

Chapter 6

Presidential and parliamentary executives

The decision to adopt either a presidential or a parliamentary executive is a critical aspect of constitutional design.¹ Considerable debate has surrounded which type is best for democratization. Reflecting upon developments in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, Juan Linz presented one of the most influential views, arguing that presidentialism presents substantial risks of political instability and even regime collapse.² The reasons, Linz suggests, are that in electoral democracies with presidential regimes, both parliaments and presidents have rival sources of popular legitimacy and authority, making it difficult to resolve disputes. Presidents hold office for a fixed term, reducing flexibility. Presidential elections are winner-take-all, raising the stakes and generating weak incentives for the losers to accept the legitimacy of the outcome. And the fusion of the offices of head of state and head of the government may reduce restraints on political leaders arising from checks and balances. Scholars have commonly concurred with Linz's argument.³ Compared with parliamentary systems, for example, Riggs regards presidentialism as less capable of generating the representativeness and legitimacy required for the survival of democratic governance.⁴ Stephan and Skach compared patterns of democratic consolidation until the early-1990s and concluded that parliamentary executives were indeed more effective in this regard than presidentialism. They argue that parliamentary democracies are more likely to allow the largest party to implement their program, even in multiparty systems. Unpopular or scandal-ridden prime ministers can be replaced by other senior party leaders without destabilizing the whole regime. Dual executives (where the head of government is separate from the head of state) are also less susceptible to military coups. And parliamentary democracy encourages long-term party-government careers, as back-benchers progress to ministerial office, strengthening party loyalties and the legislative experience of political leaders.⁵

Still no scholarly consensus exists about the claimed superiority of parliamentary executives for sustaining democracy. In response to Linz's diagnosis of potential maladies, Schugart and Carey argue that presidential executives display great diversity in their roles and formal powers, with different types, rather than all falling into a single category, and they challenge the notion that all contemporary presidential regimes are inherently more prone to breakdown.⁶ In an influential article, Mainwaring emphasized that only certain types of presidential regimes (notably those combined with multi-party systems) are particularly vulnerable to democratic instability, through generating executive-legislative deadlock, ideological polarization, and difficulties of inter-party coalition building.⁷ Cheibub and Limongi conclude that if parliamentary regimes have a better record of survival than presidential regimes, this is not due to some of the reasons most commonly offered to explain this phenomenon, such as the propensity of presidentialism for deadlock; indeed they speculate that regime instability may be associated

with levels of centralization in the policy-making process, which is only contingently related to the structure of the executive.⁸

Much of the evidence concerning the debate about executive institutions has been derived from the Latin American experience of presidentialism, a region strongly influenced by the US constitution. The standard practice used in many previous studies has been to contrast the modern history of presidential regimes in Latin America with the record of parliamentary systems in Western Europe and Scandinavia. This limited analytical framework made it difficult to generate comparisons which ruled out other potentially confounding factors characteristic of each region which we have seen are also strongly associated with the success of democracy, notably lower levels of economic development and industrialization in Latin America.⁹ The expansion of democracy during the third wave has facilitated a broader comparative focus; after the fall of the Berlin wall, many post-Communist states such as Albania, Hungary and Slovenia adopted popularly-elected presidents in 'mixed' republics, which also have a prime minister leading the government.¹⁰ A comparison of presidential powers in Central and Eastern Europe by Beliaev indicates that regimes with stronger presidential executives proved less effective at democratic consolidation during the 1990s, suggesting that the Latin American experience is not unique.¹¹ In Africa and Asia-Pacific, as well, many states have now adopted presidential or mixed executives. Blais, Massicotte and Dobrynska compared 170 countries with a working parliament, and they found that, by the late-1990s, almost half had a directly-elected president.¹² A comprehensive worldwide comparison also requires the analysis of other types of executives beyond elected presidents and parliamentary governments, taking account of non-elective presidencies, as well as more than a dozen contemporary states governed by ruling monarchies, and a few regimes in the grip of military dictatorships without even the fig-leaf of a nominal civilian president.

Therefore this chapter seeks to reexamine the evidence to see whether the type of executive influences: (i) levels of democracy and democratic consolidation during the third wave over the last thirty years, and also (ii) broader indicators of regime instability, exemplified by the occurrence of political violence, coup d'etats, and leadership assassinations. The unit of analysis is the type of regime in each nation-year worldwide from 1972-2003 and the study uses a longer time-span than many previous studies, a broader range of countries and types of regimes drawn from different regions around the globe, and, to test the reliability of the results, the alternative measures of democracy already discussed earlier in the book. The standard controls used in previous chapters are also incorporated into the multivariate analysis, to see whether the relationship between the type of executive and the resilience of democracy is conditioned by factors such as patterns of socioeconomic development, the colonial history, levels of ethnic fractionalization, and the type of electoral and party systems. Lastly, the conclusion considers the implications for constitutional reformers and what can be done to overcome the 'perils of presidentialism' for democratic stability.

Classifying types of executives

The first issue confronting any empirical study is how best to classify different types of executives. This study develops a typology according to three features. (i) The constitutional adoption of a unitary or dual executive; (ii) The constitutional process of accession for the head of state and the head of government; and (iii) The constitutional rules governing tenure in office. All these criteria are logically related to the degree of power-sharing within the regime. Based on these factors, five distinct categories of executives are identified, as summarized in Table 6.1, including military dictatorships, ruling monarchies, parliamentary monarchies, presidential republics (subcategorized into non-elective, indirectly-elected and directly-elected types), and mixed republics. To operationalize the conceptual framework, the states falling into each of these categories are classified and identified worldwide each year from 1972-2003 using cross-national time-series data from Banks, combining the classifications of the formal head of state and the formal head of government (derived from the constitution), along with the constitutional rules for their selection and tenure in office. Figure 6.1 illustrates the distribution of types of executives in contemporary states (classified in 2003) while Figure 6.2 shows trends over time in each category. This classification is relatively comprehensive but worldwide, out of 191 nations, seven contemporary states failed to fit neatly into these conceptual boxes, such as Switzerland (with a rotating presidency in the federal council), Afghanistan (ruled by a theocracy in the Taliban) and San Marino (with two co-princes), as discussed later.¹³

[Table 6.1 and Figures 6.1 and 6.2 about here]

Ruling monarchies

One of the oldest forms of government, contemporary monarchs are associated with many titles, most commonly translated as king or queen, but also there are also emirs (Kuwait, Qatar), sultans (Oman), paramount ruler (Malaysia), sovereign prince (Monaco), heavenly emperor (Japan), and co-princes (Andorra).¹⁴ As a type of regime, *ruling* monarchies are defined by three main rules. First, there is a unitary executive with power centralized in the monarch. All other executive, legislative, and judicial bodies are subordinate to the sovereign, and the constitution is also subject to royal decree or amendment. The monarch exercises substantive power as the head of state. The king or queen may also be the formal head of government, or they may appoint a premier as head of government, cabinet members and sometimes members of the legislature as well. Secondly, in terms of accession, contemporary ruling monarchies are determined through a hereditary process of dynastic inheritance through the blood-line. Most European states follow the principle of primogeniture, although the specific rules determining the process of hereditary accession to the throne vary.¹⁵ Some presidents are also succeeded in office by their sons, for example, in North Korea, Kim Il-sung (the Great Leader) was replaced after his death by his son, Kim Jong-il. In Syria, on his death in 2000, President Hafez Al-Assad

was succeeded by his son, Bashar al-Assad, who was confirmed in an unopposed referendum. Some dictators have also attempted to found a royal dynasty, for example, during the mid-1970s, Jean-Bédél Bokassa also proclaimed himself Emperor, complete with coronation, in the Central African Republic. But new monarchies are only regarded as established if the process of succession continues over more than two generations. Thirdly, in terms of tenure, the monarchy is a lifetime position, monarchs cannot be removed from office except through voluntary retirement and the traditional process of royal succession, or through extra-constitutional means, such as a revolutionary overthrow of the royal family or coup d'état.

