

**PROJECT ON THE
MEANS OF INTERVENTION**

WORKSHOP PAPERS
VOLUME FOUR: 2005-2006

**Project on the Means of Intervention
Workshop Papers**

Volume Four

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Preface

This is the fourth collection of essays flowing from the Project on the Means of Intervention at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy based at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. The Project is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and is led by Sarah Sewall. For more information, visit the Project website at: www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/nshr.shtml. The following essays were presented in draft form at Carr Center workshops during 2005. These papers represent the views of individual workshop participants; they do not summarize workshop discussions or represent conclusions of the Project. This volume contains papers focusing on counterinsurgency in Iraq and broader implications of irregular warfare for the U.S. government. Counterinsurgency continues to be a major theme of Project activities, both in case studies such as the War in Iraq, or as a broader strategic conceptualization connected to the Global War on Terrorism.

In "A Diplomat's Perspective on the Challenges Facing the U.S. Government in Iraq," the author argues for an increased integration of diplomatic and military approaches. The author argues that traditional use of force procedures preclude vital U.S. strategic assets such as the influence of money and negotiation to diffuse conflicts. Ultimate success in Iraq requires military and diplomatic circles to integrate the skills and tools of each other's unique disciplines into a cohesive whole.

Stuart Gordon's paper, "Myth Creation and that 'Nauseating Phrase': 'Hearts and Minds': The Real Meaning of 'Hearts and Minds'?" utilizes Malaya as a model of counterinsurgency whereby the term "campaign authority" could prove as a useful replacement for "hearts and minds." Gordon argues that the very term "hearts and minds" misrepresents strategic goals in counterinsurgency and should be replaced. Gordon explores the development of the mythologized "hearts and minds" phrase and discusses its historical context.

In "Great Power Counterinsurgency: Small Wars, Special Operations, and the French in Algeria," Michael McClintock discusses the historical development of counterinsurgency in Britain and France. He emphasizes the French experience in Algeria as an outgrowth of colonialism while noting the major lessons of Great Power European involvement in counterinsurgency operations.

In "Great Powers and Irregular Challenges," T.X. Hammes argues that only a genuine interagency process focused on network theory can defeat modern insurgency. Hammes discusses insurgency in relation to irregular warfare such as terrorism and provides important distinctions for categorizing and understanding the uniqueness of insurgency.

Finally, in "Shaping the Future of Counterinsurgency Warfare," Anthony Cordesman gives a sober analysis of the study of counterinsurgency. He argues we continue to come back to the same answers without learning from the past and deny the complexity and difficulty of counterinsurgency operations. Cordesman questions whether or not we should pursue counterinsurgency as a clear and possible strategy. He outlines elements of an effective counterinsurgency campaign integral for future strategic planning.

The Project is grateful to each of the authors for agreeing to share their essays here and for their participation in the project. I hope that these essays will, like the Project itself, educate and challenge all those willing to engage.

Sarah Sewall
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A Diplomat's Perspective on the Challenges Facing the U.S. Government in Iraq

Derived from the November 2005 Conference Report:

“Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Implications of Irregular Warfare for the U.S. Government.”

Success in Iraq requires a multi-disciplinary approach to counter-insurgency, with a clear recognition that the three major lines of operation - governance, economic and security are interwoven strands of the same rope. A military or civilian operator on the ground in Iraq quickly perceives that winning his particular piece of the war requires widely divergent skills in nation-building, including strengthening political institutions and economic development. One of the most compelling images of the Iraq experience is that of soldiers shedding Kevlar and stacking weapons as they settle in for politicking with reluctant and suspicious local council members, tribal leaders and religious scholars. At that same moment, a diplomat will be conferring with other soldiers, development experts and Iraqi counterparts as they consider a sewage project, either as a paperwork exercise or being ankle-deep in the muck.

While this paper focuses on the skills required of a diplomat working on counter-insurgency in Iraq, in fact the skill sets for success in Iraq for a diplomat and a soldier are as closely convergent as those of the counter-insurgent lines of operation, although the diplomat is less likely than the soldier to have to do his own shooting. The rise of a serious insurgency has forced American nation-builders of whatever discipline to have to fight for the right to do their work. A significant percentage of the funding intended for infrastructure construction and institution capacity building has been diverted to pure security requirements, including physical hardening of structures with concrete and earth barriers and the hiring of thousands of armed guards. Even hiring those guards, who have killed Iraqis in the course of their duties, and the use of the physical barriers has imposed political costs by arousing the annoyance or anger of Iraqis against the projects and people who are supposed to be winning their hearts and minds. During the Sadr City uprising of 2004, tribal and religious leaders, even those associated with the young men shooting at the Coalition complained about the lack of economic activity in their neighborhoods. American soldiers and diplomats argued back that employment creation and electricity projects were impossible when the streets were framed by bombs and snipers were on the rooftops.

This chapter of the uprising was ended by a careful application of military force, willingness to suspend the most provocative elements of military action - house searches in designated test areas, combined with quick-hitting reconstruction projects and willingness by American diplomats to engage with all but the most obvious trigger-pullers and planners. At least one of the persons with whom we negotiated through cutouts because of his connection to violence has won a seat in the Council of Representatives. We also agreed to a weapons buy back program, even though it was clear that it would do little to reduce the actual number of weapons on the streets, because doing so allowed moderate politicians an opportunity to develop patron-client relations with the young shooters. Fast, integrated transition from the use of force to politicking and spending of money is the formula which has demonstrated success in getting past violence to a political process and reconstruction in places such as Fallujah and Najaf, as well as Sadr City.

Operations in Iraq require familiarity with a variety of operational and social terrain. Sadr City and Najaf, are intensely urban, requiring precision in kinetic and non-kinetic operations. For

example in Sadr City, quarters or even neighborhoods are controlled by armed groups and are loyal to a mix of tribal and religious leaders. In Najaf, since the end of the Saddam regime, militias have risen and fallen, only to re-establish themselves over time. Now, the Sadr militia which surrendered in August 2004 is gaining influence by expanding the perimeter around Muqtada al Sadr's home, inevitably jostling up against Badr Organization guards around their facilities - leading to the two days of armed battles and arson that occurred in several places in the Shia south last fall (2005). These examples make the point that working on the three lines of operation demands complementary but differing skill sets, arguing for a fully integrated multi-disciplinary team, including military, diplomatic and development personnel. In south-central Iraq, the urban centers of Hilla, Najaf and Karbalah are joined by smaller farm towns such as Diwaniyah and Samawah. While the area is superficially religiously homogeneous, the hundreds of shrines to Shia saints, great figures in the history of Islam and even Old Testament prophets symbolize clearly the cross-cutting loyalties even among the Shia, personified now by competing religious scholars and more political and mystical figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr and Mahmoud Hassani al-Sarkhi.

In this complex environment, a team of foreigners will have to consider the extent to which their projects might affect local politics and social balance. For example, during the CPA period consultations with local councils in a southern province consistently revealed a desire for roads leading from the town center into the surrounding countryside. CPA staff were told that such roads are for children to get from home to school or to allow poor farmers to bring their goods to market. The fact that the road will also make it easier for the local shaykh to get his Mercedes to the main highway is equally critical, but unspoken. Another example of the fine balances that have to be struck are requests for higher walls around girls' schools. It could be argued that such projects reinforce inequality of girls and the women who teach them, but if such walls exist, it is more likely that conservative parents will allow their girls to come to school - thereby increasing the long-term prospects for equal treatment.

One of the more wrenching decisions concerns allowing those who have been fighting to engage in the political or development process. On several occasions, American military officers were confronted with the prospect of allowing fighters or their leaders to enter the political process and to receive benefits from development money when they had very recently been involved in the killing of Coalition personnel and Iraqis. The question that has to be answered, frequently with poor information and heavy reliance on field instinct, is whether keeping such person on the outside is more likely to advance the operational objective than swallowing hard and allowing him in. The most significant such choice concerned Muqtada al Sadr, who was on a capture or kill list and now is sought as a political coalition partner by other Islamists. Similar such decisions occur frequently involving all major ethnicities: during a first meeting at a major Sunni organization in west Baghdad, an American diplomat had to ask the major commanding the unit escorting him to the meeting not to arrest one of the Sunni participants as a suspected terrorist. That individual is now seen as among the more moderate Sunnis contesting leadership of his community and is frequently quoted in the international media.

A key element in an integrated counter-insurgency strategy is to find the most effective change agents, provide them with resources and place them in positions where they can gain more political power and social prestige by delivering material benefits to an important constituency.

Empowerment of women has proven in at least some locations in Iraq to be the most effective means of making change. Women understand much faster that political freedom and economic opportunity are what will bring the most positive change the fastest. Women tend to be less gratuitously suspicious than men and do not waste time looking for the hidden motivation before engaging in a project, whether political or economic. They are also most inclined to get past the narrowest definition of self interest to focus on how broader change can benefit them and others. It is unusual to see women outside government skimming project funds for their own benefit where men seem to see it as simply expected of them. Of all the institutional changes put in place since the change of regime, it is the rise of civil society organizations that may be the most survivable, mainly because of the heavy female participation in this aspect of democratization. The Civil Society Ministry is trying to impose registration and other requirements on charitable and other civil society organizations, ostensibly from fear that such organizations are being used by terrorists. It is widely thought that one of the major reasons is that the conservative religious authorities who have gained a strong role in that ministry are more interested in controlling women than terrorists.

Other key elements of society, such as tribal and religious leaders, remain opaque in their motivations and actions and it is difficult to generalize about their real influence on specific issues and activities. Two examples are illustrative: in setting up the first broadly selected provincial council in Qadisiyah, an American diplomat met with hundreds of Iraqi tribal political and civic leaders during an intense 6 week period of consultations - in only one of those consultations did anyone mention the need to get Ayatollah Sistani's views on this initiative - he was politely shushed by others, who asserted that the Ayatollah did not involve himself in such earthly matters. On the tribal front, it was almost laughable how seriously rival leaders asserted their primacy against each other, frequently in consecutive meetings, while damning their competitor as everything from a weakling to a Saddamist.

Understanding the interplay of tribal leaders created and sustained by Saddam with those of more traditional lineage and the exact role of religious leaders in earthly matters requires a depth of local knowledge we have not achieved - another argument for long-term, multi-disciplinary counter-insurgency - not to mention longer assignments and better language skills.

There are a few personal qualities members, especially leaders, of the multi-disciplinary counter-insurgency team will need to succeed. The first is courage that comes in at least two varieties. Physical courage is expected of soldiers, but is not usually thought of as being necessary for development experts or diplomats. That it will be necessary becomes obvious when the leader of a personal security detail tells a diplomat that the team is ready to go to a meeting and to please put on the ballistic vest and helmet perched next to the desk. There is nothing to compare, however, to being asked to be taken under fire and to be uncertain in that instant whether the Iraqis in the meeting are for or against you. As a CPA member put it, such experiences are useful because up to a certain level of danger, well beyond that experienced by most diplomats, one knows with certainty what he or she will do in hard situation - a valuable piece of self-knowledge.

Even for those who have been blessed by such experiences, the second type of courage may be more difficult, if only because it has to be sustained over time to make any difference and there is no compensatory adrenaline rush. A firefight is measured in minutes or hours, but a bureaucratic struggle over policy implicating one's career can last months or years, requiring many thankless, inglorious acts of courage every day.

An effective multi-disciplinary approach to counter-insurgency will focus over the long-term on the development of institutions. Our opponents in Iraq, including the Iranians, know this and have put money, personnel and weapons into the country to support their interests and like-minded Iraqis. The effort to counter these enemy movements requires ongoing support to partners and the identification of those who are willing to work with us, and the tools to be effective in Iraqi society. It is the identification of those partners and our willingness to fund them that requires sustained bureaucratic courage. Arguing in long meetings that a senior official's pet Iraqi speaks English very well and is quite charming, but has no popular base in Iraq is not the route to bureaucratic success. Similarly, clear-minded bureaucrats with field experience sometimes find that their negative perceptions of the effectiveness of favored American NGO's and political institutions is not shared at senior levels, and that connections in Congress will trump reality in the field every time.

Beyond the requisite types of courage, a successful counter-insurgent will be intellectually and morally flexible. When the Sadr militia uprising occurred in April 2004, it caught Coalition Forces in South Central Iraq unprepared. National Rules of Engagement of the non-American forces restricted their willingness to take offensive measures against the militia. Coalition commanders' decisions, such as allowing weapons permits for leadership security details and facilities guards - in effect legalizing the arming of people who were already attacking - were attempts at appeasement rather than the restoration of order. The hope that appeasement would restore peace was entirely misplaced and it was not until American forces re-entered the area and applied calibrated amounts of force with quick infusions of cash that the situation calmed. During the period of the unrest, several CPA outposts were essentially left to defend themselves by the unwillingness of non-American Coalition forces to engage. This life and death situation required several CPA representatives to make decisions about uses of the Iraqi funds placed in their hands to use for development projects. On other occasions, such funds were used to buy intelligence that enabled more specific targeting of attacking insurgents. The CPA representative who made and executed decisions did so on the basis of a condition that using the money had to be for the ultimate benefit of the Iraqi people. He decided that keeping his team alive and operational was itself of such benefit, as was killing a few insurgents, who had already committed at least one act of ethnic cleansing and who were kidnapping citizens to bring them before religious courts that tortured and executed them. The inspectors' reports now emerging concerning use of money from that period are models of objectivity, but do not mention that the money was being spent in a combat situation. A model counter-insurgency will require a willingness to use dollars like bullets, while accepting the need to answer later to accountants.

The most critical impediment to success is the loss of time imposed by terrorist action and need to account for it in conducting reconstruction. During the height of the Sadr uprising of spring 2004 CPA teams were restricted to their bases for weeks at a time. Reconstruction projects went undone, imposing new costs in lost materials, deterioration in partly complete projects and loss

of confidence by the population and the politicians CPA was trying to influence. Meanwhile the credibility of the militias and their Iranian sponsors continued to grow. Passage of time also creates the certainty of intervening events that will change political calculations. The clearest example was the failure of CPA to fund several promised projects before it decided suddenly to end its own existence two days early on June 28, 2004. This action resulted in the failure to fulfill the promise of the CPA head and a senior Iraqi leader to fund the Kirkuk Foundation, which had been presented to the people of Kirkuk as the centerpiece in building a multi-ethnic Kirkuk.

Time also leads to the loss of patience by institutions and politicians. The debate now raging the U.S. about the continuation of our military presence in Iraq is the macro version of the issue. It is incredible that anyone would have thought that rebuilding a big country and reversing a political and institutional culture would only take a few months or years, but it is now apparent that the support of many Americans and shamefully, their leaders, for the Iraq project was based on that premise. At the micro level, in Iraq the passage of time and loss of credibility caused Iraqis to re-calculate their interests and to at least make hedging bets for the insurgency against the Coalition. Young men who expected to be given jobs by the Coalition took positions as trigger pullers with the insurgency when construction projects were delayed for months. In the early spring of 2004, the then head of reconstruction told a gathering of CPA regional representatives that by August of that year, there would be a labor shortage in Iraq. That statement, as did many others, turned out to be wildly optimistic and damaging because it set expectations that could not be met, forcing Iraqis to look for alternatives.

A frequently overlooked factor in understanding how the loss of time affected our overall prospects of success was the symbolic importance of electricity in Iraq. For most Iraqis it was literally incredible that the same country that had destroyed Saddam's regime in weeks could not do better immediately than that regime in providing the basis of modern life to the Iraqi population. That failure fed into the natural predilection for conspiracy which held that America was deliberately withholding electricity from Iraqis as a means of control. Many CPA projects at the local level, including those to assist universities, youth clubs, hospitals and newly established NGO's foundered or were delayed because they required electricity for internet connections or sewing machines or medical equipment. Local efforts to use generators helped, but quickly encountered maintenance issues or the delays in improving availability of fuel, which was tied to the delay and ultimate failure by CPA and the Iraqi government to reform or eliminate Iraq's subsidy system which sucks the life out of Iraq's economy. CPA frequently failed to make key decisions on subsidies and others because of fear they would cause large scale civil unrest and that delay would somehow make the hard decisions easier - that assumption has proven unfounded.

Likewise, the passage of time has caused the bureaucratization of the crisis and a consequent loss of focus. Over time bureaucratic norms tend to re-assert themselves even if the crisis which caused them to be pushed aside continues or even intensifies. In Iraq, our people are dying in combat, we are still taking rounds into our compounds and aimed at our convoys, but the management office wants better accountability on the use of cell phones and to discipline those who leave safes unlocked overnight in offices secured by Marines. The Department of State has taken the schizophrenic position that it will continue to operate in circumstances that passed the

usual point for evacuation long ago, even while trying to institute normal, peacetime accounting, personnel and security procedures. FSO's serving in Iraq are under increasing pressure from security personnel to not do their jobs by going out to deal with Iraqis, as if safety or what our military colleagues call force protection, is more important than the mission itself.

Foreign Service Officers provided the leadership of the Coalition Provisional Authority's presence outside Baghdad by service as Regional and Governance Coordinators, as their deputies and in other roles, including political, project and public affairs officers. All were volunteers and went through a cumbersome application and deployment process for the privilege of serving our country in a war zone in circumstances ranging from the merely uncomfortable to the life-threateningly dangerous. The fact that we have lost only a few Foreign Service personnel reflects good fortune and the great skill of security professionals, who have taken most of the casualties, rather than the lack of ill intent on the part of our enemies

Now, more than two years into the entry of the Foreign Service into Iraq, it is becomingly difficult to staff key positions with qualified personnel in the Embassy and particularly at posts outside Baghdad. The most qualified volunteers, in terms of language capability and area expertise, have already served their tours, a few have done much more than their time, while others are signing up for a second stint, or going out as short term surge teams to cover special events such as the December 15 national assembly elections. The Service and the State Department continue to contort themselves to find ever more exotic inducements to get Foreign Service personnel to go to Iraq. The Department is also still allowing TDY excursions of less than one year, although experience has shown that, at least for reporting officers, it takes longer than that to know the Iraqi personalities involved in an issue, much less the issue itself. The experience factor will become more critical with the stand up of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraqi provinces.

The Foreign Service is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the highest priority foreign policy issue because it has refused to take the one step that would ensure a key role, demonstrate seriousness of purpose to the military and develop a cadre of true area specialists with extreme diplomacy skills. The Foreign Service has refused to recognize that service in wartime requires a complete commitment by all its personnel. Such a commitment requires at minimum the unambiguous authority to order Foreign Service personnel to serve in Iraq through directed assignments. While some Middle East specialists and Arabists have served with distinction and courage in Iraq, others have not shown up at all. They should be told clearly that they are needed by their Service and their country now in Iraq or their services are not required at all. The Service, Department and taxpayer did not spend the money to teach Arabic and develop the area skills to enable the beneficiaries of that training to avoid using their skills where they are most needed.

In other critical locations, such as Najaf, the Foreign Service has never managed to fill the two slots mandated for that city, sometimes described as the Vatican of Shia Islam. The same is true for other locations throughout Iraq. In Najaf, several officers have rotated through a single slot for up to a year, but the lack of experience and language skills has kept them from being effective with government and religious figures as personnel with those skills could have been.

Based on anecdotal evidence, military commanders are anxious to have more Foreign Service personnel, not fewer, in the field with them, both because they respect Foreign Service expertise, in both civilian policy and local culture, and because of the bureaucratic cover they get by having a direct policy connection next to them when they veer rapidly from war-fighting to politicking and project management. If the Foreign Service cannot provide these services, the military will do one or maybe both of two things: it will contract these services (field foreign policy companies will take their place alongside the private security contractors so prevalent in Iraq) and the military will simply create its own policy service by picking a few thousand of its best and brightest and sending them to school.

Whoever the field operators are - diplomats, soldiers or contractors, they are confronted constantly with the task of converting often vague policy guidance into actions on the ground. In the lethal environment that is Iraq, such decisions will be based on calculations of relevance to the objectives of the mission, risk to life and career costs. Given the frequent difficulty of communications and the dynamic nature of the environment, a leader will frequently find he has to make these decisions on the basis of little information and even less guidance from higher authority. Measuring these factors against each other requires a rare combination of personal confidence, a sense of knowledge about the environment and a willingness to go against the dictates of one's institutional culture.

Military leaders emerge from a culture that seeks very precise definitions of situations, resources and outcomes - the effort to apply metrics of progress in any situation is almost obsessive. But, in a situation such as Sadr City with its crowded and constricted physical environment in which virtually all inhabitants have access to at least small arms and in which political parties, militias, and tribal and religious leaders are vying for influence with the security forces and with each other in an uncertain political and legal atmosphere, the search for precision and identifiable results can be illusory and a formula for paralysis. Only when kinetic means had failed were Coalition commanders willing to engage with Sadr City and national leaders to try to restore peace in the fall of 2004. Even then, there was a tendency to latch on to a police official or a national official with his own agenda as an agent of solution, rather than trying to balance more amorphous forces to achieve a situation of relative stability that could be improved over time.

The main breakthrough at that time came when US military and civilian personnel were able to accept that their enemies, the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr, were necessary and maybe sufficient agents of stability. The kinetic operations, which had effectively targeted militia personnel were critical to achieving this breakthrough. Only the willingness to engage and to go through the political show of a weapons buy back program, though unlikely to effect the availability of weapons, resulted in a quieter Sadr City, even while much of the rest of Baghdad was chaotic. This success has imposed its own costs because it has given an illegal militia a key role in securing a major segment of the population, which carries the seeds of later instability. But, it also raises the possibility, however immeasurable, that the same militia will be seduced into a more democratic system in which its leaders have a role that does not risk their lives and which offers them the opportunity to bring material benefits to their followers thus gaining the leaders more support and a larger stake in the system and its stability. This might be the start of a virtuous circle that has only come about because local commanders were able to get beyond their

own culture, worked closely with policy and area experts, and enjoyed tactical freedom within policy guidelines.

If the military sometimes suffers from its search for illusory measurability in results, civilian policy and development leaders are sometimes too content to mistake inputs for results and to demand too little from their clients. Civilian policy leaders have tended to look for people in Iraq who look and talk like them. Finding such people inside and outside the country, civilians have provided them with money and advanced their political careers with little regard for their ability to actually lead Iraqis. It should be clear now, with the failure of Ahmed Chalabi to win a seat in the recent parliamentary elections, and more than two years since the U.S. invaded Iraq, that there is an inverse relationship between the appeal to Western audiences of certain Iraqis and their ability to function independently in the Iraqi environment. The stubborn failure to acknowledge this fact has led to waste of resources as diverse and critical as time, money and prestige. This waste itself has sometimes been touted as success as when we tote up meetings held, money disbursed to civic leaders who have no following, and press conferences held, to perpetuate the illusion that we are getting somewhere in our effort to get Iraqis to talk and dress like we do. While these efforts have made us more comfortable, at least in our immediate surroundings, they do little but harm to our prospects of getting Iraqis themselves to see the benefits of a democratic, federal, pluralistic Iraq that is our policy goal. Only recently have diplomats and policy makers gotten serious about dealing with the people who have demonstrated their ability to get things done in Iraq, whether that means winning elections, as in the case of the Shia religious parties or intensifying an insurgency as in the case of Sunni rejectionists. The fact is that we have a much better chance of identifying effective leaders and finding a commonality of interests from which we can build a relationship than we do of trying to fit a Western-produced political slipcover over what Churchill called the “ungrateful volcano” of the Iraqi people. The basic political strategy has to be to civilize the leaders we find rather than to drop civilized leaders into the barbaric politics that now characterize Iraq.

As we begin the process of considering a significant withdrawal of forces from Iraq, the lessons we have learned from our first three years will determine the level of historical success we have, since we will no longer be able to rely on force to recoup mistakes.

The first of those lessons is that direct engagement with Iraqis works. In all three lines of operation, we have accepted this fact and are beginning to exploit the residual respect Iraqis still have for our capabilities. Direct engagement is another name for the training method we are now using with Iraqi security forces. As in other areas of effort with Iraqis, they are seeking more guidance and consultation with us, not less. As PRT’s begin to operate, we can expect to hear requests for more trainers for provincial governments. Those requests will come in the form of demands for daily interaction and advice, not the technical fixes, such as remote learning or classroom settings that form an increasing part of the Western pedagogical experience. Iraqis want to see the commitment implied by a personal relationship and the feel of shared effort that comes from mentor and protégé showing up in the same place every day.

The desire for a personal relationship and commitment is closely related to a second lesson: Iraqis have an unerring instinct for the power center. The clearest example of this trait is the demands to visit Washington of leading Iraqi politicians in the middle of an election campaign.

An observer with a surface understanding of Iraqi politics might intuit that politicians would be afraid of appearing to close the “occupier” while running for office. Instead, Iraqi politicians want to get the message across to voters that they are well connected in Washington - the implication being that the ability to work with the Americans is critical to be able to deliver the goods to the voters.

Iraqi opinion polls and the experience of Americans who have served in Iraq demonstrate clearly that material wellbeing trumps all as a political factor. Iraqis want electricity, clean water and a working sewage system. Iraqi politicians who have been in power are widely seen to have failed to deliver these goods, and their image and electoral prospects have suffered. For the Coalition, the failure to meet the demands implied by the wave of electrical consumer goods that has washed into Iraq since liberation, especially satellite dishes, has fed a general feeling of discontent to contribute to the persistence of the insurgency.

If the Coalition had been able to make swift progress on supplying more electricity for example, there would have been more time to consolidate gains and popular rejection of the insurgency would have been closer to the surface and quicker to flower. Working generators in every village would have conveyed seriousness in a way that all the promises of huge electrical projects has never done. The broader lesson taken from the electricity issue, which now seems to be understood by both the civilian and military elements of the Coalition is that small cash now is better than big cash later. Micro examples are too numerous to mention, but a clear example of what works was in Diwaniyah when a newly arrived US unit raided several political party headquarters at about 0200 and was out repairing doors and handing out small amounts of cash in compensation for injuries and property damage by 1000 the same morning. With cash in hand, those party leaders, and the principal of a school that had been briefly occupied turned into intelligence sources, resulting in the quick end of a local insurgency. Post-conflict compensation is now a key part of every battle plan. Iraqis believe in what they can see and touch, not what they are told.

