

## Chapter 1

### Is cultural diversity under threat?

In June 1999, Bhutan, the Himalayan Land of the Thunder Dragon, became the last nation on earth to switch on television. The King lifted the ban on the small screen as part of a radical plan to modernize his isolated mountain kingdom and boost the Gross National Happiness. The country had restricted tourism and emphasized spirituality and environmental protection over rampant capitalism. Suddenly an idyllic and peaceful Lamaistic Tantric Buddhist culture, barely changed in centuries, with little access in rural areas to electricity and telecommunications, let alone the internet, was bombarded by about four dozen cable channels, broadcasting mainly imported programs.<sup>1</sup> For cable subscribers the nightly onslaught opened the world of Posh and Becks, of Larry King Live and The Simpsons, of World Wrestling Federation and American Idol, of Bollywood soap operas, of music videos and reality TV, of CNN and BBC World news. The country plugged into the internet the following year. All too soon reporters noted Bhutan's first crime wave - murder, fraud, drug offences. Bhutan had suddenly crash-landed in the 21st century. Public concern quickly mounted about threats to the country's unique culture. The letters page in local newspapers reflected columns of worried correspondence: "Dear Editor, TV is very bad for our country... it controls our minds... and makes [us] crazy. The enemy is right here with us in our own living room. People behave like the actors, and are now anxious, greedy and discontented." <sup>2</sup> Others expressed concern that a gulf had opened up between old Bhutan and the new. One minister observed: "Until recently, we shied away from killing insects, and yet now we Bhutanese are asked to watch people on TV blowing heads off with shotguns. Will we now be blowing each other's heads off?"<sup>3</sup> Television was widely blamed for a host of social ills: whether weakening spiritual values, undermining ancient traditions, inciting fraud, encouraging material consumerism, destroying family life, and provoking murder among a peaceable people. In response to public concern, in 2006 the government established a new ministry and regulatory authority to determine Bhutan's communication policy, including protecting vulnerable sectors of the public from the effects of excessive violence, obscenity, and drug-taking.<sup>4</sup> But was the introduction of TV a major cause of these problems? Will access to modern information and communication technologies erode Bhutan's traditional Buddhist culture and its feudal society? Will wrestling displace the national sport of archery, will English be heard instead of Dzongkha and Sharchop, and will jeans be worn instead of the *gho* and *kira*? Or are these concerns exaggerated?

Bhutan is perhaps the most dramatic recent example of a developing country adapting to an electronic invasion but it is far from alone; most societies have experienced a flood of information from diverse channels originating far beyond local communities and national borders. Ideas and images are transmitted from society to society through terrestrial, cable and satellite television and radio stations, feature films, DVDs, and video games, books, newspapers and magazines, advertising bill-boards, the music industry and the audiovisual arts, the digital world of the internet, websites, Tivo, streaming YouTube videos, iPod players, podcasts, wikis, and blogs, as well as through interpersonal connections via mobile cellular and fixed line telephony, social networking websites (like MySpace, Facebook, and Twitter), emails, VoIP (Skype) and instant text messaging. The world has come to our front door.

These profound changes are widely observed. But the consequences -- especially the impact of the penetration of the mass media into geographically-isolated cultures that were previously stranded at the periphery of modern communication grids -- are far from clear. What happens to communities living in distant rural villages in Bhutan, as well as far-flung districts and remote provinces in Burkina Faso, Burma, and Afghanistan, once the world connects directly to these places and people living in these places learn more about the world? In particular, will this process generate cultural convergence around modern values and is national diversity threatened?

Debate about the supposed peril arising from 'cultural imperialism', 'Coca-colonization', or 'McDonaldization' has raged for almost half a century. Nor is this a dated remnant of the Cold War era; new protectionist cultural policies have been implemented during the last few years, including by UNESCO and the European Union. The heart of this book develops a new theoretical framework and provides systematic evidence to support the argument. We hypothesize that the expansion of information flowing primarily from the global North to South will have the greatest impact on converging values in cosmopolitan societies characterized by integration into world markets, freedom of the press, and widespread access to the media. Parochial societies lacking these conditions are less likely to be affected by these developments. Moreover within countries, many poorer sectors continue to lack the resources and skills necessary to access modern communication technologies. Important social psychological barriers further limit the capacity of the media to alter enduring values and attitudes. By neglecting the role of these sequential firewalls, the risks to national diversity have commonly been exaggerated. These conditions are not simply confined to the most hermetically-sealed and rigidly-controlled autocracies, such as Burma and North Korea, or to isolated villages and provincial communities off the mass communications grid in Tibet, Bhutan, and Mali; instead these barriers are

ubiquitous in many parts of the world. This book outlines these ideas, and then lays out the evidence, drawing upon the World Values Survey, covering 95 countries worldwide from 1981-2007. The mixed method research design combines hierarchical linear models, cross-sectional time-series analysis, and selected qualitative case studies. The broad comparative framework and the wide-ranging evidence allow the core propositions to be tested empirically. The conclusion considers the implications for cultural policies.

Let us start by clarifying our central concepts and reviewing the controversy surrounding cosmopolitan communications and then outline how this book proceeds in more detail.

### **Why cosmopolitan communications are believed to threaten cultural diversity**

The starting point for our study arises from the observation that mass communications have been profoundly affected by the broader phenomenon of globalization-- the process expanding networks of interdependence spanning national boundaries that follows the increasingly swift movement of ideas, money, goods, services, ecology, and people across territorial borders. Globalization is understood here as multidimensional, encompassing *economic* aspects, such as the flow of trade, labor and capital; *social* aspects, such as inter-personal contacts and mediated information flows; and *political* dimensions, including the integration of countries into international and regional organizations.<sup>5</sup> Strictly speaking, most mass communications are not and have not become global (meaning covering all parts of the world); rather communications are in the process of becoming increasingly networked and exchanged across nation-states. These developments make territorial borders more permeable and open to external forces; making most places increasingly similar to bustling Heathrow, JFK, and Schiphol international airports, and less like the isolated capitals of Pyongyang, Ashgabat, or Naypyidaw. In this study, globalization is understood as a complex phenomenon that should not be confused with 'modernization', 'Westernization', or 'Americanization', as the term is sometimes used.<sup>6</sup> By some measures, many smaller countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, South Africa, Estonia, Hungary, and Israel – are more highly integrated into the world economy than is the United States.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, in so far as basic values are shifting, such countries as Sweden, The Netherlands and Australia are at the cutting edge of this process more than the U.S., although these changes are sometimes mistakenly dubbed "Americanization."<sup>8</sup>

Globalization is far from a novel phenomenon; it has occurred historically in periodic waves, whether driven by free trade, population migrations, military conquests, technology, or religious conversions.<sup>9</sup> Arguably both the Roman Empire and Medieval Europe under Charlemagne represented

earlier manifestations of this trend. The invention of the postal service, electronic telegraph, iron railway, and steam ship during the industrial age connected once-distant lands. Networks of 19<sup>th</sup> century traders, missionaries, soldiers, and diplomats linked peoples and places. Globalization has experienced eras of advance and retreat. Seen as an ongoing process, globalization is conceptualized as a work in progress, rather than an end state. But, as we will demonstrate, the late twentieth century witnessed a decisive acceleration in the scale, density, and velocity of interactions that cut across national boundaries.

