

Chapter 5

Electoral systems

Electoral rules represent perhaps the most powerful instrument which under-gird power-sharing arrangements, with potentially far-reaching consequences for party competition, the inclusiveness of legislatures, and the composition of governments, all of which can influence processes of democratic consolidation.¹ Formal electoral rules are understood in this study, somewhat more broadly than is common in the literature, as the official policies, legal regulations and administrative procedures governing all steps in the sequential process of contesting elections, casting ballots, and winning elected office. Among these, most attention has conventionally focused upon the last step in the development, including the quota formula, the ballot structure, and the district magnitude, which determine how votes are cast and then converted into elected office.

The theory of consociationalism argues that power-sharing arrangements have important consequences for 'kinder, gentler' governance. Rules which recognize and seek to accommodate parties and representatives drawn from distinct ethnic groups are thought most likely to consolidate fragile democracies by facilitating accommodation and building trust among diverse communities living in deeply-divided societies. The electoral mechanisms most closely associated with power-sharing include proportional representation systems, which lower the barriers facing smaller parties, and positive action strategies, such as reserved seats for ethnic communities and minority-majority constituencies. Power-sharing electoral institutions are thought especially important for accommodating diverse groups, reducing community tensions, and promoting acceptance of peace settlements in fragmented societies emerging from a recent history of bloody civil war and regime instability.² If true, these claims hold critical lessons for the most effective constitutional design which can be adopted in post-war settlements.

To consider these issues, Part I of this chapter summarizes consociational arguments favoring power-sharing electoral arrangements and the doubts expressed by critics. If consociational claims are supported, the logic suggests that countries using power-sharing (either PR electoral systems or positive action strategies) should have achieved stronger democracies than equivalent states which have not employed these policies, all other things being equal. To examine the evidence, Part II defines and classifies the major types of electoral system used in this study and then analyzes their effects on democratic consolidation, controlling for the prior social and economic conditions which the previous chapter established as important for democracy, including levels of economic development and the degree of ethnic fractionalization within each society. Case studies help to illustrate the underlying dynamic processes at work, enriching the large-N comparison. Part III describes patterns of democracy both before and after major changes to electoral systems, in the selected cases of New Zealand and Britain, to see

how far reforms increased party competition, especially representation for minority communities, and thereby strengthened democracy.

I: Consociational theory and its critics

Why might power-sharing electoral rules prove more effective for consolidating democracy, particularly in deeply-divided societies? To clarify the logic underlying consociational theory, the main steps in the chain of reasoning are outlined schematically in Figure 5.1.

[Figure 5.1 about here]

Multi-ethnic societies contain distinct ethnic communities

Consociationalism starts from the premise that social psychological feelings of attachment to group identities-- based on shared religion, language, culture or community -- are often strong, entrenched, and powerful forces dividing multiethnic societies. If not seen as fixed, innate, and immutable, then these types of cultural identities are at minimal regarded in political sociology as derived from the earliest processes of socialization within the family, school, and community, deeply-rooted in society, and thus exogenous to the political system. In the long-term ethnic identities may be transformed, for example if second-generation sons and daughters of émigré groups gradually become assimilated into the mainstream culture through language, educational opportunities, social networks, or workplace participation, but these psychological attachments are seen as enduring characteristics. In this regard, ethnicity, like gender, cues our sense of ourselves and others. Consociationalism treats ethnic identities as largely singular rather than cross-cutting categories, as reflecting group interests as well as psychological orientations, and as capable of over-riding other social and political cleavages, such as those arising from socioeconomic status, gender, or ideology.³ In this view, divisions between Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists are taken for granted as the unshakable building blocs that have to be recognized and accommodated in Northern Ireland politics, while national identities and language divide Belgian and Canadian societies, and race demarcates American society. Even though there may be many important divisions within each group, for example between poor and middle-class African Americans, or the class differences among religious communities in Belfast, this social-psychological prism regards these communities as each sharing largely homogeneous preferences and fixed boundaries, where politics represents a zero-sum game. In Iraq, in the same way, many observers consider differences among Kurds, Shi'a and Sunnis, entrenched further by insecurities and inter-community violence, as the intractable cleavages and deep-rooted building blocks which constitutional designers need to accommodate to achieve any realistic and lasting peace-settlement within the borders of a common nation-state. Understood through this perspective, the issue becomes how best to guarantee the incorporation of individual representatives and parties drawn from distinct communities within democratic political institutions, to protect community interests and provide safeguards for mutual security.

PR electoral systems facilitate minority representation

If societies are deeply-divided, what institutional mechanisms would insure that representative bodies reflect the composition of the societies from which they are elected? Consociationalism regards proportional representation (PR) electoral systems as the simplest, least contentious, and most flexible way to facilitate the election of parties representing distinct minority communities. PR elections with large multimember districts lower the formal vote hurdles facing parties seeking elected office. These rules should therefore facilitate the election of smaller parties, including those representing distinct ethnic minority groups which are scattered geographically, roughly in proportion to their share of support in the electorate. By itself, PR electoral systems kick in at the final stage of translating votes into seats, so they do not automatically generate a level playing-field for party competition in all prior stages in the sequential process of recruitment, campaigning, and gaining elected office. Minor parties may still commonly experience particular problems of gaining ballot access, for example some countries impose legal bans on parties which the courts regard as extremist, such as laws restricting the expression of racial hatred by the radical right.⁴ Others restrict competition through partisan redistricting processes limiting ballot access to minor parties, or strict party and candidate registration requirements.⁵ Minor parties may also be disadvantaged by the official rules and statutory regulations governing direct public funding, indirect state subsidies, and access to campaign broadcasting.⁶ Nevertheless, compared with majoritarian electoral systems, proportional representation systems provide lower hurdles for smaller parties and hence for those representing specific regional, linguistic, or national minority communities. Moreover unlike affirmative action policies, PR electoral systems do not need to specify and thereby freeze the size of any such minority representation, a process of legal or constitutional amendment which may well prove contentious; instead any groups and communities with a grievance may freely organize to mobilize voting support in proportion to their size.⁷ Demographic shifts, such as the growing Catholic population in Northern Ireland, and hence the gathering electoral strength of Sinn Fein and other republican parties, are also incorporated flexibly into the political process over successive elections.⁸

Positive action strategies also help minority representation

Consociationalism regards PR as the primary, but not the only, electoral mechanism which can be designed to bring minority groups into elected office, as positive action strategies can also be used to achieve this goal.⁹ This includes the creation of minority-majority districts (used in the United States to elect African Americans to the House of Representatives), the employment of communal rolls (such as those for Maoris in New Zealand), and the use of reserved seats (established in India for Scheduled Castes and Tribes).¹⁰ Worldwide such mechanisms are employed in more than two dozen countries.¹¹ Positive action mechanisms

commonly recognize and institutionalize the claims of certain specific historical communities, such as the position of the Maoris as the original Polynesian settlers in New Zealand, the Hungarian community who first settled in Romania in the 9th century, and indigenous Indian populations in Venezuela. At the same time, due to the contentious nature of affirmative action, these policies often fail to be equally inclusive for representatives and parties drawn from newer émigré communities, such as North African Muslims living in France, the Kurdish diasporas in Turkey, or Turkish ‘guest workers’ resident in Germany.

