Chapter 2

Theoretical framework

Many voices can be heard in the dispute about the consequences of cosmopolitan communications. The available empirical evidence on this issue remains mixed, with inconclusive results, and plausible counter-claims to each argument. The popular debate consists largely of theoretical speculation about the possible consequences of the widely-observed structural and economic changes in the production and distribution of mass communications, rather than from careful empirical examination of how public opinion actually is changing, in the light of survey evidence. As in Bhutan, the people in developing societies exposed to imported American/Western television, movies, and news often encounter values, practices, and ways of life that conflict with those traditionally found at home. But it remains unclear from the existing research whether, and under what conditions, this process erodes traditional aspects of distinctive national cultures. Do cosmopolitan communications accelerate the assimilation of modern values in traditional societies, as argued by the convergence thesis? Or does it trigger a backlash among those who feel most threatened by this process, as the polarization thesis proposes? Does it produce a fusion culture, with strands borrowed from different places and societies? Or, as the firewall model suggest, are deep-rooted attitudes and values relatively robust in the face mass communications flows? At this point, the answer to these questions is not clear. For all these reasons, the evidence deserves rigorous and careful scrutiny.

This chapter explains the theory at the heart of this book, the testable empirical hypotheses derived from this argument, and the research strategy used for analyzing the core propositions. Our research design is simple to explain. To examine the direct effect of media use on social values, as a first step we use individual-level survey evidence to analyze the attitudes and values of representative samples of citizens, comparing those who do and do not regularly use the mass media, controlling for many other characteristics of the audience. The individual-level comparisons focus upon the potential impact of media exposure on national identities, the economic values of consumer capitalism, traditional moral values concerning sexuality and gender equality, and support for democracy and human rights. But our theory suggests that the effect of media use will differ for those living in cosmopolitan and provincial societies. We develop a Cosmopolitanism Index based on the extent of internal and external barriers to cross-border information flows. We then apply this to classify the 90 countries contained in the World Values Survey. Hierarchical Linear Models, in particular multilevel regression analysis, are used to disentangle the impact of societal-level media environments, individual-

level social characteristics, and cross-level interaction effects. In addition, we examine longitudinal evidence of the degree of cultural change over time, comparing the impact of global media on cosmopolitan and parochial societies. Finally, selected qualitative case studies, contrasting countries with relatively similar cultural traditions and levels of development but with differing media environments, illustrates the core findings in greater depth.

Theoretical framework: the firewall model

The scenarios we have outlined in the previous chapter differ sharply in how they depict the future; but they all focus on developments in the structure and ownership of the media industry, changes in international trade in cultural markets, and the accelerated pace and volume of cross-border information flows. They all assume that the expanded volume of cultural imports from major producer countries will have a strong and direct impact on the domestic audience, for good or ill, by altering indigenous national values and beliefs. In this regard, although the alternative perspectives appear to differ, in fact they actually share remarkably similar premises. All are rooted in an implicit belief in powerful media effects and they only diverge in the predicted direction of change.

We challenge these popular views and argue that more nuanced claims about the way that the public responds to cosmopolitan communications would be more realistic. Our theory suggests that national cultures remain diverse and relatively enduring. In particular, the firewall model presented in this book implies that the impact of cosmopolitan communications on national cultures is moderated by a series of intervening conditions. At societal level, the degree of trade integration determines whether countries are incorporated into global markets. The level of media freedom influences the availability of news and information within any country. And levels of economic development shape investment in modern communication infrastructures and thus access to the mass media. These factors are closely inter-related so they are used to develop a Cosmopolitanism Index, which is defined, operationalized, and then applied to classify countries around the world. Moreover within each society, further important firewalls operate primarily at the individual level, namely poverty, where lack of socio-economic resources and skills hinder access to mass communications among poorer sectors of the population, and also social psychological learning processes, reflecting the socialization filters involved in the acquisition and transmission of core attitudes and enduring values. This framework, understood as a sequential process, is illustrated schematically in Figure 2.1. These firewalls, individually and in combination, help protect national cultural diversity from foreign influences. The mass media do have

important effects – as we shall demonstrate - but the consequences of cosmopolitan communications seem to be more limited than usually assumed.

[Figure 2.1 about here]

Trade integration: Barriers to cultural markets

We accept that the world market trading cultural goods, news information, and audiovisual services has expanded dramatically in volume, pace, and reach in recent decades. Chapter 3 examines trends in the market for cultural goods and services around the world since the early-1970s. We analyze three dimensions of this phenomenon: the cultural trade of *audiovisual services* (television programs, feature films, and recorded music); the *news flow* arising through printed newspapers and magazines, TV news and current affairs, and news wire services; and inter-connections arising through *new information and communication technologies*, including complex cross-border flows and the convergence of media arising via the Internet. The expanded pace of transborder information flows is due to many factors, including the growing diffusion of information and communication technologies, notably radio, satellite TV, and the internet, as well as reductions in trade barriers among nations, and the role of transnational media corporations.[1] Although some intangible aspects of this development cannot be reduced to dollars and cents, as one indicator, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that global trade in creative goods and services almost doubled in value during the last decade alone.[2]

The strongest potential influence from cosmopolitan communications occurs if the market for cultural goods and services is produced and exported primarily by multimedia production companies based in Western post-industrial nations – especially America – and if these products are imported into societies with divergent cultural values. The evidence presented in chapter 3 confirms the concentration of production in cultural trade. American-based or Western-based multinational corporations, dominate the ownership, production, marketing and dissemination of audiovisual products and news information sources that are widely exchanged on international markets, including films, television programs, music, transnational satellite news stations, news wires services, and related cultural products and services. Far from decreasing, the United States, the leading exporter in this market, has substantially expanded its share of audiovisual trade in recent decades. Among the leading media groups worldwide, for example, ranked by audiovisual turnover, seven of the top ten are based in the United States: Walt Disney, Time Warner, News Corporation, NBC Universal, the DirecTV Group, CBS Corporation and Viacom.[3] Other

important producer nations include Britain, Germany, Canada, and France, each with large domestic markets, as well as a major slice of world exports among networks of trade partners. With a few exceptions, such as Bollywood in South Asia, Nollywood in Nigeria, and Mexican telenovelas in Latin America, smaller audiovisual industries based in developing societies often lack the infrastructure and resources to compete effectively with the production values required to manufacture and sell cultural products in the world market. Co-productions help, but once-flourishing film industries in many countries, such as Russia and Italy, are now struggling to attract sufficient investment in production, distribution and marketing and to recoup costs through overseas sales.[4]

The economic and organizational structure of the mass media as an industry has been transformed in recent decades by the deregulation and privatization of state and public service broadcasting, which has greatly increased the number of commercial television and radio channels available in many societies, and by the rise of the internet and multimedia digital technologies. Greater competition among multiple privately-owned television channels swept away the traditional monopolies that used to exist in many countries having state-controlled or public service broadcasters. Since the early-1990s, in many societies, one or two TV channels have often been replaced by dozens. [5] The deregulation of broadcasting generated a flood of new television commercial or privately-owned stations, which typically often seek to fill hours of broadcasting by programming low-cost imported popular entertainment, with endless re-runs of American TV sitcoms and drama series, Hollywood movies, animation, popular music, and reality or game shows, with advertizing messages reflecting consumer values.[6] In countries with a limited domestic market, lacking the capacity or finances to generate their own programs, this expansion fuelled the demand for imported TV. Public service television and radio have come under growing pressure to adapt to this new media landscape and to justify their role and subsidy, given the range of alternative choices available to the audience.[7] In addition to these developments transforming the broadcasting landscape, as shown in chapter 3, transnational news channels such as CNN International and BBC World are now widely available in many parts of the globe; US and European-based news wire services - Reuters, the Associated Press and Agence France-Presse - continue to predominate as the source of international news for many media outlets worldwide; Hollywood retains its predominance in the international movie market; and foreign ownership of newspapers and magazines has also increased in recent decades.[8] New information from websites and the internet have opened the flood-gates further, and expanded the cultural role of major software corporations and websites, also based in the United States, exemplified by Microsoft, Google and YouTube.

At the same time, certain major qualifications are needed to the over-simple view that the transfer of cultural goods and service flows one-way from the global North (or the United States) to South. First, as the fusion thesis emphasizes, the market for producing and distributing cultural goods remains complex, and regional hubs are emerging for specific sectors in certain middle income economies, such as India, Mexico, China and Brazil. The rapid growth of major emerging economies, and the shift from agriculture to manufacturing and the service sector, is expected to increase the capacity of these countries to produce and export audiovisual goods to other nations with shared languages and cultural ties. Moreover many of the most successful American-produced TV programs reflect genres that originated elsewhere, whether Big Brother, Pop Idol, The Office, or Survivor, with local spin-offs popular in many countries, so that, like American pizza, tacos, or hot dogs, it is increasingly difficult to identify what is distinctively 'American' about these cultural products.

Equally importantly, the integration of economies into world markets, along with trade in cultural goods and services in the creative economy, remain far from equal around the globe. Many of the least developed nations around the world are largely excluded from world markets, functioning neither as producers nor as major consumers of cultural goods and services. Lack of development among low income societies, ironically, counteracts the impact of global communications on national cultures. [9] The poorest societies have not yet developed the mass markets that sustain foreign investment in their broadcasting, telecommunications and publishing infrastructures. External barriers to the flow of information across national borders arise from multiple sources, including protectionist trade policies, tariffs, and broadcasting regulations, for example governing foreign and domestic media ownership, imports, standards, copyrighting, intellectual property, licensing, and contents. States can also intervene actively through subsidizing domestic industries, including license fees for state controlled and public service broadcasting, financial assistance provided for the performing arts, and tax breaks to reduce the cost of newsprint or newspaper distribution. The strictest protectionist trade barriers are used in closed societies, such as Cuba, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia and Burma, but it should not be thought that these practices are confined to autocratic regimes, by any means, as many democracies also seek to protect and subsidize their national cultural industries.

Poverty and development: access to mass communications

In recent decades, technological innovations have transformed access to interpersonal and mass communications throughout many parts of the world. This social revolution accelerated following the emergence of innovative digital technologies in the mid-1990s, from the personal computer and

internet to data-accessible smart mobile cell phones. But the impact of these changes have been greatest in affluent post-industrial nations, especially among more affluent households and among the younger tech-savvy generation, and, to a lesser extent, in many middle income emerging market economies such as South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa and Brazil. A substantial digital divide remains today, excluding poorer segments of the population within affluent societies, as well as many of the world's least developed countries, from gaining access to traditional mass media, as well as to newer digital information and communication technologies.

