

**HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES**  
**IN MILITARY INTERVENTION WORKSHOP**

CARR CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

NOVEMBER 29-30, 2001  
1779 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., NW ROOT ROOM, 2<sup>ND</sup> FLOOR,  
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## PREFACE

The workshop described in this report is part of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy's Project on the Means of Intervention. The project, which is described in greater detail in on page 26 of this report, brings together military and human rights experts to explore challenging humanitarian questions about *how* military force is used.

The need for such an effort was demonstrated by the polarizing debate about the strategy and tactics of Operation Allied Force in the Balkans. Many in the human rights community argued that the air campaign against Serbia was fundamentally flawed, unnecessarily endangering both Serb civilians and the Kosovars on whose behalf force was used. In contrast, Western political and military leaders asserted that the intervention was path-breaking, not simply because of its larger humanitarian purpose, but also in light of its success in minimizing collateral damage while achieving operational objectives.

The apparent disconnect between the military and human rights communities on these issues presents an opportunity to begin a dialogue about the possibility of minimizing negative humanitarian consequences of the use of force. The dialogue will illuminate substantive issues, but also foster communication between two communities that share common interests despite significant rhetorical and institutional differences.

This project is even more timely and relevant given the current war on terrorism. Public debate about Operation Allied Force focused more on the *jus ad bellum* question of legal justification for the intervention than on *jus in bello* issues regarding the means of intervention. Today the public appears less concerned about the legal standing of a war on terrorism, and more attentive to the humanitarian consequences of the military means employed. The headlines are again featuring topics such as accounting for civilian casualties, technological advances in military capabilities, the inevitability of human error in war, the need for alliance cohesion, and possibilities of further limiting collateral damage. While their prominence may wane, these issues are likely to remain central for the world's leading power and its allies whenever force is used.

This project is intended to illuminate these issues pertaining to the use of force by analyzing them from divergent perspectives and developing common substantive ground upon which to base future policy. This workshop marks an initial step in this process. Additional information, including some workshop papers, may be found on the Center's website.

Several areas of common interest already have emerged. One centers on the importance of continuing adjustments in how the U.S. military evaluates the effects of using force (e.g., improving bomb damage assessment, empirical analysis of the value of strategic targeting, and collateral damage modeling). Another set of issues involves improving tools via technology (e.g. more integrated systems, more discriminating munitions) and ensuring appropriate rules of engagement. In addition, there is shared interest in improving public understanding of the humanitarian implications of alternative military and non-military strategies of intervention, and in defining and helping to create "realistic" public expectations about the use of force. Participants also want to consider whether existing international humanitarian law promotes or hinders the humanitarian use of force in current conflicts. The many issues raised in this workshop alone suggest the importance of continuing the dialogue.

The Carr Center's Project on the Means of Intervention was made possible by the generous financial support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the encouragement of Senior Program Officer Stephen del Rosso. Special thanks are due to Camilla Catenza, Carr Center Events Coordinator, for her superb work in organizing this workshop. I would also like to thank consultant Jennifer Hazen for drafting the workshop report and Program Officer Ingrid Tamm-Grudin for her help in editing the report and workshop papers. Finally, the project is deeply indebted to the outstanding participants in the workshop, who helped prove that this endeavor is both possible and enriching.

Sarah Sewall  
Program Director, National Security and Human Rights  
Carr Center for Human Rights Policy

# **HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES IN MILITARY INTERVENTION**

This report summarizes a workshop held in Washington, D.C. on November 29-30, 2001 as part of the Project on the Means of Intervention. The project is directed by Sarah Sewall and supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

The workshop discussion focused on the United States' use of airpower during the past decade in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. While these operations were highly successful, they raised strategic and tactical concerns about airpower's impact on civilians. Airpower has been lauded for its ability to produce results while limiting collateral damage, and it has been criticized as a risk-averse military response that falls short of its promise to protect the lives of the most vulnerable. Workshop participants discussed the ways in which the use of airpower has changed over time, the impact of international law, target selection, tradeoffs between humanitarian concerns and operational success, the process of evaluating and learning from military operations, and the challenges of creating a dialogue between the military and human rights communities.

This report highlights the main points of discussion. Remarks are not attributed to speakers in order to preserve their anonymity and therefore the openness of the forum. The meeting agenda and list of participants are included in the appendix.

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN AIRPOWER

The workshop opened with an analysis of airpower's evolution since World War II and its humanitarian implications. Technological advances have revolutionized modern warfare, changed the nature and pace of modern military campaigns, and enabled the military to address humanitarian concerns by limiting collateral damage to an unprecedented degree.

*“As a starting point, it is fundamentally correct to say military operations and humanitarian concerns are at odds. Military operations are about destruction, and are often chaotic and confused. Humanitarian concerns are about minimizing this destruction. But this doesn't tell us much. The real question is to what extent can military operations be carried out with minimum casualties without damaging effectiveness and accepting significantly higher casualties of friendly forces.”*

During WWII, U.S. strategy focused on land and sea operations. U.S. air power was small and its bombing imprecise. Air force doctrine emphasized the bombing of industrial centers to destroy the military capability of the enemy, but war planners did not consider intentional attacks on civilian populations to be acceptable. However, technology rendered such distinctions largely meaningless. In 1940, reports indicated that only one in three bombs were striking within five miles of an intended target, and this proportion dropped to one in six in bad weather. Although accuracy improved steadily throughout the war—by the end of 1944 nearly half of the bombs dropped by the US Eighth Air Force were falling within 1,000 feet of their aimpoint—strategic bombing was still a relatively blunt instrument.

Air weapons are far more accurate today, enabling pilots to hit targets while minimizing the number of civilian casualties and the extent of collateral damage. In particular, precision guided munitions (PGMs), developed during the Vietnam War, have played an increasingly important role in air campaigns in the 1990s.

During the past decade, the U.S. relied predominantly upon airpower to achieve humanitarian goals in Bosnia and Kosovo, and to attack terrorist enclaves in Afghanistan. This shift to emphasizing airpower over ground forces resulted from technological advances and the

flexibility airpower offers military planners. Airpower also can reduce risks to U.S. forces and limit collateral damage on the ground.

