Property Tax Experiment in Punjab, Pakistan: Testing the Role of Wages, Incentives and Audit on Tax Inspectors' Behavior

Asim Khwaja, Benjamin Olken (MIT) & Adnan Qadir (IGC/LSE)

In partnership with the Punjab Department of Excise and Taxation, we plan to randomly assign property tax collectors to different wage and incentive regimes. Our multi-treatment project design will enable us to measure the relative efficacy of a variety of incentive mechanisms, including salary increases, output-based pay and internal audits. This study will not only highlight policies for increasing resource mobilization in developing countries, but in a broader sense will provide insight into designing incentive mechanisms in government systems to improve public service delivery.

Research Partners:

Center for Economic Research in Pakistan, National Bureau of Economic Research, Innovations for Poverty Action

Funding:

National Science Foundation, the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie), International Growth Centre

print |