

# Confidence in the United Nations:

## Cosmopolitan and nationalistic attitudes (\*)

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#### Synopsis:

The expansion in the mission, scope and role of the United Nations raises important questions about how far public opinion supports these developments and expresses confidence in this institution, within donor states and developing nations. Analysis of attitudes towards the UN also illuminates broader issues, in particular whether nationalism has weakened if the public has become increasingly cosmopolitan in orientation, whether generally, or just within particular countries, or among the younger generation. *Part I* establishes the theoretical framework and the evidence available from previous studies. *Part II* explores the evidence drawing upon survey data from the World Values Survey 1980-2006, covering more than 80 nations. Three related indicators of public opinion are compared: confidence in the UN as an organization; support for multilateral solutions and agencies on issues such as refugees and human rights; and the expression of national identities. *Part III* presents the main findings at individual and aggregate levels. The conclusion considers their implications for understanding public support for the United Nations and for broader trends in public opinion.

(\*) It should be noted that the arguments and opinions expressed in this paper reflect the personal views of the author and do not represent the official policy or views of the United Nations or United Nations Development Programme.

Paper presented at the World Values Conference *Society, Politics and Values: 1981-2006*, 3-4 November 2006, in Istanbul.

The mission, role, and responsibilities of the United Nation have expanded substantially in recent decades. The organization seeks to confront the issues which Kofi Annan has identified as the three great challenges of our age: to ensure that globalization benefits the human race as a whole, not only its more fortunate members; to heal the disorder of the post-cold-war world, replacing it with peace and freedom; and to protect the rights and dignity of individuals, particularly women.<sup>1</sup> Contemporary concerns about development, security, and human rights involve diverse complex and intractable problems. These are exemplified most dramatically by the humanitarian refugee crisis in Darfur, the immense logistical challenge of conducting elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the plagues of poverty, hunger and AIDS afflicting Africa, and the threats to collective security and stability posed by nuclear weapons in North Korea. The scope of the UN has gradually widened over the years in attempts to eradicate poverty and hunger, to prevent war and ease strife, to rectify injustice, and to restore failed states.<sup>2</sup> The growing role of the UN has generated new multilateral conventions, treaties, and regulations on issues ranging from terrorism and security to migration and refugees, crime, trade, human rights, and environmental protection.<sup>3</sup>

At the same time, many vocal critics have questioned the performance of the United Nations, highlighting cases such as the failure of the Security Council to intervene effectively in Rwanda and Somalia, the breakdown of other initiatives such as peace-building in East Timor, and the Oil for Food scandal concerning Iraq.<sup>4</sup> In response, the organization is in the process of undergoing new internal reforms aimed to improve its impact and effectiveness, including the High Level Panel on UN Coherence, as well as changes in leadership under Ban Ki-Moon, the new Secretary General.

Paralleling these developments, the broader context of international aid and multilateral assistance through bilateral agencies has also expanded. In 2000, government pledged to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, establishing basic target for development. Donor nations promised to increase financial support for international aid, notably at the G8 summit at Gleneagles in July 2005 when countries agreed to rising levels of overseas development aid, especially funds targeted for Africa.<sup>5</sup> Donors have agreed to devote 0.7% of Gross National Income to official development assistance, although only five countries (Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Denmark) currently meet this target (see Table 1).

The growth in the scope and role of the multilateral actors raises important questions about how far the public supports these changes. Is there confidence in the United Nations, among the public within both donor states providing the primary financial support for the institution, as well as within developing nations as the primary recipients of the international aid and technical assistance. Analysis of attitudes towards the United Nations, as well as the broader context of public approval of development aid and the MDGs, is important from a policy perspective, for the actors engaged in this process. Governments need to know whether these issues are of concern among the electorate and whether levels of overseas aid are running ahead, or behind, the optimal contribution which citizen's support. Understanding these issues also illuminates broader theories of value change, notably those predicting the direction of cultural shifts in public opinion. In particular, do attitudes towards the UN suggest that nationalism has weakened as the public has become increasingly cosmopolitan in orientation? Is there evidence of a culture shift on this issue among the general public? Is this trend particularly evident among affluent post-industrial nations or among societies which are the main recipients of official development assistance? And is support for multilateral organizations and policies fostering international cooperation especially evident among the younger generation, as the cohort most exposed during their formative years to contemporary forces of globalization?

To start to explore these important issues, this study focuses upon three indicators of public opinion derived from the World Values Survey 1981-2006 (WVS). Evidence for cosmopolitan orientations is understood to include support for specific multilateral initiatives, with the United Nations playing the lead role in peacekeeping, environmental protection, development aid, refugees and human rights. Cosmopolitan attitudes are also indicated by confidence in the UN as an organization. And at the most abstract level, cosmopolitan identities are also evident through a sense of belonging as citizens of a world community, beyond the traditional boundaries of a nation-state. Alternatively, evidence that public opinion has become more isolationist and nationalistic in recent years, as a possible backlash against globalization, will be established if the public is found to prefer bilateral solutions and foreign policies decided by each nation-state, rather than a strong UN role in these matters, if the public expresses little confidence in the UN, and if they retain strong nationalistic identities. This study remains a *preliminary* examination of the empirical evidence for these issues and further work will be possible once more countries are included in the 5<sup>th</sup> wave of the WVS.

## I: Theoretical framework and review of the literature

Theorists offer several plausible reasons why public opinion may have shifted in a more cosmopolitan direction. At the broadest level, many observers argue that globalization has led towards the 'end of the nation state'. Hence Ohmae observes that the modern period represents a new historical era dominated by the growth of agencies of global governance, world markets forces, and Western consumerism, a tide against which national governments and economies have become increasingly powerless<sup>6</sup>. Anthony Giddens claims that contemporary globalization is historically unprecedented, reshaping modern societies, economies, governments, and the world order.<sup>7</sup> This process has gone furthest within the European Union, Held suggests, where the future of sovereignty and autonomy within nation-states has been most strongly challenged by European integration, but Held argues that all of the world's major regions are affected, producing overlapping '*communities of fate*'.

