

Chapter 1

What drives democracy?

Why do some regime transitions generate effective and successful democratic states which persist over many decades while other autocracies persist unreformed? This process can be illustrated during the last decade by developments in two neighboring states in West Africa, Benin and Togo, which took divergent pathways on the road traveled to democracy. Both Benin and Togo inherited the legacy of French colonial rule. Both are equally poor. Both are multi-ethnic societies. Both states gained national independence in 1960 and, after a few short years as fragile parliamentary democracies, both became military dictatorships. Yet in the early-1990s, under a new constitution, one made the transition to a relatively successful democratic regime, experiencing a succession of elections during the last decade which observers have rated as free and fair, and a peaceful and orderly transition of power from governing to opposition parties. The other remains today an unreconstructed and corrupt military-backed autocracy.¹

What caused the contrast? In particular, did the power-sharing constitution adopted in Benin during the early-1990s facilitate the development of a sustainable democracy? Proponents of power-sharing arrangements make strong claims that regimes which include elite leaders drawn from rival communities encourage moderate and cooperative behavior among rival communities in divided societies.² Power-sharing regimes are widely believed to be valuable for democracy in all states, but to be vital for containing and managing inter-communal tensions in multi-ethnic societies emerging from civil conflict, thereby helping to sustain fragile democracies. Similar assumptions have influenced the outcome of many recent peace settlements and treaties in deeply divided societies, for example in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Kosovo in 2001, and Northern Ireland in 1998.³ Theories about the virtues of power-sharing regimes for multi-ethnic societies have been developed in the work of Arendt Lijphart, Eric Nordlinger, Gerhard Lehmbruch, Klaus Armingeon, and others where it was conceptualized alternatively as either 'consociational democracy', 'consensus democracy', 'proportional democracy', or 'negotiation democracy'.⁴ Today the more common concept focuses upon 'power-sharing regimes', a term which is used here since it has been widely adapted in international relations and political science. Despite important differences embedded in these notions and arguments, the primary idea is that in multi-ethnic societies divided into different linguistic, religious or national communities, power-sharing institutions and procedures turn political opponents into cooperative partners, by providing communal leaders with a guaranteed stake in the democratic process. By contrast, power-concentrating regimes offer rival communities a zero-sum game, where losers have fewer incentives to work within the conventional political rules.

These claims have always proved controversial, however, generating heated debates about the core concept, the classification of cases, and its consequences. A chorus of skeptics have

expressed serious doubts about the assumed virtuous of power-sharing regimes and emphasized the breakdown and failure of these arrangements, drawing upon historical examples concerning the outbreak of armed conflict in Cyprus in 1963, Lebanon in 1975, Northern Ireland in 1974, and Czechoslovakia in 1993.⁵ Controversy has rumbled on in the research literature for almost forty years. Contemporary debates focus upon the difficult cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and Despite a wealth of case studies cited by both proponents and critics, many questions remain. Most importantly, do power-sharing regimes generally serve to dampen down armed conflicts in deeply-divided multi-ethnic societies and thereby produce a durable peace settlement, political stability, and the conditions under which sustainable democracy flourishes? Or may they instead, as critics charge, freeze group boundaries, heighten latent ethnic identities, hinder rebuilding the state in the early stages of recovery from violent internal conflict, and thereby fail to facilitate sustainable multi-ethnic democracies?⁶ This unresolved debate raises critical issues both for academic research seeking to understand the underlying drivers of democratization and the causes of civil conflict, and for policymakers concerned with negotiating effective peace treaties, supporting practical institutional reforms and constitutional settlements, and promoting sustainable democratic regimes.

Drawing upon this long-standing controversy, the aims of this book are two-fold. The first is to update and refine theories of power-sharing regimes to take account of the flood of contemporary developments in state-building and institutional reforms which have occurred worldwide. The theory of consociationalism originally developed in the late-1960s to emphasize the importance of certain institutional arrangements which helped to maintain democratic stability in divided societies, including the existence of coalition governments, minority veto rights, proportional representation in public offices, and self-governing autonomy for territorial communities. Processes of regime change worldwide since the early-1970s, and many recent negotiated constitutional settlements, provide a wealth of natural experiments, operating under widely varying conditions. Revising the classic framework provided by the original theory of consociationalism to take account of contemporary developments, types of power-sharing or power-concentrating regimes are defined and conceptualized in this study in terms of four formal institutional features:

- i. The basic type of *electoral system* (shaping patterns of party competition and coalition governments);
- ii. The horizontal concentration of powers in the type of *executive*;
- iii. The vertical centralization of power in *unitary or federal states*; and
- iv. The structure and independence of the *mass media*.

Constitutions commonly lay down many other normative principles and institutional characteristics of regimes, by establishing the basic structure and rules governing the state, but these four aspects represent some of the most fundamental building blocks. Other formal institutions in civil society also

play a vital role in sustaining democratic governance by linking citizens and the state, notably competition and bargaining among multiple interest groups, parties, voluntary organizations, and community associations, but these organizations exist outside of the state and, other than the guarantee of freedom of association, regulations of parties, and the establishment of basic civil liberties, beyond the core principles established in most formal constitutions.

Building on this conceptual foundation, the book tests the impact of power-sharing institutions on patterns of democratization in all societies worldwide, as well as in multiethnic societies, using a wider range of evidence and indicators than previous studies, covering more countries and a longer time-period. The book adopts a mixed research design blending quantitative breadth with qualitative depth.⁷ A large-N pooled dataset establishes the big picture. The study systematically analyzes patterns of regime change for three decades since the early 1970s in 191 contemporary nation-states worldwide (excluding independent territories). Time-series cross-sectional data is invaluable for testing how far theoretical generalizations about the impact of power-sharing institutions hold across diverse conditions and types of society. It facilitates formal models with multiple controls which can be tested using standard econometric techniques suitable for cross-national time-series data. The broad-brush perspective facilitates comprehensive comparisons across nation states and over time. Nevertheless alternative interpretations of panel data are possible since the test results remain particularly sensitive to specification issues, such as the use of lagged variables. This global picture is therefore combined with autopsies of ten particularly dramatic cases of success and failure in democratic consolidation, to poke about among the underlying blood and guts. The technique of focusing upon comparable societies which took divergent political pathways – with cases such as Benin and Togo, South Korea and Singapore, Uzbekistan and Ukraine, the UK and New Zealand, as well as India and Bangladesh - facilitates more fine-grained examination of the causal mechanisms and political processes underlying the statistical patterns. Cases drawn from different regions, eras, cultures and contexts, including both relatively homogeneous and multi-ethnic societies, help us to understanding historical developments and processes of institutional changes within particular states, thereby adding a richer texture to the theory. Anomalies to general patterns also suggest possible revisions and extensions to the formal model. Before setting out the core argument and evidence in more detail, a brief comparison of the divergent West African cases serve to illustrate the classic issues at the heart of this study.

Sustainable democracy in Benin versus electoral autocracy in Togo

In 1960, after gaining independence, the French-administered section of Togoland became the nation of Togo. Although starting as a parliamentary democracy, Togo soon fell victim to a military coup. In 1963, when the army came out of its barracks, Togo saw the assassination of its first President, Sylvanus Olympio, a period of short-lived interim governments, and in 1967 the seizure of power in a military coup by Gnassingbe Eyadema, head of the armed forces. For subsequent decades, with the support of the security forces, Eyadema maintained his grip on power, banning all

opposition parties and dissident movements. In the early-1990s, however, in line with the global wave of democratization, the international community put pressures on Togo to improve its human rights record, leading to the legalization of political parties in 1991. The following year, a new constitution established a presidential republic. In the presidential elections which followed, Eyadema won under the banner of the Rally of the Togolese People party (RPT), but only after the security forces suppressed the opposition and cheated in the polls. Democratic activists who mobilized with general strikes were met by armed troops, killing many protestors. Periodic clashes occurred between dissidents and the military, with an outbreak in 1994 causing an estimated 300,000 Togolese to flee to neighboring countries. The leadership of the opposition was hounded into exile abroad. In the 1998 presidential contest, when the possibility of a landslide victory for the opposition became apparent, the security forces halted the count and members of the Electoral Commission were forced to resign. Eyadema's main rival was banned from standing in the 2003 contest. The security forces maintained control through human rights violations, terror, and repression; Amnesty International reported many cases of political 'disappearances', arbitrary arrest, torture and deaths in detention.⁸ The National Assembly remains overwhelmingly dominated by the ruling party, providing no effective check on the executive: in 2002, the ruling Rally of the Togolese People party won 72 of the 81 seats.

In early-2005, after thirty-eight years in power, when President Eyadema died in office, he was the longest serving ruler on the continent. His passing presented Togo with a short-lived opportunity for regime change but it was lost overnight. By-passing the constitutional succession, the military immediately appointed his son, Faure Gnassingbe, as president. After an international outcry, a presidential election was held in April 2005, but the poll, which confirmed Faure Gnassingbe's grip on power with 60% of the vote, was widely regarded as rigged in favor of the ruling party. West African observers reported irregularities in voter registration, limited information available during the campaign with a censored media, and prohibition of independent electoral monitors⁹. To maintain control, the president subsequently appointed his brother as the Defense minister. Protests were met by tear gas and live ammunition from the security forces, about 500 deaths were recorded following the contest, according to UN estimates, and around 40,000 Togolese fled to neighboring Benin and Ghana. Several radio and TV stations critical of the military-backed succession were closed and websites were blocked. Togo is categorized among the 45 states worldwide rated as 'not free' by the 2006 Freedom House index, with ratings of political rights and civil liberties which are similar to Qatar, Tajikistan, and Rwanda (see table 1.1 and Figure 1.1). It also performs weakly among African nation states by the 2002 Kaufmann/World Bank indicators of voice and accountability (ranking 39th out of 49 in African states) and government effectiveness (ranking 40th), while being in the middle ranks of African nation states for levels of corruption, regulatory quality, and rule of law. It is characterized by official corruption, a weak judiciary and lack of rule of law, and abusive powers exercised by the security services.

