RIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
MAURICE AND JANE SUGAR LAW CENTER
FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE,
CORPORATION FOR ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT,
SHARE THE WEALTH,
FEDERATION FOR INDUSTRIAL RETENTION AND RENEWAL, AND
GRASSROOTS POLICY PROJECT
Table of Contents
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENTS OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
II. INCENTIVES DO NOT SERVE A PUBLIC PURPOSE UNLESS
THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY THAT THE INTENDED BENEFITS WILL BE OBTAINED
BY THE PUBLIC
A. The Public Purpose Doctrine evolved
as a mechanism to ensure that public interests would be protected
B. A Public Purpose exists only where the public
interest can be enforced
Statements of Interest of Amici Curiae
THE CORPORATION FOR ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT (CFED) is an independent, nonpartisan,
national nonprofit organization which provides policy, research, consulting
and technical assistance services to promote quality and effectiveness in
the policy and practice of economic development. In 1994, CFED published
a widely acclaimed report, Bidding for Business: Are Cities And States Selling
Themselves Short? - an assessment of the uses and abuses of development
incentives for recruiting relocating companies.
CFED's position is that if state and local governments must use development
incentives, there should be greater accountability and openness, with clear
and measurable public benefits, legally enforceable contracts, and full
disclosure of contract terms. Ideally, taxpayer money should be used not
on corporate subsidies and tax breaks but on improving the essential infrastructure
and services which create a climate conducive to business success.
THE CALUMET PROJECT FOR INDUSTRIAL JOBS is a labor-community coalition dedicated
to preserving industrial, well paying jobs in northwest Indiana by bringing
to the table labor, community and church voices when economic decisions
are made for the region. The Calumet Project for Industrial Jobs was involved
in the efforts to get Indiana state law changed and an ordinance passed
in Gary, Indiana, which curbs abuses of tax abatements. One of its board
members, Associate Professor Bruce Nissen, Indiana University Northwest,
has co-authored an article on the issue of incentives, For the Public Good:
Calumet Project Organizes for Labor and Community Based Economic Development,
Labor Research No. 19 (Fall 1992).
SHARE THE WEALTH is a national organization, based in Boston, concerned
about the growth in wage, income and wealth inequality and its dangerous
consequences for our economy, democracy and culture. Share the Wealth has
over 800 individual and organizational members active in addressing these
inequities through education, legislation and direct action.
Share the Wealth is concerned about the growing amount of unproductive subsidies
flowing from state, local and federal governments to private corporations
and its negative effects on the economy. We are especially concerned with
the growing amount of public funds which are being used to subsidize private
corporations without discernible benefit to the public interest. We believe
this case had national implications for many of the citizen organizations
we work with who are concerned about greater accountability in the use of
THE GRASSROOTS POLICY PROJECT (GPP) provides public policy research related
to jobs creation and retention for grassroots- based organizations. GPP
contends that public investment in the private sector can be useful tools
for creating good quality, living-waged jobs. However, rather than providing
more and better job opportunities, current no-strings-attached subsidy practices
often exacerbate the loss of quality jobs and public services, as powerful
corporations bargain for lower taxes, relaxed environmental standards and
lower wages. In most cases, recipients are not compelled to create significant
numbers of new jobs in return, and failure to provide those promised goes
without remedy. Last year, along with the Federation for Industrial Retention
and Renewal, GPP released a report detailing recent accountability measures
that have been passed by several cities and states. By placing strict conditions
upon public subsidies, these initiatives help to bring the interest of the
public back into public investment policies.
GPP strenuously objects to the ways in which no-stings- attached subsidies
allow corporations to use public investments for purposes that do not advance
the interest of the public. Therefore, GPP's interest in this case is to
ensure that said investments result in direct and measurable benefits for
the public in terms of jobs creation, enhanced revenues, community revitalization
and that they contain appropriate accountability mechanisms.
THE MAURICE AND JANE SUGAR LAW CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (Guild/Sugar
Law Center) is a national public interest litigation and policy center that
has concentrated its resources in the areas of corporate accountability
and community revitalization, plant closings and mass layoffs (particularly
under the Workers Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act) and environmental
justice. Beginning in 1995 the Guild/Sugar Law Center began its Corporate
Accountability and Community Revitalization Project aimed at assisting governmental
bodies and community groups involved with subsidy negotiations with companies.