Despite these claims, it remains unclear from the empirical survey evidence whether globalization has actually fostered more cosmopolitan orientations among the general public in many countries. Skeptics doubt whether identification with the nation-state has been seriously weakened among the mass public, and whether an emerging 'cosmopolitan identity' is sufficient powerful to replace the visceral tribal appeals of nationalism. In Anthony Smith's view, we are witnessing the growth of regional blocs, where nation-states remain the primary actors, not the emergence of a new world order that transcends states.<sup>8</sup> The expanding role of the United Nations in development, peacekeeping and human rights has occurred, Smith suggests, without fundamentally eroding, indeed perhaps even strengthening, deep-rooted attitudes towards nationalism and the nation-state.: "*We are still far from even mapping out the kind of global culture and cosmopolitan ideals that can truly supersede the world of nations.*"<sup>9</sup> Mann also argues that a popular backlash against the forces of globalization may have served to strengthen national identities.<sup>10</sup> Observers suggest this is also evident from burgeoning new social movements, exemplified by eco-gastronomy 'slow food' groups which embrace traditional local products. This movement has deplored the loss of distinct cultural communities to the homogenizing cultural embrace of globalization. If these developments reflect a widespread cultural phenomenon, rather than a minority, this could indicate that the public has reacted against attempts at international cooperation, multilateral regulation, and global governance fostered by the United Nations and related

agencies.

Many of these theories are developed in international relations without examining survey data. What is the empirical evidence concerning public opinion in previous studies which could help to evaluate these arguments? Existing cross-national and time-series survey analysis for public opinion towards these issues, and in particular attitudes towards the role of the United Nations, remains somewhat patchy and limited, at best. Some of the most systematic empirical time-series survey analysis has examined whether nationalism has declined since the early-1970s within the European Union. This provides a good context to test the claims since the process of European integration has been gradually strengthening, deepening, and widening the European Union. The process of economic and political integration, with people working, living, studying and traveling in different member states, can be expected to have dissolved some of the traditional cultural barriers between member states, particularly among citizens from the early joiner nations. EU member states are also relatively affluent post-industrial societies, with well-educated populations, characteristics which expected to strengthen cosmopolitan attitudes. Public opinion towards Europe and towards international organizations has been closely monitored in the Euro-barometer time-series representative surveys conducted since the early-1970.

Yet far from the steady spread of cosmopolitan attitudes, successive studies based on this survey evidence have reported that the public's identification with Europe has fluctuated over time, often in response to specific political events like the Maastricht agreement and the launch of the euro under EMU. At least by the mid to late-1990s, there is little evidence that this process has generated a steadily growing sense of European identity and community among its citizens, even among the public in long-standing member states and affluent post-industrial societies such as Germany.<sup>11</sup> Related attitudes also display a pattern of trendless fluctuations since the early 1970s, rather than growing public affection for the European project, including approval of EU policies, satisfaction with the performance of the Union, and confidence in the European Commission and European Parliament.<sup>12</sup> Persistent cross-national differences are evident dividing states such as Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belgium, where the public proves relatively positive across most indicators, from deep-seated Euro-skeptics such as Austria, Sweden and Britain.<sup>13</sup> For example, during the 1990s, British public opinion drifted in an ever more Euro-skeptic direction, with almost half the public opting for

complete withdrawal in recent years.<sup>14</sup>

If there is little systematic comparative evidence of growing cosmopolitan identities based on cross-national time-series trends since 1970 within European Union member states, what is the situation elsewhere? One of the most thorough studies of attitudes towards international organizations, by Evert, suggests a similar pattern to that already observed towards the EU. Evert reported that support for NATO and the UN is essentially multi-dimensional, with attitudes influenced by responses to specific issues and events, rather than being arrayed on a general continuum stretching from nationalism to internationalism. Fluctuations over time in the public's approval of NATO displayed no secular trends, although there were also persistent differences in support between member states.<sup>15</sup> The pattern seems to fit what we know about the public's reaction towards the European Union. Moreover a succession of studies of longitudinal trends in public opinion within the United States suggests that over time there have been waves of support for unilateralism and internationalism for America's role in the world and towards international organizations.<sup>16</sup> These waves have often occurred in response to specific foreign policy events such as military action in Vietnam, Somalia and Iraq, rather than consistently shifting in a secular trend towards a more internationalist perspective. In the United States, a series of polls have confirmed that the gut appeal of nationalism and patriotism, such as pride in America, remains extremely strong.

Therefore despite plausible reasons why globalization may be expected to have encouraged growing cosmopolitan orientations in public opinion, it seems fair to conclude that most of the available empirical studies lean towards a skeptical perspective. At least within Europe, national publics vary significantly in their support for the institutions and policies of the European Union, and the last thirty years has not seen the rise of more European identities. Similar observations can be made in American public support for international organizations. Nevertheless cross-national survey evidence remains limited, particularly systematic comparative studies to understand trends occurring in many parts of the world. We need to examine this issue since cosmopolitan orientations may also have progressed further and fastest among some countries than others. If levels of official overseas aid spending by the government reflect underlying sentiments in public opinion, then cosmopolitan orientations and support for multilateral solutions may be stronger among the affluent, smaller welfare states in Western Europe, such as Sweden, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands,

rather than in the United States or some of the nations of Mediterranean Europe. Poorer countries which have been the primary recipients of overseas assistance, development aid, and peace-keeping operations may also express more positive feelings towards multilateral agencies and policies than larger and richer states. It also remains possible that any fundamental transformation of national identities is a lagged process which will only become apparent over successive generations. Cultural theories of value change suggest that the younger generation may be most favorably leaning towards cosmopolitanism as an ideal, since they have been most exposed in their formative years to the late twentieth century wave of globalization, whether in terms of popular culture and travel, economic interdependence and job mobility, or international organizations and multinational corporations. Accordingly the existing evidence is by no means settled and it is important to examine these issues, both politically and theoretically. It should be stressed that this study represents merely the first cut at some of these questions, with some strictly preliminary results, and further research can be conducted once more countries are available in the 5<sup>th</sup> wave of the World Values Survey.

## **Part II: Evidence, concepts and indicators**

Before proceeding to analyze the survey evidence surrounding these issues, it is important to clarify the underlying concepts of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘nationalism’, which are particularly complex to define and operationalize. In this study, the concept of ‘national identity’ is understood to mean the existence of communities with bonds of ‘blood and belonging’ arising from sharing a common homeland, cultural myths, symbols and historical memories, economic resources, and legal-political rights and duties<sup>17</sup>. Nationalism can take ‘*civic*’ forms, meaning ties of soil based on citizenship within a shared territory and boundaries delineated by the nation-state, or it may take ‘*ethnic*’ forms, drawing on more diffuse ties of blood based on religious, linguistic, or ethnic communities<sup>18</sup>. National identities are usually implicit and inert, and they may only rise to the surface in response to an ‘other’, where we know what we are by virtue of what we are not. In the modern world, national identities underpin the state and its institutions exercising political authority within a given territory, although there are obviously many multinational states such as the United Kingdom, as well as stateless nations exemplified by the Kurds and the Roma.