The extent of these disparities, documented in detail in chapter 4, is often under-estimated by observers based in media-rich nations. Television penetration illustrates these disparities; for example UNESCO estimates that worldwide, only about one quarter of all households have a television set today.[10] TV penetration has reached saturation levels in advanced industrialized societies; almost all households in these countries (97%) have a TV set. Emerging economies such as Turkey, China, and Mexico have made rapid gains in acquiring these consumer durables; about 84% of all households in lower middle income societies have TVs, up by 20% from the previous decade. By contrast, among low income societies, on average only 15% of all households have a TV set, and even today less than 5% of homes have access to TVs in countries such as Uganda, Burma, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. Radios are far more widely available in poorer nations, reaching over 40% of all households worldwide. Community radio is a particularly important source of local information, music, and news in many developing societies. Innovative low-cost wind-up and solar powered radios reduce the costs of batteries. Another important trend has been the rapid spread of mobile cellular telephones, with access soaring in developing nations from 3.2% of people subscribing in 1999 to up to one third (32.4%) in 2006.[11] Fixed telephone lines also almost doubled in developing societies during the same period, from 7.6% to 13.9%. Growing levels of literacy and primary schooling, the latter prioritized as one of the key UN Millennium Development Goals, has also expanded the market for newspapers, books and magazines in many poorer nations. Recent years have seen the dramatic growth of digital information and communication technologies associated with the rise of computers and the internet, facilitating the use of text messaging, email and website, and spread even farther through smart cellular mobile phones and communal technology kiosks.

Despite these developments, Chapter 4 demonstrates that the gap *between* rich and poor nations in access to all major forms of information and communication resources remains substantial, as does the digital divide *within* societies.[12] The World Bank estimates that in 2005 there were more than

ten times as many mobile telephone subscribers in high-income countries as in low income countries. While television sets are present in almost all households in Europe and the United States, only one in seven households have a TV in low income nations.[13] In 2006, less than 5 out of every 100 Africans used the Internet, compared with an average of 50% among the inhabitants of the G8 countries.[14] In developing societies, access to printed media (daily newspapers, magazines and books) is limited by enduring problems of illiteracy and the cost of these products, as well as by language barriers. All these factors combine to generate severe information-poverty in poor nations, making these societies and especially their rural populations increasingly marginalized at the periphery of communication networks. [15] The least developed and poorest countries are often the ones that are most isolated from modern communication and information technologies, and thus cut off from the knowledge economy, without the telecommunications infrastructure needed for landline telephones in many homes and businesses. Many rural areas in these societies also lack a regular supply of electricity and, where reliable power is available, limited access to television sets and computers restricts connectivity via the television and the internet. Community radio remains a vital source of information in poor areas, while the spread of access to mobile cellular technologies in rural villages has been an important development. But in many poorer societies access to mediated news and information from television, national daily newspapers, and the internet and World Wide Web remains limited. Unless there is widespread access to these technologies in developing countries, mass communications may reach the affluent and educated elite living in urban areas, it will fail to penetrate the national culture directly. It is not clear how Western cultural imperialism can wipe out cultural diversity in poor societies such as Ethiopia, Mali and Burkina Faso, where much of the rural and illiterate population have little or no regular access to newspapers, television and movies, let alone the Internet. The impact of individual learning from cross-border news information may be significant, but if exposure is confined to a small elite, for example if CNN International is only watched by diplomats, government officials and the expatriate community, then this process will not have a direct impact upon the general public and the collective national culture.

Freedom: Internal barriers to information

In addition to the external barriers, limits on freedom of the press restrict access to information internally within any society, just as open markets are limited by tariffs, taxes, and import quotas protecting commercial trade. It is not clear how cultural imperialism can exert a strong impact in places such as Burma, Uzbekistan, or North Korea, where the regimes use a variety of techniques to deny access to foreign news organizations and rigidly to control information flows (inwards and outwards)

across their national borders. The Chinese suppression of news about the Tibetan uprisings in March 2008, and the Burmese military junta's strict control of information about the devastating Cyclone Nargis a few months later, exemplifies these practices. Even in liberal societies, such as the members of the European Union, there are regulations restricting the import of non-European entertainment. Internal restrictions on information flows arise from limits on freedom of the press, including laws governing freedom of expression and information (such as penalties for press offences); patterns of intimidation and violations of press freedom affecting journalists and the mass media (such as imprisonment and harassment of reporters); and the nature of state intervention in the media (such as state monopolies of broadcasting or the use of official censorship). The relationship between the state and the news media in any society is important, and is shaped by issues of ownership, regulation, and control. The most cosmopolitan media environments, such as India, Canada and the Netherlands, have open markets, deregulation of telecommunications, and freedom of information concerning what is broadcast, published, or transmitted. By contrast, protectionist barrier are far stronger in restrictive communication systems, characterized by policies ranging from state control of the newspaper and broadcasting sectors, overt government censorship, stringent import controls and repression of foreign news, at one extreme, to less draconian restrictions on foreign ownership of the mass media and protectionist policies regulating what can be imported and distributed. Chapter 5 develops the Cosmopolitanism Index at the societal-level, representing the permeability of nations to cross-border information flows, and operationalizes this according to a societies' participation in global markets, levels of economic development, and freedom of the press. This index is applied to classify all the countries under comparison and illustrated with case studies.

Learning: Individual social-psychological barriers to learning

Cultural convergence assumes that as audiences living in different societies become more exposed to imported music and television programs, foreign movies, and internet websites, they gradually absorb and emulate the modern ideas, images, and values embedded in these products, eventually thereby eroding national diversity. We suggest that these arguments under-estimate the external barriers to cultural trade across national borders, the lack of internal press freedom found in many societies, and the significant developmental limits on public access to communication technologies, all of which restrict the direct impact of cross-border information flows. But let us ignore these barriers for the moment, on the reasonable grounds that freedom of information and open borders for cultural trade have gradually been gaining hold in many countries, accompanied by the

growth of democracy and civil liberties, compounded by the difficulties of controlling digital information. Over time, public access to mass communication technologies is also gradually becoming more widespread, even in the poorest nations, for example through innovative micro-financing projects distributing mobile cell phones to Asian villages and low-cost computers to African schools. Nevertheless, even if all these structural barriers gradually diminish or even vanish over time, there are still good reasons to question whether exposure to cross-border information flows is capable of exerting powerful effects on the general public.

Extensive research on media effects, public opinion, and social psychology suggests that what individuals learn from direct exposure to mass communications is far more complex, subtle and limited than is generally assumed. Significant social psychological barriers restrict what we absorb from information conveyed in the media. The debate about the threat arising from cross-border media, cultural imperialism in the developing world, and the Americanization of European culture, has largely rested on selected anecdotes, xenophobic assumptions, and Cold War ideological diatribes rather than systematic empirical research about how mass media actually affects citizens. The evidence-based studies that are available to examine media effects from imported communications -- usually based on American and European public opinion -- report mixed and inconclusive results.[16] Contrary to popular accounts, existing research does not provide much support for the assumption of a massive shift in domestic public opinion that can be attributed to the role of the foreign media. Indeed the most extensive body of social psychological research currently available on the impact of mass communications -- examining the general capacity of the media to alter the way that we think and act in any context--casts serious doubts on popular assumptions about the strong impact of cross-border communication flows on public opinion and social values. The mass media are only one way that we learn about the world; the images and ideas of Hollywood, CNN and Google may not exert as much influence as other important socialization agencies that transmit enduring cultural values throughout the formative years of childhood and adolescence. Socialization processes include all the factors and agencies whereby values, attitudes, roles, skills, and patterns of behavior are transmitted from one generation to the next. An extensive body of literature has demonstrated that we learn from the home and family, school, workplace, religious authorities, workplace and the local community, as well as from the direct experience of growing up in rich and poor societies.[17] Inter-personal contact with people from other societies has also increased from the spread of travel, telecommunications, and population migrations. Core values, such as strong feelings of national identity, traditional attitudes towards morality, and orientations towards authority, acquired during formative experiences in early youth, may

prove relatively enduring. Will television and the internet destroy thousands of years of Bhutanese culture and religious teachings? Does watching Die Hard, Desperate Housewives, and CNN really threaten French culture in the land of Moliere, Degas and Sartre? Should TV images of Western lifestyles be blamed for provoking outraged protests in the Middle East, and violent hatred of America? We will present reasons and evidence to doubt these claims.

In understanding how cross-border information flows could potentially influence individual citizens and erode collective national cultures, it helps to recall the different steps in sequence of the mass communications process outlined earlier. We need to distinguish the contents of mass communications that are exported across national borders, processes of audience reception, representing the way that messages that are received and interpreted for meaning, and lastly the subsequent direct impact of this process on audiences within each county, and the more diffuse impact upon society as a whole.[18] Over the years, a large body of research literature has debated these last steps, with conflicting findings concerning the strength and significance of the media's social psychological effects on citizens.

Prior to the emergence of direct evidence from social surveys and experiments, the earliest 'propaganda' model suggested that the mass media were capable of exerting a powerful direct impact on public opinion.[19] Thus, when the U.S. Congress passed the Radio Act of 1912, it restricted foreign ownership of radio stations out of concern that, during wartime, foreigners would transmit information to enemy forces or jam American military communications. As commercial radio stations became popular, the U.S. Congress was also concerned that foreigners would broadcast subversive propaganda.[20] During World War II, German and Japanese propaganda was widely feared by the Allies as capable of shaping public opinion, both at home and abroad. The classic underlying model assumed a 'hypodermic needle' or 'stimulus-response' (SR) effect, where the messages that were seen or heard from foreign media directly altered public attitudes and behavior at home.[21] The first rigorous social science research conducted on media effects during the 1940s, however, soon reversed this thinking by emphasizing the limits of these techniques. Classic experimental studies on American soldiers, by Hovland and colleagues, found that the U.S. military training films, *Why we Fight*, were relatively ineffective in altering attitudes and behavior. [22] The Columbia school of Katz and Lazarsfeld pioneered some of the first systematic surveys using random samples of the electorate in the 1940 Erie County studies to examine the influence of campaign communications on voting behavior. [23] They also reported limited media effects, in this case the capacity of newspaper coverage and campaign radio broadcasts to

alter enduring partisan orientations and to determine American voting choices. These seminal studies influenced generations of social scientists and generated a broad consensus that attempts at using mass communications alone tended to be unsuccessful in either converting cultural attitudes or changing behavior, at least in the short-term.

