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Overlooked and Understudied Counterinsurgencies: New Perspectives on Irregular Warfare

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and

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INTRODUCTION

On October 1-2, 2008 the Harvard Kennedy School's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and the Joint Special Operations University of U.S. SOCOM co-sponsored a conference on "Overlooked and Understudied Counterinsurgencies: New Perspectives on Irregular Warfare" in Washington, D.C. The two-day not-for-attribution conference considered irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, special operations and human rights from a variety of perspectives while focusing on case studies in Burma, Nepal, the Philippines, Kashmir, Colombia, Sri Lanka, the Basque Region, Pakistan, and Oman. The conference featured two keynote speakers and hosted 90 participants from human rights organizations, NGOs, the U.S. government, the U.S. military, universities, and media. The following report outlines the conference's conceptual background, key insights and conclusions from the meeting, major arguments and recommendations of speakers, panelists and audience members, and appendices with the conference agenda and participant biographies.

BACKGROUND

What can the U.S. learn from overlooked and understudied counterinsurgencies to clarify strategic goals connected to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), to cultivate a broader awareness of human rights concerns, and to acquire greater knowledge and skills for preventing full-blown insurgencies with the potential of leading to civil war or the collapse of civil society? Overlooked counterinsurgencies cover current, off-the-radar operations taking place at both the periphery of American public awareness and Washington-directed engagement. A close examination of these operations illuminates important strategic, operational, and tactical lessons applicable to U.S. national security. These lessons may include a more focused and micro-level analysis of: human rights, law enforcement, population control, counterinsurgent warfare techniques, political authority, cultural and religious identity, engagement with indigenous populations, and the interaction between military and civilian planners.

Understudied counterinsurgencies cover current or historical operations overshadowed by traditional case studies such as: the Arab Revolt against Turkey (1916-1918), the British campaign in Malaya (1948-1960), the French experience in Algiers (1954-1962), and the Vietnam War (1954-1975). These understudied counterinsurgencies may similarly reveal important lessons which could broaden and deepen U.S. national security policy.

Examining overlooked and understudied counterinsurgencies may help to highlight lessons for preventing full-blown insurgencies. The spectrum of social disorder beginning with isolated pockets of crime and violence, moving to expanded areas of social or political unrest, shifting to broader insurgent movements, and culminating in widespread terror and complete civil war, may function as a gauge for the degree of U.S. strategic, operational, and tactical involvement or intervention in a nation. Learning how to differentiate between these stages of disorder may help guide allocation of U.S. strategic and operational assets.

Counterinsurgency operations are likely to increase as a result of the GWOT and because of a variety of germinating security concerns. The conference examined these

studies with the goal of developing new perspectives on irregular warfare germane to U.S. policy.

CONFERENCE SCOPE AND QUESTIONS

The conference addressed three major areas related to the role of overlooked and understudied counterinsurgencies:

1) Conceptual Questions

What are the root causes of insurgencies? What is the relationship between the insurgent, community, and State? What political, economic, religious, ideological, and social elements influence insurgencies? What is the relationship between insurgency and terrorism? What is the connection between Islamic extremism and the GWOT? What is the connection between human rights and insurgencies?

2) Operational Questions

What operational best practices emerge from understudied counterinsurgencies? What lessons are revealed in integrating civilian and military planning, law enforcement, population control, counterinsurgent warfare, human rights, secure borders, interrogations, and political stability? How do the case studies inform these questions?

3) Strategic Questions

As the U.S. engages in counterinsurgency and the GWOT, what options are available to employ when dealing with insurgents? What strategies and methods are most effective? Do small wars and counterinsurgencies reflect a broader trend in international security? Do understudied and overlooked counterinsurgencies provide answers missed by traditional case studies? What lessons learned emerge from these operations and how can the U.S. integrate them into future strategic planning?

KEY INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Counterinsurgency (COIN) as a subset of irregular warfare is primarily about political legitimacy, justice, and order: the insurgent attempts to overthrow the government and the counterinsurgent attempts to prevent the government from being overthrown. Furthermore, COIN is not synonymous with nation building, stability operations, or counter-terrorism.
- Human rights embody the ideals of justice and fairness which should animate and undergird an “American version of COIN” – including when America provides support for countries carrying out COIN operations. Liberal, democratic countries face specific problems during COIN operations as they balance the competing demands of human rights, liberty, security, and violence. However, it is in the strategic and moral interest of liberal, democratic countries to affirm their adherence to human rights and civilian protection when carrying out COIN operations otherwise they risk forfeiting moral and political superiority and thus legitimacy.
- American irregular warfare and COIN are often viewed as subsidiary to the question: is the United States a modern imperial power? American irregular warfare and COIN can be viewed as manifestations of Imperialism and thus can garner anti-imperial or at least anti-hegemonic responses. American global COIN strategy must take this into consideration and consider the budget requirements to carry out multiple and simultaneous COIN efforts.
- COIN case studies vary in the appropriate lessons learned applicable to an “American version of COIN” – what worked for one government may not be suitable for America.
- Military force is secondary in COIN and as a result, “a whole of government approach” should not be supplanted by a complete militarization of all aspects of society.
- The liberal, democratic worldview must enter into the realm of debating opposing ideologies connected to the problem of political legitimacy.
- Normative worldviews or ideological narratives inform insurgent movement leaders to overthrow the State. However, foot-soldiers and low-level recruits are often motivated more by basic grievances that can be alleviated by improving the rule of law, preventing corruption, improving education, and other governance issues.
- Insurgent goals and motivations vary as demonstrated by the conference case studies. Ethno-nationalist independence movements help define the conflicts in the Basque Region and Sri Lanka while religion plays a dominant role in Pakistan and to varying degrees in the Philippines and Kashmir. Marxist ideology either in

the variant of Maoism or Che-ism influenced and/or continues to influence conflicts in Oman, Nepal and Colombia. Finally, many of the insurgencies blend elements of ideology through the lens of anti-authoritarianism, economic injustice, and decolonization.

- Insurgent movements in Africa are overlooked and understudied and should receive increased attention.
- Women and children are often overlooked in counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine.
- A handful of participants asked the conference members to consider peacekeeping operations coupled with political, economic and social development as a better alternative to military-led COIN missions.
- Global insurgent or revolutionary movements such as Al Qaeda are few and far between although there may be strong parallels between global Communism and global Islamism as an appropriate starting point for strategic similarities between the Cold War and America's "Long War" against Islamic Extremism.
- Non-governmental organizations vary in their goals. Many provide humanitarian assistance and help rebuild society but should not be viewed as an extension of the government or military in a COIN effort lest they be compromised in their capacity to mollify suffering.
- Large-scale occupation forces in Iraq are different than "light footprint" Special Forces in other regions: COIN can be scaled to the appropriate size required for the mission but the various models should not be confused as uniform strategy or doctrine. Specifically, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) Manual is a good starting point for certain COIN missions but may not be applicable to every COIN effort.
- Participants urged people to find "evidence-based" doctrine and to treat operations as "testing labs" to determine what is truly successful.
- A plethora of factors will alter the future security environment and potentially destabilize nation-state governments and increase the likelihood of insurgent movements. These factors include: economic recessions, global warming and environmental degradation, water wars, transnational crime networks, drug and weapons trafficking, resource depletion, inequality resulting from globalization, the proliferation of transnational corporations, secularization, and modernization.
- Militaries and numerous parts of Government will be required to deal with insurgency and COIN in the future and thus should be prepared to do so.

CONTENT OVERVIEW

The following information was distilled from speakers, panelists and audience participants during the two-day conference. The material does not delve in depth into each discussion but highlights the major arguments, concerns, and questions for future debate.

A. INSURGENCY, COIN AND TERRORISM

The first group of speakers started with broad conceptual, historical and policy questions. A participant discussed a variety of concerns that contribute to the grand strategy analysis of insurgency, COIN and terrorism. He argued that multiple conflicts in Africa such as in the Sudan and Congo, China's economic investment in the continent, and an increasing number of pirates contribute to destabilizing conditions in the region. Numerous Latin American countries are unstable and internally debating the merits of Venezuelan-style socialism. Moreover, moral and ethical issues lie at the core of COIN thinking but are often relegated to the sidelines in favor of "harsher force." The participant also asked if the United States was "over-invested" in COIN as a tool to solve American foreign policy problems. The participant also noted that terrorism is different from insurgency. While insurgents may utilize terrorism as a tactic and some non-insurgents may employ terrorism for their own purposes extricated from the goal of overthrowing a State, counter-terrorism and COIN should be treated as two separate frameworks. Counter-terrorism is often directed at smaller groups and individuals while COIN is directed at larger movements. Counter-terrorism is often connected to finessed intelligence and legal measures while COIN is often connected to military force. Finally, he argued that while irregular warfare is a good unifying concept for insurgency, COIN and terrorism, it is "still too small for the biggest problems facing government."

Another speaker went on to list a handful of lessons for America and COIN:

- 1) COIN is not for amateurs and requires a professional skill set;
- 2) Understanding the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc. order effects of an operation are vital;
- 3) COIN cannot be considered a "lesser capability" of the USG, and the military is going to have to invest in it;
- 4) Special Forces, not conventional forces, historically specialized in COIN;
- 5) COIN professionals must live like the populace for the long-term;
- 6) SOCOM is developing a "Lawrence" project to seek out and find individuals who are good at irregular warfare and COIN because they speak the local language/dialect, understand the culture and history of the region, own relationships with local actors, and can mobilize popular support;
- 7) COIN forces should have finesse not mass;
- 8) Counter-terrorism is an urgent COIN activity but should not be considered as synonymous with COIN since terrorism is only a tactic;
- 9) COIN professionals must give credit to the host nation, NGOs, and other actors while minimizing their visibility;
- 10) COIN professionals should know the language rather than speak through an interpreter;

- 11) COIN professionals must maintain stable relationships with indigenous allies to invite them to schools and to perform joint training;
- 12) COIN is an interagency activity but should not militarize foreign policy;
- 13) COIN professionals need to look for new partners such as NGOs, private businesses, and concerned citizens;
- 14) National sovereignty is weakened in the domain of irregular warfare and COIN;
- 15) The U.S. military's conventional forces can defeat any regime in the world but it is much harder to build a new regime from scratch;
- 16) Irregular warfare and COIN is a generational certainty.