The concept of small now, better than big later also holds true when it comes to the use of violence. Violence was the essence of Saddam’s rule and it will be some time before the lessons learned from that regime are purged from the Iraqi psyche. In the meantime, those who aspire to political leadership are prone to violence, frequently as a first option. Likewise, their constituents expect the use of force as a political tool and are likely to perceive weakness when it is not used. A clear example is the growth in power of Moqtada al Sadr, a junior cleric, who took his martyred father’s mantle by forming a militia and employing it against all opponents until they push back. It would be difficult to prove that a short, sharp reaction to Sadr’s alleged complicity in the murder of Abd al Majid al-Khoei in April 2003 when he was perceived to be under Coalition protection would have prevented the Sadrite uprising that followed a year later, but it might have forced Sadr to consider the option of electoral politics sooner than he did and only after the defeat of his uprising which cost at least hundreds of lives and billions of dollars.

What we have learned in Iraq has come at considerable cost, the full extent of which we may not understand in our lifetime. Neither will we understand whether we have succeeded or failed for some time. It is a tribute to the Iraqi people that they survived with dignity the extravagant evil of Saddam Hussein and the chaos and uncertainty that followed their liberation. If there is to be

success in Iraq, it will be their courage, and determination that brings it. In a sense, all we can do now is improve their chances for success - when we destroyed Saddam's regime we gave Iraqis a chance at a better life. Since then, we have been working on the margins to improve the character of the opportunity we already provided. Final responsibility for making the best, or the worst of this opportunity will rest with Iraqis.

Myth Creation and that ‘Nauseating Phrase:’ ‘Hearts and Minds’: The Real Meaning of ‘Hearts and Minds’?

By Stuart Gordon¹

The two most enduring principles derived from the British counter insurgency in Malaya are that effective COIN strategies entail militaries capturing the ‘hearts and minds’ of a population whilst the organisational framework employed to achieve this should achieve ‘unity of effort’ defined largely in terms of organisational ‘integration.’ At their inception, both strategies had more specific, but broader and significantly more nuanced meanings. However, the myths surrounding both the idea and effectiveness of both ‘hearts and minds’ and ‘unity of effort’ strategies have generated a range of unintended consequences that permeate responses within today’s conflicts. Consequently this paper seeks to unpack the broader underlying meaning of both concepts and draw them into the cotemporary era through offering an alternative mobilising concept, ‘mission authority’ that more adequately reflects the real meaning of the original concepts.

The Real ‘Hearts and Minds’ Strategy?

The British COIN experience in Malaya was initially one of well documented failure in which it was clear that, during the course of WW2, the Army had collectively forgotten the lessons of colonial warfare. They faced a Malayan Communist Party (MCP)² that began terrorist operations in the late 1940s - murdering Europeans, terrorising plantation workers and sabotaging industry and transport networks in order to strengthen the insurgency's appeal to the ethnic Chinese – an appeal which in reality was based as much on the denial of their vote, weak property ownership rights and poverty. In this sense the potential attraction of the insurgency was as much a *rejection* of the petty tyranny of the current order as it was an *acceptance* of the communist vision.

The Communists were based largely within the jungles but supported by an ethnic Chinese population who inhabited the urban centres or jungle fringes. The MCP established an underground support network, the Min Yuen, that provided intelligence and supplies to the Communist fighters. The initial British strategy was to treat this insurgency primarily as a military phenomenon; focussing on the technical measures of prosecuting a quasi-conventional campaign and killing guerrillas rather than prioritising the defeat of the political subversion thus placing the entire country under a state of emergency, banning the communist Party, implementing a national registration scheme, conducting mass arrests, deportations, organising a massive expansion of the security forces and burning the homes and property of alleged communists. Whilst this disrupted the larger scale guerrilla operations, the MRLA easily evaded the military cordon and sweep operations. These were sufficiently heavy handed to alienate the local population, whilst the MRLA frustrated their effectiveness by reorganising the Min Yuen. If anything, the British strategy resulted in the growth of the guerrilla force to the extent that between mid-1949 and 1950 attacks increased from 100 or so to more than 400 per

¹ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not represent those of the UK MOD or Army.

² Its military wing, the Malay Races Liberation Army MRLA was dominated by ethnic Chinese and was the successor to the British trained and equipped Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).

month. Consequently most historical analyses focus on a perceived stalemate or the deteriorating security situation by 1951.³ They also share a number of other themes: the reaching of a turning ‘point’ somewhere between 1952 and (Templer’s departure in) 1954; the key role of General Templer himself in unifying the various lines of operation and the energisation of the ‘hearts and minds strategies’.⁴

Nevertheless, even by 1951 the overarching counter insurgency strategy included a framework that already had in place several of the elements that were ultimately touted as critical to the eventual success. For example, the population control measures, instigated under the Briggs’ plan (eponymously named after its author, the retired general Sir Harold Briggs, appointed to coordinate military and civilian operations) were already present. Nevertheless, Anthony Short, for example, highlights the ineffective implementation of significant elements of this policy prior to 1951 and its resultant failure, in certain areas, to deliver demonstrable benefits to the population. Consequently, both Anthony Short and Richard Stubbs argue that something new needed to be added in 1951 in order to break the resulting deadlock. Short argues that it was the appointment of Templer as overall co-ordinator that achieved this – with his capacity to overcome organisational inertia and capitalise on the advantages that would otherwise have been missed were it not for the powers vested in him. Stubbs takes an alternative line, arguing that it was the intensification of the ‘hearts and minds’ approach between 1952 and 1954 that was significant. Both, in effect, argue that it was the framework provided by the Briggs plan, either more effectively *implemented* or more creatively *augmented* that explains victory.

The essence of the Briggs plan was a strategy that sought to reduce interaction between the Min Yuen and the ethnic Chinese civilian population⁵ – doing this through a programme of forced resettlements of nearly 500,000 Chinese and the creation of new and heavily ‘policed’ villages.⁶ The intention being to deprive the Communist fighters of supplies and intelligence and contact with the ethnic Chinese civilian population.⁷ Once the Malay authorities were able to control both resources⁸ and the population they were able to limit intelligence, as well as the provision of food and shelter to the guerrillas and push the MRLA back into a jungle in which new and specialised military units – the newly re-established SAS, the Selous Scouts, the Ghurkha Brigade and Royal Marines – were able to hunt them down.⁹ Increasingly active patrolling increased further the pressure on the MRLA and drove them deeper into the jungles.

In 1951 some military units began a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign involving the provision of medical and food aid to indigenous Malays and Sakai tribes largely in the context of food restrictions to the unpacified areas. Furthermore, restrictions were lifted in pacified or ‘white

³ In particular the seminal works by Richard Stubbs and Anthony Short draw attention to the 1951 stalemate.

⁴ See Anthony Short, *Communist Insurrection in Malaya* (London: Muller, 1975); John Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1992).

⁵ Itself based upon securing and separating the ethnic Chinese from MCP influence,

⁶ Resettlement was resented but did imply better living standards and land ownership. The strategy was derived from those employed by the British in the second Boer War (1899 –1902).

⁷ Whilst curfews and food controls enforced compliance from the more rebellious areas and helped to flush out guerrillas

⁸ Controlling food and burning or spraying with herbicide crops planted by the Communists and their supporters.

⁹ This contrast with Iraq where the guerrillas remain embedded within the (particularly Sunni) population and operate within a largely urban environment.

areas' providing incentives for the population to actively inform on the communists. To a significant extent, the strategy relied upon the physical isolation of, and denial of resources to, the guerrillas thereby forcing them to predate upon the Sakai and Malays and earning their enmity. The Malay authorities augmented this approach by undercutting the social justice arguments of the guerrillas through an integrated political, security, development¹⁰ and information strategy: promising elections and national independence; building Malayan security and defence capabilities; integrating police/military and local administrative operations; and developing a comprehensive information operation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Crucially this was in the context of significant and extremely rapid economic growth *and* a much reduced military approach.

Arguably, both Short and Stubbs' explanations underestimate the extent to which the key factors leading to victory were already primed and in place in 1951 (in particular the severe limitations faced by the Malayan National Liberation Army¹¹ and the Malay authorities' capacity to control the population). Stubbs in particular placed an excessive emphasis on the effectiveness of 'hearts and minds' approaches in *wooing* the communists and their supporters as opposed to the increasing effectiveness of measures designed to physically *control* the population, isolate the guerrillas and apply a strategy in which attrition could be brought to bear against terrorists largely separated from civilians and located in the jungles.

The term 'hearts and minds' therefore became attached to a process that supposedly emphasised the active wooing of a population by a military and implied a human rights or development manifesto. The term 'hearts and minds,' understandably described by Templer 12 years after he had first employed it, as that 'nauseating phrase,' was meant to encapsulate a strategy beyond the purely military and to differentiate it from its more overtly 'military' predecessors.

In part, the resulting distortion can be attributed to the nature of the wars' historiography and its excessive reliance upon largely western sources rather than accounts from the guerrillas themselves. Furthermore, western accounts were unlikely to publicly stress the repressive elements of the strategy in the context of the increasingly competitive Cold War particularly given that several of its components (collective punishments, food controls, etc.) represented breaches of International Humanitarian Law and emerging Human Rights norms. Furthermore, the British military proved willing advocates of an aspect of the overall strategy which both

¹⁰ Funded largely by economic growth stemming from investment resulting from the Korean War.

¹¹ However, the ultimate success was to a large extent a product of a uniquely favourable context. Unlike the majority of insurgencies it was possible to control the flow of people and resources into the Malay peninsula to an unprecedented degree whilst denying the MRLA borders behind which it could retreat when pressured. This contrasts with Iraq's famously porous borders. Furthermore, the MRLA lacked supportive and neighbouring allies willing to destabilise the country and undermine any UK presence. Other, potentially critical states, were engaged with and distracted by the war in Korea – contrasting with, for example, the support given to the Viet Cong by the North Vietnamese Army or alleged Syrian and Iranian support to insurgents in Iraq. Similarly the MCP drew its support largely from the minority ethnic Chinese community whilst support amongst Moslem Malays and the other much smaller tribes was almost non-existent. Furthermore, many Malays already had a pre-existing and often quite positive relationship with the British. Many Malaysians, including Chin Peng himself, had fought alongside the British against the Japanese occupation in WWII. Relationships, trust, networks all gave the British a significant advantage when compared to, for example, the US in Iraq and the French in Indo-China. Hence physical geography, history and ethnic topography provided an extremely and unusually favourable set of conditions. Nevertheless, it still took 12 years to defeat the insurgency.

legitimised and stressed their contribution to eventual success. Contrastingly there were few who wished to provide analytical balance through stressing the contributions to eventual victory made by the more repressive elements of the strategy.

Whilst the term ‘hearts and minds’ is arguably inappropriate, the strategy could perhaps more accurately be described as the pursuit of ‘campaign authority’ comprising three elements: the creation of a ‘grand political bargain’; a sophisticated concept of unity of effort; and the carefully regulated use of force, or ‘force posture’ at all levels. The approach did not entail the specific pursuit of legality, development, ‘restraint’ or human rights objectives but the creation of a somewhat fungible sense of legitimacy and a recognition of the proportionality and limitation that underpinned the military, police and legislative responses. Together these were designed to deliver a population that was benign or neutral in its attitude to the British military. If this was not possible it was to be *physically* controlled and separated from the actual insurgents.

A Grand Political Bargain?

The British anticipation of the rapid growth of Malay nationalism and their recognition that they should yield before it veered out of control resulted in a public emphasis on a free, independent, politically and economically viable state (particularly by the Permanent Secretary for Defence, Sir Robert Thompson). This ‘grand political bargain’ was underwritten by a recognition that the British commitment was likely to be protracted.¹² Furthermore, the objectives: self rule, capitalism and a somewhat authoritarian model of democracy, were largely consistent with Malay culture and the broad aspirations of their population. The existence of this bargain was crucial in that not only did it undercut one of the MCP’s principal grievances but it gave Malays a stake in the British vision of stability without undermining existing traditional power structures. Furthermore, the visible progress towards early independence set clear limits on the appeal of the insurgency denying it mobilising propaganda whilst also contributing to the majority of the civil population’s, Malays and even Chinese, perceptions of common (and to some extent) legitimate goals that increasingly cut across ethnic boundaries. Furthermore, the early, albeit slow, but highly visible, transfer of civilian and military power to local Malay decision makers, even including ethnic Chinese, created an increasingly Malay, rather than British face to the counter-insurgency, and established a significant group of Malay’s with a vested interest in confronting the MCP. This also created a sense that the political objectives were not simply externally imposed but represented a well communicated ‘grand political bargain’ that a *significant* proportion of Malays and, increasingly, ethnic Chinese could buy into. This provided a significant component of *campaign authority* at the strategic level.

Nevertheless, whilst the British approach was ultimately successful there are clear limits to its application elsewhere. The British succeeded because they identified *a* rather than *the* ‘universal’ grand political bargain. The content of any grand political bargain is context dependent whereas the need to identify and sell *a* suitable bargain is universal. Furthermore, the timing is significant. It may be possible to construct such bargains on only a limited number of occasions. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, the British opportunistically identified and promoted their particular grand political bargain at an appropriate time. Nevertheless, the British

¹² This results from a variety of reasons, the Cold War context, an acceptance of casualties derived from a degree of ‘imperial fortitude’ and the absence of a critical investigative media.

faced few of the obstacles that have confronted the coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, Malay opinion and 'identity' were never as fragmented as they have been in both of these cases, nor was the physical presence of the British in Malaya as contentious as a western presence in Afghanistan or Iraq. Equally, the Malay Colonial authorities were able to constructively harness the pre-existing Malay political and social structures in a way that posed few of the challenges of, for example, empowering the power brokers in Afghanistan (largely tribal/ethnically defined warlords) or resurrecting and empowering the numerous tribal structures within Iraq. Furthermore, in Malaya, where the loyalty of specific population groups or their neutrality could *not* be guaranteed, it was possible to substitute repressive physical and legislative control measures.

In Iraq the failure of post-combat (or 'phase 4') planning was most problematic in terms of the absence of a 'grand political bargain' which could be developed by the more moderate Iraqis. Equally, any such plan would have had to overcome a difficult dilemma: the promise of an enduring US commitment to Iraq smacked of occupation, whilst an ambiguous commitment created a space in which aspiring power brokers could compete with the new authorities. Nevertheless, it is still possible to construct a grand political bargain in Iraq in which significant elements of the Kurds, Shia and even Sunni, the hot bed of the insurgency, can be accommodated. Krepinovich, for example, sketches out elements of a possible approach, arguing that a grand political bargain in Iraq should encompass the 'key Iraqi religious and ethnic groups and cut across key tribal and familial units.' He argues that it is possible to draw 'significant elements of each major ethnic and religious group' into a broad based coalition in pursuing a 'democratic, unified Iraq' and underwritten by US power. He admits that the 'Kurds would likely be the easiest to win over' and are anxious for the insurgency to be defeated and argue that they require a long-term U.S. presence in order 'to protect them against Shiite dominance or a Sunni restoration, as well as against external threats from Iran and Turkey.' He also argues that a 'small, but significant, Sunni element may also want the insurgency defeated, if it can be assured of a long-term U.S. presence to hedge against both Shiite domination (and retribution) and Iranian domination of a Shiite-led government.' He also suggests that, as with the Kurdish groups, many Shiites also want the insurgency to be defeated and are equally wary of Iranian subversion. He concludes that this minority of Shiites may also accept a more protracted U.S. presence in order to reduce the risks of civil war and Iranian interference.¹³

Whilst such bargains are difficult to construct it is not necessary to achieve unanimity. Rather a bargain that prevents other fault lines (ethnic, tribal, economic, regional) from reinforcing the problems and creating cross-cutting allegiances is preferable to one that pursues more abstract norms. Nevertheless, the grand political bargain is the foundation to 'campaign authority'.

Unity of Effort

A second particularly enduring 'norm' that emerged from Malaya was that of 'unity of effort.' This was enshrined within the Briggs plan's reorganisation of the colonial state's capacity to combat insurgents and to address the way in which the insurgents were able to gain support from the population. It established a mechanism for directing and co-ordinating the entire war effort

¹³ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr, 'How to Win in Iraq' *Foreign Affairs*, September/ October 2005 at <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84508/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-win-in-iraq.html>

through civil-military executive committees comprising a chief federal agency and subordinate committees at state and district levels and resulting in a much more cohesive effort drawing together the hard security plans (plans for patrols, ambushes, intelligence gathering) with punitive elements (population and food control) under the direction of a series of regional and ultimately national war executive committees.¹⁴

Nevertheless, under the original Briggs plan there were a number of apparent weaknesses – principally the absence of someone in charge overall. The then Director of Operations, Briggs himself, was unable to formally direct the police or military. Consequently Coates argues that he “could only direct his intentions through the [general officer commanding] Malaya and the commissioner of police, and the executive impotence of this arrangement retarded the real effectiveness of his office.”¹⁵ Briggs had already identified the weakness of this arrangement but, with the murder by the MCP of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, in October 1951, the resulting political ‘shock’ enabled Briggs to develop an even more unified structure.¹⁶ Following the investigation into the murder the Secretary of State for the Colonies determined that “there must be one man in charge of both military affairs and . . . he would have to be a general.”¹⁷ This created the conditions for the appointment of General Templer, who combined the positions of High Commissioner and Director of Operations throughout his tenure, only reverting to a separate structure with his departure in 1954 and following a marked decline in MCP incidents - from 500 per month to less than 100 at the point of his departure.

Under Templer, the committees developed into what were clearly synergistic and action focused structures.¹⁸ But the military generally did not have primacy within these reflecting the comparative advantage of the Police Special Branch units. Police Officers, more able to access the Malay population, dominated the provision of intelligence, resulting in a civilian focus to the co-ordination structures. At District level, for example, many Army units and formations effectively established their headquarters *around* police operations cells. Consequently, the counter insurgency effort essentially became a policing operation with military support (police casualties far exceeded those of the military) defined largely in terms of outer cordon operations—causing Templer to comment at one point that he thought there was little for a divisional commander to do save ensure the provision of beer for the troops.

These arrangements were not simply semantic rather they reflected a move from a counter-insurgency to a rudimentary ‘internal security’ strategy. Many militaries prove reluctant to accept such a transition. In Northern Ireland, for example, it was not until the mid 1970s that

¹⁴ For coverage of the administrative arrangements see Anthony Short, ‘*Communist Insurrection in Malaya*’ (London: Muller, 1975 pp.378-85); John Coates, ‘*Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954*’ (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1992) pp.116-119; Richard Stubbs, ‘*Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960*’ (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp. 98-101.

¹⁵ John Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), p. 95.

¹⁶ Noel Barber, *The War of the Running Dogs: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1971), pp. 130-32.

¹⁷ Quoted in *Ibid*, p.111.

¹⁸ At the lower levels the committees tended to comprise operational commanders with the capacity to task units.

police primacy was restored. Similarly, Shaw¹⁹ argues that the US military advisory group in Vietnam found it difficult to accept the ‘criminalisation’ strategy implied by a policy of police primacy. Nevertheless, the core of an insurgency strategy is the struggle for political legitimacy. Consequently, apart from the operational benefits, ensuring police primacy casts the insurgents in the role of the criminal and denies them a significant degree of legitimacy. Contrastingly, military primacy confers a significant degree of legitimacy on their opponent.

A reluctance to switch approaches may reflect particular preferences derived from specific military cultures. For example, the US military have a strong ‘Jominian’ culture – a preference for ‘big wars’ with a corresponding emphasis upon a formed ‘Army’, the application of fire and manoeuvre, and a preference for limited political control and defining victory in terms of the destruction of the enemy’s capacity to prosecute conventional military operations as formed bodies. Within such a culture, the concept of ‘unity of effort’ can be reduced to one that effectively guarantees military ‘supremacy’ over (or simply separation from) civilian political control and civil agencies. For example, US Joint Publication 3-08 implies the autonomy and separation of the military in some form of joint task force, whilst civil affairs doctrine generally can appear to relegate civil-military interaction to Civil Affairs (CA) structures and/or Civil Military Operations Centers or ‘CMOCs’. Equally, the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept applied in Afghanistan, and due to be extended to Iraq, frequently means, in reality, a range of largely military-led assistance strategies. These approaches contrast with the approaches in Malaya which were based more upon organisations which reflected the comparative advantages of their constituent parts and what could be described as ‘complementary approaches’ rather than their institutional subordination within military-led structures.

Unity of Effort and Economic Strategies

The concept of ‘unity of effort’ was not simply reflected organisationally but also in terms of the relationship between economic and military developments. Templer, more than anyone else, was responsible for defining the interrelationship between governance and counter insurgency operations. He argued that: “Any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all,”²⁰ and that the “two activities are completely and utterly interrelated;”²¹ continually stressing the importance of democracy, independence and development through a centrally managed information operations campaign. The success of this approach is often measured in terms of the coincidence of Templer’s tenure and the dramatic drop in MCP related attacks and the substantial decline in recruitment to (and retention within) the ranks of the MCP. The question as to whether he was directly responsible for these is beyond the scope of this paper but the success has generated a myth that ‘unity of effort’ is synonymous with a high degree of military control in an organisational sense and that economic reconstruction efforts are essentially linked to strategic success through their contribution to winning ‘hearts and minds.’

¹⁹ GDT Shaw, ‘Policemen versus soldiers, the debate leading to MAAG objections and Washington rejections of the Core of the British Counter Insurgency Advice.’ In *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol.12., No.2/Summer 2001.

²⁰ Quoted in Sunderland, ‘*Organizing Counterinsurgency*’, p. 64.

²¹ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr, ‘How to Win in Iraq’ *Foreign Affairs*, September/ October 2005 at <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84508/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-win-in-iraq.html>

Undoubtedly economic development did have a positive impact on the reduction in the appeal of the MCP. During the 1950s in particular, the infrastructure of Malaya grew rapidly and the combination of war and economic development clearly forged a new sense of national identity – but this was *not* led by military reconstruction teams. The overwhelming majority of economic reconstruction efforts (and other forms of assistance) were co-ordinated and delivered by the civilian organs of the Colonial state. The military role was largely restricted to providing an outer cordon, a security framework, in which the development work progressed. It was not ‘who’ did economic reconstruction, civilian or military, that reduced MCP recruitment and retention rates, but its *overall* effectiveness. In particular labour market reform, the reform of land ownership, improvements in local representation and delivering a better life to rural populations weaned potential recruits to the MCP away from the specific appeal of communist ideology. The tangible and real growth in the Malay economy was not engineered by the British military. Rather this vast experiment in social engineering delivered genuine security and improved living conditions, local representation, and, above all, legal entitlement to the land. However, the key point is that this process was not led by the military and nor was it particularly linked to force protection goals. These, if they existed at all, were essentially peripheral benefits.

Nevertheless, where there might have been rewards in terms of force protection was in terms of the inclusion of reconstruction benefits in the ‘roadmap to success.’ At both the strategic and tactical levels, Malays were informed of the rewards for ‘pacification’²² – strategically it was independence, whereas at the tactical level the achievement of clearly identified objectives resulted in the easing of emergency legislation.

This approach to the linkage of military-led reconstruction and force protection contrasts with the approaches employed in both Iraq and Afghanistan where military led reconstruction efforts are perceived to be integrally linked to force protection. However, in both cases there is an absence of evidence supporting the idea that military led or managed reconstruction translates directly into force protection goals. Furthermore, there is significant evidence that force protection goals are achieved more effectively by other means - interaction with the local population through patrolling, fostering informal linkages with community leaders and the sharing of information rather than through military participation in community-based assistance projects. The linkage of militarised relief and the force protection may at worst be a myth but at best it is grossly exaggerated.

Campaign Authority and Force Posture

Despite the association of the phrase ‘hearts and minds’ with the strategy employed in Malaya the tactics were in reality extremely robust. Templer was given the capacity to mobilize the totality of the colonial state against the insurgents and provided with almost plenipotentiary military and civil powers which he wielded ruthlessly to create, not some liberal human rights haven, but a powerful, unitary state. Heussler records that this was not without moments of dark comedy. Templer, addressing the supposedly recalcitrant Chinese inhabitants of one of the new villages, stated that "You are all bastards." The Chinese interpreter, paused before translating this

²² Templer introduced incentive schemes for rewarding surrendering rebels and those who encouraged the surrenders. Furthermore, increasingly desperate and brutal attacks by the communists mobilised support against them.

as: "his excellency says none of your parents were married." Templer continued: "And I can be a bastard too." The Chinese interpreter paused once more before offering: "his excellency says his parents were also unmarried."²³

Whilst Templer's approach was systematically far more robust than that employed subsequently by practically any other state in its dealings with domestic insurgency, a particular element in its success was the capacity to appear to draw a distinction between a 'state of emergency' and the imposition of martial law and a general acceptance of this by the Malay population. Whilst the 1948 Emergency Measures were clearly draconian, there existed a significant degree of restraint in their application: a right of judicial appeal and the active creation of the impression of civilian, but particularly police primacy. Furthermore, the emphasis on rule-based approaches to search and cordon operations and collective punishments such as food controls provided a degree of legitimacy whilst the well publicised punishment of security force members that breached the published and established codes reinforced the sense of proportionality, limitation and distinction and made significant contributions to perceptions of the underlying legitimacy of the Emergency Measures.²⁴ The recognition that the colonial state employed only legitimated 'emergency measures' rather than 'all measures,' perhaps more than anything else, sets the US strategy in Central Iraq and parts of Afghanistan apart from the approach adopted in Malaya.²⁵

A key factor in this was an effective information campaign which publicised the range of emergency rules as well as their interpretation and justification. The result was that, whilst never popular, the rules were perceived to be an appropriate, reasonable and relatively proportionate response to the MCP's use of terror. The information operations campaign also emphasised the dilemma for the MCP – terrorism could get you heard garner attention but was not perceived as legitimate by the majority of Malays, particularly in the face of continuing reforms. Furthermore, the MCPs own information campaign was increasingly difficult given their containment in the jungle and the resulting curbs on their access to the population. This forced the MCP to rely *more* on terror in order to be heard, but continually risking the further alienation of the people – yet not employing it risked further marginalisation.

