

Chapter 6

Citizens: National and cosmopolitan identities

This second section of this book applies the analytic framework we have developed to test the consequences of the growth of cosmopolitanism communications. Convergence theorists assume that the globalization of the mass media, especially the exposure of traditional developing societies to a barrage of Western entertainment, Hollywood movies, commercial advertising, and international news, has the capacity to transform national identities, social values, and ideas of democracy. One of the most common arguments is that the flow of cross-border information expands awareness about other people and places, so that widespread access to news from abroad may encourage greater understanding, tolerance, and trust of foreigners, while simultaneously weakening national identities and a sense of belonging to local communities. In the social sphere, conservatives fear that images of professional working women depicted in Western media could encourage more egalitarian sex roles in ultra-traditional societies, such as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, challenging conventional views about the appropriate roles of men and women in the home, workforce, and public sphere. Conservatives are also concerned that treatment of explicit sexuality in Western advertising, pornographic websites, and Hollywood movies, could loosen moral standards in traditional societies, bring more tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality, abortion, and divorce. Theorists such as Herbert Schiller, Edward Hermann, and Robert McChesney have long argued that the Western media are the missionaries designed to spread the values of consumer capitalism around the world.¹ If this claim is true, then in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, exposure to the ideas and images of free market individualism imported by the Western mass media should leave a distinct imprint on attitudes towards the role of markets and the state. In the field of international relations, soft power theorists claim that the use of the mass media for public diplomacy has the capacity to win hearts and minds, with the ideas and images conveyed by American/Western media contributing towards the end of the cold war, reinforcing public support for reform movements around the world, and thus the process of democratization.² Street battles to control television during the 'color' revolutions also suggest that the mass media has the capacity to play a vital role in regime change.³ In states such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Uzbekistan, people with access to BBC World Service, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Deutsche Welle, Radio Liberty, or Radio Monte Carlo, have opportunities to learn about democracy in other nations, as well as hearing reporting critical of human rights in their own country.

These sorts of consequences are often assumed to arise from the globalization of mass communications but the empirical evidence is scanty. There are also good reasons for skepticism about the more extravagant claims; socialization theory suggests that we learn about society and the world from multiple sources, and that deep-rooted values and social norms are acquired from interactions with family and teachers, friends and neighbors, and first-hand experiences during one's formative years.⁴ The mass media is only one potential socialization agency – and not necessarily the most important one compared with interpersonal communications. As earlier chapters noted, when confronted with ideas that conflict with local cultural norms and beliefs, people may gradually modify their views, but alternatively they may simply choose to reject or ignore them. Subsequent chapters will examine the direct impact of exposure to the media on each of these dimensions of public opinion. This chapter starts by analyzing evidence concerning one of the most important and influential claims, namely that exposure to global mass communications will gradually weaken national identities, as well as strengthening understanding, trust and tolerance of people from other countries. We outline the theoretical debate surrounding these issues, reviewing what is established by the previous literature, and then examine the empirical evidence. Descriptive comparisons and also multilevel regression models help to analyze the pooled sample containing all nations in the 5th wave of the WVS.

Do global communications encourage cosmopolitan orientations?

Previous writers offer several plausible theories why the globalization of mass communications is expected to weaken the bonds of nationalism.⁵ At the broadest level, many observers argue that globalization has led toward the 'end of the nation state'. Hence Ohmae argues that the modern period represents a new historical era dominated by the growth of the agencies of global governance, world markets forces, and Western consumerism, a tide that national governments and economies have become powerless to halt.⁶ Transformational accounts suggest that the nation state remains in place, but nevertheless its identity as a political institutions and its core capacities are profoundly undermined by globalization, while transcendentalists go even further by suggesting that globalization implies the ultimate dissolution of the nation state.⁷ Anthony Giddens claims that contemporary globalization is historically unprecedented, reshaping modern societies, economies, governments, and the world order.⁸ This process has gone furthest within the European Union, Held and his colleagues suggest, where the future of sovereignty and autonomy within nation-states has been most strongly challenged by European integration, but the authors argue that all of the world's major regions are affected, producing overlapping '*communities of fate*'.⁹ The interdependence is evident. When the sub-prime mortgage

market crumbles in the United States, stock-markets sink in Tokyo, and the Northern Rock bank goes bankrupt in the UK.¹⁰ When Brazilian rainforests shrink, the polar icecaps melt in the South Atlantic, and record wildfires hit California. The world clearly *is* becoming more closely interconnected. Media reporting of these events provides information about globalization, and direct experience, such as international travel, tourism, and immigration across national borders, is also expected to broaden the mind, by exposing individuals to other life-styles, unfamiliar practices, and alternative beliefs.¹¹ For pro-globalists, the acceleration and deepening of transborder information flows through the spread of ICTs is regarded as a deep driver providing new opportunities to learn about the world and other places indirectly. Among the consequences, this process is expected to deepen cosmopolitan orientations, contributing to greater understanding of, and respect for, habits and customs found in other cultures, strengthening trust and tolerance of other peoples, weakening parochial feelings of nationalism, and encouraging trust and confidence in the major agencies of multilateral cooperation and global governance to overcome shared world challenges. Most of these consequences are viewed by pro-globalists as positive developments, although in fragile multiethnic states emerging from conflict, the lack of a nation-wide TV and radio broadcasting system, or a linguistically-segmented newspaper market, may exacerbate existing divisions among communities, and thereby limit the capacity of the state to rebuild a sense of common identity and national unity.