Due to these developments, once isolated and remote places are now increasingly interconnected. Evidence of this phenomenon is all around us. As the authors sit in Massachusetts and Michigan, we follow real time news of events in Darfur or Baghdad on our laptops and Blackberries. Headlines about Barack Obama's victory instantly surged around the globe, connecting Kenyans celebrating in local villages with Americans rejoicing in Times Square. Travelers have access to internet cafes in Bali, CNN in Doha airport, or Die Hard movies in Beijing. Satellite TV from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya broadcast reality television shows, music clips and news images to two hundred million Arab speakers from Morocco to Syria. People living in Belgium, the Netherlands, or Switzerland can receive dozens of foreign-language channels from Britain, Germany, Italy and France on their cable TV. Mexican and Brazilian telenovelas are ubiquitous on Latin American television, as are American sit-coms in Canada, Australian soaps in Britain, British crime series in the U.S., and Bollywood movies in South Asia. Reuters, Associated Press and Agence France-Presse transmit foreign stories to news rooms around the world. International markets are linked in real time by Bloomberg Business News, the Dow Jones, and related financial tickers. Tele-centers in Bangalore and Toronto help Microsoft customers in London, Berlin and Sydney. Cell phones and text messages instantly connect émigré Mexican, Chinese and Turkish workers with news from relatives back home. Younger Americans and Europeans take all this for granted today, but it is striking to recall how rapidly this has transformed lives; the World Wide Web, born in 1989, still remains in its adolescence.<sup>10</sup>

Multiple developments have expanded the volume and pace of information flowing across national borders. This process operates through the direct transfer of people, for example through international travel, foreign tourism, and émigrés. It happens through interpersonal communications, via the traditional flow of overseas postal mail, international phone calls, telegrams and faxes, and more recently through person-to-person emails and text messages. Today the process also increasingly works through the diverse channels of mass communications. This includes traditional printed publications

(the overseas trade in newspapers, magazines, and books); and the audio-visual media (the international market in radio and television news and entertainment programs, foreign videos, DVDs, movies and feature films, popular music, and transnational TV satellite and cable broadcasts); as well as the complicated flow occurring via newer forms of digital information technologies, some of which blend the interpersonal with mass communications, (typically via websites, online videos, blogs, virtual communities, interactive video games, and list-serve emails).<sup>11</sup>

The concept of '*cosmopolitan*' communications emphasizes the channels that increasingly bind together people living within diverse communities and nation-states. The word '*cosmopolitan*', which derives from the Greek word *kosmopolitês* ('citizen of the world'), refers to the idea that all humans increasingly live and interact within a single global community, not simply within a single polity or nation state.<sup>12</sup> The conceptual distinction between cosmopolitans and locals has been part of the social sciences at least ever since Robert Merton developed it to study small town America during World War II.<sup>13</sup> In recent years, the concept of cosmopolitanism has come back into vogue as an increasingly popular way to rethink processes of democracy, seeking to extend these principles to international life. The idea of cosmopolitan democracy emphasizes that the principles of democracy should operate within states, but also among states and at the global level, including how citizens can organize collectively in civil society and have their voices heard in multilateral organizations beyond the boundaries of the nation-state.<sup>14</sup> In the same way, the idea of cosmopolitan communications can fruitfully be applied to conceptualize the growing phenomenon of information flows that cut across state borders. Communications traditionally used to be far more provincial and territorial – binding together friends and neighbors living within local villages, towns, and regions through social meetings and voluntary organizations, local newspapers, community radio stations, and face-to-face interpersonal connections. The change over time should not be over-stated; links between national elites have always been maintained through international networks, such as through foreign correspondents, diplomatic missions, and UN agencies and bureaus. Mobile populations have always traveled back and forth across territorial national borders, whether as foot-loose tourists, colonists, students, exiles, expatriate employees, labor migrants, rootless nomads, or Diaspora communities spread over multiple states. In the contemporary era, however, connections among peoples living within different nations have often become far more cosmopolitan, with multiple information networks linking together the lives of strangers from distant lands. The idea of '*cosmopolitan communications*' is understood here, most simply, as the way that we learn about, and interact with, people and places beyond the borders of our nation-state. This concept is thus far broader and more comprehensive than the idea of 'transnational'

media – referring to specific communication channels and sources that are designed to reach a multi-national audience, exemplified by BBC World, CNN International, Reuters, and Al-Jazeera.<sup>15</sup>

*From national to cosmopolitan communications*

Multiple factors contributed towards the growth of cosmopolitan communications.<sup>16</sup> In many nations, broadcasting and telecommunications were deregulated. Protectionist trade barriers lifted. Access to the mass media widened. Innovative technologies permeated societies. Multinational media corporations expanded their empires. As a result, nations have often increasingly encountered a rising tide of ideas and images imported from abroad.

[Figure 1.1 about here]

During the height of the modern era of national communications, spanning the period from the rise of radio broadcasting in the early-twentieth century until at least the early-1980s, throughout continental Western Europe, (with a few exceptions) public service corporations enjoyed a monopoly of the airwaves. Broadcasting operated as a nationally-owned public utility monopoly, with the distribution of radio and then television licenses overseen by the postal, telegraph and telephone authorities. Public broadcasting corporations were subject to periodic review in the issuance and renewal of licenses, modeled after the BBC. They often operated following principles of impartial balance across all major parties, with a mission to educate and entertain, although some such as French and Greek TV were more closely aligned with the state. The rationale for this system included spectrum scarcity, and the need to provide a universal service in the public interest, as well as the powerful role of broadcasters. There were some important variations in this pattern, however; Britain, Australia, and Japan operated a dual public service and commercial system from the 1950s onwards, while the United States and Luxembourg favored private enterprise. Meanwhile state broadcasters directly controlled the airwaves in Central and Eastern Europe, and most developing countries operated a mix of public service and state broadcasting. During this era, most local, regional and national newspapers, magazines, and book publishers were also usually domestically-owned, with legal regulations often limiting the extent of foreign investment. Some major publications were widely distributed on the international market, but this revenue was usually subsidiary to domestic sales. In Europe, the major national production companies in the creative industries and the performing arts were also often run as public corporations. The operating costs of national opera companies, theatrical productions and musical performances were

commonly subsidized by the nation-state, as part of the cultural heritage in any society, in common with national museums, art galleries, and archeological historical sites.

Of course again this process should not be exaggerated; cultural trade on international markets was important for certain sectors, even during the golden years of the national era. The motion picture industry has always been heavily reliant upon overseas sales for generating revenues, important for Hollywood but especially for production companies based in countries with a limited domestic audience.<sup>17</sup> The recording music industry based in the US, Europe and Japan was also highly export-oriented, especially major players such as EMI, Sony and Bertelsmann.<sup>18</sup> Many news outlets with limited resources for overseas bureaus and correspondents have also always relied heavily upon Western news agency wire services for international news and foreign affairs coverage, with distant correspondents networked by telegraph, submarine cable, teletype, and wireless and communication satellites.<sup>19</sup> Books, periodicals, magazines and newspapers have always relied upon a proportion of their revenues from overseas sales. The trade in television programs is also long-established and U.S. exports were particularly important, as Tunstall reminds us, when broadcasting systems were first becoming established in many countries during the late-1950s and 1960s and insufficient facilities existed for domestic productions.<sup>20</sup> Once established, however, in most places the broadcasting and newspaper industries were usually home-owned, nationally-regulated, and designed primarily to serve a domestic audience; the British Broadcasting Corporation, *Le Figaro*, or *Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlichen-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten Deutschlands* (German ARD) reflected their local origins, as distinctive as the Paris Opéra, the Drury Lane theatre, or Die Berliner Philharmoniker.