The British 'force posture' also supported tactical level 'campaign authority.' Army and police operational procedures were framed within a handbook entitled *Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya*. This recognised the strategic value of *restraint* in military operations reflecting this in rules of engagement, non-lethal measures for effecting crowd control and procedures for search and arrest operations. For example, the requirement for police to clear Army Areas of Operation (AOs) of non-combatants reduced significantly collateral damage. Furthermore, increasing measures that transferred responsibility for security to Malays – home guards in villages (closely

²³ Robert Heussler, *British Rule in Malaya, 1942–57* (Singapore, 1983) p.186.

²⁴ Richard L. Clutterbuck, *The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 36.

²⁵ The sense that the US response reflects 'all available measures' rather than a range of appropriate, proportionate and legitimate 'emergency measures' is reflected in a range of US policy responses. The regime surrounding the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo/Bhagram and Abu Ghraib and the issue of 'rendering'; rules of engagement (in Iraq in particular) that seem to allow disproportionate levels of force and the use of lethal force in situations wherein there is not necessarily an imminent threat to the lives of coalition soldiers or where it is not clear that an hostile act is underway; through to a sense amongst Iraqis that alleged breaches of IHL are not enthusiastically investigated by US military authorities.

monitored by the police), the formation of the Malay Regiment (run by Malay officers), etc, ensured that the Malay population assumed responsibility for their own security and for holding ground, albeit tightly controlled by the Colonial authorities.

The Consequences of these Myths?

Whilst the concepts of ‘hearts and minds’ and ‘unity of effort’ have both survived the context of their birth, they have become short-hand for something other than what they originally were - a complex of hard and soft security and information measures – integrated intelligence/police/military efforts largely under civil-control; control of the ‘vulnerable’ (or recidivist) parts of the population; their separation from the MCP (Min Yeun); a vigorous and comparatively sophisticated media campaign; significant civilian-led economic development; profound political reform and, in particular, progress towards independence. However, the interpretation of both principles within the COIN strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to their redefinition and, in particular, the redefining of *unity of effort* in terms of the militarisation of responses to reconstruction and humanitarian assistance strategies. This results as much from military cultural preferences, the pursuit of the Jominian war, reinforcing historical myths associated with the concepts of ‘hearts and minds’ and ‘unity of effort’ as it does from contemporary contextual factors such as obligations under the law of belligerent occupation, and chronic insecurity resulting in the absence of civilian reconstruction and ‘stabilisation’ capacities.

Furthermore, the redefinition of ‘hearts and minds’ in a way that ultimately linked military-led reconstruction efforts to the loyalty of the population and therefore force protection benefits, has entailed a dangerous, blurring of boundaries between military led assistance efforts and those from the humanitarian community. The limited evaluation of their Afghanistan ‘Quick Impact Projects’ conducted by USAID in 2003 implies little or no linkage between reconstruction efforts and force protection benefits. Yet, despite such evidence, and reinforced by a sense that the principle of ‘unity of effort’ entails the organisational *integration* of all humanitarian and development organisations, their remains a profound belief in the automaticity and immediacy of a linkage between the military delivery of humanitarian and reconstruction projects and force protection. Arguably, and far beyond the scope of this paper, the two principles, ‘hearts and minds’ and ‘unity of effort’ have converged in such a way as to entail the loss of impartiality, independence and neutrality for the humanitarian community – the cornerstones of their security. In this sense, the creation in Afghanistan of military-led ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ (PRTs) create genuine, albeit unintended consequences, without necessarily achieving some of the objectives that they set. This is particularly worrying given that the history of the Malayan counter-insurgency appears to suggest ways of mitigating these responses. In Malaya, the creation of civilian-led district development committees worked effectively, particularly through the 1950s. Arguably a strategy developed by the US PRT based in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2005, offers a model that is much closer to the approaches employed successfully in Malaya. As opposed to offering an alternative to civilian-led reconstruction, an allegation often leveled against other PRTs, the Kandahar PRT planned to support the development of the local Governor’s Provincial Development Committee. In this context, the approach to ‘unity of effort’ more accurately reflected the approaches derived from Malaya.

Whilst the counter insurgency in Malaya was ultimately successful, the principles of 'unity of effort' and 'hearts and minds' have had a very damaging effect on the way in which many soldiers think about counter-insurgency. Arguably, the alternative mobilising concept, campaign authority, offers a more useful and appropriate principle – focusing on the tailored use of force, the creation of a grand political bargain, a sophisticated media campaign and the appropriate use of economic development.

Great Power Counterinsurgency: Small Wars, Special Operations, and the French in Algeria

By Michael McClintock

Britain and France developed counterinsurgency doctrines from long experience with conquest and colonial administration, with both doctrines developing on roughly similar tracks up until World War II. In both, small wars doctrines covered what we would now call low intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, stability operations, or operations other than war.

The United States' limited comparable experience, from the Indian Wars of the 19th century to the early interventions in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Philippines had a similar influence on doctrine. A direct parallel with the European small wars doctrines fell to the force most frequently detailed to perform the constabulary function in the new American sphere of the late 19th and early 20th century, the U.S. Marines. The Marine's 1940 *Small Wars Manual* encapsulated this doctrine in the lead up to World War II.

World War II marked a juncture for the small wars doctrines of the British, the United States, and the French militaries in the face of immediate pressures for post-war decolonization and the proliferation of wars of national liberation.

- Britain retained a strong special operations capacity that had gained enormous experience in the course of the war, but its post-war counterinsurgency doctrine remained very much on the track of traditional small wars doctrine, duly modernized.
- The United States' post-war counterinsurgency doctrine, in a departure from its small wars tradition, moved firmly into the unconventional warfare basket, a “special” compartmentalized discipline fenced off from conventional forces.¹
- In the French experience, the mainstream military was transformed by a new “revolutionary warfare” doctrine in the course of the Algerian war. France's unconventional warfare and secret intelligence adepts came to dominate the armed forces as a whole and led it to mutiny and disgrace.

The French initially sought to reverse the tide of decolonization through the time-honored means of its own small wars tradition. But its experience in Indochina led to a transformation of French doctrine intended to mirror the very tenets of “revolutionary warfare” that guided its adversaries.

The result was the application of a doctrine in the 1954-1962 war in Algeria that was a fusion of colonial means and methods with a new emphasis on special operations, secret intelligence, and unconventional tactics. The theorist-practitioners who devised the new doctrine were veterans of secret intelligence assignments in Indochina and committed to fighting future revolutionary wars without restrictions.

The new French doctrine of “la guerre révolutionnaire”—“revolutionary warfare”—legitimated the use of terror to fight terror and ushered in the era of the “*guerre sale*,” the dirty war. Algeria

was its principal theatre of operations. A dominant feature of the new doctrine was the legitimization of torture as a tactic and its use on an enormous scale by intelligence technicians and army conscripts alike. A principal consequence of the new tactics was the institutional breakdown of the French army itself.

In the course of World War II, the United States too had developed a core of experience in the conduct of behind the lines operations and the beginnings of a doctrine of unconventional warfare. The transition from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to the post-war Central Intelligence Agency (1947) initially moved the exclusive responsibility for behind-the-cold war-lines functions, and many of its former personnel, to the new civilian agency.

With the creation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare in 1951 and the U.S. Army Special Forces, catalyzed by the Korean War, the military reclaimed an institutional interest in covert special operations and developed a new doctrine of unconventional warfare. Initially focused on behind the lines actions—with a view principally to *creating* and *leading* guerrillas in a Soviet-occupied Europe, the assignment of *counter*-insurgency operations and doctrine to the special operations establishment came later. In the process, the United States departed from its pre-war doctrine, jumping the small wars track of mainstream military tradition and experience.

At the same time, the military even at the height of American involvement in counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia and Central America, never fully accepted a mainstream counterinsurgency mission for the armed forces or internalized its specialized doctrine. The center held.ⁱⁱ

While the parallels of the American with the French experience, and their intersection in Indochina, deserve attention, the course of British doctrine and experience provides a more demonstrative contrast between a doctrine that evolved and modernized, without departing from fundamental precepts of military traditional and law, and the French experience, in which small wars doctrine and the mainstream military itself was overwhelmed by ideology and a resort to the very outlaw methods attributed to its enemies. The state's adoption of lawless tactics in Algeria, in particular torture, terrorized an already alienated population and destroyed any claim by those claiming authority to legitimacy.

Two Strands of British Doctrine

The British developed a new capacity for special operations before and during World War II, building upon the experience of irregular warfare in Palestine, Ethiopia, and other conflicts. The war-time experience of behind the lines operations and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) became a template for the United States' own wartime structures of covert secret intelligence operations.

In the post-war period, the British confronted immediate pressures for decolonization through violent insurgency. Two principal strands of doctrine were available for the response. The dominant strand adopted and developed was the longstanding doctrine of the small war, much as set out in Charles E. Callwell's *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (1896) and Major General Sir Charles W. Gwynn's pragmatic *Imperial Policing* (1934). The doctrine, while amended over time, centered heavily on population control, firm administrative structures, an

emphasis on policing, and a range of patently colonial military options for punitive action and collective reprisals against defiant communities.

Callwell, an artillery officer seconded to intelligence, had served in Afghanistan and South Africa; recalled to active duty in 1914 he became chief of operations in the war office. Callwell's career, like that of post-World War II British counterinsurgent Frank Kitson, blended hands-on experience with "small wars" with a background in the conventional skills, attitudes and experience of military professionalism; both eventually rose to the top of the regular armed forces.

The small war, in Callwell's definition, was a campaign by a regular army against irregulars, or "forces in which their armament, their organization, and their discipline are palpably inferior to it," terms that might still apply to most of today's "low intensity" operations. The conditions of the small war were, as a consequence, distinct from those of "modern regular warfare..."ⁱⁱⁱ These wars were further defined as "expeditions undertaken for some ulterior political purpose, or to establish order in some foreign land - wars of expediency, in fact."^{iv}

While such operations were often undertaken to "punish an insult or to chastise a people," the small wars typology also embraced responses to forms of "partisan warfare"—as in the "quelling of sedition and of insurrections in civilized countries," or, alternatively, "for the settlement of conquered or annexed territory—two common scenarios for what would now be called counterinsurgency."^v

Callwell's small war also include "campaigns of conquest," "punitive expeditions," and "campaigns to wipe out an insult, to avenge a wrong, or to overthrow a dangerous enemy." In each case, the presumption is that British forces will enjoy a vast superiority in weaponry, tactics, and military organization. This unequal nature of the small war conflict was its defining feature, and understood primarily as offering enormous advantages to the Great Power—an ironic counterpoint to today's emphasis on the *handicaps* faced by modern states in confronting "asymmetrical" warfare.

A secondary strand drew from Britain's considerable experience with unconventional warfare, from T.E. Lawrence's 1914-1918 operations in the Middle East to Orde Wingate's experiments in multiple theatres of operation: from the organization of the Special Night Squads in British Palestine in the late 1930s to campaigning with Ethiopian resistance fighters in 1941 and the Chindit Special Force in Burma (1942-1943). The war-time capacity for behind the lines operations developed by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) became a permanent part of the military and intelligence arsenal. This unconventional warfare strand of British experience played a relatively modest, and extremely focused, part in its post-war military operations and what was to become a modern British doctrine of counterinsurgency.^{vi} (The term unconventional warfare is used here in the sense of American doctrine, to refer to both a kind of war and a range of tactics, in particular operations utilizing irregular forces and tactics in the enemy's sphere of interest.)

In Malaya, the British adapted and updated pre-war doctrine to confront a Communist insurgency between 1948 and 1960. Influence of the unconventional warfare strand appears to

have been relatively modest. While elite Special Air Services (SAS) forces penetrated the sparsely populated interior in hunter killer operations to seek out insurgents, there was no wholesale creation of secret irregular units or turn to covert operations outside a transparent framework of law. Nor was torture widely reported or the object of widespread protests.^{vii} An emphasis on civil administration, law, and policing, backed by military power, prevailed. An important part of the British response was a real commitment to unity of effort between civil administrators, the police, and military authorities.

A fundamental principle in Malaya was that the government function in accordance with the law—that maintaining a firm legal framework for its operations was essential for it to establish or to retain legitimacy and to be effective. Sir Robert Thompson, in his 1966 book *Fighting Communist Insurgency, Malaya and Vietnam*, elaborated upon this as one of five guiding principles for counterinsurgency.^{viii} In doing so, Thompson anticipated later writing on the particular stresses and strains involved in fighting terrorism or insurgency, while warning of the very high stakes involved in giving in to outlaw action whatever the cause:

There is a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and with guerrilla actions for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses being that the processes of law are too cumbersome, that the normal safeguards in the law for the individual are not designed for an insurgency and that a terrorist deserves to be treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this morally wrong, but over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves. A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot expect its people to obey the law. Functioning in accordance with the law is a very small price to pay in return for the advantage of being the government.^{ix}

Thompson was the Permanent Secretary of Defence-Malaya during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), and the head of the British Advisory Mission in Vietnam in the early 1960s. But Thompson also knew the principles of unconventional warfare from first hand experience. In World War II he had served in Orde Wingate's last such venture, the Chindit Special Force, a prototypical Long Range Penetration Group operating behind the lines in Burma.

Notwithstanding its emphasis on law, the British model was not all about hearts and minds. Almost half a million people in Malaya, most of them ethnic Chinese, were forcibly relocated and confined to fortified settlements during the Malayan Emergency. Thompson himself stressed that some very harsh laws were established in Malaya, including the death penalty for carrying arms, life imprisonment for aiding the insurgents (including by providing food), and administrative detention for those suspected even of *sympathies* with the insurgency. The law could be harsh, but each law “must be effective and fairly applied.”^x Some, he added, were quickly rescinded as counterproductive, for the harm done to “innocent members of the population.”^{xi} In Malaya, writes Thompson, “The population knew what the law was, and because the government itself functioned in accordance with the law...the population could be required to fulfill its own obligation to obey the laws.”^{xii}

The Emergency declared in Kenya on October 1952, in response to the uprising generally known as the Mau Mau rebellion, was considerably more brutal than the Malayan campaign—in part

because tactics employed against African colonial subjects were traditionally even more brutal than others.^{xiii} Based largely on long-standing colonial doctrine (with some innovations, such as what Frank Kitson described as “pseudo-gangs”), operations included reprisals and the forcible relocation of tens of thousands of Kenyans from the disaffected Kikuyu community into closed camps.^{xiv} Kitson describes the April 1954 “Operation Anvil” as requiring the “rounding up the entire African population of Nairobi - slightly over 100,000 - followed by the sorting out of the 70,000 Kikuyu.”^{xv} Some 27,000 Kikuyu men were subsequently interned in camps.^{xvi}

The Kenyan emergency continued in force until 1960, although the uprising had been crushed, its last leaders hunted down and killed, by late 1955. The end of the declared emergency was precipitated in part by scandal over ongoing brutality against Kenyan internees: the findings of a parliamentary inquiry into the beating to death of 11 internees at Hola Camp on March 3, 1959. The deaths, a consequence of punishments for the internees' principled refusal to work, ignited a storm of protest in London and around the world.^{xvii}

The bottom line of the British doctrine, despite the brutality of colonial methods, was that the effectiveness of counterinsurgency depended ultimately on the legitimacy of the government and its institutions. The rule of law was the key to this legitimacy and the source of enormous political advantage to the counterinsurgent. Counterinsurgency in Malaya was waged by adapting these principles to controlling the Malayan population and isolating the insurgents—without resort either to massive military firepower or the unrestrained methods of unconventional warfare.

Sir Robert Thompson was perhaps the best known British counterinsurgent of the decolonization period, with his *Defeating Communist Insurgency* one of classic studies of counterinsurgency.^{xviii} Another key exponent of modern British doctrine was Frank Kitson, who drew upon experience in Kenya, Malaya, Muscat and Oman, Cyprus, and Germany in his 1971 classic *Low Intensity Operations*. (The *Army Quarterly* suggested Kitson's book would be as useful as had been Callwell's *Small Wars* and Gwynn's *Imperial Policing*.)

Kitson, notwithstanding his enthusiasm for unconventional methods in Kenya, epitomized the *conventionality* of British counterinsurgency no less than did Thompson: there was little special or marginal about most of his counterinsurgency approach, and officers steeped in this operational and doctrinal area came from the military mainstream—and moved easily back upon completion of assignments. On retirement, in 1985, Kitson was the Commander in Chief of the U.K. Land Forces.

The French and Revolutionary Warfare

The French military emerged from World War II committed to holding on to an overseas empire through a combination of old and new tactics framed by a new ideological view of the world. Whereas British post-war counterinsurgency developed without radical contortions from pre-WWII doctrine, the French model was transformed by a new concept of political warfare. Traditional colonial doctrine was modified with an ideological overlay in order to confront revolutionary warfare on what was believed to be its own terms.

An elaborate cold war doctrine of *guerre révolutionnaire*—revolutionary warfare—developed in the 1950s from methods tested by France in the conquest and occupation of North Africa, Indochina, and Madagascar. *Guerre révolutionnaire*, theory and doctrine, placed the spate of revolutionary activity in the French colonial sphere and around the world in the ideological frame of the cold war and the global threat of Communism.^{xix}

The doctrine's principal innovation was a determination that revolutionary insurgency was necessarily fought by mimicking its organization and tactics. This provided a new rationale and gloss for some of the old methods of pacification, from native paramilitary militias to the use of collective punishment and forcible relocation. The French doctrine was forged in Indochina but reached its highest expression in Algeria, with the conventional tactics of colonial administration and conventional warfare employed side by side with what were perceived as the tactics of the enemy, from terrorism to forced indoctrination.

The endorsement of torture as a matter of policy and its pervasive use in Algeria was possibly the most pernicious aspect of the new doctrine. The routine use of torture not only by the intelligence agencies but by career soldiers and conscripts of the regular army was a hallmark of the war. The army's wholesale embrace of torture had a dramatic effect upon the integrity of the French military itself and a devastating impact on metropolitan France, leading ultimately to the abandonment of support for the colonial war and fratricide within the military itself.

The principal effect of torture on the Algerian population was to mobilize opposition to the French. Although the exponents of the new doctrine stressed its political dimension, as offering a means to win the support of the Algerian people, the adoption of torture as a mechanism of political compulsion and control helped ensure there would be no accommodation with France short of the total independence that was won in July 1962.

The Colonial Doctrine

As did all the European colonial powers, the French had an intimate understanding of the means of compulsion and the subtle variations of coercive violence. The punitive raid, the reprisal killing, the burning of houses or the destruction of crops was the norm in the colonial world: that the colonial officer sought the submission of the colonized was the way of the world. French colonial doctrine (if not practice) is most notable, however, as it concerns the balance to be struck between military force and political action.

The political side of colonial warfare was elaborated in doctrine as the bounds of the French overseas empire were defined in the late 19th century, its greatest theorists the colonial officers Maréchal Joseph Simon Galliéni and Luis Hubert Lyautey. Galliéni's 1898 orders discuss pacification in terms not far distant from those used even in 21st century debates on counterinsurgency and the war in Iraq:

Pacification can best be achieved...through the combined action of force and politics. We must remember in the colonial struggles that we must not destroy except in extreme necessity, and, even then, we must only destroy to better build. Always we must husband the country, and its inhabitants, as the former is destined to receive our future colonial

enterprises, and the latter will be our principal agents and collaborators...Whenever incidents of war oblige one of our colonial officers to act against a village or an inhabited center, he must not lose sight of the fact that his first care, once the submission of the inhabitants is obtained, must be to reconstruct the village, to open a market, to establish a school. It is the combined action of politics and force that must succeed in pacifying the country...^{xx}

Force was to be applied judiciously; a devastated and depopulated land was of little value to the colonizer. Pacification was defined as largely an administrative function undertaken after the first flush of fighting comes to an end. Galliéni warned that terror in itself would, ultimately, provoke resistance.

"A country is not conquered and pacified when a military operation has decimated its inhabitants and made all heads bow in terror; once the first fright has calmed down, the ferments of revolt will germinate in the mass and the rancours accumulated by the brutal action of force will make them grow again."^{xxi}

A similar approach to the limitation of the use of exemplary force as an initial, calculated demonstration of power persisted in 20th century doctrine. The 1923 French army manual for troops overseas comments on the use of force in a discussion of successive stages in pacification, in which military action must conform to political necessity.

[A]t first it is indispensable to give free rein to the use of force as an example...because it is the most persuasive of all arguments in the eyes of the natives...But to use force without absolute necessity, to neglect all the resources of political action because one has at hand the troops to assure a rapid conquest, is often to commit a mistake you will sooner or later regret.^{xxii}

The French *pacificateurs* also warned of the cost to be born should the initial phase of pacification utterly destroy the human networks and institutions that hold together the society to be dominated. Although writing of the 19th century conquest of Algeria, the lesson could apply equally to the recent history of Iraq. The destruction in Algeria of the existing system of administration and local government by 1830 left the French floundering for a means to come to grips with the population that was perhaps never adequately overcome. Algerian governor-general Jules Cambon described the problem in 1894: "We did not realize that in suppressing the forces of resistance in this fashion, we were also suppressing our means of action. The result is that we are today confronted by a sort of human dust on which we have no influence and in which movements take place which are unknown to us."^{xxiii}

The recommended course in the 19th, like the 20th century was a selective, but timely, use of violence: the colonial objective was clearly the submission of the population. But having achieved that end, the soldier, in Galliéni's words, "puts down his arms. He becomes an administrator." This, observed Galliéni, at first "seemed incompatible with the idea of the military role in certain circles"; but this was the true role of the colonial officer. "It is also the most delicate, the task that demands the greatest attention and effort, that brings out the quality of the individual, as to destroy is nothing to the difficulty of reconstruction."^{xxiv}

In his *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar*, Lyautey cites an 1895 report by the then commander of the occupation forces in Indochina, General Auguste Paul Albert Duchemin, on hunting "bandits" - the guerrillas of the time.^{xxv}

[T]he experience of the past proves that one rarely, if ever, succeeds in destroying a bandit group by force. In the hunting expedition which the pursuit of a particular band amounts to, all the advantages belong to the adversary, and there is so much evidence to this effect that it would be superfluous to detail it here; and even an incomplete result is obtained only at the price of weariness, casualties, and expense for which the successes can not compensate.

General Duchemin continues with a metaphor not too far distant from Mao's famous 'fish in the sea' dictum. The "bandit," is compared with "a plant which grows only in certain terrain":

...when it is a question of putting into cultivation a plot which has been invaded by weeds, it is not enough to pull them, and be obliged to start again the next day, but necessary, after having plowed it, to isolate the conquered soil and fence it in; then to sow the good grain which is the only means which will render the terrain inhospitable to the poisonous weeds.^{xxvi}

Through long years of conquest, Algeria served as a principal laboratory of pacification. The initial problem, outlined by the contemporary Prussian theoretician von Decker in 1844, was that a European army, dependent on supply lines and heavy equipment "was unsuited to fight in such unfamiliar conditions. It could not come to grips with the enemy, there were no centers of power to be attacked and the absence of good roads impeded movement."^{xxvii} The 19th century solution, facilitated by an overwhelming advantage in weaponry, was to divide the territory into military and administrative regions linked by a network of military garrisons, posts, and checkpoints.

The 1950s patterns of French recruitment and mobilization for counterinsurgency also have antecedents in earlier colonial experience, including the recruitment of local irregulars to fight local guerrillas (or bandits) and the reinforcement - or manufacture- of inter-ethnic, religious, economic or other communal grievances to motivate native auxiliaries. Traditional and later doctrine placed particular emphasis on recruitment of irregular forces with local knowledge and skills readily applicable to the tasks of scouting, tracking, and irregular military operations. The 1923 manual for French troops overseas discusses the particular utility of locally recruited "irregulars and the *partisans*...in reconnaissance, scouting, and intelligence."^{xxviii} The highly motivated *minorities* that were mobilized in Algeria included members of the estimated one million strong population of European descent, known as the *pied noir* or *colons*.

The tactical and organizational methods developed by Lyautey, Galliéni and conqueror of Algeria Thomas Bugeaud still served as models in 20th century French doctrine. The basic counterinsurgency measures of the 1950s had direct antecedents in the pacification procedures of the previous century: the *quadrillage* system, the division and control of territory through a checkerboard of garrisoned administrative units; *regroupement*, the relocation of suspect

populations; and counterinsurgent *ratissage*, cordoning and “raking” a region, rousing insurgents like lice with a hot gunmetal comb. Even the idea of the “oil spot,” through which military and political control was to be gradually expanded around points of concentration of French resources, was essentially old doctrine renewed.^{xxix}

The influence of the 19th century theorists, and in particular Lyautey, continued at least into the 1950s. The predilection of colonial officers to leaven speeches with quotations from Lyautey did not, however, necessarily reflect a commitment to pursue Lyautey's ideal model of pacification (just as Lyautey's writing failed to reflect the real horror of conquest). A 1959 paper on the Algerian war, prepared by a French pacification officer for his peers, exemplifies this tradition: “...following the precepts of Lyautey, the pacifier by preference exhibits only his potential for violence, resorting to force only after all peaceful means have been exhausted, and always bearing in mind ‘that today's enemy will become tomorrow's ally.’”^{xxx} The underlying principle remained the same:

...in Algeria, [victory] is not a matter of conquering terrain, as it is already French territory, but of conquering the population which is under rebel sway...in general, it is the spirit of the population which one must capture, in order to extirpate the weeds continually sown by the rebels and permit the growth of the good seed.^{xxxi}

The Doctrine of Revolutionary Warfare

The proponents of a comprehensive, radically new military doctrine were thrust to the fore after the debacle at Dien Bien Phu and French withdrawal from Indochina in 1954. The new doctrine combined traditional tactics with political and psychological elements adapted from a French theoretical model of revolutionary warfare. The theory of *guerre révolutionnaire* attempted to unravel the strengths and weaknesses of revolutionary war, and indeed to define its fundamental nature. It defined operational doctrine on that basis.