Legislative office encourages elite cooperation

Once elected to representative assemblies through either mechanism, consociational theory suggests that leaders of minority groups have strong incentives for cooperation, bargaining, and compromise, through the give-and-take of legislative politics at elite level. Party leaders can leverage their position to negotiate and gain ministerial office in coalition governments. Those working together in governing alliances develop experience of regular face-to-face negotiations and political haggling, a process gradually expected to strengthen inter-community cooperation and social tolerance. In opposition, minority leaders can represent and safeguard the interests of their constituents, especially where specific minority vetoes are recognized constitutionally, for example over issues involving language policy, freedom of religious expression, or cultural rights. If negotiated peace-settlements give all significant players a stake within parliament, it is anticipated that this should strengthen the incentives for the leaders of the rebellion to accept constitutional pacts, to maintain a cease-fire, and to promote conciliation among their followers. The ability of minorities to veto proposals which would threaten community interests is seen as particularly important to their security, especially in post-war pacts. At the same time, safeguards need to be built into the implementation of peace-settlements, including continued engagement by external forces or the international community, as otherwise, once in government, the majority group may simply decide to overturn any formal constitutional agreement to protect minority rights.

Inclusiveness strengthens community support for democracy

This process, consociational theory suggests, will also have an impact upon the general public by strengthening democratic attitudes, encouraging participation, and increasing confidence in the legitimacy of the democratic channels of bargaining and compromise. Leaders have an incentive to encourage community acceptance of any peace settlement, as this helps to preserve their power and status in elected office. The inclusion of community spokespersons in visible positions of power is expected to function as a safety valve for ethnic tensions, reducing inter-communal conflict, encouraging peaceful transitions, and strengthening the process of democratic consolidation in divided societies. Under more inclusive electoral arrangements, it is theorized that each distinct religious, linguistic, or nationalistic community will feel that their voice

counts and that the rules of the game are fair and legitimate, as their leaders can articulate their concerns and protect their interests within the legislature and within government.¹² Consociational theory concludes that in the long-term this process should thereby serve to stabilize deeply conflict-ridden societies and manage, or even reduce, broader ethnic tensions. The inclusion of minority groups within parliament cannot be equated automatically with their access to substantive power, especially in largely-symbolic legislative bodies unable to check decisions made by the executive, and small parties may be impotent to shape the legislative agenda and government policy. Nevertheless the permanent exclusion of the leaders of any significant minority community from representative assemblies is thought to encourage alienation and violence. This situation is especially dangerous in divided societies emerging from protracted deep-rooted conflict, where parties are organized around issues of communal identity, rather than around programmatic or ideological lines, and where politics is viewed by each community as a win or lose game.

Critics of consociational theory

Critics have responded by raising a series of challenges to these arguments. The most important questions concern the fluidity of ethno-political identities, the strength of the electoral incentives for ethnic cooperation among elites, and the potential advantages of majoritarian electoral systems for fragile democracies.

The political relevance of social identities

As discussed earlier, consociational theory takes the existence of ethnic identities based on religion, race or nationality as fixed and enduring psychological characteristics, acquired through socialization processes rooted in the family, school and local community, which rarely, if ever, alter in the short-term due to political processes. As such, community boundaries are seen as relatively stable, with each reflecting entrenched interests, and the challenge for democracy is how to include leaders from diverse minority communities within representative legislatures. This represents an essentialist or primordial view of ethnicity. Challenges arise from the alternative constructivist perspective which suggests that people often have multiple identities, each of which are socially constructed and the salience of which is more fluid over time.¹³ Hence, for instance, Hispanics in the United States may be defined as a political community by their country of origin, such as Mexican-Americans, Cuban-Americans, or Colombian-Americans, or by other cross-cutting cleavages such as their ideological location as Democrats or Republicans, by region, class and social status, race, or by gender. What matters in this regard, constructivists suggest, is not the existence of latent social identities per se, but rather the way that the shared interests arising from these identities are channeled and organized by community leadership elites into grievances and demands requiring a collective response in the political system. Modern Iraq, for example, was created after the defeat of the German-allied Ottoman Empire in World War I, when

the victorious British and French carved up the territory of their defeated rival. The artificial boundaries of the new nation-state included Kurds in the north, with a distinct history and language, and the Shiite and Sunni Muslims with divergent religious viewpoints, regional, and cultural differences, although Shiite and Sunnis lived harmoniously in Iraq until the rise of secular Baath Party and Saddam Hussein's brutal treatment of the Shiite and Kurdish communities. The fall of Saddam, and subsequent continued instability under the American-British intervention, exacerbated latent ethnic tensions. In the first elections, political leaders and factions built party support by appealing to each community. In the constructivist view, the strength of nationalist feelings towards Iraq as a single polity, and the importance of distinct ethnic communities within its borders, were reinforced and inflamed by political developments.

The constructivist approach draws on one of the longest traditions in political sociology, arising from the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan, who suggested that contemporary European party systems reflected their historical roots within each country, with party organizations developing with the expansion of the franchise to mobilize the electorate around the major social cleavages of class, religion, and center-peripheral regions.¹⁴ For Lipset and Rokkan, social identities became organized into partisan loyalties, with party competition subsequently institutionalizing and freezing around these core cleavages. A similar process may be occurring in new democracies where, in the absence of other organizing principles, party systems develop around the core social cleavages, mobilizing blocs of voters. What matters for constructivists is less the multiple social identities existing in society than how some of these, but not others, are mobilized into party systems and thus legislative politics.

Incentives for community cooperation or rivalry

Moreover critics charge that it is dangerous to empower leaders whose popular support is based exclusively within, rather than across, the boundaries of each community. This process provides an electoral incentive for populist leaders to appeal for popular support by reinforcing ethnic tensions and mistrust of other groups, and it serves to institutionalize and thereby freeze existing ethnic identities and community boundaries.¹⁵ The political salience of communal identities may be unintentionally magnified by PR electoral rules (which lower the nation-wide vote threshold facilitating the election of small parties), and by positive action strategies (which explicitly recognize specific linguistic, religious, or nationalistic communal groups as the basis for allocating seats). The dangers of such arrangements are exemplified, critics suggest, by elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton peace settlement, which reduced the incentive for cross-community cooperation and non-sectarian electoral appeals.¹⁶ Rwanda also illustrates a country where international efforts promoted ethnic power-sharing between Hutu and Tutsi, but where the traditional ruling elites felt threatened by democratization. As a result, Snyder suggests, international efforts may have unintentionally backfired by heightening ethnic tensions, reinforcing

the incentive for extremist politicians to make sectarian appeals reinforcing ethnic hatred within each community, generating disastrous bloodshed.¹⁷ Communal leaders who win elected office gain a more visible platform, greater legitimacy, and the spotlight of the news media, all of which can be used to exploit, and thereby heighten, social tensions, ethnic hatred, and the politics of fear. Indeed, as illustrated by the Northern Ireland peace process, moderate parties which sought to cooperate across community lines gradually lost power to more radical politicians who regarded any compromise as a 'sell-out'.¹⁸ PR systems facilitate the election of smaller parties, not just from ethnic minorities, but also empower those drawn from the radical right, such as the French Front National, the Belgian *Vlaams Blok* (Flemish Bloc), and the Austrian *Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs* (FPÖ, Freedom Party), who exploit xenophobic fears about new immigrants, stoking racist tensions.¹⁹ Critics charge that power-sharing formula (PR systems with low thresholds of exclusion, and positive action strategies) fail to provide community leaders with an effective electoral incentive for cross-group cooperation. These policies may therefore serve to rigidify the boundaries dividing ethnic communities, reinforcing and heightening political instability in deeply-divided post-war societies.²⁰

