DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR-APPELLANT STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA'S BRIEF
Table of Cases and Authorities
Statement of the Case
Statement of the Facts
I. The trial court erred in holding
that N.C.G.S.§ 158-7.1 allows the expenditure of public funds for private
purposes in violatino of the North Carolina Constitution.
Summary of State's Argument
A. N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 authorizes cities and counties to
engage in economic development activities.
D. The presentcase is distinguishable from Mitchell v. Financing Authority
and Stanley v. Department of Conservation and Development.
B. N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 is invalid only if it is shown to be unconstitutional
byond any reasonable doubt under the settled caselaw in North Carolina,
N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 is constitutional.
1. Under This Court's Traditional Test of Public Purpose, Public
Expenditures are Constitutional When They are Designed to Provide an Ultimate
Benefit to the Public.
2. N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 is Constitutional Because
it is Designed to Help Local Governments Promote Commerce and Create Employment.
a. N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 Promotes
b. The Economic Development Expenditures Authorized
By N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 are an Indispensable Part of North Carolina's
Struggle for Industry and Jobs.
c. The Economic Development Expenditures Authorized
by N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 Serve the Public Purpose of Creating Employment.
d. Economic Development Expenditures Advance Other
Important Public Interests.
e. The Recruitment of Bristol Compressors to Alleghany
County Demonstrates the Public Purpose of N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1.
E. If MItchell and Stanley are not distinguishable,
they should be overruled
1. The People of North Carolina Have
Made it Clear that They Believe Public Investment in EconomicDevelopment
is a Desired Public Purpose
II. The trial court committed error in holding that even if N.C.G.S. §
158-7.1 meets the public purpose test of the North Carolina Constitution,
that it is nevertheless unconstitutional on the ground that it is impermissinbly
vague and ambiguous, is without reasonably objective standards and is incapable
of reasonably certain interpretation
a. Constitutional Amendments
2. A Broad Interpretation of Mitchell is in Conflict with all the Caselaw
in the Other States
b. Legislative Enactments
3. Mitchell Erroneously Equates "Public Purpose" with n Public
4. Today's North Carolinians Live in a Global Economy
Certificate of Service
I. Did the trial court commit error in holding that N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1
impermissibly allows the expenditure of public funds for private purposes
in violation of the North Carolina Constitution?
II. Did the trail court commit error in holding that even if N.C.G.S. §
158-7.1 meets the public purpose test of the North Carolina Constitutino,
it is impermissibly vague and ambiguous?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State of North Carolina, ex ref. Michael F. Easley as Attorney General
("State"), adopts the Statement of the Case set out in the joint
brief of the defendant-appellants the City of Winston-Salem, the Board of
Aldermen of the City of Winston-Salem, Forsyth County, the Board of County
Commissioners of Forsyth County and Winston-Salem Business, Inc. (collectively
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State adopts the Statement of the Facts set out in the joint brief of
the original defendants.
The people of North Carolina and their elected representatives in the General
Assembly have repeatedly and unmistakably declared economic development
to be a public purpose. N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 authorizes local governments
to use economic investments to attract and retain business and jobs. This
statute is one of the means the General Assembly has chosen and approved
to pursue the recognized public purpose of economic development. When local
governments seek to attract business, they do so for the public purpose
of creating employment opportunities and economic growth in their communities.
The use of economic investments to recruit business is not inconsistent
with this public purpose.
Under settled caselaw from this Court and all other jurisdictions, public
investments in economic development are constitutional if they primarily
benefit the public and provide only an incidental benefit to any private
entity. The State can be assured that local government expenditures authorized
by N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 are constitutional so long as they: (1) are for
the purpose of aiding, encouraging or locating new business; (2) are related
to business to be located in or near the area served by the local government;
(3) are reasonably calculated to enhance employment opportunities and the
tax base in the community served; (4) are reasonably expected to provide
a net long term gain to the local economy and government; and (5) the projected
public benefits are expected substantially to outweigh any anticipated private
The State intervened in this case because an adverse ruling would cripple
economic development programs pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 not only
in Forsyth County, but all across North Carolina. North Carolina would no
longer be able to compete with other states and countries in the global
economy. N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 is crucial to the general economic welfare
of North Carolina; the State therefore has an overriding interest in defending
this statute. Accordingly, this brief will address plaintiff's claim that
N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 is unconstitutional on its face.