A different speaker shifted the discussion to the relationship between terrorism, insurgency, and U.S. COIN doctrine. He argued that terrorism and insurgency are two distinct categories and that FM 3-24 does not capture the terrorism phenomena adequately. He also argued that FM 3-24 is not applicable to modern religious extremist conflicts and may not be suitably applied to jihadists. He concluded by arguing that Special Operations Forces (SOF) will become the paramount force in the "Long War" against radical Islamism.

Another panelist noted that COIN doctrine for the last 25 years has been insufficient because the case studies are limited – "we need to open the aperture more to include the last 100 years." Most importantly, Western countries should look at the ideological warfare skills used in the Cold War as techniques against Islamic extremism. The participant argued that the fight is against global insurgency and therefore requires a global COIN response. There is one golden rule in COIN: does the government or the insurgent have greater legitimacy or a 'credible vision of the future'? The participant asked: Why are so few famous insurgency case studies driving the 'canons' we derive about COIN? Why aren't revolutions covered as insurgencies? He argued that the data set should be expanded because most of the classic COIN doctrine is based on post-colonial insurgencies where the practitioners were trying to preserve the status quo. In addition, COIN professionals should focus more on religiously motivated insurgencies.

The next panelist agreed that insurgency and terrorism are rooted in legitimacy and outlined basic principles for analyzing insurgents: 1) you must obtain good historical information about the region, country and people in question coupled with anthropological data; 2) you must be able to answer: what is the ultimate goal of the insurgency?; 3) you must understand what techniques the insurgents use to fight and what strategy they employ; 4) you must be able to differentiate insurgent movements into various sub-categories such as: religious, colonial, millenarian, Maoist, Islamist, anarchist, ethno-nationalist, monarchist, and liberal pluralist. The speaker argued however that just because a group calls itself "Marxist" does not mean it completely understands the tenets of the Marxist ideology or is even pursuing a Marxist "end state" revolution. He argued that numerous "Marxist" insurgencies are focused on economic injustices or government corruption but are not truly ideological adherents of Marxism. The participant said the same thing applied to "many so-called Islamist groups" who do not truly want to "establish a resurrected Caliphate" but are more focused on repelling foreign invasions such as the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. COIN analysts and thinkers should understand a variety of insurgent strategies such as: 1)

conspiratorial revolution (the Vanguard movement of Lenin); 2) “popular war” as an increasingly “staged” war of winning support among an increasing number of citizens; 3) urban and rural warfare (using the environment as a strategic tool to blend with civilians or peasant communities). The participant cautioned conference participants that terrorism, guerilla warfare, conventional war, and insurgency are all distinct taxonomies of warfare and should be treated with analytical precision.

Another panelist argued that debates over “root causes” of insurgencies should focus on ideology and asked why the military and U.S. government does not study ideology? If poverty caused insurgency then insurgencies would be proliferating daily in the poorest regions of the world but they do not. He argued that Communism and Fascism were largely discredited as ideologies and thus their intellectual adherents dissipated. Ideology motivates insurgent leaders often trained at Universities in philosophy, political science, economics or religion who in turn recruit and mobilize foot-soldiers. He referenced *Revolution in the Revolution* by Regis Debray to underscore how intellectuals motivate and persuade revolutionary movements. He noted that while an insurgency requires two material conditions: 1) weapons and 2) guerrilla fighters, ideologues motivate and mobilize both for a “cause.” He urged for increasing efforts to support moderate Islamic intellectuals and “thought leaders” in the Muslim world to intellectually defeat radical Islamists and provide alternative visions of the future. Finally, the participant said that warriors often embody the ideals of the movement or vision they serve and the “struggle must embody the goal of the strategy.” Marxism is often presented as embodied in the struggling, working classes of the peasants who will rise up and overthrow the capitalist class while Islamist jihadists present themselves as holy warriors of Allah. Liberal, democratic countries should similarly instill in their warriors the embodiment of their ideals based on human rights. “Our own struggle ought to embody the goals we describe.”

During the group discussion, a government official asked the panel “how can we counter competing ideologies?” A panelist responded by saying: “we should embody our ideals in the actions of our soldiers on the battlefield by ensuring that they conform to the rule of law and human rights and we should increase intellectual engagement by discrediting radical Islamists through books, magazine articles, and genuine debate.” Participants argued that there are fellow “liberal” and moderate thinkers in Iran, Europe, Egypt, and various parts of the Islamic world that the U.S. government and military should help support and protect. Another participant noted that COIN should focus on discrediting insurgents by demonstrating how they harm civilians which can contribute to undermining the appeal of their movement.

A different participant argued that ideology is important in a core group but not all insurgent movements can be viewed through the lens of ideology. He said that some movements are basically nationalist and simply want to remove foreign invaders from their land.

Another participant noted that while the first set of presentations were more general, theoretical, and abstract, it is important to remember that each insurgent group should be dealt with “in its own terms because a response in Indonesia will be different than a response in the Philippines.”

A panelist summarized the overall discussion with these insights: the nation-state is under assault in numerous parts of the world and most insurgencies are trying to create

a new order, while in a few cases they are attempting to preserve the status quo; the liberal, democratic countries have lost their own sense of certainty and must consolidate and articulate a broadly appealing worldview that does not focus solely on the benefits of capitalism; and finally, the Army and Marine Corps COIN Manual (FM 3-24) does not contain all of the necessary solutions to combating an insurgency.

B. NON-MILITARY OPTIONS

The next group of speakers explored various non-military aspects of COIN. A speaker said that civilian policy-makers need to analyze violent challenges to State authority and argued that the U.S. should not initiate COIN as a revolutionary way to transform a society because only political solutions can ultimately solve deeply-rooted problems. The participant listed three non-military tools in COIN: 1) analyze foreign aid to insurgent groups; 2) improve strategic communications to counter “insurgent narratives”; 3) increase political reconciliation and bargaining to include splinter groups in the central government. The participant also discussed a new USG interagency COIN guide to be published shortly as a tool to socialize strategic discussions of COIN.

Another panelist outlined a case study on Oman featuring non-military and “light footprint” techniques the British used to aid the Sultan. The UK forces focused on “legitimacy for the Sultan,” withheld all military awards and honors until the conflict was finished, focused on security at the local level, and isolated insurgents into pockets. The participant explained how British soldiers helped fly and transport cattle from region to region to undercut critiques from the Maoist insurgents. He said the COIN strategy focused on reorganizing civil society, improving agricultural and economic development, and supporting the Sultan in an indirect fashion. Participants questioned if the Oman model was appropriate for “an American version of COIN” for a variety of reasons. One participant argued that the imposition of Islam in Oman helped fuel the Communist insurgency and that the U.S. should not support a country that imposes a specific religion or ideology. However, another participant countered that freedom of religion is not a luxury every country enjoys and the U.S. government supports religious, authoritarian regimes in the name of stability and order. A participant also noted that the U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN Manual (FM 3-24) is an excellent training tool to help foreign militaries develop solid doctrine for internal conflicts so external forces do not need to become involved.

The next panelist argued that COIN is a long-term, decades-long mission. He said small, elite forces mixed with civic actions are the best COIN operations but NGOs, human rights organizations, environmental organizations, peace activists, and a variety of “on the ground” individuals can help to understand the culture and country. The panelist also urged participants to think of the role of women in COIN. He noted that in Thailand, the government tried to fix corruption in the police force, create low-level justice systems, improve the judiciary, and empower Muslim women with education and vocational training in addition to creating an all female paramilitary force to deal with women’s issues. In the Philippines, the government initiated programs to prevent kidnapping and remove guns from the streets. He noted that a sense of “injustice” lies at the heart of every insurgency. Only non-military solutions such as improving the rule of law, cultivating a stable police force and independent judiciary, and preventing

government corruption will ultimately undercut insurgent grievances. The participant noted that the best strategic model was to focus on protecting the civilian population instead of just eliminating the insurgency. He said that Thailand developed a policy to protect minorities from persecution but used hit squads and punished “insurgent supporting villages” harshly which alienated the population. Finally, the participant noted that developmental aid may not always be allocated to the right places. Some groups may support or reject certain aid because it could eliminate a large source of income or improve the economic status of a minority group. For example, in Thailand, an Islamic-based group opposed funding for rice paddies in one area because the region was largely Buddhist. In one area of the Philippines development aid helped build roads but the road system exacerbated inequality and reinforced the power and monopoly of a local oligarchy rather than improving the lives of average citizens. The participant noted that development aid is not always carefully utilized as a non-military solution in COIN.

Another panelist focused on the nexus between development aid and COIN. Development aid and COIN have a history reaching back to the CORDS program in Vietnam. He argued that aid in COIN must focus on accountability, sustainability and adequate goal assessment. Development aid should build up a community threatened by fragmentation resulting from insurgent conflict. He also noted that aid can be both bottom-up and top-down depending on the situation.

Participant questions focused on the need for increasing: political capability, police and justice systems and functioning economic environments. Most participants noted that the State Department and USAID are underfunded and need more capacity and support. Another participant asked the conference members to consider peacekeeping operations coupled with political, economic and social development as a better alternative to military-led COIN missions. Participant also asked the conference to consider the question of amnesty for former insurgents as a tool of reconciliation. Finally, a participant drew the distinction between COIN, stability operations, and nation building, arguing that the military should not be responsible for cultivating a nation’s basic infrastructure.

C. CASE STUDIES

Panelists and participants discussed a wide variety of case studies including: Burma, Nepal, the Philippines, Kashmir, Colombia, Sri Lanka, the Basque Region, and Pakistan. Participants and panelists also highlighted the need to study African insurgencies, explore the role of multi-national corporations in COIN, and look at “out of the box” non-military solutions.

One participant argued that private corporations are hiring security firms to help them deal with insurgencies, terrorists, and revolutionary movements in conflict-zones. The speaker noted the specific role of oil companies in Nigeria trying to develop ways to deal with the MEND insurgency and said scholars and think tanks should focus more seriously on African movements.