Consequently, a consensus emerged during the 1960s and 1970s that the main impact of the mass media was in reinforcing existing preferences, rather than in persuasion or change. Media effects seemed to be weak, especially when compared with the influence of enduring partisan and social cues in voting behavior and political participation. These much stronger influences were developed through personal ties and face-to-face communications within the family and local community. Traditional socialization theories during these decades suggested that enduring and resilient cultural values, attitudes, and ways of behaving are learned in one's formative years, particularly from parents and siblings within the home and family, from role models such as teachers, local leaders and spiritual guides in the community, and from social networks of neighbors and friends. People's values are also shaped by their first-hand experiences, such as growing up in conditions of affluence or poverty. Socialization theories acknowledge that the mass media also contributes to what we learn, in childhood and later life, by reinforcing pre-existing dispositions, but it was not the most important source of deep-rooted values and ways of life.[24] Additional research questioned the conventional way that we assess the impact of the mass media; for example, the 'uses-and-gratification' school emphasized that selective attention to mediated messages is used to reinforce cultural attitudes, so that even when a correlation is established between media exposure and attitudes, the direction of causality may reflect the fact that people choose to watch, read, or listen to sources of information that are congruent with their prior values.[25] Moreover constructivist theorists and cultural studies emphasize that people are capable of selectively discarding media messages that conflict with their core values, especially if they mistrust the information source, thereby actively resisting, deconstructing, criticizing, and reinterpreting their original meaning.[26]

Nevertheless debate about these issues continued and counter-currents emerged in the literature to challenge the conventional minimal effects view. Cultivation theory, proposed in 1982 by Gerbner and colleagues, argued that the ubiquity of regular or habitual television viewing over many years generated a distorted view of reality that encouraged a commonality of outlooks and values.[27] Although many social psychologists emphasized limited media effects, the cultural imperialism school of Schiller and Galtung assumed that foreign media are capable of exerting an overwhelming impact on

developing countries, reinforcing the power of predominant Western states and capitalist predominance in relationships of neo-colonial dependency.[28] The 'minimal effects' perspective came under the most sustained and convincing challenge, however, in the extensive social psychological literature on mass communications that started to emerge in the early-1990s.[29] Contemporary communication theories propose a complex series of specific psychological effects arising from media consumption. In particular, an extensive research literature has emphasized the role of the mass media in 'agenda-setting' (shaping public concerns and policy priorities), 'framing' (cueing the meaning and interpretation of events), and 'priming' (providing evaluating criteria to judge outcomes).[30] The mass media were also recognized by social psychological theories as shaping various aspects of knowledge and cognitive beliefs, attitudes and values, as well as behaviors.

Revisionism in mass communications theories has been encouraged by methodological developments that became increasingly effective in capturing relatively modest and subtle media effects. This includes improvements in multi-wave and longitudinal panel survey design to capture dynamic effects over time, more fine-grained measures of media exposure and attention, the use of experimental designs and qualitative focus groups, widening the repertoire of methods available to study mass communications.[31] The bulk of this research has focused on within-nation studies, particularly in the United States and Western Europe. By contrast, far less research has studied the effects arising from mass communications using systematic cross-national comparisons, especially to examine this process under different social contexts and regime types.[32] The research literature continues to debate which of the newer concepts and theories are most useful, but recent work highlights the dangers of the over-simplified assumptions that underlie much of the policy and journalistic debate, which jump directly from the unquestionably important structural changes in the production, marketing and distribution of the media industry, and equally important changes in the contents of information and communication, to their presumed social psychological effects on the general public.

Core theoretical hypotheses

The theoretical controversy about the impact of cosmopolitan communications on national cultures remains unresolved and many questions remain unanswered. Although the convergence thesis emphasizing American/Western hegemony or cultural imperialism remains popular, this view has been challenged by others who see polarization or fusion as more plausible scenarios. In contrast to all of these views, the firewall model posits that these developments will have a far more limited impact, and

that the diversity of deep-rooted cultural values will persist, despite exposure to the most recent wave of globalization, because of a series of conditions filtering out the impact of cross-border information flows.

The previous literature analyzing the impact of globalization on public opinion, reviewed in subsequent chapters, has generated mixed findings. For example, an extensive body of longitudinal survey research has explored identities within the European Union. The European Union provides an exceptionally strong test of the impact of globalization. It is an ambitious effort to integrate diverse countries into a single market and to break down economic, political and psychological boundaries between member states. These studies provide little support for the view that European integration – despite the expansion of the role, size, and powers of the E.U., the emergence of a single market, the free flow of migrant workers and travel, and the erosion of barriers to cross-border cultural trade and communications within Europe -- has generated a strong sense of European identity among its citizens, even among the publics of countries that have been members of the European institutions for fifty years.[33] But research has also examined the relationship between media use and the strength of national identities in the United States and Europe, concluding that the younger generation uses traditional national news media less frequently than their elders, and they are also less attached to the nation-state than their elders.[34] These are suggestive findings but it remains to be established whether patterns of media use are causally related to the strength of national identities, and whether this relationship is conditional upon the structure of the communications system and the openness of societies to external influences. Other scholars who have explored the impact of the inflow of U.S. popular entertainment into Europe have generally concluded that this process has not led towards a systematic Americanization of worldviews or the wholesale adoption of 'Western' values.[35] Any analysis needs to carefully disentangle the direction of causality; those who prefer to watch Hollywood movies, CNN, or American-produced TV entertainment may well be those who were already favorably predisposed towards U.S. popular culture. [36] Despite much popular speculation, social scientists and policy makers still lack reliable generalizations based on the analysis of empirical evidence from many different societies and contexts, to determine with any certainty the consequences arising from the expanding role of cosmopolitan communications.[37]

To consider these issues, based on the arguments developed throughout subsequent chapters in the book, we propose a series of plausible hypothesis that can be tested against the empirical evidence. These propositions are based on the individual-level analysis of the direct impact of media use on public

opinion, variations by types of mass media, contrasts among social sectors, and the interactive effects of media use within cosmopolitan and provincial societies.

1. Hypotheses concerning the social sectors using the news media within countries

Use of the media is expected to vary among social sectors within each country (H#1.0), and our theory also generates several testable sub-propositions at the individual level, that are analyzed through survey data in chapter 4. In particular, news media use should be greatest among the well-educated, more affluent households, and those familiar with the English language, as well as varying among women and men, and among age groups. Education should also be particularly significant (H#1.1), as schooling provides the cognitive skills to understand and absorb complex information about society and the world, as well as being closely related to patterns of literacy, all factors facilitating media use. Household income (H#1.2) is closely related to educational achievements and social status, and this is also predicted to facilitate access to mass communications, for example providing the financial resources for buying TV and radio sets, for purchasing services such as cable, satellite and pay-TV, and for internet subscriptions. More affluent lifestyles also often have more opportunities for leisure, providing time to use the mass media. Income is also closely related to occupational class, although income provides a more appropriate and consistent comparison of status and wealth across diverse types of societies and economies.

The generational gap is expected to influence news media access (H#1.3), with most previous research conducted in post-industrial societies suggesting that use will be greater among the middle aged and older. Given the rapidly changing patterns of education and literacy in fast-developing societies, however, it remains to be seen if this pattern holds in these nations. When younger people access the media, moreover, this may have particularly important consequences for processes of value change. Socialization theories emphasize that cultural orientations are acquired during childhood, adolescence and early adulthood, through role models provided by parents, teachers and authority figures, as well as through general observation and direct experience. The mass media is expected to function as one of the socializing agents that can shape values and attitudes during the most formative years of a person's life. If they regularly access the mass media, the effects of this process should therefore have a stronger impact on the younger generation, as they are expected to have more fluid attitudes and values than their parents and grand-parents. In addition, young people have adapted most thoroughly to the digital world of blogs, i-pods, YouTube and MySpace. In terms of gender, research in post-industrial societies suggests that men are likely to be more regular news media users than women,

reflecting broader cultural and structural differences in men and women's lives (H#1.4). Languages are also expected to be important; in particular, (H#1.5) knowledge of English is predicted to be a significant predictor of media use, especially access to the internet. We make this prediction even though much news and information is usually available in many local languages within each country, imported popular audiovisual entertainment is often translated using dubbing or sub-titles, and UNESCO estimates that the amount of non-English language content on the internet is expanding.[38] By comparing those accessing different sources of information, chapter 4 examines the social characteristics of users within particular countries.

H1.0: Use of the news media will differ by social sectors.

H1.1: Use of the news media use will be greater among the more educated.

H1.2: Use of the news media use will be greater among high-income groups.

H1.3: Use of the news media will be greater among the middle aged and older.

H1.4: Use of the news media will be greater among men than women.

H1.5: Use of the news media use will be greater among those who are fluent in English.

2. Hypotheses about the direct impact of news media use on public opinion:

Building upon this foundation, the second set of propositions concerns the direct impact of individual exposure to the news media on social, economic and political values and attitudes, controlling for the prior social characteristics of media users. By focusing on 'cultural values', we seek to examine the priorities and concerns that people have for themselves, their families, their communities, their nation and the world.[39] For example, should children be raised to respect traditional sources of authority, the need for self-discipline, and the importance of hard work? Or should they be encouraged instead to value creativity, self-expression and self-fulfillment? At the societal level, should emerging economies such as China and Brazil seek to pursue basic agricultural and industrial development, thereby raising the standard of living for the poor, or when there is a trade-off, should they give higher priority to policies generating sustainable environmental protection? Should governments favor policies designed to maximize social welfare and economic equality, or should they encourage greater entrepreneurial activity and individual initiative? These types of choices tend to reflect fundamentally divergent values—that is, relatively enduring orientations that shape broader orientations towards the

world. We will use the World Values Survey to examine how far access to the mass media has an impact upon these and other dimensions of public opinion, such as individual-level feelings of national pride, orientations towards civic engagement and political activism, and attitudes towards democracy and government.

If the convergence thesis is correct, then exposure to images and ideas about other societies derived from the news media should foster more cosmopolitan orientations among media users, by encouraging greater tolerance as people learn about foreign lifestyles and other societies, gradually reducing support for nationalism (H#2.1). This dimension is examined by comparing the strength of national identities, attitudes towards the institutions of global governance, and tolerance of foreigners among individual users and non-users of the media. Mass communications and commercial advertizing, with its materialist and individualistic values, could also potentially alter views about the role of government and the value of economic competition; leading theorists such as Herbert Schiller, Edward S. Herman and Robert W. McChesney have argued that global media corporations provide advertising, entertainment and news designed to spread the values of consumer capitalism, serving as the "missionaries" for global capitalism.[40] To examine evidence for this thesis, we compare those who do and do not use the news media to see whether these groups diverge in their ideological orientations towards the role of markets and the state (H#2.2). Exposure to the news media may also influence moral values and attitudes towards gender equality, sexuality, and religion, by accelerating the acceptance of more liberal and secular views (H#2.3). Finally, exposure to Western news and information can be expected to reinforce civic engagement, by expanding information and awareness about public affairs and opportunities for activism, as well as increasing support for the principles of democratic governance and human rights, especially in states where such practices are lacking (H#2.4). Within given societies, we compare the attitudes and values of people with and without regular use of the news media. In chapter 6-9 we expect to find significant contrasts at individual-level between these groups, controlling for characteristics such as age, gender, education, and income, which are typically associated both with access to mass communications and with processes of underlying value change.

