In Pakistan, Money for Nothing
By Mosharraf Zaidi
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In the face of the Taliban onslaught, Pakistan's key foreign-policy instrument
has become the repetition ad nauseam of the "Pakistan needs the world's support" mantra.
When the Pakistan's Peoples Party government officials play this song, they aren't
asking for prayers, a warm embrace or a knowing nod of support. They are asking
for money. There is of course nothing novel about politicians asking for cash.
At a meeting in Tokyo on April 17, the world—in the shape of the Friends of Pakistan
forum—responded to Pakistan's calls for support with pledges of over $5.28 billion.
Foreign governments that have stepped up to the plate are wondering
though, just what the impact of their benevolence will be. How effective...
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Money Can't Buy America Love
by Andrew Wilder and Stuart Gordon
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While the debate over a troop surge in Afghanistan rages on, there has been virtual
silence on the effectiveness of another central component of the U.S.-led strategy in
Afghanistan: the surge of money intended to win Afghan hearts and minds. The figures are
astounding: Next year, Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, the monies
available to the military to support projects intended to "win hearts and minds," are
projected to nearly double to $1.2 billion. This far exceeds the U.S. Agency for
International Development's (USAID's) global education budget of approximately $800
million. Even more startling, our research finds that such aid might be hurting -- or at
best, not helping -- U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan.
Signs of just how important a weapon aid money is for the military are cropping up left
and right, most prominently in the last tenet of the counterinsurgency mantra -- "shape,
clear, hold, and build." An April 2009 U.S. Army handbook, Commander's Guide to Money
as a Weapons System, provides operational guidance to military officers in war zones
like Afghanistan to use money "to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population
to facilitate defeating the insurgents." The idea is to...
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Response by:
Nigel Pont, Carr Center Fellow:
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These two articles, the first by Andrew Wilder and the second by
Mosharraf Zaidi, raise similar issues that need greater consideration in policy making for
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Wilder and Zaidi maintain that poverty alone does not
drive terrorism and extremism. While critics would argue that poverty does
contribute to these ills, and that in the long run, extremism will diminish as a rising
economic tide raises all boats, the authors make a strong case for not relying on
development to improve security and stability. In the absence of evidence that
development contributes to short term security improvements, Wilder goes on to
emphasize the need for development to be done for development's sake. These
articles challenge some of the fundamentals underlying current US strategy and
the ever closer alignment of USAID with security objectives. Given how the ‘aid
creates stability’ paradigm underpins much of the US strategy in the region,
shouldn't there be more evidence of the connection between the two? I would like
to see policy makers asking USAID and the military for the evidence.
The real solution to the serious problems in both countries is political and needs
strong political will (domestic and international) and political solutions. The
populations of both countries have the right to improved development assistance,
but the argument that it will substantially contribute towards resolving the current
crises is drawn from a weak evidence base. Moreover, development assistance
(and other foreign money flowing into both countries) may be contributing to
instability, creating incentives for perpetuation of the status-quo and drawing
attention away from the real solutions to these problems.
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