Some participants suggested that the increased capability of airpower provides the military with a coercive tool for altering opponent behavior without completely destroying enemy forces. They argued that the threat or actual use of air strikes could achieve military goals short of a full-scale war involving the use of ground forces.

Other participants expressed concerns about relying upon airpower alone to accomplish goals that might lie beyond its capacity. For example, when an enemy leader is relatively insulated from popular opinion, air strikes may have little impact on the domestic political equation. It was argued that under such circumstances, strategic bombing cannot be justified as a means of bringing down a national government.

More fundamentally, some participants said, it is only in combination with ground forces that airpower can fulfill its potential. For example, while airpower may dissuade an enemy from entering a city it cannot stop a determined land aggressor. Protecting a city or getting an enemy to the negotiating table may require troops on the ground.

*“Airpower is characterized by a very intense, concentrated, but temporal effect. The effect is gone after the explosion. If the target is missed it can still continue to move and attack. But airpower can respond quickly over a large area, providing the military with a flexibility that cannot be found with the use of ground troops. The advantage of land power is that it is hard, dense, and permanent.”*

Some participants suggested that the apparent success of airpower in Bosnia (Operation Deliberate Force) led political leaders to overestimate the impact of airpower alone, leading to an exclusive reliance on airpower four years later in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force). While many claimed that these NATO air strikes succeeded in defeating Milosevic, others protested that the Operation Allied Force air strategy, along with the absence of ground forces, allowed the displacement of tens of thousands of Kosovars.

Airpower seems to be in the process of becoming national leaders' tool of choice. However, many participants cautioned that neither leaders nor the general public understood either the capabilities or limitations of airpower particularly well. Several workshop members suggested that a better understanding of the effectiveness of air campaigns requires not only an assessment of airpower, but also an assessment of the supporting role of ground forces.

## **THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW**

The intent of international humanitarian law (IHL) is to circumscribe and regulate the use of military force by providing laws governing the treatment of prisoners of war, the use of certain types of weapons, and the definition of legitimate targets. While the report uses the term international humanitarian law (IHL) throughout, we intend it to be synonymous with the term "law of armed conflict" (LOAC). However we recognize that not all participants view the terms as synonymous, and that the military in particular prefers use of the term LOAC in order to avoid conflating broader humanitarian principles or other legal instruments with the body of law that governs armed conflict.

Advances in technology, industrialization and urbanization, as well as the changing nature of warfare, are fueling the debate about laws governing *jus in bello*. Discussions during the workshop focused on several issues: whether IHL provides clear guidelines, whether the definition of military necessity is easily applied (particularly to coercive strategies), and the relationship between law and morality.

Some viewed existing IHL as a satisfactory regime, noting that the problem lay in adherence and enforcement. Others argued that efforts should be made to strengthen international humanitarian laws by redefining concepts, specifying the conditions under which force can be used, and outlining more specific guidelines regarding the legitimate use of force. Other participants asserted that existing law provides a sufficient guide for current operations,

even if it remains open to interpretation. Indeed, one participant argued that the international community was seeking to constrain the U.S. use of force through legal means.

*“New international humanitarian law is emerging, and if allowed to progress, law will become the most potent weapon deployed against the United States.”*

Some participants observed that a determined aggressor will ignore IHL when the law constrains military action or manipulate the law to serve national objectives. Opponents during war may use one side’s adherence to the law as a means of gaining military advantage. Adversaries may orchestrate actions to increase collateral damage, and use international media to publicize these alleged or actual violations in order to discredit opposing forces. Participants noted the need for the armed forces to deliberate carefully about the legal and operational implications of fighting an opponent that does not play by the same set of rules.

International humanitarian law, it was noted, requires the application of the concept of military necessity to targeting decisions. In order to legally justify targeting strategies, armed forces must be able to clearly demonstrate the military advantage of attacking a specified target. But the definition of clear military advantage, and who is responsible for this determination, is still open to interpretation. In addition, since the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention, the legitimacy of targets is also based on an assessment of the overall impact of the entire campaign rather than assessments of individual targets or attacks. It was noted that this development leaves justifications of targets open to greater interpretation.

In the context of a strategy that seeks to coerce political leadership by focusing on targets other than fielded forces, it may become particularly challenging to justify target selection on legal grounds. Participants suggested that this is due to the difficulty of determining whether and how individual targets achieve political results.

Some participants pointed out that the U.S. military has a cadre of lawyers who are involved in virtually every step of the decision making process in a military operation. These

military lawyers provide assessments of the legality of targets and demonstrate U.S. sensitivity to the constraints of international law. It was noted that IHL principles have seeped into the American way of war to such an extent that very few issues demand difficult legal decisions. The argument was made that the U.S. use of lawyers is almost unique. Some participants suggested the need for other nations to develop a cadre of operationally-trained military lawyers to provide guidance on decisions about the use of force.

*“It is a mistake for military planners to view humanitarian concerns as impediments to success in war. Wars are fought for political reasons, and ignoring humanitarian concerns runs the risk of winning the battle and losing the war.”*

Participants debated whether Western militaries should be held to a higher standard of performance and conformity with international law. Some suggested that a dire humanitarian crisis could justify less attention to IHL in areas such as targeting, where the scale of civilian lives to be saved might dwarf the scale of collateral damage for a particular target set. Others asserted that the domestic public and international community, justifiably or not, holds Western militaries to a higher standard when they intervene for ostensibly humanitarian reasons. Many participants sought to distinguish between morally acceptable and legally justifiable actions, suggesting that there are tensions between them.

## **TARGETING**

Participants discussed the question of how targets are selected and what criteria are used to determine legitimate targets. One key criterion, it was pointed out, is the extent to which the target meets the requirements of military necessity. As noted earlier, military necessity is not always easy to gauge. Participants agreed that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets cannot be based on either convenience or the number of civilians harmed or saved. But there was also agreement that to comply with international law, the military must do everything feasible to avoid and reduce the number of civilian casualties and the extent of collateral damage. The interpretation of “feasible” is less obvious.

