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## The New Globalism

Twenty years ago, the terms "globalism," "globalization," and "transnationality" were hardly used; today they are ubiquitous. Hardly a day passes now when they are not used in newspapers, magazines, and book titles. Despite their currency, their meaning is contested. To some, they connote "global westernization," the expanding influence and power of large the developed nations of Europe and North America, the replacement of local and regional markets by a consolidated world market, and the homogenization of culture. To others, they suggest multi-centered institutions that have the capacity to challenge and counteract the influence of western power centers.

In important ways, the struggle to define the architecture of the emerging global order is more than a struggle among the powerful or between the powerful and the powerless. It is also a struggle to define the language, terms, and concepts describing supra-national institutions and relationships. The global westernizers have tended to see globalization as a process in which nation states and international institutions created and controlled by them as major actors. The proponents of multi-centered globalization look to institutions that transcend and interpenetrate states, linking people directly together through a variety of new, usually non-governmental, movements and organizations. This essay seeks to provide an overview of the origins and development of these perspectives.

### Creating Global Communities

Communities are acts of imagination defining who we are, to which larger collectivities we belong, to whom we are accountable, and what our obligations are to

one another. Mere locational proximity does not make people neighbors, nor does geographical distance preclude membership, citizenship, or mutual obligations, shared goals, and values. At the same time, communities are institutions: routinized patterns of relations, interactions, and exchanges among individuals. These, in turn, depend on the technologies that make relationships and transactions possible. Imagined communities become institutions to the extent that technology and resources facilitate patterns of association and exchange.

The connections between visions of global unity the realization of global community are tenuous and contingent. The dream of global unity is a persistent one. For thousands of years -- from the age of Alexander the Great in the fourth century B.C.E. to the era of Hitler and Stalin in the twentieth century, would-be emperors strove to impose their *imperia* on peoples across vast geographical expanses. Inevitably, these efforts failed, in part because of technological and organizational shortcomings, in part because they underestimated the extent to which the success of political, social, and economic orders -- especially geographically extensive ones -- must be based on compliance rather than coercion. A despot's dream of world domination is fundamentally different from the masses' vision of global unity.

In the past sixty years, we have come closer to establishing a compliance-based world order than at any time in the past, in large part as an effort to counter the power of authoritarian states' imperial ambitions. This order has been predicated on the idea of the global polity as a system of nation states linked by treaties, mutual security and trade arrangements (i.e., NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the British Commonwealth), and a system of international institutions (i.e., the United Nations, the World Bank, the

International Monetary Fund). A variety of non-governmental institutions and relationships, paralleling these inter-governmental arrangements, also emerged during this period, including multi-national businesses, international social movements, transnational epistemic and religious communities, and flows of migrant labor from one nation to another. Because their growth was often facilitated by nation states seeking to expand their influence by non-political means, they were not regarded as significantly challenging the nation-state system.

The growth of these international arrangements has not gone unchallenged. While governments and their leaders have established formal institutions, global economic integration and a revolution in communications has helped to inspire the worlds' peoples with alternative visions of the possibilities of globalism. When, why, and how did we begin thinking of the global polity as being more than the sum of its nation state components? More specifically, how did visions of transnational community become a part of the popular imagination throughout the world?

**Democratizing Global Community**

Some claim that the dissemination of images from the 1968 Apollo VIII space flight denoted a fundamental change in peoples' fundamental understanding of the world: for the first time, we had a "God's eye" view of the planet Earth. Since the beginning of modern cartography (which, not surprisingly, coincided with the rise of the nation-state), people had envisioned the world as demarcated by national boundaries, like a classroom globe. Suddenly, rather than depending on the representations of mapmakers, who inevitably depicted a world sectioned by lines of

latitude and longitude and divided by national boundaries, Earth could be seen as it actually is: blue-green globe orbiting through the vast reaches of space.

The symbolic power of this image of Earth derived in large part from the extraordinary universality of its dissemination. Only a year earlier, in June of 1967, the first global television program was broadcast, initiating world-spanning satellite transmission technology with a live performance of the Beatles singing "All You Need Is Love." An estimated 350 million viewers watched the broadcast in every nation that had an adequate telecommunications infrastructure and permitted the free circulation of ideas. This infrastructure permitted the dissemination of the powerful images of the "whole earth" when the Apollo VIII astronauts brought them back from their moon voyage.