Togo is not among the most repressive one-party regimes and military dictatorships around the world and it has avoided the most extreme abuses found in Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, and Sudan - but neither has it registered sustained progress in human rights. It falls into the category of an 'electoral autocracy'. This important type of regime which is neither fully autocratic nor fully democratic exists in an ambiguous grey zone which has been conceptualized by different authors alternatively as either 'electoral autocracies' (Diamond, Schedler), 'illiberal democracies' (Fareed) or 'competitive authoritarian regimes' (Levitsky).¹⁰ Other common terms include 'hybrid' regimes, 'competitive authoritarianism', 'transitional democracies' (implicitly assuming that these regimes will eventually adopt broader institutional and political reforms in a progressive trend) or else as 'semi-free' states (Freedom House). These types of regime adopt some of the formal trappings of liberal democracy, notably holding flawed elections for legislative bodies which often function as powerless rubber-stamps, or rigged plebiscites to legitimate elite rule, but where in practice genuinely free and fair multiparty competition is restricted and basic human rights are widely abused.

[Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 about here]

After gaining independence from France, the neighboring state of Dahomey (which was renamed 'Benin' in 1975) started down a similar political road. In 1963, President Hubert Maga was deposed in an army coup led by Colonel Christophe Soglo. The country subsequently experienced a succession of half a dozen short-lived military and civilian regimes with a period of political instability which lasted until 1972, when Mathieu Kerekou seized power. The Parti de la Revolution Populaire du Benin (PRPB) established a one-party state in 1975, under an official Marxist-Leninist ideology, and appointed Kerekou president in 1980. The Kerekou government had a poor record on human rights although they started to liberalize the economy from state control, and in 1989 Marxism was abandoned as the official ideology. Under pressures from the international community and the opposition movement, in 1990 the government agreed to a new constitution and multiparty elections, with these changes approved in a popular referendum. Under the new arrangements, the President was to be directly elected for a five year term, renewable only once, using a Second Ballot majoritarian system. The unicameral national legislature (Assemblée Nationale) was to be directly elected by party list proportional representation, using the Largest Remainder-Hare Formula in multimember districts. An independent Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and High Court of Justice were established. Local areas were governed by 12 départements and 77 communes (with municipal elections introduced in 2002). The national conference established a transitional government headed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Nicéphore Soglo, an ex-World Bank official. After passage of the new constitution, 70 political parties officially registered, rising to more than 100 by 1998. The February 1991 legislative elections resulted in the opposition party, the Union for the Triumph of Democratic Renewal (UTRD), gaining a plurality of seats. After the presidential elections of March 1991, organized in a multiparty system, the main opposition UTRD candidate, Nicéphore Soglo, was elected President of the Republic with over 67% of the vote.¹¹ In 1996, presidential elections returned the former President Mathieu

Kérékou to the Presidency of the Republic, and in 2002 he was reelected, against a field of 17 candidates, for his final term in office. By the time of the March 2006 presidential elections, however, President Kérékou had to retire as he was over seventy, and thus disqualified from restanding due to the constitutional age-limit, and Mr Soglo was also too old, leaving the field open to younger contenders. In total 26 candidates stood in the first round before the field was narrowed to Thomas Yayi Boni (an Independent former-banker and newcomer to politics), who won with an overwhelming three-quarters of the vote in the second round, with Adrien Houngbedji (vereran leader of the Democratic Renewal Party) in second place. The presidential election represents another critical milestone in Benin's history. In April 2007, President Yayi's coalition won control of parliament. Following this contest, the legislature contains a dozen parties, with 64 members of parliament acting as a 7-party coalition supporting the Presidential Movement while 19 members from 5 parties are on the opposition benches. The largest parliamentary party, the Cauri Forces for an Emerging Benin, gained 35 out of 83 seats (42%).

For more than a decade now Benin has experienced a series of legislative and presidential elections which domestic and international observers have reported as free, peaceful, and fair, including the transition bringing the opposition party into power. Today Benin is widely regarded as a successful African democracy with constitutional checks and balances, multiple parties, a high degree of judicial independence and respect for human rights, and a lively partisan press which is often critical of the government. The country is categorized as 'free' by the 2006 Freedom House index, comparable to Argentina, Mexico, and Romania in its record of civil liberties and political rights (see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1). It also performs strongly against other African nation states according to the Kaufmann/World Bank indicators of voice and accountability (ranking 10th out of 49 states in Africa), political stability (ranking 5th), and rule of law (ranking 14th). Benin still faces endemic poverty and many problems of governance common in African states, including corruption in the public sector, but several high-profile cases of malfeasance have been pursued by the courts. Benin has contributed towards peacekeeping in Cote d'Ivoire and they have helped to mediate political crisis in neighboring Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Togo. In short, from the 1991 transition onwards, Benin has been widely regarded as a model country in Sub-Saharan Africa for having successfully achieved a durable democratic transition without bloodshed and military coups. Will democracy eventually break down in Benin? The danger continues, as in any poor developing society, the future remains unforeseen, and the history of regime change in the continent suggests that democracy remains a fluid situation with steps forwards and back. But a democratic regime has persisted in Benin since the early-1990s in the face of the odds.

[Figure 1.2 about here]

Explaining regimes in the cases of Togo and Benin

So what caused the divergent political pathways taken by Togo and Benin, and what does this suggest more generally about the drivers of regime change and the conditions most favorable towards building sustainable democracies and lasting peace?

Individual leaders

Many historical accounts of the breakdown of autocracies emphasize the decisive contribution made by individual leaders in government or opposition who were committed to political liberalization and human rights, while unsuccessful democratic transitions have been blamed on the failure of ruling elites to adjust successfully to political change.¹² Without the role of particular leaders, it is often argued, countries would have followed a different track, as exemplified by the impact of Adolfo Suarez in post-Franco Spain, Constantine Karamanlis's position after rule by the military junta in Greece, Lech Walesa's leadership of Solidarity in Poland, and Nelson Mandela's statesmanship in post-apartheid South Africa, to name just a few key historical figures. From this perspective, the routes followed by Benin and Togo could possibly be explained by the contrasting actions and decisions of particular presidents; Kerekou, who obeyed the constitution by standing down as president in 1991, and Eyadema, who flouted any limitation on his power until he eventually died in office. Individual actors can obviously play an important role in historical processes of regime change, but if the Benin transition flowed simply from an idiosyncratic leadership decision, this would not explain why the ruling party elite retired to the opposition bench after the 1991 elections in Benin, while by contrast the Rally of the Togolese People party backed by the security forces continues to rule in Togo, even after Eyadema's demise.

Economic development

What of alternative structural explanations, discussed in detail in chapter 4, emphasizing the underlying developmental, international, and cultural drivers of regime change? The classic developmental thesis associated with the work of Seymour Martin Lipset suggests that democracies flourish best in affluent societies with conditions of widespread literacy and education, and with a substantial middle class.¹³ Both Benin and Togo remain among the poorest countries in the world, with domestic economies based on subsistence agriculture, employing about two-thirds of their workforce. Benin ranks 161st lowest out of 177 states in the 2003 UNDP Human Development Index, with a per capita GDP (in Purchasing Power Parity) of \$1,115. One third of the population lives with incomes below the poverty level and two-thirds of the adult population is illiterate. Togo's economy is heavily dependent upon cocoa, coffee, cotton and phosphate for exports, currently ranking slightly better than Benin (143rd lowest) in the 2003 UNDP Human Development Index, with a \$1,700 per capita GDP (PPP). Living standards have deteriorated in Togo since the 1980s and the country remains heavily in debt. Life expectancy is around 54 years in both countries. Agrarian economies lack a propertied middle-class, as well as organized labor unions among urban workers, both of which are often thought to provide the underlying conditions for civil society organizations connecting citizens and the state.

Lack of development may contribute towards Togo's autocracy. But if so, this explanation fails to account for the successful political liberalization evident in even poorer Benin.

Natural resources

The well-known 'resource curse' is another related economic explanation, suggesting that countries with abundant reserves of non-renewable mineral resources, such as Nigerian oil, DRC gold, or Sierra Leone diamonds, produce less diversified and less competitive economies, more income inequality with lower investment in building human capital, and heightened danger of state capture and rent-seeking by ruling elites.¹⁴ Lootable resources, in particular, are thought to make a country particularly vulnerable to civil war, insurgency, and rebellion.¹⁵ Togo's economy was concentrated more narrowly on natural resources (phosphorus exports) than Benin's, but after prices for this commodity plummeted during the 1980s, this potential explanation cannot account satisfactorily for divergent developments which occurred during the following decade. In general, the resource thesis also needs to explain how oil-rich extractive industries can be an apparent blessing for the Norwegian state but a curse in Saudi Arabia, and how diamonds can contribute towards tensions in Sierra Leone and yet remain a valuable source of national revenue for peaceful Botswana.¹⁶ In these cases, the institutional arrangements that govern the distribution of revenue streams derived from natural resources and which promote political accountability and state responsiveness, as much as the existence and concentration of natural resources, seem important to the role of natural resources in conflict.¹⁷