Another issue raised by participants concerned the distinction between military and civilian targets. Many pointed out that the distinction between civilian and non-civilian has become blurred due to the nature of modern warfare and the environments in which modern wars are fought. Fighting in high-density urban locations makes it more difficult to prevent collateral damage than intervening in a remote desert environment. But even in situations where this distinction can be made, participants disagreed about the legitimacy of targeting certain types of civilians. Some questioned whether civilians actively assisting the military, such as key political allies or civilian employees of military establishments, deserved non-combatant immunity.

*“If the military gives up certain targets, there is a cost for this in effectiveness. What we want from the military in action is that they do not release ordnance when they see evidence that the target is non-military.”*

Participants also disagreed about the circumstances under which attacking civilian objects, such as media towers and electrical grids, is legitimate or useful to a military campaign. Debate over the NATO bombing of the RTS station in Belgrade illustrated this difference of opinion. Some pointed out that although media targets have often appeared on targeting lists, the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention made such targets illegal. Destroying the station produced little military advantage and should not have been targeted, they argued. They saw the media as providing a link between the government and the people, and viewed the severing of this link as not legitimate under IHL. Conversely, others argued that media outlets provide effective mobilizing tools for the perpetration of violence and thus are legitimate targets.

Most agreed that the targeting of electrical grids raises concerns about the impact on civilians. Some argued that the grave impact on civilians resulting from the destruction of electrical grids ruled them out as legitimate targets (and they argued that the timeframe for evaluating impact could not be simply the immediate aftermath of the strike). But others argued that the bombing of electrical grids provides military advantage by injecting friction into the system and temporarily disabling the enemy. The Gulf War was offered as an example of how technology can provide an alternative: new weapons can temporarily disable electrical grids without completely destroying them, thus reducing the long-term impact upon civilians.

One participant pointed out that these decisions are easier concerning pre-planned targets on stationary objects, and more complex and difficult when targets are mobile, or when targeting strategies change in mid-stream. Many pointed out that even after targets are selected it remains difficult to accurately identify targets on the ground during military operations. Part of the difficulty is the pace at which modern wars are fought, they observed. Most agreed that the military commander is in the best position to determine which targets and tactics provide military advantage in the context of a broader strategy.

Intelligence plays an important role in the selection of targets. The quality of intelligence helps determine the success of an operation, and affects forces' ability to hit the right targets and avoid collateral damage. Participants expressed concern about how information is gathered, processed and utilized by the armed forces. One participant argued that the military is shifting from action based on intelligence to action based on information. Intelligence, he pointed out, is processed information, which means that the data gathered is analyzed and goes through the normal chains of command. With the increased pace of modern warfare and communications, and the resulting shortened decision making cycle, the analytical phase of the process may be lost and service members may be forced to rely on a more intuitive assessment of information. Such a shift could cause an increase in errors, decrease the military's ability to achieve mission goals, and result in higher civilian casualties.

Several people suggested that the armed forces pay greater attention to how pilots identify targets during operations; they proposed further analysis on whether and when improved target identification would require positioning men on the ground, flying at lower altitudes, or changing the rules of engagement.

## WEAPONS AND TACTICS

The discussion of weapons addressed the distinction between “smart” and “dumb” weapons and future trends in precision weapons, the legitimacy of using certain weapons, and the limits of airpower in achieving military goals.

Many suggested that “smart” weapons will be the weapons of choice in the future due to their accuracy and reduced cost. Several pointed to a decade-long trend of an increasing reliance on precision guided munitions (PGMs): from roughly 10 percent of the weapons dropped in the Gulf War, to 30 percent in Kosovo, and 60 percent in Afghanistan. The availability of PGMs raised the question of whether there is or might be a legal or moral obligation to use them whenever feasible. While many agreed that PGMs are preferable when civilians are at risk, there was general consensus that “dumb” bombs still have a role to play in air operations with respect to certain targets, such as airfields, where the target is easy to identify and the risks of civilian collateral damage are minimal.

Participants debated the legality and morality of using specific types of weapons: land mines, cluster bombs, blinding lasers, and depleted uranium. The discussion concerned the distinctions between inherent characteristics of a weapon and the methods and circumstances of its employment, with participants divided about the “morality” and utility of landmines and cluster bombs. Many participants agreed on the need to study the impact of using depleted uranium. It was suggested that U.S. military attitudes toward the use and production of cluster bombs were changing in response to international concerns.

Some participants observed that rules of engagement (ROE) are often altered to address humanitarian concerns, and that such constraints are seeping into the standard design of ROE. A main point of debate concerned the extent to which such constraints are required. For example, one participant argued that ROE must ensure that pilots do not release ordnance if they personally cannot correctly identify the target. Another participant pointed out that in Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, roughly 10 percent of the PGMs used were dropped into the sea

because pilots chose not to release them during the mission (and could not return to the carriers carrying the ordnance).

Participants discussed the effects of a 15,000-foot air deck, which was often required during Operation Allied Force. Military participants noted that this is the best altitude for PGM use because it provides adequate time for the weapons to correct for accuracy. Human rights representatives argued that higher altitude flight nonetheless increased the risks of inaccurate identification and that ROE failed to compensate for this limitation.

Another topic of debate concerned the ultimate cost of operational constraints imposed for humanitarian reasons. Deliberate Force was offered as an example in which great care was taken to minimize collateral damage during an operation. Pilots often employed the smallest weapons rather than the largest the aircraft could carry, a departure from military doctrine. Precision guided munitions accounted for roughly 70 percent of weapons dropped, versus fewer than 10 percent during the Gulf War. Normal procedures providing for single passes over targets to eliminate risks to aircraft were amended to provide for numerous passes, and only after the dust had settled, in order to further reduce the possibility of inaccurately identifying targets. It was suggested that the U.S. could “afford” such caution only in limited circumstances. A participant queried whether it would be either militarily prudent or politically necessary to apply these constraints to the war on terrorism.