Also, as the national clearinghouse and experts on WARN Act litigation,
the Sugar Law Center represents hundreds of workers directly and thousands
more indirectly who have suffered employment losses, often due to relocation.
THE FEDERATION FOR INDUSTRIAL RETENTION AND RENEWAL (FIRR) is a national
association of 33 community based and technical assistance organizations
located in 29 cities. FIRR joins this brief because it is a part of our
organizational mission to promote socially responsible economic development
in communities throughout the country, and because we are especially concerned
about the role subsidy practices promoted by N.C. Gen. Stat. §158-7.1
play in degrading community social standards nationwide. These practices
stimulate subsidy gift competition between communities that have eroded
public investment in valuable economic resources, such as education, public
services, and infrastructure while offering little in the way of economic
or community development.
Amici hereby refer the Court to the statement of facts set forth in Plaintiff-Appellee's
main brief which thoroughly sets forth the circumstances which gave rise
to this lawsuit. Significantly, this case involves the constitutionality
of a statute, N. C. Gen. Stat. § 158-7.1, which has acted as the means
by which the Winston-Salem Business, Inc. ("WSBI"), a private
corporation established by private individuals in Forsyth County, has been
able to use taxpayer money, primarily obtained in the form of property taxes
levied by the City and County on property owners in Winston-Salem and Forsyth
County, for the profit of private corporations with no guarantees or requirements
that such giveaways benefit the public in any appreciable way. This statute
violates Article VI, Section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution which
The power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner,
for public purposes only, and shall never be surrendered, suspended or contracted
See Mitchell v. Housing Authority, 273 N.C. 127, 159 S.E.d2d 745 (1968).
II. Incentives Do Not Serve a Public Purpose Unless There is
a Substantial Certainty that the Intended Benefits Will Be Obtained by the
A. Public Purpose Doctrine evolved as a mechanism to ensure that public
interests would be protected.
Restrictions and concerns over the allocation of public funds to aid solely
or primarily private interests predate the development of the public purpose
doctrine and emphasize the important role which this concept, as exemplified
in this doctrine, has played in defining the scope and purposes of our political
institutions. An historical recount of the public purpose doctrine and its
significance in our democratic form of government is instructive in resolution
of the dispute before this Court.
Although the concept of 'public purpose' was not fashioned during colonial
times, conceptual antecedents of the doctrine were evident even then. Constraints
on public spending during this era were considered to be best effectuated
through the establishment of a representative legislature which was intended,
inter alia, to serve as a check on what was commonly conceded as the unmitigated
taxing power of the legislature. [See Dale F. Rubin, The Public Pays, The
Corporation Profits: The Emasculation of the Public Purpose Doctrine and
a Not-For-Profit Solution, 28 U. Rich L.Rev. 1311, 1321 (1994) (hereinafter
"The Public Pays").]
It was believed that the vigilance of the constituency and self- interest
of elected officials would protect private property interests from legislative
abuse of the taxing power for private endeavors. Id. Also, prior to articulation
and application of the 'public purpose' doctrine as we know it, courts had
begun to address issues involving government taxation for seemingly non-
public purposes. Thus, for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
in Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181 (1804), denied the levy of local parish taxes
for purposes of incorporation of the parish as a town. And in Spaulding
v. City of Lowell, 40 Mass. (23 Pick) 71 (1839), the court declined to uphold
the authority of a town to levy taxes for the construction of a public market
place on the grounds that such a expenditure was not a "necessary charge,"
within the "prudential concern" of the town. Id. at 76- 78. As
one scholar has noted:
Substituting the term "public purpose" for either
"prudential concerns" or "necessary charges" would not
have altered the context in which the limitation of the power of government
to tax was discussed. These conceptual precedents to the Public Purpose
Doctrine also support the proposition that current government expenditures
should be carefully scrutinized to insure they fulfill public purposes.
See The Public Pays, 28 U. Rich L.Rev. at 1324 (1994).