French doctrine responded to revolutionary insurgency by mimicking revolutionary insurgency—or more correctly, by mirroring a Great Power perception of revolutionary organization and tactics. The new model emphasized psychological, political, and administrative elements in tandem with conventional and covert, unconventional, and patently illegal military tactics. Its application in the Algerian war was exceptional in part because of the scope and intensity of the new tactics' application.

Many of the officers who developed and implemented the doctrine were intelligence and special warfare officers in Indochina, with hands on experience with the tactics that would become the hallmark of what came to be called the *guerre sale*—the dirty war—in Algeria.

- Revolutionary war theorist Colonel Charles Lacheroy was the first head of the covert action side of the French psychological warfare service, the Service d'Action Psychologique et d'Information (SAPI) set up in April 1956. After the 1961 putsch in Algeria he was sentenced to death (in absentia).

- Colonel Yves Godard had in 1948 organized the para's 11th Shock Regiment, the “dirty tricks” unit controlled by the French equivalent of the C.I.A., the S.D.E.C.E.: the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage.^{xxxii} Godard was the Algiers intelligence chief and Colonel Massu's Chief of Staff and “eminence grise” during the Battle of Algiers.
- Colonel Roger Trinquier, author of the revolutionary warfare classic *Modern Warfare*, had a background in intelligence and unconventional warfare in Indochina. Colonel Trinquier's Dispositif de Protection Urbaine, DPU, was an instrument of both intelligence and “counter-terrorism” bombings and assassinations, and a structure through which *piéd noir* “counterterrorists” were brought into the official security structure. (Trinquier turned up as a mercenary in the Congo after Algeria won independence.)^{xxxiii}
- General Raoul Salan served in the Deuxième Bureau—military intelligence—in the first decades of his career, before becoming a commander in Indochina and later Algeria. Salan led the 1958 coup in Algiers, and afterwards the clandestine Organization Armée Secrète (OAS) that in 1961 began a campaign of terrorism against the French state itself.^{xxxiv}
- General Paul Aussaresses, the Algiers intelligence chief now known for an unrepentant tell-all book on torture and official terrorism in Algeria (2000), and his resulting conviction by the French courts for “apologia for war crimes,” had served behind the lines in occupied Europe and subsequently in the SDECE’s clandestine Service Action in Indochina. Aussaresses served as an officer in Algeria from 1955 to 1957, mainly as an intelligence officer in General Massu’s paratroop unit.^{xxxv}

The revolutionary war confronted by France was defined as a product of a doctrine and an action program of international Communism, proceeding in progressive stages in which small unit terrorist tactics are combined with psychological warfare. French officer Colonel Georges Bonnet even advanced a simple formula to this effect as “valid for all revolutionary movements that today agitate the world.” This was partisan warfare (which can be translated as guerrilla warfare) + psychological warfare = revolutionary warfare.^{xxxvi} An essential characteristic observed in revolutionary war was “the role of individuals and small groups using terror and irregular tactics, without denying the eventual importance to the insurgents of sizable, conventionally organized formations.”^{xxxvii}

Revolutions were seen to be made unnaturally, contrived and brought to fruition by outside experts in accord with a universal formula. Even in the political sphere, the emphasis was on insurgent tactics (or techniques) and the presumption that they could be flipped and turned to the purpose of the counterinsurgent.

A French officer writing in 1957 under the pseudonym “Ximenes,” for example, explained that the population was *conquered* by revolutionary cadre and then turned against the status quo. “Revolutionary warfare has for its aim the takeover of power, made possible through the active help of the physically and morally conquered population, employing destructive and constructive techniques that are applied according to a definite procedure.”^{xxxviii} “Ximenes” was consistent

with the other French theorists in asserting baldly that "a prime characteristic of revolutionary war (is) that it is waged by remote control...and essentially ideological in nature..."^{xxxix}

Similarly, theorist-practitioner Col. Charles Lacheroy argued that as revolutionary war was merely a matter of technique imposed upon an accessible, malleable population, the counter-revolutionary could be successful in the same manner. "As it is a question of techniques and only techniques, there is no reason why Franco-Vietnamese technicians cannot do it as well as those of the Vietminh—and more rapidly since they benefit from the experience of the enemy."^{xl} Like Lacheroy, Indochina veteran Roger Trinquier, one of the most influential of the theoretician/practitioners, stressed that in revolutionary warfare, "The counter guerrilla struggle...is definitely a question of *method*."^{xli}

Lacheroy's famous dictum was that "in the beginning, there was nothing. Nothing." How then were the insurgents (outsiders) to win "the unconditional support" that Trinquier holds is the condition of victory in modern warfare? Trinquier's take on popular support, by the insurgent or the state, was that "[i]f it doesn't exist, it must be secured by every possible means, the most effective of which is *terrorism*."^{xlii} Trinquier concluded that "[t]he goal of modern warfare is control of the populace," and as a consequence, "terrorism is a particularly appropriate weapon, since it aims directly at the inhabitant."^{xliii}

Trinquier's *Modern Warfare* provides a theoretical rationale for official terrorism (of the bombs and assassination sort), describing terrorism as "the principal weapon of modern warfare," and as such a weapon rightly available to both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. "Quite simply, terrorism is a weapon of warfare, and it is important to stress it." The terrorist fights "within the framework of his organization, without personal interest...the same as the soldiers in the armies confronting him." "His victims are often women and children...But during a period of history when the bombing of open cities is permitted, and when two Japanese cities were razed...one cannot with good cause reproach him." By removing from terrorism the stigma of infamy, and eliminating the distinction between combatant and non-combatant, the way is opened to the use of terrorism by the traditional participants in warfare, the servants of states.

Trinquier also discusses official counter-terror on a practical level. A first stage of the *enemy's* use of "selective terrorism" is seen to be the targeting of "leaders and small functionaries." The response is to use the same tactics: an "intelligence-action service," can be used to target and destroy the leaders of "the opposing organization." In terms much like those of contemporary American declassified documents of the 1960s on "selective counter-terror," Trinquier suggests "opponents" be eliminated preferably "before they constitute a danger," adding that "if for various reasons—in general, political ones—we are not authorized to do this, we ought to observe their development closely..."^{xliv}

The political dimension of French counterinsurgency, about which so much was written, boiled down to a conviction that terror and psychological manipulation could be effective means to coerce even a disaffected population into providing political support.

We know that the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of a population. According to Mao Tse-tung, it is as essential to the combatant as water to

the fish. Such support may be spontaneous, although that is quite rare and probably a temporary condition. If it doesn't exist, it must be secured by every possible means, the most effective of which is terrorism.^{xlv}

The *methods* for which the theorist-practitioners of the Algerian war are best known are torture and terrorism (or, in its official sanitized form, “counter”-terrorism). In language that sounds curiously familiar in the post-9/11 world, Trinquier addresses the issue of torture in the context of terrorism and the terrorist. The terrorist, he concludes, must be made to understand that no limits are to be expected in his or her treatment. In his discussion of interrogation, in which torture—and terrorism—are portrayed as weapons of war, he cites Clausewitz’ description of war as “an act of violence intended to compel an opponent to fulfill our Will,” concluding that “To introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity.”

Trinquier portray tortures as an instrument to be used as dispassionately as any other weapon. Trinquier’s writing, like that of his peers, is oblivious to the laws of war and the rule of law: there is no reference to the advantages of a clear legal framework, as described, for example, by British counterinsurgent Robert Thompson. In contrast, expedience is the rule. The terrorist in Trinquier’s view, “must be made to realize that when he is captured he cannot be treated as an ordinary criminal, nor like a prisoner taken on the battlefield.” (Insurgents are classed across the board as terrorists; insurgent attacks, whether on military personnel or women and children, are classed as terrorism.) The aim is not to punish, but to obtain “precise information about his organization.”

No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not, specialists must force his secret from him. Then, as a soldier he must face the suffering and perhaps the death he has heretofore managed to avoid. The terrorist must accept this as a condition inherent in his trade...^{xlvi}

Trinquier further suggests that torture can be limited, regulated, and made antiseptic and dispassionate; and that there was no contradiction in endorsing torture while abjuring sadism and random brutality. “Although violence is an unavoidable necessity in warfare, certain unnecessary violence ought to be rigorously banned. Interrogations in modern warfare should be conducted by specialists perfectly versed in the techniques to be employed.” “The interrogators,” writes Trinquier, “must always strive not to injure” the detainee, while noting that “[s]cience can easily place at the army's disposition the means for obtaining what is sought.” At the same time, he invokes the argument of the lesser evil, while warning that it would be irresponsible to do less than what is necessary:

But we must not trifle with our responsibilities. It is deceitful to permit artillery or aviation to bomb villages and slaughter women and children, while the real enemy usually escapes, and to refuse interrogation specialists the right to seize the truly guilty terrorist and spare the innocent.

Terrorism in the hands of our adversaries has become a formidable weapon of war that we can no longer permit ourselves to ignore. Tried out in Indochina and brought to perfection in Algeria, it can lead to any boldness, even a direct attack on metropolitan France....^{xlvi}

Theorist-practitioner David Galula's view of torture echoes Trinquier's, but builds upon his own experience, some of which he recounts in his writing (see below). Galula describes the counterinsurgent's intelligence work as in competition with the insurgent, who is seen to have an overwhelming advantage in controlling the population because he "does not hesitate to use terror." The answer is to respond in kind to break the insurgency's control over potential sources: "If anyone seriously believes that mere talk will do it, all I can say is he will learn better when confronted with the problem. This police work was not to my liking, but it was vital and therefore I accepted it."^{xlvi}

The tactical side of French counterinsurgency, in particular the adoption of torture and terrorism by the state, was rationalized as a means to co-opt the tactics of the enemy. There was also an underlying premise that to fail to employ harsh tactics outside the professional military canon would be to yield an unassailable advantage to their adversaries. By this logic, in a dirty war (or what some American writers called "uncomfortable" wars), the counterinsurgent could ill afford not to beat the enemy at its own game. Torture and other "clandestine" methods were considered *necessary* and so ultimately moral, although it required the practitioner to abandon the high ground of professional military standards to adopt those of the terrorist.

Torture is a small act of terrorism that often has a very large footprint. Some of the tactics of terrorism of the dirty war apart from torture were addressed in considerable detail in U.S. military training materials during the counterinsurgency decade of the 1960s. They include a Pandora's Box of innovation, including terrorist tactics from car bombs to booby-traps to blow-pipe assassination weapons and "death squads," including tactics that in practice preceded and precipitated actions in kind by the Algerian Front de Libération National (FLN) (an inversion of the "counter"-terror concept)—and became a staple of terrorism around the world. (See below, the Battle of Algiers.)

The "*Main Rouge*" ("Red Hand"), for example, was a prototypical "death squad" organization thought to be run by the French intelligence (the S.D.E.C.E.) in Algeria and Morocco. Assassinations and terrorist attacks were carried out in the name of "Red Hand" on nationalist leaders and supposed sympathizers at least as early as 1954.^{xlvi} A 1966 US Army pamphlet cites the Red Hand as a classic "counter-terrorist" organization:

Terror can be used in retaliation against or as a counterbalance to terror. The "Red Hand" terrorist organization used "counterterror" against the nationalists in Algeria and against Algerian agents outside the country seeking sources of financial and weapons support for the nationalist movement. The organization was composed of *colons* - Europeans in North Africa - and allegedly operated with the tacit consent of the French Government.¹

The US Army study also describes some of the Red Hand techniques:

Another popular device is the auto booby-trap technique employed by the Red Hand in Morocco. Because the technique is quick and avoids visual tampering with the car, it is considered more advanced than attaching bombs to an automobile's starter. Two magnetic holders are attached...^{li}

The car bomb's charge, a combination of TNT and 350 ball bearings was fixed below the driver's seat, the container designed to direct the charge upward (full technical details are included).^{lii} This technique was attributed to the shadowy "Bureau 24" of the French S.D.E.C.E. in a 1956-1960 campaign against arms dealers trading with the FLN. German arms merchant Georges Puchert was killed in his Mercedes in 1959 by a bomb apparently matching these specifications, according to another account ("Filled with ball-bearings, it did relatively little damage to the car, but riddled [the] ample arms trafficker.")^{liii}

The counter-terror experience in Algeria in the latter years of the revolutionary war also provides a text-book case of unintended consequences or blow-back. Official terrorism came home to roost dramatically toward the end of the war, rebounding against the French state with the 1961-1962 terrorist campaign of the *Organization Sécret Armée*. Under the leadership of the army's disaffected commanders and intelligence chiefs, the OAS bombing and assassination campaign exemplified the reversible nature of the terror/counter-terror equation, targeting Muslims, government officials, and French troops and security forces alike (see below).

Few French declassified documents have emerged that show how torture and counter-terror was made operational in Algeria, with most of the accounts of the period uncritical paeans to revolutionary warfare written by the theorist-practitioners themselves. A few documents have emerged, however, that give insight into the contemporary "anything goes" thinking of those in command. In a March 19, 1957 memorandum, General Jacques Massu interpreted the doctrine in the form of an operational order, stressing that traditional means were inadequate to the task of fighting "the "revolutionary and subversive war" launched by International Communism and its intermediaries with the classical means of combat." The struggle required "the methods of clandestine counter-revolutionary action." Massu did not use the word torture in that document, but the meaning was clear: "The sine qua non of our action in Algiers is that these actions will be permitted, and recognized in our hearts and our consciences as necessary and morally valid."^{liv}

A similar directive of April 4, 1957, marked "Secret" and signed by Massu, is a "night and fog" instruction for secret detentions and "disappearance":^{lv}

The most absolute secrecy must be ensured on anything concerning the number, identity and the nature of suspects arrested. In particular, no mention of whatever kind is to be made to any representative of the Press.

The secrecy concerning the fate of those detained gave resonance to the terror of the times while facilitating a denial of accountability by those responsible. The order came after "Operation Champagne" concluded, and the fall-out from the tens of thousands of secret detentions, and some 3,000 secret killings was being felt in Paris and internationally.

A tactical rationale sometimes given for secret detentions and "disappearance" is that this is necessary if unsuspecting co-conspirators are to be caught off guard, unaware that their

accomplices have been seized and are then and there giving their names to interrogators. Whether or not the logic held in any particular case in Algiers, the terrorizing of tens of thousands of innocents there (both those detained and their families), shattered any pretense that the government stood for law and protection from arbitrary action—it had become the principal source of fear and uncertainty. (The premise also underrates the intelligence of the bona fide revolutionary, who goes to ground when comrades in arms unexpectedly drop out of sight; and has check-in procedures to know when that happens.)

As commander of the Tenth Military Region, Massu subsequently issued a final directive to his troops in February 1959 that included three appendices on the “police, military, and psychological” tactics to be coordinated in the “work of pacification” of the forces under his command.^{lvi} The directive addresses “interrogation techniques,” stating that “every effort must be given to persuasion,” but that “the methods of coercion must be applied when that is not enough.” A “special” directive cited in the document details “the purpose and the limits of such methods” (“le sens et les limites”).^{lvii} This document, however, is unavailable; the army’s historical division reportedly maintains that it was never filed.^{lviii}

If a French army directive did, in fact, set out the methods and limits of torture in Algeria, its historical importance, given the evidence of torture already available from former practitioners and victims, would be enhanced by its relevance to 21st century proposals to rationalize and regulate “coercive interrogation” to combat terrorism. The theorists’ assertion that the use of torture can be limited once given a green light is belied by the sheer scale and savagery of the use of torture in Algeria. While the *guerre sale* tactics did in fact achieve some tactical objectives, they were far more influential as measures undermining progress toward the broader goals of legitimacy, security, and control.

The combination of expected tactical advantage and evasion of accountability applied to both detention procedures and counter-terror in Algiers and the broader war. The exception-makes-the rule logic of secret detention applied also to the layers of secrecy applied to torture and counter-terror: the planner’s conceit that the government would not be blamed for official terrorism and interrogation cell atrocities hardly applied to the people under siege, even if it delayed a full understanding of the facts in the towns and cities of France. The bubble of secrecy rapidly and inevitably burst, and with it the government’s claim to represent the law, higher moral standards, and a more credible claim to power than its adversaries.

The theorist-practitioners of revolutionary warfare postulated that terror by the state could compete and win over the terror of the insurgent. In practice, when the terror of torture and state-sponsored bombings and assassinations overmatched insurgent terror in Algeria, this show of strength reversed the standing of government and revolutionary. When agencies of the government itself conducted kidnappings and murders and sanctioned car bombs in city streets there was little incentive to turn to it for protection.

The “constructive” techniques of the new French doctrine turned in large part on the belief that the methods of psychological warfare could be applied to influence the attitudes of the population—regardless of the objective circumstances in which they lived. Just as fear could be induced to intimidate and control, psychological methods could be used to motivate.

Building Blocks

The new approach of revolutionary war built upon the tactical and organizational methods developed by Lyautey, Galliéni, and Bugeaud. Oil spot and other 19th century pacification procedures continued to be adapted as counterinsurgency building blocks in the 1950s. Conventional military innovations developed in Indochina, such as the use of mobile strike forces, were a part of the mix, but gained unconventional or special warfare dimensions.^{lix} The key officers in the formulation of the doctrine were those with experience in covert intelligence and unconventional warfare.

The theoreticians stressed the role of intimidation, indoctrination, blackmail, and coercive terror in *forcing* the population to lend its support. To this end they employed a range of new tactics and organizational structures in the conduct of the Algerian war:

- New methods of psychological warfare and new political-administrative structures were intended to protect, control, and indoctrinate the contested population.
 - The *Sieme Bureau* (psychological warfare) bureau managed the overall pacification effort.
 - The Special Administrative Sections, SAS, were intended to provide a layer of administration between the military and the population, incorporating military specialists in health care, construction, well drilling and the like, as well as psy-ops and covert intelligence. (The SAS program and its Indochina equivalent was a model for the United States' Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam.)^{lx}
- Models for the displacement and concentration of the suspect population were developed to serve as mechanisms for both security and psychological indoctrination.
 - Some two million Algerians were eventually held in closed camps through the mechanism of *regroupement* (resettlement); over half the rural population was displaced.^{lxi} In practice, the climate of misery and fear made the positive messages of psychological warfare teams a dead letter.^{lxii}
 - In theory, by concentrating the population under military control, the resettlements provided an opportunity to practice the indoctrination techniques proposed by the theoreticians of the Fifth Bureaux/ Psychological Warfare.
 - In “pacification zones,” areas not entirely cleared but kept under close control, the population was concentrated within fortified strategic hamlets or transported to similarly fortified resettlement camps. The strategic hamlets generally had small garrisons of French conscripts or armed Muslim auxiliaries—harkis.^{lxiii}
- Colonial systems for the recruitment of local irregular forces as security auxiliaries were adapted to advance the goal of indoctrination and cooptation (through compulsory service), and to provide manpower pools for both conventional security tasks and covert action strike forces.^{lxiv}

- Colonial norms of punitive action and collective punishment were applied as instruments of coercion and political control at the grass-roots, as well as through shelling and aerial bombardment of towns and villages.^{lxv}
- Conventional military operations were modernized through the deployment of mobile strike forces, close helicopter support, and a range of other innovations.
- A system of regional inter-force interrogation centers was established: the Operational Protection Units (DOP). (A model for the United State's Provincial Interrogation Centers in Vietnam.)

The Flaw in the Mirror

The French theory of revolutionary war was flawed by its ideological bias and geopolitical pretensions. The doctrine, which taught officers how to interpret revolution and how to combat it, exacerbated the error by proposing to combat the revolutionary war through principles and tactics adapted from the theoretical image itself. The operational prescriptions of the doctrine are based in large part on the doctrine's flawed picture of revolution.

American scholar Peter Paret, who with Michael Howard produced an acclaimed translation of Clausewitz' *On War*, observes in his *French Revolutionary Warfare* that the doctrine treats "the nature, characteristics, and processes of modern revolution... haphazardly and, except in its study of the tactics, with little sophistication." In contrast, its operational aspect, "the principles and techniques of waging war against revolution" has been "closely and elaborately explored." The result is a fatally unbalanced "mirror image" in which the reflection bears only passing resemblance to the original: "What is striking in the case of *guerre révolutionnaire* is that its detailed concept of counterrevolution is taken directly from its vague view of revolution; the reflection in the mirror is sharper, while the thing reflected remains shadowy."^{lxvi}

There was also a mechanical quality to the operational side of the doctrine. The French philosopher Raymond Aron suggests, French officers committed the "cardinal error...of defining a combat or a combatant in terms of some methodology." The colonels were "obsessed by procedure—terrorism and counter-terrorism, parallel organizations, coexistence of a clandestine government and the legal administration - and they imagined that they could turn these procedures, as adopted by the partisans, against the partisans themselves."^{lxvii}

Torture

In practice, French officers no more applied the full package of the doctrine than their predecessors did the sweeping political frameworks that Lyautey and Galiéni put forward for pacification. Even at the height of the Algerian war, in the years known as "the period of dominance" of the doctrine of *guerre révolutionnaire* (1954-1962), many army officers of all ranks "agreed only with the tactical concepts of the doctrine, and either ignored or rejected their wider, nonmilitary implications."^{lxviii}

In practice, the declared strategy of both controlling and winning the support of the population was confounded both by an inability to deliver on the hearts and minds score and by special warfare tactics that mimicked insurgent terrorism and outraged the population that was to have been won over. The promise of security meant little when the supposed protectors were themselves the source of everyday terror and lawlessness. The tactics, and in particular the proliferation of torture, served to overwhelm the strategy. Torture and terrorism both indiscriminately exposed the helpless to terror and pain.

An essential principle of the new doctrine was a premise that the nature of the revolutionary threat justified virtually any response – even to the use of the same methods of terrorism attributed to the insurgent. Terrorism through bombings and selective assassination and the more intimate terrorism of the interrogation cell and the torturer were part of the same conceptual spectrum. Barriers to terrorizing detainees through torture were stripped away by the logic of expediency.

Torture was a pervasive feature of the Algerian war that became the object of massive public attention in France and was an important factor in the French public's withdraw of support for the war. The January-March 1957 campaign to destroy the F.L.N.'s Algiers network—the Battle of Algiers—was an extreme example of its use as a central instrument of counterinsurgency. As early as 1955, however, official investigations into torture in Algeria centered more upon the justification of its use than on measures to check its abuse.

An essential feature of the Algerian war under the new doctrine was that the regular forces of France's largely-conscript army were drawn into the practice of torture (and summary execution). French forces in Algeria rose from some 50,000 at the time of the 1954 outbreak of revolt to 200,000 within a year. Within two years, new government policies to lengthen the periods of military service, recall reservists, and send conscripts into the colonial war for the first time allowed troop strength to rise to nearly half a million men by.^{lxxix}

A daily routine of the use of torture in field interrogations by troops deployed in Algeria's hinterland has been described in the memoirs of former conscripts and in numerous other accounts. Scores of testimonies, by both Algerians and returning French troops and officers, also described casual murder as a normal procedure of reprisal and intimidation. Reservists told of being assigned to take prisoners away, execute them, and then report they were shot trying to escape. "Sometimes ...these reports were made out before prisoners were shot. Sometimes...shootings were made to look as if they had been the work of the FLN."^{lxxx}

The assignments were frequent enough to be given a nickname: "the wood-cutting party" or *corvée de bois*.^{lxxxi} Some reprisal killings were made in hot blood, in retaliation for specific incidents. A former paratrooper described the response to the knifing of a para sergeant in Nementchas in 1956—a rampage by the entire regiment through the Arab quarter: "Sixty-four people, mostly men, were slaughtered by automatic rifle or bayonet in less than an hour."^{lxxxii} Individuals thought to bear specific responsibility for rebel action faced a similar fate, often after torture. David Galula, in a 1963 RAND paper on which his 1964 classic *Counterinsurgency Warfare* is based, himself describes summary execution under his own command. By his account, his trusted *harki* auxiliaries had identified a man who had guided the rebels who had

murdered a fellow harki: "I phoned my battalion commander and asked him if he agreed that the man should be shot on the spot. He did. The harkis executed him."^{lxxiii}

Today the issue of torture in Algeria is known primarily through the lens of Gilles de Pontecorvo's cinematic account of the Battle of Algiers. Torture in Algeria was pervasive, however, before General Massu's 1957 operation to root out the FLN infrastructure in Algiers. The new doctrine had provided a theoretical rationale for torture and a blueprint for its systematization, opening the door to torture becoming a routine of the regular army. Torture predated the new doctrine and its institutions in Algeria, but then appeared to be primarily a tactic of the police.

