The US military has long focused on preparation for major conventional operations, rather than preparing for other types of military operations. As it struggled with counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States military realized that preparation for conventional warfare was inadequate for some other military challenges. MAROs also generate such unique requirements.

The US government's interest in halting mass atrocity has thus far remained largely rhetorical. For example, the 2006 National Security Strategy explicitly stated that “...genocide must not be tolerated. It is a moral imperative that states take action to prevent and punish genocide... We must refine United States Government efforts – economic, diplomatic, and law-enforcement – so that they target those individuals responsible for genocide... Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required...”

Despite the document's mention of the potential use of armed intervention to halt a mass atrocity or genocide, no official source directed the US military to prepare or plan for this eventuality (until recently). To the extent that actors within the US government and armed forces considered the matter, they saw intervention in mass atrocity as a “lesser included” military mission.

Sarah Sewall had experienced military dismissiveness of unconventional missions when she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Peace Operations in the Pentagon in the 1990s. She regarded a MARO as a significant and distinct challenge, and she wanted armed forces to be prepared before they faced mass atrocities in the field. US military officials, overwhelmed with ongoing operations, lacked the ability to address this conceptual challenge, but Sewall believed that military officials would understand the value of tailored concepts and planning tools if these could be developed elsewhere.