The public purpose doctrine was first announced in the nineteenth century
during an era of massive public financing of infrastructure, usually through
private entities. See Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public
Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 265, 277- 81 (1963). Mark Taylor, A Proposal to Prohibit Industrial
Relocation Subsidies, 72 Texas L. Rev. 669, 671-675 (1994). Expenditures
by state and local governments for the construction of railroads, turnpikes,
bridges, canals, ports and related facilities were generally upheld by courts
as obvious public purposes. Id.
The seminal case upholding internal improvement expenditures to private
corporations and first pronouncing the doctrine of public purpose was Sharpless
v. City of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853). Sharpless involved the spending
of public funds to purchase railroad stock subscriptions, thus aiding the
development of the railroad in Philadelphia. Prompted by economic concerns,
the court denied an injunction to prohibit the purchase as violative of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, since the constitution did not expressly
prohibit such an expenditure. However, the court tempered its decision with
language which has come to be known as the public purpose doctrine:
Neither has the legislature any constitutional right to create
a public debt, or to lay a tax, or to authorize any municipal corporation
to do it, in order to raise funds for a mere private purpose. No such authority
passed to the Assembly by the general grant of legislative power. This would
not be legislation. Taxation is a mode of raising revenue for public purposes.
When it is prostituted to objects no way connected with the public interest
or welfare, it ceases to be taxation, and becomes plunder. Id. at 168-169.
The Sharpless court set the parameters of reasoning for later decisions
applying the doctrine to infrastructure financing using public funds. More
significantly, Justice Black, in Sharpless, expounded on the boundaries
of the public purpose doctrine, expanding it beyond the limits of infrastructure
improvements. He was content to define a public purpose in terms of the
"ultimate use, purpose and object for which the fund is raised"
and embrace the stimulation and aid of commerce as a proper function of
the government. Id. at 169-170. Black was clear that the means employed,
public or private, was irrelevant for public purpose considerations. Id.
Those courts which disagreed with Sharpless' recognized an incongruity between
the hoped for "material prosperity" for a subject community, and
the business itself which was organized "solely to make money for .
. . stockholders." Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 53 (1869). See The
Public Pays, 28 U. Rich L.Rev. at 1329. In Hanson, for example, the court
held that legislation allowing local governments to levy and collect taxes
for aid to railroads was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Dillon recognized
that any incidental benefits which would accrue to the community as a result
of the railroad could not transform an otherwise private expenditure into
an expense for a public purpose. He reasoned that if taxing and spending
for incidental benefits to the community were constitutional, "who
indeed, could define the logical boundaries to this doctrine?...[A]griculture,
commerce, the mechanic arts,....every department of labor and every industrial
pursuit" would be worthy of public money as they too advance the "public
prosperity." Id. at 58-59.
Outside of the internal improvement realm, the United States Supreme Court
had an opportunity, in Citizen Savings and Loan Association v. Topeka, 87
U.S. 655 (1874), to examine the issue. Martin E. Gold, Economic Development
Projects: A Perspective, 19 Urb. Law 193, 220-205 (1987) (hereinafter "Economic
Development Projects"). The Court held that bonds issued to provide
financial assistance to an ironworks factory did not serve a public purpose,
based upon the common law, despite the favorable impact that the court conceded
would flow to the local economy from employment and revenues. 87 U.S. at
665. Like opposition to the railroad subsidies, the Court, and others, opposed
narrowly designed subsidies designed to benefit one beneficiary. See Opinion
of the Justices, 58 Me. 590, 603 (1871) (its "direct purpose (is) private
in its character; it is to increase the means and improve the property of
some, and furnish employment to some, while the benefit, if any, to the
public is only reflective, incidental or secondary"); Weismer v. Village
of Douglas, 64 N.Y. 91 (1876) (not allowing town to borrow money to purchase
stock in mill).
Despite its repeated use as a safeguard against abuses of the public purse,
the public purpose doctrine would soon lose this distinction as economic
times worsened. In cases of public aid to private companies for internal
improvements, which was prevalent during the nineteenth century, courts
readily perceived the general public benefits to be received from development
of a state's or municipality's infrastructure, irrespective of the private
means of improvement employed. See Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss.
75, 178 So. 799, dismissed on appeal, 303 U.S. 627 (1938) (allowing municipalities
to issue general obligation bonds to finance industrial facilities which
could be leased or sold to private corporations).