I. The trial court erred in holding that N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 allows
the expenditure of public funds for private purposes in violation of the
North Carolina Constitution.
Assignment of Error No. 3 (R. p. 211)
SUMMARY OF STATE'S ARGUMENT
The trial court below held that N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 violates Art. 5,
§ 2(1), the "public purpose" clause of the North Carolina
Constitution, because that statute allows "the expenditure of public
funds for private purposes." (R. p. 195) However, N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1
does not authorize the expenditure of public money for merely private purposes.
Instead, the statute authorizes counties and cities to make investment expenditures
designed for the primarily public purposes of promoting commerce, creating
jobs, and expanding tax bases. Under North Carolina caselaw, public expenditures
are constitutional when they are intended primarily to benefit the public,
even though incidental benefit to private interests also may result. Therefore,
the expenditures authorized by N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 are for a public
purpose and are constitutional.
2. N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 is Constitutional Because it is Designed to
Help Local Governments Promote Commerce and Create Employment.
The General Assembly has clearly declared the public purposes of N.C.G.S.
§ 158-7.1. Subsection (a) provides that each county and city may make
appropriations "for the purposes 't of promoting industrial development
and "other purposes" that will n increase the ... taxable property,
agricultural industries and business prospects of any county or city."
Under subsection (d2)(1), the county or city must determine that the conveyance
of property will result in the creation of a substantial number of jobs
that pay at or above the median average wage of the county or city. Thus,
the purposes of N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 are to help local governments promote
commerce and fight unemployment. Since these are purposes which benefit
the public generally, N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 serves a public purpose and
is constitutional even though incidental benefit to private interest may
result from expenditures under the statute. The private interests are merely
the means through which the greater public advantage is accomplished.
a. N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 Promotes Local Commerce.
As George Watts Carr, III, explains in his affidavit, economic development
expenditures are not giveaways to private industry; they are investments.
In my experience in business and government in North Carolina,
I have never seen a business incentive that was a "gift" to a
private company. . . . Business incentives help counties and cities recruit
commerce and jobs to North Carolina and expand tax bases, thus reducing
unemployment and increasing wealth and reinvestment. Recruitment of industry
and commerce is particularly crucial in North Carolina, which historically
has been industrially underdeveloped and poor compared with most other states.
As Mr. Carr shows, when a county or city invests in its economic future
by making incentive expenditures to recruit a business or industry, that
business or industry repays the investment not only by virtue of an expanded
tax base and jobs directly created but also indirectly by virtue of what
economists call the "multiplier" or "ripple" effect.
Newly recruited businesses and industries generate "multiplied"
commerce by requiring additional material and labor from existing industry.
For example, for each additional job created in the textile industry, almost
two additional indirect, or "multiplied," jobs are created. (R.
p. 148, State's ex. 1, pp. 3-4.) Obviously, those "multiplied. jobs
constitute increased wealth to the community. Therefore, when a city or
county makes economic development expenditures under N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1
to recruit, or retain, an industry or business, it makes a sound investment
with far-reaching return in job and wealth creation.
b. The Economic Development Expenditures Authorized by N.C.G.S. §
158-7.1 are an Indispensable Part of North Carolina s Struggle for Industry
As Mr. Carr explains, the states, counties and cities of our nation are
competing fiercely for investment, commerce and jobs. In doing so, North
Carolina's counties and cities must compete against the development investments
offered by other states. Mr. Carr says:
North Carolina's towns and counties must compete for commerce,
investment and jobs against . . . business incentives offered in the other
states. How can North Carolina's counties and cities compete if they are
the only counties and cities which cannot offer business incentives? The
answer is they cannot. Even if business incentives were wrong, which they
are not, to ask North Carolina's counties and cities to stand alone in not
offering business incentives is like asking one nation in the world to unilaterally
disarm. It has not happened recently.
(R. p. 148, State's ex. 1, p. 5.)