Despite these conjectures, it has not been demonstrated whether the process of globalization – and in particular the role of cross-border information flows - actually *has* fostered more cosmopolitan orientations among the general public of most countries. Skeptics doubt whether identification with the nation-state has been seriously weakened among the general public, and whether an emerging ‘cosmopolitan identity’ is sufficiently powerful to replace the visceral tribal appeals of nationalism. In Anthony Smith’s view, we are witnessing the growth of regional blocs, where nation-states remain the primary actors, rather than the emergence of a new world order that transcends states.¹² The expanding role of the United Nations in development, peacekeeping and human rights has occurred, Smith suggests, without fundamentally eroding-- indeed perhaps even strengthening-- deep-rooted attitudes towards nationalism and the nation-state.: *“We are still far from even mapping out the kind of global culture and cosmopolitan ideals that can truly supersede the world of nations.”*¹³ Supporting the polarization thesis, Mann argues there are complex patterns involving different possible threats to the nation-state, rather than clear-cut trends, but a popular backlash against the forces of globalization has probably strengthened, not weakened, national identities.¹⁴ Hooson also perceives a resurgence of nationalism: *“The last half of the twentieth century will go down in history as a new age of rampant and*

proliferating nationalisms...The urge to express one's identity, and to have it recognized tangibly by others, is increasingly contagious and has to be recognized as an elemental force even in the shrunken, apparently homogenizing, high tech world of the end of the twentieth century."¹⁵ Support for this interpretation is suggested by contemporary struggles for succession, resulting in the birth of new nation-states, such as Timor Leste and Kosovo, in persistent unresolved internal conflict over ethno-nationalist identities, exemplified by demands for autonomous self-government in the Kurdish region of Iraq, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and ETA's violent actions in the Basque region of Spain, as well as the peaceful divorce in Czechoslovakia, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and debates about a split among linguistic communities in Belgium. Arguing along similar lines, Castells suggests that globalization has encouraged organized resistance as diverse as the Zapatistas in Chiapas, the rightwing militia in the United States, and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan: *"People all over the world resent the loss of control over their lives, over their environment, over their jobs, over their economies, over their governments, over their countries, and, ultimately, over the fate of the Earth."*¹⁶ This view emphasizes the burgeoning anti-globalization social movements, exemplified by the mass protests mobilizing against meetings of the WTO, IMF, and G-8, and also by eco-gastronomy 'slow food' groups, which embrace traditional local products and deplore the loss of distinct cultural communities. If these forces reflect a widespread popular phenomenon, rather than the activities of small but noisy minorities, this could indicate that local and national identities have not faded away, and may even have resurfaced with new vigor in a reaction against globalization.

Evidence from previous studies

What evidence enables us to evaluate the claims underlying this debate? The bulk of the literature postulating links between globalization, use of the mass media, and nationalist and cosmopolitan orientations has been polemical and purely theoretical. Most commentators seek to account for contemporary developments in international relations, European integration, or transnational social movements by citing social observation, selected cases, and historical illustrations, without examining public opinion data systematically. But recent years have also seen a growing body of literature analyzing the empirical survey evidence concerning the strength of national identities, attitudes towards open borders for labor migration and free trade, trust and tolerance of other nations, and confidence in the multilateral agencies of global governance, all of which can throw light on these arguments.¹⁷

The most systematic time-series analysis has examined whether a sense of national identity has declined since the early-1970s within the European Union. Renewed interest in understanding the dynamics of public support within the EU has been spurred by the continuing process of European integration despite the results of referenda in which, when the public was asked to express their views, the majority rejected the proposed adoption of the euro in Denmark (2000) and Sweden (2003), the proposed constitution for Europe in France (2005) and the Netherlands (2005), and the proposed Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland (2008). Europe provides an appropriate context to test some of the core claims about the emergence of cosmopolitan orientations, since the process of European integration has been gradually strengthening, deepening, and widening the institutions and powers of the European Union over successive decades. If nationalism has faded anywhere, the experience of economic and political integration within the EU, with people working, living, studying and traveling in different member states, can be expected to have dissolved traditional barriers most clearly, particularly among citizens of the countries that have lived under European institutions for a long time, such as Italy, France, and Germany.¹⁸ There are other reasons why Europe is a suitable test-case; as we saw in chapter 3, the EU has imported a growing proportion of American TV entertainment, with a smaller internal market trading audiovisual goods within Europe. EU member states are also relatively affluent post-industrial societies, with well-educated populations and a large professional middle class, all characteristics typically expected to strengthen cosmopolitan orientations, such as trust and tolerance of other societies. Public opinion towards national identities and towards the organizations of multilateral governance has been closely monitored in the Euro-barometer time-series surveys conducted since the early-1970.