Both the "whole earth" images brought back from space and the Telstar broadcast powerfully expressed the ambiguity of emergent globalism. On the one hand, they evoked the transcendent unity of humankind. On the other, their dependence on American technology, use of the English language and musical forms implied a new world order dominated by the West. That the West under United States leadership should presume to speak and act for humanity was an extension, in new forms, of the discredited imperial dreams of the nineteenth century, when Europeans strove to enlighten their "little brown brothers," and the post world war hopes for the League of Nations and the United Nations.

But symbols exist independent of the intentions of their creators. If the Beatles "All You Need Is Love" was an emblem of western cultural imperialism, it also became

an anthem of countercultures that were resisting the power of authoritarian states throughout the world. It was no accident that the era of Apollo VIII and Telstar's global broadcasts was also the era of massive protests against the Vietnam War, race riots in 127 U.S. cities, the Prague Spring, when Czech liberals resisted Soviet domination, and the decolonization of Africa. The capacity for instantaneous global communication assured that global symbols resonated powerfully with a variety of political movements that had been transforming public life during the 1960s. The European empires were dismantled under pressure from nationalist leaders who appealed to universal theories of human rights.

Nationhood in the so-called "Third World" called attention to the disparities in development between western Rurope and North America and the rest of the world. A succession of rights movements intended to empower racial and ethnic minorities and to compel acknowledgement of the rights of women and this disabled swept the United States. While these were generally framed in terms of national legal and constitutional claims, the global dimension was not entirely absent, as native Americans recognized their kinship with the oppression of indigenous peoples in the Third World, black Americans identified with the aspirations of emerging African nations, and the peace movement questioned on humanitarian grounds the moral claims of American foreign policy.

**Globalizing Markets and Labor**

These shifts in world political culture were paralleled by changes in the global economy. While American and European multinational corporations continued to extend their influence, former colonies that controlled vital resources like petroleum

began to sense their power. By the late 1960s, OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) began to move to control oil prices and to tilt them in favor of oil producing countries. In 1973, OPEC would shut off the world oil supply to enforce its demands.

At the same time, the world labor market began to respond to the growing disparities in wealth and opportunities between the First and Third worlds. This took several forms. One involved the increasing outsourcing of unskilled manufacturing from the First to the Third World: in 1945, South America, Africa, and Asia accounted for only 6% of non-fuel exports to the developed countries; in 1980, they comprised 45%; by 1989, 71%. Another aspect of the globalization of labor markets involved the migration of people from the Third World to the First, to do the unskilled jobs that workers in advanced nations were no longer will to do. Unlike earlier migrations, in which people permanently left their native lands, the migrant labor force of the late twentieth century, using the possibilities of the global economic and communications infrastructures, was more likely to retain ties to their native lands. Remittances by migrant workers dramatically impacted their native economies, reducing poverty, raising per capita income, and fueling the growth of middle classes.

The impact of these transnational labor forces on advanced nations has been no less dramatic. the ethnically homogeneous nations of western Europe large populations of "guest workers" from north Africa and the Middle East; Canada and the United States are attracting large numbers of migrants from South and Central America, India, China, Japan, and the Middle East. Western  Western European nations, whose social and political institutions never had to accommodate religious or ethnic diversity, have

generally resisted both efforts by migrant communities to assimilate and naturalize, while also putting obstacles in the way of their maintaining their own distinct identities.

**Global Villagers: Technology and the Transformation of Ethnicity**

Things have been somewhat difference in the United States and Canada, which whose ethnic and religious pluralism have compelled them, albeit reluctantly, not only to adapt to the growth of non-native communities, but also to acknowledge, in the face of historical myths that portrayed them as primarily Anglo-American, the true extent of their diversity. Less than a century ago, it was not uncommon for upwardly mobile immigrants to abandon their languages, customs, and birth names in order to aspire to a homogenized "American" or "Canadian" identity. Today, not only do hypenated Americans proudly embrace their origins, their ethnicity often forms the basis for making claims on social and governmental institutions. (i.e., "Asian-Americans").

Technology is a key factor in the transformation of ethnic communities. While many nineteenth century migrants came to North America in the expectation of returning home, the financial and technological obstacles to maintaining ties to communities of origin were formidable. Today, with the low cost of communication via telephone and the internet and the ease of remitting funds back to their native lands, it is possible -- and increasingly common -- not only for migrants to maintain continuous contact with their communities of origin, but also to maintain dual citizenship. No longer living in isolated ghettos far from their native lands, the migrants are able to create and sustain their ethnicity and sense of community far more effectively than in the past.