Another panelist outlined the relationship between anthropology and COIN while discussing research in Kashmir. The speaker noted that anthropologists maintain a strict code of not harming the populations they study yet have direct access to insurgent movements, community concerns, and deep cultural understanding which can inform

COIN operations. The participant outlined the history of conflict between Pakistan and India and underscored the religious, ethnic, and nationalist tensions in Kashmir which fuel separatist and insurgent movements. The speaker argued that support for Kashmir/Pakistan unification comes from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Afghanistan and underscored the transnational link of the broader Sunni Islamic world with indigenous movements in Kashmir. She noted that India initiated “emergency powers” to deal with Kashmiri conflicts even though there were no significant “terrorist” attacks and argued that the Indian government and military committed human rights abuses as they attempted to clamp down on the insurgency. The speaker argued that there was no effort to return land to Kashmiris and that Hindu nationalists have exacerbated the conflict. She noted that this is a dangerous temptation of liberal democracies to utilize “emergency powers” to suspend legal and civil protections for citizens. The speaker also noted a potential “alliance of the excluded” among India’s poor and religious minorities that could pose a significant threat to India’s stability in the future. Participant discussion noted that the border between Indian and Pakistan is one of the most troubling regions in the world and said that India faces a herculean task of creating a truly pluralist, democratic nation due to its colonial history and large number of different religious and ethnic groups. Participants said that the issue of national identity is paramount and most Kashmiris feel like “second-class citizens in India.”

The next speaker outlined one aspect of COIN in the Philippines. He argued that the root cause of insurgency in the Philippines is based on “maldistribution of the ‘fruits of the land’” and explained how the military and government tried to use information technology and distance education to help improve the lives of citizens. He said that the Philippines faces conflict between the powers of plutocracy and democracy. On one hand, the wealthy class creates wealth, privilege, cronyism, patronage, and corruption while the lower classes feel stuck in poverty and disease. The Philippines has a history of authoritarian rule but is trying to improve some aspects of government. Recently, the government set up a program to record lessons from the best teachers, then beam the lessons via satellite to schools around the country. Due to minimal government funding however, the program was cancelled. Nonetheless, the speaker illuminated the power of electronic tools as a resource to improve governance and as a result, counter insurgent efforts to claim the government is ineffectual.

The next panelist explained how a powerful Maoist insurgency in Nepal developed a territorially-based “counter-state” in the Mid-Western hills, from which it spread out across the entire country. Insurgent mobilization exploited economic, social, and political grievances at the local level. Given Nepal’s weak state structure – half the budget, in fact, came from external sources – the widespread use of terror and guerrilla action simply eliminated state presence from most of the countryside. Main force units in battalion strength were then deployed. Although the COIN was not an actual “counter-mobilization” of all instruments of national power, the military succeeded in blunting the Maoist armed advance. Consequently, in 2005, the insurgents moved to emphasize alternative lines of operations, especially united front and international action. The result was that the government collapsed and “peace negotiations” commenced. These were used by the insurgents as a weapons system to outmaneuver their united front partners. The result is a situation much like post-Somoza Nicaragua, with the Maoists playing the

role of the Sandinistas and pushing establishment of a “new order,” based on the concept of “a people’s republic.”

Another panelist outlined the conflict in Burma noting the role of the military junta, student groups, Buddhist monks, and family networks. He outlined how some NGOs help organize groups to assert demands from the government and argued there is a broad base of support for the anti-junta movement. The speaker argued that the Bush Administration’s 2006 National Security Strategy says that human liberty is an imperative and thus promotes efforts to oppose the military junta in Burma. The participant promoted using the private sector to help coordinate against government and military activities arguing that the military junta is essentially a “money making mechanism” which has professionalized the “suppression of the people.” According to the speaker, the junta cuts off food, keeps resistance movements impoverished and divides ethnic and religious groups. Group participants debated whether or not private individuals and organizations should be involved in potentially “subversive” activities.

The next speaker shifted focus to a broad overview of COIN case studies and problems. He noted that America faces a strategic problem due to competing tensions to either reject or accept Imperialism. He argued that Israel/Palestine, numerous revolutionary movements and even Civil Wars in Africa including Algeria and Nigeria, the American suppression of Native Americans, Bolivia, and a variety of other cases could be considered as COIN case studies. He noted that America does not have the funding to address all global problems and thus is forced to focus on critical priorities. He argued that there is no strategic macro-vision for COIN/CT/and stability operations and questioned if the U.S. should continue to transform states to look like liberal democracies. He explored the interagency conflicts in the COIN community and said there was no centralized authority structure to coordinate these problems.

The next panelist shifted focus to the Basque region arguing that even if citizens hold political and civil rights, this does not mean they support the State’s vision of the future. The Basque region is defined by mixed families, language, and ethnicities. A large portion of the region supports nationalist policies and groups but very few support violence and terrorism. The Basque region can collect their own taxes and has a high degree of autonomy but the root concern is: who should define the identity and decide the future of the Basque people? The Basque conflict is defined by a separatist, ethno-nationalist struggle to fight for complete autonomy. The insurgent movement is small but utilizes the media to broaden their message. The speaker also warned of prisons as centers of propaganda and communication where visiting family members sometimes serve as facilitators for the movement and perpetuate a “network of suffering.” The panelist also noted that peace agreements and cease fires generally failed because they allowed the insurgency to regroup and recommended using a third party for negotiations. The participant also noted that the government and military must not commit human rights abuses or they lose bargaining leverage.

The next panelist spoke about Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers. The Tamil Tigers are a formidable armed insurgency with naval and air assets. The group is ethno-nationalist but utilizes religion when necessary. Women are included in Tiger activities which include suicide bombings and a cult of martyrdom. The participant argued that there are several important lessons to learn from this insurgency. First, the government lacked the proper analytical framework: they focused on the Tigers through the lens of

criminal law, then labeled the group terrorists, and then finally recognized they were a full insurgency. Second, the government must address the Tamil Diaspora which sends funding to the insurgency. Third, basic human rights must be a cornerstone of the COIN strategy. Fourth, the government should use alternative methods to “democratize” the hierarchically-organized Tigers to break up their centralized authority structure. Fifth, the government did not adequately focus on distinguishing between civilians and non-civilians. Sixth, the insurgents know how to utilize the media to communicate their message. The government must provide an alternative narrative. One participant asked: “if the Tigers’ leader was killed, would the organization fall apart?” The speaker said the organization is based on a cult of personality but replacements have been groomed in case the leader dies.

Another panelist shifted focus to Colombia. He explained the history of the 44-year-long conflict, outlined the strength and flexibility of the FARC’s leadership network, and noted the influence of domestic Colombian politics on developing COIN operations. He explained that the Colombian government thought they had nearly destroyed FARC then it resurged in the 1990s. The FARC focused on cities, grew the organization through the drug trade, and at one point had approximately 32,000 foot soldiers. The FARC focuses on self-sufficiency and recruits rural peasants to the movement. The Colombian government employed a more forceful policy under President Uribe, hunted down and killed some of the guerrillas, mobilized the country against the FARC, and tried to break up their drug and kidnapping networks. The speaker argued that popular support for the FARC decreased because the FARC harassed the civilian population, carried out extensive kidnappings, and cut off access to main roads and transportation systems. The Colombian government built patrolling bases to reclaim land and recaptured control over the capital city. Some participants argued that the Colombian model violated human rights and should not be viewed as ultimately successful. Another participant argued that “political prisoners” were very prominent and successful in Colombia’s negotiations with the FARC.

The next panelist outlined COIN in Pakistan. He said that Pakistan’s COIN operation was based on “strategic SPREAD” to counter the insurgent strategy of CHAOS and relied prominently on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) but notably excluded socio-economic development. The speaker argued that Pakistan views the Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Pakistani Taliban as three distinct groups. The Afghan Taliban is an important element of Pakistani national security because they are viewed as a reserve source against the threat of India and other hostile powers. On the other hand, there is concern over an increasing “Talibanization” of certain regions and tribes. The speaker noted that the Pakistani COIN strategy is to use brute force, punish insurgents and exploit cleavages in tribes and religious movements.

D. LOOKING FORWARD

The next panelist described general concerns from a specific NGO perspective. He said that in order to work in a conflict zone and be viewed as neutral and objective, NGOs value being distinguished from military operations. Most NGOs are “on the ground in conflict zones before the military and stay long after the military leaves.”

NGO security is often based on a “community of acceptance” with the local population and cannot afford to be viewed as “co-opted” by a government.

The next speaker analyzed the future of Al Qaeda (AQ) as a global insurgency. He argued that AQ is a Salafist jihadist movement but unique as a global, revolutionary force. He noted that AQ is focusing on the internet and virtual world to carry out objectives and communicate with potential recruits and members, looking to utilize ungoverned territory, taking advantage of rising opportunities like weak governments, and learning to maintain better connections with its networked affiliates. He also pointed out that there is a problem with the notion of “winning” a COIN war since irregular war achievements are difficult to define. Participants noted that similar insurgent movements linked together in a decentralized network may be working toward the same goals.

The next participant provided a broad overview of the future strategic environment. He noted that criminal networks, drug/gun/sex trafficking, civil wars, global warming, environmental disasters, starvation, poverty, failed states, economic inequality, and secularization trends all contribute to an altered security environment applicable to irregular warfare and future COIN operations. There is potential for governments to be under attack because of their inability to deal with these varied problems. This inability lends credence to insurgent criticisms of government.

CONCLUSION

The conference attempted to engender new perspectives on irregular warfare by broadening the aperture of COIN case studies, analyzing the nature of insurgencies and terrorism, forecasting future threats and sources of conflict while integrating viewpoints from academia, the U.S. government and military, foreign internationals, human rights activists, NGOs, and the media. The variety of case studies highlighted different lessons for each specific country and insurgent movement while also providing evidence of counter-productive tactics and strategies useful as cautionary flags to the U.S. military and policy-makers. The conference illuminated the ideological origins of a variety of insurgent movements from ethno-nationalist to Maoist to Islamist. While the conference did not offer a panacea to these disparate conflicts, a handful of lessons were distilled from the various studies as tools to mitigate the severity of the violence and to improve approaches to counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism.

from understudied counterinsurgencies? What lessons are revealed integrating civilian and military planning, law enforcement, population control, counterinsurgent warfare, human rights, secure borders, interrogations, and political stability? How does operational planning differ in overlooked and understudied counterinsurgencies (if it does at all)?

Moderator – William Rosenau	RAND
Cynthia Mahmood	Notre Dame University
General Victor Corpus (Ret.)	Army of the Philippines
Tim Heineman	Naval Post-Graduate School
Thomas Marks	National Defense University

1800 – 2000 Dinner and Speaker: John Tsagronis, National Security Council

Day Two: October 2

0930 – 1130 Panel Four: Overlooked Counterinsurgencies

The fourth session will analyze overlooked counterinsurgencies in the Basque Region, Sri Lanka, and Colombia. This session will focus on operational and strategic lessons crucial for shifting the focus of current U.S. national security policy. What is the connection between the overlooked counterinsurgencies and current U.S. policy? How do these operations fit into U.S. grand strategy?