In "Operation Bitter Orange," the crack-down that followed the outbreak of violence in November 1954, police rounded up "the usual suspects" - leaders of the lawful, moderate nationalist groups - and subjected most to torture. The campaign had an enormous political cost, at a stroke consolidating the nascent FLN's domination of the nationalist movement.^{lxxiv} Methods described included near-drowning, or what might in modern Iraq or Afghanistan be termed water-boarding: "With their legs and hands bound to long boards behind their backs, the accused men were immersed in bathtubs filled with water until they nearly drowned...many signed prepared confessions."^{lxxv} (In another parallel with the post-9/11 United States, where terms such as "coercive interrogation" have helped mitigate the horror of torture, the French referred to "muscular" or "reinforced interrogations ("*interrogatoires renforcés*"). The use of water torture and electric shocks was described in testimonies and petitions that received wide circulation in Algeria and in metropolitan France.^{lxxvi}

In the context of widespread protests in France over growing evidence of torture in Algeria, the government received a secret report on torture on March 2, 1955, setting out the findings of a brief inquiry by Inspector General Roger Wuillaume, a civilian lawyer. Wuillaume reported tersely that "All of the police torture" in Algeria, that these were longstanding practices, and that this is uniformly acknowledged.^{lxxvii} To ban these practices would be to plunge the police into "disarray and paralysis."^{lxxviii} He uncritically accepted explanations that the methods applied did not inevitably result in lasting harm, and that they were effective. While qualifying his assertion of the latter, Wuillaume expressed his confidence in the experts consulted: "I myself am in no position to assert that these practices were effective and am compelled to rely on the statements of those who assured me of this and who, it should be noted, were highly thought of by their superiors."^{lxxix}

Wuillaume's report is expressly about torture in Algeria: there is no effort to draw lines between torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and punishment. His report, however, concluded that the principal methods of torture employed, including water torture and electric shocks, when used appropriately, were not excessively cruel. "I am inclined to think that if used in the controlled manner described to me," he observed, "they are no more brutal than deprivation of food, drink, or tobacco"^{lxxx} Wuillaume did suggest that a distinction could be made between psychological and physical sources of pain—illustrating his point by describing the agony of water torture and electric shocks as largely "psychological." Wuillaume distinguished these methods from physical torture that resulted in "durable trauma: echimosis [bruising], fractures, burns, etc.," that he believed could reasonably be banned.

The suggestion that water torture and electric shocks were less cruel than beatings or mutilation, and so acceptable, foreshadowed post-9/11 White House memos establishing “organ failure” as the threshold distinguishing torture from other abuse (although the risk of heart failure is, in fact, noted by Guillaume as an acceptable one). In conclusion, Guillaume recommended authorizing torture, with due regulation, “because it had become so prevalent, as well as proving effective.”^{lxxxix}

The water and electricity methods, provided they are carefully used, are said to produce a shock which is more psychological than physical and therefore do not constitute excessive cruelty...According to certain medical opinion which I was given, the water-pipe method [through which suspects were pumped with water], if used as outlined above, involves no risk to the health of the victim. This is not the case with the electrical method which does involve some danger to anyone whose heart is in any way affected...I am inclined to think that these procedures can be accepted...^{lxxxii}

(In contrast, Guillaume proposed a ban on such “moral abuses” as forcing Muslims “to undress in front of their family, or to commit unnatural acts.”)^{lxxxiii}

In the event, Jacques Soustelle, then the governor of Algeria, “categorically refused” to accept Guillaume’s proposal.^{lxxxiv} But in practice, no action was taken to curb the practice of torture in Algeria, which continued to proliferate under the aegis of the armed forces. At the same time, no public demarches were undertaken to justify torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in response to the burgeoning protests in France. To the contrary, the response was uniformly one of denial, as in a speech by then-prime minister Guy Mollet shortly after the conclusion of General Massu’s operations in Algiers:

Let us speak clearly. Without doubt acts of violence, however exceptional, are to be deplored. But these were, I insist, a result of the fighting and the atrocities of the terrorists. As for premeditated and considered acts of torture, I say that if that were the case it would be intolerable. On this matter, the behavior of the Army of France has been compared to that of the Gestapo. That comparison is scandalous. Hitler gave directives that recommended these barbarous methods, while Lacoste and I always gave orders to the contrary. Investigations were ordered and rulings issued to condemn reprehensible acts. But such cases, I repeat, can be counted on the fingers of one hand.^{lxxxv}

Torture and the Regular Army

After 1955, the regular army was increasingly drawn into the day to day practice of torture, both through field interrogations of captured suspects and on assignment to the special intelligence and counter-terror units.

Theorist-practitioner David Galula, was almost unique among the revolutionary warfare writers in that his doctrinal prescriptions are presented as part of a detailed description of his own on-the-ground experience. Drawing on his stint as a sub-district commander in the Kabylie region, he criticizes the conventional military approach to insurgency through massive force, while

stressing the need to get close to the population and to stay in place for the long haul. His own approach, which appears to some extent similar to the Marine's Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam, was to move his forces from remote fortified garrisons into the very village environment within which his troops were to operate. At the same time, while gently mocking the "psychologists" of the 5ieme Bureau, Galula echoes Trinquier and other theorists in his analysis of the nature of insurgency, and in his commitment to the same logic of necessity and expedience in going outside the law.

Galula addresses the treatment of detainees in some detail in a manuscript prepared for the RAND corporation in 1963, an account of his own experience in Algeria between 1956 and 1958 on which his book is based. In rural areas, suspected guerrillas were "interrogated on the spot." "As we were in a hurry to get exploitable information, the interrogation techniques were crude and the results poor."^{lxxxvi} From the spring of 1957, suspected guerrillas in his zone were flown out by helicopter to zone headquarters for interrogation. The detention and interrogation of suspected members of the insurgents' political infrastructure, a priority in the *political* dimension of the war, continued to be the responsibility of local zone commanders until late 1957. Interrogations by local commands in most cases were described as summary, with most suspects rapidly released; under some commands, "it was 'talk or else.'"

The systematization of torture was advanced through the creation of a network of interrogation centers staffed by military and civilian intelligence personnel, the Détachment Opérationnelle de Protection (Operational Protection Detachments, DOP).^{lxxxvii}

Galula describes the rationale of the new centers as a matter both of concealment and of professionalization in the field of intelligence, while acknowledging that the routine of abuse in the local commands was a problem for some officers. A problem with the brutal treatment of detainees was the impossibility of hiding it: "[E]very company had a contingent of Moslem draftees from whom it was impossible to hide any mistreatment of civilian prisoners. The picture was altogether unpleasant, and a number of officers refused to have anything to do with it."^{lxxxviii}

A solution, from late 1957, "under the pressure of a press campaign against 'tortures,'" was to create secret interrogation centers to be run by special mixed military-civilian units, the DOPs. (His own zone's DOP detachment operated from a former brick factory, "close enough...for fast liaison...but far enough from civilian eyes.")^{lxxxix}

That Galula found the DOP system "the single most important improvement" in counterinsurgency was consistent with his efforts to reconcile contradictory views: that on the one hand torture was *necessary*, while on the other hand that the support of the population *could not be won* without humane treatment. The solution was to remove the detainee from the scene and out-source torture to the DOP. The population was expected to remain oblivious to the whole affair. Galula was aware that everyday torture of detainees in the villages could not help but backfire, but seemed unaware that torture in the DOP too would quickly become public knowledge, rebounding even more dramatically against French interests. Elsewhere in his RAND paper, he describes the tension involved in balancing his intellectual understanding of the political cost of torture to the torturer, while endorsing torture to deal with recalcitrant detainees as a practical necessity to wrest political control from the FLN.

The DOP system in fact handed over responsibility for torture in many cases to the supposed specialists he and other theorist-practitioners had advocated, out of sight of the populace. The nature of this treatment was widely described in contemporary accounts by former detainees. In a June 2000 interview, 92-year-old General Massu himself commented on the DOPs (and indirectly, on their level of expertise) with a simple reference to their methods: “these guys did their active investigations with the *gégène*,” using the popular term for the hand-cranked dynamos of field telephones used to generate electric shocks.^{xc}

In practice, the DOPs no doubt did improve the collection of intelligence, if only by providing more systematic recording of interrogations and greater centralization for the analysis of information. That their introduction lessened the impact of torture on the general population is unlikely. The DOPs were also an instrument of terror that encouraged the practice of forcible “disappearance,” with detainees kidnapped and transferred secretly to the regional centers and often never seen again. The device of ostensibly covert interrogation centers or clandestine operations in fact helped give resonance to the terror. But it did little to distance the state from its consequences: because local people generally *know* when a particular facility is employed for torture or murder: and who and what authority is behind killings, “disappearances,” and terror campaigns. Even without cell-phones, the Internet, or a high level of literacy, news of iniquity tends to travel fast.

The Battle of Algiers

The massive offensive of the first months of 1957 that is known as the Battle of Algiers is the best known operation of the Algerian war, and an object lesson for both critics of torture and other official terror and its advocates.

The gestation of the Battle of Algiers, like many aspects of the Algerian war, was a process of action and reaction. On 19 June 1956, perhaps in response to pied noir public opinion, two FLN militants, one of whom was disabled, were beheaded at Algiers’ Barberousse prison. The Algiers FLN chief responded with a statement that for every FLN member guillotined, 100 French would be killed: within four days 49 French civilians were shot dead in the streets of Algiers.^{xcii} French counter-escalation followed on 10 August, with a bomb that destroyed four houses in the Arab quarter - the Casbah - on the Rue de Thébes, killing seventy men, women, and children. Torture and counter-terrorism in Algiers both responded to and encouraged insurgent terror.

The bombing in the Rue de Thebes, immortalized in Gilles Pontecorvo’s 1965 film *The Battle of Algiers*, was generally attributed to pied noir extremists and presumed to have official sanction: there was little evidence that the authorities believed the matter required investigation and pied noir personalities who boasted of involvement remained at liberty.^{xciii}

The Rue de Thébes bombing represented the first shot in a new terrorist war of bombings aimed at people, not property, and the FLN again pledged to retaliate in kind. The FLN at that time claimed it had not previously attacked women and children indiscriminately but would henceforth consider all Europeans military targets. In the Algerian revolutionary’s view, attacks on Europeans were their own variation of “counter-terror”—reprisals for atrocities committed against Algerian civilians.

The FLN's retaliatory campaign began much as depicted in the Pontecorvo film, with the planting of bombs in the fashionable European cafés Milk-Bar and La Cafeteria (and a dud at the airport).^{xciii} The ensuing carnage, with three killed and dozens mutilated, was followed by a succession of FLN bomb attacks and assassinations, with actions of all kinds - from bombings and shootings to the destruction of property - soaring "from 50 in July, 96 in September, and 122, or roughly 4 a day in December."^{xciv} FLN terrorism in turn led to the massive military campaign to invest the Casbah that was to be known as the Battle of Algiers.)^{xcv}

The French response, code-name "Operation Champagne," began almost immediately after General Massu received his orders on January 7, 1957. Paratroops undertook an urban variation of the quadrillage "gridding" system, dividing Algiers into manageable portions, systematically cordoning them off, and then swamping them with sufficient forces to carry out house to house searches. Having invested the labyrinthine Casbah, Massu's paras began to take it apart, systematically screening its some 100,000 residents in an attempt to root out FLN cadre.

The innovation was as much quantitative as qualitative. An estimated 30 to 40 percent of the entire male population of the Casbah were detained and interrogated; some 24,000 detentions were later officially acknowledged.^{xcvi} Over 3,000 detainees in the Algiers operations subsequently "disappeared"—and much later were found to have been secretly executed or to have died under torture.^{xcvii} The military portrayed the operation as a success: the FLN "infrastructure" in Algiers was largely eliminated by March 1957, with many of its leaders dead or having fled the city.

As one history of the French secret services observes, "Massu's claim that his forces won the Battle of Algiers is open to dispute. For while his intelligence methods had served to hand the FLN a military defeat in a narrow sense, they allowed the FLN to claim a moral and political victory in the Battle of Algiers."^{xcviii} The success was temporary, and came at an enormous cost.

The shift in the doctrine and practice of the French armed forces was not without high-level insider critics. Even at the height of the Battle of Algiers, one of France's most decorated officers, General Jacques de Bollardière, confronted Colonel Massu to express his outrage at the institutionalization of torture, protesting orders that "meant an unleashing of deplorable instincts which no longer knew any limits."^{xcix} After his request for transfer was granted he published an open letter condemning the danger to the army of the loss of its moral values "under the fallacious pretext of immediate expediency" (and was imprisoned for sixty days).^c More than 40 years later, in an interview in which he expressed regret over torture in Algeria, General Massu recalled him as the "sector commander who in 1957 made it very clear to me that he did not approve of the work of the operative DOP in his sector."^{ci}

In October 1957, General Pierre Billotte, one of the most respected officers of the French army, and briefly minister of defense in 1956, also spoke out publicly to condemn torture in Algeria: "Whatever its form or purpose, it is unacceptable, inadmissible, condemnable; it soils the honour of the army and the country."^{cii} Other top officers followed suit with similar protests.

Civilian administrators, too, spoke out. Paul Teitgen, secretary general at the Algiers prefecture, who resigned in March 1957, was a veteran of the resistance—and of Dachau. His letter of resignation raised the question of "war crimes" and denounced evidence of "the cruelties and tortures that I personally suffered fourteen years ago in the Gestapo cellars."^{ciii} Teitgen revealed that torture was just one aspect of the atrocities of the Battle of Algiers: over 3,000 of the prisoners seized and interrogated subsequently "disappeared"; others were confirmed to have died in custody^{civ} (FLN sources, in turn, "guessed that between 4,000 and 5,000 prisoners disappeared", and that most "died in torture chambers or where shot 'while escaping'").^{cv}

The claim that the Battle of Algiers was a victory for the French, having shattered the FLN infrastructure, was shortsighted. The Algiers network quickly regenerated, despite the terrible destruction of 1957. No less a partisan of the methods employed than Roger Trinquier later acknowledged that by December 1960, three years after the Battle of Algiers, "the enemy was able to re-establish his organization and once again to take control of the population...The victory...had gone for naught."^{cvi}

The Battle of Algiers achieved a tactical victory for the French while losing all hope of winning the war. The terrorization of the people of Algiers, and the traumatization of metropolitan France by evidence that its armed forces engaged in atrocities bore a heavy political cost. The operation brought to a head what an earlier White House report had called the contradiction between "French colonial practice and the French liberal nationalist tradition."^{cvii}

Historian Alistair Horne, in describing "the institutionalized torture—freely admitted by Massu—on a large scale," notes that "although it may have won the battle [of Algiers], it lost the war for France through the violent and persistent reaction which it aroused..." Any tactical value offered by torture in Algeria had ultimately devastating strategic consequences. The centrality of torture in the Algerian war offered an object lesson, in Horne's analysis: "a grave warning for any country which might be tempted to employ torture as an instrument of policy; it is always a dangerously double-edged, self-destructive weapon."^{cviii}

Gangrene

The proliferation of torture was described within France as a form of "gangrene" or cancer affecting the French army and the body politic itself. Torture tarnished the French government's standing with its own people and abroad and became a critical factor in its withdrawal from Algeria.

Another commentator has stressed the sheer scale of the abuse of detainees in Algiers and its political consequences for the *Algerian* population.^{cix}

[T]here was hardly a Muslim family in Algiers which did not have a family member tortured, unaccounted for, or, at the very least, detained by the French. In this way, the French army...created a climate of hostility, fear, and antagonism, policy which reaped the dubious dividend of creating more terrorists than it snagged in the long run. It stimulated bitterness against the French....

As for the results of torture in the thousands of interrogations, “[torture] often produced inaccurate intelligence, because suspects said anything simply to put an end to the pain.”^{cx} ...

Efforts to justify torture in the Algerian conflict generally invoked a *need* to torture in order to acquire immediate tactical intelligence (the “ticking bomb”).^{cxⁱ} Clausewitz expert Peter Paret, who wrote extensively on counterinsurgency during the Kennedy administration, challenged this argument. In his analysis, confessions of support for the rebels in Algeria rarely included information of “operational significance,” information of “a political nature,” moreover, “on the organization of the rebel network, for example,” was not time sensitive in the same way, and could be obtained more reliably through measures other than torture. In any case, it did not become dated at once.^{cxⁱⁱ} “[T]orturing a prisoner to obtain such a confession could not be explained by the need to prevent an ambush or terrorist attack.”^{cxⁱⁱⁱ}

Paret’s problem with torture ran much deeper than his having found it ineffective for the purposes cited in its justification. He found that “regardless of how convincingly this was presented as an essential operational device,” torture had rapidly become a means of terrorizing both actual rebels and the population as a whole. “The brutal treatment of prisoners,” in practice, “was often motivated by considerations that had nothing to do with intelligence-gathering.” The terror of reprisals and punitive action and the official terrorism of the clandestine services was more than matched in its effect on the ordinary Algerian by the everyday terror of torture and death in the interrogation cell.

The institutional cost of torture to the French armed forces is now well known. Described as “gangrene,” the wholesale shift to methods outside the law broke down the military’s institutional integrity. The result was a loss not only of the confidence of the people of metropolitan France, but a military revolt. The rebel army officers behind the OAS terrorism campaign, the coup attempts, and the attempted assassination of Charles De Gaulle were the same special operations and intelligence supremos who had brought about the proliferation of torture and the other tactics of dirty war.

In a long interview with *Le Monde* in June 2000, General Massu broke with his longstanding position that torture in Algeria had been justified, both expressing remorse and reversing his long-standing assertions that torture had been a necessary evil.^{cx^{iv}} General Massu’s conversation for the record was precipitated in large part by the testimony of former FLN commander Louise Ighilahriz of her torture in Algeria, published in *Le Monde* on June 20.^{cx^v} In this, she provided a detailed description of repeated rape and other forms of torture while directly implicating General Massu and the Algiers intelligence chief, Colonel Bigeard. In his interview, Massu noted that “it was one case among many others...,” and that in her case “I truly regret this.” What she described was all “a product of a certain environment in Algiers at that time.”^{cx^{vi}} More striking was Massu’s statement on the necessity of torture:^{cx^{vii}}

- Is torture indispensable in time of war, as some have maintained?

- No, torture is not indispensable in wartime; one could very well do without it. When I think about Algeria, I am filled with regret, that I was part of such a thing, I repeat, a part of that certain environment. We could have done things differently.

Massu also told *Le Monde* that past involvement in torture should be acknowledged by France and condemned: “I believe that it would be a good thing. Morally, torture is a bestial thing, and so I would see that as a step forward.”^{cxviii}

Ighilahriz’s emotional testimony came soon after the publication of a memoir by General Paul Aussaresses. At age 82 and still unrepentant, Aussaresses detailed his personal involvement in the torture and murder of numerous Algerians, including well-known political leaders identified by name—and flaunting his protection from prosecution by post-war amnesties. The public attention given Louissette Ighilahriz’s account and the former general’s boasting of war-time atrocities set off a national public debate in France that continued throughout most of the year.

(In a surprising denouement, charges of “apologia for war crimes” were brought against General Aussaresses in May 2001: he was found guilty on January 25, 2002. Although his punishment was limited to a fine, the case was considered a land-mark, the first in which the French courts had, however indirectly, addressed war crimes in Algeria.)^{cxix}

Galula and “Counterinsurgency Warfare”

David Galula, writing on his experience in the war in Algeria, was one of the leading exponents of the new theories. Galula’s 1964 book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, was rapidly translated into English (as part of the Praeger counterinsurgency series), and Spanish, where it became required reading in South America’s military academies.

Galula stressed that in revolutionary war, “the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population...” To this end, “support from the population was the key to the whole problem,” support that “must be directed and organized.” Unlike some of its contemporaries, he acknowledges that support can not “be imposed on the population entirely from without. It must come partly from the people...” Pacification, as a consequence, required the identification of Moslem allies, reliance upon them to rally the majority^{cxx} At the same time, he stressed the counterproductive effect of generalized brutality against the local population. In recounting his own experience as a sub-district commander, Galula recalls having instructed his troops that “under no circumstances could we afford to antagonize the population even if we had to take risks for ourselves in sparing it.”^{cxxi}

But Galula’s injunction that revolutionary war is “20 percent military action and 80 percent political has often been misread, his broad conception of the “political” unexamined. Policing, in Galula’s terms, has nothing to do with law enforcement and everything to do with the “unpleasant” *political* police action required to find, fix, and destroy the insurgency’s civilian infrastructure. In Galula’s writings, as in those of other theorist-practitioners of unconventional warfare, the devil is in the details and the details are tactical. The methods of political action described by Galula are still in large part the methods of coercion and fear combined with the firm structures of colonial subjugation.

In his own area of command, Galula describes having imposed strict discipline to prevent the arbitrary ill-treatment of the people, while distinguishing this from collective punishments imposed by his command that included bars on movement, fines, forced labor, and the wholesale evacuation and abandonment of villages. The potential for arbitrary arrests and the treatment of detainees to antagonize the population, in turn, is acknowledged, but in the final analysis this is found to be out-weighted by necessity in coming to grips with the rebel infrastructure. Ultimately, the fine line barring the counterinsurgent from brutality is the line of necessity.

For Galula, the counterpart to the military side of counterinsurgency is this unpleasant political police function. Policing is described in terms of intelligence operations: the intelligence work required to “purge” each hamlet of its rebel political infrastructure. While stressing the importance of “pressure” to make detainees talk, Galula asserts that “[u]nnecessary harshness never pays” (emphasis added). But the fine distinction drawn between abuse that is *necessary* and random abuse seems to collapse when he enters into the specifics of even his own experience.^{cxxii}

Galula, like most of the theorists of counterinsurgency of the period, conceived of counterinsurgency as a series of stages (a mirror image of Maoist revolutionary theory). In Galula’s analysis, the insurgent political organization (the infrastructure) is destroyed in the fourth stage, with a premise this can in fact be done speedily and once and for all.^{cxxiii} This emphasizes that this stage will involve action that will antagonize the general civilian population and as a consequence should be done “efficiently and effectively,” preferably by a special force separate from counterinsurgency forces working day with the population. (Galula describes this stage as the “purge only in the 1963 manuscript prepared for RAND.)

In Galula’s experience, measures against suspected political supporters of an insurgency were inevitably abusive. The recommendation that special units be assigned such operations, like the endorsement of the DOP interrogation centers, follows naturally as a measure to evade accountability and to limit the damage to the legitimacy of more conventional forces.

The logic was that local French army contingents like those commanded by Galula, who were engaged day-to-day with particular villages, could go about winning hearts and minds so long as the most extreme measures there, including torture, could be undertaken by more shadowy forces. The failure of the logic was to believe that the suspect population would be oblivious to the authors of the ongoing arrests, “disappearances,” and torture. As noted, even in the pre-Internet era of the Algerian war, torture and even ostensibly covert action was largely out in the open, despite official denials.

The “Miraculous Oven”

Galula’s views on torture are more explicit in the 1963 report produced for RAND than in his subsequent book. In this text, recently reissued by RAND, Galula elaborates upon his own experience in concluding that torture was an essential tool of counterinsurgency. In describing a break-through in his police action in one village, he describes as a sort of epiphany the discovery that sealing suspects in the village bread oven (described as “the miraculous oven”) induces

confessions.^{cxxiv} (Bringing to mind the biblical Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, who in another miracle survived the fires of King Nebuchadnezzar's oven.)

The “miraculous oven” appears in Galula's 1963 manuscript, as a key of what he describes as a model operation to destroy the rebel infrastructure in Bou Souar.^{cxxv} Based on preliminary intelligence, Galula's forces detain a number of suspects and interrogate them individually. Despite promises to conceal their identity if they talk and to release suspects who confess fully, interrogators are met by non-cooperation. Galula's revelation is the discovery a new method of torture:

“What happened?”

“Sir, Bakouch locked Amar in one of the ovens in the bakery and told him that, if he did not talk, he would light a fire under the oven. Within ten minutes Amar was screaming to be let out, and he says he's ready to talk now.”

And thus I got my first confession.

I inspected the miraculous oven. I changed into an old coverall and had myself locked in. It was of course dark and silent as a grave inside, psychologically very impressive, but otherwise quite harmless...

The use of the “miraculous oven” (whether or not we take Galula's word that the fire was not lit) was the culmination of progressively more abusive treatment of detainees intended to break their will and force compliance. Galula initially held suspects in Bou Souar in grave-like holes dug in the back of the military compound. These were “long enough to allow a man to lie in them and covered with barbed wire. The prisoners were led to their tombs and watched by two sentries.”^{cxxvi} “The third day I cut out food, and had only water given to them.”^{cxxvii}

The extreme treatment became a model. According to his account, Galula called together his team and declared that “This oven system works well, and I am going to use it,” while warning that he wanted to be told in advance before similar initiatives were undertaken. Galula explains his resort to these methods as responding to a situation in which the civilian-combatant distinction had dropped away. “Insurgency and counterinsurgency are the most vicious kind of warfare because they personally involve every man, military or civilian, on both sides,” and because “no one is allowed to remain neutral and watch the events in a detached way.”^{cxxviii}

In an official November 1956 report on his first three months in Algeria's Kabylia region, Galula describes his failure to make headway in the region in all but a single case: the case of Bou Souar, where he reported to superiors the success of the “miraculous oven” (while acknowledging that the principal suspects had remained uncooperative). In this account, Galula refers to the destruction of the political cell as “a success made possible because I resigned myself to using harsh methods, disregarding my own abhorrence of police work.”^{cxxix}

In Galula's 1964 book, based on the RAND paper, the concrete examples of the pressure on suspects drop out—there is no reference to the “miraculous oven.” The contradiction between the invocation to avoid antagonizing the people and the tough measures required to penetrate the

rebel infrastructure is addressed as a problem of methodology. The abusive operations are, in this respect, to be quickly gotten over with; and the interrogations, are to be undertaken away from civilian view by specialists.