By contrast, others propose that community cooperation and reconciliation may be strengthened most effectively by the adoption of majoritarian electoral systems. Both Horowitz and Reilly advocate adoption of the Alternative Vote (AV, also known as the Preferential Vote or 'instant runoff', used for the Australian House of Representatives).²¹ The system of AV requires winning parties and candidates to gain an absolute majority of the vote (50%+1), rather than a simple plurality. This hurdle is thought to have two important consequences.²² First, the need to gain support from a majority of the electorate encourages individual politicians to cooperate strategically with others within their party organizations. Community leaders are interested in collaborating within electoral coalitions, to build larger organizations capable of winning seats. Even more importantly, higher thresholds also create strategic incentives for vote-pooling, as politicians and parties need to emphasize broad-based moderate electoral appeals to win. Those seeking to maximize their popular support among to the median voter will emphasize non-sectarian bridging issues, avoiding narrow polarizing and controversial policies which appeal only to distinct linguistic, racial, nationalistic or religious communities.²³ This is particularly true if the electoral districts are drawn to reflect multiethnic populations, rather than drawing boundaries between ethnic communities. Majoritarian electoral systems may thereby encourage politicians to adopt cross-identity appeals, where they target diverse sectors of the electorate.²⁴

Trade-off values in fragile democracies and failed-states

The final challenge to consociational theory emphasizes that the choice of electoral rules requires a trade off among conflicting values, where the inclusiveness of all communities within the legislature is only one consideration.²⁵ Majoritarian systems which concentrate power in the

hands of the winning party during their term of office may have other qualities that prove especially important for underpinning sustainable peace-settlements and generating stable governments in divided societies emerging from civil wars. Majoritarian and plurality electoral systems systematically exaggerate the share of seats allocated to the winning party, and reduce the share of seats allocated to smaller parties. The mechanical effect of these rules is to secure a decisive outcome for the first-ranked party, so that they can form a single-party cabinet government resting on a secure overall parliamentary majority, even in a closely-balanced election. This arrangement may help to maximize the transparency and accountability of government policymaking, as well as serving to produce stable and durable governments empowered to serve their full-term in office. Majoritarian elections are better at generating a decisive outcome, producing governments assured of a legislative majority, without a prolonged period of uncertainty arising from post-election negotiation and haggling with coalition partners. This may be particularly important in failed states, which need to reestablish internal security destroyed by prolonged civil war and ethnic conflict. Effective government may be the over-riding concern in societies emerging from deep-rooted internal conflict and failed states, such as Liberia, Somalia, Iraq, or Eritrea, where there are widespread doubts about the government's capacity to maintain internal security, to manage the economy, and to deliver basic public services. Societies emerging from a period of prolonged conflict which has destroyed inter-community trust, and with many poorly-institutionalized new parties and legislative factions elected to office, are likely to experience considerable problems in the post-election period of bargaining and compromise needed to create a workable governing coalition.

For all these reasons, while inclusive power-sharing arrangements (proportional electoral systems with low thresholds and/or positive action strategies) have often been adopted in many negotiated peace-settlements, it is by no means clear from the scholarly literature that these will necessarily prove the most effective mechanism for promoting sustainable peace, inter-ethnic reconciliation, and democratic consolidation in the long-term.

II: Comparing electoral systems

What evidence could help to resolve this debate? Case studies of the apparent success of electoral engineering (South Africa?) and apparent failure (Bosnia-Herzegovina?) can be quoted by both sides, but such examples have not proved sufficiently convincing to resolve the contemporary debate.²⁶ As we observed earlier, the proportional electoral system adopted by Benin in the early-1990s may have been the foundation of the broader process of power-sharing and democratic consolidation, in sharp contrast to the majoritarian rules which reinforced the military-backed autocracy in Togo, but it is difficult to know how far we can generalize from these examples. In the same way, we can compare the post-war Iraqi constitution, which followed consociational advice by adopting proportional party list elections for the National Assembly, with

Afghanistan which chose majoritarian elections for the Wolesi Jirga (adopting a system of Single Non-Transferable Vote). Yet case studies remain limited, as these societies differ in many other fundamental ways, so it remains difficult to isolate institutional effects arising from the electoral systems from many other factors, such as cultural traditions, levels of development, and the influence of the international community.

To examine some of the issues underlying these claims and counterclaims more systematically, broader comparisons are required. We can start by classifying power-sharing electoral arrangements, identifying both the type of electoral system and the positive action strategies for minority representation, used in all nation states worldwide. The analysis of the effects of these arrangements builds upon the multivariate models developed in the previous chapter. Institutional effects are examined controlling for prior social and economic conditions, including levels of economic development and the degree of ethnic fractionalization within each society. The dependent variables include the indicators of democratic consolidation established earlier, as well as indicators of party systems, ethnic conflict, and political stability.

Classifying electoral systems

In plural societies, Lijphart theorizes that proportional representation electoral systems are most effective for democratic consolidation, while the Horowitz-Reilly vote-pooling theory predicts that majoritarian electoral systems are most likely to serve this function. To test the evidence supporting these alternative hypotheses, the major and minor type of electoral system currently used for the lower house of parliament can be classified and then compared across all independent nation states worldwide, excluding dependent territories. The core typology used for the contemporary comparison is summarized in Figure 5.2 and the classification is derived from the 2nd edition of the *International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design* covering contemporary electoral systems used in 2004.²⁷ In total, out of 191 contemporary independent nation-states around the globe, nine are excluded from the classification of electoral systems as they currently lack a directly elected national parliament. This includes the Persian Gulf royal families (in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates), the monarchies governing Brunei Darussalam and Bhutan, the personal dictatorship of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya, and communist China.²⁸ Two additional countries are excluded as they experienced state collapse (Eritrea and Somalia) with electoral systems which remain in transition. Electoral systems for the remaining countries were categorized into three major families -- majoritarian, proportional, and combined -- each including a number of sub-categories.

[Figure 5.2 about here]

Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems are designed to translate the percentage of votes relatively proportionally into the percentage of seats won, lowering the threshold facing smaller parties. Proportional representation systems are defined in this study to

include Party List, as well as the Single Transferable Vote electoral systems which is less common.²⁹ The main institutional variations within PR systems concern the use of open or closed lists of candidates, the quota formula for translating votes into seats, the level of the legal vote threshold, and the size of the average district magnitude. By contrast, *majoritarian-plurality* systems require a higher effective vote threshold and they are essentially power-concentrating (by systematically squeezing the number of parliamentary parties). Majoritarian rules require the winning candidate or party to gain 50%+1 of the vote (including the Alternative Vote (AV) and the Second Ballot (runoff or two-round) systems). Plurality rules require that the winning candidate or party in first place gains more votes than any other, but not necessarily a majority of ballots cast (including First-Past-the-Post single member plurality system, the Party Block vote, and the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system).³⁰ Plurality rules generate a 'manufactured' majority, that is, they have a systematic exaggerative bias which usually translates a plurality of votes for the party in first place into a majority of seats. Lastly, '*combined*' electoral systems (otherwise known as 'mixed', 'dual', 'hybrid' or 'side-by-side' systems) use two ballot structures within simultaneous contests for the same elected office.³¹ This study follows Massicotte and Blais by classifying 'combined' systems according to their mechanics, not by their outcome.³² Combined systems have become increasingly popular during the last decade although a great variety of alternative designs are employed. This category can be further subdivided into 'combined-independent' systems where the distribution of seats is independent for each type of ballot, and 'combined-dependent' systems (such as Germany and New Zealand), where the distribution of seats is proportional to the share of the vote cast in the party list. As a result combined-independent systems are closer to the 'majoritarian' than the 'proportional' end of the spectrum, while 'combined-dependent' are closer to the 'proportional' end of the spectrum.