Moderator – Col. William Mendel, USA (Ret.)	JSOU
Gorka Espiau Idoiaga	Executive Office of the Basque President
N. Manoharan	Centre for Land Warfare Studies
Dave Spencer	National Defense University

1230 – 1430 Panel Five: Emerging Problems and New Approaches

Do understudied and overlooked counterinsurgencies provide answers missed by traditional counterinsurgency case studies? What lessons learned can the U.S. integrate into future strategic planning? Where and how are future threats germinating?

Moderator – Janine Davidson	George Mason University
Haider Ali Hussein Mullick	JSOU
Richard Shultz	Tufts University
John Alexander	JSOU

1445 – 1515 Concluding Remarks

Sarah Sewall	Carr Center
Brian Maher	JSOU

Conference Participant Bios:

Overlooked and Understudied Counterinsurgencies: New Perspectives on Irregular Warfare October 1-2, 2008

Harvard Kennedy School's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and Joint Special Operations University, US SOCOM

Zachary Abuza

Zachary Abuza, a professor of Political Science at Simmons College, specializes in Southeast Asian politics and security issues. He is a graduate of Trinity College and received his MALD and Ph.D from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In 2007, he was appointed Senior Fellow at the Jebson Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School. In 2005, he was a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. He is the author of four works on Islam and Southeast Asia, including *Muslims, Politics, and Violence in Indonesia*. He has also authored two studies for the National Bureau of Asian Research, and his monograph, *Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf Group* was published by the US Army War College's Security Studies Institute in 2005. Professor Abuza authored the Vietnam chapters in the 2004 and 2006 *Countries at the Crossroads* annual reports for Freedom House; and from 2001-2003 he served as Vietnam country advisor for Amnesty International (USA). He is currently a visiting guest lecturer at the Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State and at the Department of Defense's Joint Special Operations University.

Colonel John Alexander, USA (Ret.)

Col. John Alexander (Ph.D) is a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. A former U.S. Army Colonel, he served in key positions in Special Forces, Intelligence, and Research & Development. Joining Los Alamos National Laboratory, he introduced Non-Lethal Defense for which he is an internationally recognized expert. He attended the Harvard JFK School of Government *Senior Executive Program on National and International Security*, served as an advisor to Afghanistan Ministry of Defense senior officials, and recently was with the U.S. Army Science Board. He is the author of several books and many articles on international security issues.

Lois Andreasen

Lois Andreasen is the Executive Director at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. Prior to joining the Carr Center Lois spent 15 years in the private sector working in various roles including Senior Vice President & General Manager of SchlumbergerSema; Senior Vice President, Nortel Networks and President and CEO of LHS/PCM. She began her career as a Professor at the University of North Carolina and Montclair State University. She holds a Doctorate degree in Cultural Anthropology from the Texas Woman's University and completed post-graduate work at the University of Baroda, Baroda, India. Lois continued her studies at the University of North Carolina in international marketing and telecommunications.

Andrew Bell

Andrew Bell is the "Armed Forces Delegate" in the United States for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The work of the armed forces delegate is to inform the arms carriers of the United States of the work of the ICRC in conflict and promote International Humanitarian Law (IHL). His ICRC experience includes international armed conflict work during the 2006 Israel/Lebanon war, internal armed conflict work in Nepal and other work in Liberia and the Central Asian Republics. For the previous 10 years he also worked in Conflict/Post-Conflict situations in Africa, Asia, the Balkans, & the Middle-East specializing in political monitoring, ceasefire monitoring, peace treaty implementation and various confidence building missions – all for the British Foreign Ministry. Prior to his civilian work he was an infantry officer in the British Army for 11 years, taking part in the First Gulf War, Desert Storm, the end of the Cold War and operations in Northern Ireland. He attended the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the

Junior Division of the British Army Staff College and holds an MSc in International Relations from the University of Bristol.

Paul Berman

Paul Berman is a Distinguished Writer in Residence at New York University, a contributing editor to the *New Republic*, and Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute. He has reported at length from Europe and Latin America, on Nicaragua's civil war, Mexico's elections, and the Czech Republic's Velvet Revolution. He has written or edited eight books, including, most recently, *Power and the Idealists: Or, the Passion of Joschka Fischer and Its Aftermath*, with a new preface by Richard Holbrooke for the 2007 paperback edition. His book, *Terror and Liberalism*, a New York Times best-seller in 2003, is being translated into ten languages. Berman received a BA and MA in American History from Columbia University and has been awarded a MacArthur, a Guggenheim, the Bosch Berlin Prize, a fellowship at the New York Public Library's Center for Writers & Scholars, and other honors.

Anneli Botha

Anneli Botha has been a Senior Researcher for the Institute for Security Studies office in Pretoria, South Africa since March 2003. Ms. Botha's focus of research is terrorism as an international phenomenon, with an emphasis on Africa. Additionally, Ms. Botha researches strategic counterterrorism policy and African involvement in transnational terrorism. Most recently, Ms. Botha participated in the US State Department sponsored International Global Conflict Cooperation Program (IGCC) on National Security in San Diego, California. Additionally in recent months, she presented on "Radical Islamist Movements in North Africa" at a seminar hosted by the US State Department, Real Instituto Elcano and Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Madrid, Spain. She also gave a presentation on "Transnational Issues: Finance, Information, Crime and Drugs" at the Joint Special Operations University SOF Week 08 International Conference. She was a founding member of the Religious Extremism and Terrorism Desk at Crime Intelligence Head Office (SAPS). Additionally, she served on the Rapid Reaction Unit and the Special Task Force on Urban Terror in the West Cape. Ms. Botha holds a masters degree from Rand Afrikaans University in Political Studies ('98). Additionally, she is a graduate of the University of Pretoria, Political Science ('91) and International Politics ('92). She has published many works, mostly recently *Terrorism in the Maghreb: Transnationalization of Domestic Terrorism* and *Politics and Terrorism: An assessment of the origin and threat of terrorism in Egypt*.

Ariane Brunet

Ariane Brunet is Coordinator of the Women's Rights Program at Rights & Democracy, Montreal. She served as President of UAF's Board of Directors from 1999-2005. She is also a Founder of Coalition on Women's Human Rights in Conflict Situations, which seeks to strengthen international and regional capacity to monitor the respect of women's human rights in conflict and post-war situations. She played a key role in encouraging Canada to take the lead of a resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission to establish the office of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women.

James Carafano

James Carafano is the Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Senior Research Fellow at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, at the Heritage Foundation. He is a leading expert in defense affairs, military operations and strategy, and homeland security. He is also an accomplished historian and teacher, Carafano was an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, N.Y., and served as director of military studies at the Army's Center of Military History. He also taught at Mount Saint Mary College in New York and served as a fleet professor at the U.S. Naval War College. He is a visiting professor at the National Defense University and Georgetown University. Carafano is the author of several military history books and studies. His latest is *GI Ingenuity: Improvisation, Technology and Winning World War II*. Carafano also is the coauthor of *Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom*. Before becoming a policy expert, he served 25 years in the Army, rising to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. A graduate of West Point, Carafano also has a master's degree and a doctorate from Georgetown University and a master's degree in strategy from the U.S. Army War College. In 2005, Carafano earned Heritage's prestigious Drs. W. Glenn and Rita Ricardo Campbell Award. It is given to the employee who has delivered "an outstanding contribution to the analysis and promotion of the Free Society."

Lieutenant Colonel Roger Carstens, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Roger Carstens is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He is a retired Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel whose last posting was to serve as an advisor to the Iraqi National Counter Terror Force in Baghdad, Iraq. Prior to his tour in Iraq, he served as a Legislative Liaison for the Secretary of Defense in Washington, D.C. As an Army Ranger, he participated in a combat parachute assault during the invasion of Panama and later commanded three Army Special Forces Companies. He co-wrote the report “Ethical Dilemmas for Special Forces,” published by the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University; and contributed to “Preventing the Next Wave of Conflict: Understanding Non-Traditional Threats to Global Stability,” a report published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Conflict Prevention Project. He recently served as the Washington, D.C., director for the Council for Emerging National Security Affairs. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and holds a master’s degree in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College.

Colonel Joseph Celeski, USA (Ret.)

Col. Joseph D. Celeski is a research analyst and Senior SOF Fellow with the Joint Special Operations University. His current research focuses on matters relating to unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, terrorism, urban warfare, joint SOF warfighting, and senior leader competencies. Additionally, Mr. Celeski serves as a senior consultant for the Counterterrorism Technology Support Office (CTTSO), Irregular Warfare Special Project under the aegis of the ASD-SOLIC in Washington, D.C. He retired in October of 2004 as a Special Forces Colonel from a 30 year active duty career with the U.S. Army, where he served in a variety of special operations command and staff positions for over 20 of those years. He was awarded the St. Philip Neri Bronze Award from the Special Forces community in 2002 for his career work. Prior to retirement, he commanded the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Ft. Bragg, NC and also commanded coalition and joint special operations forces for two tours in Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. He is a fully qualified joint specialty officer. Additionally, he is a Middle East area expert, trained in the Arabic language, and has served throughout the Middle East and the Horn of Africa regions. He also served in the Somalia and Bosnia contingencies during his SOF career. He has a BS in Political Science from Columbus College, Georgia and he earned a MA in Public Administration from Shippensburg University in Pennsylvania and a MA in National Security from the Army War College.

Lisa Chandonnet

Lisa Chandonnet is a Conflict Specialist in the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation Technical Team at USAID. Her regional portfolio includes Sahelian West Africa, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Colombia, Ecuador and Guatemala. Her technical responsibilities include counterterrorism and youth and conflict. Prior to joining DCHA/CMM, Lisa was the Country Development Officer for Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso with USAID’s Bureau for Africa, Office of West African Affairs. During her Presidential Management Fellowship, she also completed a rotation at the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Regional Affairs Directorate on the Africa portfolio. She holds an MA in Regional, Economic & Social Development from the University of Massachusetts Lowell.

Thomas Cooney

Thomas Cooney has worked as the lead action officer on the Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, since late 2006. This is a State Department-led effort to socialize counterinsurgency concepts across the U.S. government civilian agencies and to increase the counterinsurgency capacity of the U.S. government. He started working for the State Department in late 2000. He worked on U.S. relations with the United Nations while in the International Organizations bureau through late 2004, covering the Third (social, humanitarian and cultural issues) and Fifth (administrative and budgetary issues) Committees at the UN General Assembly in New York and the UN Environment Program. From December 2004 to June 2006, he served as the State Department representative for the province of Karbala, Iraq. He was the political advisor to the Coalition battalion commander for Karbala province from December 2004 until the province’s base was closed in late summer 2005. During his tour, Mr. Cooney worked with the U.S. military and the provincial government to assist in the holding of two national elections. He also served as the U.S. government lead on reconstruction efforts in the province. He has a BA in History from the University of

Virginia and a MA in International Relations, with a Southeast Asia regional focus, from the University of California–San Diego.