Therefore the three characteristics of this type of regime (a unitary executive, dynastic accession, and a lifetime position) concentrate absolute power most effectively in the hands of the ruling monarch, the royal family and their entourage of courtiers and advisors. Ruling monarchs lack effective checks on their power and they remain unaccountable to other institutions of state. It might be thought that this type of regime would have passed away over time but, in 2002 Banks classifies thirteen nation states as ruling monarchies (defined as nations with a monarchy as both head of state and as head of government). Half are in the Gulf with the remainder scattered across many continents.¹⁶ Contemporary ruling or absolute monarchies include the King of Bahrain, the Sultan of Oman, the Emir of Qatar, the King of Swaziland, The King or Queen of Tonga, the Sovereign Prince of Monaco, and the Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam. The total number of states governed by ruling monarchies is almost untouched by the third wave of democratization during the last three decades, although some states such as Bahrain, Morocco and Nepal have experimented with more liberal reforms in recent years.

Ruling monarchies are perhaps best exemplified as a contemporary type of regime by Saudi Arabia. The Al Saud family, which came to power in the 18th century, has governed this country through successive kings. The current head of state and the head of government is King Abdullah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al Saud, who formally succeeded the late King Fahd, his half brother, in August 2005. The cabinet (Council of Ministers), especially the core ministries, include many members of the royal family, such as Prince Sultan Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al Saud (the first deputy prime minister), Prince Saud al-Faysal Bin-Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (the foreign minister), and Prince Nayif Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al Saud (the minister of the interior). The cabinet is appointed by the king. The consultative council or Majlis al-Shura has 120 members and a chairman appointed by the king for a four-year term. The royal family exerts strict controls over opposition forces, including stringent censorship of the news media, banning criticism of the House of Al Saud. Saudi Arabia has introduced very cautious moves towards democratic reform, with municipal elections held in 2005, but women were unable to participate as voters or candidates, political parties were banned, the opposition is organized from outside the country, and activists who publicly seek reform risk being jailed. In short, ruling monarchies are relatively rare worldwide, with most historical cases gradually evolving into parliamentary monarchies, where substantive power is

transferred to the legislature led by the prime minister, or to presidential republics where the trappings of royalty are overthrown. But in the remaining ruling monarchies, power remains highly concentrated and unaccountable.

Parliamentary monarchies

In Western Europe and Scandinavia, most ruling monarchies lost power through incremental processes of reform which gradually strengthened the role and independence of the cabinet (led by the prime minister) and legislature. Ruling monarchies transitioned into parliamentary monarchies, exemplified by developments in Great Britain, Belgium, and Sweden. Elsewhere in Europe, where monarchies failed to adapt to pressures for reform, revolutionary processes led to the violent overthrow of royal families and the establishment of republics, notably in France and Russia. Parliamentary monarchies are defined by three criteria.

First, parliamentary monarchies have dual executives, with a clear separation of the roles of head of state and head of government. The monarch remains as a largely symbolic head of state, with some nominal ceremonial roles when representing the nation at official diplomatic events. For constitutional monarchies, all royal acts are subject to the parliament.¹⁷ The separation of offices in dual executives is thought to promote political stability, for example, the monarch preserves continuity in a prime ministerial leadership succession or when the government is defeated by an election.¹⁸ Moreover, this division makes the state less vulnerable to decapitation by a military coup d'état or popular revolution.

In terms of selection and tenure, prime ministers are indirectly elected and government office always remains dependent upon maintaining support in parliament. General elections provide voters with a choice of parties, including the leadership team headed by the party leader as well as the party platform. Usually by convention the leader of the party winning an absolute majority of parliamentary seats over all other parties appoints the cabinet and heads the administration. In the case of a minority administration, the leader of the largest party in parliament engages in a period of negotiations with other party leaders, creating a coalition cabinet with an absolute majority in parliament. Substantive executive power resides with the government, consisting of the prime minister and the leadership team of cabinet ministers. The party linkage between the executive and legislature, and the government's majority in parliament, means that the cabinet is usually capable of driving through most of its legislative agenda and rarely suffers an outright defeat. The ability of the cabinet to implement its manifesto is particularly strong if the governing party has a substantial parliamentary majority and controls all cabinet portfolios. Parliamentary government reinforces the incentives for cooperation, and reduces the dangers of potential conflict or even stalemate, between the executive and legislature.

The prime minister and cabinet hold power during their term of office so long as they continue to receive the trust and support of the majority of backbenchers within the legislature.

The system encourages collaboration between the legislature and executive, maintains inter-electoral flexibility, and functions as an automatic safety-valve in the case of an unpopular prime minister or government; if the administration loses a vote of confidence or censure in parliament, then by convention they have to resign. In this situation, the government can call fresh elections, or they can stand down to be replaced by another party or party coalition under new leadership, without the sort of constitutional crisis generated by impeachment proceedings used to remove unpopular presidents. Governments rarely face a no confidence vote, however, because legislators in the governing party or parties are reluctant to trigger the threat of a dissolution of parliament followed by an early parliamentary election, thereby risking their own positions. The threat of dissolution reinforces party discipline. Indeed leaders can sometimes use a no confidence vote attached to legislative proposals as a way to bring backbench dissidents to heel.¹⁹ Strong party discipline also binds legislators to the government's program. The fate of party backbenchers is tied collectively to that of their leadership. Backbenchers are still prone to rebel against the party leadership on key legislative measures, they do not simply acquiesce to the whips, but this activity does not necessarily defeat government proposals, still less bring down the government.²⁰ The prime minister can also be replaced by a leadership contest within their own party, without any actions by parliament or calling a popular election; for example this occurred with the end of Mrs. Thatcher's long dominance within the British Conservative party and her successor as Prime Minister in 1990 by John Major.²¹ Beyond the vote of confidence, backbenchers have many other channels of oversight to scrutinize the government's actions and proposals. The chain of accountability extends one further step, because members of parliament are accountable to the public through general elections held at regular intervals.

In terms of intra-executive powers, the prime minister generally leads a more collegial cabinet, rather than a hierarchical structure.²² In parliamentary monarchies, cabinets are composed of a collective leadership team including seasoned senior ministers, many of whom have long experience of collaborating together within the parliamentary party as opposition shadow ministers, as well as working in different government departments when in power. There is collective decision-making and also the doctrine of collective responsibility; in public, ministers are expected to present a united front supporting decisions made by the majority of cabinet members. The prime minister appoints members of cabinet, reinforcing the incentive for backbenchers to remain loyal to the leadership, in the hope of career advancement to government office. Political parties act as the glue binding together the executive and legislature, as well as linking cabinet members collectively within the executive.