[Figure 5.3 about here]

A comparison of trends in the use of the major types of electoral systems used worldwide since the early-1970s in Figure 5.3 illustrates the sharp fall during the decade of the 1990s in the number of countries without any competitive elections. The use of multi-party elections for the legislative and executive office became far more widespread during this era, for example International IDEA estimate that just over 40 presidential elections were held in each decade during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970, rising to 67 in the 1980s, before shooting up to 222 during the 1990s.³³ Trends in the number of parliamentary elections show a similar rise, doubling from 196 contests held during the 1970s to 381 during the 1990s. Nevertheless many of these elections have been used in recent years as a façade to legitimate the rule of regimes which have been conceptualized, alternatively, as 'electoral autocracies' (Diamond), 'illiberal democracies' (Fareed) or 'competitive authoritarian regimes' (Levitsky), exemplified by Belarus, Egypt, Malaysia, Uzbekistan, or Zimbabwe.³⁴ As discussed in chapter 3, electoral autocracies are often difficult to classify with any precision as they are characterized by the formal trappings of liberal

democracy, but where free and fair multiparty competition and civil liberties are sharply limited by the ruling elites. Common techniques to limit genuine electoral competition, often reported by observers, include major restrictions on access to the ballot for opposition parties and intimidation of challengers, the widespread use of intimidation, coercion, or bribery by security forces at the polling station, and by strong pro-government bias and limits on independent journalism in campaign coverage in the media airwaves.

Turning to trends in the type of electoral system which have been used, Figure 5.3 shows that proportional representation systems have usually been more popular than majoritarian systems, with the category of 'combined' or 'mixed' electoral systems the smallest category but rising in popularity in the 1990s. This is partly the result of the adoption of this system in many of the newer democracies which emerged following the fall of the Berlin wall, as well as the way that this system has been adopted by some established democracies which reformed their systems, such as New Zealand.³⁵

[Table 5.1 about here]

Table 5.1 summarizes a series of indicators illustrating the characteristic impact of the major types of electoral systems on party systems and levels of proportionality. The results generally conform to expectations arising from the previous literature about the mechanical workings of electoral systems. Hence, as anticipated, the exaggerative bias common in majoritarian systems usually results in a decisive electoral outcome; on average, under these rules the largest party generally wins two-thirds of all parliamentary seats. This empowers single-party cabinet governments to implement their legislative program during their term of office assured of the support of a comfortable parliamentary majority, without the need for coalition partners. By contrast, PR systems are more likely to generate coalition governments; the largest party usually wins less than a majority (44%) of seats. The indicators also confirm that PR rules systematically lower the effective electoral threshold, thereby facilitating the election of many smaller parties. This pattern is consistent irrespective of the specific indicator of party competition which is compared, for example the Rae party fractionalization index is twice as strong in PR systems compared with majoritarian elections.

Based on this classification, the question which arises is whether there is systematic support for the core consociational claims that PR is the most effective electoral system for democratic consolidation, and that this is particularly evident in divided societies. To start to scrutinize the evidence, we can examine whether the four indicators of democracy used throughout this study differ by the major types of contemporary electoral systems used worldwide, without introducing any prior controls.

Figure 5.4 compares the scores on Freedom House's indicator of Liberal Democracy, Polity IV's Constitutional Democracy, Vanhanen's Participatory Democracy, or Cheibub and

Gandhi's Contested Democracy. Irrespective of the indicator used, the results confirm that countries using List PR electoral systems consistently rate as significantly the most democratic, as consociational theory claims. The combined types of electoral system are located in an intermediate position. By contrast, majoritarian electoral systems proved consistently less democratic, for example, according to the Polity scale, nation states using PR systems were on average twice as democratic as those using majoritarian rules. When tested by ANOVA, these differences by types of electoral system all proved moderately strongly associated and statistically significant (with the Eta coefficient of association at .37 to .53 all at the $p=.001$ level).

[Figures 5.4 and 5.5 about here]

But does this pattern also vary systematically by the type of ethnic cleavages within each society, with PR proving most important in plural societies, the second and stronger claim in consociational theory? For a preliminary look at the patterns, Figure 5.5 compares societies which were classified as either heterogeneous or homogeneous, based on dichotomizing Alesina's ethnic fractionalization index. This is a simple classification of plural societies, gauging whether populations are ethnically similar or different, but it cannot take account of whether such cleavages are politically-salient. The comparison, without any prior controls, confirms that among homogeneous societies, nation states using PR electoral systems were consistently more democratic than countries with majoritarian elections, and the difference in levels of democracy between PR and majoritarian electoral systems was greatest in heterogeneous societies, as Lijphart theorizes. Consociational theory emphasizes that majoritarian systems can work well within homogeneous societies, but that PR elections are particularly important for consolidating democracy in divided societies, and the comparison conducted so far provides preliminary support for this claim.

Positive action mechanisms for ethnic minorities

As an alternative proposition, Lijphart theorizes that democratic consolidation in divided societies will also be strengthened by electoral rules which incorporate positive action policies designed to insure the election of representatives or parties drawn from minority communities. We can compare the effects of three such mechanisms which have been employed in different countries.

District boundary delimitation: In some countries, electoral boundaries are drawn to recognize certain communities of interest, creating specific single-member districts where minority electorates are concentrated. In the United States, for example, following the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its amendment in 1982, racial redistricting processes have been based on identifying concentrations of black, Hispanic, Asians and Native American minorities within the electorate. There are disputes about their effects but many argue that these have proved critical for the election of Africa-American and Latino congressional candidates to the US House of

Representatives.³⁶ In Hungary, the boundary authority takes into account ethnic, religious, historical or other local communities when creating districts, while Panama and Ukraine also require consideration of minority populations. Boundaries are often drawn and revised periodically to maintain population equality between districts but some countries have over-represented specific territories by requiring smaller electoral quotas within certain regions; until recently, for example, the population of Scotland was over-represented by Westminster MPs in comparison with England. Majoritarian electoral systems are also not an insurmountable barrier for the success of smaller nationalist parties if their popular support is heavily concentrated within specific districts.³⁷ The Scottish National Party, for example, both performed relatively well in gaining seats within their own regions; in the 2005 general election, for example, the SNP gained 17.7% of the vote in Scotland and they won 6 seats (10%) in the region. By contrast, other minor parties with more dispersed across Britain, such as the Greens, UKIP and BNP, gained no seats.³⁸ Electoral geography and the drawing of district boundaries are critical in this regard, with majoritarian systems most disadvantageous for smaller parties or scattered communities with dispersed support.

