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Mr. Rahul Banerjee
Sustainability Science Program
Kennedy School of Government
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Office: 311 Rubenstein Building
Tel: (1) 617-496-4382
Group affiliation: Giorgio Ruffolo Research Fellow in Sustainability Science
Fall Term only
Rahul Banerjee is a Giorgio Ruffolo Research Fellow in the Sustainability Science Program. He is a Senior Adviser for Power Markets at the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission in New Delhi. His interests include regulatory affairs, and market mechanism to induce competition and efficiency. Rahul’s research is on the design of capacity for long-term power supply markets in India. He is contributing to collaborative work with the Initiative on Public-Private Partnerships to Promote Sustainable Development in India led by Professor Rohini Pande. At the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission he contributed to the formulation of power market regulation. He is involved with development of power market and various aspects of power market design including capacity markets, ancillary markets, transmission markets, power exchanges, traders, markets oversight, and surveillance. Over the last 18 years he has worked on a range of areas in public and private sector, including power transmission and distribution at Siemens Ltd, equity analysis and trading in capital markets, derivative contract designing and trading platforms at National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange Ltd, and energy trading software solutions at Wipro Technologies Ltd. He is a management graduate of the T A Pai Management Institute (2001) and holds an undergraduate degree in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from the Birla Institute of Technology (1994). His faculty host is Rohini Pande. He is working closely with Nicholas Ryan.
The design of capacity for long-term power supply markets in India
The rapid-growth of the economy in India has created high-demand for power that needs to be supported with increased generation capacity. New Generation capacity addition is facing several challenges including shortage of fuel, poor financial health of discoms etcThis research work focuses on the design of capacity markets for long-term power supply in India using economic analysis and international power market experiences. The study includes integration of fuel markets with power markets, metrics and techniques for least cost evaluation methodology of long-term contracts with competitive bidding, risk sharing between generators and utilities in long-term power supply contracts, contracts to hedge electricity and fuel price risk, fuel supply agreements, and inducing new technology through competitive bidding routes. The work will produce a long-term contract design with the goal of equitably balancing generators’ and consumers’ interests.