Participants briefly discussed policy and humanitarian concerns regarding U.S. military cooperation with indigenous forces. A U.S. policy increasingly reliant upon local ground forces paired with U.S. airpower makes this issue ever more pressing. Questions were posed about an external military’s responsibility for inhumane or unlawful actions by indigenous forces. NATO air strikes in support of the Bosnian-Croat offensive, possible NATO collaboration with the Kosovo Liberation Army in Kosovo, and Western support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan were cited as cases of concern.

## CHALLENGES OF OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

Some military representatives observed that criticism from human rights organizations can be useful. However, they argued that human rights groups that assess military operations must have sufficient operational knowledge to understand and effectively evaluate the actions they monitor. It is unreasonable, some suggested, for these external observers to point to each incident of collateral damage as a sign of inattention to humanitarian concerns. Damage, they argued, does not necessarily indicate negligence. Many military participants observed that wars are messy and that civilian casualties often are unavoidable. It would be helpful, one participant offered, if informed human rights organizations would criticize fellow organizations that make spurious or unfounded charges.

*“The best thing would be the NGO world saying ‘this is what we’d like to see,’ and the military saying ‘this is the best we can do,’ and trying to narrow this gap.”*

Many participants felt that the military was not primed to ask the right questions or gather the required data to minimize future collateral damage and civilian deaths. Some argued that a different approach to after-action reports that included more detailed analysis of these issues would make a significant difference.

There is limited empirical data about the strategic impact of specific strikes or types of targets, several participants observed, and thus minimal understanding of whether and why coercion strategies work. But others countered that an inability to isolate variables makes it difficult to ever hope for meaningful empirical analysis of strategic bombing. Some suggested that useful military assessments, which might help inform the public debate, often are not made available in an unclassified form.

It was noted that the U.S. military has developed a methodology for predicting collateral damage, a relatively recent advance and evidence of the United States’ sensitivity to humanitarian concerns. Several participants argued for the need to update and refine the model.

Some suggested that evidence is rarely gathered after the fact to determine whether the model's predictions are accurate. An inflated model, they observed, may induce overly conservative targeting decisions by increasing the predicted costs of attacking a given target.

It was also noted that the failure to make accounting for casualties a priority during or after conflicts produces an image of callousness. The review process in each operation remains largely ad-hoc, and in many cases takes place outside of public view. Increased efforts to accurately account for collateral damage would, it was argued, help demonstrate the seriousness with which the U.S. armed forces view the issue.

*“We are not in the international humanitarian law business for the purpose of Monday morning quarterbacking. We give wide latitude to military judgement, and think it is unfair to second-guess servicemen. Instead, we try to address the bigger decisions that are made, that aren't clouded by the fog of war; that if made differently would not affect military effectiveness but would protect better those on the ground.”*

There was also debate about the timing of NGO critiques of military operations. Some thought that NGOs must raise their concerns during operations so that the military can respond in real time. Others countered that investigations and critiques may hinder the conduct or even success of operations. They also noted that in times of armed conflict, it may not be possible or responsible to provide the type of information often demanded. If this is the case, others responded, the armed forces should learn how to address this problem because current policies often fuel public and international distrust, potentially undermining operations or international coalitions.

## **LEADERSHIP AND PUBLIC OPINION**

Participants reflected on the sources of humanitarian constraints upon the use of force. While international humanitarian law certainly places constraints upon the use of force, many thought that popular conceptions of “morality” had a far more powerful impact. They observed

that political leaders' assumptions about domestic public opinion are central to shaping the political constraints that are imposed upon interventions. Thus, political leaders must understand that when the U.S. engages in a military operation, the mission must be won both at home and on the battlefield.

Participants discussed the tensions between political sensitivities and military strategies, focusing on how to reconcile humanitarian concerns with military effectiveness. Many suggested that while political concerns, often humanitarian in nature, can result in constraints upon military options, these concerns can lead to perverse outcomes. A strategy motivated by a desire to protect civilians may ultimately increase the suffering of innocents in a given conflict. For example, some argued that the gradualism that politicians demanded in Operation Allied Force may have lengthened the overall campaign. Others argued that taking out Serb air defenses early on in the campaign, even if causing greater immediate civilian casualties, might have reduced overall collateral damage. In either case, an apparently less humane strategy might have reduced aggregate civilian deaths during the conflict. Several participants argued for the need to educate political leaders and publics about the potential costs of “humanitarian” constraints on the use of force, especially with regard to how strategic decisions (e.g., gradualism, no ground forces) affect outcomes. Some participants even wondered whether military intervention could remain effective under the increasing weight of these political/humanitarian constraints.

*“The more accurate we become, the smaller the footprint we leave, the more accuracy improves, the higher the bar is — and we’re facing mission impossible.”*

To some participants, recommendations to reduce civilian casualties seemed to suggest or require that the armed forces assume greater risks. Because the U.S. has an obligation to protect those in uniform, some questioned the legitimacy of asking service members to accept greater personal risks in order to meet humanitarian concerns. Others suggested that increased risk to American service members could jeopardize an entire humanitarian operation because U.S. casualties could place greater political pressure on politicians to end the entire operation.

Most agreed that political and military leaders should take responsibility for creating more realistic expectations about the use of airpower, the possibility of casualties, and the likelihood of success without costs. Political and military leaders also have the responsibility to keep the public informed, and to ensure that information is as accurate as possible. Some suggested that human rights organizations can assist in this process, especially in foreign countries where they can provide on-the-ground information on the crisis and communicate with the local population. But participants agreed that responsibility for communicating the military's efforts to protect civilians ultimately lies with political and military leaders. Improving the process of identifying and understanding errors, and demonstrating efforts to avoid them, can only enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces.

## **THE CHALLENGE OF DIALOGUE**

This workshop opened a dialogue between two very different cultures: the U.S. military/security community and the human rights/humanitarian relief community. It must be noted, of course, that within each community there exists a broad diversity of opinion, including significant disagreement. This report necessarily simplifies this complex reality. Nonetheless, the meeting initiated a conversation about the use of airpower and its impact on civilians across all of these various cultural and organizational divides.