Still many state courts, concerned that the public interest be protected,
identified specific criteria essential to making a determination that a
particular subsidy would benefit the people. See Mae Nan Ellingson, Jerry
C.D. Mahoney, Public Purpose and Economic Development: The Montana Perspective,
51 Montana L. Rev. 356, 374 (1990) (identifying four factors common to those
programs appropriately considered to have a public purpose: the program
has traditionally been conducted by government; it cannot be conducted as
effectively by the private sector or without government sponsorship; it
benefits primarily or directly all citizens or general class of citizens;
and the program is reasonably related to the intended benefit). See Nichols
v. South Carolina Research Authority, 351 S.E.2d 155, 163 (1986); City of
Cleburne v. Gulf, 66 Tex. 457, 1 S.W. 342 (Tex. 1886) (invalidating agreement
between local government and corporation whereby local government sought
to induce corporation to locate in area).
Despite this historical legacy, recent judicial deference to legislative
determinations of "public purpose" has unfortunately had the effect
of watering down the effectiveness of this significant constitutional limitation
upon governmental power in many courts outside this state. See Common Cause
v. State, 455 A.2d 1 (Me. 1983); Wilson v. Conn. Product Dev. Corp., 355
A.2d 72, 75 (Conn. 1974); Pipestone v. Madsen, 178 N.W. 2d 594, 596 (Minn.
1970); Arthur L. Coleman, A Reexamination of the Public Purpose Doctrine:
Nichols v. South Carolina Research Authority, 39 S.C.L. Rev. 565, 570-71
The documented abuses, and well known general inability of current tax abatement
programs to accomplish their job creation goals, as has been amply illustrated
in this case by Plaintiff, and inability to protect popular democratic control
over the decision-making process, coupled with the scarcity of public funds
for genuine infrastructure improvements, see Opinion of the Justices, 598
So.2d 1362 (Sup. Ala. 1992), requires, at the very least, that this court
find that such legislative determinations are rational only when there is
substantial certainty that such tax deals will inure to the public's benefit.
This can be accomplished only where there exist sufficient guarantees that
the intended purposes will in fact be accomplished.
B. A Public Purpose exists only where the public interest can be enforced.
Significantly, nowhere in either Defendant's or Amici's Brief do they articulate
how the people of Winston-Salem and Forsyth County have benefitted from
the thirteen or so tax deals which have occurred pursuant to this statute.
It is obvious that where tax incentives fail to accomplish their intended
goal no public purpose has been served. Keeping in mind the historical and
present concerns inherent in tax giveaways, it is necessary that the public
purpose requirement contain mechanisms of accountability to guard against
the abuses and typical inadequacies of incentives systems. Yet, in practice
accountability mechanism are rarely attached to the tax incentives. Furthermore,
few states have methods for assessing the actual costs and benefits associated
with incentive. Also, because the resources put at the disposal of businesses
by state and local governments are scarce, it is imperative that such accountability
measures be incorporated into the fluid public purpose doctrine.
A prevalent and persistent problem with most incentive legislation, which
is shared by the one at issue here, is the inability to adequately involve
the public in determining whether a specific proposal is sufficiently "public"
and to provide legally enforceable mechanisms which will protect the public
interest. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 158-7.1 et seq. In the instant case,
this problem is manifested in several significant ways:
1. The county and city did not themselves enter into any agreement with
the private corporations but instead entered into an agreement with an "intermediate"
body, here the WSBI, which is essentially unaccountable to the public, who
then contracted with the private sector. No agreement existed between the
city and county and Pepsi Cola, for example, and so there exists no way
to enforce Pepsi Cola's promise to create 1,000 permanent jobs in exchange
for the $1 million subsidy. In fact, Pepsi Cola created only 140 jobs, received
$700,000, and there is no agreement that exists now that can be used to
hold Pepsi-Cola to its promises.
Any tax incentive deal should be in the form of an express, written contract
between the government offeror and the corporate offeree. Written contracts
are the best mechanism to ensure enforceability because they create legally
enforceable promises and remedies. Tax incentive contracts should specify
the benefits which corporations are intended to supply to the government
and public in exchange for tax incentives, the conditions which constitute
a breach and the types of enforcement mechanisms used to ensure compliance.
A statute which fails to require such contracts should be found sufficiently
vague to be unconstitutional.