The classic typology of support for the political system within the nation-state

which was developed by David Easton identified three distinct dimensions: whether citizens identify with their national community, whether they express confidence in core regime institutions, and whether they support specific authorities or leaders.<sup>19</sup> Reflecting this typology, the concept of *cosmopolitanism* can also be understood to operate at three different levels. First, at the most abstract level of core identities, cosmopolitans represent those who see themselves broadly as citizens of the world, or even as autonomous individuals who reject the notion of belonging to a particular country, producing a sense of commonality with neighboring countries, citizens, and regions of the world. At the institutional level, cosmopolitans express relatively high levels of confidence and trust in the multilateral organizations and agencies of global governance, including the European Union and the United Nations. Lastly, at the most specific level, cosmopolitans are expected to support public policies designed to address global concerns, including (in donor nations) approving relatively high levels of overseas aid contributions, giving priority to achieving the Millennium Development Goals, and establishing global standards and regulatory bodies on issues such as human rights and environmental protection. Cosmopolitans prefer multilateral solutions so that the United Nations assumes primary responsibility on tackling issues which cross national borders, such as peacekeeping, human rights, arms control, and protecting the environment, rather than leaving decisions to be determined by each nation state. Conversely, *nationalists* are understood in this study as those who identify strongly with their nation-state, who express minimal confidence in the United Nations, and who remain skeptical of multilateral solutions and policies.

What survey evidence allows us to examine claims to see whether cosmopolitan orientations are becoming more widespread, whether among the general public, or within particular countries, or among the younger generation? National and cross-national surveys help to illuminate these issues, notably occasional studies conducted by the Program on International Attitudes at the University of Maryland, the Pew Global Attitudes Project, the BBC World Service, and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.<sup>20</sup> Surveys of American and European public opinion often monitor foreign policy attitudes within specific nations, and studies have compared attitudes among some of the major donor countries, for example by Kohut and Stokes.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless consistent comparisons over time and across nations are limited using these resources. As mentioned earlier, previous comparative analysis has often relied upon the Eurobarometer monitoring public opinion towards these issues since the early-1970s

within EU member states. Modules on nationalism have also been included within the annual International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), covering almost two-dozen countries.<sup>22</sup> These are all invaluable sources yet systematic cross-national time-series analysis of attitudes towards the UN remains limited, especially systematic studies comparing public opinion across a wide range of developing nations and for an extended period of time.

This study utilizes the most comprehensive comparative data available from the World Values Surveys 1981-2006. The current release of the survey covers more than 80 nations worldwide during the whole period, including many developing, post-communist and post-industrial societies (see the nations listed in technical appendix B).<sup>23</sup> The preliminary results from the fifth wave of surveys, conducted in 2005-6, are integrated into this analysis, allowing the comparison of 18 nations currently available, although not all items measuring all dimensions selected to monitor cosmopolitan orientations were included for all these societies or waves. The World Values Survey contains long-established democracies, consolidating democracies, and authoritarian states, and includes societies ranging in per capita income from \$300 to well over \$30,000 per year. This study remains the only comparative survey that aims at comprehensive global coverage, including more than 80 out of 193 contemporary independent nation-states in the world, in countries containing the majority of the world's population. All the surveys used face-to-face interviews based on a multi-stage random sample. The analysis weights the data to compensate for obvious deviations from national populations. Utilizing the World Values Surveys, public opinion was monitored at the three levels conceptualized earlier, distinguishing among confidence in the UN as an institution, approval of multilateral solutions and policies, including growing support for the role of the United Nations and for overseas development aid; and identification with the global community. Appendix A provides the specific questionnaire items selected for analysis. For time-series comparisons, comparisons were available for items carried since 1981 on the UN role on refugees and human rights, as well as on national identities, and since the mid-1990s for items on confidence in the UN as an organization.

### **III: Results and analysis**

#### ***Confidence in the United Nations 1995-2006***

One dimension of cosmopolitan orientations concerns support for the United Nations, monitored by the proportion who expressed 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot of

confidence in this institution. This item has been asked in the same way in each wave of the WVS since the mid-1990s, allowing comparisons in some societies over the last decade, as well as comparisons among a broad range of nations. The results of the pooled comparison are illustrated in Figure 1, showing the wide range of public opinion on this item. There was overwhelming confidence in the UN in some of the Least Developed Nations (LDCs), notably in Bangladesh, Uganda, Tanzania, as well as in moderately developed nations such as Albania and the Philippines. But gross national income was not consistently associated with confidence in the UN, since the publics living in some of the most affluent smaller welfare states in northern Europe also displayed considerable support for the UN, notably Norway, Sweden, Iceland and Portugal. The high levels of Official Development Aid, contributed by governments in the Nordic states towards the United Nations and developing countries, appears to be in accordance with these indicators of public attitudes. At the same time, societies found among those ranked as displaying minimal confidence in the UN include many Middle Eastern states sharing a common Muslim heritage, whether rich or poor in national GDP, including Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Iraq, Algeria and Morocco. The national contrasts are striking; hence while almost nine out of ten citizens has confidence in the UN in Bangladesh, only one in ten expresses these sentiments in Morocco.

[Figure 1 about here]

Many plausible reasons could be suggested for some of these contrasts, in particular the specific role of the UN in each country, whether the organization is seen as providing development assistance, enforcing peacekeeping and security, or even supporting democratic governance and human rights. Many other important factors could possibly shape broader attitudes and orientations towards the role of multilateral organizations, such as cultural traditions in the strength of nationalism within each society; the international role and military/economic power of each nation-state; and levels of international development aid received in recipient states. It is particularly difficult to disentangle broader and more enduring factors which may contribute towards secular shifts in cosmopolitan orientations from the impact of specific events arising from UN interventions in security and defense, such as the UN's peace-keeping operations role in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia and Angola, the security council resolutions after 9/11 authorizing the use of force in the Afghanistan war, and the role of the international

community and the security council in the Iraq war, Palestine, and conflict in the Middle East. One way we can start to explore this by comparing time-series data for confidence in the United Nations in those countries where this has been monitored in successive waves of the WVS.