Reserved seats: Another alternative form of positive action is the use of reserved seats designed to compensate for historically-disadvantaged communities. These are found, for example, for indigenous minorities in New Zealand, Pakistan, and Fiji, where these seats are filled by appointees of the recognized group or elected by voters from a communal electoral roll.³⁹ Reserved seats have been applied based on recognition of race/ethnicity, language, national identity and religion, as well as for minorities on island territories detached from the nation-state land mass. There is nothing particularly novel about these arrangements; reserved seats were used in many colonially administered territories and after the Second World War separate communal rolls with reserved seats became integral parts of power sharing solutions to end internal conflicts in Lebanon in 1943, Cyprus in 1960, and Zimbabwe in 1980. A recent worldwide review found that at least 32 countries used reserved seats, communal rolls, race conscious districting, or special electoral arrangements designed for communal or minority representation in parliament.⁴⁰ During the last decade, these strategies were reflected in the compartmentalized ethnic arrangements of peace pacts in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosova. In Croatia, for example, which uses List PR for most seats, specific districts are reserved for members of Hungarian, Czech and Slovak, Ruthenian and Ukrainian, and German and Austrian minorities. As we have already seen, in Singapore the Group Representative Constituencies provide a voice for Indian, Malay, and Eurasian minority candidates. Mauritius allocates eight seats for Hindu, Muslim, Chinese and Creole recognized communities. India reserves a certain number of seats in each state for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, where only candidates drawn from these communities can stand for election. One of the best-known examples of such policies include Lebanon's parliament which has 128 seats divided among distinct groups. Members are divided evenly

among Christian and Muslim communities, each allocated 64 seats, and within those two major categories are eleven different factions, each with reserved seats. The top three sects on the Christian side include the Maronite Catholics (with 34 reserved seats), the Greek Orthodox and the Greek Catholics. On the Muslim side, the Shias and Sunnis each have 27 reserved seats, while the Druze have eight. Most countries using reserved seats have majoritarian electoral systems, including within FPTP systems such as Pakistan, India, Samoa, Iran and Kiribati. But countries with PR and combined electoral systems also include this mechanism, particularly the cases of post-conflict power-sharing agreements, namely Rwanda, Kosovo, Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Lebanon.

What is the effect of these mechanisms for minority representation on democratic consolidation? We can start by comparing levels of democracy, using the four indicators already employed in this study, in the countries which do and do not use at least one of these positive action mechanisms. Figure 5.6 illustrates the patterns, confirming that the 29 countries employing positive action policies for minority representation are consistently more democratic across each of these indicators. ANOVA shows that the pattern is statistically significant, with the most substantial contrast found using the Polity index.

[Figure 5.6 about here]

Multivariate analysis

The preliminary comparisons so far appear to support the consociational argument favoring more proportional electoral systems or positive action strategies for minorities. But are the contrasts we have observed the product of the institutional arrangements, or can they be attributed to other features in the nation states under comparison. Multivariate analysis is needed to see whether these patterns persist even after employing the battery of prior controls which we established in the previous chapter to be closely related to levels of democracy. One of these concerns the past colonial legacies which continue to shape the contemporary distribution of electoral systems; hence three-quarters of the former-British colonies use a majoritarian electoral system today for national elections to the lower house of the legislature, as do two-thirds of the ex-French colonies. By contrast, proportional electoral systems are employed by three-quarters of the former-Portuguese colonies, two-thirds of the ex-Spanish colonies, and all the former Dutch colonies.⁴¹ The post-communist states freed from rule by the Soviet Union divide almost evenly among the three major electoral families, although slightly more countries (37%) have adopted proportional systems. While Eastern Europe leans towards majoritarian arrangements, Central Europe adopted more proportional systems. To examine the impact of electoral systems on democracy, we need to expand the models already developed in chapter 4, controlling for past colonial histories, as well as degrees of ethnic fractionalization, levels of economic development,

regional diffusion, the Middle East region, and the physical and population size of the country. In these models, combined (mixed) electoral systems are the default (comparison) category.

[Tables 5.2 and 5.3 about here]

Table 5.2 presents the results of the OLS regression models, based on analysis of the pooled time-series cross-sectional data. The coefficients confirm that, compared across all societies worldwide, countries using majoritarian electoral systems have a worse democratic performance on each of the indicators, even after controlling for the range of economic and cultural factors associated with democracy. By contrast, PR electoral systems are positively associated with democracy, although the coefficient for the Freedom House index was not statistically significant. Moreover the use of positive action strategies was also positively related to levels of democracy across all the indicators. Overall the multivariate analysis confirms the comparisons observed earlier, supporting the consociational argument that countries using PR electoral systems and positive action strategies are the most successful democratically. Consociational theory predicts that these forms of power-sharing institutions are valuable in general, but nowhere more so than in divided societies. Accordingly Table 5.3 repeats the analysis but limiting the comparison to plural societies, defined by dichotomizing the Alesina measure of ethnic fractionalization. The results show that the positive impact of PR electoral systems on democracy is far stronger in these nation states, for example the use of PR produces a 5-10 percentage point increase in democracy on the 100-point scales. Countries using positive action strategies for ethnic minority representation were also significantly more democratic.

Part III: Case studies of electoral reform

The comparisons drawn so far seem to provide considerable support for many of the consociational claims. Yet we have not been able to test all the sequential steps in the consociational argument outlined in Figure 5.1. The relationship between electoral systems and democracy could still be due to many other factors, for example PR may facilitate multiparty competition and higher electoral turnout, without necessarily leading towards inter-communal trust among party leaders or greater satisfaction with the democratic process among community members. Paired case studies of electoral reform in Britain and New Zealand provide a better understanding of the underlying dynamic processes at work, in particular how far changing the rules alters patterns of party competition and the representation of ethnic minority groups.

During the post-war era, both Britain and New Zealand used to exemplify the classic Westminster model, characterized by single member plurality electoral systems and unitary states. First-past-the-post produced a two party adversarial system in parliament, single-party cabinet governments, and strong central governments in both countries. Due to New Zealand's colonial origins, these nation states also shared many strong cultural bonds, especially during the heyday of the British Commonwealth prior to the UK's entry into the European Union. Both are

long-standing stable democracies, each containing important minority communities, and each society becoming increasingly diverse in recent decades. The majority of New Zealand's population is descended from British émigrés, with significant minorities of indigenous Maoris, of Polynesian descent, and more recently other European, Pacific islanders and East Asian immigrants. By 2050, it is estimated that the white population will become a minority in New Zealand. In the UK, the primary arguments about the political representation of national identities have focused upon the peace settlement in Northern Ireland, and upon devolution in Scotland and Wales. More recent émigré communities are represented in the Muslim population in Britain, including diverse Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities, as well as Sikhs and Hindus originally from India, the black population from Afro-Caribbean descent, and other East Asian groups.

Each country has taken a different path towards electoral reform, and the inclusion of specific minorities. New Zealand adopted a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system (combined-dependent) for the national parliament in 1993, while continuing to use Maori communal rolls for the indigenous population. By contrast, electoral reform has been widely debated but not yet implemented for the British House of Commons and for English local elections, although the Labor government has introduced a range of alternative electoral systems used for selecting British members of the European Parliament (regional PR closed party list using the d'Hondt rule), the new Scottish Parliament and Welsh assembly (using 'additional member system or AMS), and the London Assembly and London Mayor (supplementary vote systems). Under devolution, Scotland was granted a parliament with considerable law-making powers, while the Welsh assembly has administrative responsibilities for a range of public services.⁴² Here we can focus upon analyzing changes following the adoption of AMS for Scotland and Wales, as the most comparable combined dependent electoral system to the MMP arrangement chosen in New Zealand.