Moreover, North Carolina already offers fewer economic development incentives
than competing states. That fact makes it all the more important that North
Carolina's counties and cities have the authority to make economic development
expenditures. Mr. Carr attached to his affidavit a chart comparing North
Carolina, Virginia, South Carolina and Georgia in terms of 16 important
development investment categories. The chart shows, for example, that North
Carolina offers incentives in only eight of the 16 categories. By comparison,
Virginia offers incentives in 1S categories. (R. p. 148, State s ex. 1,
ex. c.). Mr. Carr concludes that if plaintiff prevails in this suit, the
people of North Carolina will be at a crippling disadvantage in competing
for commerce and jobs.
c.The Economic Development Expenditures Authorized by N.C.G.S. §
158-7.1 Serve the Public Purpose of Creating Employment.
By attracting and creating jobs, the development investments authorized
by N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 combat unemployment. Combatting unemployment
serves a public purpose because of the enormous costs unemployment imposes
on society, as is shown in the Affidavit of Dr. John Edward Connaughton.
As Dr. Connaughton explains, unemployment imposes costs in several ways.
First, the people of the state must pay maintenance benefits to unemployed
persons. Second, the community and state lose the value of the goods and
services the unemployed persons would have produced had they held jobs.
Third, people pay a cost in community stress. (R. p. 148, State's ex. 4,
pp. 1-2.) Data published by federal and state agencies forcefully suggest
that unemployment is at least one cause of poverty. Both the federal and
state data show strong correlations, over many years, between unemployment
and poverty. (R. p. 148, State's ex. 4, pp. 3-4.) Dr. Connaughton concludes:
Since unemployment imposes such tremendous costs upon society, and since
unemployment plainly correlates so strikingly with poverty, it is evident
that policies and measures that communities can take to bring in jobs to
erase unemployment are in the public interest. (R. p. 148, State's ex. 4,
Clearly, the economic development expenditures authorized by N.C.G.S. §
158-7.1 are among the measures counties and cities can take to erase unemployment,
and therefore these expenditures serve a public purpose.
d. Economic Development Expenditures Advance Other Important Public Interests.
Plaintiff contended before the trial court that the economic development
expenditures authorized by N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 disrupt natural market
forces and subvert market efficiency. (R. p. 141, plaintiff's ex. 101.)
However, as Mr. Carr explains in his affidavit, there are other important
interests besides market efficiency that states, counties and cities rationally
may wish to promote through the use of economic development investments.
For example, North Carolina currently offers a job tax credit of up to $2,800
for each additional job created in one of the State's severely distressed
counties by a business with more than nine employees. The General Assembly
also appropriated $6.3 million for the fiscal year 1993-94 to the North
Carolina Community College System to train workers in new and expanding
industries. Surely, development investments that train workers and encourage
commerce and employment in severely distressed counties serve important
public purposes, even if those interests are not
wholly harmonious with market efficiency.
As Dr. Connaughton forcefully explains:
I am aware that some opponents of business incentives oppose
them on the ground that they are inefficient and disrupt natural market
forces. However, in my opinion as an economist, market efficiency, though
certainly an important interest, is but one competing interest among many
in our society. If market efficiency would dictate that every manufacturing
enterprise in North Carolina must be located within 30 miles of Raleigh,
Winston-Salem, Greensboro, Charlotte or Wilmington (in order to be close
to interstate transportation hubs and markets), would this be in the best
interests of the citizens of the rest of North Carolina's counties? Must
they, in order to secure well-paying jobs, uproot and flood into the already
overcrowded metropolitan areas? Will the people of North Carolina be better
off in the aggregate if tens of thousands of citizens of Alleghany, Anson
and Warren counties must abandon their homes and move to Charlotte, Greensboro
and Wake County in the interest of market efficiency?
(R. p. 148, State's ex. 4, pp. 4-5.)
Such clustering will predictably impose enormous stress on our present system
of allocating natural resources such as water. We have all read how Virginia
Beach outstripped its water supplies in Virginia. Is it in North Carolina's
broader interests to create congested clusters of commerce surrounded by
deserts of lack of opportunity? I think not.
