A Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO) describes a contingency operation that aims primarily at halting the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups that is aimed principally against non-combatants. Less important than the type of mass atrocity or its scale is the primary purpose of the violence, the civilian nature of the victim, and the response it triggers.   When political authorities direct forces to halt the violence against civilians, the result is a Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO). What distinguishes a MARO is the character and dynamics of the conflict and the mission’s primary objective—ending mass atrocities against civilians.

The Project, as it moves towards filling the gap of “how” to respond militarily to a mass atrocity or genocide, has identified three main distinctions of a mass atrocity situation:

1. Multiparty Dynamics. Unlike traditional warfare between enemy and friendly forces, a MARO situation is defined by complex multiparty dynamics. Perpetrators of violence, victims of violence, the interveners, and other actors such as bystanders, the media, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) interact with results that will be difficult to predict.
   
   
2. Illusion of Impartiality. The intervener may be acting for what he considers impartial reasons (e.g., defense of human rights), unrelated to the identities of the parties or the underlying conflicts. While the intervener may be acting in an evenhanded manner against “actions,” the perpetrators and victims will perceive the intervening force as anything but impartial. An intervention to stop mass atrocities will inevitably be hostile to the party committing violence, effectively putting the intervener in alliance with the victims against the perpetrators. As the intervener changes the dynamics, there is a high potential for a MARO to quickly metastasize again into another type of conflict—civil war, insurgency, interstate conflict—and for the original distinctions between victim and perpetrator, and the original “impartial” reasons for intervention, to dissolve.
   
   
3. Escalatory Dynamics. A MARO can be defined by unique escalatory dynamics— mass killing of civilians can potentially intensify and expand very quickly once it begins. At the same time, the international community is slow to reach decisions to intervene, and slow to operationalize a response. This asymmetry presents a challenge for conducting a successful MARO.

There are then eight key operational and political implications of these three distinguishing characteristics.

1. Different Information, From the Outset. The difficulty of predicting either the onset or course of mass atrocity, the complexity of the operational environment (OE), and the potential for unanticipated consequences of intervention all highlight the critical role of different information from the outset of considering a possible MARO, including non-traditional types of information from non-traditional sources.
   
   
2. Advance Interagency Planning. The potentially rapid escalatory dynamic of a mass atrocity implies that advance interagency planning and preparation for a MARO will be critical. A MARO is likely to be a contingency that requires improvisation or adapting an existing deliberate or crisis plan.
   
   
3. Speed vs. Mass.A MARO may stand traditional planning precepts on their heads; for example, the potential for a rapid escalation of mass atrocities may require privileging speed over mass in MARO planning, thus putting a premium on capabilities such as transport assets and mobile forces to reach and move within the area of operations (AO), as well as upon rapid political and military decision-making in the face of uncertainty and risk.
   
   
4. The Power of Witness. The shameful nature of mass atrocities suggests the potential power of witness: surveillance and other forms of both high-tech and low-tech witness can deter or mitigate violence against civilians. During an intervention, witness can be critical for gathering evidence that can be used in future criminal proceedings.
   
   
5. Symptoms or Root Causes—Can There Be a Handoff? One of the most important questions related to MARO planning is the intervening force’s measure of responsibility for civilians. This question of limits pertains to both scope of tasks and length of time. Will the intervening force simply stop the killing, providing whatever emergency assistance it can until relative stability has been restored, with a handoff to a follow-on mission or the host nation’s government? Or will the force be expected to sustain its efforts beyond the cessation of the killing, to include the provision of services and restoration of governance? There are severe challenges for either approach, yet the choice makes a huge difference for the intervention of the military (and accompanying civilian agencies).
   
   
6. Immediate Non-Military Requirements. Regardless of a MARO force’s future nation-building responsibilities, it is likely that many non-traditional military tasks will fall to military forces in the short term, certainly while the level of violence remains high. A MARO plan must account for the particular combination of humanitarian, public order, justice, and governance challenges that accompany mass atrocities, and it will be best served by early integration with civilian actors and agencies in order to facilitate the transition of specific responsibilities to others.
   
   
7. Moral Dilemmas. The complex dynamics of a MARO situation create multiple moral dilemmas, such as how to distinguish and separate perpetrator from victim populations, and how to avoid becoming complicit in revenge killings. These dilemmas may create significant political vulnerabilities for the intervening parties.
   
   
8. Political Guidance. A high degree of politico-military interaction in the MARO planning process is critical. Most of the vexing issues related to a MARO—e.g., how to identify perpetrators, whether to treat the symptoms or the root causes, the degree of risk to assume in moving swiftly—need to be resolved by civilian authorities.