[Table 2 about here]

As shown in Table 2, the change in the proportion of those who express 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' of confidence in the UN varies quite considerably among different nations. The comparison is hampered by the fact that different time periods are under comparison, depending upon which countries were carried in successive waves of the WVS. In some nations confidence strengthens by more than 10-points in successive waves, notably in the large developing societies of India, China, South Africa, and Bangladesh, as well as in Croatia. Yet far from a consistent trend, in others confidence falls, for example by more than 20 percentage points in Bulgaria, Estonia, South Korea and Iran. The overall pattern strongly suggests that, rather than a steady expansion of cosmopolitan orientations and support for the UN as a multilateral organization, fluctuating shifts are occasioned by more specific events and activities. The precise reasons for these changes (and their timing) needs to be related more closely to changes in UN operations which may be associated with the image and activities of the United Nations in different countries, a matter for further investigation.

### ***The role of the United Nations 1981-2001***

Confidence in international institutions represents only one dimension of cosmopolitan orientations; what is the evidence for support for multilateral solutions and policies, including the role of the UN? The battery of items contained in successive waves of the WVS since 1981 monitors whether respondents preferred whether certain problems such as refugees and human rights should be handled primarily by each nation state, by the UN, or by national governments with UN coordination.

*“Some people believe that certain kinds of problems could be better handled by the United Nations than by the various national governments. Others think that these problems should be left entirely to the respective national governments; while others think they would be handled best by the national governments working together with coordination by the United Nations.*

*I'm going to mention some problems. For each one, would you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should be decided by the national governments, by the United Nations, or by the national governments with UN coordination?"*

		National Governments	United Nations	National governments, with UN coordination
V180	Refugees	1	2	3
V181	Human Rights	1	2	3

It should be noted that the two items (on refugees and human rights) included in the first and second waves were subsequently expanded in the third wave to a broader range of activities, which were carried again in the fourth wave. The 2005-6 wave modified the coding scheme (see Appendix A), so that the results are not directly comparable with previous versions. To maintain the cross-national and time-series comparison this study focused only upon the indicators concerning refugees and human rights, since these items were asked since 1981.

[Figure 2 and Table 3]

The scatter-gram in Figure 2 displays the cross-national variations in the pooled waves 1995-2001, representing the national mean in support for the UN role on the issues of refugees and human rights. The results show considerable cross-national variations and that overall countries often gave considerably greater priority to the UN role in tackling the problems of refugees and displaced persons migrating across national borders, rather than human rights issues. Table 3 illustrates the full responses for each country. Many countries such as Tanzania, Albania, Slovakia and Egypt expressed far greater confidence in the UN's role on these issues (especially on dealing with problems of refugees) compared with the role of their national government. By contrast the publics in many other countries had more confidence in the nation-state rather than the UN, particularly on human rights where the role of the United Nations received relatively little support. Indeed it is quite striking how a plurality of opinion expressed greater support for the role of their national governments on human rights, or the national governments in combination with the UN, rather than seeing the United Nations role as acting alone on this issue. This pattern was found even in countries which international observers and human rights commissions have frequently cited for abuses of human rights. While people may have general confidence in the UN as an institutions, on the human rights issue the public seems to have some serious doubts about the independent global

leadership role of the UN.

[Table 4 about here]

To compare trends over time in support for the UN role the items on human rights and refugees were combined, for a scale ranging from low (where the greatest support was expressed for the role of the nation state on these issues) through moderate to high (where the greatest support was expressed for the UN acting alone on these issues). The mean results per nation were compared over the successive waves of the WVS 1981-2001, as shown in Table 4. The results again suggest no secular shift towards growing support for the role of the United Nations acting independently of national governments on these issues; if anything there is a slight movement over the last two decades away from this position.

### ***The Erosion of National Identities 1981-2001?***

Lastly the strength of national and cosmopolitan identities can be gauged by people's attachment to different territorial areas, an approach commonly used in previous studies.<sup>24</sup> The WVS 1981-2001 monitored identities as 'trade-off' items, where people had to specify their first and second geographic identity. In the World Values Surveys, people were asked the following:

*"To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all?*

*And the next?*

- *The locality or town where you live*
- *The state or region of the country in which you live*
- *Your country [**The U.S, France, etc.**] as a whole\**
- *The continent in which you live [**North America/Europe/Asia/Latin America, etc**] \**
- *The world as a whole"*

\*[Each specific nation and continent substituted for these labels.]

People could give two responses, allowing overlapping and multiple identities if, for example, people felt that they belonged most strongly to their local community and then with their country, or if they identified with their country and then with their continent, and so on. The replies can be combined to provide a 10-point cosmopolitan identity scale ranging on a continuum from the most localized identities up to the most cosmopolitan.

[Table 5 and Figure 3 about here]

How do attitudes vary over time and by type of society? Perhaps the most common explanation for differences the rise of cosmopolitan identities regards the process of human development as one of the primary driving forces. Traditional developing societies have faced financial volatility and economic insecurities produced by opening up markets to global forces, illustrated by the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-99, throwing millions into unemployment and slowing down investments in Latin America. During the 1990s the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, some in Latin America, and many in Central and Eastern Europe experienced failures in economic growth, with setbacks in human security and growing poverty. In a situation of growing insecurities, societies may be expected to experience a resurgence of nationalism and hence stronger identification with the nation-state. In contrast, in post-industrial societies, experiencing greater prosperity and comfortable levels of economic growth, nationalism may have weakened, as shown by the tendency to transfer authority from the nation-state simultaneously downwards towards more local and regional communities, as in Quebec, Scotland and Catalonia, and also upwards towards broader multilateral alliances. If this explanation is correct, then nationalist identities should have eroded most in affluent post-industrial societies. Arguably economies such as those in the United States, Germany, and the UK have been transformed most radically by the process of technological change, new communications, and open markets in goods and services, as well as by high levels of education and affluence produced by socioeconomic development. Nationalism can be expected to remain stronger in less secure and poorer societies, such as those in South-East Asia and Africa, as well as in post-Communist states struggling with the disruptive process of economic and political transitions in Central and Eastern Europe.