The success of the ongoing project depends upon the willingness and ability of members to exchange assumptions and perspectives, and develop a mutually respectful working relationship. A central and recurring theme was the sense of mutual misunderstanding.

Several human rights representatives felt misunderstood with respect to their main concerns regarding the use of force. They argued that they understood the difficulties of war and did not expect perfection, but did expect the armed forces to do a better job both of explaining what they are doing during operations to protect civilians, and of studying past missions to better protect civilians in the future. Meanwhile, some military participants believed that the U.S. armed forces do an unparalleled job in avoiding collateral damage and thoroughly study past

operations, but naturally sometimes make mistakes in the fog of war. Moreover, some argued, airpower cannot be judged onto itself, but should be compared to alternatives that may be even more costly to civilians, such as ground war or economic sanctions that kill “from the bottom up.”

*“There is a perfect war: a war that has public support, a war in which the military abides by international humanitarian law, and a war in which the military and the politicians are perceived of as candid, open, and doing the best they can.”*

Nevertheless, there was general agreement in several areas. First, most participants stated that the military and the human rights communities need to make greater efforts to inform one another about their respective missions, operations, intentions, and expectations. Participants also agreed that there is no such thing as a perfect war in the sense of a conflict without casualties, mistakes, or collateral damage.

Most participants agreed that the success of past air campaigns has bred unrealistic expectations about collateral damage, and that the U.S. military has contributed to this phenomenon through its desire to publicize its successes. And participants generally agreed upon the need to learn more – and differently – from past military operations in order to improve the conduct of future operations.

A broad question for future discussion was framed as follows: how can future military operations further minimize collateral damage without undermining the success of the operation or risking significantly higher military casualties? Most participants agreed that identification of “best practices” could provide a fruitful framework for progress on this question.

## Appendix 1 — Workshop Agenda

### HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES IN MILITARY INTERVENTION

November 29 & 30, 2001

1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Root Room, 2<sup>nd</sup> Floor Washington D.C. 20036-2103

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*Thursday, November 29*

#### *Background of History and Issues*

Project Background and Introductions

**Michael Ignatieff** and **Sarah Sewall**

Historical Overview of Humanitarian Issues in the Conduct of War

**Col. Phillip S. Meilinger**, USAF (Ret.), SAIC

Evolution of International Humanitarian Legal Regime and Current Key Issues

**Daniel Helle**, International Committee of the Red Cross

**Col. Charles Dunlap**, USAF Air Education and Training Command

*Respondent:* **Ruth Wedgwood**, SAIS

#### *Operation Desert Storm*

**Col. Jerome Martin**, Peru State College

**Daryl Press**, Dartmouth College

**Col. Raymond C. Ruppert**, JA, USA (Ret.)

*Respondent:* **David Petrasek**, International Council on Human Rights Policy

#### *Dinner*

**Dinner Address by General Wesley K. Clark USA (Ret.)**

## Appendix 1 — Workshop Agenda

### HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES IN MILITARY INTERVENTION

November 29 & 30, 2001

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*Friday, November 30*

#### *Operations in the Former Yugoslavia*

Operation Deliberate Force

**Col. Robert Owen**, USAF Air Mobility Command

*Respondent:* **Maj. Gen. MacGhee**, USAF Air Doctrine Center

Operation Allied Force

**Benjamin Lambeth**, RAND Corporation

**William Fenrick**, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

*Respondent:* **Maj. Gen. William Nash**, USA (Ret.), Council on Foreign Relations

#### *Human Rights Considerations in Enduring Freedom and Future Operations*

**Dana Priest**, Washington Post/US Institute of Peace

**Ken Roth**, Human Rights Watch

**William Arkin**, SAIS

*Respondent:* **Daniel Byman**, RAND Corporation

#### *Wrap Up*

**Michael Ignatieff** and **Sarah Sewall**, Carr Center

## **Appendix 2 — Participant Biographies**

CARR CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY  
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

### **HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES IN MILITARY INTERVENTION WORKSHOP**

November 29-30, 2001  
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW Root Room, 2<sup>nd</sup> Floor, Washington, DC

#### ***Mr. William M. Arkin***

Mr. William M. Arkin is a Senior Fellow at SAIS and Senior Military Adviser to Human Rights Watch. He is a correspondent and columnist for *The Washington Post* and *The Los Angeles Times* and a military analyst for NBC. He is also an adjunct professor at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Mr. Arkin has investigated the effects of warfare on civilian populations and pioneered the methods of post-war bomb damage assessments and environmental assessments, starting with the Gulf War in 1991. He has written extensively on targeting, weapons technology, and civilian casualties in warfare.

#### ***Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon***

Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon is the President and CEO of Refugees International. In the Clinton Administration, he served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and as the Pentagon spokesman. Previously, Mr. Bacon spent 25 years at *The Wall Street Journal* as a reporter, editor and columnist.

#### ***Mr. Mark Bartolini***

Mr. Mark Bartolini is the International Rescue Committee's (IRC) vice-president for government relations, based in Washington D.C. He joined IRC in 1993 as a coordinator of humanitarian relief efforts in Bosnia. In 1996 he became director of IRC's Bosnia program. He also previously served as IRC's deputy director of government relations in Washington. In his work for the IRC, Mr. Bartolini has traveled extensively in the Balkans and Africa. Mr. Bartolini worked as a journalist prior to joining the IRC.

## Appendix 2 — Participant Biographies

### ***Mr. Reuben E. Brigety, II***

Mr. Reuben E. Brigety, II is a researcher with the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch in Washington, D.C. Following graduation from Annapolis, he served as an assistant speechwriter and political-military analyst to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jeremy "Mike" Boorda. He later went on to Cambridge University where he earned his Ph.D. in international affairs, with a focus on the strategy and theory of warfare.

### ***Ms. Holly Burkhalter***

Ms. Holly Burkhalter is the Advocacy Director of Physicians for Human Rights, and formerly coordinated the U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines. Previously, Ms. Burkhalter served as the Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch in Washington, D.C. and as a staff member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a board member of the U.S. Institute for Peace.

