

AIR AND LAND POWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS: IMPLICATIONS OF A CIVILIAN CENTER OF GRAVITY

September 6-7, 2007



PROJECT ON THE MEANS OF INTERVENTION
CARR CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
AND
THE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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THE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Cover photos: group photos and Lieutenant General Douglas Lute.

Report by Tyler Moselle

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Carr Center for Human Rights Policy
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Ph: 617-495-5819
Fax: 617-495-4297
www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp

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SECTION 1: Preface

On September 6 and 7, 2007, the Project on the Means of Intervention and the Strategic Studies Institute co-sponsored a conference on “Air and Land Power in Counterinsurgency Operations: Implications of a Civilian Center of Gravity” in Washington, D.C. The two-day conference considered counterinsurgency (COIN) from a variety of perspectives, anticipating challenges and opportunities in the forthcoming development of joint COIN doctrine.

The Project on the Means of Intervention aims to advance understanding of humanitarian challenges that arise in the context of using military force. Since 2000, the Project has brought active and retired officers from the United States military and other security specialists together with members of the human rights and humanitarian communities to consider how humanitarian considerations are factored into, and affected by, military intervention. The Project is supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and is based at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Through a series of workshops, conference reports and working papers, the Project explores the significant intersection of military concerns about the efficient and effective use of force with humanitarian concerns about minimizing harm to civilians during war. More information is available online at: <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/programareas/nshr.php>

The Carr Center’s Project on the Means of Intervention and the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute have previously joined to sponsor conferences on issues of mutual interest. In November 2005, we cosponsored “Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Implications of Irregular Warfare for the United States Government,” where then-Lt. Gen. David Petraeus delivered the keynote address. The conference served as a springboard for the creation of the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5).

This conference on “Air and Land Power in Counterinsurgency Operations: Implications of a Civilian Center of Gravity” sought to engage air and sea power expertise and equities in the COIN discussion and contribute to the evolution of the Joint Forces Counterinsurgency Manual, which will be released in 2009. It included representatives from various U.S. military services,

academics, human rights activists, government policy-makers, members of the media, and representatives of foreign nations interested in COIN. Participants affirmed the core tenets of the new Army/Marine Corps doctrine while highlighting its many limitations and lacunae. The meeting suggested a need for increased analytic work to support effective COIN – to evaluate initial host nation capabilities, to measure COIN progress, and to assess civilian impact of the use of force. They also urged efforts to conceptualize, and develop capabilities for, alternative models of COIN that draw upon the full range of USG and foreign nation capabilities and provide alternatives to large-scale, boots-heavy, and sustained engagement described in FM 3-24. The conference also highlighted positive lessons from the process of creating the Army/Marine Corps COIN manual that could be applicable to the effort to develop a joint COIN Manual.

I would like to express appreciation to the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, particularly Doug Lovelace, Steven Metz, Lt. Col. Nate Freier, and Col. Greg Cusimano for their vision, leadership and effort. Tyler Moselle and Meghan Frederico of the Carr Center worked diligently and effectively to make the conference a success. Thanks, finally, to the workshop participants, especially our featured speakers LTG Douglas Lute and LTG David Barno (Ret.), for their interest in enhancing the discussion about the future of COIN.

Sarah Sewall

Director, Project on the Means of Intervention
and the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy

SECTION 2: Introduction

In September 2007, Harvard University's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and the U.S. Army War College co-sponsored a conference on "Air and Land Power in Counterinsurgency Operations: Implications of a Civilian Center of Gravity" in Washington, D.C. The conference considered counterinsurgency (COIN) from a variety of perspectives, anticipating challenges and opportunities in the forthcoming development of joint COIN doctrine.

The conference explored five broad themes through panels and speakers. Those themes are reflected in the organization of the following conference report, which begins by highlighting the core tenets of the new Army and Marine Corps COIN doctrine and the process by which it was created. While the Army/Marine Corps doctrine is focused on ground forces, the United States typically fights by combining contributions from all services and the central question for the conference was how the joint doctrine should evolve.

The first panel discussed the nature of insurgencies and counterinsurgency (COIN). Panelists considered whether the Army/Marine Corps doctrine adequately accounts for the changing nature and methods of modern insurgencies or effectively integrates all service capabilities. Participants offered different approaches and considerations for future doctrine development.

A second panel explored the discriminate use of force. Panelists debated the relative merits of air and ground forces for minimizing civilian harm. The discussion underscored both the importance and challenges of empirical data to evaluate the relative impact of capabilities and ensure proper applications of force in COIN.

The third panel examined intelligence requirements in COIN. Presenters discussed relative air and ground contributions to intelligence and the varying requirements for different types of information and understanding.