N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 does not force any county or city to make economic
development investments. A rural community that wishes to stay rural may
do so. However, a county or city that wishes to diversify its economy by
recruiting commerce through economic development expenditures should have
the right to do so. As Mr. Carr states in his affidavit: "A city or
county may wish to invest in its schools, libraries and parks for the good
of the community. However, a county or city may, just as rationally, wish
to invest in commerce and jobs by means of recruiting commerce with economic
development incentives." (R. p. 148, State's ex. 8.)
If plaintiff wins this lawsuit, counties and cities in North Carolina that
want new commerce and expanded job opportunities will have to wait until
that commerce finds them. On the other hand, N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 empowers
counties and communities to invest and to forge their economic destinies
In his affidavit, Mr. Carr points out that local development investments
also advance the important purpose of helping the industry or business find
the county or city that wants it. As Mr. Carr says:
In my experience, a company prefers to locate in a community
where the people want it and make it welcome. It just makes common sense
that the company and the community are better off when they want each other.
By virtue of the local incentives authorized under N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1,
North Carolina's counties and cities may demonstrate plainly to a company
that they want the company.
Moreover, without the investment incentives authorized by N.C.G.S. §
158-7.1, communities promoting commerce will be forced to rely on private
sector assistance, which favors the wealthier urban areas. In other words,
without N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1, the economic gap between the urban and
rural areas of North Carolina will likely widen. Government is the instrument
by which citizens undertake collective action. Plaintiff's instant lawsuit
threatens to sabotage the collective efforts of citizens in North Carolina's
rural and poorer communities to invest to improve their economic lots.
Finally, plaintiff argued in the trial court that sometimes business incentive
deals do not work out perfectly. (See T. pp. 51-57.) However, Mr. Carr explains
that this argument is invalid because business incentive deals
. . . are made in the same imperfect world as all other business
deals--by businessmen whose view into the future is not clairvoyant. As
I learned in over twenty-five years as a businessman, sometimes the most
carefully crafted business deal fails, and not even the shrewdest businessman
succeeds in every business venture.
(R. p. 148; State's ex. 1, p. 8.)
e. The Recruitment of Bristol Compressors to Alleghany County Demonstrates
the Public Purpose of N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1.
Alleghany County is one example of a community that seized its economic
destiny in its hands with the help of N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1, as is shown
in the affidavit of Dr. Edward M. Bergman. (R. p. 148, State's ex. 5.) The
North Carolina Department of Commerce had classified Alleghany County as
a severely distressed county. In 1990, Alleghany County's per capital personal
income averaged $12,951, while the State's averaged $16,266. Alleghany's
poverty rate hovered around 20 percent, while the State's averaged 13 percent.
(R. p. 148, State s ex. 5, pp. 2-3.) There was a severe shortage of jobs
in the county, and the tax base was deteriorating. (R. p. 148, State's ex.
5, pp. 4-5.)
In order to fight the decline of their community, the people of Alleghany
County recruited Bristol Compressors, which manufactures air conditioner
compressors. (R. p. 148, State's ex. 6.) Alleghany County expects 750 jobs
in 10 years from Bristol Compressors, and an increase in the tax base of
$40 million. The Bristol Compressors recruitment already has proved a success
in Alleghany County. Gross retail sales have leaped, and the tax base of
the county has increased as well. (R. p. 148, State's ex. 5, pp. 5-6.)
Dr. Bergman concludes that Alleghany's citizens made a sound investment
when they recruited Bristol Compressors, stating: "The community benefits
from the increased commerce, infrastructure improvement, economic diversification,
and workforce development that has accompanied the arrival of Bristol Compressors."
(R. p. 148, State's ex. 5, p. 6.)
Bristol Compressors would not have come to Alleghany County without local
investments. Jeff Flattery, vice president of operations of Bristol Compressors
in Alleghany County, states in his affidavit as follows:
The [local business] incentives demonstrated that the local
community was united in their desire to have Bristol Compressors locate
its new facility in Alleghany County, North Carolina. In the absence of
a competitive local incentive package, Bristol Compressors would not have
considered locating in Alleghany County.
(R. p. 148, State's ex. 7.)
Thus, the economic boom that Bristol Compressors represents for Alleghany
County could never have come about without the local economic development
investments authorized by N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1. It is a good example
of how the statute is designed to benefit the public generally and how important
it can be to the quality of life in North Carolina's communities.