Ethan Corbin

Ethan Corbin is a Ph.D Candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he earned his MALD in May 2007. His fields of study at the Fletcher School are International Security Studies and Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization. Prior to coming to Fletcher, he received an MA in Middle Eastern History at Paris IV- La Sorbonne in 2005. He received his AB from Bowdoin College. He is also the editor-in-chief of *Al Nahkalah*, an online journal on Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization, based at the Fletcher School.

General Victor Corpus, AFP (Ret.)

Gen. Victor Corpus is a retired brigadier general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP); former chief of the Intelligence Service, AFP; and holds a master's degree in public administration from the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Victor Corpus is a man who has experienced the entire length and breadth of the Philippine political spectrum. He began as soldier, became a rebel with the New People's Army, and then returned to being a soldier again. He spent ten years in detention during the Marcos era after spending five years in the hills with the rebel movement. Sentenced to death by musketry by a military tribunal, he was freed together with other political prisoners after the EDSA revolution in 1986. He has authored a book entitled *Silent War*, and is working on another book entitled *America's Dim Mak Points: Unrestricted Warfare in the 21st Century*.

Janine Davidson

Janine Davidson is an Assistant Professor for National and Global Security at George Mason's Graduate School of Public Affairs. She is also non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution, where she works on the 21st Century Defense Initiative. Prior to joining the GMU faculty, Dr. Davidson served in the Pentagon as Director, DoD Stability Operations Capabilities in the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, where she oversaw the implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)." In this role, she was also the Department of Defense lead for the Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative and was the head of the Consortium for Complex Operations, an innovative interagency project to enhance education, training, and performance in complex emergencies, including conflict prevention, peace operations, stabilization, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency. Before joining the Department of Defense, Dr. Davidson was Director, Counterinsurgency Studies with the Center for Adaptive Strategies and Threats at Hicks and Associates, Inc, where she studied counterinsurgency, terrorism, and stability & reconstruction operations and participated in Red Teaming and war-gaming. From 2003 to 2004, she was an Associate and consultant at DFI Government Practice in Washington D.C. and a pre-doctoral Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution. From 1988 to 1998, Dr. Davidson served in the United States Air Force as an aircraft commander and senior pilot for the C-130 and the C-17 cargo aircraft. Dr. Davidson has also taught at Davidson College in North Carolina. Her forthcoming book, *The Fog of Peace*, examines the U.S. military's adaptation and learning processes for counterinsurgency and irregular war.

Colonel Drew Doolin, USMC

Col. Drew Doolin is a Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution where he works in the 21st Century Defense Initiative in Foreign Policy. Upon completion of the Basic School at Quantico in 1987, he has served in various positions and commands in the Marine Corps, as a battlefield commander, political advisor, and military training officer. Col. Doolin is a published author and has won many personal awards including the Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal with gold star in lieu of Second Award, the Meritorious Service Medal with two gold stars in lieu of Third Award, the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Gold Star in lieu of Second Award, the Joint Staff Badge, and the Vice Presidential Service Badge. He is a graduate of Illinois State University.

Anton du Plessis

Anton du Plessis is the head of the International Crime in Africa Programme (ICAP) at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa. The ISS is a leading policy and research institute focusing on the promotion of human security and justice in Africa. In addition to his management role at the ISS, Anton is

also a recognized expert in counter-terrorism and international criminal law in Africa. Before this, Anton was a terrorism prevention expert in the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna. Anton represented the UNODC as an international law and counter-terrorism expert on the AU Counter-Terrorism Model Law expert working group. During his time at the UNODC, he worked closely with AU and several sub-regional organizations in Africa. Prior to joining the UNODC, Anton was head of the Crime and Justice Programme at the ISS where he worked on a broad range of crime and criminal justice policy, research and technical assistance project. He is also an admitted advocate of the High Court of South Africa. While practicing as an advocate, he regularly sat as a criminal law expert assessor in serious murder and rape trials in the High Court. Anton also worked as a prosecutor for the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) of South Africa. In 2001, he was appointed as a Senior State Advocate and head of the NPA's Sexual Offences Section. Anton has published numerous articles, book chapters and training guides, and is the co-author of an upcoming titled "Counter-Terrorism Law Handbook". He holds the following law degrees: B-Iuris, LL.B. and LL.M. (with specialization in criminal law and human rights – *cum laude*).

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, USA

Lt. Col. Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is a specialist in Arab-Israeli and Persian Gulf security affairs and has published articles and monographs on the military dynamics of the region and U.S. Policy towards the region. Prior to joining the Institute in 1989, he worked as a civilian military analyst with the U.S. Army. In 1992, he took a leave of absence from the Institute to work on the U.S. Air Force Gulf War Air Power Survey, to which he contributed a chapter on Iraqi strategy and planning prior to Operation Desert Storm. He is a reserve officer in the U.S. Army, serving on active duty in 2008 with the Human Terrain System Assessment Team in Iraq, in 2001-2002 at U.S. Central Command headquarters and on the Joint Staff during Operation Enduring Freedom and the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and in 1991 in Turkey and Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort. He served as an advisor in 2006 to the congressionally-mandated Iraq Study Group, in 2005-2006 to the Multi-National Corps Iraq Information Operations Task Force, and in 2002-2003 to the State Department's Future of Iraq defense policy working group. He has a MA in Arab Studies at Georgetown University.

Joshua L. Gleis

Joshua Gleis is an International Security Program Research Fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. He is also a Visiting Scholar at Columbia University's Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and a Ph.D. Candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His three fields of study are international security studies, Southwest Asia and Islamic civilizations, and international negotiations and conflict resolution. Josh is currently in the final stages of completing his doctoral dissertation, which explores how to more effectively withdraw from Islamist insurgencies. His doctoral dissertation is entitled, "*Withdrawing Under Fire: A Comparative Case Study of the Israeli Withdrawals from Lebanon in 2000 and the Gaza Strip in 2005.*" As mini-case studies, the dissertation also explores the British withdrawal from Iraq in the 1920s, the French withdrawal from Algeria, the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and the US from Somalia. While writing his dissertation Josh is employed as a part-time private consultant on matters related to security, the Middle East and international relations at-large. In the past he has served as an analyst at the Jebson Center for Counter Terrorism Studies. Josh received a MA in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School as well as a BA in Near Eastern Studies from Cornell University. He has served as the Ph.D. representative for the Fletcher Student Council, Editor-in-Chief of Fletcher's online school newspaper, and as a fellow at the Tufts Hillel Center, where he was responsible for educating undergraduates about the history and politics of the Middle East as well as implementing Muslim-Christian-Jewish dialogue.

Seb Gorka

Seb Gorka is the founding Executive Director of the Institute for Democracy and International Security (ITDIS). He is also a former expert of the Defense Ministry of the first democratic government of Hungary. Since then he has been an International Research Fellow at the NATO Defense College in Rome, a fellow at Harvard University's JFK School of Government, and a policy analyst with the RAND corporation in Washington, DC. He is also a non-resident fellow of the Terrorism Research Center in Virginia and a

member of the US Council of Emerging National Security Affairs.

Brian Grzelkowski

Brian Grzelkowski is the DC-based Senior Policy Advisor for Mercy Corps, an international relief and development agency working in over 30 countries worldwide. Prior to joining Mercy Corps, he worked for the Pew Charitable Trusts and as a professional staff person on the House Committee on International Relations covering European political and security affairs and international trade issues. Before this, he spent 10 years living and working in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa in a variety of international relations and foreign policy positions with the Motion Picture Association, a humanitarian relief organization in Bosnia and the European Union. Brian has a BA from Wesleyan University and an MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Colonel Tim Heinemann, USA (Ret.)

Col. Tim Heineman is an adjunct counter-terrorism instructor for the Center for Civil Military Relations, US Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, California serving as team leader on a world-wide mobile training team. He is also the director of a non-profit organization, Worldwide Impact Now, which does humanitarian work focusing on Burma, Kenya and Mexico. He retired from the US Army Special Forces (SF) in 2003 after 31 years of active duty, where he served in all combatant commands across the spectrum of peace-crisis-war. He served in SF assignments commanding at A detachment, company and battalion levels. He also served as deputy commander and chief of staff of two special forces groups, as Special Operations Command Europe J3 Director of Operations for a 90-country area of operations, as Joint Para-Military Commissioner in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and with SOCCENT as both Director of Special Forces Ground Operations for Operation Desert Storm, and as a senior Special Operations Planner for Operation Iraqi Freedom. He served as Dean of Academics, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, and was an associate professor at the US Army Military Academy at West Point. He was further the Army's senior observer-trainer of 2-4 star level army component commands in the capacity as Commander, Operations Group Delta, US Army Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). He was a War College Fellow from the Advanced Operations Art Studies Fellowship – the US Army's primary program for strategic planners. He has a MA in German from Middlebury College and BA in German from George Mason University.

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMC (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Frank Hoffman is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, where he serves as the Center's strategic and global affairs analyst, develops advanced concepts and conducts research into the nature of future conflict. He is also a resident Research Fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. His professional experience includes 10 of active and 14 years of Marine Corps Reserve service. He has served at the Pentagon as a management and policy analyst for nearly a decade, and his federal service includes an OSD political appointee in the Clinton and Bush administrations. He served on the staff of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission); was the National Security Analyst and Director, Marine Strategic Studies Group, at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico; and served on the Professional Staff, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. He has authored *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War*, (Praeger, 1996) and has published over 100 articles and reviews on national security strategy, defense economics, and military history, and lectured at most of the country's professional military education schools and major think tanks. He was also a contributing author to the new Army/Marine Counterinsurgency manual. Mr. Hoffman holds degrees from the Wharton Business School, George Mason University, and the U.S. Naval War College.

Sarah Holewinski

Sarah Holewinski is the Executive Director of the Campaign of Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), which advocates for better policies for war's survivors, particularly with the US and NATO state militaries and in conflict zones (Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Israel, et al). Sarah has published Op-Eds in the Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, and USA Today on mitigating civilian harm through recognition and amends. Previously, Sarah was a member of The White House AIDS policy team throughout President Clinton's second term and later joined West Wing Writers—a firm of former White House speechwriters. Sarah has worked in India, in Rwanda with the William J. Clinton Foundation, and as

a consultant to Human Rights Watch. Sarah received her BA from Georgetown University and a Masters in Security Policy at Columbia University's School of International Public Affairs. She is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a fellow of the Truman National Security Project.