A fourth panel featured presentations on command and control. Panelists considered whether COIN poses special challenges for coordinating the application of military power, and how U.S. military command arrangements might best meet those needs.

The fifth and final panel focused on joint COIN doctrine and implementation. Which principles remain relevant for crafting a joint COIN doctrine? How can the U.S. military best integrate complementary capabilities in evolving forms of irregular warfare? What conceptual, operational, or resource hurdles remain to creating joint doctrine?

The report concludes with a summary of areas of consensus and outstanding questions related to the evolution of joint COIN doctrine.

SECTION 3: The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was the result of a multi-service, collaborative process that included academics, journalists, international participants, and representatives from human rights groups. A participant said that policy-makers should take note of the collaboration as a process.

The Manual initiated widespread discussion about COIN across the services, reinvigorated debate about irregular warfare in academia and in policy circles, and communicated key COIN principles to the public and media. The Manual is being used in military training centers, across the interagency community, at universities, and is being read by a diverse public audience.

“The COIN manual is a work in progress. It was created as a response to Iraq and thus we’ll have to wait and see if it’s useful for the next [COIN] conflict.”

The Manual is an effort to intellectually equip soldiers to plan and execute COIN campaigns. It stresses the centrality of the civilian to success of COIN and the corollary need to protect the population. It calls for calibration in the use of kinetic force, rejecting the “destroy the village to save it” mentality. It explains why U.S. forces must focus on supporting the host nation government. The Manual also stresses that success in COIN requires political efforts as well as military actions.

Critiques of the Manual

Some participants argued that the COIN Manual’s premise regarding troop ratios is problematic. A large force presence increases the probability that soldiers will kill civilians and anger the population, thus thwarting the mission of counterinsurgency to support the host nation government and win over the population. Participants argued that the COIN Manual should consider alternatives that focus on smaller numbers of troops.

An alternative vision is that the Manual’s operational approach is correct but key tenets such as restraint on the use of force, emphasis on non-kinetic aspects of COIN, and greater risk assumption by U.S. forces must be incorporated throughout other services and by other actors.

One human rights participant said America needs to perform “doctrinal housecleaning” to make sure earlier manuals are revised in accordance with the new COIN approach. The COIN Manual focuses on the civilian but can be undermined by different approaches to COIN or its component tasks by other military services or agencies. For example, the U.S. Army and CIA follow different manuals when interrogating suspected insurgents. The doctrinal housecleaning is particularly vital when exporting U.S. training to foreign militaries. The participant argued that the Colombian Army’s old field manuals that featured death squads and paramilitary structures were adapted from old U.S. training manuals. The participant urged all government and military organizations to adopt the civilian-centered approach to COIN.

“Get the CIA and Special Forces out of the way or integrate them into the same doctrinal process that focuses on civilian protection. The American military, Special Forces, and intelligence communities need some serious doctrinal housecleaning.”

Another critique questioned how long the new Manual would retain salience. If Iraq collapsed he asked, would the new COIN Manual be viewed as obsolete and useless? Even if the Manual is a fresh attempt to seriously organize and communicate COIN doctrine, some participants are concerned that it may be discredited before it can be fairly tested.

Finally, a participant urged the group to distinguish between an external COIN force and a host nation COIN force. Discussion about the American occupation of Iraq often confuses this distinction.

SECTION 4: Contributions of Air and Ground Forces

Airpower

The Air Force can offer close air support, intelligence, electronic warfare, increased mobility, surveillance, and space

“Airpower enforces a feeling of helplessness among the enemy.”

control assets in COIN. Some participants stressed airpower’s unique psychological advantage in communicating superiority to insurgent forces. Several argued that airpower’s flexibility and response speed remains critical and cannot be replaced by ground forces.

Participants also argued that airpower is less likely to agitate civilians than ground forces because ground troops cause more collateral damage than airpower and are more visible to the community. While acknowledging that the U.S. military doesn’t track civilian casualties, one participant contended that ground forces killed 10 times more civilians in Vietnam than did the Air Force.

The utility of foreign reliance upon air power in COIN has historical precedent, according to a participant. During World War I, he said, counterinsurgency practitioner T. E. Lawrence argued that the British Army was the central cause of civilian agitation in Iraq. The Army had left a small Air Force in Iraq after its withdrawal, and the insurgency eventually dried up. In a more recent example, the U.S. Air Force supported the Kurds against Saddam Hussein. The participant argued that airpower can be uniquely effective without support from ground forces in situations where indigenous ground forces are capable.