### ***Dr. Daniel Byman***

Dr. Daniel Byman is the Research Director of the Center for Middle East Public Policy and a policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. Before coming to RAND, Dr. Byman served as a Middle East politics analyst for the U.S. government. He is an adjunct professor at George Washington University and Georgetown University. Dr. Byman is the author of forthcoming books, *The Dynamics of Coercive Force* (Cambridge University Press, 2001) and *A Peace That Lasts: Preventing the Recurrence of Ethnic Conflict* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), as well as numerous articles and RAND monographs.

### ***General Wesley K. Clark, USA (Ret.)***

Retired U.S. Army General Wesley K. Clark was NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and commanded the first major combat operation in NATO history. He served previously as Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was the lead military negotiator for the Bosnian Peace Accords at Dayton. His recent book, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat* (PublicAffairs 2001), assesses NATO's war and how future wars will be waged. General Clark is associated with Stephens Group, Inc., where he works on high technology venture capital as the Managing Director of Merchant Banking.

## **Appendix 2 — Participant Biographies**

### ***Mr. Edward Cummings***

Mr. Edward Cummings is the Assistant Legal Adviser for Non-Proliferation in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State. He is a career member of the Senior Executive Service. He joined the State Department in 1979 after serving in the U.S. Army in the Pentagon in the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army (1974-1979). He is currently the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Convention on Conventional Weapons Review Conference, and has participated in many humanitarian law negotiations since 1977. He served previously as the Counselor for Legal Affairs at the U.S. Mission in Geneva (1995-2000) and as the Assistant Legal Adviser for Politico-Military Affairs (1987-1995).

### ***Mr. W. Harvey Dalton***

Mr. William Harvey Dalton serves as the Associate Deputy General Counsel (Intelligence) in the Office of General Counsel in the Department of Defense. He received his LLB from the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill in 1965 and his LLM from the University of Miami in Ocean Law in 1973. He is a retired officer and has specialized in international and operational law throughout his 30-year Navy career.

### ***Mr. Stephen J. Del Rosso, Jr.***

Mr. Stephen J. Del Rosso, Jr., is a senior program officer for the International Peace and Security Program at the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Previously, Mr. Del Rosso was program director of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and managed the Pew Charitable Trusts “Global Security” grantmaking program in Eastern and Central Europe. He also served overseas in the Foreign Service, on Secretary of State George Shultz’s staff, and as program coordinator of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

### ***Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.***

Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. is the Staff Judge Advocate of Air Education and Training Command at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas. He served as the legal advisor in Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOC) during various operations and exercises in Africa and the Middle East, including Operation Provide Relief/Restore Hope (1992-93), Operation Vigilant Warrior (1994), Operation Desert Fox (1998), and Bright Star (1999). He also served at air bases in Korea and the U.K., was the legal advisor for U.S. nuclear forces from 1995-98, and was the CAOC legal advisor for Blue Flag 00-2 in 2000. He has taught air operations' law in Canada, Uruguay, South Africa, the Czech Republic and, most recently, Colombia (2001). He is the recipient of the Thomas P. Keenan Award for International and Operations Law, and is a Distinguished Graduate of the National War College.

## Appendix 2 — Participant Biographies

### ***Mr. William Fenrick***

Mr. William Fenrick is the Senior Legal Adviser in the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, serving in that role since 1994. He is the Senior International Lawyer and Law of War Adviser to the Prosecutor. Mr. Fenrick is responsible for the Legal Advisory Section, and was the main author of the June 2000 NATO Bombing Study. From 1992-1994, Mr. Fenrick was a member of the Commission of Experts appointed by the UN Secretary General to examine allegations of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Mr. Fenrick is a former Canadian Military Lawyer who served as Director of Law for International Law and Operations and Training.

### ***Mr. Roy Gutman***

Mr. Roy Gutman is a *Newsweek*, defense correspondent in the Washington Bureau. He previously spent many years as *Newsday's* foreign correspondent. He is a Pulitzer Prize winner for international journalism, author of *A Witness to Genocide*, and founder of "The War Crimes Project." He also edited the unique journalists' handbook, *The Crimes of War*.

### ***Dr. Morton H. Halperin***

Dr. Morton H. Halperin is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he directs the Center on Democracy and Free Markets. He served as Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State and as Senior Director for Democracy at the National Security Council during the Clinton Administration.

### ***Mr. Daniel Helle***

Mr. Daniel Helle is a Legal Adviser for the International Committee of the Red Cross at its headquarters in Geneva. He also serves as the Deputy Head and Legal Advisor of the IRC's delegation to the United Nations in New York. Previously, Mr. Helle served as Associate Expert at the UN Center for Human Rights and the Office of the High Commissioner and as Legal Adviser for the Norwegian Institute for Human Rights in Oslo.

### ***Mr. Ken Hurwitz***

Mr. Kenneth Hurwitz is an attorney with the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, in New York, working since 1998 in the Lawyers Committee's International Justice and Latin America programs. He served as legal consultant, investigator and litigation coordinator for two Torture Victim Protection Act litigations brought against former Salvadoran generals Jose Guillermo Garcia and Eugenio Vides Casanova. Before coming to the Lawyers Committee, Mr. Hurwitz was a corporate attorney at Proskauer Rose LLP, New York, and, later, in a private investment group.

## Appendix 2 — Participant Biographies

### *Dr. Michael Ignatieff*

Dr. Michael Ignatieff is Director of the Carr Center of Human Rights Policy and Carr Professor of the Practice of Human Rights Policy at Harvard University. He has researched ethnic war in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Afghanistan. His recent work combines eyewitness accounts of modern war with an historian's insight into human conflict.

### *Mr. Benjamin S. Lambeth*

Mr. Ben Lambeth is a senior staff member at RAND, where he has directed RAND's International Security and Defense Policy program. Mr. Lambeth has written more than six dozen articles and reports on air power, Soviet and Russian military affairs and other topics. His recent book, *The Transformation of American Air Power* (Cornell University Press, 2000), earned the U.S. Air Force Association's Gill Robb Wilson award in arts and letters for 2001. He just completed a book on Operation Allied Force entitled *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (RAND, 2001).