In summary, in parliamentary monarchies, governments are subject to multiple forms of accountability. In electoral democracies, governments are subject to occasional popular elections every few years. In between these contests, the prime minister's continued grip on power is always contingent upon maintaining the support of their cabinet colleagues and carrying a

majority of parliamentary backbenchers. If the government loses a vote of confidence in parliament, they fall. This creates incentives for the leadership to consult backbenchers, via party whips, and to pay attention to any potential revolts. Prime ministers are most powerful in parliamentary monarchies where they head single-party governments which enjoy a solid majority over the opposition parties. In this context, prime ministers have many opportunities to implement much of their legislative agenda and party platform or manifesto, because of the fusion of the cabinet executive and legislature within one party. Where parliamentary monarchies have coalition governments, prime ministers face greater limits on their autonomy. They share executive power with cabinet ministers from other parties, requiring a process of bargaining and negotiation over key policy decisions within the government. Leaders also remain continually dependent upon the support of a multiparty coalition in parliament to pass the government's legislative proposals. Governments face the continual threat of a no confidence vote in parliament, and they remain accountable to the electorate for their record and performance at regular intervals. In parliamentary monarchies, prime ministers also share power with the symbolic head of state. As such, prime ministers who head coalition governments also exercise considerable power but they face multiple checks on their autonomy, an arrangement which comes closest to the power-sharing regime advocated by consociational theorists.

Parliamentary monarchies can be identified by the Banks dataset based on the classification of the formal head of state (monarchies) and the formal head of government (prime ministerial) in constitutional conventions. The definition suggests that 23 nation states were parliamentary monarchies in 1973, rising in number during the 1970s, with 31 such regimes in 2003. One third of all parliamentary monarchies are located in Western Europe and Scandinavia, but many are also found in Asia-Pacific (10) and in the Caribbean (9). The influence of the British Commonwealth is evident in the distribution of parliamentary monarchies, with countries such as Canada, Australia and Jamaica retaining the crown as the symbolic head of state, as well as adopting the Westminster model of a bicameral parliament.

Presidential republics

Presidential republics also have a unitary executive, where the head of state and head of government are fused into a single office.²³ The president is thus also the symbolic leader of the nation, as well as heading the day to day business of running administrative departments. By contrast with ruling monarchies, however, presidencies do not have dynastic accession in attaining office by the bloodline over more than two generations, and, although a few have declared themselves presidents-for-life, they usually hold power for a constitutionally fixed term of office.

Presidencies are a non-hereditary office, attained through three routes to power. In *non-elective presidencies*, presidents are empowered by being appointed or self-appointed to office.

There is a fine line between a military junta which governs explicitly and civilian presidencies which are appointed and backed by the armed forces, sometimes as a façade for mainlining power in the hands of the military, as we have observed earlier in the case of President Faure Gnassingbe in Togo. Judgments are required for the accurate classification of regimes in countries such as Pakistan and Libya, where the military play an important role but where there are also civilian elements in government. In some states, presidents may also hold office after being appointed by a single hegemonic party, where the leadership emerged from an internal power struggle among elites or from a process of one-party internal elections. *Indirectly-elected presidencies* are exemplified by the US constitution which specifies an Electoral College. The College is composed of a number of delegated electors drawn from each state, depending upon its population size. Each delegate is committed to voting for a specified candidate determined by the popular vote in each state, but there have been exceptional cases of 'disloyal' delegates. In several close American elections (notably in 1876, 1888, and 2000), while one candidate received the most popular votes, another candidate managed to win more electoral votes in the Electoral College and so won the presidency. Lastly, *directly-elected presidencies* are filled through popular elections. These may be free and fair contests with multiparty competition, but they may also be a manipulated plebiscite or referendum, characterized by restrictions on the ability of opposition forces to register and campaign, ballot-rigging, or voter intimidation, where only one candidate may be listed on the ballot.²⁴ In most cases, contests use plurality or majoritarian electoral systems, with a few more complex or mixed procedures.²⁵ Blais, Massicotte and Dobrzynska found that out of 91 countries with a directly-elected president, 61 used the majority rule, most often the majority-runoff or second ballot procedure.²⁶

With a few exceptional cases (Switzerland and Bosnia-Herzegovina), the one-person presidency cannot be shared, making the office a winner-take-all position.²⁷ This characteristic is thought to provide the losing parties and candidates with weak incentives to accept the legitimacy of the outcome. This feature may be especially destabilizing in the absence of political trust and confidence in the fairness of electoral processes, such as in states emerging from conflict or in newer electoral democracies with a history of manipulated or fraudulent electoral practices. Potential problems associated with this system are illustrated by the constitutional crisis triggered by the July 2006 presidential elections in Mexico, determining the successor to Vicente Fox. Felipe Calderón (PAN) was declared the winner, although he had only a wafer-thin edge, estimated at less than 244,000 votes or 0.58 percentage points separating the main candidates. The declaration led to legal challenges by rival López Obrador (PRD), repeated demands that the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) carry out a total recount, and massive protests in Zocalo Square, Mexico City. The tight result raised troubling doubts about the legitimacy of the outcome, producing months of political uncertainty and heated unrest, and called into question the stability of Mexico's 2001 transition to a competitive multiparty system. By contrast, depending upon the

final distribution of seats, a similarly-close result under a proportional representation electoral system in a parliamentary system would have given the government a narrow parliamentary majority but it would also have rewarded the opposition with many members of parliament and a powerful position in holding the government to account. More deep-rooted problems of executive power are illustrated by cases where presidents have been willing to trample upon the rights of the opposition and abuse power to perpetuate their rule, exemplified by President Alberto Fujimori's government in Peru and President Alexander Lukashenko's grip on power in Belarus.

In contrast to prime ministers, presidential tenure is not dependent upon the legislature. Indeed presidents are rarely constitutionally removed from power during their term in office except through the exceptional circumstances of impeachment, or through unconstitutional processes, such as cases where the military intervenes in a violent coup d'état. Presidents who are directly elected for a fixed term remain accountable at intervals to the electorate, but not to the legislature in their day-to-day actions. As a result, of mutual independence, there is weaker incentive for cooperation and collaboration between presidents and legislatures. If there is a headlong clash between the executive and legislature, policy stalemate and gridlock, or other form of political impasse between these bodies, it becomes difficult to overcome this by replacing the president through legitimate constitutional channels. During their term of office, the removal of a president normally requires an extraordinary process of impeachment by the legislature and the courts, entailing a major constitutional crisis and a period of serious political instability and uncertainty. Such initiatives have often followed revelations of major leadership scandals and financial corruption. Cases of impeachment used to be relatively rare but in Latin America they occurred in Brazil in 1992, Venezuela and Guatemala in 1993, Ecuador in 1997, and Paraguay in 1999.²⁸ Elsewhere, President Bingu wa Mutharika was threatened with impeachment proceedings in Malawi in 2005, there have been a number of attempts in the Philippines against President Gloria Arroyo, Lithuanian President Rolandas Paksas was removed from office in 2004 following this procedure, and President Roh Moo-hyun was impeached the same year in South Korea. Other presidencies have been removed by a mass popular uprising and extra-constitutional means, such as the downfall of President Estrada by people power in the Philippines in 2001, following a failed attempt at impeachment, entailing considerable destabilization and turmoil. In Ecuador, as well, massive protests by indigenous groups, coupled with actions by the military, led to the removal of President Mahaud in 2000. The unitary structure of the executive is believed to make presidencies more vulnerable than dual executives to decapitation via a coup d'état.