Far from finding a steady spread of cosmopolitan attitudes, however, successive studies based on Euro-barometer surveys have reported that the public's identification with Europe has fluctuated over time, often in response to specific political events such as the Maastricht agreement and the launch of the euro under EMU, as well as in reaction to economic performance.¹⁹ For example, a recent study that explored longitudinal support for European integration from 1973-2004 in eight long-term member states concluded that support grew following the Maastricht Treaty, peaking around 1991, and subsequently fell.²⁰ Little evidence suggests that European integration has generated a steadily growing sense of European identity and community among its citizens, even among the public in long-standing member states and in affluent post-industrial societies.²¹ In predicting public support for further European integration, Hooghe and Marks argue that national identities remain more influential than economic calculations.²² Related attitudes, including approval of EU policies, satisfaction with the

performance of the Union, and confidence in the European Commission and European Parliament, also display a pattern of trendless fluctuations since the early-1970s, rather than growing public support for the European institutions.²³ Persistent cross-national differences are also evident, dividing Europhile states such as Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belgium, where the public is relatively positive across most indicators (despite the rejection of the referenda mentioned above), from deep-seated Euro-skeptic states, such as Austria, Sweden and Britain.²⁴ There has been little convergence in these differences; for example, during the affluent 1990s, British public opinion drifted in an ever more Euro-skeptic direction, with almost half the public opting for complete withdrawal by the end of the decade.²⁵

Although Euro-barometer trends do not indicate a steadily growing sense of European identity, more specific factors do help to predict support for the EU. For example, a study based on a recent Germany survey reports more tolerance of foreigners, and also greater support for the institutions of global governance, are evident among Germans with direct personal experience of transnational social relations and border-crossing, such as if they travel to work in another European state or if they have relatives or friends living in another country.²⁶ Studies comparing 21 countries in the European Social Survey also found that euro-skepticism was associated with lower income and education, as well as with distance from Brussels, and with the duration of the country's EU membership.²⁷ Attitudes towards EU enlargement have also been linked to exposure to the mass media, with 'priming' effects shaping the standards used by the public to evaluate applicant member states.²⁸

If there is little systematic comparative evidence of growing cosmopolitan identities based on cross-national time-series trends since 1970 within European Union, what is the situation elsewhere? One of the most thorough studies of attitudes towards international organizations, by Evert, suggests a similar pattern to that already observed towards the EU. Evert reported that support for NATO and the UN is multi-dimensional, with attitudes influenced by responses to specific issues and events, rather than being arrayed on a general continuum stretching from nationalism to internationalism. Fluctuations over time in the public's approval of NATO displayed no secular trends, although there were also persistent differences in support between member states.²⁹ Previous analysis by one of the authors, based on comparisons over time using the World Values Survey data, provided only limited support for the argument that public opinion has consistently moved in a more cosmopolitan direction.³⁰ Instead the evidence strongly suggests that, rather than long-term secular trends, public opinion responds to the impact of specific events arising from UN interventions in security and defense, such as the UN's peace-keeping operations role in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia and Angola, the security

council resolutions after 9/11 authorizing the use of force in the Afghanistan war, and the role of the international community and the security council in the Iraq war, Palestine, and conflict in the Middle East. The pattern of trendless fluctuations seems to fit what we know about public support for the European Union. Moreover a succession of studies of longitudinal trends in public opinion within the United States suggests that over time there have been waves of support for unilateralism and internationalism for America's role in the world and towards international organizations.³¹ These waves have occurred in response to specific foreign policy events such as military action in Vietnam, Somalia and Iraq, rather than consistently shifting in a secular trend towards a more internationalist perspective. In the United States, a series of polls have consistently confirmed that the gut appeal of flag-waving symbolic patriotism, such as pride in America, remains extremely strong.³²