Ethnic divisions

Ethnic hatred is widely regarded as the root of much civil conflict.¹⁸ Deeply-divided societies with a high level of ethnic fractionalization among distinct religious, linguistic, nationalistic, or racial communities are often thought to be most vulnerable to armed internal conflict.¹⁹ Multi-ethnic societies are widely assumed to face particularly serious challenges in holding democratic elections, maintaining political stability, and accommodating rival communities. For example, Mansfield and Snyder argues that holding early elections as part of any peace-settlement in poor and conflict-ridden states can exacerbate tensions, by generating populist leaders seeking to heighten latent ethnic identities to maximize their popular support.²⁰ In this view, it is important to follow a sequential process in this context, first reconstructing the core functions of the state to maintain security and manage the delivery of basic public services before subsequently moving towards elections. Tensions among different ethnic communities are generally thought to undermine government legitimacy, social tolerance, and inter-personal trust, all of which are believed to lubricate the give-and-take of political bargaining and compromise which characterize democratic processes. In the worst cases, ethnic conflict may lead towards deep-rooted and prolonged civil wars, and occasional cases of outright state-failure, as exemplified by developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Sudan, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, and Sri Lanka.²¹

But the degree of ethnic fractionalization alone also fails to explain divergent developments in the particular cases under comparison. Both Benin and Togo are multiethnic plural societies, with tensions between groups, although they have escaped some of the severe ethnic conflict common in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the sort of civil wars that have produced state collapse in Angola, Sierra Leone, Congo-Kinshasa, and Somalia. The Togolese population contains Ewe, Mina, and Kabre tribes and languages. The main cleavages follow a north-south division, with an estimated 70-80% of the military forces drawn from the north. The multiethnic population in Benin is divided among an estimated 42 ethnic groups, distributed in different regions, with two main linguistic groups each with dialect variations, as well as divisions between those practicing different animist religions as well as the minority Christian and Muslim groups. Parties in Benin are largely structured along ethno-regional lines, facilitating group mobilization and interest representation in the political system.²² The way that ethnic groups are represented in any political system is a complex process, discussed later, depending in part upon the type of electoral system used and the geographical distribution of ethnic groups within and across electoral districts, as well as the mobilization and heightening of ethnic identities through party politics, and the presence of cross-cutting cleavages (for example regional, linguistic, and religious ties).²³ It may well be the case that ethnicity functions differently for politics in Benin and Togo, due to the way that communal grievances are mobilized, the accommodation of group interests, or the historical legacy of communal tensions. Ethnic diversity is widely recognized as not equivalent to ethnic conflict.²⁴ But simple measures estimating the degree of ethno-linguistic and ethno-political fractionalization suggest considerable similarities between both societies.²⁵

Popular demands from radical movements

The politics of economic inequality, and the way that this can generate radical demands for political change, is emphasized by other accounts, notably in a sophisticated rational game theoretic model developed by Acemoglu and Robinson.²⁶ According to this view, the story of democracy is one where, faced with serious social unrest and the threat of revolution from below, the affluent ruling elite faces three options. They can decide to grant redistributive policy concessions to ameliorate popular discontent. They may choose to expand voting rights to poorer sectors of society, thereby conceding power. Or they can engage in repression by actively putting down rebellions. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that in many European countries, such as Britain, France and Sweden, the extension of the universal male franchise during the nineteenth century took place as a result of pressure from the credible threat of popular violence, social turbulence, and chaos, arising from the radicalization and organization of urban workers.²⁷ Affluent elites conceded the voting suffrage to men, in this view, because they calculated that this option was less costly than letting loose the grape-shot on the streets of London, Paris, and Stockholm. One can argue whether this theory fitted the timing and sequence of historical developments which occurred with the expansion of the franchise in European democracies.²⁸ In Britain, for example, the threat of revolutionary action appeared stronger and more credible during the radical Chartist movement mass protests, which peaked with the 1848 petition

signed by six million, at a time when Louis Philippe had been removed from the French throne and revolutions were soon to convulse other European capitals. By contrast although there were mass rallies, British politics were more quiescent around 1867 or 1884, when the Second and Third Reform Acts were passed expanding the franchise to adult male citizens living in urban and rural areas, respectively.²⁹ The account by Acemoglu and Robinson does not seek to explain the expansion of the universal franchise to the majority of the British population, when there was no revolutionary threat, with passage of votes for women in 1918 and 1928.

Without pursuing the accuracy of the historical argument in more detail, the 'revolutionary threat' thesis also fits most uneasily in the particular cases under comparison. Regimes in both Benin and Togo faced internal and external pressure for change during the early-1990s, including street protests and mobilization by the opposition movement. In the Togolese case, the security forces did not hesitate to suppress protest by using brute force and armed repression. Opposition activists were killed or fled to neighboring states. This led to some financial loss of development aid but the financial penalty was insufficient to force concessions from the military. In Benin, by contrast, the constitutional concessions agreed in the early 1990s stabilized and, upon losing the 1991 election, the ruling party conceded power to the opposition. In short, the game theoretic model of regime transition does not take us very far unless we know why rulers choose either to concede power or to employ repression.

International pressures

Another possible factor for the growth of democracy in Benin could lie in the role of the international community, which has invested growing resources involving a wide range of actors and initiatives in promoting and facilitating democratic governance, where this has come to be understood as a vital component of human development.³⁰ This includes multilateral agencies such as the United Nations, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Bretton Woods institutions, which have become increasingly active during the last decade.³¹ Regional organizations have also played an important function, such as the European Union, the Organization of American States, and African Union, as well as international agencies and NGOs such as International IDEA, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and IFES (formerly the International Foundation for Election Systems).³² Since the early-1980s, significant bilateral development aid offered by the United States has been devoted to democracy promotion, primarily channeled through the activities of the USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the sister bodies, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the National Republican Institute for International Affairs.³³ Under the Bush Administration, after 9/11, the rhetoric of US foreign policy also gave increased emphasis to linking democracy promotion with American interests, understood as a new doctrine of 'democratic realism'. Hence at a presidential speech before the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy in November 2003, the Bush administration directly related the global expansion of freedom to American security. "As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom

leads to peace.”³⁴ In his second inaugural address, on 20th January 2005, President Bush went further in expanding this instrumental or pragmatic claim into a full-blown vision which the administration hoped would be capable of guiding US foreign policy for many generations.³⁵ Although the role of the United States has perhaps attracted the most attention and controversy, especially after interventions attempting state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq, in fact many other advanced industrialized countries have also channeled increasing resources into the promotion of democracy, ‘good governance’, and human rights, notably by development agencies such as Norway’s NORAD, Canada’s CIDA, and UK’s Dfid.³⁶

Development aid has been invested in programs seeking to foster inclusive forms of participation, including elections as the most dramatic symbol of democratic progress, but also multiple projects designed to strengthen civil society associations and the independence of the news media. Other programs have sought to build state capacity, notably by public administration reforms designed to improve the transparency, accountability and efficiency of the executive branch at national and sub-national levels, by strengthening the power of elected legislatures, and by reinforcing rule of law through the judiciary. Decentralization has proved a popular strategy, seeking to develop the capacity of local communities to determine their own lives.³⁷ Programs have also emphasized the need to monitor and protect human rights, as well as integrating principles of gender equality into the heart of democratic governance.³⁸ It remains difficult to measure the precise impact of these diverse types of programs through standard econometric techniques, since any effects are often gradual, indirect, and long-term. Levels of aid expenditure are also a crude gauge of effectiveness; for example, the DRC transitional presidential election in 2006 cost 248 million dollars, a staggering expenditure compared with the cost of a program directed at parliamentary strengthening in the same country. The empirical comparative evidence based on cross-national development aid has generated mixed results; for example a study for the World Bank examined the impact of spending on democratization in a large sample of recipient nations over the 1975-2000 period and found no evidence that aid promotes democracy.³⁹ Nevertheless one of the most detailed studies analyzing trends in patterns of USAID expenditure on democracy promotion indicates that this was capable of generating tangible benefits in subsequent levels of democratization.⁴⁰

There are also many case studies of specific programs and countries assessing the most effective strategies which the international community has used to respond to challenges in democratic transitions.⁴¹ Cases suggest that these activities can help to sustain democratic regimes, where the international community provides financial resources, capacity-building, and technical assistance to support agencies and policies within each country seeking to promote human rights, strengthen civil societies, and reform governance. This process is exemplified by the role of the European Union in contributing towards the dramatic political transformation of many post-communist nation states in Central Europe, notably in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, where democratic governance was required as a condition of entry into the European Union.⁴² But there are

also many conflicting pressures in foreign policy and international pressures can also prove negative for democracy, for example where the foreign policies of Western countries have served to support oil-rich autocracies or ruling elites which serve their own strategic interests.⁴³ Carothers has emphasized the inherent dualistic tensions within the Bush administration; the campaign against Al Qaeda means that the United States needs friendly allies, military cooperation, and diplomatic ties with states such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Uzbekistan, in contrast with the more idealistic desire to support opposition reform movements and human rights campaigners seeking to overturn autocratic regimes.⁴⁴

How do these factors influence the two cases under comparison? In terms of international relations, both West African states are relatively minor players. Neither serves a vital strategic role, whether for external military bases, foreign investors, or as trading partners with major industrialized nation states. As regional powers, in multilateral organizations, both are clearly outweighed by Nigeria and Ghana. Benin and Togo could therefore differ today due to the distribution of support from the international community. In particular, lack of democratic reforms has halted aid flows to Togo from the European Union and the United States. By contrast, with a more favorable human rights record, Benin receives about six times the total official development assistance from the international community. Nevertheless it is difficult to attribute Benin's success to international aid as the financial rewards have largely followed the shifts towards democracy in the early-1990s, reinforcing developments in each country and perhaps acting as an incentive for ruling elites. Other than functioning as a potential incentive, the timing of intervention and patterns of democratic aid assistance cannot be used as a cause to explain satisfactorily the initial regime transition which occurred in Benin during the early-1990s.