Lastly, in terms of intra-executive power, in presidential systems the cabinet is also usually hierarchical, where members are appointed to serve the personal leader at the apex of the administration, rather than collegial.²⁹ Hierarchical structures generate weak notions of collective cabinet responsibility, the doctrine that decisions are taken by majority vote and all members are then bound by these decisions. Instead loyalties are to the person of the president.

The leader consults the cabinet, but major decisions may be taken by the president alone, or in conjunction with a few core advisers, even if he or she over-rides the wishes of the majority of cabinet members.³⁰

All these characteristic features usually concentrate considerable power in the hands of a single chief executive who is relatively autonomous of both the legislature and the judiciary, and who thus has less incentive to cooperate and compromise with these institutions. The defining feature of presidential republics is that unitary executives combine the positions of non-hereditary head of government (running the country) and head of state (the symbolic national leader). This combination of roles in one office removes an important source of checks and balances across institutions which are evident in dual executives. Based on the formal head of the government (as specified in the constitution) the Banks dataset estimates that there were 41 presidential republics in 1972, and this number remains fairly stable over time, with 45 states falling into this category in 2003. Today presidential republics predominate throughout Latin America, as is well known, but this form of regime is also fairly common in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Asia and the Pacific. It should be noted that if the Banks dataset is classified by the *effective* head of government (rather than the formal head of government), then the estimated number of presidential regimes expands substantially. But this requires a subjective judgment on the part of the coders about the real location of power in the regime, whether with the premier or president. For example, President Putin exerts considerable power within the Russian federation, including appointing the premier. Should this system be classified as a mixed republic with a dual executive or as an effective presidential system? This study chooses to focus on the formal office as defined in the constitution or legal system, as the most reliable and consistent source of classifications.

Mixed republics

As Figure 6.2 illustrates, recent years have seen a growing number of formal constitutions which share powers between a president and prime minister, with a sharp jump in the number of these regimes in the early-1990s. Mixed republics are exemplified by the constitution adopted by the French Fifth Republic. Maurice Duverger introduced the notion of 'semi-presidential' or 'mixed' executives and subsequent scholars have debated how best to define and label this category.³¹ This is the most complicated category to classify, depending upon the precise distinctions which are drawn by different scholars. In this study, regimes are categorized as 'mixed republics' when they contain a dual executive containing both a non-hereditary president as head of state and a prime minister as the formal or constitutional head of government. No judgment is made about the location of power within the executive, which can differ substantially. Whether the president or prime minister is dominant in these systems, and hence who is the effective head of government, depends substantially upon the selection processes and specific constitutional arrangements, for example the distribution of the powers of

veto, nomination, decree, budgetary, and legislative initiative, as well as whether the premier is indirectly elected (and thus with a democratic mandate) or appointed to office (and thus dependent upon the president). In mixed republics, in reality presidents can be predominant over the legislature and the prime minister, such as in Russia under President Putin, but presidents may also hold office as purely symbolic national figureheads, as for example in Ireland, India, and Germany. In mixed republics, prime ministers also differ in their roles and powers; some run the government fairly independently with a largely symbolic presidency. Other premiers are appointed by the president and they remain weak figureheads.

The best known example of mixed republics is probably the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic which established a prime minister chosen by the President but who nevertheless needs to gain support in the National Assembly. When the president is drawn from one party, but the opposition parties are in control of the legislature, then the president often has to select an opposition prime minister, a process known as cohabitation. Traditionally only a few countries could be categorized as mixed republics; Duverger, for example, recognized France, Finland, Austria, Ireland, Iceland, Weimar Germany and Portugal within Western Europe. In recent years, however, many more nations outside of this region have included both presidents and prime ministers within the constitution, including many post-communist states. The Banks dataset estimates that there were 37 mixed executives in 1972 (defined as states with a presidential head of state and a prime ministerial as the *formal* head of government). By 2003, this category had almost tripled to 92. Rejecting both the classical form of parliamentarianism and also presidentialism, one of the most striking developments in new constitutions has been the popularity of this form of regime, for example throughout Central Europe.

Military states

The last type of unitary executive concerns military states, where power resides with the armed forces. Where a junta rules, there is a small group of senior officers who exert control; in other cases, a single senior commander takes over the reins of head of state. Military regimes are also characterized by the use of martial law. Since the early-1990s, this type of regime has declined. After the end of the Cold War, military regimes throughout Latin America were replaced with electoral democracies. In the Middle East, states such as Syria and Egypt that were once clearly military dictatorships have switched to other forms of autocracy. Nevertheless some clear cases remain among contemporary states which are run by military dictatorships, notably Myanmar after the military invalidated the results of the 1990 Assembly elections. Other contemporary examples include Libya under Colonel Gaddafi, Guinea-Bissau after a coup led to the empowerment of President Joao Bernardo Vieira in 2003, and Mauritania after a military coup in August 2005. Pakistan fell into this category after a coup in October 1999 led by General Pervez Musharraf, who assumed the title of Chief Executive as head of state and then, in June

2001, of President. Nevertheless this country's classification remains complicated, as the regime has seen growing elements of civilian rule in a mixed republic, with parliamentary elections, and in April 2002 Musharraf held a flawed referendum to extend his rule for another five years. Accordingly, to be consistent, Pakistan is probably best described today as a presidential republic (with military backing) rather than a pure military state. In Thailand the military ruled on and off from 1947 to 1992, when they were replaced in democratic elections by a parliamentary monarchy. In September 2006, however, with the endorsement of the king, army commander-in-chief, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, seized power in a bloodless coup while Thaksin Shinawatra, the prime minister, was overseas. In Fiji, persistent racial tensions have led to considerable instability, including a military coup in 2006, the fourth time this has occurred in the last twenty years. According to the Banks dataset, the number of military states rose from 15 in 1972 to 20 in 1975 (under what Huntington termed the second reverse wave of democratization), then fell steadily over the years to five states in 2006.

