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Students in the Political Economy and Government Program register at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.
Students’ dissertations cover a wide range of topics. Recent Examples include the rising role of primary elections in Latin American politics, the role of ethnicity and institutions in the political economy of African development, and the microfoundations of economic growth.
Formal political theory, and its limits; in particular those areas in which rational choice and public choice theories are seemingly undermined, and why. The ways in which those political areas in which rational choice theory has been criticized (in particular, collective action) can be modeled using the tools of game theory, or in an economic context.
Organizational design and incentives structures, particularly as applied to bureaucracies.
Comparative political economy, new institutional economics, historical and sociological institutional theory, formal and quantitative methods, behavioral political economy (including issues related to globalization, demographic change, taxation, macroeconomic policy, voter-consumer behavior, political organization and representation, political, ethnic and national ideologies).
Economic analysis of the origin of political, legal and social institutions and their implications for development; the incorporation of positive political economy models into normative arguments about government intervention; and corruption, particularly in less developed countries.
Political economy of development, particularly interested in studying the links among inequality, social expenditure, investment in human capital and social mobility.
International relations, democratization issues in Eastern Europe, the effects of economic integration particularly in the EU, psychology and negotiation, game theory.
Political economy of development.
Comparative and international political economy, especially the politics of macroeconomic and international trade policy-making.
Comparative political economy and institutional change in European history, and less developed countries.
Institutional economics, development economics, game theory and political economy of the policy-making process and elections.
How institutions affect economic development. In particular, the microeconomic effects of institutions in a development context and why land titling programs have not led to improved access to private-sector credit for the former squatters.
The effect of institutions, specifically legal and quasi-legal institutions, on economic growth. How transitional institutions promote and/or retard development.
The role of ethnicity and institutions in the political economy of African development; applications of models of collective choice to the political economy of development; examination of how domestic political alignments and institutional choices affect the foreign policy behavior of states.
Development; industrial organization; micro institutions; exploring the role of institutions and social norms in determining economic behavior and outcomes, particularly in less developed countries; and examining market failures preventing private sector growth in developing countries.
Normative political theory and development economics.
Political economy and develoment. Role of institutions and how they are shaped by history; institutional persistency; inequality and political institutions; determinants and consequences of violence and crime.
Labor economics, especially as it pertains to issues in the developing world, with special interest in immigration, and the long-term impact of wars and regimes. The continuing impact of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Development economics.
Political economy of development, behavioral economics, game theory, comparative political economy, gender, Middle East, Islamic finance.
Issues at the intersection of political economy and development economics. Currently working on projects on political connectedness and firms in Maharashtra, India; the effects of ownership structure of sugar mills on the socioeconomic outcomes of farmers in Tamil Nadu, India; and on understanding the constraints and motives facing corrupt officials running a large workfare program in India.
Development economics, public economics, industrial organization, and quality of policy making process.