If plaintiff's lawsuit succeeds, future success stories such as Bristol
Compressors in Alleghany county will e thwarted. As Dr. Bergman concludes
in his affidavit: "It is my professional opinion that local incentives,
when used carefully and prudently, can benefit a community enormously. Apparently,
Mr. Maready's lawsuit threatens to strip North Carolina's cities and counties
of a reasonable tool for promoting their economic well-being." (R.
p. 148, State's ex. 5, p. 8.)
E. If Mitchell and Stanley are Not Distinguishable,They Should Be Overruled.
1. The People of North Carolina Have Made it Plain That They Believe Public
Investment in Economic Development is a Desired Public Purpose.
Plaintiff contends that it is not the business of government to expend public
money to attract or retain commerce and industry. (See T. pp. 274, 421.)
However, in a democratic society the people properly determine the purposes
of government, and since Mitchell and Stanley the people of North Carolina
have made it clear by virtue of (a) constitutional amendments and (b) legislative
enactments that they want State and local governments to have the power
to invest in job creation and economic development.
a. Constitutional Amendments:
In 1976 the voters approved Art. 5, § 9 of the North Carolina Constitution,
empowering the General Assembly to authorize counties to issue revenue bonds
to finance the cost of capital projects consisting of industrial, manufacturing
and pollution control facilities. This amendment abrogated Mitchell and
Stanley. Also in 1976, the voters approved Art. 5, § 8 of the Constitution,
allowing the General Assembly to authorize State and local governments to
issue revenue bonds to finance for "any . . . private corporation n
the cost of health care facility projects that "serve and benefit the
public." This amendment abrogated Foster v. Medical Care Commission,
283 N.C. 110, 195 S.E.2d 517 (1973). In Foster, the Court had held that
the expenditure of public funds to finance privately-owned hospital facilities
violated the "public purpose" clause of the North Carolina Constitution,
and struck down the statute that authorized such expenditures.
Thus, the voters of North Carolina nullified by constitutional amendment
Mitchell, Stanley and Foster, the three major cases since 1968 in which
an expenditure of public money was held to violate the public purpose clause.
In 1984, the voters approved Art. 5, § 11 of the Constitution authorizing
the issuance of revenue bonds to finance the cost of capital projects consisting
of agricultural facilities. Finally, in 1986, the voters approved Art. 5
§, 13, authorizing the General Assembly to grant to State and local
governments "all powers useful" to develop seaports and airports
and authorizing such public bodies, among other things, to finance and refinance
private parties to accomplish such development.
b. Legislative Enactments:
The best evidence of the public's strong and enduring support for public
investment in industrial development is N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 itself.
The genesis of this statute lies in the Local Development Act of 1925, N.C.
Sessions Laws, Chapter 33, titled 'An Act to Aid in the Development of Any
City, Incorporated Town or City. This enactment contained the essential
provisions of current subsection (a) of the statute. In 1985, the General
Assembly amended N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 by designating the existing statute
as subsection (a) and adding new subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f).
In 1991, the General Assembly added what is now subsection (d2). In 1993,
the General Assembly added subdivisions (b)(6), (b)(7) and (d2)(1) and expanded
subsection (f). Thus, in the last 10 years the people, through their elected
representative in the General Assembly, three times revisited and substantially
expanded N.C.G.S. ~ 158-7.1. Each time, they reaffirmed the public purpose
served by the local economic development goals of the statute.
In addition to N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1, since Mitchell and Stanley the General
Assembly has enacted numerous tax credits and programs to promote commerce,
industrial development and job creation. For example, in 1987 the General
Assembly enacted N.C.G.S. §§ 105-130.40 and 105-151.17, which
provide income tax credits of up to $2,800 for each additional job created
in a severely distressed county by a business of more than nine employees.
In 1993, the General Assembly enacted N.C.G.S. § 143B-437A, creating
the Industrial Development Fund and making funds available, among other
things, for the construction of water, sewer, gas and electric lines for
existing industrial buildings for qualified industrial operations, and for
the repair, improvement or renovations of industrial buildings for qualified
industries in North Carolina s most distressed counties. Funds available
for a single project are based on the number of jobs committed to the project
times $2,400 up to a maximum of $250,000 per project.