Donna Hopkins

Donna Hopkins joined the U.S. State Department in 1998 as a Foreign Service Officer (Political Cone), serving in Warsaw, Poland; the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs; and the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs (PM) in Washington, D.C. In 2003 she transferred to the Civil Service and now heads the Plans and Policy Team in the PM Bureau Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis. In this capacity, Ms. Hopkins and her team work closely with State and interagency colleagues on national security-related strategy, policy, and planning matters that impact international security and foreign policy. Prior to joining the State Department, she spent 13 years on active duty in the United States Navy, becoming one of the first female naval officers to serve on ships at sea. She has served since 1988 in the U.S. Navy Reserve, including recalls to active duty during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Joint Endeavor, and the 1995 Bosnian war. She has commanded six reserve units and holds the rank of Captain. Ms. Hopkins graduated in 1997 from the U.S. Naval War College, where she earned a MA with Highest Distinction in National Security and Strategic Affairs.

Gorka Espiau Idoiaga

Gorka Espiau Idoiaga is the Senior Adviser for Peace Building to the Executive Office of the Basque President. He is also a Senior Associate to the Center for International Conflict Resolution (CICR) at Columbia University and a former Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. Previously, he was the spokesperson for Elkarrri, the movement for dialogue in the Basque Country. He has also served as a logistics operator for NGOs in Croatia and Bosnia. He holds a graduate degree in Information Sciences and Journalism from the University of the Basque Country.

Arif Jamal

Arif Jamal is a scholar and prominent journalist from Lahore, Pakistan. Arif has written more than 200 investigative and interpretive articles in English, focusing on such subjects as Islamist politics in Pakistan, jihad in Kashmir, madrassas and Afghanistan. Arif's first book, which profiles and analyzes the history of the jihad in Kashmir in 1988, is expected to be published this fall. Arif began his professional career in Pakistan in 1986 as a journalist with Radio Pakistan and has since worked with such publications as The Pakistan Times, The Muslim, The News, Newline and Financial Post. Arif has also worked with various foreign media including The New York Times, Radio France International, and The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. He is currently affiliated with New York University.

Ana Julia Jatar

Ana Julia Jatar is the Communications and & Outreach Coordinator at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. She was previously a Research Fellow at the Carr Center, where she focused on civil and political human rights violations in elected authoritarian regimes such as Venezuela, Russia, and Zimbabwe. Before joining the Carr Center, she served as a member of the Executive Committee and Director of the Political Discrimination Project at SUMATE, an NGO established in 2003 to defend political and electoral rights in Venezuela. While at SUMATE, she wrote a book titled *Apartheid in the XXI Century*. In the early 90's she served in the Venezuelan government and was appointed head of the anti-trust agency. From 1994 until 2001 she was a Senior Fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington DC, where she dealt with trade, antitrust and other US/Latin-American policy issues. In 1995 she became the director of the Dialogue's Cuba Program and wrote a book on Cuba titled *The Cuban Way*. The book received the Choice Award as Outstanding Academic Book. From 2001 to 2003 she was a visiting fellow at the David Rockefeller Center, Harvard University where she investigated the growing economic and political bonds between Fidel Castro's and Hugo Chavez's governments. She is member of the Editorial Committee of El Nacional, Venezuela's leading daily newspaper where she also writes a bi-weekly op-ed piece. Dr. Jatar has a Ph.D in economics from Warwick University in the UK.

Colonel Daniel Kelly, USMC

Col. Daniel Kelly is currently the Director of the USMC Center for Irregular Warfare. A career infantry officer, Col. Kelly has held numerous command staff billets and participated in several operations, to

include: Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope, Somalia; Operation Allied Force and Joint Guardian, Kosovo; and Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom II.

Kevin Lanigan

Kevin Lanigan is the Director of the Law & Security Program at Human Rights First. He leads Human Rights First's efforts to ensure a greater understanding of and respect for human rights in U.S. national security policy, through a combination of policy-relevant research, analysis, and advocacy. Before he joined Human Rights First, Kevin practiced law for 20 years as an associate and partner with the Washington, D.C., law firm Hogan & Hartson, primarily in the area of civil rights. Earlier in his career, he served as a state prosecutor in Arizona and later as executive director of the Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest. Kevin has taught military science at Georgetown University and Public Interest Law at Arizona State University College of Law, and has been a frequent speaker on topics including criminal justice issues, human rights and post-conflict reconstruction. Kevin served on active duty as a U.S. Army Reserve judge advocate in Bosnia during 2001, Afghanistan during 2002-03, and Iraq during 2005-06, with duties including rule of law support and reform and human rights protection. He was twice awarded the Bronze Star Medal for meritorious achievement and service in Afghanistan and Iraq. During 2006-07 Kevin served as legal advisor to the Iraq Ministry of the Interior in a UK Department for International Development capacity development program. He has also served as a civilian advisor in the post-conflict security and reconstruction sphere in Afghanistan.

Neil Levine

Neil Levine is the Director of the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation in USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. CMM leads USAID efforts to develop approaches to the causes and consequences of conflict. From 2000-2007, Mr. Levine served as the Chief of the Governance Division in USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance where he worked on issues involving promotion of transparent, accountable and effective democratic institutions. Mr. Levine served as deputy director for the Office of Central American Affairs (LAC/CEN) from 1995-2000. He has a strong interest in countries in transition and worked closely in support of the USAID's Missions in Central America to support implementation of the peace accords in El Salvador and Guatemala. From October 1998 through June 2000, he worked to develop the strategy, budget justification, and implementation of the post-Hurricane Mitch Hurricane Reconstruction programs in Central America. From 1993 to 1995, he served as congressional liaison officer in the Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs with responsibility for the Latin America Bureau and democracy and governance issues. Before coming to USAID, Mr. Levine served on Capitol Hill for 10 years, first on the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and then as legislative assistant for foreign affairs to Congressman Edward Feighan (OH). He has also worked as a research assistant at Human Rights Watch in New York. He has a MA from both the National War College (2008) and the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs (1996), and a certificate from the Institute for Latin American and Iberian Studies, Columbia University (1996). He has a BA from Earlham College (1983).

Colonel Brian Maher, USAF (Ret.)

Col. Brian Maher, a member of the Senior Executive Service, is the President of Joint Special Operations University. He had retired in July 2000 after 30 years of active duty, at the rank of colonel, and then served as Vice-President until rising to the Presidency in June 2007. He was commissioned in 1970 as a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. While on active duty, he served as an air operations staff officer in the newly formed USSOCOM, participating in command-level planning for Operation Just Cause. Later, he commanded the Joint Special Operations Command's Air Component at Fort Bragg, N.C., where he participated in Operation Uphold Democracy conducting SOF air operations from aboard the USS America. His academic assignments included faculty duty at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and Commandant of the USAF Special Operations School. Throughout his academic career he maintained operational credentials by serving during Operation Joint Forge as Joint Special Operations Task Force Two Commander, San Vito, Italy; twice deploying as Director, Special Operations Liaison Element to Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia during operations Desert Thunder and Desert Fox; and more recently serving as Chief of Staff to a key special operations Joint Task Force in Operation Enduring Freedom at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. He received his B.A. in Aeronautical Engineering from the U.S. Air Force Academy. He received his Masters in Business Administration from Oklahoma City University, and his

masters of Science in Aeronautical Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology. In 2005, he received his Doctorate of Education from the University of West Florida.

Cynthia Mahmood

Cynthia Mahmood is a Senior Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and Associate Professor of Anthropology at Notre Dame University. She has conducted extensive field research in India and Pakistan, and pioneered the face-to-face ethnography of religious militants in Punjab and Kashmir. She is the founder and editor of the University of Pennsylvania Press book series on The Ethnography of Political Violence, which helped establish the blossoming field of the anthropology of violence. She is a frequent consultant and expert witness in legal and political arenas in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom in matters relating to human rights, terrorism, religion and conflict in South Asia. She has published three books and dozens of academic articles on these topics. She received a Ph.D in Anthropology from Tulane University.

N. Manoharan

N. Manoharan is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He has been the South Asia Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center Washington and recipient of the Mahbub-ul Haq Award. His areas of interest include Sri Lanka, Maldives, human rights, ethnic conflicts, multiculturalism, terrorism, and national security. His most recent publications include *SAARC: Towards Greater Connectivity* and *Ethic Violence and Human Rights in Sri Lanka*. His forthcoming book is entitled *Counter-Terror Laws and Security in Developing Democracies: Lessons from India and Sri Lanka*. He is currently working on 'Comprehensive Internal Security Strategy for India'.

Thomas A. Marks

Thomas A. Marks is head of the Irregular Warfare Department at the School for National Security Executive Education (SNSEE) of National Defense University in Washington, DC. He is the author of *Maoist People's War in Post-Vietnam Asia*, considered the current standard on the subject of "people's war." His follow-on, *Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam*, was honored as a *Choice* Outstanding Academic Book selection; and was complemented by *Counter-Revolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang*. A former US government officer who is a member of the editorial board of *Small Wars and Insurgencies* (London), he previously served as the Oppenheimer Chair of Warfighting Strategy at the Marine Corps University, where he taught "Insurgency and Operational Art." He is an Adjunct Professor at the US Joint Special Operations University and for 2006 was awarded Educator of the Year. He graduated from the United States Military Academy and in his Ph.D. work at the University of Hawaii focused on the relationship between popular upheaval and revolutionary crisis. His most recent field service was as the operations consultant for a newly raised Saudi Arabian commando unit.

Michael McCarrick

Michael McCarrick is the National Security and Human Rights intern at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. Prior to coming to the Carr Center, he worked for NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts, where he focused on political policy pertaining to women's reproductive rights. He has a BA in Political Science from Stonehill College.