H2.1: Exposure to the news media fosters more cosmopolitan orientations and greater tolerance to foreign lifestyles.

H2.2: Exposure to the news media encourages favorable attitudes toward global capitalism.

H2.3: Exposure to the news media shapes more liberal and secular attitudes towards gender equality, sexuality, and religion.

H2.4: Exposure to the news media reinforces civic engagement.

3. Hypotheses about the direct impact of different types of media

In addition, the typical characteristics of media users varies for television/radio news, newspapers, and the internet, and as some of these types of mass communications are more cosmopolitan than others, their cultural effects can be expected to differ. The internet is the most international media under comparison; although many popular online sources of information are local or national, nevertheless the internet provides the lowest barriers to connecting directly into global networks and news sources. The internet is also the medium that states find most difficult to restrict. Techniques of censorship, IP blocking, and contents filtering are employed by the most restrictive regimes to block internet traffic into and out of the country, including by Pakistan, Burma, and China.[41] In most countries, however, states and internet service providers employ relatively few controls over online content, compared with other mass media. Use of the medium also eradicates the traditional spatial barriers to information; users can read and compare stories from online newspapers, multimedia news websites, or journalistic blogs originating from New York, London, Delhi, or Qatar.

Compared with the internet, television and radio news are more commonly based on domestic broadcast networks and filtered through the prism provided by local, regional and national reporters and journalists, even though many more people now have access to transnational news broadcasts from satellite networks such as MSNBC and CNN International. The contents of television and radio are also more closely regulated and managed through broadcasting authorities. With the exception of a handful of titles such as the *Economist* or *Herald Tribune*, the majority of newspapers, magazines and other printed publications are still designed to generate sales and advertizing revenues primarily from a domestic readership.[42] Even transnational magazines that are sold widely around the world, such as Vogue, Elle or Cosmopolitan, print editions with contents, images and advertizing tailored to each national or regional market. Foreign newspapers and imported magazines have always been sold on news-stands and made available in libraries, but access has also become far easier and cheaper with the rise of the internet. Giant multinational corporations such as News Corporation and Bertelsmann have increased their engagement in the publishing sector in many countries through growing foreign investment, mergers or outright takeovers, and regional partnerships. In the light of these considerations, chapter 10 examines the contrasts by type of media. We predict (H#3.1) that the impact of cosmopolitan communications will be strongest among regular users of the internet and email, and also (H#3.2) that it will be weaker among regular readers of newspapers and radio/TV news.

H3.1: The impact of cosmopolitan communications will be strongest among regular users of the internet and email.

H3.2: The impact of cosmopolitan communications will be weaker among regular newspaper readers and radio/TV news users.

4. The interactive effects of media exposure in provincial and cosmopolitan societies

The preceding hypotheses can all be tested using individual level survey data. But our model specifies that each society's external and internal barriers to information flows will interact with individual patterns of news media use. Consequently, we hypothesize that a *cross-level interaction* effect will also be apparent; the firewall model implies that (H#4.0) the impact of exposure to the mass media on cultural values will be strongest in the most cosmopolitan societies. In particular, the expansion of cosmopolitan information flows will have the strongest effect on national cultures under certain conditions: (H#4.1) in the most globalized societies, with few significant external barriers to cultural imports; (H#4.2); in societies with internal media freedom; (H#4.3) in affluent societies with widespread public access to media technologies. People who are heavy media users, living in cosmopolitan societies that combine integration into international cultural markets, freedom of the press, and the growing affluence that facilitates public access to the mass media, such as Switzerland, Norway, Belgium and Hungary, are expected to be most influenced by cross-border communications flows. By contrast, people living in provincial countries that are relatively closed externally to foreign cultural imports, with limited internal media freedom, and with limited media access, - such as Myanmar, Rwanda, and Togo - are expected to be relatively inoculated from the effects of cosmopolitan communication flows. Successive models comparing media users living within different types of society allow us to pin-point any cross-level interaction effects. Multilevel regression models (which are a part of Hierarchical Linear models or HLM) are the most suitable technique to examine individual-level, national-level, and cross-level interaction effects, as described in detail in Technical Appendix C at the end of the book.

H4.0: The impact of exposure to the mass media on cultural values will be strongest in the most cosmopolitan societies.

H4.1: The impact of exposure to the mass media on cultural values will be strongest in societies integrated into global market and communication networks.

H4.2: The impact of exposure to the mass media on cultural values will be strongest in societies with internal media freedom.

H4.3: The impact of exposure to the mass media on cultural values will be strongest in economically developed societies, where many people have widespread access to media technologies.

5. Societal-level trends in cultural convergence over time

Lastly, if cultural convergence is indeed occurring, further evidence of this phenomenon should be observable using time-series data. The World Values Survey (WVS) has been conducted in five waves since 1981. As described below, longitudinal analysis at individual-level is complicated by the fact that the questions monitoring media use have altered over time, as well as by discontinuities in country coverage in the WVS. Nevertheless certain identical items have been carried in eleven countries over successive waves of the survey from 1981-3 to 2005-7. This facilitates direct comparisons of changes in national cultures over a quarter century. The convergence thesis logic implies the proposition (H#5.0) that values should prove relatively similar today, and they should have gradually converged most clearly over time, in persistently cosmopolitan societies with the most open borders to information flows, such as Norway, America, Britain and Japan. By contrast, more parochial contemporary societies, such as Mexico, Argentina, and South Africa, should remain more diverse in their cultural values today and they should not display growing convergence over time. These propositions can be tested empirically by comparing variance today among contemporary societies contained in the most recent wave of the WVS, as well as analyzing value changes over time among countries during the last quarter century, since the start of the World Values Survey.

H5.0. Cultural convergence over time will be greater among the most cosmopolitan societies.

H5.1: The most cosmopolitan contemporary societies will display the greatest similarities in cultural values today.

H5.2: The most parochial societies will display the greatest divergence in cultural values today.

H5.3: Over time, cosmopolitan communications will reduce divergence among national cultures.

Data and evidence

Our research design classifies cosmopolitan and provincial societies, according to the external and internal barriers to cross-border information flows. Within each type of society, we compare those who do and do not have regular access to news and information from television and radio, newspapers, and the Internet. We analyze the values and attitudes of these groups, controlling for other characteristics such as age, gender, income and education that typically differentiate news users. Through multilevel analysis, we test the strength and the direction of any *individual-level* effects arising from media use, any *national-level* effect arising from living in different types of society, and any *cross-level* effects arising from use of the media within each type of society.

Evidence from the World Values Survey

Individual-level evidence about exposure to mass communications and cultural values in a wide range of societies is derived from analysis of the World Values Survey (WVS), a global investigation of socio-cultural and political change gathered cross-nationally comparable data in five waves from 1981 to 2007. This project has carried out representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of the publics in more than 90 independent countries, containing over 88 of the world's population and covering all six inhabited continents (see Figure 2.2). It builds on the European Values Survey, first carried out in 23 countries in 1981. A second wave of surveys was completed in 43 countries 1990-1991. A third wave was carried out in 55 nations in 1995-1996, and a fourth wave, in 70 countries, took place in 1999-2001. The fifth wave covering 56 countries was conducted in 2005-2007.[43] The WVS survey includes some of the most affluent market economies in the world, such as the U.S., Japan and Switzerland, with per capita annual incomes over $40,000; together with middle-income countries including Mexico, Slovakia, and Turkey, as well as poorer agrarian societies, such as Ethiopia, Mali and Burkina Faso, with per capita annual incomes of $200 or less. In total, eleven nations have been included in all five waves of the survey since 1981, facilitating a consistent comparison of long-term trends during the last quarter century (see Appendix Table B2 for the list). A broader range of 27 nations were included in both the 1990 and 2005 surveys, allowing comparisons over the last fifteen years.

As Table 2.1 and Figure 2.3 illustrate, there are also significant variations in levels of human development in the countries under comparison, as monitored by the UNDP Human development Index combining per capita income with levels of education, literacy and longevity. Some smaller nations also have populations below one million, such as Malta, Luxembourg and Iceland, while at the other extreme both India and China have populations of well over one billion people. The survey contains older

democracies such as Australia, India and the Netherlands, newer democracies including El Salvador, Estonia and Taiwan, and autocracies such as China, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, and Egypt. The transition process also varies markedly: some nations have experienced a rapid consolidation of democracy during the 1990s; today the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Argentina currently rank as high on political rights and civil liberties as Belgium, the United States, and The Netherlands, which have long traditions of democracy.[44] The survey also includes some of the first comparative survey data from several Muslim states, including Arab countries such as Jordan, Iran, Egypt, and Morocco, as well as in Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The most comprehensive coverage comes from Western Europe, North America and Scandinavia, where public opinion surveys have the longest tradition, but countries are included from all world regions, including Sub Saharan Africa.

[Table 2.1 and Figure 2.3 about here]

The World Values Surveys/European Values Surveys have included some media items, monitoring regular use of a daily newspaper and the frequency of watching TV, since the first wave in 1981. This facilitates some comparisons over time, but longitudinal analysis is complicated by the fact that these items were not carried consistently in all countries or in all subsequent waves of the survey. Television use was included in the 3rd and 4th waves in a few countries where more detailed cases can examine change over time, including developing societies in South Africa, Bangladesh, Peru, and Pakistan, and contemporary post-industrial nations such as Spain, Sweden, Norway and the United States. The richest battery of items monitoring news media use was introduced in the most recent survey in 2005-2007, however, so this book draws primarily on the fifth wave, covering more than fifty societies. This dataset allows us to compare a wide range of countries from all major cultural regions, as well as democratic and autocratic regimes that vary in their levels of press freedom and cultural trade protectionism, with China, Viet Nam, and Russia having some of the world's most restrictive policies controlling the flow of information across their national borders. The fifth wave of the survey collected evidence about regular use of mass communications, including the print media (newspapers, magazines and books), broadcast mass media (radio and TV news and public affairs), the new media (Internet and email), and personal communications (talking with friends or colleagues). As dependent variables, the study analyzes the impact of access to these various types of mass communication on multiple dimensions of cultural change, including feelings of national identity, attitudes towards markets and the state, attitudes towards traditional moral values and support for democracy and human rights. Aggregate data at the societal level is used to compare the pattern of media freedom, global

information flows, and the openness of cultural trade in all contemporary independent nation-states worldwide, drawing on standard international indicators from such sources as UNESCO, UNCTAD, the International Telecommunications Union, Reporters without Borders, and Freedom House.