Figure 3, based on the 1999-2001 wave of the WVS, shows how national identities varied across different countries. The results show a mixed pattern, with few consistent variations in the strength of cosmopolitan identities which could be clearly attributed to the type of society or patterns of economic development. Nationalism proved relatively strong in many developing states, such as Jordan, Morocco, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, but also in the United States. By contrast, more cosmopolitan orientations were also evident in Germany (East and West), Hungary, Poland and Ireland, as well as the Philippines. Table 5 shows the trends in the cosmopolitan scale from 1981-2001 in the nations which were available for comparison across this period. The results suggest that in some nations there has been a rise in nationalism whilst in

others these feelings have weakened, rather than a consistent pattern across all nations.

[Figure 5 about here]


At the same time, this initial analysis remains limited and it could well be the case that broader cultural changes only become evident on a long-term basis, requiring exploration through other techniques such as cohort analysis. In this regard, any shifts in cosmopolitan and nationalistic orientations may be understood to reflect each generation's distinctive experiences of the major developments in international affairs and globalization in the twentieth century, as cohorts acquire their attitudes and identities during their formative years prior to the Great War, the interwar era, and the post-war decades. To examine these issues, cosmopolitan identities were compared among cohorts, subdividing the pooled 1981-2001 sample by decade of birth. The results in Figure 5 reveal a steady and significant rise in cosmopolitan identifiers by cohort. While the time-series data suggests grounds for skepticism about the erosion of nationalism, the preliminary cohort analysis suggests stronger evidence of an underlying shift among the mass publics.

### **Conclusions and discussion**

The issue of how far there has been a steady shift in support towards the United Nations, and whether this represents a broader transformation of feelings towards the role of the nation state and national identities, raises important issues. This paper represents the first preliminary analysis to see how far attitudes have become more cosmopolitan in orientation, as indicated by confidence in the UN as an institution, support for an active role for this institution on issues such as human rights and refugees, and weakening identification with the nation state.

The overall results presented here from the time-series data provide only limited support for the arguments that public opinion has moved in a more cosmopolitan direction. Instead the evidence considered for longitudinal changes more strongly suggests that public opinion in responding to specific shifts in the role of the UN, associated with dramatic events, rather than secular changes. Nevertheless the cohort analysis suggests a different interpretation, with generational shifts evident in orientations. The next steps in the research are to examine this issue in more detail and to explore further the underlying root causes of support for both the institution and role of the United Nations.

**Figure 1: Confidence in the United Nations**




Note: The proportion of the population expressing 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' of confidence in the United Nations. Data weighted by weight (v259)

Source: World Values Survey 1995-2005




**Figure 3: The strength of cosmopolitan identities scale**



Source: WVS pooled 1981-2001

**Figure 5: Cosmopolitan identities scale by cohort**



Source: WVS pooled 1981-2001

**Table 1: Overseas Development Aid as a Percentage of Gross National Income, 2001-2005**

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Chg
Norway	0.80	0.89	0.92	0.87	0.93	0.13
Sweden	0.77	0.84	0.79	0.78	0.92	0.15
Luxembourg	0.76	0.77	0.81	0.83	0.87	0.11
Netherlands	0.82	0.81	0.80	0.73	0.82	0.00
Denmark	1.03	0.96	0.84	0.85	0.81	-0.22
Belgium	0.37	0.43	0.60	0.41	0.53	0.16
Austria	0.34	0.26	0.20	0.23	0.52	0.18
United Kingdom	0.32	0.31	0.34	0.36	0.48	0.16
Finland	0.32	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.47	0.15
France	0.31	0.37	0.40	0.41	0.47	0.16
Switzerland	0.34	0.32	0.39	0.41	0.44	0.10
Ireland	0.33	0.40	0.39	0.39	0.41	0.08
Germany	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.35	0.08
Canada	0.22	0.28	0.24	0.27	0.34	0.12
Italy	0.15	0.20	0.17	0.15	0.29	0.14
Spain	0.30	0.26	0.23	0.24	0.29	-0.01
Japan	0.23	0.23	0.20	0.19	0.28	0.05
New Zealand	0.25	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.27	0.02
Australia	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.00
Greece	0.17	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.24	0.07
United States	0.11	0.13	0.15	0.17	0.22	0.11
Portugal	0.25	0.27	0.22	0.63	0.21	-0.04
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.41</b>	<b>0.41</b>	<b>0.42</b>	<b>0.47</b>	<b>0.08</b>

**Source:** DAC online OECD Statistics: Net Disbursements [data extracted on 2006/10/15 19:43 from OECD.Stat](http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE1) <http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE1>

**Table 2: Confidence in the UN, 1995-2005**

	1995-97	1999-2000	2005-6	Chg
India	55	72		17
Croatia	27	41		14
China	56	69		13
South Africa	52	62		10
Bangladesh	83	93		10
Venezuela	43	52		9
Sweden	66	73	78	8
West Germany	47	53	42	6
Japan	60	61	65	5
Jordan	35	38		4
Vietnam	58	61		3
Argentina	39	41		2
Philippines	75	77		2
Mexico	51	47	53	2
East Germany	34	47	35	1
Turkey	48	48		0
Spain	50	49		-1
Montenegro	47	44		-2
Nigeria	74	70		-4
Georgia	59	54		-5
New Zealand	56		51	-5
Netherlands		54	39	-5
Slovakia	58	52		-5
Serbia	23	17		-6
Chile	63	57		-6
Slovenia	39	49	33	-6
U.S.	50	58	44	-6
Hungary	67	60		-7
Italy		68	61	-7
Romania	53	44	35	-8
Finland	55	46		-9
Poland	68	58	49	-9
Lithuania	58	48		-10
Egypt	43	32		-11
Ukraine	68	55		-13
Czech	62	48		-14
Russia	61	26	46	-15
Britain		61	45	-16
Latvia	65	48		-17
Belarus	71	53		-18
Iran	56	36		-20
S.Korea	81		56	-25
Estonia	70	44		-26
Bulgaria	73	42		-32