The liberalization of public service broadcasting and telecommunication monopolies, which occurred in many countries during the 1980s and 1990s, led to the rapid proliferation of more loosely regulated commercial or privately-owned TV and radio channels and telecommunication companies. The new channels of commercial broadcasting also fuelled the expansion of mass advertizing and encouraged the growth of transnational advertizing and market research companies. The print sector has also been affected by growing foreign ownership of newspapers and multinational publishing companies, as well as by cross-media ownership that seeks vertical integration across delivery platforms, linking together books, magazines and newspapers with movies, videos, DVDs, and advertizing.

Technological developments have also played a major role in this process, shaping how business, society, and governments work, function and interact throughout the world, bringing multiple

changes to everyday life.<sup>21</sup> The rapid expansion of access to new information and communication technologies from the mid-1990s onwards, and media convergence across platforms, accelerated the pace of interchanges across state boundaries through the panoply of electronic mail and text messaging, mobile phones, online websites and blogs, and related developments.<sup>22</sup> Television broadcasting was transformed by the growth of satellite broadcasting and cable programming and there were important innovations in digital technologies associated with the rise of the internet, mobile cell phones, and multimedia convergence. Today multiple sources of entertainment, news and information vie for attention in the most media-rich environments -- from feature films to You-Tube videos, from headlines on the BBC World Service to CNN, and from blogs to networked emails -- only some of which are locally or nationally-based. These profound developments have had most impact in advanced industrial societies, where many people have adopted the paraphernalia of laptops, Wi-Fi, I-pods and BlackBerries. But digital technologies such as data-connected smart-phones has also spread to emerging economies in the developing world, including to some remote rural villages but especially to the more affluent middle classes living in cities such as Mumbai, Johannesburg, and Doha.

These combined trends have torn down protection and thrown open national markets to a flood of imported products, as documented in chapter 3, providing opportunities for multinational multimedia production and distribution conglomerates. As exemplified by ten of the most important players, these are not exclusively based in the United States, but all are located in a handful of larger post-industrial societies, including Time Warner, Viacom, Disney, the BBC (UK), Sony (Japan), News Corporation (US-Australia), Bertelsmann (Germany), Associated Press, Reuters (UK), and General Electric. Despite some important second-tier hubs operating within particular geo-linguistic regions, such as Bollywood, Al Jazeera, or TV Globo, the direction of international trade in cultural goods and services flows mainly from a few major production conglomerates based in the global North to audiences in the rest of the world. The rise of cosmopolitan communications can therefore be traced back to the deregulation of mass communications, technological innovations, and trade liberalization, processes that started in most advanced industrialized societies during the 1980s, before this transformation eventually swept though the rest of the world in subsequent decades.<sup>23</sup> These changes have affected all major media sectors, including the expansion of transnational TV networks, international news wire services, the market for feature films, television programs, and publications, advertizing agencies, recorded popular music, and the internet.

*The impact of the cosmopolitan communications on the audience*

These basic developments have been widely observed but what have been the consequences for national cultures? This question has sparked intense debate and for more than half a century, theorists have offered a range of conjectures, with alternative viewpoints illustrated schematically in figure 1.1.<sup>24</sup> Perhaps the most popular view anticipates a gradual process of cultural convergence around Western values occurring worldwide; the predominance of American and other Western media conglomerates in the production of cultural exports is expected to erode the diversity of traditional values, indigenous languages, and local practices found in societies importing these products. Other observers challenge these claims, however, emphasizing that many deeply-traditional societies in the Middle East, Africa and Asia have actively rejected foreign ideas and images imported in Western media -- from liberal sexual mores to notions of individualism, secularism, and free market capitalism - intensifying culture wars around the world. Still others envisage that we are experiencing fusion, where cultural artifacts from many different places are exchanged, merged, and reinvented in a world bazaar. These interpretations, illustrated in Figure 1.1, predict alternative long-term effects from cosmopolitan communications, ranging from assimilation to rejection or amalgamation.<sup>25</sup>

In contrast to all these arguments, the more skeptical perspective developed in this study suggests that, due to the existence of important firewalls, many entrenched indigenous values, social attitudes, and core beliefs embedded within national cultures are far more impervious to the impact of cosmopolitan communications than is generally believed. The direct experience of globalization does have clear effects, as we will demonstrate, as does the mass media. Nevertheless the influence of cosmopolitan communications has a less radical or transformative impact on deep-rooted societal differences than is often assumed. As is often the case with important new phenomena, the effect of these developments has been over-hyped. Important changes clearly *are* occurring, but we expect cultural diversity to persist for the foreseeable future. Let us examine theoretical arguments in the literature. We will then outline our core argument and the reasons why we remain highly skeptical of many of the sweeping claims that are commonly made.

#### *The L.A. effect: cultural convergence?*

The most popular view for the last half century remains cultural convergence around Western values, or the 'homogenization' scenario, which can also be termed the 'L.A. effect' since so many of the consequences are thought to arise from the products generated by Hollywood/Silicon Valley. The core contention argues that greater exposure to foreign news and popular entertainment, imported mainly from multinational corporations based in the United States or from other major Western producer

countries, will gradually undermine, dilute, or even eradicate the variety of national identities, distinctive beliefs, cultural practices, and traditional lifestyles found around the world. Cultural convergence has often been regarded as 'Americanization' or 'Westernization', although these notions are much too simple to capture the multinational complexity of this phenomenon. This argument is not confined to developing societies by any means; it is often expressed in European debates, such as French concerns about imported American entertainment and news. Nevertheless, if the claims of convergence are true, previously-isolated traditional cultures located in peripheral geographic areas in the global South, exemplified by Bhutan, seem most vulnerable to these developments.

This idea is hardly novel; these arguments echo concerns about the dominance of Western journalism and news agencies expressed at the height of the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century era of decolonization.<sup>26</sup> Theories of cultural imperialism, popularized during the 1960s and 1970s by Johan Galtung and Herbert Schiller, claimed that the mass media were powerful tools used by neo-colonial Western powers to exert hegemonic control over the ideas, habits, and traditions found in weaker developing states and peripheral societies.<sup>27</sup> Thomas McPhail dubbed this phenomenon 'electronic colonialism', emphasizing the dangers of Americanization: "*All of the US multimedia empires, along with their extensive advertizing networks, project and encourage US tastes, values, mores, history, culture and language around the world.*"<sup>28</sup> This view was reinforced during the 1970s by Tapio Varis's analysis of the continued imbalance in the traffic in television programs, and supported by Jeremy Tunstall's *The Media are American*.<sup>29</sup> These ideas contributed to the contentious New World Information Order debate in the early-1980, a process that divided UNESCO and left an enduring rift in the organization.<sup>30</sup> It should not be thought that these concerns have faded with the passage of time; during the 1990s, echoes of these historic fights continued to be heard by commentators who dubbed American predominance of audio-visual trade 'Coca-colonization' (Howes), 'Dallasification', (Liebes and Katz), 'McDonaldization' (Ritzer, Barber), or 'McDisneyization' (Ritzer and Liska).<sup>31</sup> Most commentators have usually regarded cultural convergence with concern, although Joseph S. Nye, Jr. suggests that American predominance in the market for cultural products represents a more positive and benevolent development, as 'soft power' can supplement the power of military might and economic resources in U.S. foreign policy.<sup>32</sup> American observers believe that the diplomatic use of communications is an important tool that the United States can use to strengthen the spread of American/Western liberal ideas, such as the value of democratic governance, respect for human rights, and support for free markets.<sup>33</sup>