The regional bodies in the UK

What have been the effects of electoral reform on party systems and minority representation in each country? Figure 5.7 illustrates party fortunes in elections held before and after devolution, which was first implemented in 1999. The process of decentralization can be regarded by social scientists as a natural pre-post experiment which modified the rules in successive contests, while holding constant the broader social and economic context in each region. The electoral system used for Westminster contests also remained largely unchanged; the House of Commons continues to employ traditional single-member districts and plurality elections (first-past-the-post), although for the 2005 election, following boundary revisions, the total number of Scottish MPs was cut from 72 to 59, bringing Scottish districts into line with the size of the average electorates in England and Wales. The first elections for the Scottish parliament and for the Welsh Assembly were held in 1999 under the Additional Member

(combined dependent) system and the process was repeated again in 2003 and in 2007. Scottish voters were given two ballot papers: one used the familiar system of first-past-the-post to elect each of the 73 constituency members. The second used party lists in eight regional multimember districts to elect 56 additional representatives. The latter were allocated so that the overall distribution of seats was proportional to the share of votes cast for each party in each region. The d'Hondt formula is used for allocating the top up seats. Under the d'Hondt system, parties which perform well in constituency votes, but fail to translate that success into elected constituency members, will be rewarded via the additional member system. Conversely, parties which do well by securing constituencies win fewer top-up seats. Similar processes were followed for allocating the sixty-seat Welsh Assembly.

[Figure 5.7 about here]

As shown by the proportion of votes cast for each party, illustrated in Figure 5.7, the Labour party has predominated in the series of elections in both regions. Indeed fear of continuous Labour hegemony was perhaps the main reason why a cross-party coalition favored the Additional Member system for the new bodies. But the systematic pattern evident in successive contests since devolution shows that Labour performs most strongly in general elections, with their support eroding in the regional contests. For example, compared with the 1997 general election, the first regional elections for the new Scottish parliament in 1999 saw a striking 9-point fall in the Labour party's share of the vote. This contest saw significant advances for the Scottish National Party and for the smaller parties, notably the Scottish Green party and the Scottish Socialist party. Labour's share of the Scottish vote recovered in the 2001 general election, only to fall back again in the 2003 and 2007 regional contests. Moreover surveys monitoring nationalist sentiment from 1997 to 2004 report that this also fluctuated over time in these regions.⁴³ The Scottish National Party did not threaten Labour's grip on Holyrood Palace in 2003. In 2007, however, scandals within the leadership led to a dramatic loss of votes for the minor Scottish Socialist Party. The SNP benefited from this and from disillusionment with the Blair government, winning a third of the Scottish vote. As a result, the SNP formed a minority administration in the Scottish Assembly, led by Alex Salmond as First Minister. This victory, represents a historic breakthrough in power for the Scottish Nationalists, although SNP have only a wafer-thin one-seat lead over Labour. It is the first time that Labour failed to come first in any Scottish election since 1955.

The fluctuating patterns of party support found in general and regional contests north of the border are also evident, but to a lesser extent, in Wales. Since devolution, waves of votes have been gained by smaller parties under the AMS combined electoral system used for the Welsh Assembly, only to fall back again in Westminster contests. Hence Plaid Cymru support peaked sharply during the 1999 regional elections before sliding back in the 2005 general

election. Patterns of peaks and troughs in PC support are evident in successive regional and general elections since then. Labour remains the largest party in the Welsh Assembly, although attempts have been made to assemble a 'rainbow' coalition to challenge its hegemony. Women also proved very successful in getting elected to the regional bodies, in 2006 representing 39.5% of the Scottish parliament and achieving parity (50%) in the Welsh Assembly, compared with just 19.7% of the House of Commons.⁴⁴

To summarize, the electoral systems introduced with devolution in Britain generated an initial surge for the nationalist parties in 1999. The smaller parties and independents have also benefited: the Scottish parliament currently contains seven members from the Greens, six members from the Socialist Party, two independents and two other party representatives, most elected from the more proportional regional lists. Party fragmentation has increased in the regions. The results in the 2007 Scottish elections confirmed the hopes of the nationalist parties who anticipated that the creation of the new bodies under devolution, and their greater visibility in these assemblies, would provide a platform which would eventually strengthen their popular support, providing a launch-pad to power.

New Zealand

New Zealand adopted a different route to electoral reform when they abandoned using a traditional single-member districts and plurality elections (first-past-the-post) and adopted a combined dependent system (Mixed Member Proportional or MMP) in 1993.⁴⁵ The New Zealand parliament contains 120 MPs. Each elector has two votes: one for the party lists, returning 51 members, and the other for one of the 62 general or the 7 Maori seats.⁴⁶ Parties are represented in parliament if they get at least 5% vote in the lists, and above this threshold the overall distribution of parliamentary seats is proportional to the share of votes cast in the lists. Special measures are specified for the Maori population, who are recognized as an indigenous population originating in Polynesia with special cultural rights. There have been special Maori electorate seats since 1867, when Maori men were first given the vote. The number of Maori seats was fixed at four until the Electoral Act 1993 stipulated that the numbers could rise or fall, depending on whether Maori choose to go on the general or the Maori electoral roll. Increasing numbers have chosen the Maori roll, which resulted in the number of special Maori electorate seats rising to seven in the 2005 Parliament. Of the 19 Maori MPs in that Parliament, the remaining 12 Maori MPs represented the general electorates or were list MPs.⁴⁷ In 2005, the first Maori party was created, currently with four elected representatives in parliament. New Zealand has become increasingly diverse ethnically and, at 6.4% of the population, Asians are the third largest ethnic group. MMP has given them a political voice, currently with one Labour and one National list Asian MPs.

What have been the consequences of electoral reform in New Zealand? Prior to this change, New Zealand had an entrenched two-party ‘Westminster’ system during most of the twentieth century. Government office rotated between the conservative National Party and the center-left Labour party, excluding minor party contenders from legislative and government office. Dealignment trends weakened party identification during the 1980s, and electoral volatility rose, but with little effect on parliamentary politics due to the use of the first-past-the-post single member electoral system.⁴⁸ The new MMP system was used for general elections in 1996, 1999, 2002 and 2005. The results confirmed the expectations that more proportional elections would lead towards multiparty competition and coalition governments, as well as more inclusive parliaments for women and minority MPs (see Figure 5.7). Under first-past-the-post, prior to reform, there were usually two or three parties in parliament. After reform, from 1996 to 2005, there were six or seven. The effective number of parliamentary parties rose from around 2.2 prior to reform in 1993 to 3.8 under the MMP system in 1996. Single party governments were replaced by majority or minority coalitions. The proportion of women elected to office rose substantially, as did the proportion of Maori, Pacific Islander and Asian MPs. In short, the MMP system in New Zealand fulfilled the first three steps illustrated in Figure 5.1 which are suggested by consociational theory.