The police operation, he stresses, is not against common criminals, “but against men whose motivations, even if the counterinsurgent disapproves of them, may be perfectly honorable. Furthermore, they do not participate directly, as a rule, in direct terrorism or guerrilla action and, technically, have no blood on their hands.” The suspects are “local people, with family ties and connections,” and so can expect to generate “solidarity and sympathy.” The expression that appears repeatedly in the RAND paper and the subsequent book is that their treatment will inevitably be “unpleasant,” and that as a consequence all that can be done is to mitigate the effect on the local population.

Under the best circumstances the police action cannot fail to have unpleasant aspects both for the population and for the counterinsurgent personnel living with it. This is why elimination of the agents must be achieved quickly and decisively.^{cxxx}

A further wrinkle is the presumption that some of those detained will be innocent. The solution is to distinguish between counterinsurgents working to win the support of the population and the specialists who come in for the dirty work:

But who can ever guarantee that mistakes will not be made and innocent people wrongly arrested?...Assuming that only the right men have been arrested, it would be dangerous and inefficient to let them be handled and interrogated by amateurs. All these reasons demand that the operation be conducted by professionals, but an organization that must in no way be confused with the counterinsurgent personnel working to win the support of the population.
cxxx

A strong argument is also made that “insurgent agents” that cooperate while in custody should, under certain conditions, be released—a practice Galula seems himself to have adopted while a commander in Algeria. Principal among the conditions, however, was a commitment to support the counterinsurgency under close military control after release.

Part of Galula’s cachet as a “modern” counterinsurgent, even to the present, is his emphasis on political action—and criticism of the overuse of conventional military forces and firepower. Galula’s stand on torture is generally overlooked in favor of his principled statements on the importance of winning over the population and avoiding unnecessarily brutality. Galula clearly understood the importance of the people in counterinsurgency, and struggled to come up with the tactics and a strategy with which to move forward.

The high standing accorded Galula’s theoretical framework is also tied in part to Galula’s own account of his success in the pacification of the sous-quartier under his command in 1956 and 1957. Yet Galula himself stresses the limits to local efforts such as his own, bemoaning the fact that “we would find sooner or later that we had reached a plateau above which we could not rise.”^{cxxxii} This was attributed to France’s political leadership, on the one hand (“The same old

political instability in France), and on the other, the lack of a standard operational procedure in Algeria.

For true success, even locally, Galula recognized that he needed some small amount of cooperation from the majority, cooperation that was absent “except in a few isolated spots.” Even in his own area of command, “where improvements in the population’s attitude were spectacular, I could not vouch for their real depth...”^{cxxxiii} In practice, his own account suggests the improvements were illusory. In advance of his reassignment, Galula had attempted to act in accord with his theoretical framework for counterinsurgency by organizing the beginnings of a political party. But there were only seven local people in his Aissa Mimoun sub-district of whom he could be “absolutely sure,” and five of them were harkis—Muslim auxiliaries.^{cxxxiv}

Things fell apart soon after his reassignment in February 1958. Within weeks after handing over command, insurgents ambushed and killed his successor, Captain “Simon,” forcing Galula to return until April 1, 1958. His next replacement, Captain “Hermann,” was in turn killed in December 1958. When Galula returned to the area for the last time in May 1959, “My area had visibly retrogressed to the average level of most of Kabylia ...”^{cxxxv}

Counter-Terror and the End of the Came

In May 1958, army officers backed by Colonel Massu and General Salan led a coup by pied noir militants that ousted the civilian government of Algeria and precipitated a crisis leading to the fall of the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle, a favorite of the military, rose to the occasion and agreed to form a new government. De Gaulle would not, however, rule on behalf of the colonels in Algeria. On September 16, 1959 he broke with his predecessor's pledges of Algérie Française now and forever in a speech to the nation proclaiming the hitherto unthinkable: that the Algerians should have the right to self-determination.

The colonels and the pied noir irredentists read De Gaulle's message as capitulation to Muslim hordes and the Soviet Bear. In the disintegration of French authority in Algeria that ensued, it was not the FLN that struck the decisive blow. It was French citizens that threw up barricades in the last week of January 1960 (and in one incident killed 14 gendarmes and wound 123), and French citizens that in April 1961 threatened to overthrow the De Gaulle government.^{cxxxvi}

In 1961 and 1962 French "counter-terror" was turned against the French state itself in a campaign of terrorism led by some of the army's own top leaders. The way had been cleared through years of counter-terror against suspected FLN sympathizers in which secret military units had worked closely with pied noir extremists. Colonel Trinquier's Algiers Dispositif de Protection Urbaine, DPU, for example, had long given positions of authority to pied noir personalities widely-known known as "counter-terrorists" to positions of authority. Official responsibility for the campaign of terror bombings and attacks on Muslim Algerians that escalated after 1956 was an open secret. As Alistair Horne observed, "Counterterrorism...became the official policy of France because officers, whether legally or not, applied it."^{cxxxvii}

The new structure, headed by General Salan, was the clandestine group Organisation Armée Secrète, O.A.S. In this new and last round of counter-terror, indiscriminate attacks on the Arab population proliferated, while O.A.S. assassins targeted French political leaders and pied noir liberals. The best known O.A.S. plots were those aimed at assassinating de Gaulle; others targeted included François Mitterand, whose apartment was partly destroyed by a bomb on April 2, 1961.^{cxviii}

On April 20, 1961, in tandem with the O.A.S., many of the top army officers of the Algerian war acted to force de Gaulle from office, and reverse the moves toward disengagement in Algeria. The putsch was launched with Gen. Challe at the helm, backed by Generals Raul Salan and Edmond Jouhaud in accord with a tactical plan drawn up by psy-war and "dirty-tricks" specialist Colonel Yves Godard.^{cxvix} The *putsch de généraux* quickly collapsed when it failed to receive the support of the army in France or from other parts of Algeria. The French doctrine of revolutionary war collapsed with it, although it would live on through another year of O.A.S. terrorism, and find new life in the military manuals and dirty wars of Latin America.

The putsch and its collapse removed all prospects for a negotiated end to the Algerian revolution on terms less than full independence. The rebel officers were imprisoned and tried. General Challe and two others received 15 year prison sentences, and several hundred officers received lesser penalties (all, however, were later covered by de Gaulle's 1968 amnesty). The elite military units that were at the heart of the revolt were dismantled. The Foreign Legion's own elite para regiment, the 1st R.E.P. - the original wearers of the "Green Beret," and a classic example of an elite force as political actor—was disbanded. On April 27, 1961 the legionnaires dynamited their barracks near Algiers and marched off into the sunset of demobilization.^{cxl}

The last phase of French "revolutionary warfare" continued until shortly before Algerian independence in July 1962 and the French withdrawal from Algeria. After April 1961, Generals Salan and Jouhaud became the chief and deputy of the O.A.S., while disgruntled army advocates of *guerre révolutionnaire* filled its ranks (the latter included Colonels Godard and Lacheroy). Godard took responsibility for setting up the O.A.S.'s terrorist infrastructure, "modeled on a combination of the F.L.N. (which none had studied more closely than Godard) and the D.P.U.s (Dispositifs de Protection Urbaine) established by Trinquier and Godard during the Battle of Algiers to divide the city up into a grid."^{cxli}

Within a month, a terrorist bombing campaign was unleashed against liberal Europeans and Muslims alike, gradually escalating to open attacks on troops and gendarmerie.^{cxlii} The terror campaign included classic psy-war propaganda efforts, with walls painted with all-seeing eyes (as later used by the U.S. in Vietnam) and the slogan "The O.A.S. sees everything, knows everything."^{cxliii}

The counter-measures against the O.A.S. included a brief effort to fight fire with fire, bizarrely mimicking both FLN and O.A.S. atrocities. A group established in November 1961 by leaders of the Gaullist Mouvement pour la Communauté, MPC, used plastic explosives in bombings of six Algiers cafés popular with the O.A.S. extremists; the false beards worn led the French press to dub them the "*Barbouzes*."^{cxliv} The group was short-lived, with its headquarters attacked in December, followed by a classic "counter-counter-terror" bombing that finished the job.^{cxlv} A

large packing crate delivered to the “Barbouzes” on January 29, 1962 was expected to hold a new printing press ordered for the production of anti-O.A.S. posters. The 90 kilograms of explosives inside demolished the three story headquarters, killing the leader of the group and 18 others. Four survivors were stopped in a pied noir neighborhood and burned alive.^{cxlvi} Subsequent efforts to suppress the O.A.S. were undertaken with more conventional military and intelligence tactics.

By March 1962, OAS terror attacks were openly targeting the army and gendarmerie. on Three gendarmerie half-tracks were bazookaed on March 22 as they came through an Algiers underpass, killing 18 and wounding 25; and two truckloads of teenage conscripts were fired upon on March 23, killing seven and wounding eleven.^{cxlvii} These and similar attacks spurred harsh counteraction, and the OAS high command was captured at the end of March, although mass killings of Algerians and the destruction of infrastructure continued for more than month.

The official toll of deaths attributed to the O.A.S. rose to 98 in December 1961 and 553 in February 1962—although these figures may have excluded the random killing of Muslims in pied noir pogroms.^{cxlviii} According to a perhaps conservative estimate, the O.A.S. killed 2,360 people and wounded 5,418 in its little more than one year of existence.^{cxlix} According to another source, in Algiers alone in the last six months of the war the O.A.S. killed "three times as many civilian victims as had the F.L.N. from the beginning of 1956 onwards...including the Battle of Algiers."^{cl}

By mid-June 1962, the O.A.S. play-within-the-play of the Algerian revolution had reduced much of Algeria's cities to ruins, cost thousands of lives, and accelerated the flight of the pieds noirs masses from Algeria (by the beginning of August only 40,000 of one million would remain).^{cli} A referendum was held in Algeria on 1 July 1962 in accord with the terms of the Evian Agreement, with Algerians voting overwhelmingly for independence. Two days later de Gaulle formally recognized Algerian independence.

The bankruptcy of the doctrine of *la guerre revolutionnaire* was ultimately made clear by its effect on the military itself. Increasingly politicized, the military leaders most firmly committed to the new doctrine in theory and execution lost sight of the standards of military professionalism and took action against their own forces and political authority. The consequences for the state were extreme.

ⁱ From their inception, efforts were made to insulate Special Forces personnel from conventional military forces and to keep those with unconventional/special warfare skills within the special operations establishment. A 1953 memorandum from the Third Army (in the files of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare), reflected a policy “to insure that PsyWar and SF [Special Forces] trained and experienced personnel follow, to the extent permitted by overall D/A [Department of the Army] policy, a career pattern in their fields.” PSWAR 210.3, Memorandum from the Third Army, 5 November 1953, “Re: Reassignment of Officers Special Forces Units Ft. Bragg to Other Units,” OCPW, National Archive RG 319. Cited in Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990* (New York: Pantheon, 1992), p. 43.

ⁱⁱ When Col. John D. Waghlestein said the Army had an 1894 doctrine of counterinsurgency, he was essentially right. Doctrine in this area had largely been delegated to the special operations and intelligence communities, while the mainstream military went its own way. More recent COIN doctrine was unconventional warfare doctrine turned on its head, and essentially a doctrine of the special operations and secret intelligence establishment.

ⁱⁱⁱ At the same time, he explained that there could be large-scale small wars, with the 1894-5 war between Japan and China an example: "The expression 'small war' has in reality no particular connection with the scale on which any

campaign may be carried out; it is simply used to denote, in default of a better, operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces." Colonel C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars. Their Principles and Practice* (London: General Staff-War Office/HMSO, 1906), p. 22. The first edition appeared in 1896. All quotations are from a 1914 HMSO reprint of the 1906 3rd edition.

^{iv} *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 24.

^v *Ibid.*

^{vi} It would be mistaken to say that torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment was not a factor in modern British counterinsurgency. The use in interrogation in Northern Ireland of what became known as the "five techniques" (wall-standing; hooding; subjection to noise; deprivation of sleep; and deprivation of food and drink) was a case in point. An official inquiry ruled in March 1972 that the techniques were illegal, and they were banned. See Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism (The Parker Committee), March 1972. Covert counter-terror that crossed over into official terrorism may also have occurred in Northern Ireland: evidence continues to emerge of collusion between the British army and security services with Protestant/Loyalist paramilitary organizations, including clandestine targeting for sectarian "death squad" killings. (On collusion, see, for example, Human Rights First, *Beyond Collusion: The U.K. Security Forces and the Murder of Patrick Finucane* (New York: Human Rights First, 2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/beyond_collusion.pdf#search=%22castlereagh%20detention%20center%22 (accessed June 22, 2006).

^{vii} In contrast with the French experience, where conscript soldiers were a primary vector through which the reality of systemic torture reached the public in France, a review of hundreds of letters home written by conscript soldiers from Malaya, now on file in London's Imperial War Museum, found little evidence of conscript awareness of torture or other systemic prisoner abuse. (Research undertaken by the author in 1987-88).

^{viii} Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, *Fighting Communist Insurgency, The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), p. 115. Thompson based his counterinsurgency classic largely on his experience as Permanent Secretary of Defence for Malaya during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), and as the head of the British Advisory Mission in Vietnam in the early 1960s.

^{ix} *Ibid.*, p. 53.

^x *Ibid.*

^{xi} Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, p. 53. Laws enacted but subsequently dropped in this manner included a provision for the government "to seize and deport all Chinese found in a declared bad area. Another allowed the government to impose a collective fine on all the inhabitants of an area where the people were uncooperative."

^{xii} *Ibid.*

^{xiii} The level of brutality in Kenya may have reflected not only institutional racism but racist policy. In *Small Wars* Callwell reflects the Victorian view that "uncivilized" peoples only respected harsh tactics. And conversely, that people of European extraction (people who seemed just like them) required rather more sophisticated handling. In Callwell's analysis, "Uncivilized races attribute leniency to timidity. A system adapted to La Vendée is out of place among fanatics and savages..." *Ibid.*, p. 148. The same logic may have been reflected in differing standards having been applied in Malaya and Kenya. The cost of the Emergency in lives as of the end of 1956, according to official statistics, was 11,503 suspect Kikuyu killed by government forces, and, at hands of the rebels, 95 Europeans, 29 Asians, and 1,920 "loyalist" Africans killed. (Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham, *The Myth of 'Mau Mau': Nationalism in Kenya* (New York: Praeger/ Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966), p. 303.). See also Kitson, *Bunch of Five* (1977), op. cit., p. 121, for a figure of 11,500 "Mau Mau dead" and "2,400 African casualties."

^{xiv} See Frank Kitson, *Gangs and Counter gangs*, for his description of unconventional tactics in the Kenyan "Emergency," including the deployment of British officers in black-face to lead rebel turncoats as pseudo-guerrillas.

^{xv} Kitson, op. cit., p. 78.

^{xvi} Rosberg. and Nottingham, op. cit., pp. 302-3. For another account of "Anvil" see Julian Paget, *Counterinsurgency Campaigning*, op. cit., pp. 98-9.

^{xvii} An inquiry ensued and the record of this and of inquest proceedings was presented to Parliament in July 1959. Secretary of State for the Colonies, *Record of Proceedings and Evidence in the Inquiry into the deaths of eleven Mau Mau detainees at Hola Camp in Kenya* (London: HMSO, July 1959). See also *Gangrene*, with an introduction by Peter Benenson (London: John Calder, 1959), for contemporary accounts of Hola Camp and documents, as well as detailed reporting on Algeria.

^{xviii} Thompson's influence waned as he expressed trenchant criticisms of the conduct of the war in Vietnam in his subsequent books.

^{xix} A prescient March 1953 report to the Eisenhower administration's Psychological Strategy Board addressed French resistance to decolonization in North Africa (with Algeria "the most serious trouble spot") as a reflection of a rigid cold war mentality: "The French attribute to Communism, with little examination, the responsibility for the nationalist movement. The main danger in North Africa is for the French ...to refuse to face the real issue, to be caught by their own propaganda, and proceeding on unwarranted grounds to bring more and more fuel to the fire which may consume them. Psychological Strategy Board, "A US Program Vis-a-vis the North African Controversies", 30 March 1953, Declassified Documents Series, microfiche (1985:002228).

^{xx} General Galiéni, conqueror of North Africa and theorist of *pacification* gave this version of the political-military synthesis in his *instructions fondamentales* for colonial forces of 22 May 1898. Cited in Luis Hubert Lyautey, *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar (1894-1899)*, volume II (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1920), p. 282. Lyautey, who dedicated the work to his mentor Galiéni, cites him and others on pacification in his final chapter, "Du Role Colonial de L'Armee."

^{xxi} Lyautey, op. cit., p. 283.

^{xxii} France. Ministère de la Guerre, *Manuel a L'Usage des Troupes Employées Outre-Mer* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1923), p. 109.

^{xxiii} Cited in Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 37. The decline of French ability to manipulate Algerian affairs through a traditional social structure was noted in the March 1954 U.S. Psychological Strategy Board paper cited above; "France has long relied on local chieftains and officials - pashas, caids and caliphas - for the execution of its policies". Their status, however, had been undercut by French programs "which threaten the fabric of traditional Arab society..."

^{xxiv} Lyautey, op. cit., p. 283; Galiéni also outlines the tasks to which French troops are to be put after the first, strictly military phase of conquest. "During the period which follows the conquest the troops have only a policing role in a strict sense; but it is wise to take advantage of the inexhaustible qualities of devotion and inventiveness of the French soldier." To this end, the soldier is to be put to good use in what we would now call civic action: "as a supervisor of works, as a teacher, as an artist."

^{xxv} Lyautey, op. cit., p. 279.

^{xxvi} Ibid.

^{xxvii} Walter Lacquer, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Cultural Study* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), pp. 113-21 summarizes Decker's 1844 study of the Algerian situation and small wars doctrine.

^{xxviii} *Irréguliers* were defined as forces recruited for specific operations on a temporary basis, but otherwise equipped as regulars and led by French officers. *Partisans*, in contrast, "carry their own arms, or those that the authorities furnish them, and are led by their own chiefs. France, Ministère de la Guerre, *Manuel a L'Usage des Troupes Employées Outre-Mer* (1923), op. cit., p. 159-60.

^{xxix} What came to be known toward the end of the 19th century as the "tache d'huile" –"oil spot" strategy provided a foundation for gridding. A configuration of strong-points was devised, each providing a focus in a network of expanding circles of areas under government control. Like a slowly expanding stain, colonial troops and administrators advanced outward from garrisoned strong-points until the entire territory was under control, and 'pacified'. See, Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria* (London: Pall Mall Press/Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1964) p. 105.

^{xxx} Boutin, Jacques "De certains aspects de la guerre de pacification en Algérie," CHEAM no. 3089 (Paris: February-March 1959), pp. 3-4. 46 page typescript. (CHEAM documents are identified by unique classification numbers; authors are generally identified only by name and first initial.)

^{xxxi} Ibid.

^{xxxii} Horne, op. cit., p. 189.

^{xxxiii} Ibid., p. 551.

^{xxxiv} Paret, op. cit., *French Revolutionary Warfare*, p. 113.

^{xxxv} Paul Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957* (New York: Enigma Books, 2002); first published in May 2000 as *Services spéciaux. Algérie 1955-1957* (Paris: Perrin, 2001).

^{xxxvi} Paret, op. cit., *French Revolutionary Warfare*, p. 10, citing Colonel Georges Bonnet, *Les guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires* (Paris, 1958), p. 60.

^{xxxvii} Ibid.

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- ^{xxxviii} Ibid., p. 11, citing 'Ximenes', "La guerre révolutionnaire et ses données fondamentales," in *Revue Militaire d'Information*, February-March 1957, a special edition devoted exclusively to the theory of revolutionary war.
- ^{xxxix} Ibid., p. 16. This is the common ground within a range of theoretical positions on how revolutions originate, from that of psychological warfare chief Colonel Lacheroy, who attributed all to outside agents ("In the beginning there is nothing", he declares - "nothing"), to others who accept the preexistence of real grievances, but maintain these pose no real problem "until they are nurtured and exploited by agitators, who - directly or indirectly- work for the Communist cause."
- ^{xl} John Ambler, *The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966, p. 313).
- ^{xli} Ibid., p. 92.
- ^{xlii} Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, online at the website of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 8. (First published in English by Praeger, 1964.)
- ^{xliii} Ibid., chapter 4.
- ^{xliv} Ibid., pp. 16-25, 36-37. On the U.S. counterterrorism in doctrine, see McClintock, op. cit., chapter 10, "Counterterrorism and Counterorganization."
- ^{xlv} Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, chapter 2.
- ^{xlvi} Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (1961, available at <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp#vii> (accessed June 20, 2006).
- ^{xlvii} Trinquier, chapter 4, "Terrorism: The Principal Weapon of Modern Warfare."
- ^{xlviii} Ibid., p. 202. Galula added his concerns that "police work" should be "kept within decent limits," and "that it not produce irreparable damage to my more constructive pacification work." On the ethical dimension, Galula takes a means justify the ends approach: "As for moral twinges, I confess I felt no more guilty than the pilot who bombs a town knowing of the existence of, but not seeing, the women and children below."
- ^{xlix} Horne, op. cit., p. 129, describes the Ben Bella attack by Main Rouge agent Jean David, and refers to the group's "subterranean links to French intelligence." See also J. Joachim, *The Red Hand* (London: Schuman, 1962).
- ¹ U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters. *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies*, (Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-104) (Washington, D.C.: GPO, September 1966), p. 172.
- ⁱⁱ Ibid., p. 189; full technical details follow in the original.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid.
- ^{liii} Horne, op. cit., pp. 262-3; he adds that Swiss arms dealer Marcel Léopold was found in a Geneva hotel, with a curare tipped blow-pipe dart in his neck—and that the contraption used was "thoughtfully left behind for the benefit of the world Press).
- ^{liv} Jacques Isnard, « L'armée française et la torture, » *Le Monde*, June 23, 2000. Massu was then the commander of the 10th Parachute Division.
- ^{lv} Cited in Horne, op. cit., p. 199.
- ^{lvi} Ibid., citing declassified documents released in 1995.
- ^{lvii} Ibid.
- ^{lviii} Ibid.
- ^{lix} The Groupes Mobiles, a form of rapid reaction force, incorporated infantry, military engineers, communications specialists, tanks, and artillery. But two-thirds of French forces were tied up in static defensive positions. Ronald H. Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army), 1985, United States Army in Vietnam series, p. 110.
- ^{lx} See Peter Paret, op. cit., *French Revolutionary Warfare*, pp. 80-92, on the role of the S.A.S. in pacification. Insiders from French pacification programs have produced a wealth of documentation, including reports from the equivalent of the U.S. Hamlet Evaluation System in Vietnam. On the Indochina system of GAMOs, see Y. Hoquet, "Un Aspect de la Guerre D'Indochine: Les Bureaux de liaison pour la pacification" (Paris: 1958), p. 3. Typescript, *Centre de Hautes Etudes Administratives sur l'Afrique et l'Asie Modern*, CHEAM, No. 2896. On the S.A.S. and GAMO systems as an antecedent to CORDS and RD, see Bernard Fall, Lecture, Far East Training Center, AID/UH, 1966, p. 24 (Lansdale Papers, Box 16).
- ^{lxi} See Heggoy, op. cit., pp. 224-5, on the reality of the *regroupements*. Guerre révolutionnaire theorist Captain André Souyris defined the problem of cutting off the rebels from civilian support as largely one of protecting the cooperative civilian population from reprisals. The two-part solution was to "regroup" the people into large concentrations "in locations easily observed by the government forces," and to "organize the population in a manner that will oblige them to side with the legal government, to ensure their self-defense." Capitaine André Souyris, "Un

procède efficace de contre-guerrilla: L'Auto-Defense des populations," *Revue de Défense Nationale*, June 1956, p. 689. Souyris examines in detail a pilot resettlement program launched in Cambodia in 1946.

^{lxii} The conditions of the regroupements were the object of considerable scandal in metropolitan France after investigations by parliamentarians brought them to the attention of the public. Heggoy, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-5 describes conditions, and notes that "a rule of thumb was that if a regroupment had 1,000 inhabitants, one child died every two days." Concentrating the population under military control was intended to provide an opportunity to apply the indoctrination techniques proposed by the theoreticians of the Fifth Bureaux/ Psychological Warfare.

^{lxiii} For Trinquier's description of the theoretical role of the strategic hamlet, see *Modern Warfare*, *op. cit.*, pp.73-4.

^{lxiv} The principal auxiliary structure was the system of *harka*, which grew to over 140,000 in number by the end of Algerian conflict. Other special operations forces drew upon indigenous personnel on the model developed in Indochina. Colonel Roger Trinquier "Témoignage 'Les Maquis d'Indochine'," *Revue Historique des Armées*, no. 2, 1979, pp. 169-190, provides background on irregular counter-guerrilla strike forces, based on his command of the *Groupement de Commandos Mixte Aéroportés*, GCMA's (Mixed Airborne Commando Groups), the section of the *Service Action* in Indochina that deployed indigenous Montagnard auxiliaries (a model inherited by the United States Special Forces in Indochina). Like the later organizational method of the U.S. Army Special Forces, relatively large indigenous forces were organized and led largely by small cadres of non-commissioned officers, with a single junior officer responsible for up to a thousand indigenous *maquisards* (the same ratio applied to the Special Forces A team).

^{lxv} For detailed accounts of punitive action and reprisals in the course of the war, see Henri Le Mire, *Histoire Militaire de la Guerre D'Algérie* (Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, 1982); Horne, and Heggoy, *op. cit.*

^{lxvi} Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare.*, p. 20.

^{lxvii} Raymond Aron, *Clausewitz, Philosopher of War*, trans. Christine Booker and Norman Stone., p.370. Aron finds the "partisans with partisans" formula valid only in "a rigorous and narrow military sense", and cites the long history of tactical mimicry in European wars ("Napoleon is credited with the formula 'when fighting partisans, you must fight like partisans'. Behind the front the Germans maintained *Jagd-kommandos* (flying commandos) who behaved like partisans. But they hardly differed from the soldiers operating like the *Parteigänger* whom Clausewitz knew, i.e. light troops...").