The one important qualification to this argument, however, has been found in terms of generational change, since young people and the well-educated are usually found to be less nationalistic than older and less educated groups.³³ Global comparisons of cosmopolitan orientations, indicated by a sense of belonging 'to the world as a whole', based on the 1981-2001 waves of the World Values Survey, confirmed this pattern.³⁴ Similar findings are reported in survey-based cross-sectional studies of national identities, national pride, and support for the agencies of multilateral governance in other particular countries, such as Britain, Australia, and Sweden.³⁵ If this is a generational pattern, as Tilley and Heath argue, then it remains possible that any fundamental transformation of national identities is a lagged process that will only become apparent over successive generations, through the process of demographic turnover.³⁶ During their formative years, the younger generation has been most exposed to the late-twentieth century wave of globalization, though their experiences with cross-border information flows in popular culture, such as through MTV, i-pods, and You Tube, as well as their greater international travel and tourism. By providing information and knowledge, education functions in many regards in a way that is similar to the role of the mass media; both potentially expand our understanding and awareness about other places and peoples. On the other hand, if the age-related pattern of cosmopolitan orientations is a life-cycle effect, as Jung argues, then this implies no consistent predictions of future trends over time.³⁷ Jung also uses a multilevel model to examine whether a country's integration into the global economy was related to supranational identities, concluding that there was no evidence supporting this claim. In general, generational and educational patterns are some of the strongest and most consistent predictors of broader dimensions of value change, for example in terms of adherence to self-expression values and attitudes towards gender equality.³⁸ These are some of

the most important factors to include in any analysis of cosmopolitan orientations, national identities, and support for the agencies of global governance

Therefore despite plausible theoretical reasons why globalization and transborder information flows may be expected to have encouraged growing cosmopolitan orientations in public opinion, on the basis of the existing research literature it seems fair to conclude that most of the available empirical studies lean towards a more skeptical perspective. At least within Europe, national publics vary significantly in their support for the institutions and policies of the European Union, and recent decades have not seen the rise of stronger pan-European identities, although a European identity is stronger among the younger generation and the well educated. Yet the evidence requires further analysis because studies of cross-national survey evidence have been mainly limited to post-industrial societies, and given the experience of globalization, different trends may well be occurring in the global South, as well as in particular regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and Central and Eastern Europe. Most importantly, we also need to consider evidence relating cosmopolitan orientations directly to the differential impact of transnational information flows and the use of the mass media, since the convergence thesis suggests that cosmopolitan orientations should have progressed further and fastest among those who are most exposed to globalized mass communications. Our research design allows us to do this by contrasting attitudes among users and non-users of the news media living within different types of media environments. If transborder information flows shape cosmopolitan orientations among media users, the core theory developed in earlier chapters predicts that this effect should be strongest in the open type of information environments. The existing evidence, although leaning towards skepticism, is by no means settled, and it is important to reexamine these issues.

Concepts, evidence, and indicators

Before proceeding to analyze the empirical data, we first need to clarify the underlying concept of 'nationalism', which is complex to define and operationalize. In this study, the idea of 'national identity' is understood to mean the existence of communities with bonds of 'blood and belonging' arising from sharing a common homeland, cultural myths, symbols and historical memories, economic resources, and legal-political rights and duties.³⁹ Nationalism can take '*civic*' forms, meaning ties of soil based on citizenship within a shared territory and boundaries delineated by the nation-state, or it may take '*ethnic*' forms, drawing on more diffuse ties based on religious, linguistic, or ethnic communities.⁴⁰ National identities are usually implicit and inert, and they may only rise to the surface in response to an 'other', where we know what we are by virtue of what we are not. In the modern world, national

identities underpin the state and its institutions exercising political authority within a given territory, although there are many multinational states such as the United Kingdom, as well as stateless nations, such as the Kurds and the Roma. By contrast, cosmopolitan identities are understood as those outlooks, behaviors and feelings that transcend local and national boundaries.⁴¹ Typically, cosmopolitans are tolerant of diverse cultural outlooks and practices, valuing human differences rather than similarities, cultural pluralism rather than convergence, and de-emphasizing territorial ties and attachments. Nationalism and cosmopolitanism are usually regarded theoretically as opposites, although it remains to be seen empirically whether these feelings could potentially coexist without contradiction, for example if people have strong feelings of national pride but also favor multilateral solutions to world problems. We view nationalism and cosmopolitanism as multidimensional phenomenon, with different forms of expression, for example in attitudes towards the institutions of multilateral governance, in feelings of belonging and attachment to different communities, or in support for policies that facilitate protectionism or globalization, such as attitudes towards free trade or open labor markets.

What survey evidence allows us to examine whether regular use of the news media generates more cosmopolitan orientations within the most globalized and open communication environments? National and cross-national surveys help to illuminate trends in public and elite opinion, notably occasional studies on World Public Opinion conducted by the Program on International Attitudes at the University of Maryland, the Pew Global Attitudes Project, the BBC World Service, and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.⁴² Surveys of American and European public opinion often monitor foreign policy attitudes within specific nations, and studies have compared attitudes among some of the major donor countries.⁴³ Nevertheless consistent comparisons are limited using these resources, along with the ability to link attitudes to patterns of media consumption. Previous comparative studies have often relied upon the Euro-barometer monitoring public opinion towards these issues since the early-1970s within EU member states. Modules on nationalism have also been included within the annual International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), covering almost two dozen countries.⁴⁴ These are invaluable sources but systematic cross-national time-series surveys of attitudes remain limited, especially systematic studies comparing public opinion and use of the media across a wide range of developing nations, and countries with different levels of globalization, and different types of media environment. To provide the broadest cross-national analysis, this book utilizes the most comprehensive comparative data available from the World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys carried out from 1981 to 2007, covering more than 90 societies worldwide.