These arguments are not merely academic; their legacy has also been influential during the last decade among policymakers in the international community, indeed political support has revived these ideas, providing the intellectual rationale justifying the implementation of new protectionist regulations, import quotas, tariffs, license fees, and subsidies. In 2005 UNESCO secured international agreement for the *Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity*, addressing the concern that global communications may be capable of undermining, or even destroying, local customs and traditions, minority native languages, and indigenous life-styles in developing societies.<sup>34</sup> The sponsors, France and Canada, gathered support from 148 countries in its favor, with only the United States and Israel voting against. The convention legitimates domestic legal measures protecting local creative industries, although the implications for world trade remain unclear.<sup>35</sup> Protectionist measures have also been passed by the European Union, including most recently the 2007 *Audiovisual Media Services Directive*, designed to provide a regulatory framework promoting European-produced programming (and limiting American television program imports) within EU member states.<sup>36</sup> In recent decades, the World Trade Organization reached agreement to liberalize trade in multiple economic sectors; since 1995, for example, average tariffs have fallen by one third in member states.<sup>37</sup> Real growth in trade surged by around 7-9 percent worldwide during the last decade, affecting all regions and national income groups, with particularly strong export-led growth in emerging markets such as China, India and Brazil. The world has negotiated trade agreements on everything from textiles and minerals to banking and manufactured products; nevertheless sensitivities have limited attempts to further liberalize trade in cultural goods and services.

But are the widespread popular fears about the potential impact of cultural convergence, arising from the imbalance in world markets, actually well-founded? The *consequences* of these changes for the audience, and for society in general, may be far from straightforward.<sup>38</sup> Most importantly, the convergence thesis rests, rather unreflectively, on the implicit supposition that people submissively assimilate, and even emulate, ideas and images transmitted directly from mass communications. Audiences are viewed as essentially passive, absorbing Western ideas and values, along with fashions and lifestyles. The simplest version of the argument implies a powerful and direct media effect based on a straightforward 'stimulus-response' (SR) psychological model. Whether the globalization of mass communications actually has these effects on the audience, however, remains to be demonstrated. There are many reasons, discussed below, why deeply-imbedded cultural values and attitudes in each nation may prove relatively impermeable to these processes.

Despite the intensity of the theoretical debate, until recently little direct evidence has been used to examine these issues.<sup>39</sup> In part, this neglect arises from the limited availability of systematic and reliable cross-national survey evidence monitoring cultural values as well as media habits. It may also be attributed to ideological and methodological limitations, inadequate comparative theorizing, and the individualistic bias in the social psychological study of media behavior. Whatever the reasons, it is obviously risky to jump directly from observations about the American/Western trade imbalance in cultural markets to claims about the effects of this process upon the public. It is especially dangerous when these ideas are used to justify restrictive cultural policies and the regulation of the mass media. It is true that today, compared with earlier decades, many more people living in Paris, Tokyo, and Johannesburg have access to catch the headlines on CNN International or the BBC World, to watch a Hollywood blockbuster, or to use Google or YouTube. When they do so, it is indeed possible that they may gradually assimilate the ideas and images they experience from these sources, eventually leading towards long-term cultural convergence. Alternatively they could instead choose to react against any messages, to reinterpret their meaning, or simply to ignore them.

*The Taliban effect: Cultural Polarization?*

The cultural convergence argument has attracted many critics over the years. In particular, an alternative scenario is provided by the polarization argument or 'Taliban' effect. This view does not dispute the core changes in media landscapes, including the changing economic structure of the mass media, and the direction and volume of trade in international cultural markets. Rather than emulation, however, theorists such as Pearce envisage a process of active rejection by traditional societies, so that the growth of cross-border information flows may spark growing culture wars between the global North and South. For example, some observers argue that a backlash against imported Western entertainment and news, along with the values of secularism, individualism, and consumerism, has encouraged a revival of tribal loyalties and ethnic identities in the Middle East and South-East Asia, directly fuelling rage against the United States.<sup>40</sup> In this view, traditional societies consciously attempt to distance themselves, and to protect their cultures, from the foreign values, ideas and images commonly conveyed in imported Western/American media.<sup>41</sup> The tensions between convergence and polarization have been popularized in vivid metaphors by Benjamin Barber as the rivalry between McWorld v. Jihad, while Thomas Friedman has drawn the contrast between the Lexus and the Olive Tree.<sup>42</sup> Although the role of mass communications was not central to the argument, the idea of value-based polarization is also reflected in Samuel Huntington's provocative thesis, predicting a Clash of Civilizations between the

West and other cultures.<sup>43</sup> In the polarization scenario, exposure to the 'other' is believed to provoke active measures to reject foreign threats. This process can also be termed the 'Taliban' effect, as one of the most extreme examples of a regime trying to exert rigid control on all media, to reduce foreign influences, after they gained control of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The Taliban banned TV and cinema, as well as many types of painting and photography, cassette players, VCRs, musical instruments, and video tapes, as well as demolishing thousands of historical statues and artifacts.

In support of the polarization argument, cultural theorists suggest that audiences reinterpret the contents of messages imported from foreign media, thereby remaking their meaning in particular local contexts, undermining their intended effects.<sup>44</sup> In this perspective, people have the capacity to actively criticize, resist, and reject media messages, just as they can read between the lines of official state propaganda, especially if the messages reflect culturally-unacceptable values, attitudes and forms of behavior. From this perspective, people are considered capable of deconstructing meanings and generating resistance to the spread of a uniform Western or American culture. For example, a study of audiences in various European countries who watched similar popular entertainment imported from the U.S. (Dallas) found that people constructed diverse frameworks of meaning from this shared experience.<sup>45</sup> Moreover some theorists within this perspective argue that in highly traditional or socially-conservative cultures, greater familiarity with Western values carried in popular entertainment and news about the world can trigger unintended effects, catalyzing new culture wars between the forces of modernization and reaction. Opposition to globalization manifests itself in popular street protests based on cultural issues (exemplified by Muslim demonstrations in Pakistan against Danish publication of cartoons of Mohammed) and by consumer boycotts against imported cultural products or the development of local alternatives (illustrated by the popularity of Mecca Cola in the Middle East or the slow food movement in Europe).<sup>46</sup> The collapse of the Doha world trade negotiations in July 2008 over agricultural protectionism, after seven years of talks, also signaled limits to this process. Political and environmental concerns may increase support for anti-globalization forces, encouraged by rising public concern about global warming, the reaction against lost jobs in rich countries, worries about food safety and security, the growing cost of extended supply chains associated with rising oil prices and transportation costs. The International Network for Cultural Development was formed in 1998 as an advocacy NGO to fight economic globalization and to promote multicultural expression, indigenous arts and crafts, and local diversity.<sup>47</sup>

Although providing an interesting and plausible perspective, the polarization effect on the audience has also not been subject to rigorous scrutiny and evaluated against systematic evidence from public opinion surveys. Too often there is a tendency for theorists to jump from patterns of conflict that have been widely observed, to blame the media messenger for these developments. Hence the spread of transnational media and cross-border information flows, exemplified by the popularity of Al Jazeera and Al Arabia, are used to explain tensions between the forces of radicalism and the status quo within Arab states, without demonstrating the connection in any systematic way, rather than attributing these developments to other underlying causes. Do people living in countries such as Egypt, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, who are regularly exposed to the cross-border flow of information and popular entertainment, absorb or reject the modern values contained in foreign cultural products? Does this process influence sexual mores, consumer attitudes, or trust in other nations? So far, these questions have not been tested systematically against a wide range of empirical evidence.