Regional diffusion

Regional diffusion is another popular argument for processes of regime change, for example the dramatic toppling of Communist states throughout Central Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁴⁵ Diffusion is not simply developments spreading accidentally in lagged fashion within a region; instead it requires that knowledge of innovation in one state spreads to others where similar strategies or tactics are adopted, as illustrated by the electoral revolutions which swept illiberal regimes from power since the mid-1990s in Bulgaria and Romania and then moved to Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.⁴⁶ Other types of regional neighborhood effects are suggested by the striking predominance of autocratic regimes throughout the Arab world, where the third wave transition to democracy experienced in many parts of the world by-passed political regimes in this region.⁴⁷ As noted earlier, regional organizations have also played an important role by shaping political developments within their sphere of influence, notably the European Union's impact over states both in the Mediterranean and in Central Europe, as well as the Organization of American States's impact in Latin America.⁴⁸ In recent years the African Union has given growing emphasis to

human rights and democratic governance, at least in official declarations, treaties, and conventions.⁴⁹ Hence at a meeting in Addis Ababa in January 2007, the AU endorsed the *African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance*, signed by 10 countries, including Benin.⁵⁰ Nevertheless these developments are relatively recent and the geographical explanation of regional diffusion remains unsatisfactory in the West African cases, as patterns of regime change within neighboring states remain checkered (see Figure 1.1); Togo and Benin are surrounded on their borders both by autocracies (Burkina Faso, Niger, Cote d'Ivoire) and by growing democracies (Mali, Ghana), as well as states which veer uncertainly between the two (Nigeria). Both countries have a common French colonial background, so this also rules out path dependent historical explanations focused on different colonial legacies. Togo is slightly smaller than Benin both physically and in terms of population, so the relative advantages of governance and public administration which are often enjoyed by small and compact nation states is also implausible as a possible reason for Benin's success.⁵¹

In short, several popular explanations of the underlying conditions leading towards processes of regime change -- emphasizing the role of individual actors, levels of economic development, the resource curse, the existence of ethnic tensions, pressures derived from revolutionary threats and from the international community, and geographic patterns of regional diffusion -- leave us with a continuing puzzle as these factors fail to account satisfactorily for these cases. Within the last decade, while initial attempts at liberalization stalled under military rule in Togo, the neighboring state of Benin progressed a long way down the road towards becoming a peaceful democratic regime with alternating parties in power, where the military stayed in the barracks. At this stage, having eliminated some of the usual suspects in the democratization literature as unconvincing, we may be tempted to conclude that the divergent developments in each country were simply accidental, explained by a particular configuration of specific circumstances and contingent events which are not repeatable elsewhere. Yet such a conclusion would be ultimately unsatisfactory and indeed if Benin's democracy is simply a one-off 'accident', how do we account for similar political developments in equally poor democracies on the continent, exemplified by Mali, Mauritius, Lesotho, Senegal, Namibia, and Ghana, as well as the well-known case of South Africa? Regime change may be triggered by many proximate catalysts, whether the death of a long-standing dictator, a failed military coup d'etat, an upsurge of 'people power' deposing a discredited regime, an external military invasion, or a sudden economic crisis or outbreak of internal conflict which generated state collapse. Each transition can be treated as *sui generis*, but the challenge for social science and for policymakers is to distinguish the factors which are common in the simultaneous breakdown of autocratic regimes and the consolidation of sustainable democratic regimes across many countries worldwide during the third wave.

Institutional arrangements

The primary suspect, which has not yet been considered, concerns the type of institutional arrangements created by the new constitutions introduced in each country in the early-1990s. Togo

opted for a strong presidency, with only weak legislative and judicial checks to counterbalance executive power. The Togolese constitution specified majoritarian elections, following France in using the Second Ballot electoral system (also known as the 'Two-Round' or 'Runoff' system) for both presidential and legislative contests.⁵² This requires 50% of the vote or more to win, raising the threshold facing minor parties. The ruling party holds 89% of the seats in the Togolese legislature, providing a rubber-stamping body with no effective restriction on the president. In other divided African states, the Second Ballot system has been blamed for the breakdown of the electoral process and renewed outbreaks of civil war, including in Angola and in Algeria in 1992, and in the Republic of Congo in 1993.⁵³ Benin also adopted a presidential form of executive with a majoritarian Second Ballot system, but with multiple contestants; for example the first round election saw thirteen candidates in 1991 and seven in 1996. Moreover the country opted for a proportional representation electoral system for the legislature, using closed party lists, the Hare quota and greatest average, with no minimum legal threshold, producing a more competitive multiparty system. The judiciary also enjoys greater independence with the Constitutional Court responsible for the final announcement and validation of the election results, and an independent Electoral Commission that organizes parliamentary and presidential contests since 1995. Both are unitary rather than federal states, but Benin also decentralized more decision-making powers to regional and local elected bodies. Constitutional guarantees of press freedom are also far more extensive in Benin, where there are more than fifty newspapers, state and commercial TV channels, and over thirty state or commercial radio stations. Reporters without Borders's 2005 *Index of Press Freedom* ranked Benin as 25th worldwide, comparable to the UK, and higher than France, Australia, and the United States.⁵⁴ In Togo, by contrast, the government owns and controls the only significant television station, the only regular daily newspaper, the *Togo Presse*, and many of the radio stations.

The question - which is explored at the heart of this book - is whether the constitutional structures established in the early-1990s can be credited as the key element which led each country down divergent political paths, particularly contrasts between power-concentrating regimes with few checks on executive autonomy, exemplified by Togo, and the greater degree of power-sharing among multiple stake-holders found in Benin. Of course, there are many reasons to be cautious, and indeed skeptical, before accepting this potential explanation. In regarding institutions as providing durable constraints on political actors, the precise timing of any rule changes need to be carefully monitored. The adoption and effective workings of power-sharing regimes can be the product of a more democratic culture and society, as well as its endogenous cause. Political elites make constitutional rules which then bind their hands.⁵⁵ Some constitutional rules prove sticky, others prove malleable. Disentangling the direction of causality needs close attention to tracing step-by-step developments and 'before-and-after' natural experiments in regime change. Issues of effective implementation are also fundamental, since de jure constitutional restrictions on executive power can exist as parchment barriers which are widely flouted in practice. We need to understand how power-sharing constitutions

arise and what process of bargaining and pact-making leads to their acceptance and implementation among elites, especially in negotiated and imposed peace settlements. It would be premature to rule out other potential explanations for democratization which have not yet been considered, or to confirm at this stage that constitutional rules do indeed matter for regime change, in these particular countries and across a wide range of other cases. But certainly an initial comparison of Benin and Togo suggests that the institutional choices made in the early-1990s remain a prime suspect in any search for the reasons for the different type of regimes existing today. If so, Benin's power-sharing constitution may hold important lessons for democracy promotion strategies in other poor and divided societies, both in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

Trends in democracy worldwide

The timing of the breakdown of military rule in Benin in the early-1990s, and the subsequent development of a sustainable democratic regime over successive elections, was far from accidental. Events in this country illustrate broader trends, as the growing popularity of democratic regimes represents one of the most striking and dramatic political transformations experienced worldwide during our lifetimes. The broader phenomenon, popularly known as the 'third wave' of democratization as Huntington termed it, is conventionally understood to have commenced with the toppling of dictatorships in Portugal, Spain and Greece during the early-to-mid-1970s.⁵⁶ Spreading from Mediterranean Europe, the movement towards democracy surged rapidly worldwide during the late-1980s and early-1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communist party control throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Autocracies lost their grip over governments in many Asian states, and a series of elections in Latin America saw the end of military regimes in the region. The Middle East remains the global region least affected by these developments, although even here there have been growing pressures and some liberalization of the regimes, for example multi-party national elections held in Algeria, Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt, and municipal elections held in Saudi Arabia, the expansion of political information from independent television news channels in the region, the formation of Human Rights Commissions in Egypt and Qatar, and the moves towards women's empowerment in Oman, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Morocco.⁵⁷

[Figure 1.3 about here]

The net impact of the third wave of democracy has transformed the global political map. There are many complex issues about how best to classify, measure, and categorize types of regimes, as discussed in Chapter 3. One of the most common approaches uses the estimates provided by Freedom House, a think-tank monitoring civil liberties and political rights worldwide. This organization classifies three-quarters of all countries as 'electoral democracies' today, compared with less than half before the start of the third wave.⁵⁸ Nor is this simply a product of the measure and typology employed; as Figure 1.3 illustrates, both Polity IV and Vanhanen report a similar surge in levels of

democratization, despite using different indicators and methodologies, as discussed fully in subsequent chapters.

During the early-1990s, stunned by developments, Francis Fukiyama anticipated ‘the end of history’ or at least the collapse of most authoritarian regimes and the triumph of Western political values and liberal democracies.⁵⁹ Subsequent events have made commentators, rightly, more cautious. After a few heady years in the late-1980s and early-1990s, indicators suggest that the tide of regime change lost momentum, despite the ‘color revolutions’, and the pace of sustained progress in democratization slowed in the early twenty-first century. Indeed, although it remains too early to tell for certain, observers have detected signs of a possible third reverse wave since 2000.⁶⁰ Any backlash may have been fuelled by the Bush administration’s rhetorical emphasis on democracy promotion while simultaneously supporting strategic allies in the ‘war on terror’ such as Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Egypt.⁶¹ Trends may also have been influenced by the failure of the Maliki government in Iraq to achieve political progress, reduce conflict, and achieve a stable peace-settlement, as well as by the global price of oil, the threat of terrorism, the new assertiveness of states such as China, Russia and Venezuela, and specific events undermining fragile democracies in places such as Fiji, Thailand, and Bangladesh. Electoral autocracies, illustrated by the case of Togo, have stagnated and failed to make the ‘transition’ to becoming sustained democratic regimes, as earlier observers had hoped. In this regard, many observers have detected the rise of the new type of regime, although this category has proved difficult to pin down as it has been alternatively conceptualized as ‘hybrid regimes’, ‘semi-democracies’, ‘competitive authoritarianism’, ‘illiberal democracies’ or ‘elected autocracies’.⁶² Overall it is apparent that despite subsequent striking and important breakthroughs since the early-1970s, the third wave revolution remains limited in its depth, uneven in its breadth, and incomplete in its impact.