Monitoring use of the news media

To examine these issues, for the individual-level analysis we draw on the 5th wave of the World Values Survey, which measured regular use of daily newspapers, radio/TV news, magazines, books, and the internet/email "*to learn what is going on in your country and the world*" 51 societies covering a wide range. Regular use of each of these sources was registered as a simple dichotomy, providing a comparative indicator of news exposure, although providing no information about the intensity of use (for instance, how many hours people watched or listened to news), levels of interest and attention (for example, whether people read stories about politics or economics), the type of newspaper or TV station (such as whether people tuned into public service or commercial TV), or levels of exposure to the wide range of other types of mass communications (such as popular TV entertainment or movies). Since people commonly spend only a small proportion of their time listening or watching news, compared with the hours devoted to other types of TV or radio programs, this measure is likely to provide a conservative estimate of any impacts that are detected from exposure to the mass media, and broader indicators could possibly detect stronger effects. At the same time, if significant effects are detected from regular exposure to news, these can be regarded as an indirect proxy for media habits (people who regularly watch or listen to the news are likely to use radio and TV for other types of programs as well). This data allows us to construct an overall summary news media use scale, generated by summing self-reported weekly use of newspapers, radio/TV news, the internet, books and magazines as information sources, with the mean 5-point score standardized to 100-points for ease of comparison. Principal component factor analysis (not reproduced here) showed that all of these items were strongly inter-correlated, producing a balanced scale with a normal distribution. As previous studies have reported, the analysis confirms that far from being distinctive, patterns of internet use continue to be significantly associated with use of other forms of news media, a pattern with important implications for the interpretation of the digital divide.[45] Table 2.2 shows the World Values Survey estimates of regular (at least weekly) use of these media, showing disparities that we can also be observed through aggregate statistics.

[Table 2.2 about here]

Overall, as numerous studies have found, among all the media under comparison, radio and television news was the most popular medium, with 88 percent reporting that they use this resource for information on a regular basis.[46] TV and radio news were ubiquitous in affluent societies, but even in the poorest places, such as Rwanda, India, and Burkina Faso, about two thirds of the population reported getting information regularly from these sources. Newspapers were also used regularly by the majority of respondents, although the overall average proportion of users (57%) disguises marker disparities between countries such as Norway and Sweden, where nine out of ten people use newspapers regularly, compared with less literate and poorer societies such as Mali and Morocco where one third or less of the respondents use them. The contrasts were equally striking for access to the internet and email; overall about one third (30%) reported using this as an information source, similar to the proportion that reported using magazines (34%) and books (32%).

[Figure 2.3 about here]

As illustrated in Figure 2.3, most of the countries with the highest media use-- located in the top third of countries ranked on this scale-- were affluent post-industrial societies, including the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, and Finland) where newspaper use was particularly high, the smaller European welfare states (Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany), Anglo-American countries (Australia, the United States, Britain, and Canada), with slightly lower use of newspapers and the internet in Italy, France and (especially) Spain. These disparities among OECD economies confirm previous studies and they can be attributed at macro-level to the structure and distribution of the newspaper industry (national or regional, broadsheet or tabloid), as well as to public policies, for example the Scandinavian use of heavy newspaper subsidies designed to maintain media pluralism.[47] As an earlier study by one of the authors noted: "The newspaper market varies greatly by country due to such factors as long-standing historical and cultural traditions in each region; levels of social development in terms of education, literacy, and income; the news industry's organization, economics, production and distribution system; and the overall structure of public subsidies, government regulations, and national levels of democratization." [48]

Even among relatively affluent nations, the digital divide in access to new information and communication technologies in the Mediterranean region and Scandinavia has also been widely observed; for example, two-thirds to three-quarters of all respondents reported using the internet/email regularly in Norway, Sweden, the United States and the Netherlands, compared with four out of ten Italians, and around one quarter of all Spaniards.[49] Although these patterns are familiar, it is

also striking that some East Asian societies also rank among the top third of countries in media use, including Malaysia and South Korea (where governments have aggressively promoted investment in ICT infrastructure and skills to develop knowledge societies), and Japan (the latter due to maintaining high subscriptions amongst the major daily newspapers, rather than particularly high internet/email usage), although other East Asian tigers such as Taiwan lagged behind these countries.

Various types of societies and types of regimes can be found among the countries in the middle-ranks of media use, although many of these are emerging middle-income economies with moderate levels of literacy and education. Lastly, the poorest and least developed countries with low literacy also tend to have the lowest levels of public access to the news media, including Rwanda, Mali, Zambia, Burkina Faso, and Ghana in sub-Saharan Africa, although it is noteworthy that according to these estimates, both India and China also rank low on media access. Another way to make the comparison is to examine the proportion of respondents who reported that they did not regularly use any of these sources of media information; among the countries ranked lowest overall, one in ten reported no regular use of any of these sources in Morocco and Mali, one fifth reported no use in China, Burkina Faso and Zambia, while one third reported no use in India. Chapter 5 will discuss the reasons for these differences, and analyze the factors contributing to disparities in access to information and communication technologies.

Monitoring television watching

We can also compare general use of television across 69 societies during the 1980s and 1990s. The World Values Survey measured the number of hours that people devoted to watching television. Surveys that break down viewership figures in much finer detail, such as those conducted in the United States by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, show that television news and current affairs is important, but is only a relatively modest proportion of the overall time devoted to watching TV.[50] By contrast, far more time is devoted to popular entertainment, such as drama series, movies, comedies, game and reality shows, and similar fare. The World Values survey monitored TV habits in 16 post-industrial nations in 1981-3, expanding coverage to in fifty societies from many parts of the world in the second wave, and including 17 societies (including many in the Middle East) in the third wave. The survey measured: *"Do you ever watch television? If yes, how much time do you often watch television during an average workday?"*

[Table 2.3 about here]

The result of the comparison, shown in Table 2.3, confirms that use of TV has become almost ubiquitous in many places, including post-Communist Europe, as well as in most affluent post-industrial societies. In a dozen countries, including Britain, the United States, Canada, more than one third of all respondents report spending at least three hours per day watching television. By contrast, the survey includes eleven developing countries, such as India, Mexico and Zimbabwe, where at least in the mid or late-1990s, one fifth to one half of all respondents reported never watching TV. These estimates are out of date today, given growing availability of TVs in many of these societies, but some important disparities remain, and the comparison allows us to test the effects of television watching among viewers and non-viewers in earlier waves of the survey. The societal disparities in access to television, as well as the contrasts observed in use of a wider range of news media sources, provides a suitable 'most different' comparison that can test the impact of these patterns on cultural values.

Mixed methods

Any single approach, taken in isolation, has limits. Consequently this study opts for a mixed research design, combining the virtues of pooled survey data in more than 90 nations with rich and detailed narrative studies of contrasting paired cases.[51]

A large-N pooled dataset is used to establish the overall picture. The variables used here are described in Technical Appendix A, including the construction of the Cosmopolitanism Index. The list of countries and surveys included in the study is described in Technical Appendix B. The use of Hierarchical Linear Models, in particular multilevel regression analysis, is described in detail in Technical Appendix C. In brief, the firewall theory predicts that individual use of the news media will have a *direct* effect on individual values. In addition, it predicts that a *cross-level interaction* effect will also be apparent, as external and internal barriers to information flows in each society will interact with individual patterns of news media use. To operationalize these factors, the key models in the second section of the book involve measurement at two distinct levels. A representative sample of individual respondents (level 1) is nested within national-level contexts (level 2). The World Values Survey was conducted among representative samples of the adult population within each nation-state. Given the use of multilevel data, hierarchical linear models (HLM) are most appropriate for analysis, including multilevel regression analysis.[52] Level 1 in our core models includes the following *individual-level* measures: male gender (0/1), household income using a 10-point scale, age (in years), the education scale, and the media use 5-point scale (or each of the separate dummy variables for use of newspapers, radio/TV and the Internet). Level 2 includes the following *national-level* variables: the standardized KOF globalization index, the

standardized Freedom House press freedom index, and the standardized level of economic development (per capita GDP (2006) in Purchasing Power Parity). *Cross-level* interactions are also included, as the effects of media use are expected to be moderated by the level of cosmopolitanism within each country. To measure the joint effects of media use at individual level, while taking account of the environment at national-level, models include the Cosmopolitanism Index*media use. Those who are interested in the multilevel regression methods employed can find a more detailed description in Technical Appendix C.

In addition, in chapter 10 we also use HLM to estimate direct evidence of changes over time, utilizing the social values and attitudes contained in successive waves of the World Values Survey conducted since 1981. We classify nations included in the survey according to the annual Cosmopolitanism Index estimated for the year closest to that of the survey. We can then examine the degree of change in cultural values among cosmopolitan and parochial societies. Chapter 10 draws on cross-sectional time-series (CS-TS) panel data, consisting of repeated observations (each wave of the survey) on a series of random units (the countries included in the WVS). The analysis of panel datasets through regression faces certain important challenges and the interpretations of the results are quite sensitive to the choice of specification issues, alternative models, and diagnostic tests.[53] Ordinary least squares regression estimates assume that errors are independent, normally distributed, and with constant variance. Panel data violates these assumptions and raises potential problems of heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, robustness, and missing data. In particular, autocorrelations are generated because, with time-series data, the same countries are being observed repeatedly and the additional observations do not provide substantially new information. The danger of OLS analysis is that the beta coefficients will remain unbiased but the disturbance terms from the errors (i.e. omitted variables) are likely to be correlated. In other words, if OLS regression models are used, the significance of any coefficients may be inflated, generating Type II errors, suggesting that significant relationships exist when in fact they do not. Various techniques have been designed to handle panel datasets, including Ordinary Least Squares linear regression with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE), and the use of robust regression.[54] In this study, we extend the use of generalized linear models (HLM). Our multilevel regression models include both subjects (countries) and repeated variables (waves) with correlated residuals within the random effects.

Lastly we also use selected narrative paired case studies to illustrate the underlying causal mechanisms at work, taking account of historical developments and processes of cultural change within

given nations.[55] Cases allow researchers to develop theories, to derive hypothesis, and to explore causal mechanisms. This approach is particularly useful with outliers that deviate from the generally observed pattern. The case comparison examine societies that are similar in certain important regards, such as sharing a cultural tradition and level of socio-economic development, while differing in their media environments. Chapter 4 compares cases that exemplify cosmopolitan and parochial societies. Among the African democracies in the World Values Survey with relatively open and pluralistic media environments, *Mali* illustrates one of the poorest societies in the world with limited public access to the mass media, while by contrast *South Africa* has a well developed communications infrastructure and global networks. These contrasts are explored further in chapter 5. Among parochial societies, *Syria* exemplifies a society that has minimal press freedom and which is also relatively isolated from global markets, compared with *China*, a rapidly industrializing society that has recently joined the World Trade Organization, with growing affluence due to extensive international trade, yet with serious limits on internal freedom of expression and publication. Case studies must always be sensitive to problems of selection bias, and it is difficult to determine how far broader generalizations can be drawn from the particular countries.[56] Nevertheless the combination of cross-national large-N comparisons with selected cases is a strong design that maximizes the potential benefits of each approach. If the two contrasting approaches point to similar conclusions, it can increase one's confidence in the robustness of the findings.