Another Air Force participant pointed out that the COIN manual would work if the U.S. were capable of sustaining deployment of a large ground force. But this is untenable, he argued, because neither American

“Reevaluate counterinsurgency in a fresh way that doesn’t focus on a manpower intensive force. Such a large ground presence is untenable to the host nation population we are trying to win over.”

citizens nor the indigenous population is likely to support this for a long period of time. Thus, airpower can fill an important gap in supporting the host nation government when ground forces cannot be sustained. The participant said the Army and Marine Corps should reevaluate the Manual in a way that doesn't emphasize such a heavy ground presence. He said that civilians remember incidents such as Haditha and Abu Ghraib more than they remember collateral damage from a faceless airplane.

Ground Forces

Many participants countered the airpower view. They argued that while it is tempting to seek intervention without direct engagement, counterinsurgency can never be successful without a strong ground presence. Ground forces are necessary to secure the population and provide stability for the host nation

“Synergy between services is what’s most important. We shouldn’t have commanders saying: ‘my service can accomplish this whole task.’”

government. Because many insurgencies take root in states with less effective government institutions, American ground forces will often be required. Airpower, in this view, is at its best a strong force multiplier for ground power.

Another participant pointed out that counterinsurgents must interact with the local population, sitting in on local mosque meetings and getting to know the inhabitants and the area. Airpower cannot accomplish these face-to-face tasks. Air assets can take a picture of Najaf but cannot point out which individuals are making IEDs in their basement or which individuals could be persuaded to support the local government. Another participant said that without a strong American ground presence, the U.S. Air Force could be used as a tool of revenge or repression by the host nation government or local forces.

Ground force participants said that non-judicious use of airpower can create just as much collateral damage as a heavy ground force

“Civilians would choose disciplined ground troops over faceless Air strikes if they had a choice.”

presence. Moreover, precision-bombing can be exploited by insurgents who use civilians as shields or who infiltrate civilian communities for protection against airpower. Another participant argued that the 2006 Israeli Air campaign against Lebanon killed an immense number of civilians while attempting to punish Hezbollah.

The Civilian

A human rights participant said it doesn't matter whether air or ground forces kill civilians but that U.S. forces are killing innocent people at all. It appeared to him that Afghans more commonly demonstrated against the government due to collateral damage from airpower while Iraqis were more frequently angered when ground troops caused civilian harm. However, he said that no matter what service, the military should follow rules of engagement, decrease collateral damage, pay compensation where applicable, and hold itself accountable in an open and transparent way.

Going Forward

Participants agreed that air and ground forces have unique contributions in COIN that they need to develop more thoroughly and articulate to one another. Air and ground forces have not worked perfectly together in Iraq or Afghanistan and the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual focused minimal discussion on airpower. It would be a great benefit to the joint doctrine and operations process to more fully develop various operational concepts in which services integrate their contributions.

SECTION 5: Discriminate Use of Force

The discriminate use of force is a key requirement in both air and land power in counterinsurgency operations. One participant argued that the Army has substantially reduced civilian casualties due to increased escalation of force (EOF) training, specifically at Traffic Control Points (TCPs) while an Air Force participant said they do a good job assessing the likelihood of collateral damage to mitigate civilian harm. For more information on both of these topics please refer to the following conference reports available online at the Carr Center website: *Learning and Integration: Escalation of Force and Traffic Control Point Operations* (March 2007) and *Humanitarian Issues in Military Targeting* (2002).

Civilian Casualty Data

Participants noted that there is no systematic compilation of civilian casualty data. Yet various participants claimed that in some cases airpower caused fewer civilian casualties while in other cases ground forces caused fewer civilian casualties. Since the U.S. military does not release civilian casualty data there is no easy way to examine the scope or pattern of damage. This lack of transparency is detrimental to the information operations of the military as it seeks to counter insurgent claims regarding civilian deaths or select the best mix of operational capabilities for a specific mission.

In addition, numerous participants said that civilian casualty data could help the military accomplish its objectives by improving operational learning. For example, the Army's efforts to track EOF incidents have led to reduced civilian casualties, particularly at TCPs. Participants said that "collateral damage drove officials crazy" because of the public demonstrations and anger such incidents generated toward coalition forces. Another participant argued that for every one civilian killed, 10 insurgents are recruited and that a recently translated Taliban insurgency manual makes clear that insurgents use collateral damage and civilian casualties to their advantage.

One military participant responded that it would be extremely difficult to gather hard data that means much on a macro-scale because each situation is unique and you cannot extract lessons learned. Another participant said the Air Force spends large sums of money to anticipate and model expected casualties but does not collect civilian casualty data because the time spent collecting information would be too time consuming. Another participant noted that when the U.S. military does not control the terrain where airpower is employed, performing civilian casualty analysis would be impractical. Overall, many participants thought that the U.S. military would benefit from developing efficient ways to track and analyze civilian casualty data.