Theories of power-sharing regimes

Questions about processes generating regime change, at the heart of this book, raise significant and enduring intellectual puzzles, attracting an immense literature in the research community.⁶³ Understanding these issues is a core challenge for scholarship in the social sciences and it is also vital for establishing what policy initiatives taken by the international community and by domestic reformers will prove most effective in promoting and sustaining democratic reforms. After more than three decades, like a complex series of natural scientific experiments, global developments in regime change since the early-1970s present major opportunities to understand and shape this important phenomenon. This preliminary and brief comparison of recent developments in Togo and Benin lead us to suspect, although these cases do not yet establish, that the institutional rules may matter for this processes, allowing liberal reforms to flourish and a reduction in conflict and instability, even in poor and divided societies. At some level it is obvious that formal institutional rules matter for regime change. Nevertheless reliable, systematic and precise estimates of the effects of different types of institutions on democracy are often lacking. It is likely that societies that differ for a variety of

reasons, such as geography, natural resources, and culture, will differ both in their political institutions and in their level of democracy. If this initial hunch that formal institutions matter is indeed correct, what specific institutions count, and what theories provide insights to help understanding and explore these issues more systematically beyond these particular African cases?

This book builds upon, and updates, the theory of consociationalism which has dominated scholarly debates about the most appropriate regime for democratic transition and consolidation, especially in deeply-divided post-conflict societies.⁶⁴ Consociational theory addresses the essential contrasts found between power-sharing and power-concentrating regimes.

Power-sharing regimes are understood in this study most generally as those states which are characterized by formal institutional rules which give multiple political elites a stake in the decision-making process. Such arrangements are most relevant for multi-ethnic societies, where each ethnic, linguistic, religious, or national community acquires a stake in the political process, but they are also potentially important for countries deeply divided by types of deep-rooted civil conflict which are not ethnically-based, such as the Nepalese peace-settlement with the Maoist rebellion or an end to violence in Colombia between the state and outlawed armed groups and drug cartels. By contrast, *power-concentrating regimes* are characterized most broadly by more restrictive formal institutional rules which limit office to a smaller range of actors. This study focuses upon the formal institutional rules, notably the basic type of electoral system, the type of presidential or parliamentary executive, and the division of powers between the central state and regions, as well as freedom of the independent media, which are at the heart of any regime.

These institutional rules are also referred to collectively in this study as the '*constitutional arrangements*' characterizing the regime, although the rules are not necessarily embodied in a written 'Constitution', a 'Fundamental Law', or the 'Basic Laws' of a country.⁶⁵ This usage echoes the view of Dicey: "Constitutional law, as the term is used in England, appears to include all rules which directly or indirectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power in the state."⁶⁶ The focus in this study is on the formal institutional rules governing the regime, in part because in a few countries such as the UK there is no single document representing the written Constitution, but also, more importantly, because in others the formal rules governing the electoral system or the role of the independent media are determined by a range of secondary laws, administrative practices, and judicial decisions, with only the most general principles contained in the formal written Constitution. Moreover in the case of freedom of the press, the practical constraints and legal restrictions which exist are sometimes totally at odds with the grand rhetoric embodied in the official state Constitution.

The book draws upon but then updates the classic theory of consociationalism, which was originally developed in the late-1960s and early-1970s to explain stability in a few deeply-divided European societies, including Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. The scope of this idea was subsequently widened considerably to cover several developing societies, such as the Lebanon,

South Africa, and Malaysia. The concept was developed by several writers, including Gerhard Lehbruch, Jorg Steiner, and Hans Daalder.⁶⁷ The seminal political scientist, however, and the scholar who has continued to be most closely associated with developing and advocating the concept throughout his lifetime, is Arend Lijphart.⁶⁸

In 1968, Lijphart published *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. The book reflected upon the way that the Netherlands was a stable European parliamentary democracy despite being a deeply divided society with multiple cleavages or ‘pillars’ of religion and class. At the time, this phenomenon was considered puzzling, because it was widely assumed that the most stable representative democracies required the type of institutions which characterized the British political system during this era. Westminster was characterized by a two-party system in parliament, with the regular electoral swing of the pendulum producing a rotation of the major parties between government and opposition. The largest party with a parliamentary majority was empowered to govern without coalition partners, with the prime minister heading a collective cabinet and a well-disciplined parliamentary party. Westminster was centralized with a strong unitary state across the UK, although local governments administered parishes, counties and municipalities. The British political system rested on the foundation of single member plurality elections, a relatively homogeneous society with the primary class cleavage reflected in the main parties, and a strong civic culture. Lijphart theorized that the Netherlands had nevertheless developed a stable democracy, despite social segmentation or ‘pillarization’, mainly due to the power-sharing structures which encouraged elite cooperation. Proportional representation elections, multi-party parliament, and coalition cabinets generated multiple stakeholders in the political system, where community leaders learnt to work together to bargain and compromise and, in turn, this encouraged tolerance and accommodation at mass levels. Consociational theory takes for granted the existence of social cleavages, and rivalry among distinct communities for economic, social and political goods, and suggests that stable political systems overcome these rivalries by encouraging consensus, negotiation, and compromise among community elites.

Broadening the theory beyond the specific case of the Netherlands, Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism emphasizes the importance of governing incentives which work through a ‘top-down’ two-stage process. First, power-sharing arrangements are thought to mitigate conflict among leadership elites. “*Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.*”⁶⁹ These arrangements are designed to maximize the number of ‘stakeholders’ who share an interest in playing by the rules of the game. This process is exemplified by proportional electoral systems with low vote thresholds which usually produce multiparty parliaments, with many minor parties each representing distinct segmented communities. In this context, party leaders have an incentive to bargain and collaborate with other factions in parliament in order to gain office in governing coalitions. Executive power-sharing is theorized to temper extreme demands and dampen expressions of ethnic intolerance among elites. In

segmented societies, the leaders of all significant factions at the time of the settlement are guaranteed a stake in national or regional governments. This is thought to provide a strong enticement for politicians to accept the legitimacy of the rules of the game, to moderate their demands, and to collaborate with rivals. By making all significant players stakeholders, it is hoped that they will not walk away from constitutional agreements. In turn, to preserve their position in government, in the second stage of the process, community leaders are thought to promote conciliation among their followers and to encourage acceptance of the settlement. Under these arrangements, each distinct religious, linguistic or nationalistic community, it is argued, will feel that their voice counts and the rules of the game are fair and legitimate, as their leaders are in a position to express their concerns and protect their interests within the legislature and within government.

Lijphart identified four characteristics of '*consociational*' constitutions as an ideal-type: *executive power-sharing* among a 'grand coalition' of political leaders drawn from all significant segments of society; a *minority veto* in government decision-making, requiring mutual agreement among all parties in the executive; *proportional representation* of major groups in elected and appointed office; and considerable *cultural autonomy* for groups.⁷⁰ These arrangements, Lijphart suggested, have several benefits over majority rule in any society, generating 'kinder, gentler' governance with more inclusive processes of decision-making, more egalitarian policy outcomes, and better economic performance.⁷¹ But the potential advantages of power-sharing institutions are nowhere more important for democracy and good governance, it is suggested, than in segmented societies which lack cross-cutting cleavages. In the most heterogeneous societies, Lijphart argues, "*Majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy. What such regimes need is a democratic regime that emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of being satisfied with a bare majority.*"⁷² Lijphart's argues that power-sharing regimes encourage group cooperation (at best), and avoid outright ethnic rebellion (at worst), in plural societies divided into distinct linguistic, religious, nationalistic, and/or cultural communities. If true, this represents an important claim that may have significant consequences. Power-sharing regimes can be regarded as, at minimum, a realistic initial settlement achieving the widest consensus among all factions engaged in post-conflict negotiations. Proponents suggest that such regimes are also the most effective institutions for establishing democracy and good governance.

In subsequent work, Lijphart amended the core concept to draw a line between 'consensus' and 'majoritarian' democracies, extending the comparative framework to include ten institutions divided into two dimensions. The 'executive-parties' dimension compared the concentration of executive power in single party or coalition cabinets, the use of dominant or balanced executive-legislative relations, two-party versus multiparty systems, majoritarian or proportional electoral systems, and pluralist or corporatist interest group systems. The federal-unitary dimension included unitary or federal systems, unicameral or bicameral legislatures, flexible or rigid constitutions, judicial

review, and central bank independence. Based on this conceptual map and the comparison of 36 democracies, Lijphart argues that consensus democracies have many advantages. Where parties and politicians representing diverse ethnic communities are included in the governing process, Lijphart theorizes that segmented societies will more peacefully coexist within the common borders of a single nation-state, reducing pressures for succession. In this claim, Lijphart cites the conclusions drawn from early work by W. Arthur Lewis on the failure of Westminster-style democracy when it was exported to post-colonial West African states.⁷³ For more systematic evidence, Lijphart shows that, with any prior controls, significantly fewer violent riots and political deaths were recorded in consensus rather than majoritarian democracies (measured by the executive-parties dimension).⁷⁴ Consensus democracies, Lijphart suggests, also have many other benefits, notably in the quality of democracy (for example by generating a larger proportion of women in elected office, greater party competition, higher voting turnout, and stronger public satisfaction with democracy), as well as by producing more successful macro-economic management (in terms of the record of inflation, unemployment, and economic inequality). As Bogaards notes, in making this argument, the description and classification of consociational institutions evolves in Lijphart's work into normative prescriptions of the best type of regime for divided societies.⁷⁵

The power-sharing model was originally established as an alternative to 'Westminster'-style majoritarian or power-concentrating regimes, characterized by unitary states and majoritarian-plurality elections. Consociationalism claims that winner-take-all regimes are more prone to generate adversarial politics in a zero-sum power game. Even critics would not dispute that majoritarian democracies can work well under certain conditions; in relatively homogeneous societies, as well as in cultures characterized by deep reservoirs of interpersonal trust and social tolerance, and in stable democracies with regular alternation among the main parties in government and opposition. In this context, losing factions in one contest will accept the outcome of any single election as fair and reasonable because they trust that, in due course, a regular swing-of-the-pendulum will eventually return them to power in subsequent elections. But these conditions may well be absent in societies with a legacy of bitter and bloody civil wars, factional strife, or inter-community violence, and in transitional post-authoritarian states, such as Benin, with little or no experience of electoral democracy. Where minority groups are persistently excluded from office in the legislature or in government, majoritarian systems dilute the incentives for community leaders to compromise their demands, to adopt conciliatory tactics, and to accept the legitimacy of the outcome. These problems can be exemplified by, for example, sporadic outbreaks of sectarian violence and the lack of sustained progress towards democracy evident in Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe.⁷⁶ The worst-case scenario of civil war, ultimately leading to genocide, is illustrated by Burundi's 1993 election held under majoritarian rules, where Sisk suggests that the fears of the minority Tutsi were exacerbated by the ascendance to power of a party representing the more populous Hutu.⁷⁷ Majoritarian regimes fail to

incorporate minorities into government, encouraging excluded communities to resort to alternative channels to express their demands, ranging from violent protest to outright rebellion and state failure.