Types of executives versus scaled measures of executive power

Before proceeding to analyze the data, we need to consider whether the typology is adequate for the purpose. In recent years some revisionist scholars have questioned the older tradition of classifying types of executives, on the grounds that this process fails to capture important cross-national variations in the distribution of power among chief executive, cabinets, ministers, bureaucrats, and legislatures.³² Echoing the debate we have already reviewed about alternative measures of democracy, both typologies of executives and continuous scaled indices of the powers of the chief executive have been used for comparison. Such a scale could potentially help to resolve difficult issues of classification, such as contrasts evident between the effective power of presidents in Russia and in Ireland, both with formal dual executives in mixed republics but, in practice, with very different roles. A number of power indices have been developed, for example, to explain institutional choices in post-communist presidencies, Frye created a scale of executive powers and classified regimes based on a check-list of 27 functions, such as the formal constitutional powers of the president to propose legislation, appoint judges and call elections.³³ Shugart and Carey compared presidencies by using a simpler list of 10 powers, weighted with a scoring system, for example whether presidents have a full or partial veto over legislative bills, whether they have budgetary powers, and whether they can appoint cabinet ministers with or without the need for legislative confirmation processes.³⁴ Building on this approach, Metcalf sought to develop and refine the Shugart and Carey scoring system.³⁵

Yet it remains problematic to classify regimes based the formal legal and constitutional powers, which may differ substantially from informal practices. Attempts to evaluate the underlying distribution of power are inherently subjective. Executive powers can also vary substantially over time, according to the specific officeholders. In established democracies such

as Britain, for example, with certain established conventions but without a written constitution, both relatively weak and strong prime ministers are evident historically; some leaders have exerted an iron grip over decisions made by their cabinet, with other opting for a more collegiate role.³⁶ It is often difficult to distinguish the personal style adopted by individual leaders, and the way they use the constraints and opportunities of office, from the constitutional roles allocated to the institution. Other sources shaping leadership power include the status, skills, popularity, and expertise of particular prime ministers and presidents. The role of the particular leader is particularly important during periods of democratic transition, such as those occurring during the early-1990s in Central and Eastern Europe, when the distribution of authority between the executive and legislature remain fluid and ambiguous, and there is a contested struggle over the appropriate roles for each body.³⁷ Classifying the changing powers of the executive branch over time in one country is a formidable task, let alone attempting such an exercise on a consistent basis over time and across countries.

Continuous scales of executive power also remain sensitive to the specific indicators used for identifying the functions of the chief executive, and the subjective and somewhat arbitrary weighting which is given to these measures. Is it more important, for example, if a president has the constitutional power to dissolve the legislative assembly, to appoint ministers, or to veto proposed bills? There are no agreed guidelines or yardsticks to evaluate these functions. It is also unclear whether a similar approach could be applied to assess and compare prime ministerial powers across a wide range of parliamentary systems, an area which is strikingly under-researched.³⁸ Moreover the overall powers of the executive and legislature are also dependent upon many broader constitutional arrangements, such as whether the regime is unitary or federal, whether the courts and judiciary are powerful or circumscribed, and whether the bureaucracy is part of a hierarchical structure within departments headed by a minister, or whether it functions relatively autonomously. Tsebelis has proposed an alternative comparative framework, which counts the number of institutional and partisan veto-players in the process of policy change.³⁹ This approach is valuable, for example in emphasizing that presidential systems can have multiple institutional veto-players, whereas prime ministers in single-party parliament and unitary state can have a single institutional veto-player. But the veto-players approach is less useful for analyzing the specific impact of types of executives on democracy, since many other institutional factors, such as party systems, are brought into the analysis. Therefore although scaled indicators of the powers of the executive appear better suited for capturing subtle constitutional differences among states, in practice, given the current state of research, the lack of precision involved in generating the existing indices reduces their consistency and reliability.

By contrast, simpler and more parsimonious typologies of major types of executives, focusing on a few core constitutional features, attract greater consensus in the research

literature.⁴⁰ As with any attempt at developing clear and comprehensive institutional typologies, difficult boundary issues remain in certain cases which refuse to fit neatly into conceptual boxes. This is especially true for attempts to classify mixed republics, where it is unclear whether the president or prime minister is effectively the more powerful office.⁴¹ Nevertheless, despite this qualification, comparative typologies of executive institutions generate more consistent comparisons than continuous scales of executive power. The classifications developed here aims to be comprehensive, covering all or nearly all contemporary states worldwide. There remain some cases which are not classified, for example failed states where it is difficult to identify the form of central authority, such as Afghanistan prior to adoption of the new constitution, Iraq immediately after the downfall of Saddam, and states which were experiencing radical regime change in any particular year, such as the Central African Republic in 2003. The classification rules generate categories which are independent of the measures of democracy, in order to avoid conflating the independent and dependent variables. Hence this study classifies all types of presidential executives, including those rising through non-elective routes, not merely those leaders who hold office through direct elections. The typology which is employed is also relatively parsimonious, as it is founded on a few simple and observable rules, a process which facilitates replication, encourages transparency, and generates greater consensus about the results of the classification. The typology also does not stray too far from the normal distinctions and common-sense categories found in everyday language.

Types of executives and democracy

Are democracies less stable under presidential executives, as Linz claims? In the light of the ongoing debate, we can reexamine the evidence for this issue by comparing the record of democracy, using the indicators employed in earlier chapters, against the different types of executive arrangements which have been delineated. To operationalize the typology, the classification of the head of state and the chief executive office is derived from the cross-national time-series dataset provided by Arthur S. Banks.⁴² This dataset measures the type of executive used worldwide in 191 nations on an annual basis, so that again nation-year is the unit of analysis. The dataset provides about 5,000 cases (regime-year) which can be classified. The multivariate models which are used for analysis incorporate the battery of controls which we have already established as relevant for explaining processes of democratization in previous chapters. The models control patterns of socioeconomic development, the colonial history of each country, levels of ethnic fractionalization, and the type of electoral and party systems. The models used for analysis focus upon three alternative dependent variables, namely whether the type of executive influences: (i) contemporary levels of democracy and patterns of democratic consolidation during the third wave over the last thirty years, and also (ii) broader indicators of regime instability, exemplified by the occurrence of political violence, coup d'états, and leadership assassinations. In each case, after applying controls, military states and ruling monarchies would

be expected to prove the least democratic of all regimes. Military states are also expected to be the most vulnerable to political instability; many came to power through a coup d'etat, often in states with a history of regime instability and violent conflict, and they may also be overthrown in this way. If the Linz thesis is correct, then all forms of presidential republics (non-elective, indirectly elected, and directly elected) would be expected to prove less democratic and less stable than all parliamentary monarchies. Mixed republics would be expected to fall somewhere between the position of presidential republics and parliamentary monarchies.

Does systematic evidence demonstrate these propositions, in particular the supposed virtuous of parliamentary executives for sustaining the process of democratization and avoiding democratic breakdown, as Linz suggests? Table 6.2 first compares the mean score of different regimes on the four indicators of democracy (Freedom House, Polity IV, Vanhanen and Cheibub and Ghandi), examining the significance of the difference in the mean scores (using ANOVA), without applying any prior controls.

[Table 6.2 about here]

The initial results appear to confirm the Linz thesis; irrespective of the indicator of democracy chosen for analysis, all cases of parliamentary monarchies achieve higher mean scores than all types of presidential republics. Moreover the difference in scores by type of regime is statistically significant and also substantially large; on the 100-point scales, presidential regimes have democracy scores which are between one third and one half of those recorded for parliamentary monarchies. Also confirming expectations, monarchies and military states achieve the lowest scores according to these indicators. Mixed republics, however, are more difficult to interpret, but overall they score closer to presidential republics than to parliamentary monarchies. Moreover the difference between presidential republics and parliamentary monarchies is not simply the product of whether the executive is non-elected, indirectly election, or directly elected. As the mean scores show, the directly and indirectly-elected presidential republics continued to display consistently far lower scores on all the democracy indices than the indirectly elected premiers in parliamentary monarchies. All these estimates, however, remain preliminary since there are no controls for the prior conditions in each state, for example levels of economic development. As already observed, the types of executives cluster by region (see Table 6.3), for example more than half of all the contemporary ruling monarchies are in Middle Eastern states. Presidential republics are rare in Western Europe, although fairly common in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, while Mixed Republics are found in most countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Many countries with parliamentary monarchies are within the British Commonwealth. This geographic distribution reinforces the need for multivariate analysis to rule out other confounding factors, such as levels of development or colonial traditions, which affect both the

adoption of a particular type of constitutional executive and also levels of democratic consolidation.