Attempts to conceptualize and measure the core concepts of nationalism and cosmopolitanism remain under debate.⁴⁵ Hence Roudometof suggests a one-dimensional operationalization, with a single scale based on continuum of territorial identities ranging from cosmopolitan to local orientations.⁴⁶ Others who criticize this measure as too simple have recommend a two-dimensional operationalization, that also takes account of attitudes towards transnationalism, ranging from cultural or economic protectionism to openness.⁴⁷ Still others have specified a multidimensional perspective; for example Woodward et al suggest that Australians respond differently to distinct aspects of this phenomenon, favoring the increased flow of cultural goods and supporting cultural diversity, while by contrast greater anxieties surface on issues such as the impact of globalization on jobs, the environment, and human rights.⁴⁸ This study also adopts a multidimensional approach. The concept of *cosmopolitanism* can be understood to reflect both values and identities. Cosmopolitans represent those who express tolerance and trust towards people from other countries, rejecting the politics of fear and xenophobia towards foreigners. Cosmopolitan orientations should lead towards openness to understanding other peoples and places, for example expressed through an interest in foreign travel or working abroad, and tolerance of immigrants, strangers, and visitors from other nations. Conversely, *nationalists* are understood in this study as those who identify strongly with their country of origin (or with regions and local areas within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state), who express strong pride in their country, and who remain less trusting of other nationalities and more intolerant of foreigners. These core values and identities should also influence attitudes towards specific institutions and public policies, for example cosmopolitans are also expected to support specific policies favoring open labor markets and free trade, while nationalists are more likely to support economic policies designed to protect local jobs or industries, an issue explored in more depth in the next chapter.

Utilizing the World Values Surveys, principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation was used to test whether this conceptual typology reflected the underlying dimensions of public opinion in the selected items contained in the World Values Survey and listed in Table 6.1. In terms of trust of outsiders, from other places, societies, and faiths, survey items monitored trust in people from another nation and also from another religion. The strength of national identities was gauged by multiple items concerning the strength of national pride, willingness to fight for your own country, and also people's attachment to different territorial areas, all items commonly used in previous studies.⁴⁹ The 2005-7 World Values Survey monitored identities using multiple items, where people could specify several overlapping geographic identities, rather than treating them as trade-off responses, a practice followed in previous waves of the study.⁵⁰ The 2005-7 measure assumes that one can have multiple nested

identities, so that people can maintain their national and local identities while also having a growing sense of supranational attachments; people can be proud of living in local communities in Flanders or Wallonia, for example, while also seeing themselves as citizens of Belgium and part of European Union. Accordingly respondents were asked the following in the WVS:

“People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Using this card, would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself?”...I see myself as citizen of the [French] nation.... I see myself as member of my local community...” [*substitute nation of the survey]⁵¹*

[Table 6.1 about here]

The results of the factor analysis presented in Table 6.1 show the relationships among the selected variables with the rotated matrix, accounting, in total, for more than half (58%) of the variance in responses. The analysis confirmed the existence of two distinct dimensions of public opinion, distinguishing between trust in outsiders and feelings of nationalist identity. Appendix A provides more details about the specific questionnaire items selected for analysis and their coding and measurement. The analysis presented in this chapter focuses on data drawn from the 5th wave in 2005-7, as not all the items selected for analysis were included with identical wording in all previous waves. To construct value scales, the separate items listed in Table 6.1 were summed and converted into two standardized 100-point scales, for ease of comparison across each dimension. Any single item may generate specific responses in particular countries and contexts, for example a question the willingness to fight for one's country may trigger a specific reaction for Rwandans, Iraqis or Russians living near conflict zones, whereas value scales across a wider range of items are more likely to generate reliable cross-national comparisons reflecting more general attitudes towards nationalism.

Explaining trust in outsiders

To examine the associations of these dimensions of public opinion with use of the news media, as a first step we can look descriptively at the contrasts in mean levels of trust in outsiders (measured on a 100-point scale) by level of news media use among each type of society, without any controls. Trust in foreigners and in people from another religion is an important indicator of broader orientations towards other countries and world regions, with implications for public support for bilateral alliances and for multilateral cooperation in the international community. Taken to an extreme, xenophobia and faith-based hatreds can have disastrous consequences for social stability and for international relations, while by contrast tolerance of other peoples and faiths is beneficial for harmonious relations. The pattern in

Figure 6.1 illustrates the average level of trust in outsiders expressed by low, moderate and high news media users (categorizing the combined media scale), living within each type of society.