Note: % 'a great deal' quite a lot' of confidence in the UN within nation

Source: WVS 1995-2005

**Table 3: Role of the UN v. national government on refugees and human rights**

	UN role in refuge			UN Role in human rights			
	NatGov	both	UN	NatGov	both	UN	UN Mean
Tanzania	28	7	66	64	6	29	48
Albania	43	15	43	46	6	48	45
Slovakia	31	20	49	31	33	36	43
Egypt	18	32	50	32	38	31	40
Japan	21	27	53	20	61	18	36
Uganda	19	34	47	45	31	25	36
Iran	19	45	36	13	55	32	34
Zimbabwe	23	31	46	52	29	19	32
S.Korea	36	7	57	25	70	5	31
Bulgaria	44	20	36	38	38	24	30
Bangladesh	31	29	40	32	48	19	30
Montenegro	17	44	39	30	50	20	29
Belgium	30	21	48	33	57	10	29
Slovenia	38	14	47	25	64	11	29
France	40	11	48	23	69	8	28
Netherlands	29	21	51	26	69	5	28
Taiwan	33	16	51	28	67	5	28
W.Germany	32	21	47	25	66	8	28
China	32	24	43	45	43	12	28
Austria	34	17	49	24	71	5	27
N.Zealand	45	13	42	42	46	12	27
India	33	20	47	43	51	6	27
Switz.	46	12	42	25	65	10	26
Czech	30	24	45	23	70	6	26
Bosnia	36	21	44	52	41	8	26
E.Germany	39	17	44	25	68	8	26
Croatia	34	19	47	37	58	5	26
Spain	27	29	44	29	64	7	26
Vietnam	33	34	33	55	27	18	25
Ireland	34	22	44	40	54	6	25
Luxembourg	38	20	42	23	69	8	25
Jordan	19	50	32	30	51	19	25
Denmark	34	21	45	10	85	5	25
Finland	39	15	46	27	69	4	25
Latvia	41	16	42	34	59	7	25
Sweden	29	26	45	20	76	4	25
Norway	31	24	45	30	66	3	24
Nigeria	42	19	40	57	34	9	24
Italy	49	10	41	37	55	8	24
Estonia	40	19	42	28	66	6	24
Poland	37	21	42	40	54	5	24
N.Ireland	34	23	43	47	48	4	24
Uruguay	44	15	41	34	60	6	23
Lithuania	42	15	42	31	65	4	23
Serbia	34	31	35	40	49	12	23
Peru	43	17	40	44	50	6	23

Argentina	58	12	31	42	43	15	23
Portugal	47	12	41	35	60	5	23
Iceland	39	18	43	10	87	3	23
Belarus	43	18	40	31	63	6	23
Morocco	36	31	34	57	31	12	23
South Africa	44	20	36	51	40	9	23
Turkey	49	7	43	31	69	1	22
Mexico	38	28	34	36	53	11	22
Romania	51	16	33	32	59	9	21
Britain	37	24	39	35	62	3	21
Australia	43	17	40	42	56	3	21
Canada	38	29	33	31	60	9	21
Azerbaijan	43	21	36	57	37	6	21
U.S.	45	20	35	42	51	7	21
Russia	48	16	36	39	57	4	20
Dom.Republic	57	10	33	36	56	8	20
Hungary	47	19	34	16	78	6	20
Macedonia	52	14	34	51	43	6	20
Ukraine	48	18	35	47	49	5	20
Venezuela	61	11	28	40	50	11	20
Philippines	49	21	30	63	28	8	19
Chile	45	26	29	41	50	9	19
Brazil	50	13	37	47	52	1	19
Armenia	60	9	30	41	53	6	18
El Salvador	57	13	30	49	45	6	18
Moldova	51	17	32	40	57	2	17
Colombia	72	6	22	38	59	3	13
Georgia	71	8	22	59	38	3	12
Greece				16	78	6	
Malta				49	48	3	
<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>49</b>

*Q: Some people believe that certain kinds of problems could be better handled by the United Nations than by the various national governments. Others think that these problems should be left entirely to the respective national governments; while others think they would be handled best by the national governments working together with coordination by the United Nations (both). I'm going to mention some problems. For each one, would you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should be decided by the national governments, by the United Nations, or by the national governments with UN coordination?*

Source: WVS 1995-2001

**Table 4: Support for the UN role on the issues of refugees and human rights**

	<b>1981</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>2001</b>
France	3.96	3.88		
Britain	3.78	3.62		3.75
West Germany	4.04	4.02	3.87	3.99
Italy	3.77	3.53		3.62
Netherlands	4.05	3.99		
Denmark	4.12	4.08		3.98
Belgium	3.96	3.93		
Spain	4.02	3.93	3.87	3.99
Ireland	3.83	3.67		
Northern Ireland	3.76	3.53		
U.S.	3.48	3.39	3.50	3.89
Canada	3.80	3.71		3.71
Japan	4.30	4.33	4.23	4.31
Mexico	3.72	3.66	3.73	3.67
South Africa	3.66	3.25	3.25	3.82
Hungary	3.79	3.76	3.72	
Norway	3.95	3.81	3.88	
Sweden	4.07	4.07	3.95	3.90
Iceland	3.97	3.96		
Argentina	4.01	3.29	3.41	3.19
Finland	3.94	3.88	3.73	3.83
South Korea	4.03	3.99		

Note: For the question see Table 3. This represents the mean response on a 6-point scale ranging from low (support for the nation state on these issues) to high (support for the role of the UN on these issues).

Source: WVS 1981-2001

**Table 5 : Cosmopolitan identities scale, 1981-2001**

	<i>1981</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>Chg</i>
Mexico	4.32	4.97	5.04	5.27	0.95
U.S.	4.37	5.03	4.93	5.21	0.84
Belgium	4.41	4.77		5.01	0.60
Sweden	4.11	4.43	4.51	4.60	0.49
Canada	4.60	4.99		4.79	0.19
Netherlands	4.70	4.90		4.86	0.16
Iceland	4.62	4.64		4.51	-0.11
N.Ireland	3.97	4.24		3.85	-0.12
France	4.82	5.00		4.68	-0.15
Spain	4.61	4.53	4.36	4.43	-0.19
S.Africa	5.17	4.93	4.96	4.98	-0.20
Japan	4.49	4.43	4.22	4.20	-0.28
Hungary		4.42	4.80	4.08	-0.34
Britain	4.71	4.63		4.35	-0.35
Italy	5.09	5.34		4.69	-0.40
Finland	4.81	5.01	4.84	4.39	-0.43
Denmark	4.64	4.44		4.20	-0.45
Ireland	4.40	4.49		3.95	-0.45
Argentina	5.74	4.87	5.50	5.02	-0.72
Poland		4.79	4.73	4.02	-0.77
W.Germany	4.66	4.69	4.97	3.78	-0.88
S.Korea	4.01		4.38		
Norway	4.05	4.13	4.18		