In 1991 the General Assembly enacted N.C.G.S. §§ 105-130.41 and
105-151.22, providing tax credits to North Carolinians utilizing North Carolina
s deep-water ports at Morehead City and Wilmington for exports. The intent
of this legislation was to attract port business for Morehead City and Wilmington
that was going to out-of-state ports. (R. p. 148; State's exs. 2-3.) The
N.C. Ports Authority's 1994-1995 Annual Reports to the General Assembly
show that the Ports Authority tax credits have prompted substantial increased
shipping through Wilmington. For example, the 1995 report shows an additional
2,727 new statewide jobs, $68,557,301 additional income ~o North Carolinians
and additional State and local taxes of $9,075,411 resulting from the tax
credits. (R. p. 148; State's exs. 10-11.)
In 1989, the General Assembly enacted N.C.G.S. §§ 105-163.010
to -163.014, providing tax credits for qualified business investments, allowing
tax credits to individuals and corporations that invest in qualified North
North Carolina continues to invest in training its workers by appropriating
funds to the Community College Industrial Training Program.
Furthermore, locally elected representatives for scores of cities and counties
in North Carolina have made economic development investments pursuant to
N.C.G.S. ~ 158-7.1 and thus believe the statute serves a public purpose
in their communities. (R. pp. 144-46, original defendant's exs. 2-33.) As
a final example of a public investment in commerce, in 1993 the General
Assembly appropriated $5 million for the 1993-94 fiscal year to establish
the Industrial Recruitment Competitive Fund. See Session Laws 1993, c. 321,
s. 314.3. The purpose of the fund is to provide financial assistance to
businesses or industry deemed by the Governor to be vital to North Carolina's
economy. In 1995, the General Assembly renewed this program, albeit at a
lower funding level.
There can be no doubt that through the above constitutional amendments and
legislative enactments since Mitchell and Stanley, the people of North Carolina
have made it clear that they consider public investments in job creation
and industrial development to be a proper function of government.
4. Today's North Carolinians Live in a Global Economy.
Both the majority and dissent in Mitchell recognized that the concept of
"public purpose" is not amenable to a precise slide-rule definition,
but rather evolves with changing times and conditions. In 1995, the people
of North Carolina live in a global economy and need a definition of the
"public purpose" clause that allows the expenditure of public
funds for the purpose of economic development and job and wealth creation.
As Justice (later Chief Justice) Parker wrote in his trenchant dissent in
North Carolina is no longer a predominantly agricultural community.
we are developing from an agrarian economy to an agrarian and industrial
economy. North Carolina is having to compete with the complex industrial,
technical, and scientific communities that are more and more representative
of a nation-wide trend.
All men know that in our efforts to attract new industry we are competing
with inducements to industry offered through legislative enactments in other
jurisdictions as stated in the legislative findings and purposes of this
challenged Act. It is manifest that the establishment of new industry in
North Carolina will enrich a whole class of citizens who work for it, will
increase the per capita income of our citizens, will mean more money for
the public treasury, more money for our schools and for payment of our school
teachers, more money for the operation of our hospitals like the John Umstead
Hospital at Butner, and for other necessary expenses of government. This
to my mind is clearly the business of government in the jet age in which
we are living.
Justice Parker was right, and this Court should hold N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1
For the reasons set out above, this Court should reverse the trial court's
conclusion that N.C.G.S. § 158-7.1 is unconstitutional. Instead, this
Court should hold (1) that that the statute does not violate the "public
purposes" clause of Art. 5, § 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution
because it authorizes expenditures that have the object of conferring an
ultimate net advantage upon the public, even though benefit to private interests
may incidentally result, and (2) that the statute is neither vague and ambiguous,
nor without reasonably objective standards, nor incapable of reasonably
Respectfully submitted, this the 4th day of December, 1995.
MICHAEL F. EASLEY
John R. McArthur
Andrew A. Vanore, Jr.
Chief Deputy Attorney General
W. Wallace Finlator, Jr,
Assitant Attorney General
Jane T. Friedensen
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State of North Carolina
Post Office Box 629
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602-0629
Telephone: (919) 733-6118
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