[Figure 6.1 about here]

The figure clearly illustrates the sharp contrasts in trust among those living in cosmopolitan and parochial societies. Moreover those who are most attentive to the news media are far more tolerant of outsiders than those who are less attentive, a pattern consistently found within each type of society. The contextual effects are particularly striking: people with low media use in cosmopolitan societies are more trusting of outsiders than the most attentive media users in parochial societies. We can speculate about some of the underlying reasons for these patterns. In the most cosmopolitan societies, such as Switzerland, Norway and the United States, the general public has widespread access to multiple sources of information and news, and national borders are open to the flow of imported images and ideas from abroad. Reporters and journalists also enjoy considerable freedom to provide independent coverage that can be critical of the actions and policies of their own government, and a plurality of media outlets help to provide a range of perspectives when reporting foreign affairs and news about other societies and cultures. By contrast, people living in parochial societies, such as Haiti, Syria and Nepal, often have far less access to a wide range of information sources providing awareness and understanding about international events and cultures. Where governments restrict freedom of expression, domestic news coverage is more likely to reflect the official position of the state, with less independent reporting or international sources providing coverage critical of the regime. These descriptive findings provide some initial support for the claim that regular use of the news media exposes people to ideas and images from other societies and peoples, encouraging a more cosmopolitan view of the world, and this pattern appears to be strongest in the most cosmopolitan places. Far from any polarization effect, this provides tentative support for the convergence thesis.

[Figure 6.2 about here]

Because the contrasts by type of environment are so striking, the scatter-gram in Figure 6.2 examines the societal-level patterns in more detail, showing countries classified on the Cosmopolitan index on the vertical axis and by the mean level of trust in outsiders from the 5th wave WVS on the horizontal. It is immediately obvious that a cluster of affluent cosmopolitan societies such as Norway, the US and France are highest on the trust scale. These are the societies with the densest access to information technologies, as well as a free press and open borders. Moreover many of the most parochial nations under comparison are *least* trusting of outsiders, including China, Morocco and Russia.

At the same time, although generating a moderately strong correlation ($R=.458$, $\text{Sig}.000$) there are also some countries located in the top left quadrant, such as the Netherlands, Germany and Italy, which are relatively cosmopolitan in their social characteristics and media environments, and yet that appear to be less trusting of outsiders than might be expected.

Such descriptive results are limited; as we established in the previous chapter, many factors such as age, education, and income are closely associated with use of the news media, as well as often being linked with social values and attitudes. Multilevel models using regression analysis are needed to determine whether exposure to the news media remains significantly related to trust in outsiders after controlling for the other individual-level social characteristics and attitudes that help to predict use of the media, as well as testing interaction effects between the societal-level media environments and individual use of the media. Table 6.2 presents the results of the multilevel regression models in the pooled sample for all societies in the 5th wave of the WVS. The standardized 100-point trust in outsiders scale (combining trust in people of other nationalities and other faiths) is the dependent variable. These models control for the factors that we have already established are some of the key predictors of media use, including individual level demographic characteristics (gender and age) and socio-economic resources (education and income).⁵² The models also entered the societal level Cosmopolitanism Index and they test the cross-level interaction effect. As is common in multilevel models, all variables were standardized to the mean, for ease of interpretation of the coefficients. The multilevel regression models were also double-checked to be free of any collinearity problems. The core results for the Cosmopolitan index are summarized in Model A, but four further models were also run to explore the impact of alternative national-level components in more detail, including the separate effects of globalization, economic development, media freedom and societal-level media access.

[Table 6.2 about here]

The results in all models presented in table 6.2 confirm that *individual-level use of the news media was significantly associated with greater trust in outsiders*, even after controlling for the other individual-level characteristics that we have already established contribute towards news media use. Since the scale for trust in outsiders is measured using standardized 100-point scales, the model suggest that those who use the news media heavily are, on average, approximate 15 percent more likely to trust outsiders. Overall education remains the strongest individual-level predictor in the model. This result confirms numerous previous studies that have established that the cognitive skills, knowledge and information associated with schooling are closely associated with more tolerant and trusting attitudes.⁵³

Greater trust in outsiders was also found among the more affluent households, and there was no significant effect for gender, although somewhat unexpectedly, greater trust was also evident among the older population, a pattern that persisted in the data regardless of whether the age variable was logged or not.