**Globalizing Higher Education**

The globalization of higher education is a key factor facilitating transnational community. As *Table 1* suggests, the percentage of doctorates awarded by U.S. universities to individuals who were Asian, Hispanic, or non-resident aliens (foreign students) doubled between 1980 and 2000 – with the largest increase in the non-resident alien category, which tripled in size during this twenty year period. The percentage of non-U.S. citizens receiving masters and doctoral degrees from U.S. universities between the late 1970s and mid-1990s increased from 27% to 38.7% of all degrees awarded (National Center for Education Statistics, 1997).

*Table 1:* Number of doctorates awarded, 1980-2000, by ethnicity and citizenship.

| YEAR | TOTAL PhDs | # ASIAN | # HISPANIC | # NON-RESIDENT ALIEN | % ETHNIC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1980-81 | 32,839 | 877 | 456 | 4,203 | 17 |
| 1984-85 | 32,307 | 1,106 | 677 | 5,317 | 22 |
| 1990-91 | 38,547 | 1,459 | 732 | 9,715 | 31 |
| 1995-96 | 44,645 | 2,646 | 984 | 11,450 | 34 |
| 1999-2000 | 44,808 | 2,380 | 1,291 | 11,238 | 33 |

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS), "Degrees and Other Formal Awards Conferred" surveys, and Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), "Completions" surveys.
(This table was prepared August 2001.)

While there has been an increase in the percentage of non-U.S. students committed to remaining in the U.S. after receiving their degrees (from 46% in 1985 to

54% in 1995), the fact that nearly half the non-U.S. graduates intended to return to their countries of origin suggest that we are seeing something more than the traditional "immigration to the promised land" scenario. Students are not merely using the pretext of education to gain permanent entry to the U.S. While some are staying, at least as many are returning home to become scholars, officials of national governments or international bodies, executives in transnational business firms or NGOs.

Significantly, the globalization of higher education has not been a one-way proposition. Over the past decade, the number of U.S. students studying abroad had more than doubled, from 71,154 in 1991-92 to 160, 920 in 2002-2003 ("American Students Study Abroad, 2003), While this is a relatively small number compared to the 586,323 non-U.S. students enrolled in American universities, the number of American studentsd studying abroad it is an impressive and rapidly growing population ("International Student Enrollment," 2003).

While the countries of choice for American studying abroad are, not unexpectedly, primary western European (63%), the number chosing to study in "non-traditional" countries, particularly in Asia, Latin America, and Africa has increased dramatically, encouraged by the relatively lower cost of study abroad, increasing competition for places in American universities (competition sharpened in part by universities' efforts to recruit non-U.S. students), and by the growing interest among American students in overseas careers.

Another fact suggests that this is more than an example of global westernization: the impressive increase in the number of students writing dissertations on some aspect

of globalization, globalism, and transnationalism. No dissertations were written on these subjects before 1975. In 1980, 19 were written, in 1992, 37, in 1995, 121, in 2000, 316 (Hall 2002). The dissertations were written in virtually every field and profession, from arts and culture through theology and urban planning. It is quite clear from the abstracts that "globalization" and related terms meant different things in different fields.

Not only has the number of dissertations addressing gloablization and related issues increased substantially, more interestingly, as *Table 1* suggests, the percentage written by non-U.S. students -- or U.S. students of "complex ethnicity" comprises nearly half the number of dissertations on global topics.

*Table 1:* Total number of globalization dissertations and dissertations written or advised by individuals with names suggesting complex ethnicity.

| YEAR | #DISSERTATIONS | #ETHNIC AUTHORS OR ADVISERS | % ETHNIC |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1970s | 31 | 3 | 10 |
| 1980 | 18 | 1 | 5 |
| 1985 | 16 | 7 | 43 |
| 1990 | 37 | 9 | 24 |
| 1995 | 121 | 48 | 39 |
| 2000 | 316 | 152 | 48 |

Source: UMI/Dissertation Abstracts

The term "complex ethnicity" derives from the increasingly multi-ethnic/multi-cultural characteristics of the U.S. student population. Half a century ago, graduate education was overwhelmingly the preserve of privileged white Anglo-Saxon Protestant males. Today, in addition to the substantial non-U.S. presence, a substantial proportion of students are children or grand-children of immigrant families or products of mixed ethnicity marriages. As late as the 1950s, such people would have looked to graduate education as a way of washing away the stigma of foreign origins. Today, Japanese-American, Chinese-American, and Korean-American students, children or grandchildren of immigrants, are likely to be studying alongside and socializing with Japanese, Chinese, and Korean students in ways that make difficult clear demarcations of ethnic identity. Moreover, the U.S. students with ethnic origins are as likely to seek careers in the nations from which their parents or grandparents emigrated as to do so in the U.S. -- and the same can be said of their non-U.S. counterparts.

