[Back to Document View] LexisNexisª Academic Copyright 2001 Micromedia Limited Canadian Business and Current Affairs Copyright 2001 Legal Resource Centre, University of Alberta Law Now November, 2001 SECTION: v.26(2) O/N'01 pg 11-13; ISSN: 0841-2626 CBCA-ACC-NO: 5236756 LENGTH: 1438 words HEADLINE: DNA evidence: balancing the scales of justice BYLINE: Winterdyk, John; Holmgren, Janne A BODY: [Graph Not Transcribed] ''The end must justify the means'' - MATTHEW PRIOR (1664 - 1721) Since the first Canadian criminal case involving DNA evidence in 1989, there has been a steady growth in the number of cases relying on it. While our criminal justice system is embracing the use of DNA evidence in criminal trials, there are causes for concern, some of which are outlined in an earlier article where we examined some of the impacts that DNA evidence has had on the criminal justice system and which categories of legal professionals supported and opposed the use of DNA evidence. We concluded that the subjects showing the most support towards DNA and its reliability and admissibility were the ones who were most familiar with DNA testing and DNA as evidence as a whole (Holmgren and Winterdyk, LawNow (18:7) 1994). In this article, we took a more pratical stance by interviewing 22 defence lawyers in seven major cities across Canada. All of the interview participants had defended or entered guilty pleas in at least two cases involving DNA evidence. The objective of this study was to examine the impact the extended use of DNA fingerprinting has on defence counsels' ability to defend their clients when DNA is part of incriminating evidence. Findings: Defence Counsels' Continued Battle to Balance the Scales of Justice One of the themes that evolved throughout the interviews was the parallel between the assessment of the actual evidence and the need to understand the assessment. In essence, if one does not understand the evidence, it becomes difficult to engage in effective direct examination and cross-examination of the evidence when it is presented. The resulting vulnerability creates the feeling among defence counsel that DNA evidence is so overwhelming that it is not possible to contest the evidence in court. This is particularly true in Canada, where ''the admissibility of novel scientific evidence has been considered in detail in surprisingly few Canadian cases'' (Gatowski et al., in Expert Evidence: The International Digest of Human Behaviour Science and Law, 4, 1996). This further supports the suggestion that the legal system has difficulty keeping up with this continuing state of development with regards to the changes that are so rapidly occurring within the expanding areas of forensic sciences. The interviews revealed both the importance and the difficulty of lawyers becoming educated about DNA evidence. For example, one lawyer described the endless amount of hours he had to research material and read in order to be able to adequately defend his client. Defence counsel, in challenging DNA evidence, have tended to focus not so much on the techniques used for the actual extraction of DNA, but on probability statistics. For example, one defence counsel was successful in having the highly seductive probability statistics eliminated from two cases in eastern Canada. The assessment of DNA evidence depends upon the knowledge of how it works. A person interviewed from a private laboratory that processes DNA evidence for both Crown and defence counsel commented on the issues of the limited knowledge of defence counsel. This person noted that funding is a major issue for defence counsel. Many of the defence cases are funded by Legal Aid, and as a result, the lawyers are limited in paying for their needed resources and educating themselves on issues surrounding DNA evidence. Based on the interviews, it appears quite evident that defence counsel require assistance in assessing DNA evidence. However, another critical issue that emerged was access to independent experts. The ability to challenge DNA evidence is largely dependent upon the availability of an independent witness. This availability is, in reality, a two-fold issue. First and foremost, if the Crown is using an independent laboratory to test the samples then that independent laboratory cannot appear on behalf of the defence. This type of assertion by defence counsel became a recurring theme throughout the interviews. Another defence counsel argued that if the Crown is using the RCMP or the Centre of Forensic Sciences in Toronto, then defence counsel are limited in their resources and may be forced to obtain expertise in another country. This was the case with R. v. Morin. The defence DNA sample was tested in Boston, USA. However, this issue was closely related to monetary resources being available and seemed to be most prevalent in high-profile cases (see R. v. Bourguignon, R. v. Milgaard, R. v. Morin, R. v. Murrin, R. v. Sophanow and R. v. Stillman). This leads to the other crucial issue facing defence counsel: the cost of having tests done. Independent laboratories charge anywhere from $800 to $3,000 per analysis. In addition, independent expert witnesses charge in the range of $1,200/day for their testimony. These costs are essentially prohibitive for the majority of criminal defendants. When participants were questioned on the financial assistance provided by Legal Aid to obtain expert advice, it became apparent that this was one of the more significant issues faced by defence counsel. In fact, one defence lawyer explained that lawyers needed prior knowledge about DNA evidence simply to convince Legal Aid that they need an expert witness. Conclusion It has become apparent that having the requisite knowledge about DNA evidence is perhaps the most crucial component in providing an adequate defence, because defence counsel need to be able to explain the need for an independent expert in order to obtain government funding for such services. It seems logical that an independent, non-governmental expert should be made available for defence counsel to assist in the examination of the Crown's expert's evidence. Given the defence counsels' difficulties with DNA evidence, it should also be commonplace that defence counsel be provided with at least a small amount of untouched DNA for independent analysis. There is no reason why forensic DNA testing cannot accommodate such a recommendation since this is commonplace in medical diagnostics. This study, one of the first of its kind, has provided some important insight into the increasing role of forensic science in the courtroom. In essence, it reveals that while the use of DNA evidence may be valid, defence lawyers do not have the knowledge or resources to adequately defend their clients. The end result may be that justice is being compromised by the seductive uses of science in some cases. Thus there needs to be a closer examination of the communication, liaison, and understanding between all parties involved in bridging law and science in the courtroom. Justice may be compromised in instances where technical issues are communicated ineffectively to non-technical people (i.e., jurors). As the Kaufman Report outlined after the examination of the Guy Paul Morin case, it is essential that all forensic scientists and the legal community establish some joint educational programming to enhance understanding of forensic issues. Today, as this research shows, little has been done in terms of ensuring that this matter has been resolved between all parties. The 46th Annual Conference of the Canadian Society of Forensic Science, held in Edmonton in 1999 attempted to address these issues by bringing together forensic scientists and members of the legal professions. However, as noted, it seems that law and science have not, to date, found a comfortable meeting ground, and until this happens, the scales of justice will remain unbalanced. The resulting vulnerability creates the feeling among defence counsel that DNA evidence is so overwhelming that it is not possible to contest the evidence in court. For example, one defence counsel was successful in having the highly seductive probability statistics eliminated from two cases in eastern Canada. In fact, one defence lawyer explained that lawyers needed prior knowledge about DNA evidence simply to convince Legal Aid that they need an expert witness. In essence, it reveals that while the use of DNA evidence may be valid, defence lawyers do not have the knowledge or resources to adequately defend their clients. The end result may be that justice is being compromised by the seductive uses of science in some cases. It seems logical that an independent, non-governmental expert should be made available for defence counsel to assist in the examination of the Crown's expert's evidence. JOURNAL-CODE: 1437 LOAD-DATE: February 20, 2002