Lijphart emphasizes that power-sharing regimes are not only best for creating a durable long-term accommodation of cultural differences; in reality these are the only conditions which are broadly acceptable when negotiating any post-conflict settlement. Consociationalism can be regarded as, at minimum, the most realistic perspective, representing the necessary conditions to secure peace-agreements among all parties.⁷⁸ Lijphart reasons that considerable uncertainty surrounds the implementation and outcome of any new constitutional agreement. Groups may have partial information about the strength of their support and thus the outcome of any contest. Political actors are also assumed to be relatively risk-averse. Majoritarian rules of the game raise the stakes of any negotiated peace settlement: some parties will win more, others will lose more. The risks are therefore higher; if one faction temporarily gains all the reins of government power, few or no effective safeguards may prevent them from manipulating the rules to exclude rivals from power on a permanent basis. Established democracies have developed deep reservoirs of social trust and tolerance which facilitate the give-and-take bargaining, compromise, and conciliation characteristic of normal party politics. Yet trust is one of the first casualties of societal wars. Under majoritarian rules, without any guarantees of a regular swing of the electoral pendulum between government and opposition parties, losing factions face (at best) certain limits to their power, potential threats to their security, and (at worst), possible risks to their existence. For all these reasons, Lijphart argues that the only realistic type of settlement capable of attracting agreement among all factions in post-conflict divided societies are power-sharing regimes which avoid the dangers of winner-take-all outcomes. More inclusive power-sharing regimes are likely to develop stronger support from stakeholders and thus to generate stable institutional equilibrium. Empirical evidence supporting this argument is presented by Linder and Baechtiger who compared 62 developing countries in Asia and Africa and report that a summary index of power-sharing is a significant predictor of democratization.⁷⁹ Nevertheless in the longer term power-sharing institutions may also produce certain undesirable consequences for good governance, including the potential dangers of policy-stalemate, immobility, and deadlock between the executive and legislature, the lack of an effective opposition holding the government to account and providing voters with a clear-cut electoral choice, a loss of transparency in government decision-making, and the fragmentation of party competition in the legislature, while federalism is accompanied by the dangers of secession.

Critics of power-sharing regimes

Despite the popularity of the theory that power-sharing regimes are the most effective for sustaining democracy, especially in divided multi-ethnic societies, critics have challenged the core assumptions and claims.

The strongest charges are that power-sharing regimes which recognize existing community boundaries assume that ethnic divisions in mass society, such as those between rival communities in Northern Ireland, are intractable and persistent. Understood in this light, the major challenge becomes how best to reflect and accommodate such social cleavages within the political system. An alternative constructive perspective emphasizes instead that ethnic identities are not fixed and immutable; instead they have social meanings which can be reinforced or diluted through political structures and through elite leadership.⁸⁰ Donald Horowitz articulated perhaps the most influential critique by arguing that power-sharing regimes may in fact serve to institutionalize ethnic cleavages, deepening rather than ameliorating social identities. In particular, he suggests, the lower vote thresholds characteristic of proportional representation electoral systems provide parties and politicians representing minority groups with minimal motivation to appeal for voting support outside of their own community.⁸¹ In this context, in deeply divided societies, leaders may use populist rhetoric to exploit, and thereby heighten, social tensions, ethnic hatred, and the politics of fear. Indeed, moderate leaders who seek to cooperate across ethnic lines may find that they lose power to counter-elites who regard any compromise as a 'sell-out'. By failing to provide leaders with an effective electoral incentive for cross-group cooperation, Horowitz suggests that in the longer term PR may serve to institutionalize and thereby reinforce ethnic tensions in society, generating greater political instability, rather than managing and accommodating communal differences.

The clearest illustration of these dangers can be found in the case of the post-Dayton power-sharing arrangements introduced to govern Bosnia and Herzegovina. The division of government among the Bosniacs, Croats or Serbs was implemented with an intricate set of constitutional arrangements balanced at every level. Proportional elections for the lower house were held in 1996 where the major leaders of each community mobilized support within each of the three national areas by emphasizing radical sectarian appeals, and electors cast ballots strictly along ethnic lines. Studies suggest that after Dayton, subsequent population shifts led to fewer multiethnic communities, not more⁸². In this perspective, power-sharing regimes based on formal recognition of linguistic or religious groups may magnify the political salience of communal identities, by institutionalizing these cleavages and by providing electoral incentives for politicians and parties to heighten appeals based on distinct ethnic identities. Snyder presents a strong argument that in the early stages of democratization, weak politicians may decide to fan the flames of ethnic hatred and nationalism to build popular support: *"Purported solutions to ethnic conflict that take pre-democratic identities as fixed, such as partition, ethno-federalism, ethnic power-sharing, and the granting of group rights, may needlessly lock in mutually exclusive, inimical national identities. In contrast, creating an institutional setting for democratization that de-emphasizes ethnicity might turn these identities towards more inclusive, civic self-conceptions."*⁸³ In this perspective, explicit recognition of ethnic rights may make it more difficult, not easier, to generate cross-cutting cooperation in society, by reducing the electoral incentives for elite compromise.⁸⁴ PR electoral systems, in particular, lower the vote threshold to electoral office; as

a result parties and politicians may be returned to power based on electoral support from one religious or linguistic minority community, rather than having to appeal to many segments of the broader electorate.

By contrast, Horowitz theorizes that the higher vote thresholds characteristic of electoral rules where the winner needs to gain an absolute majority of the vote (50%+1) gives politicians and parties a strong incentive to seek popular support (vote-pooling) across groups. Both the Alternative Vote (also known as the Preferential Vote or 'instant runoff', used for the Australian House of Representatives) and the Second Ballot (used for many presidential elections, such as in France) require parties and candidates to win an absolute majority of the votes, so politicians must seek support among a broad cross-section of the electorate. Majoritarian electoral systems are thought to encourage 'bridging' cross-identity appeals, targeting rich and poor, women and men, as well as diverse ethnic communities.⁸⁵ More moderate electoral appeals should thereby foster and encourage the cultural values of social tolerance, accommodation, and cooperation in society. Along similar lines, Ben Reilly argues that the Alternative Vote electoral system is more effective at providing incentives for parties and politicians to seek multiethnic votes, generating moderating compromises with members of other communities for the sake of electoral success.⁸⁶ Nevertheless few countries have adopted Alternative Vote electoral system, and when this system was used in Fiji it failed spectacularly in the May 2000 coup led by George Speight.⁸⁷ Barkan also suggests that in agrarian African societies, PR often does not produce electoral results that are significantly more inclusive than majoritarian elections with single-member districts.⁸⁸ Moreover, he suggests that under PR multimember constituencies, the weaker links connecting citizens with elected members, and the loss of constituency service and public accountability of elected officials, reduces the prospects for long-term democratic consolidation in Africa.

Another challenge arises from Lijphart's claim that power-sharing regimes are the only realistic way to achieve a voluntary peace settlement and a consensus about the constitutional rules among rival factions in divided societies. This is not necessarily the case, however, because of the trade-off values involved in the choice of any new institutional framework and the need to balance competing demands.⁸⁹ This is shown, for example, by the contrasts between the new constitutions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both countries have differed in their priorities; Afghanistan selected a majoritarian electoral system (Single Non-Transferable Vote) with provincial constituencies for the lower house (Wolesi Jirga) and the Second Ballot system for the Presidential election (Second Ballot). By contrast, the Iraqi parliament uses proportional representation elections (regional party lists with a Hare quota) plus compensatory seats for minority parties. In Iraq, PR elections generated a multiparty legislature and a multiparty coalition government was established with a mixed type of executive, where powers were divided between the prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, and an indirectly elected 3-person presidential council, headed by Jalal Talabani. By contrast, in Afghanistan the constitutional agreement following

the Loya Jirga concentrated considerable decision-making power in the presidency and executive, checked by a weak legislature.

Another important issue in post-conflict agreements, such as in Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo and Sudan, is how power-sharing arrangements are brokered, and in particular whether they arise from negotiated pacts among all major parties, from one side achieving a decisive victory and seizing control of the state following an armed struggle, or from a peace settlement generated by the international community and external forces. Power-sharing constitutions which are imposed by external powers on a country after intense ethnic conflict seem least likely to survive and to provide durable peace-settlements, particularly once the outside powers withdraw and cease to enforce the arrangement.⁹⁰ The chances of a durable peace remain relatively poor, for example Collier estimates that 40% of civil wars recur within a decade and thus, on average, a country that has terminated civil war can expect the outbreak of a new round of fighting within six years.⁹¹ The civil wars that end with an outright victory – as compared to a peace agreement or a ceasefire – are three times less likely to recur, possibly because one party is sufficiently subdued or deterred from fighting again.⁹² Furthermore, in civil wars where third parties intervene by economic, diplomatic or military means, conflicts persists, except when the intervention clearly supports the stronger party, in which case it mostly shortens conflict.