Note : See text for details of the scale construction

Source : WVS 1981-2001

**TECHNICAL APPENDIX A**

**THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS**

1995-2001

*“Some people believe that certain kinds of problems could be better handled by the United Nations than by the various national governments. Others think that these problems should be left entirely to the respective national governments; while others think they would be handled best by the national governments working together with coordination by the United Nations. I’m going to mention some problems. For each one, would you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should be decided by the national governments, by the United Nations, or by the national governments with UN coordination?”*

		National Governments	United Nations	National governments, with UN coordination
V177	International peacekeeping	1	2	3
V178	Protection of the environment	1	2	3
V179	Aid to developing countries	1	2	3
V180	Refugees	1	2	3
V181	Human Rights	1	2	3

2005-6

*“Some people believe that certain kinds of problems could be better handled by the United Nations or regional organizations rather than by each national government separately. Others think that these problems should be left entirely to the national governments. I’m going to mention some problems. For each one, would you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should be decided by the national governments, by regional organizations, or by the United Nations?” (Read out and code one answer for each problem):*

		National governments	Regional organizations	United Nations
V179.	Peacekeeping	1	2	3
V180.	Protection of the environment	1	2	3
V181.	Aid to developing countries	1	2	3
V182.	Refugees	1	2	3
V183.	Human Rights	1	2	3

**INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE**

*"I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?" (Read out and code one answer for each):*

	A great deal	Quite a lot	Not very much	None at all
V147. The United Nations	1	2	3	4

**COSMOPOLITAN vs. NATIONALISTIC IDENTITIES**

1981-2001

*"To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all?"*

*And the next?*

- *The locality or town where you live*
- *The state or region of the country in which you live*
- *Your country [**The U.S, France, etc.**] as a whole\**
- *The continent in which you live [**North America/Europe/Asia/Latin America, etc**] \**
- *The world as a whole"*

\*[Each specific nation and continent substituted for these labels.]

2005-6

*"People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Using this card, would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself?" (Read out and code one answer for each statement):*

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

V210. I see myself as a world citizen.

V211. I see myself as part of my local community.

V212. I see myself as part of the [**French**]\* nation.

V213. I see myself as part of the [**European Union**]\*\*

V214. I see myself as an autonomous individual.

\* [Substitute your country's nationality for "French"]

\*\* [Substitute appropriate regional organization for "European Union"]

**TECHNICAL APPENDIX B:  
COUNTRIES CURRENTLY IN THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY**

RefNo	Nation	Wave	Wave	Wave	Wave 4	Wave 5	Total
		1	2	3			
		1981- 83	1989- 91	1995- 97	1999- 2001	2005- 2006	
8	Albania	0	0	999	1,000	0	1,999
12	Algeria	0	0	0	1,282	0	1,282
32	Argentina	1,005	1,002	1,079	1,280	0	4,366
51	Armenia	0	0	2,000	0	0	2,000
36	Australia	1,228	0	2,048	0	0	3,276
40	Austria	0	1,460	0	1,522	0	2,982
31	Azerbaijan	0	0	2,002	0	0	2,002
50	Bangladesh	0	0	1,525	1,500	0	3,025
112	Belarus	0	1,015	2,092	1,000	0	4,107
56	Belgium	1,145	2,792	0	1,912	0	5,849
70	Bosnia	0	0	800	1,200	0	2,000
76	Brazil	0	1,782	1,149	0	0	2,931
100	Bulgaria	0	1,034	1,072	1,000	0	3,106
124	Canada	1,254	1,730	0	1,931	0	4,915
152	Chile	0	1,500	1,000	1,200	0	3,700
156	China	0	1,000	1,500	1,000	0	3,500
170	Colombia	0	0	6,025	0	3,025	9,050
191	Croatia	0	0	1,196	1,003	0	2,199
203	Czech Republic	0	3,499	1,147	1,908	0	6,554
208	Denmark	1,182	1,030	0	1,023	0	3,235
214	Dominican Republic	0	0	417	0	0	417
901	East Germany	0	1,336	0	1,914	1,076	4,326
818	Egypt	0	0	0	3,000	0	3,000
222	El Salvador	0	0	1,254	0	0	1,254
233	Estonia	0	1,008	1,021	1,005	0	3,034
246	Finland	1,003	588	987	1,038	0	3,616
250	<b>France</b>	<b>1,200</b>	<b>1,002</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,615</b>	<b>1,001</b>	<b>4,818</b>
268	Georgia	0	0	2,008	0	0	2,008
826	<b>Great Britain</b>	<b>1,167</b>	<b>1,484</b>	<b>1,093</b>	<b>1,000</b>	<b>1,041</b>	<b>5,785</b>
300	Greece	0	0	0	1,142	0	1,142
320	Guatemala	0	0	0	1,001	0	1,001
348	Hungary	1,464	999	650	1,000	0	4,113
352	Iceland	927	702	0	968	0	2,597
356	India	0	1,163	2,040	2,002	0	5,205
360	Indonesia	0	0	0	1,004	0	1,004
364	Iran	0	0	0	2,532	0	2,532
368	Iraq	0	0	0	4,650	2,701	7,351
372	Ireland	1,217	1,000	0	1,012	0	3,229
376	Israel	0	0	0	1,199	0	1,199
380	<b>Italy</b>	<b>1,348</b>	<b>2,018</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2,000</b>	<b>2,023</b>	<b>7,389</b>
392	<b>Japan</b>	<b>1,204</b>	<b>1,011</b>	<b>1,054</b>	<b>1,362</b>	<b>1,096</b>	<b>5,727</b>
300	Jordan	0	0	0	1,223	0	1,223
417	Kyrgyzstan	0	0	0	1,043	0	1,043