“The time spent collecting valuable data for civilian casualty analysis would be too consuming for the military.”

Contractors

Numerous participants raised the issue of contractors in combat. Contractors can do routine or specialized tasks such as convoy transportation and dignitary security that enable the U.S. military to focus on other missions. At the same time, the indigenous population views contractors as a part of the U.S. military. Yet contractors do not follow the same ROE guidelines as the military services. There was broad agreement that because civilian perceptions of the COIN force are vital to winning the war, contractors should comply with military ROE.

“There is a belief among the Iraqis that American contractors can and will shoot anyone they want to whenever they want to and that no court of justice will hold them accountable.”

A participant argued that this is another reason why airpower is superior to entirely relying on ground forces. Contractors are viewed as part of the ground force and increase the probability of harm to civilians. A participant responded that if ground forces are necessary in COIN, then contractors should not be used or should comply with military ROE.

SECTION 6: Intelligence

Air and Land Power

The Manual says that COIN is driven by “human intelligence” which is obtained by ground forces – not overhead equipment or electronic systems. In this view, airpower is valuable but limited in its ability to provide information. Further, the Army / Marine Corps COIN Manual emphasizes the synergies between ground operations and intelligence. As infantry operate and obtain more information, that information will in turn drive its decisions. The opportunity to collect and employ real time intelligence was portrayed as an advantage of ground capabilities.

“I am concerned to hear of the Air Force’s fixation on technology as a solution to intelligence in counterinsurgency. We don’t want to be too removed from direct users of intelligence.”

A participant explained that the Air Force can offer special intelligence advantages. For example, it can utilize imagery, video, and other non-kinetic tools for geospatial imaging to help determine launch points of IEDs or to track and identify suspicious vehicles. A participant said the Air Force is starting to build human intelligence capabilities as well. In one view, the intelligence requirement for COIN is no different than other forms of warfare; forces need to know everything they can about an enemy in any type of war. In COIN, the goals are more intangible but still rely on the same principle of understanding enemy capabilities and intentions. In his view, the biggest difference in COIN is not the requirement, but the need to push the intelligence down to lower levels of U.S. command.

“Of course it’s harder to find an individual insurgent in COIN but it’s not hard to get to him with airpower. Air intelligence can track insurgent movement easier than ground forces.”

Expanding the Use of Intelligence

Another participant said the U.S. military needs better integration between operations and intelligence at the highest level to move beyond a Commander-centric model to a broader systems analysis perspective. He argued there are numerous commanders who do not understand how to use intelligence for broader non-kinetic issues such as analyzing the psychology of a community. He also noted that the intelligence community should keep analysts on one problem set over a long period of time regardless of unit requirements. He said that Marines did a good job of this in the Al-Anbar province and noted that the Army is generally not as good because units move around the battle space more frequently.

“The military must move beyond the narrow band of using intelligence only for targeting or tracking enemies.”

A human rights participant said that an altogether different kind of intelligence is needed in COIN. Instead of just obtaining information to attack enemies, intelligence should be used to support the population. Ground forces that interact with the population directly on the most basic levels can make all the difference in a COIN operation. For example, one soldier who understands what’s going on in a village can determine if someone new has entered the village but can also figure out local community needs or wants. Another participant countered that this may fall more appropriately under the role of the indigenous police force.

An Intelligence Metric for Progress in COIN

A seasoned intelligence participant noted there is no metric to assess progress in COIN operations, thus there is no clear way to determine if mission objectives are being achieved. He said that some of the best social, political, religious, and economic intelligence he receives is from NGO reporting and the press who interact directly with locals. For example, a reporter noticed that in one area, women walked around without headscarves and

“What intelligence metrics could include cultural, religious, political, and social developments to assess mission progress?”

featured a story on turning an insurgent into a counterinsurgent using relative community freedoms and stability as a sign of progress in COIN operations.

SECTION 7: Command and Control

Participants discussed the paradoxical nature of command and control in COIN. Ground voices generally felt that the application of airpower should be further decentralized to creatively respond to threats, while airmen tended to view ground activities as less coordinated with air activities than desirable. Many agreed that air-ground coordination had improved significantly over the course of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but that further changes, including possible new command and control arrangements, should be considered.

COIN is a much more decentralized fight requiring organizations and doctrine responsive to smaller segments of the battlefield which allow “small,” highly responsive concentrations of force. Traditional battle concepts of centralized control have not proven adequately responsive for COIN, it was argued. In particular, many ground force participants saw operations as too centralized and independent for COIN and contended that airpower was not sufficiently responsive to ground force requirements.