2. The current structure of the local decision-making body, in this case
the WSBI, is extremely susceptible to situations in which private corporate
officers can wield too much influence in the interest of private profit,
as opposed to the public good. In this case, for example, there has been
a blatant conflict of interest when the chief or former chief executive
officer of several benefitting corporations have been members of, and sometimes
even the chair, of WSBI, the entity negotiating deals on behalf of the county
and city. See Maready trial brief at 4. Again, where such affiliations are
not prohibited by statute then the statute should be held to be unconstitutional.
3. Under the current system, private corporations are able to obtain "reimbursement"
for expenses with essentially no mechanisms of accountability. For example,
here Wake Forest received $700,000 million for "expenses" after
submitting an invoice to WSDI without any substantiation for those expenses,
and without fulfilling any of the job creation promises. An enabling statute
which could survive constitutional challenge would establish explicit standards
to govern the mechanisms by which private corporations seek reimbursement.
4. The current system hides from public scrutiny the decision making process
whereby decisions are made as to how public money will be spent in furtherance
of economic development. In this case, for example, the Defendant has argued
that many of the giveaways were made pursuant to G.S. § 158-7.1 (a)
and thus were not subject to the open meeting requirement of (c). This incongruity,
whereby there exists a largely undefined area under which the WSBI may exercise
its "discretion" as to determining appropriate expenditures, is
sufficiently vague to render the statute unconstitutional.
5. Under the current system, the WSBI did not undertake a cost-benefit analysis
prior to negotiating the tax deals at issue in this action. In the final
analysis what are touted as quid pro quo arrangements are in actuality unrestricted/
unaccountable public giveaways to private companies. Although usually neglected,
a cost/benefit analysis is currently seen as an essential component of any
effective subsidy program:
Moreover, when using development incentives, states and localities
should establish permanent systems to ensure that their use is cost-effective
and accountable to the public. This area has received relatively little
Bidding for Business: Are Cities and States Selling Themselves Short?, Schweke,
Rist and Dabson 50-51 (Corporation for Enterprise Development, Washington,
D.C.) (1994) (Appendix D).
6. Under the current system, the WSBI is not required to adhere to any specific
standards by which to evaluate whether a particular subsidy will in fact
satisfy the purposes of the statute to "aid and encourage" the
location of "manufacturing enterprises". N.C. Gen. Stat. §
158-7.1 (a). As the trial court found: "The guidelines gave the City
and County virtually unlimited discretion as to the amount and purposes
for which City and County funds could be paid to private corporations for
alleged economic incentive purposes." Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment, filed August 28, 1995, at 6 (hereinafter "Findings
That the WSBI could authorize the expenditure of public funds to pay the
costs of, for example, parking fees for employees of Southern National Bank
or a portion of rent for that bank, as sufficient to satisfy this criteria
is evidence that the statute is unconstitutional as applied. Again, it is
highly significant that nowhere in either Defendant's or Amici's brief do
they ever state how the various tax deals stimulated the local economy,
promoted business, or resulted in the creation of a substantial number of
jobs in the city or county that pay at or above the "median average"
wage in the county. See NCDA brief at 36.
7. Under the current system, it is completely unclear what it is that workers,
or taxpayers, receive in exchange for their money. The statute requires
only that the Governor determine that a "substantial number of jobs"
that pay "at or near the average median wage" be created. N.C.
Gen. Stat. §158-7.1 (d1)(1). This is misleading and poorly drafted.
It is unclear what is meant by "median average" wage since the
terms have two entirely different meanings.
8. Under the current system, a corporation is not required to demonstrate
financial need and the state is not required to show that a particular tax
incentive fits within an economic development plan. Indeed, the trial court
here found that: "No evidence was presented of economic distress in
the City and County from 1990 to the present time." Findings of Fact
at 6. Instead, these tax deals are negotiated on an ad-hoc basis within
a vacuum, with each deal subject to the political climate of the moment.
