The United States does not currently recognize mass atrocity response as a unique operational challenge, and there is no operational concept or doctrine that might help commanders understand the dynamics and demands of responding to mass atrocities. As a result, the US is not fully prepared to intervene effectively in a mass atrocity situation. This is not to argue that everything about a MARO is different. Most tactical tasks comprising a MARO will be familiar. This is true almost across the operational spectrum; convoy escort, direct fires, and detainee operations are features of both peacekeeping and war. More broadly, a MARO involves a dynamic mix of offense, defense, and stability operations. Many familiar operational concepts, such as no-fly zones, protected enclaves, or separation of forces, may be elements of a MARO operational plan.

The fact that the tasks and concepts are familiar reveals little about the dramatically different context in which those tasks must be performed. Consider the US experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which the context changed from major combat operations to counterinsurgency. Although many of the tasks and concepts remained the same, US forces were inadequately prepared to carry them out.

Some comparisons can be drawn between MAROs and other uses of military force that are recognized as types of operations requiring their own doctrine and training. However, in each case, there are sufficient distinctions to consider MARO a separate type of operation. For example, the civilian is critically important in both MARO and in humanitarian and relief operations, but the latter generally occur within permissive (non-violent) environments. Food, shelter, medical, and other assistance are required; the force is not organized or equipped to provide civilians protection from armed attack.

MAROs may combine elements from high-intensity conventional combat with aspects of non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). But a MARO is obviously neither of those missions. For example, a MARO could require massing force, maneuvering, and closing with a well-organized and equipped adversary as in conventional operations. But in conventional operations, that enemy aims first to defeat opposing forces, not slaughter the defenseless. A NEO occurs in the face of external factors (e.g., competing sides in a civil war, a natural disaster) that have created the emergency requiring civilian evacuation. A NEO requires identifying and protecting civilians at risk, but success is defined as transporting the civilians to safety. Defeating combatants, protecting civilians from continuing attacks, or creating stable conditions are not part of the NEO mission.

A MARO can also resemble a robust peacekeeping operation. Indeed, in recent years civilian protection language has become embedded in UN peace operations mandates. Unfortunately, tactical civilian protection is only slowly being implemented, in part because it presumes a level of capability and commitment to use significant levels of force for which not all troop contributors are prepared. More fundamentally, there is also little common understanding yet of what is required to “operationalize” civilian protection during peace operations. In notable cases, courageous UN field commanders have pushed the envelope of their mandates and capabilities to protect some civilians in specific tactical circumstances. Nonetheless, increasing civilian protection as one aspect of a peace operation remains conceptually and operationally distinct from intervening in ongoing mass atrocities for the primary purpose of halting civilian killing.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) has some aspects that are similar to those of mass atrocity response. COIN also prominently features the civilian, along with insurgents and local and/or foreign counterinsurgents. Insurgent and counterinsurgent forces compete for civilian loyalties using positive (protection/assistance) and negative (threats/violence) actions, and some civilians will be allied more closely with the competing groups. However, in COIN, all civilian protection is instrumental and relevant to the sides’ competition for legitimacy. In a MARO, protection of civilians victimized by perpetrators is the core objective of the mission.

At the macro level, what distinguishes a MARO and a MARO situation is the character and dynamics of the conflict and the mission’s primary objective—ending mass atrocities against civilians. Identifying the characteristics of mass atrocity and the particular challenges of a MARO is a prerequisite for developing relevant planning tools and the supporting doctrine, training, leadership, and matériel support.