This should be no surprise, a participant explained. The Ground Theater Air Control System (TACS), which integrates air operations with ground forces, was designed for use against conventional enemies during the Cold War, principally the Soviet Union. It focuses on the problem of close air support for ground forces along a largely linear battlefield. COIN, however, requires an uneven distribution of all the capabilities air forces can provide: close air support, intelligence, electronic warfare, mobility, surveillance, and controlling space. The Ground TACS also focuses on large unit combat in which Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (those who coordinate the respective capabilities from the services) rarely need to function below the battalion level. In COIN, the Ground TACS is too centralized to support a small unit fight, he said.

In addition, several participants argued that many modern air platforms, while also effective in COIN, are overly expensive for sustaining current and future COIN requirements. They argued that COIN requires a family of far more efficient light attack, light observation, light transport and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle capabilities that can be decentralized and used in a

more distributed fashion at a fraction of the cost. Theater integration for high capability platforms like Global Hawk and other theater UAVs is still necessary, but a light, decentralized, distributed force structure, as an adjunct to the current force structure, is necessary for COIN and irregular warfare. Participants agreed that the Air Force must transform its capabilities to contribute more effectively to COIN.

From the alternative perspective, a participant argued that Ground Operations are too independent and decentralized. In particular, he contended that ground forces often failed adequately to coordinate their various plans with the other services. An Air Force participant argued that this often reflected ground commanders' lack of understanding about the potential utility of airpower. For this reason, he said, Air Force officers should be placed with ground commanders to help coordinate joint capabilities.

SECTION 8: Conclusion

The conference highlighted issues that should be addressed as the United States moves toward developing Joint COIN doctrine and organizes its military to face insurgent challenges in the 21st century. There was general agreement upon the key tenets of COIN as laid out in the new Army/Marine Corps doctrine. Participants did not articulate or advocate for a competing COIN paradigm such as one emphasizing kinetic operations over political efforts or focusing on targeting insurgents at the expense of protection of civilians.

Rather, the differences that emerged reflected contrasting views of how to achieve the central military tenets of COIN. While the new COIN manual directed significant public attention to the ground perspective and contributions to COIN, the Air Force and Navy had yet to articulate their respective contributions in the form of updated COIN doctrine. Therefore air power proponents sought to educate participants about the contributions air assets can make to COIN. In addition, participants suggested that the “boots heavy” COIN model explored in the Army/Marine Corps doctrine may not be the sole or even desirable model for continued future U.S. COIN.

A key issue that the conference implicitly identified but did not address in depth is how the USG should evaluate host nation military capabilities in order to make appropriate choices about complementing or supplementing them with U.S. military capabilities. This is a key requirement for effective joint COIN doctrine.

The conference also highlighted the need to develop empirical means of assessing civilian impact of different types of capabilities and operations, both for campaign design and as a means of real-time operational feedback. The discussion entailed repeated assertions about the relative discrimination of air and ground power. These assertions should be tested against their actual effects upon civilian populations in COIN in order to better refine U.S. COIN practice.

The conference suggested a need to more closely examine the role of private military contractors and the impact that their independent rules of engagement and accountability

procedures may have upon both the U.S. military and the effectiveness of USG COIN efforts. Several participants suggested that further strengthening U.S. military accountability and compensation for civilian harm remains a challenge.

Participants agreed that the planned joint doctrine should highlight the full range of U.S. military capabilities that can contribute to COIN, but the discussion indicated that further analytic work to articulate the comparative advantages and multiple applications is required. The discussion suggested that all services, and perhaps particularly the Air Force, should prioritize the procurement of COIN-friendly capabilities, be they cheaper surveillance tools, more discriminate munitions, or armored transport vehicles. Participants also urged that traditional approaches toward defining and collecting intelligence required transformation to better account for human dimensions and importance of non-kinetic efforts. In addition, most participants agreed that applying joint capabilities effectively and responsively in COIN requires close scrutiny and perhaps innovation in command and control arrangements.

While the discussion revealed contrasting views of the relative value and employment of alternative U.S. military tools, participants stressed the importance of better understanding the relative contributions of different services and capabilities and developing flexible and innovative ways to employ them in support of COIN. Although many of the key tenets of COIN – as articulated in the new Army/Marine Corps Field Manual – are likely to remain constant, future insurgent challenges are certain to evolve in unanticipated directions. The U.S. armed forces must remain both prepared and flexible in providing an effective military component for addressing these challenges.