**Higher Education and the Globalizing of Ethnic Identity**

In a chapter titled "The Invention of the Asian American" in his study of standardized educational admissions testing in the United States, Nicholas Lemann offers a remarkably detailed account of the impact of interactions between Asian students, assimilated Asian-Americans, and children of recent immigrants from Asia at Yale in the 1960s and 1970s (Lemann 2000, 174-184). The chapter describes the impact of Yale's decision to recruit students meritocratically in the late 1960s on a group of young people of varied Asian ethnicity, many of them of immigrant and/or working class background, to an institution that had been overwhelmingly white, male, Protestant, and upper class. The key players in the story are Don Nakanishi, a second generation Japanese American from the Los Angeles working class, Alice Young, daughter of a

Taiwanese diplomat, and Bill Lann Lee, a first generation immigrant from a New York working class family. Together with six other students, they organized the Asian-American Student Association, a group whose primary objective was to increase Asian enrollment at Yale.

At a university where they were very much in the minority and constantly reminded of their marginality, the students began exploring their own history and identity (inspired in part by the Black studies movement. After being taunted by classmates on Pearl Harbor Day of 1967, Lemann writes, Don Nakanishi,

> decided it was time to stop being a meek little premed. Some of the Yale preoccupation with leadership, which had been designed for boys much more favored than Don, had worked its way into his psyche, although the idea was to use it to fight injustice rather than to rule. He switched majors, first to sociology, then to psychology, finally to political science. He joined the closest available ethnic student association, the one for Mexican-Americans, since he considered himself to be an honorary member by virtue of being form East LA. He began to read up on the experiences of Japanese in the United States. . . . Finally, in his junior year, having personally become more self-consciously ethnic and more politically confrontational, and having been influenced by the rising note of protest on campus, Don led a small group that founded the Asian-American Student Association of Yale (Lemann 2000, 176-177).

"The notion of an Asian-American was a bold and new one, Lemann notes.

> It was also a completely artificial construct, bu Caucasians didn't have to know that. They seemed to be willing to accept the notion of a monolithic, on-the-

> march, slant-eyed juggernaut, so why not use it?At that point Asian-Americans at Yale were an amalgam mainly of two groups, Chinese-Americans and Japanese-Americans, which spoke different languages, lived back home in different ethnic enclaves, and had been taught by their war generation parents to think of each other as the enemy (177).

While joining with other ethnic student groups in left-wing campus crusades, the Asian-Americans made admissions work their main activity. They worked relentlessly, both through pressuring the university to admit more Asian students, and through personal recruiting excursions, to increase the Asian presence at Yale. The class admitted the year Don, Alice, and Bill started at Yale had nine. The year they organized their association, the number had risen to thirty-five. By the late 1990s, Asian-Americans comprised nearly 15% of incoming Yale College freshmen and 12% of university students overall (Waters 2001, Figure B-3). Combined with the 569 Asians from among Yale's international students, Asians and Asian-Americans comprised 17% of the Yale student body (Waters 2001, Table A-10 and Table B-1).

Judging from the number of Asian-American student associations throughout the United States and the high representation of Asians among the rising numbers of international student enrollments at American colleges and universities in the 1980s and 1990s, American institutions of higher education, rather than serving as they traditionally had, as "melting pots" intended to "Americanize" ethnic students, were becoming settings in which students were able to redefine themselves in terms of ethnicity rather than citizenship. It was not uncommon, as in one of Harvard's doctoral fellows programs, to have two students of Chinese ethnicity -- one a second generation

Chinese-American, the other a Chinese student studying in America -- both writing dissertations on indigenous Chinese voluntary associations and social movements.

The impact of these kinds of interactions on post-graduate professional careers and social networks bear further study. At one time, the Chinese student would have studied in the United States and returned to China to build a career in a Chinese university. Now one can easily imagine the Chinese-American ending up in a Chinese university and the native Chinese student becoming an academic professional in the United States. One way or another, ethnicity seems likely to trump nationality.