At the national level, *living in a cosmopolitan society makes people more trusting of outsiders*. This suggests that exposure to information flows from outside national borders does not generate a negative backlash; instead, people who live in isolated and parochial societies with minimal information about the outside world tend to be more fearful of strangers and foreigners. Those who are bound to other countries by communication networks, ties of trade, and news about the world are generally more trusting as a result. But how do we know which aspect of the cosmopolitanism index was most important for this relationship, in particular whether it was simply the product of living in more affluent post-industrial societies, or whether globalization, media freedom and media access played a role? These factors cannot be entered simultaneously, due to their strong inter-correlation (rich economies also tend to have well-developed media access, freedom of expression, and so on). But we can enter each of these national-level variables in successive models to test their effects. The results of the alternative models in Table 6.2 indicate that, as theorized, each of these societal characteristics at national-level can be regarded as strong and significant drivers in this relationship. In particular, economic development does have a strong effect on trust in outsiders; as previous studies have found, the people of more affluent countries are more likely to trust people from other countries and religions. But it is striking that media freedom has a stronger effect on trust in outsiders than economic development alone; this suggests that countries with a pluralistic range of media outlets and minimum internal restrictions on freedom of expression are the most likely to trust foreigners and peoples of other faiths. The separate impacts of media access and the KOF Globalization index were statistically significant but also weaker than the predictive capacity of the composite Cosmopolitan index.

Finally the models also enter the cross-level interaction effect: the results confirm the positive impact on trust of use of the media within more cosmopolitan societies. The coefficients are significant and moderately strong; on the 100-point scale, for example, after applying all the other controls, people who use the news media more heavily in cosmopolitan societies are about 8% more trusting of outsiders. The multilevel model provides support for the argument that people's openness to foreigners and people of different faiths is affected by use of the news media and by the permeability of the society in which they live.

Feelings of national identity

To establish whether these findings are robust, we will also run similar models to explore the factors associated with nationalist identities. The composite nationalist scale was constructed by summing responses on the extent to which respondents expressed a sense of national pride and the extent to which they were willing to fight for their country, as well as the extent to which people saw themselves as a national citizen and part of a local community. The scatter-plot in figure 6.2 shows the modestly negative relationship between the societal level of cosmopolitanism and the nationalist scale; some of the most cosmopolitan societies such as Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, and Japan are also the least nationalistic in their values. At the same time, some of the most provincial societies, such as Mali, Ghana and Jordan, were the most nationalistic. But there is quite a wide distribution of countries, including parochial societies such as Indonesia, China and Ukraine which are not very nationalistic, and only a weak correlation between these two dimensions ($R=0.105$).

[Table 6.3 about here]

Again many factors could be contributing to these patterns and multilevel regression may help us to interpret the data. The results of the models presented in Table 6.3 show that after including all individual-level controls, in general, *nationalist identities were usually positively and significantly associated with individual-level use of the news media*. In addition, feelings of nationalism were weakened by education, but they were stronger among more affluent households, among the older generations, and among men.

At the national level, *living in a cosmopolitan society was strongly related to less nationalistic orientations*. Running through the alternative models suggests that overall the degree of globalization was the strongest national-level predictor of less nationalistic attitudes, although the effects of globalization, economic development, and societal-level media access were very similar. Many factors closely associated with economic development are expected to contribute towards the erosion of nationalism, including, in particular, widening levels of access to education, the growth of the professional middle classes, and the greater affluence generated by economic growth. But the results also suggest that the expansion of access to the mass media, and the direct experience of living in more permeable societies open to outside influences, also play important roles in this process. Lastly, the interaction effect of using the news media in cosmopolitan societies was significantly negative. News media use was usually associated with slightly stronger nationalist identities. Nation-wide broadcasting systems and national newspapers can reinforce a sense of belonging to a single community and

allegiances to the nation-state, such as feelings of national pride or willingness to serve and defend one's country militarily. But this effect is contingent upon the context: nationalist identities are *weaker* in the most globalized societies, such as the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden, characterized by dense networks of cosmopolitan communications with easy access to foreign television channels, as well as international communication networks. Moreover national identities are *especially weaker among news users in these cosmopolitan societies*. As some hope, and others fear, denser and faster interconnections across territorial borders *do* seem to gradually erode older allegiances and promote a more multicultural ethos. Media use is not the strongest factor in this process, but it is a significant contributing factor, interacting with direct experience of living in an increasingly globalized world.

Conclusions and discussion

The growth of broadcasting systems within each country has traditionally been regarded as an important way to strengthen national communities and feelings of national identity, especially in multicultural societies with contested national boundaries. Public service broadcasters, in particular, often regard their role as bringing together diverse sectors, sub-regions and communities, as well as representing the nation to the outside world. These are key components of the mandate for the BBC, set forth in its Royal Charter.⁵⁴ This role has come under increasing challenge from deregulation and the new competitive multichannel environment, leaving public service broadcasters to reinvent their distinct mandate and mission.⁵⁵ The globalization of the news media, and the expansion of cross-national information flows, may potentially disrupt these processes of nation-building, if this gradually generates broader identities and allegiances. Cosmopolitan communications can be regarded as having potentially beneficial consequences, for example if this process spreads ideas about universal human rights and democratic governance around the world. But this process is also often regarded as threatening, for example when foreign ideas and imported programs limit the ability of fragile multicultural states and post-conflict societies to develop stronger bonds and allegiances across diverse social sectors and ethnicities. Although theorists have often speculated about the impact of cross-national information flows on nationalist and cosmopolitan orientations, systematic empirically evidence directly examining public opinion, and spanning many different types of societies and media systems, has generally been lacking.