*The Bangalore effect: Fusion?*

Another interpretation has also emerged-- the fusion or 'hybridization' thesis, which can also be depicted as the 'Bangalore' effect. Theorists within this perspective suggest that easier and faster communications among societies generates a creative global *mélange* that mixes genres, programs and contents derived from different times/places.<sup>48</sup> Through this process, creative ideas are exchanged in different countries, but these are then remade and re-exported. As a result, the very concept of an indigenous (and American) cultural product becomes unclear in its meaning. 'Glocalization' encourages a blending of diverse cultural repertoires through a two-way flow of global and local information generating cross-border fertilization, mixing indigenous customs with imported products. This process is thought to generate original fusions of music, design and fashions, which are neither uniquely ethnically-traditional nor industrial-modern.<sup>49</sup> From this perspective, Asians in London's Brick Lane, Hispanics in New York's Queens, and pied noirs living in Paris's XVIII arrondissement are neither wholly Western nor purely the product of immigrant cultures but a *mélange* of both. McDonalds and similar American fast food restaurants are certainly popular, but in this view they are outnumbered by the diverse ethnic cuisines, whether Italian, Chinese, Thai, Indian, Japanese or Mexican, which have spread to cities worldwide, including those in the United States. The process can also be regarded as the Bangalore effect, reflecting the global reach of the financial services, and information technology companies based in that city.<sup>50</sup> American customers seeking technical support for computer products are routinely connected to Bangalore call centers, in a geographically-meaningless space.

A fusion culture emphasizes that modern mass communications involves a two-way exchange worldwide, generating complex currents and eddies, seen as more of a global bazaar with counter-flows than a simple form of neo-colonial dominance. Californian fusion cuisine typically amalgamates eclectic dishes - Asian, Mediterranean, and Latin American - with local farmer's market produce. It is neither wholly local nor wholly global. Another typical fusion product is mash-up music, made by sampling, remixing and combining distinct pop songs. The fusion interpretation suggests that although American companies predominate in the production, distribution and sales of popular TV entertainment and feature films, these products have absorbed genres, formats, and program ideas from diverse sources - the Dutch Big Brother, British Pop Idol, and Hong Kong action flicks. Thus, the quintessentially American center of information technology, Silicon Valley, has a huge component of Asian scientists and entrepreneurs. With open borders, the United States has become the largest consumer market for information and communication, as well as the most successful exporter of cultural products and services. But, like the popularity of Chicago pizza, Amsterdam *rijsttafel*, or London chicken tikka masala, the cultural goods that emerge are neither wholly indigenous to each country, nor wholly foreign, but a fusion. Thus, McDonalds itself now offers croissants and Asian noodles. Pushed to the extreme, there is no such thing as cultural authenticity; rather there are a variety of creative *mélanges* drawn from diverse sources.<sup>51</sup>

Important regional markets have also emerged, facilitating local exchanges and counter-flows, such as Bollywood films in South Asia, Mexico and Brazilian popular TV in Latin America, Chinese video software on Wal-Mart shelves, and South Korean television dramas broadcast in other Asian countries. International websites, advertising messages, consumer products, and newspapers are other examples of cross-border goods and services that are tailored to fit local markets and interests. Fusion can occur because global media companies adapt their products to local communities, using indigenous images and accents to sell imported brands. National media companies may also import but then adapt global products, dubbing feature films into domestic languages or adding sub-titles. And audiences may transform imported cultural products by adapting them to local needs and conditions.<sup>52</sup> Understanding these issues is complicated by the fact that diverse reactions to the same phenomena may be occurring simultaneously among different social sectors; for example the affluent and educated urban elite living in developing countries may come to share similar ideas and attitudes to their counterparts living in Europe or North America, due to the spread of mass communications, while at the same time this process may generate greater polarization between elites and more conservative groups living in traditional rural communities in the same societies.

## Plan of the book

### *Part I*

In the light of this debate, the next chapter outlines the firewall theory at the heart of this book, identifies the core testable empirical propositions that flow from our theory, explains the book's research design, and outlines the sources of evidence. *Chapter 3* examines the international market for cultural goods and services, including the volume and direction of exports and imports across national borders, and trends over time. We analyze evidence for the trade in audio-visual services, the flow of news information, and the role of new information and communication technologies. We demonstrate that cultural exchanges occur more densely among core societies, mostly based in the global North, that have rich and dense networks of connectivity. By contrast, peripheral societies, that are less closely connected, are heavily concentrated in the global South. The evidence demonstrates the leading share of the international market in cultural trade held by the United States – and the way that this share has grown, not shrunk, in recent years. But the chapter also demonstrates the limits of trade integration for poorer societies.

*Chapter 4* focuses on understanding how far deep-rooted poverty and lack of economic development remain major barriers in access to the mass media– examining regular use of newspapers and magazines, television and radio broadcasts, and the Internet/email -- and how this varies among and within societies worldwide. The comparative framework focuses on some of the leading media-saturated post-industrial countries, such as the United States, Sweden, Germany and Japan; some middle-income nations and emerging economies, such as Brazil, India, and China, where public access to all forms of electronic and printed communications has been rapidly growing; as well as considering some of the least developed societies, where isolated rural communities have minimal access to the news media, such as in Burkina Faso, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. There are also substantial disparities in news use between the information-rich and poor within countries. Information and communication technologies have spread most widely among more affluent households in high and middle income countries, but substantial gaps in media access remain, not simply in new ICTs. Evidence from international statistics gathered by UNESCO, the ITU, and related agencies allow us to compare the patterns of access around the world and to consider whether the digital divide has gradually closed over time. The World Values Survey helps to monitor patterns of mass communications at individual-level

and to explain the underlying reasons for disparities in access. Case studies from Mali and South Africa illustrate the contrasts in greater depth.

*Chapter 5* compares and classifies societies worldwide using a new Cosmopolitanism Index based on identifying the external and internal barriers to the free flow of information. The most cosmopolitan societies, such as Denmark, Estonia and Switzerland, are characterized by widespread public access to multiple media channels and sources, limited trade barriers to cultural imports, and few major restrictions on the independence of journalists and broadcasters. These societies are at the forefront of the globalization process, integrated with many other countries through strong communication, economic, and political networks. Certain emerging economies and developing nations, such as the Czech Republic, South Africa, and Argentina, are increasingly integrated into cosmopolitan networks. By contrast, in provincial societies, such as Burma, Iran, Syria, and Viet Nam, the state continues to exert considerable control over news and public affairs, restricting both cultural imports and freedom of the press. These countries are also poorly integrated into global markets in trade and communication networks, and the public has restricted access to mass communications. Provincial societies also include emerging economies such as China and Russia, which are integrated with world trade markets, but that restrict information flows at home. Other cases, such as Mali, Indonesia, and Ghana, are newer democracies with considerable media freedom, but with relatively weak integration into global markets and communication networks, under-developed communication infrastructures, and relatively limited public access to the mass media. We classify the societies in the countries under comparison according to the Cosmopolitan index and illustrate the typology with selected case studies.