There are questions, however, about subsequent steps in the chain of reasoning. Far from facilitating inter-community understanding, as consociational accounts claim, the inclusion of more minor parties in parliament may have produced greater polarization around issues of ethnicity, following the rise of the New Zealand First. This party, founded by Winston Peters in 1993, adopted an anti-immigrant populist platform which challenged legal rights enjoyed by the Maori aboriginal population under the Treaty of Waitangi. The party won 8.3% of the vote and two seats in the 1993 general election, but their support rose sharply to 13.4% of the vote and 17 seats in 1996 after reform, and they entered government in coalition with the National Party. Their support subsequently slumped, but it rebounded again in the 2002 election, where New Zealand First was the third most popular party, with 10% of the parliamentary vote and 13 MPs.⁴⁹ New Zealand First can be seen as moderate on social policies but as part of the radical right family through its strong emphasis on economic and cultural nationalism. The party currently remains protectionist in its economic policy, calling for New Zealand ownership of key assets and infrastructure, arguing against economic globalization, and favoring limits on the extent of foreign ownership in the country. It presents a strong defense of cultural nationalism. For example, Winston Peter argued that: “The public has legitimate concerns over the influx of immigrants – the dramatic changes in the ethnic mix – culture – and the other aspects of national identity – and the mindless, unthinking way change is inflicted on our society. In their contempt for the past, Labour and National have swept away many of the old landmarks – often selling them off to overseas investors – and have dismantled much that was valued and cherished by New Zealanders. ... There are many apparent threats to our way of life from open door immigration policies, through

to a growing obsession with the fundamentalism which has sprung up around the Treaty of Waitangi and to the disturbing increase in lawlessness in our society.” The impact of electoral reform in New Zealand therefore seems to have increased the representation of ethnic minorities, but also to have politicized and polarized issues of ethnicity, leading both to the creation of the Maori party and to the popular backlash led by New Zealand First. New Zealand is an established democracy with a tolerant culture, so this process is unlikely to lead towards serious ethnic conflict, nevertheless in more fragile democracies and more deeply-divided societies the politicization of latent ethnic identities carries certain well-known dangers. Moreover the last step in the logical chain of consociational theory also remains in question, as it remains unclear whether electoral reform, and the inclusion of more ethnic minorities in parliament, has actually generated greater satisfaction with democracy among ethnic minority communities.⁵⁰

Conclusions

The theory of consociationalism has been widely influential in shaping debates about the most appropriate electoral arrangements to adopt in divided societies and negotiated peace settlements. Yet the claims have always proved controversial and systematic evidence has been lacking to test the evidence for some of the core contentions. This chapter has combined both large-N cross-national time-series analysis with selected paired case-studies about the consequences of changing the electoral rules in the cases of Britain and New Zealand.

The results confirm that PR electoral systems are more democratic than majoritarian systems, a pattern replicated irrespective of the choice of indicator used, and a pattern that was particularly marked in divided societies. In exploring how this process works, the case studies suggest that either PR with low thresholds or positive action strategies (or both) can be used to facilitate the election of representatives and groups drawn from minority communities. The adoption of AMS in Scotland and Wales has boosted the electoral success of nationalist parties in regional contests, although so far their support has not carried over into Westminster general elections. This process has also led towards greater party fragmentation in Scotland. In New Zealand, the MMP system has strengthened the inclusion of Maoris, Asians and Pacific Islanders, although it has also facilitated the success of the New Zealand First party on a platform of cultural protection, and thus stirred up greater controversy about issues of Maori rights and multiculturalism. Whether this process has had a broader impact upon political attitudes and values, particular support for democracy among minority communities, remains an open question and it may take successive elections over many years before any cultural impact becomes apparent. Electoral systems, moreover, are only one dimension of consociationalism. It may be that other institutions are more important for democratic consolidation, so we need to go on in the next chapter to consider the choice of types of presidential versus parliamentary executives.

Table 5.1: Characteristics of contemporary electoral systems, 2000

		<i>PR</i>	<i>Combined</i>	<i>Majoritarian</i>	<i>N.</i>
(i)	Largest governing party, % of seats	44.4	53.7	68.1	158
(ii)	Rae party fractionalization index	65.2	54.6	34.6	189
(iii)	Mean number of all parliamentary parties	9.3	8.7	5.0	175
(iv)	Mean number of relevant parliamentary parties	4.7	4.4	3.2	175
(v)	Herfindahl index for all parliamentary parties	.33	.39	.57	153
(vi)	Effective number of parliamentary parties	3.69	3.77	2.33	103
(vi)	Index of proportionality	90.4	83.2	83.1	110
(viii)	Effective electoral threshold	11.3	24.5	35.4	148

Notes and sources:

(i) The number of seats held by the largest governing party in the lower house of each country's national assembly. Source: Banks 2000

(ii) The *Rae Party Fractionalization Index*. Source: Banks 2000.

(iii) The mean number of parliamentary parties with at least one seat in the lower house of the national parliament. Source: Calculated from *Elections Around the World*.

(iv) The mean number of relevant parliamentary parties (those with more than 3% of seats in the lower house of the national parliament). Source: Calculated from *Elections Around the World*.

(v) The Herfindahl Index for all parliamentary parties, ranging from 0 to 1, representing the probability that two randomly selected members of the lower house of parliament belong to different parties. Source: The Database of Political Institutions Keefer/World Bank 2005.

(vi) The *Rose Index of Proportionality* (a standardized version of the Loosemore-Hanby Index) Source: Rose 2001.

(viii) The *Effective Electoral Threshold*, using the formula $(75/m+1)$, where m refers to the district magnitude or the number of members returned in the electoral district. Calculated from Rose 2001.

Table 5.2: Electoral systems and democracy, all societies worldwide

	Liberal democracy			Constitutional democracy			Participatory democracy		
	Freedom House			Polity IV			Vanhanen		
	b	(pcse)	p	b	(pcse)	p	b	(pcse)	p
INSTITUTIONAL RULES									
Majoritarian	-2.33	(.454)	***	-7.64	(.949)	***	-3.18	(.533)	***
Proportional representation	.904	(.619)	N/s	3.85	(.561)	***	1.95	(.344)	***
Positive action strategies	4.13	(.466)	***	11.41	(.777)	***	5.76	(.284)	***
CONTROLS									
Log GDP/Capita	13.90	(.832)	***	11.91	(1.01)	***	14.05	(.663)	***
Ex-British colony	12.35	(.962)	***	12.36	(1.36)	***	2.05	(.803)	**
Middle East	-10.99	(1.16)	***	-16.79	(1.40)	***	-5.87	(.809)	***
Regional diffusion	.632	(.036)	***	.883	(.049)	***	.481	(.029)	***
Ethnic fractionalization	-8.45	(.878)	***	-1.98	(1.56)	N/s	-10.05	(.694)	***
Population size	.001	(.001)	N/s	.000	(.001)	***	.001	(.001)	***
Area size	.001	(.001)	***	.001	(.001)	***	.001	(.001)	***
Constant	-21.96			-38.45			-46.6		
N. observations	4768			3946			4128		
N. of countries	174			145			167		
Adjusted R²	.487			.533			.624		

Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100-point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standard errors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata's xtpcse command. For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of electoral system, see Figure 5.1. The default (comparison) is mixed electoral systems. For details of all the variables, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.