[Table 6.4 about here]

Table 6.4 presents the results of the multivariate analysis. The models for the 100-point standardized scales of Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy, and Participatory Democracy use ordinary least squares regression (with their panel corrected standard errors), where the unit of analysis is the regime-year, as in previous chapters. After applying the standard range of controls employed earlier, the results confirm that, as Linz argued, compared with parliamentary republics (as the default category), presidential republics are indeed significantly associated with lower levels of democracy. This pattern is confirmed irrespective of the indicator of democracy which is selected for analysis. Yet at the same time, mixed republics have an even worse record (according to the Freedom House and Polity measures), while, as might be expected, ruling monarchies and military states fare among the worst. The other control indicators behave as expected from the analysis in previous chapters. The overall models are fairly successful by explaining between 58% to 68% of the variance in patterns of democracy worldwide.

In addition, we can look more directly at indicators of political crisis, to see whether presidentialism is also associated with less stability, and even regime breakdown, as Linz suggests. A political crisis scale was constructed from events recorded in the Banks dataset, derived from records in the *New York Times*, including for each nation-year, the number of coups d'etat, major constitutional changes, political assassinations, general strikes, cases of guerrilla warfare, government crisis, purges of opposition, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations. The scale was created by adding together all these events, without any weighting of their relative importance for threatening the survival of the regime. The comparison of the mean score on the crisis scale in Figure 6.3, without any controls, shows that as Linz predicted, presidential republics are more often associated with political crisis than parliamentary monarchies; the difference is substantively large since presidential republics record almost twice as many crisis events as parliamentary monarchies. At the same time, the worst record is displayed by military states, as might be expected given the extreme nature of this type of regime and the way in which they usually come to power through a coup d'etat. And the small number of ruling monarchies in the dataset emerge as the most stable and immune from political crisis, possibly because they maintain the strongest autocratic grip by banning political parties, organized opposition forces, and dissident movements from challenging their rule. The regression analysis in Table 6.4, confirms the significance of these results, even with the standard controls.

[Figure 6.3 and Table 6.4 about here]

Conclusions

There has long been concern that presidential democracies are less stable and more prone to regime breakdown, but the evidence has been challenged by scholars who argue that there are many different types of presidential regimes, rather than just one category. Moreover comparisons of the empirical evidence have often been limited to historical patterns in Latin America and Western Europe, rather than considering executives elsewhere. This chapter has proposed a new typology of executives, based on a few simple criteria, based on the formal constitutional structure of a unified or dual executive, and the forms of selection and tenure for executives. Based on this typology, the conclusions from this analysis are that parliamentary monarchies have a better record at democratic consolidation, as many have argued, compared with presidential republics. This is also true if the comparison is limited to elected presidential republics compared with parliamentary monarchies. Mixed republics – the type of executive which has proved most popular for new constitutions during the last decade – shows a somewhat inconsistent record, but this category performs worse on democracy than parliamentary republics, at least according to the indicators provided by Freedom House and Polity IV. And presidential republics also have a poorer record than parliamentary monarchies according to direct indicators of crisis events, such as experience of coup d'etat, political assassinations and riots.

The broader lesson, reinforcing the conclusions from earlier chapters, is that constitutional design plays an important role in driving democracy. Even after cultural, social and economic factors are taken into account, the choice of executive institutions is systematically related to the success (or failure) of democracy. These findings support the argument that power-sharing arrangements, which are characteristic of parliamentary monarchies, are at the heart of this process. In these types of executives, there are multiple checks and balances on political leaders. The dual executive divides the ceremonial monarch as the symbolic head of state from the prime minister, functioning as the effective head of government. The government faces the electorate at regular intervals, and between these contests, the cabinet remains collectively accountable in their daily actions to the scrutiny of the legislature and, if they lose the confidence and trust of their backbenchers, they pay the ultimate penalty and lose office. The flexibility in the prime minister's tenure, so that the leadership can be replaced without a major constitutional crisis if he or she loses support, provides an additional safety-valve. And the incentives for cooperation and consultation between the executive and legislature are also likely to promote accommodation and compromise, fostering stability. Horizontal power-sharing is particularly evident where the government rests on a multiparty coalition. The results of the analysis of types of executives are consistent with those we have already observed with electoral systems. The question which remains to be considered in the next chapter is whether vertical power-sharing also serves the same function, and therefore whether federal arrangements and decentralization of decision-making also strengthens democracy, as consociational theory suggests.

Table 6.1: Classification criteria for types of executives

	Military states	Ruling monarchies	Presidential republics	Mixed republics	Parliamentary monarchies
<i>Unified or dual executive</i>	There is a unified executive: the head of state is also head of the government	There is a unified executive: the head of state and the head of government are fused in a single monarchical office	There is a unified executive: the head of state and the head of government are fused in a single presidential office	There is a dual executive: the president and the prime minister are separate posts; either office may be predominant.	There is a dual executive: the monarch is a ceremonial head of state and the prime minister leads the government.
<i>Accession process</i>	Usually a coup d'etat. The ruler who seizes power is a senior officer or group of officers from the military or a figure-head leader strongly backed by the armed forces.	The monarch is a hereditary ruler for life, following conventional rules of succession. The monarch appoints the head of government and the monarch may also appoint ministers and legislators.	The president is a non-hereditary fixed-term office. Presidents enter office through non-elective routes, indirect election, or direct election.	The posts of the president and prime minister are filled by various forms of indirect election, direct election, and appointment.	The leader of the party with an absolute parliamentary majority forms the government. Where no party has an absolute majority, conventionally the leader of the largest parliamentary party seeks to form a governing coalition.
<i>Tenure in office</i>	For as long as the military exert control.	The monarch cannot be removed from office except through retirement and succession, or through extra-constitutional means (a coup d'etat).	The president serves for a fixed term of office, unless removed by an exceptional process of impeachment or through extra constitutional means (a coup d'etat).	There are varied forms of tenure; some prime ministers can be replaced by the president, others are directly elected.	The monarch cannot be removed from office except through retirement and succession. The government (including the prime minister and members of cabinet) can fall by defeat at a general election or by a non-confidence motion passed by a majority of the legislature.
<i>Power within the executive</i>	There may be a military council of senior officers, or a separate civilian group of advisers	Cabinet structures are highly hierarchical; the cabinet (and parliament) act in an advisory capacity to serve the monarch.	Cabinet structures are usually hierarchical with the president at the apex, members are appointed to serve the leader, cabinet responsibility is individualized, and major decisions may be taken by the president alone.	Cabinet structures may be hierarchical (following the model described for presidential republics) or collegial (following the model described for parliamentary monarchies).	Cabinet organization is usually collegial and composed of senior policymakers. The prime minister is conventionally regarded as 'first among equals'. Decisions are regarded as collective and binding upon all members.
<i>Contemporary examples</i>	Myanmar, Libya, Mauritania	Brunei, Bhutan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, Oman, Tonga	Argentina, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Belarus, The Philippines, USA.	France, India, Israel, Latvia, Hungary, Russia, Slovakia,	Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Japan, Lesotho, Malaysia, Britain