## *Part II*

The second part of the book tests the firewall theory. This predicts that individual use of the news media will have a *direct* effect on individual values. In addition, the account predicts that a *cross-level interaction* effect will also be apparent, as external and internal barriers to information flows in each society will interact with individual patterns of news media use. In particular, in the most cosmopolitan societies, we predict that even after controlling for other social characteristics, the public who are most regularly exposed to information from the media will differ significantly from groups that remain more isolated from mass communications. The study tests the impact of exposure to the mass media on the strength of national identities and cosmopolitan orientations; values and attitudes towards markets and the state; orientations towards religion, gender equality, and traditional standards of morality; and attitudes towards democracy, self-expression values, and human rights. In all cases, these patterns are

examined controlling for other individual-level characteristics associated with use of the media, including education, income, gender, and age.

*Chapter 6* opens this section by examining whether those most exposed to news and information are less nationalistic and more cosmopolitan in orientations, as expected, and how this pattern varies in open and closed societies. Commentators such as Anthony Giddens have argued that globalization has led towards the 'end of the nation state'.<sup>53</sup> Regular exposure to more information about other societies and the world via the news media should contribute towards this process. Yet skeptics doubt whether identification with the nation-state has been seriously weakened among the mass public, even in the European Union, and whether an emerging 'cosmopolitan identity' is sufficient powerful to replace the visceral tribal appeals of nationalism. In Anthony Smith's view, for example, we are witnessing the growth of regional blocs, where nation-states remain the primary actors, not the emergence of a new world order that transcends states.<sup>54</sup> To consider these issues, this chapter examines whether regularly users of the news media differ significantly in the strength of their national identities, support for the organizations of global governance, and attitudes towards national or multilateral solutions to policy problems.

*Chapter 7* explores the impact of the news media on attitudes towards the free market and the role of government intervention in management of the economy. This issue is particularly important for the former communist states and Latin American societies that have followed the policies of the Washington consensus, deregulating and privatizing the public sector, liberalizing trade, and shrinking the role of the state. Mass communications is expected to have encouraged support for economic liberalism, though emphasizing mass consumerism, individualism, and capitalism, especially through advertizing as well as through the values conveyed in popular entertainment and financial news exported from affluent post-industrial societies. A body of research has explored factors leading towards public support for free trade and economic integration.<sup>55</sup> This chapter goes further to examine the role of mass communications in this process, in particular whether those groups that do and do not regularly use the news media display distinctive economic values, underlying preferences towards the role of markets and the state.

*Chapter 8* examines whether media users have distinctive orientations towards traditional moral values and religion. Previous work by the authors has demonstrated a consistent values gap between post-industrial and developing societies in traditional moral values, attitudes towards marriage and divorce, tolerance of homosexuality, and support for gender equality in the roles of men and women.<sup>56</sup>


A wealth of evidence from the World Values Survey also demonstrates that rich and poor societies differ substantially in patterns of religious values and practices.<sup>57</sup> What is the impact of mass communications on these processes? The convergence thesis suggests that popular entertainment or news information reflecting Western values, when imported into traditional cultures, will probably accelerate process of value change, such as encouraging greater tolerance of sexual liberalization and more secular behavior. Alternatively, the polarizing thesis reflects the views of other commentators who argue that Western popular entertainment has generated a backlash in developing societies, particularly in the deeply-conservative Arab States, by emphasizing explicit sexuality, gratuitous violence, consumerism and a celebrity culture; denigrating respect for historical traditions, established customs, and religious authorities; and undermining the importance of family, marriage, and honor. From this perspective, the spread of the global media may have contributed towards culture wars. This chapter explores these issues by contrasting the groups based on regular use of mass communications to analyze the empirical evidence for these arguments.

*Chapter 9* analyzes support for democratic ideals, self-expression values, and human rights. The logic of the convergence view is that greater familiarity with democratic practices and human rights from the media will spread these ideas, thereby encouraging reform movements and human rights activists in previously-closed societies and autocratic regimes. Access to international news and information about democratic societies abroad should be a particularly potent mechanism for spreading demands for political rights and civil liberties at home. At the same time, where the news media are largely controlled by powerful governing elites, through state ownership of broadcasting, overt censorship, intimidation of independent journalists, or by other related mechanisms, then mass communications can be used as a mechanism of state control and propaganda. We examine the evidence for these claims, and whether those with and without access to mass communications, who live in countries ruled by very different regimes, such as Russia, Ukraine, and Poland, differ in their political orientations and support for the regime.

*Chapter 10* examines the degree to which cultures actually have converged over time, utilizing aggregate indicators to classify more than 90 societies in terms of the Cosmopolitanism Index. The World Values Survey has now been conducted in five waves since the early-1980s and by comparing trends over time in selected attitudinal indicators we can test whether national cultures have gradually converged in the most cosmopolitan societies.

Finally, the conclusion in *Chapter 11* summarizes the main results and considers the consequences both for understanding theories about the impact of mass communications on cultural diversity, as well as the broader implications for cultural policy. Proponents who celebrate the globalization of mass communications regard it as a way of potentially strengthening awareness about other countries and promoting international understand around the world, as well as spreading the principles and practices of democratic governance and human rights. This perspective advocates neo-liberal free market policies dismantling trade restrictions, cutting tariff barriers, and loosening media ownership regulations, in order to maximize the free flow of information and trade across national borders. Critics who view this process with alarm see cultural diversity under threat, due especially to the predominance of American/Western multinational corporations in audiovisual trade. This view favors protectionist cultural trade policies, using tariffs and quotas to regulate and limit the import of audiovisual services, and subsidies designed to preserve domestic creative industries and cultural pluralism. Protectionist sentiments are strongest in developing nations, as exemplified by debates within UNESCO, but they can also be found among affluent postindustrial societies; the European Union, for example, remains divided between those member states favoring more competitive markets within Europe and others, led by the French, seeking to protect Europe's creative economy against the Americanization of popular culture.<sup>58</sup> There are also deep divisions about these issues among theorists within the social sciences. The conclusion discusses whether interventions designed to protect national cultures against foreign influences are appropriate, or whether the free flow of information and open borders are more desirable policies.

Figure 1.1: Theories about the impact of cosmopolitan communications



---

<sup>1</sup> Ross McDonald. 2004. 'Television, materialism and culture: An exploration of imported media and its implications for GNH.' *Journal of Bhutan Studies*; Whalley J. Kezang. 2004. 'Telecommunications in the land of the Thunder Dragon: recent developments in Bhutan.' *Telecommunications Policy* 28 (11): 785-800; S. Akhtar and T. Gregson. 2001. 'Internet technologies in the Himalayas: lessons learned during the 1990s.' *Journal of Information Science* 27 (1): 9-17; Tashi Wangchuk. 2004. 'The Middle Path to Democracy in the Kingdom of Bhutan.' *Asian Survey* 44(6): 836-855.

<sup>2</sup> Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy. 2003. 'Fast forward into trouble.' *The Guardian* June 14th.

<sup>3</sup> Op cit.

<sup>4</sup> Bhutan Information, Communication and Media Authority. *Information Communications and Media Act 2006. Clause 26/2(g)*. <http://www.bicma.gov.bt/>

<sup>5</sup> For balanced overviews of the debate about globalization, see David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. 1999. *Global transformations: Politics, economics, and culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chapter 7; Anthony McGrew and David Held. Eds. 2007. *Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies*. Cambridge: Polity; David Held and Anthony McGrew. 2007. *Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide* Cambridge: Polity; Jens Bartelson. 2000. 'Three concepts of globalization.' *International Sociology* 15(2): 180-196.

<sup>6</sup> David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. 1999. *Global transformations: Politics, economics, and culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chapter 7.

<sup>7</sup> For details, see chapter 3.