APPENDIX 1: Agenda

Air and Land Power in Counterinsurgency Operations: Implications of a Civilian Center of Gravity

Sponsored by the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University and the
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College

September 6-7, 2007

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Conference Center:
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036

THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 6

11:15 – 11:30 Conference Welcome and Introduction

Douglas Lovelace Jr.
Sarah Sewall

Strategic Studies Institute
Carr Center

11:30 – 12:30 Speaker: Lieutenant General Douglas E. Lute, White House

1:00 – 3:00 Panel One: Understanding Insurgencies and COIN

Do our COIN strategy and doctrine adequately account for the changing nature and methods of modern insurgencies? How do the various services think about the contemporary COIN challenge?

Moderator: Steven Metz
Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, USA
Richard Andres
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMC (Ret.)
Michael McClintock

Strategic Studies Institute
1st Battalion, 34th Armor
Air Force SAASS
MC Center Emerging Threats
Human Rights First

3:15 – 5:45 Panel Two: Discriminate Use of Force

What does Afghanistan and Iraq teach us about challenges in the discriminate and controlled use of air and land power? When has the use of force been counterproductive? When and why might specific capabilities be preferable?

Moderator: Josh White
Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, USA
Major General Charles Dunlap, USAF
Fred Abrahams

The Washington Post
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
Human Rights Watch

6:30 – 7:00 Reception

7:00 – 9:30 Dinner

Speaker: Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.)

8:30 – 10:15 Panel Three: Intelligence Requirements

Does the nature and fidelity of intelligence differ for air and land power in COIN? How do air and ground forces uniquely contribute to intelligence gathering? How can intelligence be more effectively obtained and employed?

Moderator: Dana Priest	Washington Post
Lieutenant Colonel Jim Gavrilis, USA	J-5, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Brigadier General Jan-Marc Jouas, USAF	Air Force ISRA
Colonel Derek J. Harvey, USA (Ret.)	Defense Intelligence Agency
Marc Garlasco	Human Rights Watch

10:45 – 12:45 Panel Four: C2 and Integration

What special challenges does COIN pose for coordinating the application of military power? How do SOF activities and interactions with indigenous forces complicate the picture?

Moderator: Greg Jaffe	Wall Street Journal
Major General William Holland, USAF	9 th Air Force and CENTCOM AF
Colonel Gary Crowder, USAF	Combined Air Operations Center
Colonel Philip Wilkinson, UKA (Ret.)	Chatham House
Colonel Lawrence Killmeier, USMC	Marine Attack Heli Squadron-167

1:40 – 2:25 Speaker: John L. Esposito, Georgetown University

2:30 – 4:45 Panel Five: Joint Doctrine and Implementation

What principles are relevant for crafting a joint COIN doctrine? What conceptual, operational, or resource hurdles remain? What is a military doctrine's relationship to a national COIN strategy?

Moderator: Stephen Biddle	Council on Foreign Relations
Brigadier General Herbert Carlisle, USAF	Headquarters, USAF
Colonel Alex Alderson, UKA	Mission Support Group, UKA
Colonel Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC	Command and Staff College, MCU
Kalev Sepp	OSD/SOLICIC
Donna Hopkins	Political / Military Affairs, State

APPENDIX 2: Participant List

Fred Abrahams

Fred Abrahams is Senior Researcher in the Emergencies Division at Human Rights Watch.

Colonel Alex Alderson, UKA

Colonel Alderson works at the British Army's Land Warfare Centre where he is currently leading the team updating the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine.

Richard Andres

Dr. Richard Andres is a professor of security studies at the Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). He is currently assigned as a special assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force.

Jane Arraf

Jane Arraf, currently a correspondent for NBC News in Baghdad, has been covering Iraq since 1991.

Colonel Thomas Baltazar, USA (Ret.)

Thomas Baltazar was appointed in November 2005 as the Director of the Office of Military Affairs, Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, US Agency for International Development.

Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.)

Lieutenant General David W. Barno has served as the Director of the NESAC Center (National Defense University) since April 2006.

Andrew Bell

Andrew Bell is the "Armed Forces Delegate" in the United States for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Colonel Howard Belote, USAF

Colonel Howard D. (Dave) Belote is the Chief, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5), Joint Staff, Pentagon.

Colonel Kevin Benson, USA (Ret.)

Kevin Benson retired from the Army as a colonel in July after 30 years of service. He was the director of plans for coalition ground forces and directed the development of the invasion plan of Iraq in 2003. He also was director of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Stephen Biddle

Stephen Biddle is Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he specializes in national strategy, the conduct of war, and recent operations in the war on terror.

Linnea Bohn

Director, Iraq Policy and Operations Group, U.S. State Department.

Anthony Cain

Dr. Chris Cain is Editor-in-Chief of *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, a forum for critically examining and debating contemporary national defense topics.

Phillip Carter

Phillip Carter is an attorney with McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP in Los Angeles, where his government contracts practice includes work for a number of major defense firms.

Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, USA

Lt. Gen. Chiarelli is the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Alexander S. Cochran

Dr. Alexander S. Cochran currently serves as Historical Adviser to the Chief of Staff Army.

Colonel James Cook, USAF (Ret.)

Colonel James Cook, a foreign area officer and communications-computer specialist, is permanent professor and head of the U.S. Air Force Academy's philosophy department.

Tom Cooney

From late summer 2006 to the present, Mr. Cooney has worked as the lead action officer on the Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative. This is a State Department-led effort to socialize counterinsurgency concepts across the U.S. government civilian agencies and to increase the counterinsurgency capacity of the U.S. government.

Alexandra M. Courtney

Ms. Courtney works as a Conflict Specialist and Civil-Military Advisor in the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation at USAID.

Colonel Gary Crowder, USAF

Colonel Gary L. Crowder is Deputy Director, Combined Air Operations Center, Al Udeid AB, Qatar.

Lieutenant Colonel Matt Davidson, USAF

Lt Col Davidson is an Air and Space Strategist in the Chief of Staff of the Air Force's Strategic Studies Group--CHECKMATE in the Pentagon.

Bonnie Docherty

Bonnie Docherty is a researcher in the Arms Division at Human Rights Watch and a lecturer and clinical instructor at Harvard Law School's Human Rights Program.

Major General Charles Dunlap, USAF

Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr. is Deputy Judge Advocate General, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

John L. Esposito

John L. Esposito is University Professor, Professor of Religion and International Affairs, Professor of Islamic Studies and Founding Director of the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

Colonel Gordon Ettenson, USAF (Ret.)

Mr. Ettenson, an Associate at Booz Allen Hamilton, received a Bachelor's degree in Political Science/International Affairs from the US Air Force Academy and a Master's degree in Political Science/International Affairs from the University of Pittsburgh.

Aleardo Ferretti

Mr. Ferretti joined the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1985 and is currently the Washington-based Senior Delegate to the Armed Forces for Canada and the United States.

Michele Flournoy

Michèle Flournoy is President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).

Peter Gantz

Peter Gantz is a U.S. government stability operations expert.

Marc Garlasco

Marc Garlasco is the senior military analyst at Human Rights Watch (HRW), and is HRW's resident expert on battle damage assessment, military operations, and interrogations.

Lieutenant Colonel Jim Gavrilis, USA

Lieutenant Colonel James A. Gavrilis, Political-Military Planner, Iraq Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff, Pentagon.

Lieutenant Colonel Scott D. Graham, USAF

Scott D. Graham is the Deputy Director of the Coalition / Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence in Nellis AFB, NV.

Colonel Thomas Greenwood, USMC

In August 2006, Colonel Greenwood was re-assigned to Quantico, Virginia, as Director, Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Adam Grissom

Adam Grissom is Associate Director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the RAND Arroyo Center.

Elaine M. Grossman

Elaine M. Grossman is a reporter for National Journal Group's Global Security Newswire.

Brian Grzelkowski

Brian Grzelkowski is the DC-based Senior Policy Advisor for Mercy Corps, an international relief and development agency currently working in over 30 countries world wide.

Colonel Phil Han, USAF

Phil Haun, Colonel USAF Active Duty - Colonel Haun is currently a PhD candidate in International Relations and Security Studies at MIT Department of Political Science.

Colonel Derek J. Harvey, USA (Ret.)

Mr. Derek J. Harvey is the Defense Intelligence Agency senior analytical specialist for Iraq who is currently serving as an intelligence and policy advisor for the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq.

Lieutenant Colonel S. Clinton Hinote, USAF

Lt Col S. Clinton Hinote (goes by "Clint") recently completed a 13-month tour as Chief, Strategy Division, US Central Command Air Forces.

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMA (Ret.)

Mr. Hoffman is currently a Research Fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities at Quantico.

Major General William Holland, USAF

Maj. Gen. William L. Holland is Deputy Combined Forces Air Component Commander, U.S. Central Command; Deputy Commander, Air Force Forces; and Vice Commander, 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force, Air Combat Command, Southwest Asia.

Victoria Holt

Victoria Holt joined the Stimson Center in 2001, bringing policy and political expertise from her professional experience within the State Department, Congress, and the NGO field.

Donna L. Hopkins

Donna L. Hopkins works in the Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.

Greg Jaffe

Greg Jaffe has been a reporter with the Wall Street Journal since 1995.

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Johnson, USA

Lieutenant Colonel Andy Johnson is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer serving on the faculty of the School for Advanced Military Studies in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Brigadier General Jan-Marc Jouas, USAF

Brig. Gen. Jan-Marc Jouas is Vice Commander, Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.

