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Students in the Political Economy and Government Program register at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.
Students’ dissertations cover a wide range of topics. Recent Examples include the rising role of primary elections in Latin American politics, the role of ethnicity and institutions in the political economy of African development, and the microfoundations of economic growth.
Formal political theory, and its limits; in particular those areas in which rational choice and public choice theories are seemingly undermined, and why. The ways in which those political areas in which rational choice theory has been criticized (in particular, collective action) can be modeled using the tools of game theory, or in an economic context.
Organizational design and incentives structures, particularly as applied to bureaucracies.
Economic analysis of the origin of political, legal and social institutions and their implications for development; the incorporation of positive political economy models into normative arguments about government intervention; and corruption, particularly in less developed countries.
Political economy of development, particularly interested in studying the links among inequality, social expenditure, investment in human capital and social mobility.
Political economy of development.
Comparative and international political economy, especially the politics of macroeconomic and international trade policy-making.
Housing policy, urban economics, and economic history.
Institutional economics, development economics, game theory and political economy of the policy-making process and elections.
How institutions affect economic development. In particular, the microeconomic effects of institutions in a development context and why land titling programs have not led to improved access to private-sector credit for the former squatters.
The effect of institutions, specifically legal and quasi-legal institutions, on economic growth. How transitional institutions promote and/or retard development.
The role of ethnicity and institutions in the political economy of African development; applications of models of collective choice to the political economy of development; examination of how domestic political alignments and institutional choices affect the foreign policy behavior of states.
Development; industrial organization; micro institutions; exploring the role of institutions and social norms in determining economic behavior and outcomes, particularly in less developed countries; and examining market failures preventing private sector growth in developing countries.
Research on applied microeconomics and reduced form and structural techniques. Primarily interested in empirical political economy, and to other applied micro fields (i.e., industrial organization, development, public economics, and labor).
Political economy and develoment. Role of institutions and how they are shaped by history; institutional persistency; inequality and political institutions; determinants and consequences of violence and crime.
Labor economics, especially as it pertains to issues in the developing world, with special interest in immigration, and the long-term impact of wars and regimes. The continuing impact of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Development economics.
Political economy of development, behavioral economics, game theory, comparative political economy, gender, Middle East, Islamic finance.
Research in global capital flows. Focus will be on the US-China bilateral financial relationship.
International political economy, particularly U.S. trade policy and protectionism. The political economy of special interest groups, the role of political institutions and domestic politics on international economic bargaining, and formal quantitative political methodology.
Development economics, public economics, industrial organization, and quality of policy making process.
Social economics; in particular neighborhood and network effects, their effects on economic equilibria, and how they might be used to explain certain (value) puzzles and better integrate behavioral phenomena into economic theory. The micro-foundations of the effects of political institutions (de jure institutions and de facto organizations) on economic behavior, and how both political and social structures can interact to affect inequality, growth, and entrepreneurship.