<sup>8</sup> See Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2.

<sup>9</sup> William McNeill. 1986. *Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Nayan Chanda. 2007. *Bound Together: How Traders, Preachers, Adventurers, and Warriors Shaped Globalization*. New Haven: Yale University Press; M. Lang. 2006. 'Globalization and its history.' *Journal of Modern History* 78(4): 899-931.

<sup>10</sup> It should be noted that networked computing and computer-mediated email existed for the scientific community since the early 1960s, but the number of users was very small, even in the US. The birth of the Internet can be dated to the invention of the World Wide Web in 1990 and then the launch of Mosaic (1993), Netscape Navigator (1994), and Microsoft Internet Explorer (1995). For details, see Pippa Norris. 2001. *Digital Divide*. New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>11</sup> See UNESCO's classification presented in Figure 3.1. The full panoply of the creative economy also includes international exchanges of performing arts (music, theatre, dance, opera), visual arts (paintings, sculptures),

heritage goods (crafts festivals, museums), creative services (architecture, advertising, research) and design (furniture, fashions), but these sectors are beyond the scope of this study.

<sup>12</sup> For useful discussions of the concept, see Ulf Hannerz. 1990. 'Cosmopolitans and locals in world culture.' In *Global Culture: Nationalism, globalization and modernity*. Ed. Mike Featherstone. London: Sage; John Tomlinson. *Globalization and Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen. Eds. 2002. *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>13</sup> Robert Merton. 1957. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

<sup>14</sup> Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds). 1995. *Cosmopolitan Democracy: an Agenda for a New World Order* Cambridge: Polity Press; David Held. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* Cambridge: Polity Press; Richard Falk. 1995. *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics* Cambridge: Polity Press; Daniele Archibugi. 2008. *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>15</sup> For studies of transnational television see, for example, Jean K. Chalaby. Ed. 2005. *Transnational television worldwide: Towards a new media order*. London: I.B. Taurus; Khalil Rinnawi. 2006. *Instant Nationalism: McArabism, al-Jazeera and Transnational Media in the Arab World*. Lanham: University Press of America. For patterns of transnational media within Europe, see Council of Europe. 2004. *Transnational media concentrations in Europe*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. [http://www.coe.int/t/e/human\\_rights/media/AP-MD\(2004\)007\\_en.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/media/AP-MD(2004)007_en.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> For detailed accounts of the historical developments leading to deregulation see, for example, David Hesmondhalgh. 2007. *The Cultural Industries*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. London: Sage; Peter J. Humphrey. 1996. *Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press; Open Society Institute. 2005. *Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence*. Hungary: OSI; Monroe Price, Beata Rozumilowicz, and Stefaan G. Verhulst. Eds. 2001. *Media Reform: Democratizing Media, Democratizing the State*. London: Routledge; David Ward. 2007. *Television and public policy: Change and continuity in an era of global liberalization*. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

<sup>17</sup> Kerry Segrave. 1997. *American Films Abroad: Hollywood's Domination of the World's Movie Screens*. Jefferson, NC.: McFarland.

<sup>18</sup> Thomas L. McPhail. 2007. *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders and Trends*. Oxford: Blackwell. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Chapter 5.

<sup>19</sup> Olivier Boyd-Barrett. 1980. *The International News Agencies*. London: Constable; William A. Hachten and James Scotton. 2006. *The World News Prism: Global Information in a Satellite Age*. Wiley-Blackwell; Thomas L. McPhail. 2007. *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders and Trends*. Oxford: Blackwell. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Chapter 7.

<sup>20</sup> Jeremy Tunstall. 1977. *The Media are American*. New York: Columbia University Press.

<sup>21</sup> Pippa Norris. 2001. *Digital Divide*. New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Manuel Castells. 2000. *The rise of the network society* 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.

---

<sup>22</sup> Pippa Norris. 2001. *Digital Divide*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>23</sup> There are numerous excellent overviews of these developments: see, for example Thomas L. McPhail. 2006. *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders, and Trends*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, Lee Artz and Yahya R. Kamalipour. Eds. 2007. *The Global Media: Trends in International Mass Media*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield; Chris Barker. 1997. *Global Television: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwells; Chris Barker. 1999. *Television, Globalization and cultural identities*. Buckingham: Open University Press; Manuel Castells. 2004. *The Power of Identity*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell; Paula Chakravartty and Yuezhi Zhao. Eds. 2008. *Global communications: toward a transcultural political economy*. Lanham : Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc; Anne Cooper-Chen. Ed. 2005. *Global Entertainment Media: Content, Audiences, Issues*. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; Tyler Cowen. 2004. *Creative Destruction: How Globalization Is Changing the World's Cultures*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

<sup>25</sup> Robert Holton. 2000. 'Globalization's Cultural Consequences.' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*. 570:140-52; Frank Webster. 2006. *Theories of the Information Society*. London: Routledge. 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed..

<sup>26</sup> 'Cultural imperialism' has also been termed 'media imperialism' and 'electronic imperialism'. For the origins of the debate about this concept and the original advocates, see, Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge. 1965. 'The structure of foreign news'. *Journal of Peace Research*. 2(1): 64-91; Johan Galtung. 1971. 'A structural theory of imperialism.' *Journal of Peace Research*, 8: 81-118; Johan Galtung. 1980. *The True Worlds*. New York: The Free Press; Herbert J. Schiller. 1971. *Mass communication and American empire*. Boston: Beacon; Herbert J. Schiller. 1973. *Communication and Cultural Domination*. White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press; M. Masmoudi. 1981. 'The new world information order.' In *Crisis in International News: Policies and Prospects*. Ed J. Richstad and M.A. Anderson. New York: Columbia University Press. For a critical account, see J. Tomlinson. 1991. *Cultural imperialism*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

<sup>27</sup> For the origins of this debate see, Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge. 1965. 'The structure of foreign news'. *Journal of Peace Research*. 2(1): 64-91; Johan Galtung. 1971. 'A structural theory of imperialism.' *Journal of Peace Research*, 8: 81-118; Johan Galtung. 1980. *The True Worlds*. New York: The Free Press; Herbert J. Schiller. 1971. *Mass communication and American empire*. Boston: Beacon; Herbert J. Schiller. 1973. *Communication and Cultural Domination*. White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press; M. Masmoudi. 1981. 'The new world information order.' In *Crisis in International News: Policies and Prospects*. Ed J. Richstad and M.A. Anderson. New York: Columbia University Press. For critical accounts, see J. Tomlinson. 1991. *Cultural imperialism*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Peter Golding and Phil Harris. Eds. 1997. *Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Globalization, Communication and the New International Order*. London: Sage Publications.

<sup>28</sup> Thomas L. McPhail. 1983. *Electronic colonialism: The future of international broadcasting and communication*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.p.60

---

<sup>29</sup> Tapio Varis. 1974. 'Global traffic in television.' *Journal of Communication*, 241: 102–109; Tapio Varis. 1984. 'The International Flow of Television Programs.' *Journal of Communication* 34 (1):143-152; Tapio Varis. 1986. 'Trends in International Television Flows.' *International Political Science Review* 7: 235-249; Tapio Varis. 2002. 'The International Flow of Television Programmes.' In Toby Miller (ed.) *Television - Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies*. New York: Routledge; Jeremy Tunstall. 1977. *The Media are American*. New York: Columbia University Press.