Colonel Daniel Kelly, USMC

Colonel Daniel Kelly is currently the Director for the USMC Center for Irregular Warfare.

Colonel Lawrence Killmeier, USMC

Colonel Killmeier joined the Marine Corps in 1983 through the Platoon Leaders Class and was commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant following graduation from the University of Connecticut in 1986. He is currently attending the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle PA.

Major Jonathan Klug, USA

Major Jonathan P. Klug. Jon Klug is a US Army strategic plans and policy officer stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He currently serves as a doctrine writer in the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate and is the lead author of a joint counterinsurgency publication.

Kevin Lanigan

Kevin Lanigan spent the bulk of his career to date as a partner at Hogan & Hartson, where he represented clients before Congress and federal agencies on a wide variety of issues, including civil rights, constitutional law and immigration. Most recently, he has been working as a consultant, providing advice, training and resource coordination to the Legal Advisor's Office of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and assisting the Legal Advisor in drafting legislation consistent with international law and standards.

Douglas Lovelace, Jr., USA

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., became the Director of the Strategic Studies Institute in May 2000. He held the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research Chair at the U.S. Army War College.

Lieutenant General Douglas E. Lute, USA

On May 15, 2007, Lt. Gen. Lute was named as Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan.

Carter Malkasian

Carter Malkasian directs the Center on Stability and Development at CNA.

Elisa Massimino

Elisa Massimino is Washington Director of Human Rights First. She is the organization's chief advocacy strategist, an expert on a range of international human rights issues and a national authority on US compliance with human rights law.

Remy Mauduit

Remy Mauduit is Editor of USAF's Air & Space Power Journal (French edition) and Chair of Guy P. Wyser-Pratte of French (and African) Studies at U.S. Marine Corps University.

Michael McClintock

Michael McClintock has worked in the human rights field for over thirty years and has written extensively on U.S. military doctrine and foreign policy from a human rights perspective. He is the author of *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990* (Pantheon, 1992) and of histories of El Salvador and Guatemala.

Steven Metz

Dr. Steven Metz is Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute.

Tyler Moselle

Tyler Moselle is a Research Associate at Harvard University's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy.

Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, USA

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl was a member of the writing team that produced Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. He is currently with the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor.

Major General Richard Y. Newton III, USAF

Maj. Gen. Dick Newton is Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Nichols, USA (Ret.)

Mr. Nichols is a retired US Army LTC (23 years) and a senior military analyst for the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) for over five years.

Christopher Preble

Christopher A. Preble is the director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.

Dana Priest

Dana Priest is an author and a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist. Priest has worked almost twenty years for The Washington Post.

Colonel Robyn S. Read, USAF (Ret.)

Robyn S. Read, Colonel, USAF (retired), currently works for the USAF as a civilian researcher assigned to the AF Doctrine Development and Education Center, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Kalev Sepp

Dr. Kalev I. Sepp is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Capabilities.

Sarah Sewall

Sarah Sewall is the Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and Lecturer in Public Policy at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government.

Michael Shaikh

Michael Shaikh is International Crisis' Group's Asia Program's Advocacy and Research Analyst based in New York.

Erin Simpson

Erin M. Simpson is an Asst Professor of National Security Affairs at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, VA.

Major Niel A. Smith, USA

Maj. Smith works at the US Army - Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center in Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Brigadier General Lawrence Stutzriem, USAF

Brig. Gen. Lawrence A. Stutzriem is the Director, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Strategic Studies Group - CHECKMATE, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

John J. Tierney, Jr.

PhD (International Relations) U of Pennsylvania, 1969; faculty member, full time, Catholic U of America, 1966 – 76; full time staff, US house of Representatives, 1976 -80; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981 – 93; presently full time faculty, Institute of World Politics, Washington, DC. Author: *Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History* (Potomac 2006).

Keith Warman

Mr. Warman is a Senior Military Analyst at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth since January 2004.

Sean Watts

Professor Watts earned a B.A. in International Affairs from the University of Colorado in 1992, a J.D. from William & Mary School of Law in 1999, and an LL.M. from The Judge Advocate General's School in 2004.

Colonel Philip Wilkinson, UKA (Ret.)

In his last job before leaving the British Army, Col. Wilkinson was Assistant Director of the UK's Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre and was the principal author of the UK's and NATO's doctrine for Peace Support Operations. He is a research associate at Chatham House and a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

Richard J. Wilson

Richard J. Wilson is Professor of Law and founding director of the International Human Rights Law Clinic at American University's Washington College of Law, in Washington, D.C, where he has taught since 1989.

Josh White

Josh White joined *The Washington Post* in 1998 and spent six years working for the Virginia staff of the newspaper's Metro section, where he reported on police and courts in Prince William County, VA.