Table 6.2: Mean democracy scores by type of executive

		FH Liberal Democracy	Vanhanen Participatory Democracy	Polity IV Constitutional Democracy	Cheibub Contested Democracy
Parliamentary monarchy	Mean	88.3	43.0	92.4	86.0
	N	911	774	570	852
	PM indirectly elected	89.2	43.7	93.0	87.7
	PM non-elected	37.1	3.0	40.6	0.0
Mixed executive	Mean	53.0	21.5	49.2	39.9
	N	2344	2023	2027	2243
	Directly elected	49.4	16.9	42.4	32.6
	Indirectly elected	64.5	32.3	67.7	58.7
	Non-elected	27.2	1.7	18.6	2.7
Presidential republic	Mean	58.5	15.9	54.2	45.4
	N	1306	1115	1115	1246
	Directly elected	64.0	21.2	63.8	57.7
	Indirectly elected	64.3	12.0	51.4	40.4
	Non-elected	24.9	0.2	14.2	1.0
Monarchy	Mean	40.9	0.5	8.2	0.9
	N	404	326	322	349
Military state	Mean	30.2	1.0	17.4	0.6
	N	321	308	282	313
Total	Mean	57.2	20.2	49.8	42.2
	N	5885	4798	4553	5366
Coefficient of association (eta)		0.506	0.547	0.506	0.481
Sig. (P)		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: See text for details. All democracy scales are standardized to 100 points, for comparison.

Source: Coded from Arthur S. Banks *Cross-national Time-series Data Archive*.

Table 6.3: Classification of type of executives by region, 2003

	Parliamentary Monarchy	Presidential republic	Mixed republic	Monarchy	Military state	Other	Total
Sub-Saharan Africa	1	17	27	1	1	2	49
Asia-Pacific	10	8	14	4	1	0	37
Central & Eastern Europe	0	0	26	0	0	1	27
Middle East	0	1	8	7	1	2	19
North America	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
Central and South America	9	16	7	0	0	0	32
Scandinavia	3	0	2	0	0	0	5
Western Europe	7	1	8	1	0	2	19
Total	31	45	92	13	3	7	191

Note: The number of states falling into each category in 2003.

Source: Coded from Arthur S. Banks *Cross-national Time-series Data Archive*.

Table 6.4: Types of executive and democracy, all societies worldwide

	<i>Liberal democracy</i>			<i>Constitutional democracy</i>			<i>Participatory democracy</i>			<i>Contested democracy</i>		
	Freedom House			Polity IV			Vanhanen			Przeworski et al/ Cheibub and Gandhi		
	b	(pcse)	p	b	(pcse)	p	b	(pcse)	p	b	(se)	p
INSTITUTIONAL RULES												
Presidential republics	-5.79	.873	***	-9.80	1.38	***	-5.46	.731	***			
Mixed republics	-10.77	.803	***	-14.25	1.26	***	-3.40	.655	***			
Ruling monarchies	-15.13	1.43	***	-44.50	2.31	***	-21.09	1.18	***			
Military states	-24.19	1.37	***	-34.12	2.06	***	-13.65	1.07	***			
CONTROLS												
Log GDP/Capita	12.91	.589	***	10.1	.886	***	11.88	.482	***			
Ex-British colony	9.35	.616	***	10.7	.968	***	2.56	.503	***			
Middle East	-7.57	1.19	***	-2.69	1.79		-3.81	.914	***			
Regional diffusion	.556	.020	***	.582	.020	***	.662	.019	***			
Ethnic fractionalization	-7.91	1.14	***	-1.86	1.80		-5.60	.946	***			
Population size	.000	.000	***	.000	.000	***	.000	.000	***			
Area size	.001	.000	***	.002	.000	***	.000	.000	***			
PR electoral system for lower house	2.71	.596	***	6.32	.886	***	3.00	.488	***			
Constant	-6.70			5.17								
N. observations	4766			3939			4127					
Adjusted R²	.620			.585			.688					

Note: The default (comparison) is Parliamentary Monarchies. Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100-point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standard errors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata's xtpcse command. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression. For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of executives, see Figure 6.1. For details of all the variables, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.

Table 6.5: Types of executive and the indicators of political crisis, all societies worldwide

	Political crisis scale		
	Freedom House		
	b	(pcse)	p
INSTITUTIONAL RULES			
Presidential republics	.656	.174	***
Mixed republics	.246	.160	N/s
Ruling monarchies	-.616	.286	*
Military states	1.67	.272	***
CONTROLS			
Log GDP/Capita	-.289	.098	***
Ex-British colony	-.321	.124	***
Middle East	.731	.215	***
Ethnic fractionalization	-.793	.222	***
Population size	.000	.000	***
Area size	.000	.000	***
PR electoral system for lower house	.606	.119	***
Constant	2.04		
N. observations	4719		
Adjusted R²	.114		

Note: The default (comparison) is Parliamentary Monarchies. Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standard errors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata's xtpcse command. For the classification of the type of executives, see Figure 6.1. For details of all the variables, including the political crisis scale, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.

Figure 6.1: Types of executives (with the number of contemporary states falling into each category)






Figure 6.2: Trends in types of executives worldwide, 1972-2003



Note: Coded from Arthur S. Banks *Cross-national Time-series Data Archive*.

Figure 6.3: Mean scores on the political crisis scale by types of executives



Note: The political crisis scale is constructed from events recorded in the Banks dataset including the number of coups d’etat, major constitutional changes, political assassinations, general strikes, cases of guerrilla warfare, government crisis, purges of opposition, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations. The measure is constructed for every regime-year as a simple additive scale without any weighting.

Source: Coded from Arthur S. Banks *Cross-national Time-series Data Archive 1972-2003*.

¹ Giovanni Sartori. 1996. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An inquiry into structures, incentives and outcomes*. London: Macmillan.

² Juan Linz. 1990. 'The Perils of Presidentialism.' *Journal of Democracy* 1(1): 51-69; Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela. Eds.1994. *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America*. The Johns Hopkins Press; Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Consolidation*. Johns Hopkins Press; Arendt Lijphart. 1996. Ed. *Presidential v. Parliamentary Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

³ See, for example, Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach. 1993. 'Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation: Parliamentarism and presidentialism.' *World Politics* 46 (1): 1-22; Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁴ Fred W. Riggs. 1997. 'Presidentialism versus parliamentarism: Implications for representativeness and legitimacy.' *International Political Science Review*, 18 (3): 253-278.

⁵ For a discussion, see Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach. 1993. 'Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation: Parliamentarism and presidentialism.' *World Politics* 46 (1): 1-22.