Table 5.3: Electoral systems and democracy, plural societies only


	Liberal democracy			Constitutional democracy			Participatory democracy		
	Freedom House			Polity IV			Vanhanen		
	b	(pcse)	p	b	(pcse)	p	b	(pcse)	p
INSTITUTIONAL RULES									
Majoritarian	-4.27	(.625)	***	-3.30	(1.16)	***	.317	(.474)	N/s
Proportional representation	4.81	(.966)	***	10.68	(.915)	***	4.65	(.565)	***
Positive action strategies	.424	(.676)	N/s	13.96	(1.52)	***	3.86	(.714)	***
CONTROLS									
Log GDP/Capita	10.21	(.519)	***	7.26	(1.21)	***	8.08	(.695)	***
Ex-British colony	8.35	(.744)	***	8.20	(1.10)	***	1.00	(.497)	*
Middle East	-8.39	(.974)	***	-20.72	(3.13)	***	-7.18	(.934)	***
Regional diffusion	.739	(.027)	***	1.04	(.055)	***	.548	(.025)	***
Ethnic fractionalization	14.97	(3.18)	***	26.51	(4.27)	***	15.1	(1.00)	***
Population size	-.001	(.000)	***	-.001	(.001)	***	-.001	(.001)	***
Area size	.001	(.001)	***	.001	(.001)	***	.001	(.001)	N/s
Constant	-30.9			-54.9			-50.9		
N. observations	2116			1851			1831		
N. of countries	76			66			72		
Adjusted R²	.545			.477			.579		

Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100-point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standard errors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata's xtpcse command. Only plural societies are selected (based on dichotomizing Alesina's ethnic fractionalization index). For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of electoral system, see Figure 5.1. The default (comparison) is mixed electoral systems. For details of all the variables, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.

Figure 5.1: The core sequential steps in consociational theory




Figure 5.2: Classification of contemporary electoral systems, worldwide 2004




Notes: FPTP First Past the Post; 2nd Ballot; Bloc Vote; AV Alternative Vote; SNTV Single Non-Transferable Vote; STV Single Transferable Vote. Systems are classified based on Appendix A in Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly. Eds. 2005. *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*. 2nd ed. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. For more details see <http://www.aceproject.org> and Pippa Norris. 2004. *Electoral Engineering*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Figure 5.3: Trends in types of electoral systems used worldwide, 1973-2003




Source: Coded from Arthur S. Banks *Cross-national Time-series Data Archive*, Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly. Eds. 2005. *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*. 2nd ed. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, and related sources

Figure 5.4: Levels of democracy by type of electoral system, 2000


Note: The standardized 100-point scales of democracy are described in Table 3.1. The four scales measure *Liberal Democracy* (Freedom House 2000), *Constitutional Democracy* (Polity IV 2000), *Participatory Democracy* (Vanhanen 2000), and *Contested Democracy* (Cheibub and Gandhi 2000). When tested by ANOVA, the difference between mean scores are significant (at the $p=.001$ level). Contemporary electoral systems are classified in 191 nation states worldwide based on Appendix A in Andrew Reynolds, Ben Reilly and Andrew Ellis. 2005. *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. The type of electoral system was classified into three categories: *Majoritarian/plurality* (Single member plurality, 2nd Ballot, Block Vote, Alternative Vote, and Single Non-Transferable Vote), *Proportional Representation* (Party List and STV) and *Combined* (using more than one type of ballot in simultaneous elections for the same body).

Figure 5.5: Contemporary levels of democracy by type of electoral system in heterogeneous and homogeneous society, 2000




Note: For the classification of electoral systems, see Figure 5.3. The types of heterogeneous or homogeneous society are classified by the dichotomized Alesina index of ethnic fractionalization.

Figure 5.6: Contemporary levels of democracy by the use of positive action strategies for ethnic minority representation



Note: The standardized 100-point scales of democracy are described in Table 3.1. The four scales measure *Liberal Democracy* (Freedom House 2000), *Constitutional Democracy* (Polity IV 2000), *Participatory Democracy* (Vanhanen 2000), and *Contested Democracy* (Cheibub and Gandhi 2000). When tested by ANOVA, the difference between mean scores are significant (at the $p=.001$ level). The use of positive action strategies in 29 out of 191 nation states, including through reserved seats and boundary delimitation, are described in the text.

Figure 5.7: Elections in Scotland and Wales before and after devolution



¹ See Giovanni Sartori. 1994. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry Into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes*. New York: Columbia University Press; Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman. 1996. *Institutional Design in New Democracies*. Boulder, Co: Westview.

² Arend Lijphart. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Arend Lijphart. 2004. 'Constitutional design for divided societies.' *Journal of Democracy* 15(2): 96-109.

³ Kanchan Chandra. 2001. 'Ethnic bargains, group instability, and social choice theory.' *Politics & Society* 29(3): 337-362; Kanchan Chandra. 2005. 'Ethnic parties and democratic stability.' *Perspectives on Politics*. XX:XXX-XXX.

⁴ Meindert Fennema, 2000. 'Legal repression of extreme-right parties and racial discrimination.' In *Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics*. Eds. Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁵ For a study of these factors, see Shaun Bowler, Elisabeth Carter and David M. Farrell. 2003. 'Changing party access to elections.' In *Democracy Transformed?* Ed. Bruce Cain, Russell Dalton and Susan Scarrow. Oxford: Oxford University Press. For an application of these factors to the radical right, see Elisabeth Carter. 2005. *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?* Manchester: Manchester University Press. Chapter 5 ; Pippa Norris. 2005. *Radical Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4.

⁶ International IDEA. 2003. *Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns*. Stockholm: International IDEA.

⁷ Arend Lijphart. 1997. 'Unequal participation: democracies unresolved dilemma.' *American Political Science Review* 91: 1-14.

⁸ Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry. 2006 'Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict and its Agreement: 1. What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern Ireland.' *Government & Opposition* 41(1): 43-63.

⁹ Arend Lijphart. 1986. 'Proportionality by Non-PR Methods: Ethnic Representation in Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany and Zimbabwe.' In Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (Eds) *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*. New York: Agathon Press; Arend Lijphart. 1997. 'Unequal participation: democracies unresolved dilemma.' *American Political Science Review* 91: 1-14.

¹⁰ Kanchan Chandra. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Kanchan Chandra. 2005, 'Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability.' *Perspectives on Politics*. 3(2): 235-252.

¹¹ Anna Jarstad. 2001. *Changing the Game: Consociational Theory and Ethnic Quotas in Cyprus and New Zealand* Uppsala, Dept. of Peace and Conflict, Uppsala University; Andrew Reynolds. 2005. Reserved Seats in National Legislatures. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30 (2): 301-310; Lisa Handley. 2005. 'Comparative Redistricting Practices.' Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC; Andrew Reynolds. 2007. 'Minority MPs in national legislatures: Existing research and data gaps.' Minority Rights Group International/ UNDP..

¹² For a critical comparison of the evidence supporting this proposition, see Pippa Norris. 2002. 'Ballots not Bullets: Electoral Systems, Ethnic Minorities and Democratization.' Chapter 8. In *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy*. Ed. Andrew Reynolds and Scott Mainwaring. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹³ Kanchan Chandra. 2001. 'Ethnic bargains, group instability, and social choice theory.' *Politics & Society* 29(3): 337-362; Kanchan Chandra. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press..

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