Given these estimates, consociational theory may under-estimate certain practical realities about achieving durable power-sharing agreements in societies such as the Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Timor Leste, or Iraq which are emerging from years of violent rebellion, prolonged militant hostilities, and armed uprisings. The initial period of peace-building in such a society is one fraught with considerable uncertainties and risks, where a few spoilers may use violent tactics to block full implementation of any constitutional settlement. In the immediate aftermath of conflict, the public is likely to place considerable priority upon restoring security, repairing the basic infrastructure, and encouraging the conditions for economic regeneration. Newly-elected legislatures and governments engaging in lengthy periods of internal negotiation and partisan squabbling in the allocation of government portfolios may prove incapable of achieving a consensus and taking effective action in a timely fashion, for example in determining national priorities about restoring basic services. In these circumstances, the public may well become impatient and blame the constitutional settlement for the perceived lack of progress. In this context, constitutional settlements which generate power-concentrating regimes may be preferable, by strengthening the capacity of elected government leaders to take difficult but necessary actions to improve security and rebuild the state.

In a related argument, both Roeder and Rothschild and also Mansfield and Snyder suggest that a sequencing process is necessary for the peaceful consolidation of democracy.⁹³ In the early stages of the initial transition from autocracy, when political institutions remain weak, states remain highly unstable and vulnerable to increased likelihood of violence and war. Power sharing is one of the

easiest ways to arrive at a multi-party negotiated peace-settlement but nevertheless this arrangement may tend to freeze in the divisions already present in a country. The peaceful transition to democracy, Mansfield and Snyder argue, requires that states first need to establish national boundaries, administrative capacity, and rule of law, concentrating power in strong central state institutions, for example in the public sector and police force, before taking the step of encouraging mass political participation and elections. The strength of domestic institutions is measured by the degree to which domestic authority is concentrated in the state's central government, or the antithesis of power-sharing. If this sequence is not followed, the authors argue, the danger is that rising populist pressures, and lack of state capacity to mediate conflicting pressures from different interests, may fuel internal conflict and a bellicose nationalism which triggers war. There may also be a contagion effect at work; Tull and Mehler suggest that Western efforts to solve violent conflict in African states through power-sharing peace-settlements may encourage rebel leaders elsewhere across the continent to embark upon the insurgent path, challenging the state through violent uprisings, in the hopes of gaining power.⁹⁴ Overall in failed states, where basic services have broken down, the public may prioritize government effectiveness in the delivery of basic public services, such as security, housing, and electricity, rather than constitutions requiring lengthy debate, negotiation and bargaining among multiple parties, bodies, and agencies to arrive at decisions. Power-sharing may thereby reduce confidence in the new constitution and undermining the long-term process of democratic consolidation. By contrast, power-concentrating regimes may prove more effective at taking decisive and timely actions to prevent war or to restore the infrastructure devastated by conflict.

The Plan of the Book

To summarize, given the divergent theoretical perspectives and empirical findings in the research and policymaking communities, it is important to reexamine the arguments put forward by consociational theorists about the suitability of power-sharing constitutional arrangements for successful democratic consolidation, especially in divided societies. Many claims are based upon specific case studies, exemplifying both the success and failure of these arrangements, but it remains difficult to generalize from these systematically to broader patterns found elsewhere. We also need to analyze the relative importance of political institutions compared with alternative explanations for democratic consolidation, and how institutions work under different social and cultural conditions. The book therefore sets out to re-examine whether political institutions, particularly power-sharing arrangements, explain the divergent pathways taken by autocratic and democratic regimes.

Part I of the book lays the foundations for the study by considering the most appropriate research design, comparing alternative measures of democracy, and examining the social and cultural conditions which underpin and reinforce the impact of institutions on democratic consolidation. *Chapter 2* summarizes and critiques the methods and approaches which have been used to examine consociational theory in the previous literature and then describes the research design adopted by this

study. One reason why the debate remains unresolved is the difficulty of operationalizing many of the core concepts in consociational theory. This study seeks to clarify the argument by establishing consistent and reliable comparative evidence about power-sharing arrangements used in a wide range of countries. Lijphart's theory of power-sharing suggests that these arrangements provide more stable democracies which benefit in terms of a number of social and economic outcomes, for example in terms of gender equality and social welfare. He emphasizes that these arrangements are generally desirable for *all* states but that they are also vital for those seeking accommodation in multi-ethnic societies, where linguistic, religious or national communities coexist within the borders of a single nation state. This study therefore adopts a large-N approach by comparing time-series cross-sectional data (TSCS) covering 191 contemporary countries around the globe, including both ethnically heterogeneous and relatively homogeneous nation states. This strategy is also important because in this study ethnicity is not treated as 'given' and immutable; instead it is understood as at least partially politically constructed, so that focusing upon only the contemporary multi-ethnic or divided societies would distort the results of the analysis by introducing a systematic bias. The analysis covers political developments occurring from 1972 to 2004, which is widely recognized as the period of the 'third wave' of democratization. The cross-sectional time-series data analysis compares institutions across all societies and then runs the models again for multi-ethnic (plural) societies, measured by the Alesina index of ethnic fractionalization. The models for all societies also control for ethnic fractionalization. In addition, the specific case studies explore these relationships in more depth by examining how ethnic minorities are accommodated under power-sharing arrangements, for example for the Maoris in New Zealand, along with the multiple linguistic and religious communities in India. No single approach is wholly persuasive by itself, however, and there are limits to the analysis of panel data, so this quantitative analysis is supplemented by qualitative paired case-studies illustrating processes of historical development within particular nation states. The research design does not make any assumptions using the conventional distinction made between indigenous (homeland) minorities and immigrant minorities, and the political consequences of each, because it is not self-evident that this is the most important aspect of ethnicity which leads towards demands for self-government. In addition, this conventional dichotomy fails to capture the complexity of ethnic identities in many parts of the world. Hence some cases under comparison examine the politics of indigenous minorities (for example, in New Zealand), while others examine multiple dimensions of ethnicity.

Chapter 3 considers the most suitable indicators of democracy. Four measures are compared: Freedom House's index of liberal democracy, the Polity IV project's measure of constitutional democracy, Vanhanen's indicator of participatory democracy, and Przeworski et al's classification based on notions of contested democracy. These represent the most widely-cited standard indicators of democracy which are commonly used by scholars and policy analysts in comparative research. Each has several strengths and weaknesses. The pragmatic strategy, adopted by this book, is to compare the results of analytical models using alternative indicators, to see if the findings remain

robust and consistent irrespective of the specific measure of democracy which is employed for analysis. If so, then this generates greater confidence in the reliability of the results. Comparison of these indicators also identifies major trends in the democratization process during the third wave period. These indicators are distinct from notions of 'good governance' which are also widely used, for example measuring levels of corruption or rule of law, and the concluding chapters explore the relationship between democracy, indicators of the quality of governance, and broader issues of human development.

Before testing the impact of any constitutional arrangements, the study first needs to consider the most appropriate controls for properly specified multivariate models, since institutions represent only part of any comprehensive explanation of the process of democratization. *Chapter 4* examines the underlying social conditions believed to sustain democracy, notably the impact of wealth and poverty. An extensive literature, following the seminal work of Seymour Martin Lipset, has emphasized the overwhelming importance of economic development for democratic consolidation. Economic accounts are probabilistic; it is not claimed that democracies can *never* be established in poor states, such as Benin, but it is implied that this type of regime rarely flourishes for long in inhospitable environments. Despite the extensive literature, the precise reasons for the relationship between wealth and democracy remain poorly understood. Moreover previous studies often do not examine political developments occurring since the early-1990s in many poorer African, Asian and Latin American nation states. To reexamine the evidence, to update the literature, and to establish suitable controls for subsequent models, this study analyzes how far patterns of democracy are systematically related to economic development. Building upon a range of studies in the literature, other structural conditions which are also analyzed in this chapter include how far democracy is related to the size of nation states, the role of colonial legacies, patterns of regional diffusion, and the degree of ethnic heterogeneity. The East Asian cases of South Korea and Singapore help to illustrate the strengths and limitations of economic explanations alone.

Having laid the preliminary groundwork, *Part II* analyzes the evidence for the consociational claim that power-sharing regimes are more effective than power-concentrating regimes for sustaining democracy. Successive chapters in this section focus upon four central aspects of power-sharing arrangements which have widely featured in contemporary constitutional debates, each of which provides potential checks on the autonomy and power of the single-party executive, namely the type of electoral system, presidential versus parliamentary executives, federalism and decentralization, and regulation of political communications.

Chapter 5 considers the most appropriate typology of *electoral systems*, how these rules generate patterns of party competition which are important for power-sharing within legislatures and coalition governments, and whether the type of electoral system is systematically related, as consociational theory claims, to democratic consolidation. Multiple rules shape electoral systems and

scholars have focused on several major aspects: the basic type of electoral system, the vote-seats allocation formula, the mean district magnitude, the ballot structure, the use of legal minimal vote thresholds for parties qualifying for seats, the existence of positive action strategies for women and minorities, and the regulation of state funding and campaign communications for political parties. In established democracies electoral rules are often regarded as endogenous, but elsewhere these institutions have sometimes proved far less sticky, and, as Colomer emphasizes, it is usually politicians who make the rules.⁹⁵ Where electoral reforms are introduced, in order to disentangle the direction of causality, studies need to pay careful attention to the 'before' and 'after' temporal sequence, for example the effective number of parliamentary parties in the elections immediately preceding and succeeding the implementation of any reform. Established democracies have also sometimes experienced pressures for major revisions to their electoral systems, and Britain and New Zealand provide illustrative cases here. Both these nation states once exemplified classic majoritarian or 'Westminster' parliamentary democracies, sharing strong cultural bonds and historical ties, yet with different experiences of electoral reform since the early-1990s.