There should be proof that a particular deal will in fact meet certain well
defined goals that address the particular needs of a community. These goals
should include the creation of a specific number of jobs, a commitment to
remain in the locality and a requirement to invest in the community, a plan
to create jobs of a certain "quality" (i.e. which provide adequate
wages, benefits and stability). They should reward businesses who do not
violate employment and environmental laws, and provide day care, pensions,
comprehensive health benefits, to improve worker safety and environmental
9. Finally, under the current system, any private corporation that violates
state and federal laws is in no way encumbered from being the recipient
of public funds. The statute provides no means, for example, of determining
whether a particular applicant (or beneficiary) has violated environmental
and worker safety statutes.
Instead of defending these inherent failures, the principle theme that resonates
throughout both Defendant's brief, as well as Amici North Carolina Economic
Development Association, is that "if we don't do it, someone else will."
See NCDA brief at 16 (citing tax incentive programs in other states). Such
a philosophy does not make good public policy, especially in light of the
overwhelming evidence concerning the ineffectiveness and abuse of tax subsidies.
First, unaccountable tax incentives have the, albeit unintended, effect
of causing a "race to the bottom" as communities, workers, and
unions, seek to reduce labor, environmental and social costs, forcing wage
and benefit concessions when corporations use the threat of flight, or of
refusal to locate in a given geographical area.
Second, unaccountable tax incentives essentially surrender the public good
to what amounts to gross blackmail by the desirous corporations, by virtue
of what amounts to lack of accountability of middle-level officials not
subject to the electoral process:
Because industrial relocation incentives often operate in an environment
where appointed officials from multiple levels of government engage in secret
negotiations, the danger for misuse of governmental power is greater than
with other types of economic regulation. Significant influence over the
decision to offer incentives is often helped by appointed, rather than elected
officials. Because appointed officials have less direct accountability,
the potential for abuse will be greater for forms of economic regulation
when appointed officials have more influence.
A. Proposal to Prohibit Industrial Relocation Subsidies, at 687.
Those states and cities which have grown weary of having their feet held
to the fire have done what this state has not and responded to the tax abuse
problem by enacting statutes or ordinances which require corporate accountability.
In Gary, Indiana, for example, there now exists an ordinance which requires
companies to show clear financial need for an abatement, provide a complete
health care package to employees working over a certain number of hours,
pay prevailing wages for the industry, and terminate such abatements if
the firm fails to live up to the terms of the ordinance.
There also now exist what is commonly termed "right to know laws"
which require application and performance information after a subsidy has
been granted; "public participation" laws, whereby it is required
that the public be included in the decision before a subsidy is granted
to a private corporation; "hidden cost" laws, whereby states require
governmental units to keep records of and provide annual reports on their
expenditures in the form of tax exemptions; "recapture" laws,
whereby states may cancel subsidies or recoup them when a private corporation
does not fulfill its promises; and "anti-poaching" laws, which
attempt to prohibit a corporation from relocating within a state's or city's
In other words, state legislatures can enact legislation which ensures accountability;
this state legislature has not done so. The statute in this case merely
requires that the governing board "determine" that the conveyance
of the property stimulate the local economy, promote business, and result
in the creation of a substantial number of jobs in the county or city that
pay at or above the median average wage in the county or, for a city, in
the county where the city is located. This language, besides being poorly
drafted, does not provide any concrete, enforceable, assurance that the
incentive will in fact stimulate the local economy, promote business and
result in the creation of jobs. The company receiving the incentive is not
contractually bound to create any jobs at all.
Specific plans aimed at accomplishing well defined goals produced through
a democratic process are essential prerequisites to tax incentive accountability.
If these qualities are absent, instead of enhancing the economic and social
well-being of local communities, subsidies will continue to be a "candy
store" deal for often wealthy multi-national and global corporations
whose only real interest is the profit of their shareholders.
The parade of horribles offered by Defendant and Amici need not in fact
occur. The added requirement is only that they proceed with the use of tax
incentives to promote economic development in a fiscally responsible manner.
This court should be reluctant to conclude that a public purpose is being
satisfied where legislators have failed to ensure accountability through
the use of available means. If the public has no reasonable guarantee of
gain, expenditures in their name cannot accurately be said to have their
"purpose" in mind.
NLG/SUGAR LAW CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
NLG/SUGAR LAW CENTER FOR
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
Kary L. Moss, Esq.,
Lamont Satchel, Esq.
2915 Cadillac Tower
Detroit, MI 48226
Lamont David Satchel, Esq.
February 14, 1996
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