### *Major General David F. MacGhee, Jr.*

Major General David F. MacGhee, Jr., is Commander of the Air Force Doctrine Center at the Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, where he is responsible for Air Force basic, operational, joint and multinational doctrine. Major General MacGhee served as the Air Combat Command Inspector General and as Director of Aerospace Operations during Operations Desert Fox and Allied Force. He has also held staff assignments in the Directorate of Plans at U.S. Air Force Headquarters in Washington, D.C. and at the Supreme Allied Powers Headquarters in Mons, Belgium.

### *Dr. Jerome V. Martin*

Dr. Jerome V. Martin is the Vice President for Academic Affairs at Peru State College. Dr. Martin, now retired from the U.S. Air Force, served as an intelligence officer in the U.S., Southeast Asia and Europe and concluded his career as the Commander of the 34<sup>th</sup> Education Group. Dr. Martin has written about air power theory in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

## **Appendix 2 — Participant Biographies**

### ***Mr. Phillip S. Meilinger***

Mr. Phillip S. Meilinger is a retired Air Force officer. During his thirty year career he served as a pilot, staff officer and educator. He flew C-130 and HC130 aircraft in Europe and the Pacific, was a staff officer in the Pentagon during the Persian Gulf War, and taught at the Air Force Academy, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, and the Naval War College. His publications include four books and over 40 articles; his latest work "Airwar: Essays on Its Theory and Practice" is due out in Spring 2002. He is currently the deputy director of the AEROSPACENTER at Science Applications International Corporation in McLean, VA.

### ***Major General William Nash, USA (Ret.)***

Retired U.S. Major General William Nash is Director of the Center for Preventative Action and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He formerly commanded Task Force Eagle in Bosnia, a multinational division supporting the Dayton Peace Accords, and served as a UN administrator in Mitrovica, Kosovo.

### ***Colonel Robert C. Owen***

Colonel Robert C. Owen is Chief, Policy and Doctrine Division, Directorate of Plans, Air Mobility Command at Scott Air Force Base in Illinois. In this capacity, he supervises Air Mobility policies and directs Command special projects, such as Expeditionary Air Force Study, Future Total Force Unit Study, and the Air War Over Serbia Study. During the Kosovo conflict, Colonel Owen provided command guidance on command relations for deploying Air Mobility Command forces and directed the development and execution of the forces' redeployment and reconstitution plans as the conflict closed.

### ***Mr. David Petrasek***

Mr. David Petrasek is Research Director at the International Council on Human Rights Policy. He is currently directing a project examining the responses of NGOs to military intervention in human rights crises. Mr. Petrasek has worked on human rights issue as an international lawyer for Amnesty International, from 1990-1996, and at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, from 1997-1998.

### ***Ms. Samantha Power***

Ms. Samantha Power is Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy and Executive Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University. From 1993-1996, Power covered the wars in the former Yugoslavia as a reporter for *U.S. News and World Report* and the *Economist*. In 1996 she joined the International Crisis Group (ICG) as a political analyst, helping launch the organization in Bosnia. She has just completed, "*A Problem from Hell*": *America and the Age of Genocide*, which examines U.S. responses to genocide in the twentieth century.

## Appendix 2 — Participant Biographies

### *Dr. Daryl Press*

Dr. Daryl Press is an assistant professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. His areas of expertise are U.S. foreign policy and military analysis, including military operations during the Gulf War. For the past seven years, Dr. Press has worked as a consultant for the Defense Department on current U.S. military planning in the Persian Gulf region.

### *Ms. Dana Priest*

Ms. Dana Priest is a guest scholar at the United States Institute of Peace and a recipient of the MacArthur Foundation Research and Writing Grant. She is currently examining the implications of the military's expanding influence over American foreign policy. Ms. Priest is on leave from *The Washington Post*, where she served as Pentagon correspondent and reported breaking foreign policy stories. Ms. Priest has written extensively on the changing role of the regional Commanders-in-Chief, the Kosovo air war, the Army's peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Bosnia and the role of U.S. Special Forces around the world.

### *Mr. Kenneth Roth*

Mr. Kenneth Roth is the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, a post he has held since 1993. The largest U.S.-based international human rights organization, Human Rights Watch investigates, reports on, and seeks to curb human rights abuses in some 70 countries. From 1987 to 1993, Mr. Roth served as Deputy Director of the organization. Previously, he was a federal prosecutor for the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington. He also worked in private practice as a litigator.

### *Colonel Raymond C. Ruppert, JA, USA (Ret.)*

Colonel Raymond C. Ruppert is a retired Army officer. He served as the Staff Judge Advocate for U.S. Central Command during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In 1991, he became the Chief of the International and Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General. From 1994 to 1996, he served as Legal Advisor to the United European Command in Stuttgart, Germany. He assumed the duties of Chief, Standards of Conduct Office, Office of the Judge Advocate General in July 1996. Upon his retirement in June, 1998, he became Director of Continuing Legal Education for the North Carolina Bar Association in September 1998. He has written for the *Oklahoma Law Review*, *Military Review* and *The Army Lawyer*.

## Appendix 2 — Participant Biographies

### *Ms. Sarah Sewall*

Ms. Sarah Sewall is Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy and Program Director at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University. She served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance during the Clinton Administration and was Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell. Her most recent writing is “Multilateral Peace Operations” in *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, eds, Lynne Rienner, 2002.

### *Dr. Ruth Wedgwood*

Dr. Ruth Wedgwood, a professor at Yale Law School and Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Affairs, is a senior fellow for International Organizations and Law at the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Public International Law. In 1998-1999, Wedgwood served as the Charles Stockton Professor of International Law at the US Naval War College. She was later appointed by then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen to be a member of the National Security Study Group of the Hart-Rudman Commission from 1999 – 2001.