Michael McClintock

Michael McClintock has worked in the human rights field for over thirty years and has written extensively on U.S. military doctrine and foreign policy from a human rights perspective. He is the author of *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990*, and of histories of El Salvador and Guatemala. He is the former research director of Human Rights First and currently a consultant with that organization. He also directed the organization's Discrimination Initiative and the Fighting Discrimination Program, with its special focus on hate crimes. He is the co-author, with Scott Horton and Kevin Lanigan, of Human Rights First's *Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impunity*. Previously, he worked with Amnesty International for almost 20 years and as the deputy head of program of Human Rights Watch from 1994 to 2002. He is a graduate of Ohio University and the University of Wisconsin.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon, USAF

Lt Col. McMahon is the Director of the Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) which he assumed in June, 2005. He is responsible for strategic-level special operations forces education through research, analysis, publication, and senior-level seminars. The Strategic Studies Department's work focuses on four core areas; research and publications, combating terrorism curriculum, interagency processes curriculum, and JSOU's strategic planning and programming. A career US Air Force Intelligence Officer, Lt Col McMahon is fully qualified as a collections and analytical officer. He was selected for the competitive USAF Foreign Area Specialist Program and studied for two years as a Dean's Fellow at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) in New York City. Upon graduation with an MA in International Affairs, he was selected to join the faculty of the USAF Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field as the Director of both the Latin American Orientation and the Asia-Pacific Orientation Courses. Lt Col McMahon then took a career broadening tour as an Assistant Professor of Aerospace Studies at Manhattan College. He was assigned to Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC) Detachment 560. Besides teaching Air Force Officer Trainee coursework, he was Adjunct Professor in the Peace Studies and Government Departments. A three year overseas assignment to Guam followed the New York assignment. As the Director of Intelligence, 13th Air Force at Andersen Air Force Base, Lt Colonel McMahon was responsible for US Air Force intelligence support and operations for all of Asia and Oceania except Japan and Korea. He has been awarded numerous medals for this service in the USAF. He was a Distinguished Graduate from USAF Squadron Officer School and a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.

Jemma Lohr McPherson

Jemma Lohr McPherson is a student at the Georgetown University Law Center. Before beginning her legal education, she worked as a Research Assistant for the Carr Center's Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Project, as Research Assistant to Carr Center Director, Sarah Sewall, and at Amnesty International in the United Kingdom. She plans to focus her studies on international rule of law issues. She received her BA from Wellesley College.

Colonel William Mendel, USA (Ret.)

Col. William Mendel serves as a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) under contract with Science Applications International Corporation. He manages the JSOU research and publication effort. He completed ten years of government service as senior military analyst and intelligence specialist with the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas where he conducted primary research in a number of foreign countries. Before his retirement from active duty as a U.S. Army infantry Colonel, he served as a tenured faculty instructor at the U.S. Army War College and held the Maxwell D. Taylor Chair of the Profession of Arms. Other military duties have included command of the Florida Ranger Camp and command and staff assignments in the United States, Korea, and Germany. In Vietnam he served as a rifle platoon leader and infantry company commander. He is a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College. He earned his MA in Political Science at the University of Kansas and was graduated from Harvard's Kennedy School program for Senior Officials in National Security.

Colonel William Miller, USA

Col. William Miller was appointed as the Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy for SOCOM, as a member of the Senior Executive Service in August of 2007. Prior to his appointment, he was the Chief Operating Officer and primary strategic analyst for Miller-Smith Strategic Solutions, Inc. providing direct support to the Center for Special Operations in the development of strategies and plans to support global special operations and to the United States Army in the development of future concepts and doctrine. He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Cavalry upon graduation from the University of Florida. After completion of basic officer training at Fort Knox, Kentucky and Fort Benning, Georgia, he completed a 26 year career in the United States Army. Mr. Miller led and commanded Soldiers, U.S. and allied, from the platoon through Brigade level and has extensive operational experience, including numerous deployments in Europe (Kosovo and Bosnia) and the Middle East (Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan). He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and he was a War College Fellow in the Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship at SAMS after Task Force Command. Mr. Miller earned his B.S in Business Administration from the

University of Florida, a M.S. in Operations Research from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and an M.MAS from SAMS.

Tyler Moselle

Tyler Moselle is a Research and Program Associate at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy where he works with Sarah Sewall on the National Security and Human Rights Program. Prior to joining the Carr Center, Tyler worked as a teaching and research assistant at Brigham Young University, the Naval War College, and Harvard University where he focused on US national security and foreign policy, globalization and terrorism, the future of war, and religious violence. Tyler holds a bachelor's in history from BYU and a master's in government from Harvard University.

Haidar Ali Hussein Mullick

Haidar Mullick is a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University, where he conducts research on U.S. Foreign Policy toward South Asia and the Middle East. He is part of the Panel of Experts at Spearhead Research in Pakistan, and is a Research Associate at the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) at the University of Bradford, UK. He has previously done research at the Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy Studies Program, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the Hudson Institute's Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World.

Sohail Abdul Nasir

Sohail Abdul Nasir is an Islamabad-based journalist. He was born in the North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan and got his MA from the University of Peshawar. This background helped to shape his professional career, guiding him to write on foreign policy matters, regional security issues and the war on terrorism.

Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Nichols, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Ralph Nichols has been a senior military analyst for the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) for over 5 years. Specialized areas of interest: combat identification/fratricide (friendly fire), rules of engagement (ROE)/ escalation of force (EOF). Recent projects/publications: Escalation of Force Handbook (July 2007), Traffic and Control Point Operations – Iraq (April 2006), manage combat identification/fratricide specialty link on the CALL website. Current projects/publications: Battle Staff NCO Handbook, Tactical Operations in Counterinsurgency (COIN), and Fratricide Handbook.

Admiral Eric Olson, USN

Adm. Eric Olson is the 8th and current commander of the USSOCOM. He is the first Navy Seal to ever be appointed to the grade of a three-star and four-star admiral as well as the first naval officer to be the USSOCOM combatant commander. Admiral Olson is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1973 and completed SEAL training a year later. For the next two decades, he served in a variety of military assignments, many of them overseas. In 1994, he became the commander of the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, an American counter-terrorism unit. He was promoted again in 1999 when he assumed command of the Naval Special Warfare Command in Coronado, California. He assumed his current assignment in July 2007.

Joy Olsen

Joy Olsen is the Executive Director of the Washington Office of Latin America. She is a human rights expert who has directed non-governmental human rights organizations for more than a decade. Ms. Olson has a long-standing commitment to promoting greater transparency in U.S. military programs in Latin America. She co-founded the “Just the Facts” project and co-authored its three books on US military programs with Latin America. Her many achievements include campaign leadership to end U.S. government efforts to deport refugees who fled from civil war in El Salvador to the U.S. She led NGO efforts to increase U.S. funding for Central American peace accords implementation and a successful advocacy effort to lift the ban on food and medicine sales to Cuba. Prior to joining WOLA as Executive Director, Ms. Olson served as Director of the Latin America Work Group (LAWG), a coalition of 60 non-governmental organizations working together to promote peaceful and just U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. A published author in the Latin American human rights field, Ms. Olson did her graduate studies at the National Autonomous University of Mexico.

Bard O'Neill

Dr. Bard O'Neill is a professor of International Affairs and the Director of Studies of Internal Warfare at the National War College. He is the author of several books including *Insurgency and Terrorism* and *The Deadly Embrace: the Impact of Israeli and Palestinian Rejectionism on the Peace Process*. He has lectured extensively on the Middle East, insurgency, and terrorism and is a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Justice Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, and NSA. He has also appeared as a guest on many media programs. A renowned American Civil War historian, Dr. O'Neill conducts annual lectures on battlefields throughout the eastern United States.

Kimberly Paschall

Kimberly Paschall is the Office Manager for the Armed Forces Department and Assistant to the Protection Team to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Regional Delegation for the U.S. and Canada. The role of the Armed Forces department is to inform the arms carriers of the United States of the work of the ICRC in conflict situations and promote International Humanitarian Law. The Protection Team makes regular visits to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay and works to help restore family links and detainee issues in Iraq and Afghanistan. Before she joined the ICRC, Kimberly worked at E*Trade Financial for two years. Kimberly has also worked with the Consul-General of the Philippine Embassy and has done volunteer work in the Dominican Republic. She received her BA in Political from James Madison University.

Robert Perito

Robert Perito is a Senior Program Officer at the United States Institute of Peace. He is an expert on peace and stability operations, police and constabulary forces, organized crime, and US national security affairs. Mr. Perito came to USIP after a distinguished career in government service. From 1967 to 1995, he was a United States Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State, retiring with rank of Minister Counselor. His last assignment was Director of the Office of International Criminal Justice where he received a Superior Honor Award for chairing the Administration's Task Force on Combating International Alien Smuggling. From 1995 to 2001, Mr. Perito served as Deputy Director of the U.S. Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. In 1988-89, Mr. Perito served in the White House as Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council under Presidents Reagan and Bush. From 1983-84, he was Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs at the Department of Commerce. In 1980, Mr. Perito was an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow and worked for the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Perito is a Visiting Lecturer in Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Mr. Perito's most recent book is entitled, *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Post Conflict Security Force*. He holds a BA from the University of Denver and an MA in Peace Operations Policy from George Mason University.

Dana Priest

Dana Priest is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist for The Washington Post, where she covers the intelligence community and national security issues. In her 20 years at The Post, she has written extensively on the military, counterterrorism and the CIA. In 2007, she and a colleague broke the outpatient-care scandal at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. In 2006 she received a number of honors for reporting on CIA secret prisons and counterterrorism operations, including the Pulitzer Prize for beat reporting, the George Polk Award and the Overseas Press Club award. She has covered military action in Panama, Iraq and Kosovo, and has traveled widely with Army Special Forces and infantry around the world. In 2004, she was a Pulitzer finalist twice, for reporting on clandestine intelligence, and for her contribution to The Post's articles on the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. Her 2003 book, "The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace With America's Military," was a finalist for the Pulitzer. Ms. Priest graduated from the University of California at Santa Cruz with a degree in political science.

Michael Radu

Michael Radu is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and Co-Chairman of its Center on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Homeland Security. He joined FPRI in 1983, and has since studied terrorist and insurgent groups worldwide. Various agencies of the U.S. and other governments have

called upon his expertise, and news media around the world regularly use him as an expert source, including the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, Newsweek, and Associated Press. He was a National Peace Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace; and he has monitored elections in Cambodia, Romania, Peru, and Guatemala. He has authored books on foreign policy and terrorism, mostly recently *Dilemmas of Democracy and Dictatorship: Place, Time, and Ideology in Global Perspective*. He received his Ph.D. in international relations from Columbia University.