^{lxviii} Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare*, p. 8, cited in McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, p. 43.

^{lxix} Horne, *Ibid.*, p. 151.

^{lxx} Talbott, *op. cit.*, p. 92, citing the writings of former reservists.

^{lxxi} *Ibid.*

^{lxxii} Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 171, citing Leulliette.

^{lxxiii} David Galula, *RAND*, p. 236.

^{lxxiv} Heggoy, *op. cit.*, p. 82-3.

^{lxxv} *Ibid.*

^{lxxvi} See Kessel and Pirelli, *op. cit.*

^{lxxvii} Florence Beaugé, « La torture, ou que faire de cet encombrant passé ?, » *Le Monde*, October 28, 2004. In Section 1 of his report, Wuillaume describes in detail the principal methods of torture reported. These included water torture, beatings, burns, electric shocks, suspension by the arms (in some cases leading to dislocations), being forced to remain in excruciatingly painful positions, and being forced "to dance naked" in front of close relatives or neighbors. See Roger Wuillaume, *Gouvernement Général, Inspection Général De L'Administration en Algérie*, March 2, 1955, reproduced in Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *La raison d'état: textes publiés par la comité Audin* (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2002), pp. 65-76 (Wuillaume Report).

^{lxxviii} *Ibid.*, Beaugé; and Wuillaume Report, p. 74.

^{lxxix} Wuillaume Report, p. 73.

^{lxxx} *Ibid.*, p. 74.

^{lxxxi} *Ibid.*, p. 76; see also Horne, p 196. .

^{lxxxii} Translation from Horne., p. 197. See Wuillaume Report, pp. 73-4: Wuillaume detailed both "the pipe" method of water torture (*le tuyau*) and "the bath" (*la baignoire*), in which "the individual is immersed to the point of suffocation, or unconsciousness.")

^{lxxxiii} Wuillaume Report, p. 72.

^{lxxxiv} Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

^{lxxxv} Guy Mollet, Speech to the Socialist Federation of la Marne, April 14, 1957.

^{lxxxvi} David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1964, 2006), p. 202.

- ^{lxxxvii} The DOPs were a dependency of the Centre de Coordination Interarmées (Inter-Force Coordination Center, CCI).
- ^{lxxxviii} Galula, op. cit., p. 202.
- ^{lxxxix} Ibid., p. 315.
- ^{xc} Florence Beauge, « La torture faisait partie d'une certaine ambiance. On aurait pu faire les choses différemment, » *Le Monde*, June 22, 2000.
- ^{xcⁱ} Ibid., pp. 183-4; the orders cited were to "kill any European between the ages of eighteen and fifty-four. But no women, no children, no old people..."
- ^{xcⁱⁱ} Ibid., pp. 183-4; Horne remarks that pied noir "counter-terrorists" "made no secret of their responsibility", that one bomber discussed the matter "lightheartedly" with him, but that none were ever detained. See also Heggoy, op. cit., pp. 232-244.
- ^{xcⁱⁱⁱ} Horne, op. cit., pp. 185-6.
- ^{xcivxcv} Talbott, op. cit., p. 82.
- ^{xcv} The "who started it" debate is one that can not be won, but a parallel to the Rue de Thebes bombing as a counter-terror catalyst to terrorism may be found in the recent history of the Middle East. A March 8, 1985 car bomb targeting the Beirut apartment of Hezbollah's chief, Sheik Fadlallah, may have set in motion some of the ensuing terror bombings by radical groups throughout the region. The bomb destroyed an apartment block, killing some 80 people and injuring 200 (but the Sheik was unharmed). The *Washington Post* and other sources subsequently tied the bombing to the CIA and a program to train foreign "counter-terrorists. See McClintock, op. cit., pp. 380-383.
- ^{xcvi} Horne, op. cit., *A Savage War...* p. 199.
- ^{xcvii} See Horne, op. cit., p. 202; and Heggoy, pp. 240 citing figures from the dissident prefect of Algiers, Paul Teitgen, cited by Vidal-Naquet: "3,024 of more than 24,000 persons arrested disappeared." General Paul Aussaresses, who served Massu as his intelligence chief at the time, in 2000 described his personal involvement in torture and summary executions during the operations, while asserting that France's political authorities were "perfectly aware" of these actions. He also confirmed the figure that 3,024 suspects *disparu* "disappeared" who were summarily executed or died under torture. « Torture en Algérie : l'aveu des généraux, » *Le Monde*, November 2000.
- ^{xcviii} Douglas Porch, *The French Secret Services* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 384.
- ^{xcix} Horne, op. cit., p. 203.
- c Ibid.
- ci Armelle and Paul Botherol, « Bollardière en prison, *Le Monde*, July 2, 2000.
- cii Cited in Alistaire Horne, *The French Army and Politics, 1870-1970* (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 85. Gen. Billotte went directly to the French public through an open letter, published in *Le Monde* on October 6, 1957.
- ciii Horne, op. cit., *A Savage War*, p. 203-4.
- civ See Horne, op. cit. *A Savage War*, p. 202; Heggoy, pp. 240.
- cv Heggoy, op. cit., p. 241.
- cvi Trinquier, op. cit., p. 49.
- c^{vii} Psychological Strategy Board, op. cit., "A US Program Vis-a-vis the North African Controversies", 30 March 1953. Declassified Documents Series, microfiche (1985:002228).
- c^{viii} Horne, *The French Army and Politics*, p. 85.
- cix Douglas Porch, *The French Secret Services* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 384.
- cx Ibid.
- cxⁱ Paret, op. cit., *French Revolutionary Warfare*, p. 72.
- cxⁱⁱ Ibid., p. 72.
- cxⁱⁱⁱ Ibid.
- cx^{iv} Florence Beaugé, « La torture faisait partie d'une certaine ambiance. On aurait pu faire les choses différemment, » *Le Monde*, June 22, 2000.
- cx^v Florence Beauge, « Torturée par l'armée française en Algérie, « Lila » recherche l'homme qui l'a sauvée, *Le Monde*, June 20, 2000.
- cx^{vi} Florence Beaugé, « La torture faisait partie d'une certaine ambiance. On aurait pu faire les choses différemment, » *Le Monde*, June 22, 2000.
- cx^{vii} Ibid.
- cx^{viii} Editorial, « Torture en Algérie : l'aveu des généraux, » *Le Monde*, November 23, 2000.
- cx^{ix} For a summary of the French debate and the Aussaresses trial, see Neil MacMaster, "Torture: from Algiers to Abu Ghraib," *Race and Class*, vol. 46 no. 2, 2004.

^{cxx} David Galula, "Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958," Forward by Bruce Hoffman (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1963, 2006), pp. 213-4.

^{cxxi} *Ibid.*, p. 116

^{cxxii} *Ibid.* p. 318.

^{cxxiii} Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 124. Galula's 1963 report produced for RAND, Galula elaborates upon his own experience in concluding that torture is an essential tool of the fourth stage (see below). David Galula, "Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958" (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1964, 2006), p. 202.

^{cxxiv} David Galula, "Pacification in Algeria," p. 202.

^{cxxv} *Ibid.*, p. 202.

^{cxxvi} *Ibid.*, p. 197.

^{cxxvii} *Ibid.* p. 199. Galula notes that of those interrogated (who included a woman), the prime suspects had withheld the desired information:

Pretty soon I received complete confessions from the minor offenders, including the woman. I knew in detail most of the activity of the three bosses. Of these, one made a full confession.... Cousin Oudiai resisted the oven treatment and still proclaimed his innocence. I did not care; I knew enough about him. Amrane needed a lot more pressure before he would talk, but talk he did except for these vital pieces of information: who was his boss, and when, how, and where he made contact with Oudiai and the fellaghas...

Ibid., pp. 202-3.

^{cxxviii} *Ibid.*, p. 202.

^{cxxix} *Ibid.*, p. 437.

^{xxx} *Ibid.*

^{xxx} *Ibid.*

^{xxxii} *Ibid.* p. 301.

^{xxxiii} *Ibid.*, p. 301.

^{xxxiv} *Ibid.* p. 353.

^{xxxv} *Ibid.* p. 355.

^{xxxvi} Horne, *op. cit.*, pp. 362-3.

^{xxxvii} Heggoy, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-243. The DPU, and Colonel Trinquier himself, were also identified in the aftermath of the Battle of Algiers as having direct involvement in the torture of suspects, offering "advice and technical assistance" whenever necessary. Heggoy, *op. cit.*, p. 242, citing testimonies of former prisoners.

^{xxxviii} Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

^{xxxix} Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 448; he adds that Godard, "the master intelligence operator...mislaidd in a public corridor his briefcase containing all details of the putsch." Colonel Yves Godard, Algier's intelligence chief and Colonel Massu's Chief of Staff and "eminence grips" during the Battle of Algiers, had in 1948 organized the para's 11th Shock Regiment, "the dirty tricks" unit controlled by the French equivalent of the C.I.A., the S.D.E.C.E. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

^{cxl} *Ibid.*, p. 459.

^{cxli} *Ibid.*, p. 484; Godard headed a "General Staff," presiding over three sections " 'Organisation of the Masses'; 'Organization-Intelligence-Operations'; 'Political Action and Propaganda'.

^{cxlii} *Ibid.*, p. 486-9.

^{cxliii} *Ibid.*, p. 486. American counterinsurgent Edward Lansdale was credited with using an identical tactic, which he called the "Eye of God," in the 1950s campaign in the Philippines. A variation used in Vietnam in the 1960s was dubbed "Operation Black Eye." See McClintock, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-241.

^{cxliv} *Ibid.*, pp. 493-5; Horne cites MPC's head, Lucien Bitterlin, as having said that the MPC had obliged when a colonel of the Military Security branch asked him "to '*plastiquer*' several activist cafés in Algiers." Horne cites a *France-Soir* scoop entitled "Carte blanche for 'Barbouzes' to liquidate the O.A.S.;" the unit was presented as made up of "all the aces of espionage, counter-espionage and subversive warfare..."

^{cxlv} This account is from Horne, *op. cit.*, *A Savage War*, pp. 493-4, "Degueldre slaughters the 'barbouzes'."

^{cxlvi} *Ibid.*

^{cxlvii} *Ibid.*, pp. 524-5.

^{cxlviii} *Ibid.*, p. 496; an aspect of the terror was to force the FLN to retaliate, in the hope the peace talks would be suspended or put back. Horne also chronicles FLN killings, citing statistics published in its bulletins of Algerians executed as "traitors", including 200 killings reported on 1 November alone.

^{cxlix} Ibid., p. 530.

^{cl} Ibid., p. 531; citing Vitalis Cros, *Le temps de la violence* (Paris, 1971) on the contrasting of FLN-OAS killings.

^{cli} Ibid., 531-33.

Great Powers and Irregular Challenges

By T. X. Hammes

Although the title of the seminar tasked us to look at Irregular Challenges, I chose to focus on insurgency. I did so because insurgency is the most significant of the irregular challenges. While terrorism can cause great damage and even alter our way of life, only insurgency allows irregulars to take over entire countries and change the balance of power in key regions of the world. This paper will first review both the enduring and emerging characteristics of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Once that background is established, it will offer a way of analyzing and then fighting insurgencies as networks.

Insurgency

Insurgency has evolved significantly since Mao wrote his famous “On Protracted War” in 1937. Yet many of the basic truths of insurgency remain valid. First and foremost, it is a political not a military struggle. It is not amenable to a purely military solution without resorting to a level of brutality not acceptable to the western world. Even the level of brutality Russia has inflicted upon Chechnya – killing almost 25% of the total population and destroying its cities -- has not resulted in victory. Next, the critical vulnerability of the United States is the political will of the American people. Insurgents have learned over the last thirty years that they do not have to militarily defeat the United States to drive us out of an insurgency. Rather they only have to destroy our political will. Another aspect of insurgency that has not changed is the duration. Insurgencies are measured in decades not months or years. Finally, despite America’s love of high technology, the side with the simplest technology often wins.

While these factors of insurgency have remained constant, it has evolved in other areas. Insurgencies today are not the single party organizations that characterized Mao and Ho’s efforts in Asia. Today, they are loose coalitions of the willing; human networks that range from local to global. The fact that these networks span the globe means external actors such as the Arabs who went to fight in Afghanistan, the Afghans who went to fight in Bosnia and the European Muslims that are showing up in Iraq are now a regular part of insurgencies. In addition to being composed of coalitions, they also operate across the spectrum from local to transnational organizations. The goals of each element of the coalition vary too. In Afghanistan, some of the insurgents simply wish to rule their own valleys while Al Qaeda seeks a transnational Caliphate. Within Iraq, many of the Sunni insurgents seek a secular government dominated by Sunnis while other Sunnis, the Salifists, seek a strict Islamic society ruled by Sharia. The fact that recent insurgencies have been coalitions is a critical component in understanding them. For too long, American leadership stated the insurgency in Iraq could not be genuine because they had no unifying cause or leader. Therefore, they could not be a threat. Yet the insurgents in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Palestine have never had a unified leadership or belief – other than the outside power has to go. Yet these insurgents have driven out the Soviet Union and continue to contest the United States, Russia and Israel respectively. The lack of unity of current insurgencies is in many ways a strength.

Showing the adaptability characteristic of successful organizations, many insurgencies are trans-dimensional as well as transnational. As western efforts have reduced the number of physical locations that are safe, insurgents have aggressively moved into cyber space. Further, the capacity of broadband has greatly increased the usefulness of the internet. Expanding from simple communications and propaganda, the insurgents and their terrorist counterparts have moved to training schools, theological indoctrination rooms, recruiting, vetting, and logistical arrangements on line. The wide availability of password protected chat rooms allows them to hold meetings with very little chance of discovery. Not only do we have to find the room among the millions out there, and crack the password, we have to do so with a person who can speak the language of the group using it.

Another major change is the fact that insurgencies are becoming self supporting through a combination of fundraising/charity organization, legitimate businesses and criminal enterprises. They no longer depend on one or two major outside sponsors that are subject to diplomatic or economic pressure from the United States.

Because the insurgencies are no longer unified politically, there will be numerous motivations within the same conflict. In Afghanistan, Chechnya, Palestine and Iraq, the insurgents hold a wide variety of ideologies. From those who want a secular government with them in charge to religious fundamentalists, in each country the only thing unifying theme is their hatred of an outside element. And at times, even this hatred is not strong enough to keep them from fighting each other while fighting the outsider.

Counterinsurgency

In the same way insurgencies have enduring characteristics, so do counterinsurgencies. The fundamental weapon in counterinsurgency is good governance. While the insurgent must simply continue to exist and conduct occasional attacks, the government must learn to govern effectively. The first step of governance is providing security for the people. Without effective, continuous security, it does not matter if the people are sympathetic with the government or not, they must cooperate with the insurgent or be killed. Yet providing security is not enough. The government must also provide the people with hope for a better future – for their children if not for themselves. It must address the ‘poverty of dignity’ that Tom Freidman has so clearly identified as a driving motivator for terrorists. The people must have hope not just for a better life materially but a feeling of dignity that comes from having some say in their own futures.

With these constants in mind, the counterinsurgent must also deal with the emerging characteristics of insurgency. To deal with the transnational character of insurgents, the counterinsurgent must develop a truly international approach to the security issues facing them. In addition, they must counter not just a single ideology but the ideologies of the various groups fighting them. This is very challenging because attacking the ideology of one may reinforce another. It requires deep cultural and historical knowledge of the people in the conflict but it can be an advantage if the government attacks the ‘coalition of the willing’ by exacerbating their differences. Finally, the government must find a way to deal with the numerous external actors that will come to join the insurgency. The true believers among them and among the insurgents

can only be killed or captured but the rest must be turned from insurgent to citizen. And, if possible, the counterinsurgent should keep the foreigners from return to their homes to spread conflict there.

Visualizing the insurgency

With the mixture of enduring and emerging characteristics, the question arises as to how best to analyze and perhaps model modern insurgencies. I propose that we focus on the human connections rather than any organization chart for the following reasons.

- A map of the human connections reflects how insurgencies really operate. Such a network map will reveal the true interactions between the different people/nodes and show the actual impact of our actions against those connections.
- A network rather than hierarchical model of our own organizations will allow us to see much more clearly how our personnel policies effect our own operations.
- Models of human networks account for charisma, human will and insights in ways a simple organizational chart cannot.
- Networks actively seek to grow. By studying network maps of human connections we can see where that growth takes place and what it implies for the insurgent and the government.
- Networks interact with other networks in complex ways that cannot be portrayed on an organizational chart.
- Network maps show connections from a local to a global scale and reveal when insurgents use modern technology to make the “long distance” relationships more important and closer than local ones.
- Networks portray the trans-dimensional and trans-national nature of insurgencies in ways no other model can.

Finally, if we begin to understand the underlying networks of insurgencies, we can analyze them using an emerging set of tools. “A string of recent breathtaking discoveries has forced us to acknowledge that amazingly simple and far-reaching laws govern the structure and evolution of all the complex networks that surround us.”^{cli}

By mapping the human connections in these networks and then applying both cultural knowledge and network theory to the networks, we can understand them more clearly. We can also apply the common sense observation that most networks grow from pre-existing social networks. To assist us in building our network maps, we can use any of a number of sophisticated anti-gang software programs that allow us to track individuals and visualize their contacts. This visualization software is enormously helpful in HUMINT analysis. In particular, we will be able to see the gaps where we do not show connections that we know should be there.

In fact, such an approach has already been used. Marc Sageman has done a detailed study of Al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, mapped the operational connections and then compared them to the pre-existing social connections. His work points the way to much more effective analysis of insurgent and terrorist organizations.

His studies revealed the key nodes in each part of the organization. Over time, it can show how changes in the operating environment effect each organization and show both the real and cyber world links between individuals and organizations. In short, it paints a picture of the enemy network that we can analyze.

Sage-man has shown us how to map an enemy network. This is a critical tool in counterinsurgency but not the central element of a strategy. For the counterinsurgent, the central element must be the people. The counterinsurgent has to provide effective government in order to win the loyalty of the people. The two most critical elements governance are security and hope for the future. While this sounds simple, helping another country establish good governance is one of the most challenging tasks possible. It is made much more difficult by the fact there would not be an insurgency if the present government were not already failing and reluctant to make the necessary changes.

Attacking the insurgency

There is an old saying in military planning – “Get the command and control relationships right and everything else will take care of itself.” It is simply a common sense acknowledgement that people provide solutions only if they are well led in a functional organization. Thus the first step, and often most difficult, in counterinsurgency is to integrate the command and execution of the friendly forces. Note I say integrate and not unify. Given the transnational and trans-dimensional nature of today’s insurgents, it will be impossible to develop true unity of command for all the organizations necessary to fight an insurgency. Instead we must strive for unity of purpose by integrating the efforts of all concerned.

While the U.S. military does not like committees, a committee structure may be most effective for command in a counterinsurgency. There should be a committee for every major political sub division from city to province to national levels. Each committee must include all key personnel involved in the counterinsurgency effort – political leadership (prime minister, governor, etc), police, intelligence, economic development, public services and military. The political leadership must be in charge and have full authority to hire, fire and evaluate the other members of the committee. Members of the committee must not be controlled or evaluated by their parent agencies at the next higher level or they committee will fail to achieve unity of purpose.

Once the national committee is established, it is essential that Washington DC provide mission type orders, allocate sufficient resources and then let the in-country personnel run it. Obviously, the biggest challenge in this arrangement are developing the leadership to lead the in-country, particularly the civil leadership and convincing the national level bureaucracies to stay out of the day to day operations.

Once established, the committees can use the network map to develop a plan to defeat it. The most important information provided by the network map is the identity of the key hubs and smaller nodes. These are the key elements of any network and must be understood well to understand the actual functioning of the network.

For counterinsurgencies, Boyd's Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loop remains valid but the focus changes. The focus must be on Observation-Orientation segment of the loop. The government must understand what it is seeing before it can decide what to do. To date our efforts have focused on shortening the sensor to shooter (decision-action) step. Now we must focus on improving the quality and speed of the O-O segment.

Once we understand the network or major segments of it, we can attack. However, the fundamental rules for attacking a network are different than for conventional war. First, it is better to exploit a known node than attack it. Second, if you have to attack, the best attack is a soft attack designed to introduce distrust into the network. Third, if you must make a hard attack, conduct simultaneous attacks on related links or else the attack will have little effect. Finally, after the attack increase surveillance to see how the insurgency tries to communicate around or repair the damage. As they are reaching out to establish new contacts, the new nodes will be most visible.

An integral part of counterinsurgency is an effective information campaign. It will have multiple targets of the host country population, international community, insurgents and their supporters. It must be integrated into all aspects of the campaign and can only be effective if based on the truth. Spin will eventually be discovered and the government will be hard pressed to recover its credibility.

In summary, insurgency is a competition between human networks. To understand those networks we must understand the pre-existing links as well as the cultural and historical context of each struggle. Further, we have to understand not just the insurgents network but also those of the host nation government, the common people of the nation, our coalition partners, NGOs and, of course, our own.

The strategy must focus on establishing good governance by strengthening our key nodes and weakening the enemy's in order to shift the mass of the population to our side. Good governance is founded on a combination of providing effective security for the population and giving them hope for their future. It is not based on killing insurgents/terrorists. To provide that security we must be able to visualize the fight between and within the human networks involved. Only then can we develop and execute a plan to defeat the insurgents.

Shaping the Future of Counterinsurgency Warfare

By Anthony H. Cordesman

I have mixed feelings as I approach the subject of counterinsurgency today. I have now been involved in this field professionally for more than 30 years and I cannot discuss any of the issues involved without a feeling of déjà-vu and some discouragement. We seem to find it far harder to learn from the past than we should, and we repeat it whether we remember it or not.

The Lessons of Complexity, Uncertainty, and Risk

This brings me to the first point I would like raise about counterinsurgency. Time after time, I have seen people approach the subject of counterinsurgency by trying to oversimplify the situation, underestimate the risks, and exaggerate the level of control they can achieve over the course and ultimate strategic outcome of the war. They try to deny its complexity, and the full range of issues that must be dealt with.

In doing so, many try to borrow from past wars or historical examples, and they talk about “lessons,” as if a few simple lessons from one conflict could be transferred easily to another. The end result is that -- far too often -- we end up rediscovering the same old failed slogans and over simplifications and trot out all the same old case histories without really examining how valid they are.

I cannot tell you how gallopingly irrelevant are many aspects of the other counterinsurgency campaigns I have lived through today. We focus once again on Mao, Malaysia, Vietnam, Northern Ireland, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We try bring back the same old tactical and technical solutions, without remembering past failures. “Oil spots,” “hearts and minds,” “Special Forces,” walls and barriers, and sensor nets are just a few examples of such efforts.

For example, some talk about the use of sensors, UAV, and IS&R in Iraq as if they were “magic bullets.” I inherited the unattended ground sensor program in Vietnam at DARPA, and became all too aware of all its failures. Decades later, I was briefed by senior Israeli official on why a new system of such sensors and UAVs was going to work in Southern Lebanon, and he provided remarkable amount of statistical evidence and technicals to indicate that this time a more modern approach would work. The fact that the briefer was killed in Lebanon months later, and Israel was effectively defeated, is a warning about the relevance of what he was saying. It is also a warning about choosing any other over-simplified approach to counterinsurgency based on either technology or past wars.

Things become much worse when you fail to be ruthlessly objective about the present. There is no way to avoid the fog of war, but there is no reason to make it a self-inflicted wound. Counterinsurgency cannot be fought on the basis of political slogans, official doctrine, ideology, and efforts to spin the situation in the most favorable terms. Unless warfighters and policymakers

honestly address the complexity, unique characteristics, and risks and costs a given conflict, they inevitably come up with solutions which, as the old joke states, are “simple, quick and wrong.” History shows all too clearly that this “simple, quick and wrong” approach is how we have created far too many of our past problems in foreign policy, and that it is a disastrous recipe for war. In retrospect, fewer of our failures occurred because we lacked foresight, than because we sought simplicity at the expense of reality

To use another old joke, Americans also treat counterinsurgency as if were a third marriage, “a triumph of hope over experience.” We began by underestimating the scale of the problems we really have to face and just how many resources, how much time, and how expensive in dollars and blood the cost will be. We can’t plan for hope and best cases if we want to win. We have to examine all of the variables, prioritize, and be very careful about the importance of any issues we dismiss. We have to be ready for failure in unanticipated areas.

The reality is that counterinsurgency warfare is almost always a “worst case” or we would not become involved in it in the first place. We become involved in counterinsurgency because an ally has failed, because a friendly nation has failed. We become involved because diplomacy and foreign policy have failed. Almost by definition, we become involved because things have gone seriously wrong.

We ignore the fact that the course and outcome of counterinsurgency wars inevitably is affected by law of unintended consequences. Risk analysis is remarkably difficult, because risk analysis based on what we think we know going in, and that set of perceptions almost invariably proves to be seriously wrong over time. Both allies and enemies evolve in unpredictable ways. Political, social and economic conditions change inside the zone of conflict in ways we cannot anticipate. Wars broaden in terms of the political impact on regions and our global posture. Conflict termination proves to be difficult to impossible, or the real-world outcome over time becomes very different from the outcome negotiators thought would happen at the time. The reality proves far more dynamic and uncertain than is predicted going in; the fight requires far more time and resources necessary to accomplish anything than operators plan for.

We need to understand that we cannot develop ways to eliminate all such uncertainties, and we need to recognize that mistakes will inevitably be made that go far beyond the ones that are the result of political bias or ideology. There are some who would believe that if only planners and analysts could work without political bias or interference, this would solve most of our problems. Well quite frankly, even the best planners and analysts will face major problems regardless of their political and military leadership. The scale of ignorance and uncertainty will inevitably be too great when we enter most counterinsurgency contingencies. We have to accept that as the price of going to war.