⁶ Mathew Soberg Shugart and John Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

⁷ Scott Mainwaring. 1993. 'Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy - the difficult combination.' *Comparative Political Studies* 26 (2): 198-228; Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1997. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press. See also Mark Jones.1995. *Electoral laws and the survival of presidential democracies*. Paris: University of Notre-Dame Press.

⁸ José Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 2002. 'Democratic institutions and regime survival: Parliamentary and presidential democracies reconsidered.' *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 151 2002; José Cheibub, Adam Przeworski, and S. M. Saiegh. 2004. 'Government coalitions and legislative success under presidentialism and parliamentarism.' *British Journal Of Political Science* 34: 565; José Cheibub. 2002. 'Minority governments, deadlock situations, and the survival of presidential democracies.' *Comparative Political Studies* 35: 284; 2007; José Cheibub 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press..

⁹ See, for example, Mathew Soberg Schugart and John Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Juan J.

Linz and Arturo Valenzuela. 1994. Eds. *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Eds., 1997. *Presidential Democracy in Latin America* New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰ Timothy Frye. 1997. 'A politics of institutional choice: Post-communist presidencies.'

Comparative Political Studies 30: 523. See also M. Stephen Fish. 2006. 'Stronger legislatures, stronger democracies.' *Journal of Democracy* 17(1):5-20.

¹¹ M.V. Beliaev. 2006. 'Presidential powers and consolidation of new post-communist democracies.' *Comparative Political Studies*, 39 (3): 375-398.

¹² André Blais, Louis Massicotte and Agnieszka Dobrynska. 1997. 'Direct presidential elections: A world summary.' *Electoral Studies* 16(4): 441-455.

¹³ Notably some cases of co-presidencies (Switzerland and Bosnia-Herzegovina)

¹⁴ The most authoritative and sweeping historical account of forms on monarchies is provided by Samuel E. Finer. 1999. *The History of Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The most comprehensive historical reference work is John Middleton Ed. 2005. *World Monarchies and Dynasties*. New York: Sharpe Reference.

¹⁵ One exception is that technically the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church, the Pope, is monarch of Vatican City and elected by the College of Cardinals. In Malaysia, the Paramount Ruler is nominally elected, but in practice the position rotates among nine hereditary rulers.

¹⁶ Traditional monarchs also persist in some specific sub-national territories.

¹⁷ For this reason, these systems are sometimes termed 'constitutional' monarchies.

¹⁸ Jean Blondel. 'Dual leadership in the contemporary world: A step towards executive and regime stability?'. In *Comparative Government and Politics*. Eds Denis Kavanagh and Gillean Peele. London: Heinemann.

¹⁹ John D. Huber. 1996. 'The vote of confidence in parliamentary democracies.' *American Political Science Review* 90: 269.

²⁰ Philip Cowley. 2004. 'Parliament: More Bleak House than Great Expectations.' *Parliamentary Affairs* 57(2): 301-314.

²¹ For details, see N.G. Jesse. 1996. 'Thatcher's rise and fall: An institutional analysis of the Tory leadership selection process.' *Electoral Studies* 15 (2): 183-202.

²² T.A. Baylis. 1989. *Governing by Committee: Collegial Leadership in Advanced Societies*. Albany: NY: State University of New York; Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle. Eds. 1994. *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²³ The terminology can be somewhat confusing and inconsistent in common usage, since some countries such as Poland have presidents who are head of the government but not head of state. In such cases, these office-holders are termed here 'prime ministers' to maintain consistency. As such, 'presidents' are always defined here as presidents of the nation-state who hold both the office of non-hereditary head of state and head of government.

²⁴ Andreas Schedler (Editor). 2005. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner.

²⁵ André Blais, Louis Massicotte and Agnieszka Dobrynska. 1997. 'Direct presidential elections: A world summary.' *Electoral Studies* 16(4): 441-455. One exception is Switzerland, with a rotating head of state (presidency) chosen from among the seven ministers in the Federal Council.

²⁶ André Blais, Louis Massicotte and Agnieszka Dobrynska. 1997. 'Direct presidential elections: A world summary.' *Electoral Studies* 16(4): 441-455.

²⁷ The exceptions are co-presidencies used with rotation among the seven members of the Federal Council in Switzerland, and the powers shared among three co-presidencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina following the Dayton agreement.

²⁸ For details, see John M. Carey. 'Presidentialism and representative institutions.' In *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America* Eds. Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael Shifter. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins Press.

²⁹ Jean Blondel and N. Manning. 2002. 'Do ministers do what they say? Ministerial unreliability, collegial and hierarchical governments.' *Political Studies* 50 (3): 455-476.

³⁰ Colin Campbell and M.J. Wyszimirski. Eds. 1991. *Executive Leadership in Anglo-American Systems*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

³¹ Maurice Duverger. 1980. 'A new political-system model - semi-presidential government.' *European Journal of Political Research* 8: 165; H. Bahro. 1998. 'Duverger's concept: Semi-presidential government revisited.' *European Journal of Political Research* 34: 201; Alan Siaroff. 2003. 'Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary distinction.' *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (3): 287-312.

³² Robert Elgie. 1997. 'Models of executive politics: A framework for the study of executive power relations in parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes.' *Political Studies* 155: 217-231; Lee

Kendall Metcalf. 2000. 'Measuring presidential power.' *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (5): 660-685.

³³ Timothy Frye. 1997. 'A politics of institutional choice: Post-communist presidencies.' *Comparative Political Studies* 30: 523.

³⁴ Mathew Soberg Shugart and John Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³⁵ Lee Kendall Metcalf. 2000. 'Measuring presidential power.' *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (5): 660-685.

³⁶ Ludger Helms. 2005. *Presidents, Prime Ministers and Chancellors: Executive Leadership in Western Democracies* Palgrave.

³⁷ T.A. Baylis. 1996. 'President versus prime ministers: Shaping executive authority in Eastern Europe.' *World Politics* 48 (3): 297+; O. Protsyk. 2006. 'Intra-executive competition between president and prime minister: Patterns of institutional conflict and cooperation under semi-presidentialism.' *Political Studies* 54 (2): 219-244; M.V. Beliaev. 2006. 'Presidential powers and consolidation of new post-communist democracies.' *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (3): 375-398.

³⁸ Some regard parliamentary regimes as increasingly following a presidential style of leadership. See, for example, the discussion in Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb. Eds. 2005. *The presidentialization of politics: a comparative study of modern democracies*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press/ECPR.

³⁹ From the veto-power perspective, presidential systems (especially in divided governments, where different parties hold the presidency and control the legislature) could have more power-sharing features than some parliamentary systems (especially where a single party dominates in the lower house of the legislature and therefore holds the premiership). See G.Tsebelis. 1995. 'Decision-making in political-systems - veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism.' *British Journal of Political Science* 25(3): 289-325.

⁴⁰ Arendt Lijphart. 1996. Ed. *Presidential v. Parliamentary Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁴¹ Alan Siaroff. 2003. 'Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary distinction.' *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (3): 287-312.

⁴² Arthur S. Banks *Cross-national Time-series Data Archive. (CNTS)* The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (also referred to as CNTS), assembled at the State University of New York,

Binghamton, provides a comprehensive listing of international and national country data facts. The database has statistical information on a range of countries, with data entries ranging from 1815 to the present. The data was provided by Banner Software, Inc. Binghamton, NY 13905.