qualified employees, land, shopping mall space, and so on. (App 311)

In short, there is no economic crisis, or even any sign of economic distress, to justify the local governments in this case in interfering in the free enterprise system and using tax funds to bribe corporations to locate or expand. Although our adversaries argue to the contrary, there is not one whit of competent evidence in this case which shows, or even suggests, either that their projects resulted in a net good for the community or that they were otherwise needed. Judge Rousseau, having carefully considered all the evidence, concluded:

No evidence was presented that the incentives paid or committed by the City and County improved the unemployment rate or that they otherwise resulted in meaningful economic enhancement. No evidence was presented that the incentive grants made by the City and County reduced the net cost of government or resulted in a reduction in the amount or rate of property taxes paid by, or the level of services rendered to, the Citizens of Winston-Salem and/or Forsyth County. (R p 193)

It is not meaningful to talk about increased tax revenues without talking about the increased costs of government, or about the number of jobs lost unless we also talk about the number of jobs gained during the same period of time. Indeed, the statistics from the Department of Labor introduced by plaintiff show that the unemployment rate in Forsyth County has hovered around 4% during all of the times in question. (R p 192; PX 147, App 213 - 221) In view of full employment, when our adversaries speak of "new jobs" they are in fact speaking of shifting of jobs from one local industry to another. And obviously, the shifting of jobs is to the "new industry" which is able to lure employees away from established industries with the use of tax funds supplied in part by the established industries.

The only crisis of any sort before this Court is not economic. It arises out of the fact that over the past several years we have created a new industry in this State, i.e., the industry of "economic development", involving people whose jobs and offices exist for the purpose of promoting other businesses. The people who clamor for government incentives are too often in the business of locating industries. They are paid a fee or commission out of the incentive tax dollars, or their livelihood is dependent on the funneling of such public moneys. They are therefore in favor of incentives. In fact, there is no better manifestation of this new industry than the amici briefs filed in this case.

We respectfully submit that both wisdom and stare decisis require that § 158-7.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes be declared unconstitutional because it violates Article V, Section 2 of our Constitution. Our people, with whom the covenant of government is made, have voted three times on the issue; in adopting the Constitution of 1868, in the rewrite of the Constitution in 1970 and in the resounding vote of the people on November 2, 1993 which emphatically defeated the idea.

Economic incentives as done in this case are unconstitutional, illegal, wrong, unfair and simply bad government

[...]
[Contents]

CONCLUSION


For the reasons cited herein, this Court should affirm the trial court's factual determinations and its determination that G.S. § 158-7.1 is unconstitutional.

This the 2nd day of January, 1996.
                     William F. Maready              							                                                                                   PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE          
                     AND CROSS-APPELLANT                 

                                  
                     Michael L. Robinson                				                     State Bar No. 9438                  

                     ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
                     AND CROSS-APPELLANT
	                     

OF COUNSEL:

ROBINSON MAREADY LAWING & COMERFORD, L.L.P.
370 Knollwood Street, Suite 600
Winston-Salem, NC 27103
Telephone:	(910) 631-8500
Telecopy:		(910) 631-6999




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