428	Latvia	0	903	1,200	1,013	0	3,116
440	Lithuania	0	1,000	1,009	1,018	0	3,027
442	Luxembourg	0	0	0	1,211	0	1,211
807	Macedonia	0	0	995	1,055	0	2,050
470	Malta	0	393	0	1,002	0	1,395
484	<b>Mexico</b>	<b>1,837</b>	<b>1,531</b>	<b>2,364</b>	<b>1,535</b>	<b>1,560</b>	<b>8,827</b>
498	Moldova	0	0	984	1,008	0	1,992
912	Montenegro	0	0	240	1,060	0	1,300
504	Morocco	0	0	0	2,264	0	2,264
528	<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>1,221</b>	<b>1,017</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,003</b>	<b>1,050</b>	<b>4,291</b>
554	New Zealand	0	0	1,201	0	954	2,155
566	Nigeria	0	1,001	1,996	2,022	0	5,019
578	Norway	1,051	1,239	1,127	0	0	3,417
586	Pakistan	0	0	733	2,000	0	2,733
604	Peru	0	0	1,211	1,501	0	2,712
608	Philippines	0	0	1,200	1,200	0	2,400
616	Poland	0	1,920	1,153	1,095	1,000	5,168
620	Portugal	0	1,185	0	1,000	0	2,185
642	Romania	0	1,103	1,239	1,146	1,776	5,264
643	Russia	0	1,961	2,040	2,500	2,033	8,534
682	Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	1,502	0	1,502
911	Serbia	0	0	1,280	1,200	0	2,480
702	Singapore	0	0	0	1,512	0	1,512
703	Slovakia	0	1,136	1,095	1,331	0	3,562
705	Slovenia	0	1,035	1,007	1,006	1,037	4,085
710	South Africa	1,596	1,478	2,935	3,000	0	9,009
310	<b>South Korea</b>	<b>970</b>	<b>1,251</b>	<b>1,249</b>	<b>1,200</b>	<b>1,200</b>	<b>5,870</b>
724	<b>Spain</b>	<b>2,303</b>	<b>4,147</b>	<b>1,211</b>	<b>2,409</b>	<b>1,201</b>	<b>11,271</b>
752	<b>Sweden</b>	<b>954</b>	<b>1,047</b>	<b>1,009</b>	<b>1,015</b>	<b>1,003</b>	<b>5,028</b>
756	Switzerland	0	1,400	1,212	0	0	2,612
158	Taiwan	0	0	780	0	0	780
834	Tanzania	0	0	0	1,171	0	1,171
792	Turkey	0	1,030	1,907	3,401	0	6,338
800	Uganda	0	0	0	1,002	0	1,002
804	Ukraine	0	0	2,811	1,195	0	4,006
840	<b>United States</b>	<b>2,325</b>	<b>1,839</b>	<b>1,542</b>	<b>1,200</b>	<b>1,493</b>	<b>8,399</b>
858	Uruguay	0	0	1,000	0	0	1,000
862	Venezuela	0	0	1,200	1,200	0	2,400
704	Viet Nam	0	0	0	1,000	0	1,000
900	<b>West Germany</b>	<b>1,305</b>	<b>2,101</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2,148</b>	<b>988</b>	<b>6,542</b>
716	Zimbabwe	0	0	0	1,002	0	1,002
	<b>Total sample</b>	<b>30,480</b>	<b>60,176</b>	<b>82,861</b>	<b>105,318</b>	<b>28,510</b>	<b>307,345</b>

Note: Contemporary nation-states (83) excluding regional samples except for East Germany.

**Note:** (\*) It should be noted that the opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not represent the official views of the United Nations. The author is most grateful to all the Principal Investigators and the collaborators on the World Values Surveys for early release of the fifth wave of this dataset for analysis in this chapter.

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<sup>11</sup> Sophie Duchesne and André-Paul Frogner. 1995. 'Is There a European Identity?' In *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*. Edited by Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Angelika Scheuer. 1999. 'A Political Community?' In *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*. Ed. Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also B. Nelson, D. Roberts and W.Veit. (eds). *The Idea of Europe: Problems of National and Transnational Identity*. Oxford: Berg.

<sup>12</sup> The most thorough empirical work on orientations within Europe from 1973-1990 using the Eurobarometer surveys can be found in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. 1995. *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. For more recent updates of trends see, for example, European Commission. July 2006. *Eurobarometer 65: Public Opinion in the European Union. First Results* (F/w Spring 2006) [//ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65\\_first\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_first_en.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> Pippa Norris. 2003. 'The Political Regime.' In *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*. Ed. Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Mattei Dogan. 1994. 'The Decline of Nationalism within Western Europe.' *Comparative Politics*. 281-305.

<sup>14</sup> Geoffrey Evans. 1999. 'Europe: A New Electoral Cleavage?' In Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris. *Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-Term Perspective*. London: Sage.

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Geoffrey Evans. 1998. 'How Britain Views the EU'. In Roger Jowell et al. *British Social Attitudes: the 15<sup>th</sup> Report*. Aldershot: Dartmouth/SCPR.

<sup>15</sup> Philip Evert. 1995. 'NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations.' In *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*. Edited by Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>16</sup> Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro. 1992. *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in American's Policy Preferences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Richard Sobel. 2001. *The Impact of Public Opinion on American Foreign Policy Since Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press; Oli R. Holsti. 2004. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. Rev ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Edwards C. Luck. 1999. *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organizations, 1919-1999*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press

<sup>17</sup> There is a large literature on the concepts of nationalism and national identity. See, for example, Michael Ignatieff. 1993. *Blood and Belonging*. London: Chatto and Windus; Benedict Anderson. 1996. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso; Michael Billig. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage; Ernest Gellner. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell..

<sup>18</sup> Anthony D. Smith. 1991. *National Identity*. London: Penguin. Chapter 7.

<sup>19</sup> David Easton. 1965. *A Framework for Political Analysis*. Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; 1975. 'A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support.' *British Journal of Political Science*. 5: 435-57.

<sup>20</sup> Pew Global Surveys <http://pewglobal.org/>; Chicago Council on Foreign Relations <http://www.c CFR.org/publications/opinion/main.html> See also Benjamin I. Page and Jason Barabas. 2000. 'Foreign policy gaps between citizens and leaders.' *International Studies Quarterly* 44: 339-364.

<sup>21</sup> Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes. 2006. *America Against the World*. New York: Times Books; see also <http://www.americans-world.org/index.cfm>

<sup>22</sup> For an earlier study based on the ISSP module on nationalism, see, for example, Pippa Norris. 1999. 'Global Communications and Cultural Identities.' *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*. 4(4):1-7.

<sup>23</sup> For more details, see <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

<sup>24</sup> Sophie Duchesne and André-Paul Frogner. 1995. 'Is There a European Identity?' In *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*. Edited by Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. Oxford: Oxford University Press.