Conclusions and qualifications

This research design allows us to test the impact of mass communications using a broad range of countries and multiple techniques. We anticipate that any direct effects arising from use of the mass media will be most evident among individuals with regular use of newspapers, television, radio, and the internet. By comparing the social values, attitudes and beliefs of the media audience with others living in the same society, we can see if these groups differ significantly. By nesting the analysis within different types of environments, we can examine broader contextual and interactive effects. We hypothesize that the impact of the *cosmopolitan* communications can best be tested by analyzing the interaction between media use at individual level and the type of society. Information flows arising from media sources are expected to have the greatest tendency to facilitate cultural convergence in the most cosmopolitan societies, characterized by free trade cultural policies, widespread media access, and freedom of information. This process advances the analytical framework and the research agenda much further than the previous literature.

Nevertheless some important qualifications and limits to this research design need to be acknowledged.

In particular, this approach cannot detect any more *diffuse* long-term effects arising from mass communications – for example if advertizing, television, and movies convey broader images and ideas that gradually percolate throughout society. People do not have to see glossy images of Levis or Nikes to want to buy these products. People who watch or read about the news often discuss the events and headlines with family, friends, colleagues, and neighbors. Through social networks, news gradually trickles down to others in the community (the 'water-cooler' effect). The role of interpersonal discussion is likely to be a particularly important source of information in societies with low levels of literacy and with an oral culture. Nevertheless, diffuse long-term indirect effects on society as a whole are the most difficult, if not impossible, to attribute with any degree of reliability to mass communications per se. We can certainly speculate about the way that images or ideas in advertising, news headlines, or popular entertainment shape societal attitudes and values beyond the audience, but it is not clear how this process can be established empirically.

Another major challenge arises from attempts to establish the direction of causality between use of the media and social values. Prior interests may plausibly drive media use, for example, an interest in international affairs may well encourage people to surf the internet for news about events abroad. At the same time, regular media use may plausibly shape social attitudes and values, for example regularly accessing foreign news websites may well facilitate learning about other people and places. The difficulty of determining the direction of causality is not unique to this study; indeed it plagues all cross-sectional survey analysis seeking to establish the impact of media use. The WVS monitors public opinion among different samples of respondents taken at roughly five-year intervals. Experimental 'pre-post' research designs, and panel surveys of the same respondents over time, are the most effective techniques used to disentangle causality, by controlling for prior media selection biases. Unfortunately both techniques are also challenging to implement on a cross-national basis. It is also often difficult to generalize from the results of specific social psychological experiments conducted among small groups and atypical populations, such as college students, to understand broader patterns in society as a whole. The approach taken by this study cannot ultimately control for self-selection biases in the audience, but any *direct* effects arising from use of the mass media should be evident most clearly in the contrasts found among the audience compared with the non-audience.

The available survey measures of media use are also limited. At the individual level, the 5th wave of the World Values Survey monitored regular use of daily newspapers, news broadcasts and in-depth reports on radio or TV, printed magazines, books, the internet and email, and use of television entertainment, as well as personal discussions with friends or colleagues. The specific questionnaire items used to monitor media use are contained in Technical Appendix A. As general measures designed to cover multiple societies and media systems, these are inevitably restricted in their precision. We lack any survey evidence about the potential impact arising from many other types of global communication flows, for example the role of imported feature movies, videogames, or popular music. Nor can we identify the specific contents and messages that people are exposed to from accessing the mass media, such as the types of websites that people typically use, or whether they read tabloid or broadsheet newspapers, or whether they watch public service or commercial TV stations. It is possible that attitudes towards the United States are shaped more directly by other forms of mass entertainment, such as the images carried in Hollywood blockbusters, than by CNN nightly news or by TV drama and game show programs. Nor can we monitor the extent of exposure and attention to the news media, for example how frequently people read newspapers or watch TV news, or how long people have used the internet. The distinction between radio and television news is also poorly captured by the questionnaire, along with differences between email and use of the World Wide Web. These issues and many others must be left to further comparative research, which can replicate some of the core propositions developed in this study by exploring media contents and audience reception in finer-grained detail. What we can examine in this book, however, is whether regular users of the most common types of mass media differ significantly from those who do not use these sources of information.

Moreover individual-level surveys of media use ideally need to be supplemented by information about media contents. We lack data about what people were watching or reading when they used the news media or television in general; and thus the extent to which individuals were exposed to particular types of cross-border information flows. For example, European Audiovisual Observatory monitors how far European public service and private TV stations feature American movies, drama and entertainment, showing substantial variations in European societies. Within countries, people could choose to watch mostly domestically-produced TV, or alternatively those with cable or satellite access could select to tune into CNN, EuroNews and Sky TV. It requires far more fine-grained audience research surveys, such as those provided by Nielsen Audience Research, to monitor viewing habits with any degree of precision. The picture becomes even more complicated if we try to monitor the degree of attention individuals paid to international news in the print sector, radio, as well as non-domestic content via the

Internet. In addition, ideally we need a measure of exposure to non-domestically produced contents that operates across all channels of mass communications; for example, people could watch a high proportion of American movies on cable TV while also regularly paying attention to local or national news. In the absence of any precise measure of media contents, or individual-level patterns of exposure, we assume that people living in societies that are most cosmopolitan are generally more likely to encounter cross-border information flows from a variety of sources. Our research design provides only a conservative indicator of any impact and again experimental research would allow these issues to be explored with control over the precise contents of the messages.

These are all important qualifications and we will return to addressing these issues in more detail, and consider their consequences for the interpretation of the overall results, in the concluding chapter. In the meanwhile, to start to build the empirical evidence concerning the core argument, we go on in the next chapter to analyze the international market determining the exchange of cultural goods and services.

Figure 2.1: The firewall model of cosmopolitan communications



Figure 2.2: Coverage of the World Values Survey, 1981-2007

Note: Country included In the World Values Survey 

Figure 2.3: Societal mean levels of news media access by levels of press freedom and type of economy.



Notes: Societal mean levels of news media access, aggregating the 100-pt combined scale (WVS 2005-7). Levels of Press Freedom 2006, standardized z-scores from Freedom House. Type of economy categorized by levels of per capita GDP in PPP (World Bank 2007).

Table 2.1: Countries in the World Values Survey, ranked by contemporary levels of income

	High income societies ($15,000+)	GDP per capita ppp 2006 (World Bank 2007)	Human development index 2005 (UNDP 2007)	Medium income societies ($2,000-14,999)	GDP per capita ppp 2006 (World Bank 2007)	Human development index 2005 (UNDP 2007)	Low income societies ($1,999 and below)	GDP per capita ppp 2006 (World Bank 2007)	Human development index 2005 (UNDP 2007)
1	Luxembourg	$54,779	0.944	Korea, Rep.	$13,865	0.921	Macedonia, FYR	$1,940	0.801
2	Norway	$40,947	0.968	Greece	$13,339	0.926	Guatemala	$1,771	0.689
3	Japan	$40,000	0.953	Slovenia	$12,047	0.917	Bosnia and Herzegovina	$1,741	0.803
4	Andorra	$38,800	.	Portugal	$11,124	0.897	Egypt, Arab Rep.	$1,696	0.708
5	United States	$38,165	0.951	Trinidad and Tobago	$10,268	0.814	Albania	$1,604	0.801
6	Iceland	$35,782	0.968	Saudi Arabia	$9,910	0.812	China	$1,595	0.777
7	Switzerland	$35,696	0.955	Malta	$9,618	0.878	Azerbaijan	$1,576	0.746
8	Denmark	$32,548	0.949	Argentina	$8,695	0.869	Serbia and Montenegro	$1,455	.
9	Ireland	$31,410	0.959	Czech Republic	$7,040	0.891	Morocco	$1,439	0.646
10	Sweden	$31,197	0.956	Uruguay	$6,987	0.852	Armenia	$1,284	0.775
11	Taiwan	$29,500	.	Estonia	$6,945	0.860	Philippines	$1,175	0.771
12	Singapore	$27,685	0.922	Mexico	$6,387	0.829	Georgia	$1,071	0.754
13	United Kingdom	$27,582	0.946	Hungary	$6,126	0.874	Ukraine	$1,040	0.788
14	Finland	$27,081	0.952	Chile	$5,846	0.867	Indonesia	$983	0.728
15	Austria	$26,110	0.948	Latvia	$5,683	0.855	India	$634	0.619
16	Canada	$25,562	0.961	Poland	$5,521	0.870	Pakistan	$623	0.551
17	Netherlands	$25,333	0.953	Croatia	$5,461	0.850	Vietnam	$576	0.733
18	Germany	$24,592	0.935	Venezuela	$5,427	0.792	Moldova	$492	0.708
19	Belgium	$24,541	0.946	Lithuania	$5,247	0.862	Bangladesh	$454	0.547
20	France	$23,899	0.952	Slovak Republic	$5,126	0.863	Nigeria	$439	0.470
21	Australia	$23,372	0.962	Malaysia	$4,623	0.811	Zimbabwe	$409	0.513
22	Cyprus	$22,699	0.903	Brazil	$4,055	0.800	Zambia	$365	0.434
23	Italy	$19,709	0.941	Iraq	$3,600	.	Tanzania	$335	0.467
24	Israel	$18,367	0.932	Turkey	$3,582	0.775	Kyrgyz Republic	$326	0.696
25	Spain	$16,177	0.949	South Africa	$3,562	0.674	Ghana	$300	0.553
26	New Zealand	$15,458	0.943	Dominican Republic	$2,694	0.779	Uganda	$274	0.505
27				Russian Federation	$2,621	0.802	Rwanda	$268	0.452
28				Thailand	$2,549	0.781	Burkina Faso	$267	0.370
29				Peru	$2,489	0.773	Mali	$250	0.380
30				Romania	$2,443	0.813	Ethiopia	$155	0.406
31				Colombia	$2,317	0.791			
32				Bulgaria	$2,256	0.824			
33				Jordan	$2,193	0.773			
34				El Salvador	$2,173	0.735			
35				Algeria	$2,153	0.733			
36				Belarus	$2,070	0.804			
37				Iran, Islamic Rep.	$2,029	0.759			

Note: The 93 countries in the World Values Survey, 1981-2007 are classified and ranked by GDP Per Capita in PPP, 2006. Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2007.