**Education, Nationality, and Transnationality**

The development of civil society in the United States provides a valuable paradigm for understanding the contemporary emergence of transnational civil society. Like the world itself, the United States covered a huge geographical expanse and, unlike most nations, contained a multitude of peoples, each with their own traditions and languages. Even among the Americans who spoke English, there were differences in religion, modes of production, and lifestyle sufficient to bring about a destructive civil war less than a century after independence from Britain..

Although the idea of political unity had been abroad in the land since the mid-eighteenth century, it was only with the greatest difficulty that functional nationhood could be achieved. The first national government, organized under the Articles of Confederation in 1777, just after the achievement of independence from England, created a very weak central state, with virtually all important powers remaining in the

constituent states. The second framework for national government, the Constitution of 1787, ceded greater power to the national government -- including powers to tax, regulate commerce, raise armies, and adjudicate differences between the states. But still, before 1860, states remained powerful and did far more of the work of government than the central state. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the authority of the central government was periodically tested by challenges from the states over a variety of issues including the existence of slavery, economic policy, and the power of the national government to suppress dissenting opinions. Eventually, the question of the authority of the central state would be decided on the battlefield.

But even after the victory of the federal union over the states in the 1860s, thoughtful Americans understood that the states were far from united. "The American people," declared Harvard president Charles W. Eliot, "are fighting the wilderness, physical and moral, on the one hand, and on the other are struggling to work out the awful problem of self-government" (Eliot 1869) For this fight they must be trained and armed." The country might be united politically, but it was far from achieving fully functional nationhood. Its economy was fragmented and dominated by rivalries between urban centers: before 1860, no railroads crossed state lines; there were no geographically-extensive enterprises or national markets. Nationality was an idea, but not an operational reality.

If American nationality did not spring from common language, religion, ethnicity, or political allegiance, where did it come from? What made it possible for Americans to form large collectivities that operated across vast geographical expanses? The answer appears to lie in the efforts of a handful of educators to systematically

create national elites and a national culture. One part of the effort was rooted at Yale in the 1820s. The largest college in America at the time, Yale was already recruiting its students nationally -- and even those students who came from New England were unlikely to settle there after graduation. Fearing the rise of "infidelity" -- the abandonment of religion -- and the corruption of the democratic process, Yale set out self-consciously to educate leaders, to imbue them with common values, and to disseminate them throughout the country.

Yale sought, as its faculty wrote in the famous Yale Report of 1828, to provide its students – nearly half of whom were born beyond the borders of Connecticut by 1830 – with "the *discipline* and the *furniture* of the mind;" to provide them with the values, the "balance of character," which would enable them not only to successfully pursue their occupations, but to fulfill a broad range of duties "to his family, to his fellow citizens, to his country" in ways enabling "to diffuse the light of science among all classes of the community" (Day, et al. 1829)

"Our republican form of government renders it highly important," the Report concluded, evoking a peculiarly democratic and egalitarian conception of leadership, "that great numbers should enjoy the advantage of a thorough education."

> In this country, where offices are accessible to all who are qualified for the, superior intellectual attainments out not to be confined to any description of persons. *Merchants*, *manufacturers*, and *farmers*, as well as professional gentlemen, take their places in our public councils. A thorough education ought therefore to be extended to all these classes. It is not sufficient that they be men of sound judgment, who can decide correctly, and give a silent vote, on great

> national questions. Their influence upon the minds of others is needed; an influence to be produced by extent of knowledge, and the force of eloquence. Ought the speaking in our deliberative assemblies be confined to a single profession? If it is knowledge, which gives us the command of physical agents and instruments, much more is it that which enables us to control the combinations of moral and physical machinery. . . .

For Yale's leaders, the goal was not only to make higher education accessible, but to make it broadly influential. "The active, enterprising character of our population," the Report concluded,

> renders it highly important, that this bustle and energy should be directed by sound intelligence, the result of deep thought and early discipline. The greater the impulse to action, the greater is the need of wise and skillful guidance. When nearly all the ship's crew are aloft, setting the topsails, and catching the breezes, it is necessary there should be a steady hand at the helm. Light and moderate learning is but poorly fitted to direct the energies of a nation, so widely extended, so intelligent, so powerful in resources, so rapidly advancing in population, strength, and opulence. Where a free government gives full liberty to the human intellect to expand and operate, education should be proportionally liberal and ample. . . .