## **PROJECT ON THE MEANS OF INTERVENTION**

SARAH SEWALL  
PROGRAM DIRECTOR

Through the Project on the Means of Intervention, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy aims to advance our understanding of humanitarian challenges that arise in the context of using military force. The project is directed by Sarah Sewall and supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. This effort brings active and retired officers from the United States military and other security specialists together with members of the human rights and humanitarian communities in a series of workshops to explore how human rights considerations are factored into, and affected by, military intervention.

The way that military force is used receives far less attention in policy circles than does the question of when states should intervene militarily. Yet the means of military intervention have dramatic implications for the security of civilians in the target country, the security of intervening forces, and the effectiveness of the intervention itself.

To explore these issues, the Center is bringing together practitioners and experts, largely from the military and human rights communities, for a yearlong series of workshops. Some participants view military interventions as concerned with force protection and mission accomplishment at the expense of protecting vulnerable civilians in the target country. Others see humanitarian constraints, whether legal or political in nature, as unduly complicating the use of force and compromising its effectiveness. By bringing these perspectives together, the project hopes to illuminate a range of topics while exposing participants to competing views. A central

question for this project is the degree to which moral and pragmatic interests may overlap in applying force consistent with humanitarian principles.

In 2001, a small group from the military and human rights communities gathered in Cambridge, MA to discuss concepts and project design. Later that year, a workshop was held in Washington, D.C. to survey humanitarian issues connected with the use of air power. Future workshops will be held during 2002, with topics such as targeting, ground forces, and lessons learned and best practices.

Through written products and a concluding conference, the project will capture substantive analysis and recommendations and bring them to a wider audience. The project aims to illuminate and dissect a set of issues that have become increasingly important during the last decade. It intends to foster more critical and nuanced thinking among participants, their associated institutions, and between the military and human rights communities both in the policy process and ultimately on the ground. Ultimately, the project aims to affect the way nations intervene militarily, making the use of military power more consistent with humanitarian principles.



## **THE CARR CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY**

MICHAEL IGNATIEFF  
DIRECTOR

SAMANTHA POWER  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The Carr Center is a research, teaching and training program that critically examines the policies and actions of governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other actors that affect the realization of human rights around the world. The Center was formally launched in June of 1999 through a gift from Kennedy School alumnus Gregory Carr.

The yawning gap between the apparent attractiveness of human rights ideals and their realization has prompted the Center to focus on the tools and techniques for realizing existing norms. The next stage of human rights research also requires broadening into new areas of inquiry. The Center focuses on ways in which human rights policy issues intersect with other concerns such as military intervention, non-governmental advocacy, domestic politics, and economic development. Working effectively at the intersection of human rights and other disciplines also requires forging new relationships with those who are only just beginning to grapple with the human rights implications of their work, including multinational corporate executives, Internet entrepreneurs, public health professionals, political scientists, lawyers, military leaders, journalists, and economists.

Non-governmental human rights organizations are rarely tailored to conduct objective analysis of their own tactics and strategies; academic initiatives concerned with human rights often are removed from the public policy debate or can reflect a narrow scholarly perspective. In the division of labor among human rights-related institutions, the Center occupies a unique

niche. As an independent research center, it offers a forum in which diverse views about human rights can be considered. The Center hopes to draw new voices to the table, thereby extending and deepening the human rights dialogue.

The Carr Center's location in a school of public policy allows it to draw upon a range of disciplines and the case-based analytic approach for which the Kennedy School is known. The Center is developing programs that empirically and analytically address central issues in human rights policy and practice.

The Carr Center sponsors a speaker series, a film series, periodic conferences and workshops, and internal colloquia. It publishes a working paper series, an annual guide to human rights courses at Harvard, and a series of human rights policy cases, intended for use in graduate courses. Its book series, which was launched in 2000 with the publication of *Realizing Human Rights: Moving From Inspiration to Impact*, edited by Samantha Power and Graham Allison (St. Martin Press, 2000), includes Michael Ignatieff's recent *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry* (Princeton University Press, 2001). More information about the Carr Center activities and resources is available on the Center's website: [www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp](http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp)

The Center is developing five substantive areas of focus: national security and human rights; "American Exceptionalism"; genocide prevention and punishment; NGO effectiveness and accountability; and corporate social responsibility. These topics, simultaneously overlapping and complementary, will create an integrated research agenda that reflects the Center's links to both the academic and policy communities. The Center is actively engaged in the following three programs:

The **national security and human rights program** has launched a project, with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, on military strategies for humanitarian intervention. Program director Sarah Sewall is exploring the factors shaping these strategies and their implications for international humanitarian law, for intervention objectives, and for civilians in target countries. The project seeks to place the character and dilemmas of modern

humanitarian interventions in a broader historical context as well as suggest lessons for future intervention and for the laws of war.

The “**American Exceptionalism**” program analyzes the unique constitutional and civil rights tradition of the United States, exploring its divergence from other Western rights cultures. It also seeks to understand the root causes of the United States’ longstanding habit of exempting itself from international human rights obligations and international legal frameworks. A grant from the Winston Foundation has supported the formation of a Harvard-based working group and the launch of a year-long speaker’s series (2002-2003), which will result in a book (edited by Michael Ignatieff) on the causes and consequences of this exceptionalism.

The **genocide prevention and punishment program** examines legal, political, and military responses to mass atrocity. The program has hosted numerous speakers at the Kennedy School to analyze national and international mechanisms geared to curb atrocity. Samantha Power, who was funded by an Individual Project Fellowship from the Open Society Institute, has interviewed victims, perpetrators, and more than 300 U.S. government officials in the exhaustive study of U.S. responses to genocide in the twentieth century. The findings are published in “*A Problem from Hell*”: *America and the Age of Genocide* (Basic Books, 2002).

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## **ABOUT THE RAPPORTEUR**

**Jennifer M. Hazen** is a Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations at Georgetown University, where she has also taught undergraduate courses in democratization and conflict studies. Ms. Hazen received her B.A. in Political Science from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and her M.A. in International Relations from Georgetown. Before returning to graduate school, Ms. Hazen spent three years working as a television producer at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, DC. Ms. Hazen has also worked on special projects for the U.S. State Department, the United Nations, Management Systems International, the University of Maryland, and Women in International Security.