Table 2.2: Use of media sources for information, 2005-7

	Daily newspaper	Radio/ TV news	Internet/ email	Magazine	Books	No use of any of these media	Media use 100-pt scale
Sweden	94	98	71	61	44	0	73
Norway	92	99	75	61	38	0	73
Switzerland	91	95	62	57	53	0	72
Finland	89	97	57	69	42	1	71
Australia	85	98	54	57	48	0	68
Netherlands	75	97	67	55	38	1	66
U.S.A.	71	91	67	51	44	2	65
South Korea	75	94	65	37	47	1	64
Andorra	85	94	49	48	40	1	63
Cyprus	76	90	36	71	39	1	63
Germany West	86	96	44	51	35	0	62
Canada	72	96	53	44	42	2	61
Malaysia	87	92	37	46	43	1	61
Britain	72	93	49	48	42	2	60
Germany East	79	97	35	49	39	1	60
Japan	90	98	46	36	27	1	59
Italy	71	95	40	51	36	0	59
France	62	95	38	47	33	2	55
Poland	56	97	28	45	35	2	52
Slovenia	63	90	35	51	23	2	52
Trinidad	81	93	21	23	38	3	51
Serbia	73	89	29	31	30	3	51
Chile	64	93	34	27	28	3	49
Indonesia	53	91	21	33	41	3	48
Spain	63	91	27	32	25	5	48
Russia	54	94	21	31	35	1	47
Ukraine	61	92	11	39	29	2	46
Bulgaria	63	97	19	28	28	2	46
Ethiopia	53	79	18	35	38	6	46
Taiwan	56	90	34	27	18	5	45
Iran	51	85	19		32		44
Thailand	50	91	14	27	39	2	44
Mexico	48	89	22	27	33	7	44
Moldova	55	90	20	26	24	3	43

South Africa	60	82	14	34	25	9	43
Romania	51	94	14	32	22	4	43
Turkey	60		22	16	22		42
Brazil	36	86	24	28	28	4	41
Argentina	47	90	21	23	21	4	40
Zambia	43	72	18	24	33	19	38
Viet Nam	39	95	10	21	23	3	38
Jordan	42	86	17	13	22	8	36
Colombia	31	89	17	20	21	8	36
Morocco	31	87	27	17	15	10	36
Mali	32	71	22	32	31	11	35
Uruguay	30	90	19	15	22	7	35
India	52	61	9	22	22	30	33
Ghana	23	82	9	11	33	13	32
China	23	75	11	17	19	19	29
Burkina Faso	19	66	8	16	22	19	27
Rwanda	10	63	12	11	25	16	26
Total	57	88	30	34	32	5	49

Note: Proportion who reported using each of these media sources "*…to learn what is going on in their country and the world… during the last week*." The 100-point media use scale is generated by summing self-reported regular use of each of these five sources of information (newspaper, radio/TV news, magazine, books, and the internet/email). The scale counts each source as a simple 1/0 dichotomy, where each source is weighted equally, standardizing the mean score to 100-points for ease of interpretation. In total, 60 nation-states (and 51 societies, as East and West Germany had separate samples) monitored news media use in the 5th wave of the WVS. In two cases, mean substitution was used when estimating the mean national media use scale for missing items not asked in Turkey (radio_TV use) and Iran (magazine use).

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

Table 2.3: Use and frequency of watching television

	Wave	Does not watch TV	1-2 Hours per day	2-3 Hours per day	More than 3 hours per day
Moldova	1994-1999	.5	51.5	28.5	19.6
Iceland	1981-1984	.9	66.8	24.4	8.0
Belarus	1994-1999	1.0	32.1	32.8	34.1
Lithuania	1994-1999	1.0	41.6	29.7	27.6
Armenia	1994-1999	1.2	15.2	25.4	58.3
Azerbaijan	1994-1999	1.2	14.0	32.5	52.3
Japan	1994-1999	1.3	36.0	35.3	27.4
Estonia	1994-1999	1.3	41.8	31.9	25.0
Macedonia, Republic of	1994-1999	1.4	21.5	28.9	48.1
Sweden	1994-1999	1.7	78.7	11.7	8.0
Latvia	1994-1999	1.7	44.4	32.8	21.0
Norway	1981-1984	1.7	67.0	21.5	9.8
Sweden	1981-1984	1.8	72.0	16.3	9.9
Germany West	1981-1984	1.8	59.3	26.4	12.4
United States	1981-1984	2.0	35.0	21.0	42.0
Ukraine	1994-1999	2.1	52.3	30.8	14.9
Great Britain	1981-1984	2.1	31.9	24.9	41.1
Northern Ireland	1981-1984	2.2	34.6	26.3	36.9
Australia	1994-1999	2.3	40.9	26.7	30.1
Italy	1981-1984	2.7	55.0	24.1	18.2
Norway	1994-1999	2.7	58.5	25.8	13.0
Canada	1981-1984	2.8	43.6	18.3	35.3
Taiwan	1994-1999	2.9	49.7	23.6	23.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1994-1999	2.9	28.6	38.3	30.2
Denmark	1981-1984	3.0	65.1	21.5	10.4
Spain	1999-2004	3.1	44.8	30.7	21.5
United States	1994-1999	3.4	41.7	27.4	27.5
Spain	1981-1984	3.9	50.6	24.9	20.6
Saudi Arabia	1999-2004	3.9	33.8	37.3	25.0
Netherlands	1981-1984	3.9	61.1	21.2	13.8
Romania	1994-1999	4.5	33.1	33.3	29.0
Chile	1994-1999	4.6	45.6	26.9	22.9
Hungary	1994-1999	4.8	50.0	26.5	18.7
Spain	1994-1999	4.9	44.4	31.9	18.9
Egypt	1999-2004	4.9	45.3	28.2	21.6

New Zealand	1994-1999	5.1	39.8	35.5	19.6
Belgium	1981-1984	5.2	48.1	28.0	18.7
Russian Federation	1994-1999	5.3	29.6	31.7	33.5
Switzerland	1994-1999	5.5	67.9	19.1	7.6
Indonesia	1999-2004	5.6	41.9	28.4	24.0
Algeria	1999-2004	5.7	36.2	28.4	29.7
Uruguay	1994-1999	5.7	34.8	29.8	29.7
Argentina	1999-2004	6.0	41.7	29.1	23.2
Brazil	1994-1999	6.1	47.0	17.1	29.8
Argentina	1994-1999	6.2	49.9	25.3	18.7
Bulgaria	1994-1999	6.2	20.6	37.3	36.0
Peru	1999-2004	6.2	45.4	28.0	20.4
Ireland	1981-1984	6.4	34.5	19.1	39.9
Malta	1981-1984	6.4	55.6	19.1	18.9
Poland	1994-1999	6.5	46.4	27.4	19.7
Croatia	1994-1999	6.6	39.9	32.3	21.2
Puerto Rico	1994-1999	7.3	40.8	24.1	27.8
France	1981-1984	7.3	52.7	24.3	15.7
Iraq	1999-2004	7.6	35.0	30.6	26.9
Puerto Rico	1999-2004	8.1	45.5	25.4	21.0
Germany	1994-1999	8.4	47.4	28.3	15.8
Serbia and Montenegro	1994-1999	8.5	42.5	26.3	22.7
Venezuela	1994-1999	9.1	36.6	25.4	28.9
Colombia	1994-1999	9.9	55.4	19.2	15.4
Bangladesh	1999-2004	10.2	47.5	36.5	5.8
Czech Republic	1994-1999	10.3	34.0	31.8	23.9
Peru	1994-1999	10.3	45.5	24.0	20.2
Slovenia	1994-1999	11.1	61.4	18.3	9.2
Dominican Republic	1994-1999	11.6	53.4	20.2	14.8
China	1994-1999	11.9	47.8	25.9	14.5
Morocco	1999-2004	12.2	45.1	20.6	22.1
Slovakia	1994-1999	12.3	40.3	29.9	17.5
Jordan	1999-2004	12.3	37.9	22.9	27.0
South Africa	1999-2004	12.3	36.5	26.4	24.8
Philippines	1994-1999	12.6	57.5	16.4	13.5
Albania	1994-1999	13.5	58.8	22.6	5.1
El Salvador	1994-1999	14.1	52.0	14.7	19.3
Nigeria	1999-2004	19.6	34.5	21.1	24.9
Pakistan	1994-1999	20.1	9.2	59.2	11.5

Pakistan	1999-2004	21.2	50.5	21.0	7.3
Nigeria	1994-1999	21.6	37.5	21.8	19.0
Uganda	1999-2004	22.9	47.9	16.8	12.4
Finland	1994-1999	23.8	35.2	25.2	15.8
South Africa	1994-1999	24.5	36.3	20.0	19.3
Bangladesh	1994-1999	29.2	53.8	13.5	3.5
India	1994-1999	35.8	51.6	11.3	1.3
Mexico	1994-1999	49.2	29.1	11.9	9.7
Zimbabwe	1999-2004	53.0	26.4	9.5	11.1

Note: Q: *"Do you ever watch television? If yes, how much time do you often watch television during an average workday?"* Responses monitored in 69 societies.

Source: World Values Survey, 1981-2004.

[1] S. Brunn and T.R. Leinbach. Eds. 1991. *Collapsing Space and Time: Geographic Aspects of Communication and Information*. London: HarperCollins Academic.

[2] UNCTAD. 2008. *Secretary-General's high level panel on the creative economy and industries for development*. Accra, Ghana: UN. TD (XII)/BP/4 April 2008; UNESCO. 2005. *International Flows of selected Cultural Goods and Services, 1994-2003*. Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.

[3] European Audiovisual Observatory. 2007. *2007 Yearbook: Trends in European Television*. European Audiovisual Observatory: Strasbourg.

[4] C. Hoskins and R. Mirius. 1988. 'Reasons for the U.S. domination of the international trade in television programmes.' *Media, Culture and Society* 10: 499-515; Kerry Segrave. 1997. *American Films Abroad: Hollywood's Domination of the World's Movie Screens*. Jefferson, NC.: McFarland; Kerry Segrave. 1998. *American Television Abroad: Hollywood's Attempt to Dominate World Television.* London: McFarland; Melvyn Stokes and Richard Maltby. 2005. Eds. *Hollywood Abroad: Audiences and Cultural Exchange*. Berkeley: University of California Press; M. Tracey and W.W. Redal. 1995. 'The new parochialism: The triumph of the populist in the flow of international television.' *Canadian Journal of Communication*, 20: 343–365.

[5] David Ward. 2007. *Television and public policy: Change and continuity in an era of global liberalization*. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; Richard Collins. 1998. *From Satellite to Single Market: New Communication Technology and European public services television.* London: Routledge.