Beyond elections, the type of executive, determining horizontal linkages in government decision-making, is often regarded as important for democratic consolidation. *Chapter 6* analyzes the systematic contrasts found between presidential and parliamentary executives. Parliamentary systems headed by a prime minister are commonly regarded as more effective for political stability, through binding together the executive and legislature. Cabinet governments are collegial bodies where the classical notion suggests that the prime minister is 'first among equals' (*primus inter pares*). By including representatives from minority parties in cabinet office, coalition governments facilitate bargaining and compromise among parties within the executive. Presidential systems, by contrast, are winner take all where executive power is concentrated in the hands of a single leader. Some evidence supports the notion that parliamentary systems are superior for strengthening democratic regimes. Stephan and Skach compared types of executives during the early-1990s and concluded that parliamentary executives were more effective for democratic consolidation than presidential systems. The reasons, they suggest, are that parliamentary democracies are more likely to allow the largest party to implement their program, even in multiparty systems. Moreover unpopular prime ministers can be replaced as leader without destabilizing the whole administration through the impeachment process or through calling fresh elections. By facilitating leadership turnover and thereby providing an outlet for popular disaffection, a parliamentary system is also thought less susceptible to military coups.⁹⁶ And parliamentary democracy also encourages long-term party-government careers, strengthening the partisan bonds and legislative experience of political leaders.⁹⁷

Still no scholarly consensus exists about the supposed virtues of parliamentary executives for sustaining democracy, in large part because much of the previous evidence was limited to comparing presidential systems in Latin America with parliamentary systems in Western Europe, making it difficult to compare like with like.⁹⁸ Presidential systems used to be relatively rare, although

these arrangements have now been adopted in a wide range of newer democracies. Moreover research on post-communist states suggests that what matters may be less the formal structure of a presidential or parliamentary executive but rather the strength or weakness of the legislature, and thus the ability of this body to check the executive.⁹⁹ Rather than simple dichotomies of parliamentary versus presidential systems, here are many different types of checks on the power of presidential executives, so we need to consider the impact of these institutional variations. In the light of this debate, this chapter reexamines the global evidence for the relationship between types of executives and the democracy indicators.

Another institutional feature, influencing vertical channels of decision-making, concerns how far power is concentrated in the nation's central government and how far it is devolved downwards to sub-national and local levels. *Chapter 7* examines federalism and decentralized structures of decision-making. The second half of the twentieth century has seen a proliferation of federations, and a variety of related forms of decentralization designed for multicultural societies, most recently in the constitutional reforms occurring in Belgium (1993), South Africa (1997), Spain (since 1978), and devolution in Britain (in 1999).¹⁰⁰ These arrangements are often believed to be critical for democratic consolidation, especially in divided societies, by allowing ethnic minorities considerable self-determination over their own affairs on culturally sensitive matters, such as linguistic and educational policy. Partition which separates groups and redistributes populations into distinct regions, allowing each minority group to exercise self-government and gain security in the areas where it forms the majority, has been argued to be the only realistic solution to intense civil wars where ethnic loyalties have calcified into ethnic hatreds.¹⁰¹ Yet critics of federalism fear that this process can result in succession and the break-up of nation-states, such as in the shattered former-Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, especially if boundaries are drawn to reinforce ethnic identities and regional parties.¹⁰² Treisman examines a range of empirical evidence and suggests that decentralizing powers from central to local governments does not necessarily produce more effective and responsive rule, as advocates claim.¹⁰³

Chapter 8 turns to the role of the fourth estate, as independent journalism can provide another vital check by reporting the abuse of power by the executive, as well as providing a channel of expression for dissident forces and opposition movements, strengthening the transparency of government decision-making, and revealing problems of corruption in the public sector. Commonly regarded as part of the public sphere, rather than a classic institution of government, nevertheless the regulation of the primary channels of political communications, particularly the independent news media, should be seen as an important part of the institutional reforms for strengthening and consolidating democratic regimes. For example, Besley and Burgess found that in the Indian case, governments proved more responsive to shocks, such as falls in crop production and crop flood damage, in states where newspaper circulation was higher and electoral accountability greater.¹⁰⁴ Cases examining the role of the press are selected from post-communist Eurasia, a region which has

registered some important gains for electoral democracy following the fall of the Berlin Wall, but which also contains some strongman autocracies, such as Belarus and Turkmenistan, where practices such as censorship, persecution and intimidation of independent journalists, and disinformation campaigns by the state remain common. Ukraine and Uzbekistan are selected for in-depth comparison.

Part III concludes by focusing upon the consequences of institutional choices for development and for public policy, with important lessons both for domestic reformers as well as for the international community. If power-sharing regimes are important for sustaining democracy, as the evidence indicates, how can they be developed? The conclusion in *Chapter 10* summarizes the main findings of the book, reflects upon challenges to the argument, considers the broader policy implications for reducing conflict and for developing sustainable democracies worldwide, and discusses the lessons both for domestic actors as well as for the international community.


Table 1.1: Key indicators in Benin and Togo

Social and economic indicators	Benin	Togo
Area	116, 622 sq km	56, 785 sq km
Pop., 2007	8.1m	5.7m
Pop below poverty line (%)	33%	32%
GDP per capita (PPP US\$), 2006	\$1,100	\$1,700
Life expectancy at birth, 2003	53 years	58 years
Human Development Index, 2003	0.431	0.512
Adult literacy (% of pop. 15+), 2001	34%	61%
Ethnic fractionalization, 2002 (Alesina)	.787	.709
Political indicators		
Year of independence (from)	1960 (France)	1960 (France)
Liberal Democracy Freedom House Index, 1973	6.5	6.5
Freedom House classification 1973	Not free	Not free
Liberal Democracy Freedom House Index, 2007	2	5.5
Freedom House classification 2007	Free	Not free
Control of Corruption (Kaufmann) 2005	16	30
Government effectiveness (Kaufmann) 2005	31	6
Political stability (Kaufmann) 2005	57	12
Rule of Law (Kaufmann) 2005	36	14
Voice and accountability (Kaufmann) 2005	55	13
Regulatory quality (Kaufmann) 2005	30	21




Note: See the appendix for details of these indices and sources of data. Freedom House Index 7-point scale (where 1=high, 7=low) The Kaufmann indices rank each country on 0-100 point scales where higher = better governance ratings.

Source: Daniel Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2006: *Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996-2005*. www.worldbank.org

Figure 1.1: West Africa by type of regime, Freedom House, 2004




Key

- Free 
- Partly free 
- Not free 

Source: Calculated from *Freedom Around the World*. www.freedomhouse.org


Figure 1.2: Liberal democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1970s and 2005



Note: The figures are the mean score of each country on the 7-point Liberal Democracy scale by Freedom House.

Source: Calculated from *Freedom Around the World*. www.freedomhouse.org

Figure 1.3: The growth of democracies worldwide, 1972-2004



Note: The graph shows the growth of in the proportion of democratic regimes worldwide as monitored using standardized 100-point scales by Freedom House, Cheibub and Gandhi, Vanhanen, and by Polity IV. See chapter 2 for a discussion of these measures and trends.

¹ For more details about these cases, see Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, 2001. *Determinants of democratization in Africa: a comparative study of Benin and Togo*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America; Boubacar Diaye, Abdoulaye Saine, and Mathurin Hounnikpo. 2005. *Not yet democracy: West Africa's slow farewell to authoritarianism*. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press.

² As discussed later in this chapter, during his lifetime Arend Lijphart published a long series of articles and books devoted to developing the ideas of consociationalism and consensus democracy. The seminal work are Arend Lijphart. 1969. 'Consociational democracy.' *World Politics*. 21: 207-25; Arend Lijphart. 1975. *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. Berkeley: University of California Press; Arend Lijphart. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Arend Lijphart. 2008. *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge.

³ For a half-dozen comparative case studies, see Ulrich Schneckener. 2002. 'Making power-sharing work: Lessons from successes and failures in ethnic conflict regulation.' *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (2): 203-228; Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff, editors. 2004. *Managing and settling ethnic conflicts: perspectives on successes and failures in Europe, Africa and Asia*. London: C. Hurst. On Kosovo, see Andrew Taylor. 2001. 'Electoral systems and the promotion of 'consociationalism' in a multi-ethnic society: The Kosovo Assembly elections of November 2001.' *Electoral Studies* 24(3): 435-463

⁴ For a review of the extensive literature, see Rudy B. Andweg. 2000. 'Consociational democracy.' *Annual Review of Politics* 3:509-36. For the development of alternative versions of this concept, see Gerhard Lehmbuch. 1967. *Proporzdemokratie. Politisches System und politische Kultur in der Schweiz und Osterreich*. Tübingen: Mohr; Jurg Steiner. 1974. *Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press; Hans Daalder. 1974. 'The consociational democracy theme.' *World Politics* 26: 604-21; Kenneth McRae. Ed. 1974. *Consociational Democracy: Conflict Accommodation in Segmented Societies*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart; Klaus Armingeon. 2002. 'The effects of negotiation democracy: A comparative analysis.' *European Journal of Political Research* 41: 81; Arend Lijphart. 2002. 'Negotiation democracy versus consensus democracy: Parallel conclusions and recommendations.' *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (1): 107-113; Wolf Linder and Andre Baechtiger. 2005. 'What drives democratization in Asia and Africa?' *European Journal of Political Research* 44: 861-880. For an early and influential critique, see Brian Barry. 1975.

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