Thomas Renard

Thomas Renard is a consultant and an expert on terrorism and insurgencies, specializing on Western Europe and North Africa. He is a frequent contributor to Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus and Terrorism Monitor, where he wrote many pieces on al-Qaeda in Europe and in the Maghreb. He is also an occasional collaborator with *Le Soir*, the main French-speaking newspaper in Belgium. Some of his other collaborations include French-speaking journals *Défense et Sécurité Internationale* (DSI) and *Les Cahiers du RMES*. Simultaneously, he is a part-time Research Assistant at the DC-based Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, where his work focuses on the European Union. Previously, as a Research Assistant at the Center on Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), he assisted in the elaboration of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Mr. Renard holds a MA in International Affairs from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University; and a MA in Journalism and a BA in Political Sciences from the Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium.

Andrew Reynolds

Andrew Reynolds, a career civil servant, has since late 2000 served as Deputy and chief of staff for the Office of the Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State (STAS), U.S. Department of State. Mr. Reynolds began his career in 1974 with Systems Sciences Incorporated, Washington, D.C., as a researcher for energy and public health issues. He joined the Federal Energy Agency in 1975 and, subsequently, the Energy Information Administration of the Department of Energy (DOE), where he specialized in electricity, nuclear power and energy supply and demand forecasting and analysis. From 1983-1986 Reynolds was posted in Paris as DOE Representative for Europe in the US Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. He returned to Washington as Deputy Director for the DOE Office of International R&D Cooperation where he managed the U.S./U.S.S.R. Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy agreement. Mr. Reynolds joined the State Department in 1990 as Deputy Director of the Office of Science and Technology Cooperation and, in 1994-96, served as S&T advisor to the U.S./Russia Cooperative Commission. From October 1996 to August 2000, Reynolds was posted as Counselor for Environment, Science and Technology at the U.S. Embassy in Rome. As an undergraduate, Mr. Reynolds combined international relations and pre-medical studies as a University Scholar at the University of Virginia. He holds graduate degrees in energy technology management from George Washington University and strategic intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College.

William Rosenau

William Rosenau is a political scientist in the Rand Corporation's Washington Office, where he specializes in the study of insurgency, terrorism, intelligence, and military special operations. He is also the chairman of RAND's Insurgency Board. Dr. Rosenau has served in the US State Department's counterterrorism office (S/CT); as a congressional legislative assistant; on the US Department of Defense Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM); and in the office of the US assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict (OASD/SOLIC). He is also an adjunct professor in Georgetown University's Security Studies program. He is the author of *US Internal Security Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion, and Public Order* (Routledge, 2005). He has authored many RAND publications, most recently *From the Ashes? The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency* (forthcoming, 2008); *Subversion and Insurgency* (2007); and *Confronting the "Enemy Within": Security Intelligence, Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies* (2004). He holds an A.B. in political science (Columbia), an MA in history (Cambridge), and a Ph.D. in War Studies (King's College, London).

Richard Shultz

Richard Shultz is a security adviser and professor of international politics at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, where he teaches graduate-level courses in various aspects of international security. He is also

the director of the Fletcher School's International Security Studies Program. The program is dedicated to graduate-level teaching and research on a broad range of conflict, defense, and strategic issues. Since 2003 he has directed the Armed Groups Project for the Washington-based National Strategy Information Center. The project seeks to understand the complex nature of armed groups and explore approaches for meeting these challenges. He has held three chairs: the Olin Distinguished Professorship of National Security Studies at the U.S. Military Academy, Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow at the U.S. Naval War College, and Brigadier General H. L. Oppenheimer Chair of War-fighting Strategy, U.S. Marine Corps. Since the mid-1980s he has served as a security consultant to various U.S. government agencies concerned with national security affairs. His most recent books include *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat*, and *The Secret War against Hanoi: Kennedy and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam*. His new monograph is titled *Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement*.

Sarah Sewall

Sarah Sewall has worked at the nexus of national security and humanitarianism throughout her career in government, academia, and non-governmental organizations. She currently teaches and is Faculty Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. Her research focuses on U.S. national security strategy, civil-military relations, and the ethics of fighting insurgencies and terrorism. She is completing, with John P. White, a year long assessment of senior civil-military decision-making. In 2007, she founded the MARO Project to create a military concept of operations for intervening to halt mass atrocity. Her prior work with the U.S. military included writing the introduction to the University of Chicago edition of the *Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (2007). Sewall was the first U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance during the Clinton Administration. She previously had served for six years as Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell. Just prior to joining the Kennedy School, she edited *The United States and the International Criminal Court* (2002) at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She serves on the Center for Naval Analysis Defense Advisory Committee, the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Offensive Information Operations and several non-profit boards. She was educated at Harvard and Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar.

Michael Shaikh

Michael Shaikh is a Senior Analyst for Crisis Group's Asia Program based in New York where he acts as the deputy to the Asia Program director. He also develops his own research and reports for Crisis Group's Asia Program with a focus on South Asia and thematic issues such as counter-insurgency, deradicalization, policing and terrorist financing. He was the co-author of HRW's report, "The Human Cost: Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan", which documented war crimes and civilian deaths, perpetrated by the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan in 2006. He re-joined Crisis Group in August 2007 after returning from Afghanistan and Pakistan where he worked first as an analyst for Crisis Group and then as the Afghanistan Researcher for Human Rights Watch. Michael holds an MA in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and a BA in Political Science and Asian History from Hobart and William Smith Colleges.

David Spencer

David Spencer is a professor for National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at National Defense University. He has specialized in the study of Latin American insurgencies. He spent five years working in El Salvador during the recent civil war, and has spent the last nine years working in a variety of capacities in relation to the conflict in Colombia. He has worked for a number of defense think tanks to include the Center for Naval Analyses (CAN) and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Prior to accepting the position at CHDS, he was the Senior Director for Combating Terrorism at Hick & Associates. In this capacity he provided support for a variety of projects of United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). He earned his Ph.D in Political Science from George Washington University, where he specialized in Latin American politics. He grew up in Latin America, living in Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala.

Chitra Tiwari

Chitra Tiwari is a free-lance journalist, political analyst and commentator of international affairs with a focus on South Asian affairs. He is also a former Assistant Professor of international affairs and political science at Nepal's Tribhuvan University. Dr. Tiwari has published many articles on comparative politics and international relations in various scholarly international journals. He is the co-author of *Nepalese Political Behavior* published from Denmark (1994). At present he works on a free-lance basis as an independent political analyst and contributes articles to The Washington Times. He has also addressed the workshops and seminars as an expert panelist to discuss Nepal's civil war at several universities and think tanks in the United States and Canada, including the Heritage Foundation, McGill University, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. His special articles published in The Washington Times covered analysis of Maoist insurgency in Nepal. He also published exclusive interviews of the Maoist leaders Pushpa Kamal Dahal (a.k.a. Prachanda) and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai for The Washington Times during the height of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. His journal article titled "Red Star over the Himalayas" was published in the September 2005 issue of the *Current History*. Dr. Tiwari holds a Ph.D. in International Affairs and Political Science from George Washington University.

S. John Tsagronis

John Tsagronis is the Senior Director for Policy Implementation and Execution on the National Security Council Staff at the White House. He reports directly to the National Security Adviser and Deputy National Security Adviser on a broad range of issues at the nexus of policy development and operational planning. He is responsible for the NSC's new strategic review and management process that monitors performance against our national security objectives, and was recently asked to conduct a review of the overall performance of the national security system. Immediately prior to joining the NSC Staff, he was the Senior Director for Security Programs in the State Department's new Bureau for Foreign Assistance. Previously, he served as the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Policy at the U.S. Agency for International Development where he was responsible for the policy and program oversight of the Agency's efforts in the global war on terrorism, coordination on counterinsurgency policy with other U.S. Government officials, and liaison with international donors on matters of interest to U.S. national security. Before joining the Administration in December 2001, Mr. Tsagronis spent 17 years providing analytical and policy support to the Department of Defense and the U.S. Intelligence Community on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, asymmetric warfare, and homeland security from various positions he held in the private sector, academic and think tank communities. His work in counterinsurgency for nearly 25 years has brought him to nearly 50 countries. Mr. Tsagronis is a student of Bates College and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is a long-standing member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a Fellow of the Royal Geographic Society, both in London.

S. Tjip Walker

Tjip Walker leads the Warning and Analysis Team in the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) at the US Agency for International Development. In this capacity he coordinates CMM's analytical leadership on range of conflict related issues, including early warning, assessment, monitoring and evaluation, and training. He also serves as USAID's lead on fragile states. In that capacity, he recently completed leadership of a multi-year, multi-donor collaboration sponsored by the OECD's Fragile States Group focused on improving service delivery in fragile states. In his 25-year career as a development professional, he has been engaged in efforts ranging from developing a methodology for assessing democratic governance to reviewing the effectiveness of USAID's support to disarmament/ demobilization/ reintegration (DDR) programs to articulating the agency's first policy statement on conflict management. Dr. Walker holds an MPA from the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University and a Ph.D. in political science from Indiana University.

Lieutenant Colonel Keith Warman, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Keith Warman is Senior Military Analyst at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth. Retired Army Officer, LTC, 26 years; assignments included: Instructor at the Pre-Command Course (PCC), Fort Leavenworth; Battalion Commander, 519th Military Police Battalion, Fort Polk, deploying to both Operations Enduring Iraqi Freedom; Battlefield Operating System (BOS) Chief, Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), Fort Leavenworth; and Corps G3 Plans Officer, I Corps, Fort Lewis. His primary duties at CALL include collecting, analyzing, and disseminating OEF and OIF best practices and current challenges supporting follow-on deploying forces and institutional army requirements. He as

participated in many projects/publications, most recently: Contributing Author on Escalation of Force (EOF) Handbook; Author of Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) Smartcard; and Author of Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) Smartcard. Additionally, he has conducted numerous Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) on OEF/OIF operations/lessons learned, to follow-on deploying units worldwide.

Sandra Wilson

Sandra Wilson is the current Chief of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's Support Team (NST) at SOCOM. She serves as the NGA Director's personal onsite representative for the Commander and is responsible for providing full-spectrum Geospatial Intelligence from NGA to the Command and its components, as they pursue their global missions. Prior to her current assignment, she was the Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence College (NGC) of the NGA, and served in a number of senior level positions at the NGA. Before joining NGA in 2004, Ms. Wilson retired from the USAF as a Colonel. During her military career, she served in various capacities in intelligence and national security programs, where she was given a number of major military awards for her service. She holds an M.S in National Security Strategy from the National War College, an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval Command & Staff College, and a BA in Political Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She is also a Distinguished Graduate of the Postgraduate Intelligence Program at the Defense Intelligence College.

Richard Wilson

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