<sup>30</sup> Sean MacBride. 1980. *Communication and Society Today and Tomorrow, Many Voices One World: Towards a new more just and more efficient world information and communication order*. Paris: UNESCO. International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems; Hamid Mowlana. 1985. *International Flow of Information: A Global Report and Analysis* Paris: UNESCO. For the background to the UNESCO debate and its consequences, see Thomas McPhail. 2005. *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders, and Trends*. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. Chapter 10.

<sup>31</sup> D. Howes. Ed. 1996. *Cross-cultural Consumption: Global markets, local realities*. London: Routledge; G. Ritzer. 1993. *The McDonaldisation of Society*. Newbury Park, CA: Pine Forge Press; G. Ritzer and A. Liska. 1997. 'McDisneyization'. In *Touring Cultures: Transformation of travel and theory*. Eds. C. Rojek and John Urry. London: Routledge; T. Liebes and E. Katz. 1993. *The export of meaning: Cross-cultural readings of Dallas*. Oxford: Polity Press; Benjamin Barber. 1996. *Jihad vs McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World*. New York: Ballantine Books.

<sup>32</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs; Joseph S. Nye. 2008. 'Public diplomacy and soft power.' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616: 94-109; Watanabe Yasushi and David L. McConnell (Eds). 2008. *Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

<sup>33</sup> David Rothkopf. 1997. 'In Praise of Cultural Imperialism.' *Foreign Affairs*, 107:38-53.

<sup>34</sup> UNESCO. 2001. *Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity*. Paris: UNESCO. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf>. For a discussion, see S. Azzi. 2005. 'Negotiating cultural space in the global economy - The United States, UNESCO, and the convention on cultural diversity.' *International Journal* 60(3): 765-784 .

<sup>35</sup> Jan Wouters and Bart De Meester. 2008. 'The UNESCO convention on cultural diversity and WTO law: A case study in fragmentation of international law.' *Journal of World Trade* 42(1) 205-240; C.B. Graber. 2006. 'The new UNESCO Convention on cultural diversity: A counterbalance to the WTO?' *Journal of International Economic Law* 9 (3): 553-574; M. Hahn. 2006. 'A clash of cultures? The UNESCO diversity convention and international trade law.' *Journal of International Economic Law* 9 (3): 515-552.

<sup>36</sup> For the EU debates, see Mario Hirsch and Vibeke G. Petersen. 'European policy Initiatives.' In *Media Policy: Convergence, concentration and commerce*. Ch 14. Ed Denis McQuail and Karen Siune. London: Sage; Mark

---

Wheeler. 2004. 'Supranational regulation: Television and the European Union.' *European Journal of Communication* 19(3): 349-369; M. Burri-Nenova. 2007. 'The new audiovisual media services directive: Television without frontiers, television without cultural diversity.' *Common Market Law Review* 44: 1689-1725.

<sup>37</sup> Roumeen Islam and Gianni Zanini. 2008. *World Trade Indicators 2008: Benchmarking Policy and Performance*. Washington DC: The World Bank.

<sup>38</sup> Michael G. Elasmr. Ed. 2003. *The Impact of International Television: A Paradigm Shift*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

<sup>39</sup> For reviews of the existing literature, see W. Ware and M. Dupagne. 1994. 'Effects of U.S. television programs on foreign audiences: A meta-analysis.' *Journalism Quarterly*, 71(4): 947-959; Michael G. Elasmr and John E. Hunter. 1993. 'The impact of foreign TV on a domestic audience: A meta-analysis.' *Communication Yearbook* 20: 47-69; Michael G. Elasmr and John E. Hunter. 2003. 'A meta-analysis of cross-border effect studies'. In Michael G. Elasmr. Ed. 2003. *The Impact of International Television: A Paradigm Shift*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

<sup>40</sup> See, for example, Meic Pearse. 2004. *Why the Rest Hates the West: Understanding the Roots of Global Rage*. InterVarsity Press; Frank Louis Rusciano. 2006. *Global Rage after the Cold War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>41</sup> See, for example, Meic Pearse. 2004. *Why the Rest Hates the West: Understanding the Roots of Global Rage*. InterVarsity Press.

<sup>42</sup> Benjamin Barber. 1996. *Jihad vs McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World*. New York: Ballantine Books; Thomas L. Friedman, 2000. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*. New York: Anchor Books; Thomas L. Friedman. 2007. *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century*. New York: Picador.

<sup>43</sup> Samuel Huntington. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

<sup>44</sup> Daya Kishan Thussu. (Editor). 1998. *Electronic Empires: Global Media and Local Resistance*. New York: Hodder Arnold Publication.

<sup>45</sup> T. Liebes and E. Katz. 1993. *The export of meaning: Cross-cultural readings of Dallas*. Oxford: Polity Press.

<sup>46</sup> Ernesto Zedillo. Ed. 2008. *The future of globalization: explorations in light of recent turbulence*. London/New York: Routledge; Daniel Drache. 2008. *Defiant Publics: The Unprecedented Reach of the Global Citizen*. Cambridge: Polity.

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.incd.net/incden.html>

<sup>48</sup> See, for example, Marwan M. Kraidy. 2005. *Hybridity, Or The Cultural Logic Of Globalization*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press; Jan Nederveen Pieterse. 2003. *Globalization and Culture: Global Melange*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

<sup>49</sup> Roland Robertson. 1992. *Globalization: social theory and global culture*. London: Sage; Eugene Eoyang. 2005. *Two-Way Mirrors: Cross-Cultural Studies in Glocalization*. Lexington Books; J. Lull. 2000. *Media, Communication,*

---

*Culture: A Global Approach*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Cambridge: Polity; Jan Nederveen Pieterse. 2003. *Globalization and Culture: Global Melange*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc; Marwan M. Kraidy. 2005. *Hybridity, Or The Cultural Logic Of Globalization*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

<sup>50</sup> For details about the surge in India's information technology industry, see R. Dossani and M. Kenney. 2007. 'The next wave of globalization: Relocating service provision to India.' *World Development* 35(5): 772-791; NASSCOM. 2008. *Indian IT Industry Factsheet (2008)*. [http://www.nasscom.in/upload/5216/Strategic\\_Review\\_Feb2008.pdf](http://www.nasscom.in/upload/5216/Strategic_Review_Feb2008.pdf)

<sup>51</sup> Tyler Cowen. 2004. *Creative Destruction: How Globalization Is Changing the World's Cultures*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

<sup>52</sup> Terhi Rantanen. 2006. *The Media and Globalization*. London: Sage.

<sup>53</sup> Anthony Giddens. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Polity Press: Cambridge.

<sup>54</sup> Anthony Smith. 1995. 'Towards a Global Culture?' In *Global Culture* edited by Michael Featherstone. London: Sage.

<sup>55</sup> K.C. Kaltenthaler, R.D. Gelleny and S.J. Ceccoli. 2004. 'Explaining citizen support for trade liberalization.' *International Studies Quarterly* 48(4): 829-851; Martin S. Edwards, 2006. 2006. 'Public opinion regarding economic and cultural globalization: evidence from a cross-national survey.' *Review of International Political Economy* 13 (4):587-608.

<sup>56</sup> Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University.

<sup>57</sup> Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. *Sacred and Secular: Politics and Religion Worldwide*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>58</sup> C. Pauwels and J. Loisen. 2003. 'The WTO and the audiovisual sector - Economic free trade vs cultural horse trading?' *European Journal of Communication* 18(3): 291-313; Mark Wheeler. 2004. 'Supranational regulation: Television and the European Union.' *European Journal of Communication* 19(3): 349-369.