Though geographically dispersed, Yale's alumni formed nationally-extensive social networks. Many sent their children to Yale. Many more were recruited into national economic, educational, and religious enterprises anchored at Yale and/or

directed by Yale alumni. They became particularly active in propagating the use of voluntary associations and corporations as mechanisms for collective action.

Harvard had remained a parochially Bostonian institution until the Civil War, when Harvard graduates distinguished themselves through their military service and civilian leadership. Boston's economic leaders, whose business activities were increasingly involving them in enterprises outside New England, grew concerned with Harvard's parochialism. Their concerns were shared by a young chemistry instructor, Charles W. Eliot. During the war, Eliot toured Europe, conducting an intensive study of the relation between education and economic and political development in England, France, and Germany -- and thinking about the kind of higher education the United States would need to fulfill its national promise.

On Eliot's return, he wrote a two part article, "The New Education," for the *Atlantic Monthly* in which he set forth the ideas that would frame the modern research university. In 1869, the businessmen who controlled Harvard made him its youngest president (he was only 35!) and gave him a free hand and generous financial support. Within a decade, Harvard had become the preeminent American university, attracting an internationally renowned faculty and placing its graduates in the nation's most important public and private enterprises.

Where Yale had directed its efforts to creating a nationally-dispersed elite network, Harvard concentrated on building leadership cadres in emerging economic centers like Boston, Philadelphia, New York, and Chicago. The increasing importance throughout the country of university graduates intentionally educated for national

leadership provided the vision that inspired the organizational consolidations of the late nineteenth century in government and business, while the consolidation of large-scale organizations helped to provide the resources needed to establish and support national cultural institutions (Galambos 1977, 1983; Hall 1982; Sklar 1988).

In writing of the evolution of large technological systems, historian Thomas P. Hughes writes that such complexes as electric light and power systems include not only physical artifacts like generators, transformers, and transmission, but also

> organizations, such as manufacutring firms, utility companies, and investment banks, and they incorporate components usully labeled scientific, such as books, articles, and university teaching and research programs. Legislative artifacts, such as regulatory laws, can also be part of technological systems. Because they are socially constructed and adapted in order to function in systems, natural resources, such as coal mines, also qualify as system artifacts (Hughes 1987, 51).

The creation of national economic and cultural institutions and the growth of government in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were similarly linked. Nation-scale enterprises required human and intellectual capital produced by universities. Both required the social capital enabling people operating in large geographically extensive enterprises to work productively together. The "progressive movement" of the early twentieth century was less a social movement concerned with economic justice than it was a mobilization of the masses by educated elites determined, as one leading intellectual put it, to "fulfill the American national promise" (Croly 1909, 439). The success of this national elite enabled the United States to become a world leader in the years following the first World War.

**Educating Global Elites**

The demographics and self-representations of contemporary higher education suggest that a process very similar to the one framing the American nation-building process of a century ago may be unfolding. There are the tensions between the metropolitan elite-building model promoted by Harvard (the equivalent of global westernization) and the more multi-centered network model pushed by Yale (the equivalent of a more egalitarian less state-centered transnationality). In both, higher education appears to be a centrally important element, training both the leaders who gravitate to the global centers of commerce and culture and to international organizations and those who work in and with indigenous organizations and transnational coalitions and network organizations.

One thing is clear: defining globalism is beyond the power of nation states. The despot's dream of world conquest has been definitively displaced by the belief, held by men and women throughout the world, that other forms of solidarity by other means are possible. More to the point, the ways in which we are educating global leaders may well -- far more than the pronouncements of government officials -- the ultimate form and meaning of globalism.

It is far from clear what the ultimate architecture of the global order will be. As the events of 9/11 remind us, global westernization has helped to galvanize both national and transnational resistance to the growing influence of western institutions and values, much as the globalizing demography of higher education seems to be producing cadres of experts and professionals who, in elevating ethnicity over

nationality, are as likely to put themselves in the service of moblized nationalisms and fundamentalisms as to work in transnational communities and movements.

Either direction underscores the weakness of nation states and calls attention to the emergence of new forms of community, collective action, identity, and solidarity. Whether these take the form of "network organizations" like the transnational group of software designers committed to developing open-source software, transnational non-governmental organizations committed to sustainable development, human rights, humanitarian relief, or other social justice goals, or implementing the goals of international organizations and multinational corporations, is anybody's guess.

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