[6] Jin Dal Yong. 2007. 'Transformation of the world television system under neo-liberal globalization, 1983 to 2003.' *Television and New Media* 8(3): 179-196; Richard Collins. 1998. *From Satellite to Single Market: New Communication Technology and European public services television.* London: Routledge.

[7] Benjamin Bagdikian. 1997. *The Media Monopoly*. Boston: Beacon Press; Robert W. McChesney. 1999. *Rich Media Poor Democracy*: *Communication Politics in Dubious Times.* Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

[8] Council of Europe. 2004. *Transnational media concentrations in Europe.* Strasbourg: Council of Europe. http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/media/AP-MD(2004)007_en.pdf.

[9] D. Bigman**.** 2007. *Globalization and the Least Developed Countries: Potentials and Pitfalls.* New York: Oxford University Press.

[10] UNESCO. The latest available year of all these estimates is 2005.

[11] International Telecommunication Union. www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/itc/graphs/fixed.jpg

[12] Tim Hayward. 1995. Info-*Rich, Info-Poor: Access and Exchange in the Global Information Society.* K.G.Saur; William Wresch. 1996. *Disconnected: Haves and Have-Nots in the Information Age*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press; Pippa Norris. 2001. *Digital Divide*. New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Liangzhi Yu. 2006. 'Understanding information inequality: Making sense of the literature of the information and digital divides.' *Journal of Librarianship and Information Science* 38 (4): 229-252.

[13] The World Bank. 2007. *World Development Indicators 2007*. Washington DC: The World Bank. Table 5.10 and 5.11.

[14] International Telecommunications Union. http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/ict/index.html

[15] Georgette Wang, Anura Goonasekera, and Jan Servaes. Eds. 2000. *The New Communications Landscape: Demystifying Media Globalization*. London: Routledge.

[16] For a discussion, see the collection of studies in Michael G. Elasmar. Ed. 2003. *The Impact of International Television: A Paradigm Shift.* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

[17] For an overview of socialization theory, see Joan E. Grusec and Paul D. Hastings. 2007. (Eds). *Handbook of Socialization: Theory and Research.* New York: The Guilford Press. For comparative studies, see Ronald Inglehart. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies.* Princeton: Princeton University Press; Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel*. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[18] Preben Sepstrup. 1990. *Transnationalization of Television in Western Europe*. London: John Libbey. For the distinction between the program contents and the messages received and interpreted, see T. Liebes and E. Katz. 1993. *The export of meaning: Cross-cultural readings of Dallas.* Oxford: Polity Press.

[19] Walter Lippman. 1922. *Public Opinion.* New York: Macmillan; Harold Lasswell. 1971 [1927]. *Propaganda techniques in World War I.* Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press. For a discussion, see Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell. 2006. *Propaganda and Persuasion.* 4th edition. Thousand Oaks: CA: Sage.

[20] Ian M. Rose. 1995. 'Barring foreigners from our airwaves: An anachronistic pothole on the global information highway.' *Columbia Law Review* 95: 1188.

[21] For a comprehensive overview of alternative theories of mass communications, see Denis McQuail. 1994. *Mass Communication Theory.* London: Sage. 3rd ed.

[22] C.I. Hovland, A. Lumsdaine and F. Sheffield. 1949. *Experiments on mass communication*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[23] Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld. 1955. 'Images of the mass communications process.' In *Personal influence: The part played by people in the flow of mass communications,* 15-42. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

[24] Steven H. Chaffee, L.S. Ward, and L.P. Tipton. 1970. 'Mass communication and political socialization.' *Journalism Quarterly* 47 (4): 647; C. K. Atkin and W. Gantz. 1978. 'Television-news and political socialization.' *Public Opinion Quarterly* 42 (2): 183-198.

[25] Jay G. Blumler and E. Katz. 1974. *The uses of mass communications: Current perspectives on gratifications research*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

[26] W. Russell Neuman, Marion R. Just, and Ann N. Crigler. 1992. *Common Knowledge: News and the Construction of Political Meaning*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press; C. Roach. 1997. 'Cultural imperialism and resistance in media theory and literary theory.' *Media Culture & Society* 19: 47 1997.

[27] George Gerbner, Larry Gross, M. Jackson-Beeck, S. Jeffries-Fox and Nancy Signorielli. 1978.

[28] See Michael G. Elasmar and Kathryn Bennett. 2003. 'The cultural imperialism paradigm revisited: Origin and evolution.' In Michael G. Elasmar. Ed. 2003. *The Impact of International Television: A Paradigm Shift.* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

[29] John Zaller. 1996. 'The myth of massive media impact revived: New support for a discredited idea.' In *Political persuasion and attitude change* (pp. 17–78). Eds., Diana C. Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman, and Richard A. Brody. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

[30]Bryant Jennings and Dolf Zillmann, Eds. 2002. *Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research*. 2nd edition. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum; Glenn Sparks. 2005. *Media Effects Research: A Basic Overview*. 2nd edition. New York: Wadsworth. For agenda-setting theory, see Maxwell McCombs and D.L. Shaw. 1972. 'The agenda-setting function of the mass media.' *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36: 176-185.

[31] Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillmann (Eds). 2002. *Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research.* NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum; Eric Bucy. 2009. *Sourcebook for Political Communication Research: Methods, Measures, and Analytical Techniques.* New York: Routledge.

[32] Michael Gurevitch and Jay Blumler. 1990. 'Comparative research: The extending Frontier.' In *New Directions in Political Communication: A Resource Book*. Eds. David L. Swanson and Dan Nimmo. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

[33] Sophie Duchesne and Andrè-Paul Frognier. 1995. 'Is There a European Identity?' In *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*. Edited by Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Angelika Scheuer. 1999. 'A Political Community?' In *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*. Ed. Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also B. Nelson, D. Roberts and W.Veit. (eds). *The Idea of Europe: Problems of National and Transnational Identity*. Oxford: Berg.

[34] Wendy M.Rahn and Thomas J. Rudolph. 2001. 'National identities and the future of democracy.' In *Mediated Politics*. Eds.W. Lance Bennett and Robert M. Enbtman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Pippa Norris. 2001. 'Global Governance and Cosmopolitan Citizens.' In *Governance in a Globalizing World*. Eds. Joseph S. Nye and John Donahue. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Pp.155-177.

[35] Michael G. Elasmar and John E. Hunter. 1993. 'The impact of foreign TV on a domestic audience: A meta-analysis.' *Communication Yearbook* 20: 47-69; Michael Featherstone. Ed. 1990. *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalism and Modernity*. London: Sage; Elihu Katz and Tamar Liebes, 1990. *The Export of Meaning: Cross-Cultural Readings of Dallas.* New York: Oxford University Press; Michael G. Elasmar and John E. Hunter.2003. 'A meta-analysis of cross-border effect studies'. In Michael G. Elasmar. Ed. 2003. *The Impact of International Television: A Paradigm Shift.* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

[36] See contributions in Michael G. Elasmar. Ed. 2003. *The Impact of International Television: A Paradigm Shift.* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

[37] Michael G. Elasmar. Ed. 2003. *The Impact of International Television: A Paradigm Shift.* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

[38] John Pimenta, Daniel Paolillo and Daniel Prado. 2005. *Measuring linguistic diversity on the internet.* Paris: UNESCO. See also regular estimates by Global Reach. http://global-reach.niz/globalstats.

[39] Milton Rokeach. 1968. *Beliefs, Attitudes and Values.* San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass.

[40] Herbert J. Schiller. 1992. *Mass communication and American empire*. 2nd edition Boulder: Westview Press . P36; Robert W. McChesney. 1999. *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Chapter 2. See also Edward S. Herman and Robert W. McChesney. 1998. *The Global Media: The Missionaries of Global Capitalism*. Cassell; Edward S. Herman. 1999. *Triumph of the Market: Essays on Economics, Politics, and the Media.* South End Press.

[41] Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski and Jonathan Zittrain. 2008. *Access Denied: The practice and policy of internet filtering*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

[42] Hsiang Iris Chyi and George Sylvie. 2001. 'The medium is global, the content is not: The role of geography in online newspaper markets.' *Journal of Media Economics* 14(4): 231-248; George Sylvie and Hsiang Iris Chyi. 2007. 'One product, two markets: How geography differentiates online newspaper audiences.' *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 84(3): 562-581; S.J. Best , B. Chmielewski and B.S. Krueger. 2005. 'Selective exposure to online foreign news during the conflict with Iraq.' *Harvard International Journal Of Press-Politics* 10(4): 52-70.

[43] Full methodological details about the World Values Surveys, including the questionnaires, sampling procedures, fieldwork procedures, principle investigators, and organization can be found at: http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/wvs-samp.html.

[44] These countries are ranked as equally 'free' according to the 2008 Freedom House assessments of political rights and civil liberties Freedom House. 2008. *Freedom in the World*. www.freedomhouse.org.

[45] Pippa Norris. 2001. *Digital Divide*. New York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.

[46] Unfortunately the 5th wave of the survey does not allow us to disaggregate use of radio and television news, where we would expect to find some marked contrasts.

[47] Karl Erik Gustafsson and Olof Hulten. 1997. 'Sweden'. In *The Media in Western Europe* edited by Bernt Stubbe Ostergaard. London: Sage.

[48] Pippa Norris. 2000. *A Virtuous Circle*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4.

[49] Pippa Norris. 2001. *Digital Divide*. New York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.

[50] See, for example, The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. Aug 2008. 'Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and Traditional Sources: Audience Segments in a Changing News Environment.' http://people-press.org/report/444/news-media

[51] For a discussion of the advantages of mixed research designs, see Henry Brady and David Collier. 2004. *Rethinking social inquiry: Diverse tools, shared standards*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

[52] Robert Bickel.2007. *Multilevel Analysis for Applied Research: Its Just Regression!* New York: The Guilford Press.

[53] James A. Stimson. 1985. 'Regression in time and space: A statistical essay.' *American Journal of Political Science* 29:914–47; Cheng M. Hsiao. 1986. *Analysis of panel data.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Sven E. Wilson and David M. Butler. 2007. 'A lot more to do: The sensitivity of time-series cross-section analyses to simple alternative specifications.' *Political Analysis* 15 (2): 101-123.

[54] Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz. 1995. 'What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data.' *American Political Science Review.* 89: 634-647; Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz. 1996. 'Nuisance vs. substance: Specifying and estimating time-series cross-sectional models.' In *Political Analysis* Ed. J. Freeman. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

[55] See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. 2004. *Case Studies and Theory Development*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

[56] For a discussion of the potential problem of selection bias in comparative politics, see Barbara Geddes. 2003. *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory building and research design in comparative politics*. Chapter 3. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press; David Collier, James Mahoney and Jason Seawright. 2004. 'Claiming too much: Warnings about selection bias.' In *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.