This does not mean, however, that politics and ideology are not an important source of self-inflicted wounds. It is an open question to me which is proving worse, the infantile expectations of the neocons going into the Iraq war, or the equally infantile expectations of the neoliberals, at least at the civilian level, going into Vietnam.

I have gradually concluded that the Kennedy administration was worse than the Bush administration on the grounds of sheer hypocrisy. The Bush administration officials seem to have been sustained true believers in the justice of their cause. All too early in Vietnam, Rostow, the Bundies, and Hilsman already knew that they were on the edge of failure. On the other hand, when I look at who was the less capable Secretary of Defense—McNamara or Rumsfeld—I have to choose Rumsfeld. In Rumsfeld's case, we had already been through Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. Rumsfeld, and those around him, had far more of a past to learn from and they should have done so.

But I'm not sure that war fighters and analysts are all that much better. It is frightening to look back at the almost endless reams of analyses, plans, and solutions that people advanced in war colleges and in think tanks and universities during Vietnam War, El Salvador and Lebanon. Vietnam may have represented the nadir of American analysis, planning, and objectivity. However, Somalia, the Dayton accords, and Iraq also represented a failure to analyze the situation properly. Even when we analyzed well, we failed to translate this analysis into effective plans and operational capability within the interagency process.

Moreover, time and again, we drift into a focus on trying to win in tactical terms rather than focusing on whether we could use a war to achieve the desired national, regional, and grand strategy outcome. We forget that it is the end that counts, and not the means. We also forget that slogans and rhetoric kill, ideology kills, and a failure to fully survey and assess kills.

The Lesson of Strategic Indifference; Of Knowing When Not to Play the Game

The second point I would like touch upon is a lesson we seem to repeatedly learn at the end of counterinsurgency campaigns but then perpetually forget in entering into the next conflict. Not every game is worth playing, and sometimes the best way to win is not to play at all. When we talk about the risks of counterinsurgency, it is far too easy to mischaracterize the situation by seeing the intervention as too easy and the need for action as too great. It is far too easy to exaggerate the threat. I still remember distinctly the first time I ever attended a session of the British parliament. It was to hear Duncan Sandys denounce an African leader for leading the entire continent into the ways of darkness and death. That particular leader was Jomo Kenyatta. Seven years later, he was the Western symbol of stabilization in Africa.

It is equally easy to both exaggerate the ability of a counterinsurgency campaign to achieve a desired strategic outcome and ignore the fact that history is often perfectly capable of solving a problem if we do not intervene. A few years ago, I toured Vietnam, and saw from the Vietnamese side their vision of what had happened in the war. There were many tactical and political lessons I drew from that experience, one of which was how thoroughly we ignored what was happening to Buddhist perceptions and support at the political level while we concentrated on the tactical situation and the politics of Saigon.

The lesson I found most striking, however, was seeing the grand strategic outcome of the war as measured by even the most trivial metrics. I bought a bottle of mineral water in Hanoi airport and discovering that on the front label it said "USA Water," while its back label stated that it had

been processed through a 14-step process developed by NASA. When I looked at the toy counter, I saw that the bulk of toys consisted of US fighters or fighters with US marking. When I walked over to the news counter, I saw the “Investor’s Journal” in Vietnamese and English. This was after being told repeatedly how glad the Vietnamese were that we stayed in Asia as a deterrent to China. We were right in many ways about the domino theory, we just forgot that dominos can fall in two directions.

Is Counterinsurgency the Right Means to the End?

This brings me to my third point. Even if the game is worth playing, counterinsurgency may not be the way to play it. Robert Osgood made the point a long time ago that you engage in limited war, you do it for limited purposes. If you cannot keep the war and the purposes limited, you should not engage. It is amazing how easy it is to forget this. There are times when a counterinsurgency campaign is necessary or is forced on the US from the outside, but there are many times when we have a choice and can choose options other than counterinsurgency. Containment is one such option. I’m not going to ask for hands, but if you had known when we went into Iraq what you know today, would you still have rejected containment as the option? If you have to think about military involvement in Iran or Syria, is containment quite that bad a choice versus expanding a limited war or regime change -- at least by force?

If you cannot use containment, should we take advantage of military options where we have a decisive set of advantages: the ability to carry out selective strikes with limited cost. Placing US forces on the ground where they must conduct a major counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaign is far more costly and risk-oriented than using limited amounts of force in precision strikes or other carefully limited forms. Sanctions and sustained political pressure often have severe limits, but they too can sometimes achieve the desired result in ways that are and less costly than counterinsurgency.

Even when a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaign is necessary, using US forces may not be the answer. It is true that the US will normally only consider engaging in counterinsurgency because the nation it is going to fight is weak or divided. Far too often, however, we seem to commit our forces to combat. In many cases, it will still be better to rely on the local ally and build up their forces, even if this means a higher risk of losing in what is, after all, a limited war.

The right answer may never be clear, easy to choose, or be the same for different crises and problems. I would also like to emphasize, that I am not for a moment saying we should not use counterinsurgency techniques. What I am saying is that we should only engage directly in counterinsurgency after we assess the costs, risks, ability to achieve the desired end objective, *and the alternatives* honestly.

Conflict Termination Does Not always Mean Winning

My fourth point goes firmly against the American grain, but it is a natural corollary of limited war. If we cannot achieve the desired grand strategic outcome, we need to accept the fact that the

US must find ways to terminate a counterinsurgency war. Defeat, withdrawal, and acceptance of an outcome less than victory is always acceptable in limited war. For all the arguments about prestige, trust, and deterrence, there is no point in pursuing a limited conflict when it becomes more costly than the objective is worth or when the probability of achieving that objective becomes too low.

This is a lesson that goes against our culture. The whole idea that we can be defeated is no more desirable for Americans than for anyone else, in fact, almost certainly less so. But when we fail in Haiti, we fail in Haiti. We live with it, and in fact, it almost does not matter. Nobody truly notices. Exiting Somalia was not without consequences, but they were not critical. And I've already mentioned the consequences of Vietnam.

That does not mean that we should not stay in Iraq as long as we have a good chance of achieving acceptable objectives at an acceptable cost. But, it does mean that we can afford to lose in Iraq, particularly for reasons that are frankly beyond our control and which the world will recognize as such. There is no point in "staying the course" through a major civil war, a catastrophic breakdown of the political process, or a government coming to power that simply asks us to leave. In all three cases, it isn't a matter of winning or losing, but instead, facing a situation in which there is no real condition for staying.

In the future, we need to say that it is a limited war if it is a limited war. We need to explain fully what the limits are and develop a strategy for implementing, communicating and exploiting these limits. One mistake is to tell the host government, or the people you are fighting with, that your commitment is open-ended and that you can never leave; the incentive for responsibility vanishes with it.

Similarly, if you tell the world that a marginal strategic interest is vital, the world will sooner or later believe it, which is very dangerous if you have to leave or lose. You are better off saying you may lose, setting limits, and then winning, than claiming that you can't lose, having no limits, and then losing. And this should not be a massive, innovative lesson, but it is one we simply do not seem prepared to learn.

If We Must Fight a Counterinsurgency Campaign, We Must Focus Firmly on the Strategic, Political, and Allied Dimension of the Fighting

My fifth point is that focusing on the military dimension is an almost certain path to grand strategic defeat in a serious conflict. If we must engage in counterinsurgency warfare, and sometimes we must, then we need to plan for both complexity and cost. We have to prepare for the risk of long-term engagement and escalation, which will require more forces and resources, or otherwise set very clear limits and act upon them regardless of short-term humanitarian costs. We need to prepare for, and execute, a full spectrum of conflict. That means doing much more than seeking to win a war militarily. We need to have the ability to commit ourselves in ideological and political terms. We must find ways of winning broad local and regional support; stability operations and nation building are the price of any meaningful counterinsurgency campaign.

We Cannot Win Unless We Create an Ally and Partner Who Can Govern and Secure the Place Where We Are Fighting.

Sixth, successful counterinsurgency means having or creating a local partner that can take over from US forces and that can govern. What strikes me as most consistent between Vietnam and Iraq is that both cases show we cannot win an important counterinsurgency campaign alone. We will always be dependent on the people in the host country, and usually on local and regional allies. And to some extent at least, we will be dependent on the UN, traditional allies and diplomacy. If we can't figure out a way to have or create such an ally, the conflict is probably not worth fighting.

This means doing far more than creating effective allied forces. In most cases, we will have to find a way to reshape the process of politics and governments to create some structure in the country that can actually act in areas we liberate. Pacification is the classic example. If we can't deploy allied police forces and government presence, we often end up with a place on the map where no one in his right mind would go at night.

We have to be prepared to use aid and civic action dollars as well as bullets, and I think the US military has done far better in this area in Iraq than it has in the past. I wish I could say the same for AID in Washington, or for any aspect of the economic planning effort under the CPA. I can't. We ignored the economic realities going into Iraq and we ignore the economic realities now. Every independent assessment of our aid effort warns us just how bad our performance is in these areas -- even in critical areas like the oil industry. We now have spent or committed our way through nearly \$20 billion, and we have virtually no self-sustained structural economic change to show for it. Most aid projects spend more money on overhead, contractors, and security than gets to Iraqis in the field. We can't protect most of our aid projects, economic growth comes largely from US waste and wartime profiteering.

Our self-congratulatory measures of achievement are mindless. Who cares how much money we spend or how many buildings we create, unless it goes to the right place and has a lasting impact. The number of school buildings completed is relevant unless there are books, teachers, furniture, students and security, and the buildings go to troubled areas as well as secure ones. Bad or empty buildings leave a legacy of hostility, not success. Empty or low capacity clinics don't win hearts and minds. Increasing peak power capacity is meaningless unless the right people actually get it.

Honestly Winning the Support of the American People

Seventh, it is critical that we honestly prepare the American people, the Congress and our allies for the real nature of the war to be fought and prepare them to sustain the expense and sacrifice through truth, not spin. I suggested to several senior US officers that the first step in wartime is to shoot the PAOs you have in peacetime. That is unfair to the PAOs; like diplomats, they are paid to lie, in this case, for the campaign, rather than for the country. But there is only so much shallow spin that the American people or Congress will take. It isn't a matter of a cynical media

or a people who oppose the war; rubbish is rubbish. By the time we finish “spinning,” we deprive ourselves of credibility, domestically and internationally.

Planning for Realistic Durations

I would normally have mentioned my eighth point earlier, but it is so closely linked to winning the support of the American people that I am mentioning it now. Serious counterinsurgency campaigns take five to fifteen years. They don’t end conveniently with an assistant secretary or a President’s term in office. Again and again we deny the sheer length of serious counterinsurgencies.

Planners, executers, and anyone who explains and justifies such wars, all need to be far more honest about the timescales involved, just how long we may have to stay, and that even when an insurgency is largely over, there may be years of aid and advisory efforts.

Implications for War Fighting

My final points about counterinsurgency focus on war-fighting, and I should stress that my concerns are not with the details of military strategy and tactics, but rather with broader lessons I believe I have learned over the more than 40 years from Vietnam to Iraq.

First, I cannot stress often enough that we need to focus relentlessly on the desired outcome of the war and not the battle or overall military situation. It doesn’t matter how well we did last month; it doesn’t matter how we’re doing tactically. The real question is, are we actually moving toward a strategic outcome that serves our interests? If we don’t know, why are we there spending the lives of American men and women in the first place?

We have to teach at every level that stability operations and conflict termination are the responsibility of every field-grade officer. And, for that matter, every civilian. We need to act on the principle that every tactical operation must have a political context and set of goals. We need to tie our overall campaign plan to a detailed plan for the use of economic aid at every level, from simple bribery to actually seeking major changes in the economy of a given country.

Second, we need to understand, as Gen. Rupert Smith has pointed out, that the enemy will continue to try to win counterinsurgency conflicts by finding ways to operate below or above our threshold of conventional superiority. It is stupid, as some in the military have done, to call our enemies cowards or terrorists because they will not fight on our terms. The same remarkably stupid attitudes appeared in 19th century colonial wars and often cost those foolish enough to have them the battle. The Madhils victories in the Sudan are a good case example.

We have to be able to fight in ways that defeat insurgents and terrorists regardless of how they fight. They’re not cowards for fighting us in any way that does so at the highest cost to us and the least cost to them. If they can fight below our threshold of conventional superiority, then technology is at best a limited supplement to our human skills, military professionalism, and

above all, our ability to find ways to strengthen local allies. It is far more important, for example to have effective local forces than more technology.

Net-centric is not a substitute for human-centric, and for that matter, human-centric isn't a substitute for competent people down at the battalion level. Systems don't win. Technology doesn't win.

Third, we need to acknowledge that enemies can fight above the threshold of our conventional ability, not just beneath it. I have never understood why Americans think *they* can win an ideological struggle over Islam. Our Muslim allies can; *if* we work with them.

Our public diplomacy and political actions can have a major impact. But, when we talk about many of the wars we are now fighting, the local, cultural, ethnic, religious, and political issues have to be fought out largely by our ally on the ground and other Islamic states. We can help, but we alone are not going to win, or even successfully dominate, the battle for hearts and minds. Only regional allies with the right religion, culture, and legitimacy can cope with the growing ability of our ideologically-driven opponents to find the fault lines that can divide us from our allies by creating increased ethnic and sectarian tensions.

Fourth, we do need to improve our counterinsurgency technology, but we cannot win with “toys.” I mentioned the Israeli failure in Lebanon earlier largely because American audiences have some familiarity with our own history of failures of this kind. This was a case where I listened to an hour and half of interesting technological ideas as to why Israel would win in Southern Lebanon, which looked almost exactly like some of the briefings we used to give at DARPA during Vietnam.

Israeli technology failed in Lebanon as ours did in Vietnam, and some of the same IED systems that helped defeat Israel have now emerged in Iraq: those twin IR sensors, the shaped charges, the radio-controlled devices, the foam painted to look like rocks. Like Israel, we can defeat most IEDs, but not enough. Moreover, I suspect that you could take the cost of every insurgent IED to date, and it would still be cheaper than one AH1S that went down over Iraq.

Fifth, our best “force multiplier” will be effective allies, and interoperability with a true partner. We can win most counterinsurgency campaigns if we can create strong allies. We do win if we have troops that can operate against insurgents in the field, but carry out nation building and civil action activities at the same time. We win if we can find ways to match the military, political, economic, and governance dimension. Creating a real partnership with allies means respect; it doesn't mean creating proxies or tools. It also means recognizing that creating the conditions for effective governance and police are as important as the military. So is the creation of effective ministries. In this kind of warfare if you focus on the ministry of defense and ignore the ministry of the interior, and even more difficult if you ignore the ministry of finance, this just doesn't work.

In most places, the actual counterinsurgency battle is local and as dependent on police and effective governance as effective military forces. In hyper-urbanized areas, which represent many of the places where we fight, the city is the key, at least as much as the national

government. And, incidentally, Iraq has already shown time after time that it is difficult to sustain any victory without a lasting presence by local police and government offices

We also need to recognize something about regional allies that goes against our present emphasis on “democracy.” In most of the world, “legitimacy” has little to do with governments being elected, and a great deal to do with governments being popular. By all means, hold elections. They won’t do much harm in most cases. Sometimes, they can even do some good.

But, elections in wartime are only the answer if they help us win. In many cases, elections may bring people to power who are more of a problem than a solution. This is particularly true if elections come without the preconditions of mature political parties, economic stability a firm rule of law, and checks and balances. In most cases, we will need to worry about the people who don’t win—people, ethnicities, and sects who will not have human rights protection. (If any of you think there is a correlation between democracy and human rights, congratulations, you got through college without ever reading Thucydides. The Melian dialogue is the rule, not the exception.)

Fifth, we need to have a functional interagency process and partner our military with effective civilian counterparts. We cannot afford to bypass the system or to have civilian agencies that do not do their part from the outset. We need to begin by deciding on the team we go to war, and then make that team work. It is one of the oddities historically that Robert McNamara got his largest increase in US troops deployed to Vietnam by bypassing the interagency process. The Bush Administration began by going through an interagency process before the war, but largely chose to ignore it after January of 2003.

This is the wrong approach. Counterinsurgency wars are as much political and economic as military. They require political action, aid in governance, economic development and attention to the ideological and political dimension. The US can only succeed here if the interagency process can work.

At another level, we need civilian risk-takers. We need a counterpart to the military in the field. Frankly I don’t support the staffing of more interagency coordination bodies in Washington unless their primary function is to put serious resources into the field. We’re not going to win anything by having better interagency coordination, and more meetings, unless the end result is to put the right mix of people and resources out in the countryside and where the fighting takes place.

One suggestion I would make is that we put a firm end to the kind of mentality that overstaffs the State Department and intelligence community in Washington, and doesn’t require career civilians to take risks in the field. Foreign Service officers should not be promoted, in fact should be selected out, unless they are willing to take risks. Believe me, having been a FSR, and having taught international relations for years, we can get all of the risk takers we want. There already is a flood of applications from qualified people. We can also ensure continuity and expertise by drawing on the brave group of people already in Iraq and Afghanistan -- a remarkable number of whom are already contract employees -- and giving them career status.

We also need to “civilianize” some aspects of our military. We need to improve both their area and language skills, create the added specialized forces we need for stability and nation building operations, and rethink tour length for military who work in critical positions and with allied forces. Personal relationships are absolutely critical in the countries where we are most likely to fight counterinsurgency wars. So is area expertise and continuity in intelligence.

I am not particularly impressed with the idea that you can’t get our military and civilians to accept 18 month to 24 month tours in key slots. I find there are plenty of people willing to do this. The problem today is often that the selection system presents problems. People who take additional risks should be paid for it and have different leave policies and promotion incentives. The fact is that a man who is only a battalion commander is only a battalion commander. Other officers need to be there who have skills that go beyond that level. Those officers need to have more diverse skills, and deal adequately with the broader dimension of war, and stay long enough to be fully effective.

The last point I would like to raise today concerns intelligence. There are a lot of people here who have worked in the intelligence community and I know many are going to disagree with what I am about to say. Nevertheless, I don’t believe HUMINT is the panacea many promise. Good analysis is critical. Having allied countries, or allied forces, or allied elements, develop effective HUMINT is absolutely critical.

Far too often, we will have to go into counterinsurgency campaigns without being able to put qualified Americans in the field quickly enough to recruit effective agents and develop effective HUMINT on our own. Does that mean HUMINT isn’t important? No, of course it doesn’t; it is a useful tool. So is technical intelligence. But to create effective abilities to deal with security issues, you must have a local partner in most serious cases.

Authors' Biographies

Dr. Stuart Gordon

Stuart Gordon is a Senior Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy and a Research Fellow at the University of Reading. He has written widely on civil-military co-operation; challenges to humanitarianism; the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, the legality of the invasion of Iraq and the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He is currently writing a book entitled 'Alms and Armour' which explores the controversies surrounding the relationship between the military and the humanitarian communities in Iraq and Afghanistan. At Sandhurst he manages the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Peace Support/Stabilisation Operations (PSO) programmes and has been heavily involved in preparing British military units for deployments to Helmand Province in Afghanistan. During 2003 he served as a Lieutenant Colonel within the US Army's Coalition Forces Land Component Command, latter becoming Operations Director for the US/UK's Iraq Humanitarian Operations Centre in Baghdad. He has conducted field research and policy advice work in conflict situations in Iraq, Nepal, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Michael McClintock

Michael McClintock has worked in the human rights field for over thirty years and has written extensively on U.S. military doctrine and foreign policy from a human rights perspective. He is the author of *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990* (Pantheon, 1992) and of histories of El Salvador and Guatemala. He is currently the Director of Research of Human Rights First.

McClintock has participated in numerous fact-finding missions in conflict areas – in Central and South America, Northern Ireland, Ethiopia, and the Philippines. In addition to his work on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, he has written on such issues as humanitarian intervention, the prevention of genocide, hate crimes and other aspects of discrimination, and corporate responsibility.

Before joining Human Rights First in 2002, he worked with Amnesty International for almost 20 years, moving from a focus on Latin America to a global portfolio in the late 1980s. He moved to Human Rights Watch in 1994 where he had principal responsibility for the work of the Arms Division and regional divisions dealing with Africa and Europe and Central Asia. He is a graduate of Ohio University (1972) and the University of Wisconsin (1974).

Col. T.X. Hammes

T. X. Hammes was born in American Falls, Idaho on 31 August 1953. He was commissioned from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1975. In his thirty years in the Marine Corps, he served at all levels in the operating forces to include command of a rifle company, weapons company, intelligence company, infantry battalion and the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force.

He participated in stabilization operations in Somalia and Iraq as well as training insurgents in various places. He never served in the Pentagon, Headquarters Marine Corps or a Joint Staff.

Colonel Hammes has attended The Basic School, US Army Infantry Officers Advanced Course, Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Canadian National Defense College. He also spent one year on a Research Fellowship with the Mershon Center for Strategic Studies. His final tour in the Marine Corps was as Senior Military Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

He is the author of “The Sling and the Stone: On War in the Twenty-First Century” and numerous articles and opinion pieces. He is currently reading for a DPhil in Modern History at Oxford University.

Dr. Anthony Cordesman

Anthony Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is also a national security analyst for ABC News. His analysis has been featured prominently during the Gulf War, Desert Fox, the conflict in Kosovo, the fighting in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War. During his time at CSIS, he has been director of the Gulf Net Assessment Project, the Gulf in Transition Study, and principle investigator of the CSIS Homeland Defense Project. He has led studies on national missile defense, asymmetric warfare and weapons of mass destruction, and critical infrastructure protection. He directed the CSIS Middle East Net Assessment Project and acted as codirector of the CSIS Strategic Energy Initiative. He is the author of a wide range of studies on U.S. security policy, energy policy, and Middle East policy, which can be downloaded from the Strategic Energy Initiative, Homeland Defense, Military Balance, and Gulf in Transition sections of the CSIS Web site (www.csis.org). Professor Cordesman has formerly served as national security assistant to Senator John McCain of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. He directed the analysis of the lessons of the October War for the secretary of defense in 1974, coordinating U.S. military, intelligence, and civilian analysis of the conflict, and he has served in numerous other government positions, including in the State Department and on NATO International Staff. He also served as director of policy and planning for resource applications in the Department of Energy, and he has had numerous foreign assignments, including posts in Lebanon, Egypt, and Iran, and worked extensively in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Professor Cordesman is the author of more than 40 books, including a four-volume series on the lessons of modern war. His most recent books include: *The Iraq War*; *Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century*; *The Lessons of Afghanistan*; *Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction*; *Cyberthreats, Information Warfare, and Critical Infrastructure Protection*; *Strategic Threats and National Missile Defenses*; and *The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo*. He has been awarded the Department of Defense Distinguished Service medal, is a former adjunct professor of national security studies at Georgetown University, and has twice been a Wilson fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian.

National Security and Human Rights Program and the Project on the Means of Intervention

The National Security and Human Rights Program examines national security issues through the prism of human rights, weaving humanitarian concerns into the fabric of traditional security studies. Through research, publications, and dialogue among practitioners and academics, the Program aims to shape national and international security and human rights policies and the promotion of organizational learning and change.

The Program addresses issues ranging from the effect of war on foreign civilians to the impact of security measures upon American citizens; from civil-military relations at the highest levels in Washington to the lowest levels in the field; and from the role of military ethics, leadership, training, doctrine, and capabilities in upholding human rights norms and laws to national and international judicial redress for abuses committed during armed conflict. The Program also examines human rights as justification and outcome of national and international interventions (using both military and non-military tools) and the role of human rights in post-war reconstruction efforts.

The National Security Human Rights Program comprises several initiatives. The Project on the Means of Intervention lies at the core of the Program's activities. Through an ongoing dialogue between the military and human rights community, the Project considers how humanitarian considerations are factored into the conduct of war. Having completed a several-year effort focused principally on U.S. airpower, the Project recently began a new phase devoted to counterinsurgency operations and institutional learning.

The NSHR Program also hosts and co-sponsors workshops, seminars, training sessions and other exchanges with interested military and civilian institutions (for example, co-sponsoring the Army's February 2006 counterinsurgency doctrine revision working conference). The Program publishes working papers and sponsors research related to programmatic activities. The Program helps develop the capacity of human rights organizations to constructively engage military actors, and helps integrate humanitarian perspectives into military activities. By facilitating independent activities or participation in institutional activities such as war games and training seminars, the Program helps these two communities identify and expand common interests and concerns.

The Carr Center for Human Rights Policy

Director: Sarah Sewall

Executive Director: Diane Malcolmson

The mission of the Carr Center, like the Kennedy School, is to train future leaders for careers in public service and to apply first-class research to the solution of public policy problems. Our research, teaching and writing are guided by a commitment to make human rights principles central to the formulation of good public policy in United States and throughout the world.

Since its founding in 1999 through a gift from Kennedy School alumnus Greg Carr, the Center has developed a unique focus of expertise on the most dangerous and intractable human rights challenges of the new century, including genocide, mass atrocity, state failure and the ethics and politics of military intervention.

In approaching such challenges, we seek to lead public policy debate, to train human rights leaders and to partner with human rights organizations to help them respond to current and future challenges. We also recognize that the solutions to such problems must involve not only human rights actors, but governments, corporations, the military and others not traditionally conceived of as a part "human rights" efforts. Thus, we seek to expand the reach and relevance of human rights considerations to all who influence their outcomes.

The Center uses its *convening power* to create a safe space for human rights organizations and other policy actors to engage in constructive self-criticism and to forge new partnerships.

The Center uses its *research capacity* to evaluate the human rights policies of the United States and other governments and to analyze the dilemmas that need to be resolved when human rights principles are brought to bear on major public policy choices.

The Center uses its *teaching capacity* to inspire future leaders to make respect for human rights principles a central commitment of democratic leadership.