The findings presented here suggests that exposure to the news media does indeed have a strong positive impact on strengthening trust and tolerance of outsiders, including people of different nationalities and faiths. But far from automatically eviscerating national identities, as some fear, the

impact of the news media is conditional upon the societal environment. General use of the news media is usually linked to stronger national identities, but these feelings are weakened in cosmopolitan societies, especially among news users living in these contexts. These relationships remain significant after applying multiple prior controls for education, income, age, and gender, factors that help to predict both use of the news media and social values.

At the same time, the interpretation of the empirical results must be qualified in certain important respects. Media use and demographic characteristics represent only some of the multiple reasons underlying trust in outsiders and broader nationalistic orientations. We do not endorse a monocausal theory. If feelings of xenophobia or trust in other religious communities are deeply rooted in social psychological traits, in early socialization experiences, in social networks, or in structural conditions in society, then these feelings could be explained by many other factors not included in these analytical models.⁵⁶ Hence social capital theories, explaining the related concepts of generalized trust and tolerance within society, emphasize the importance of personal bonds and networks formed from face-to-face interactions, the degree of ethnic, linguistic, or racial heterogeneity or homogeneity in any society, and the role of associations in bridging social divisions.⁵⁷ And classic accounts of the 'authoritarian personality' regard trust in others as psychological traits closely associated with feelings of powerlessness, frustration, and resentment.⁵⁸ Spatial explanations suggest that attitudes towards foreigners could be related to a society's geo-cultural location, including the proximity of countries to neighboring states sharing certain linguistic, religious, or ethnic characteristics and historical traditions. If so, the geographic location of respondents living within particular regions and national communities living in multi-cultural states, such as Belgium, Canada and the UK, could also prove important.⁵⁹ Theories based on party competition emphasize that feelings of nationalism can be exacerbated by the rhetorical appeals of political elites and party leaders (especially on the radical right), in the extent to which they emphasize the salience of immigration and asylum seekers as issues on the political agenda.⁶⁰ Within international relations, explanations often stress that public opinion reflects the international power of the state, elite cues from the domestic political leadership, and foreign relations with other countries.⁶¹ Feelings of openness to people from other countries and tolerance of outsiders with different faiths may also be affected by direct inter-personal experience with transborder social relations arising from immigration, travel and job mobility.⁶²

In short, feelings of nationalism and trust in outsiders are complex issues that cannot be reduced to explanations based on any single factor, and the role of the media in this process is only one

part of the story—but it does seem to have an impact on cosmopolitan orientations and generalized trust. It remains to be seen whether similar patterns are evident when we examine other dimensions of public opinion. Subsequent chapters will examine whether exposure to cosmopolitan communications has the capacity to expand neo-liberal support for free markets and to reduce faith in the role of the state in the economy, to alter traditional moralities, or to expand support for democratic values. If we find similar patterns to those presented in this chapter, this will increase our confidence in the reliability and robustness of the results. It is to these issues that we now turn.

Table 6.1: Dimensions of cosmopolitan orientations

	Nationalist identities	Trust outsiders
V212 Sees self as a national citizen	.802	
V211 Sees self as part of a local community	.731	
V209 Expresses national pride	.646	
V75 Willingness to fight for country	.450	
V130 Trust in people of another nationality?		.930
V146 Trust in people of another religion		.929
Total variance	30.3	28.5

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Factor Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Coefficients of .40 or less were dropped from the analysis. See Appendix A for the construction of these scales.

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

Table 6.2: Multilevel regression models explaining trust in outsiders

	A Cosmopolitan Index	B Globalization index	C Economic development	D Media Freedom	E Media Access
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL					
Demographic characteristics					
Age (years)	1.45*** (.099)	1.46*** (.099)	1.46*** (.099)	1.46*** (.099)	1.46*** (.102)
Gender (male=1)	-.099 (.090)	-.099 (.090)	-.099 (.091)	-.099 (.091)	-.099 (.091)
Socio-economic resources					
Household Income 10-pt scale	.628*** (.101)	.627*** (.101)	.628*** (.101)	.628*** (.101)	.627*** (.101)
Education 9-pt scale	2.177*** (.119)	2.180*** (.118)	2.177*** (.118)	2.180*** (.118)	2.180*** (.118)
Media use					
News media use scale	1.53 *** (.112)	1.54*** (.112)	1.53*** (.106)	1.53*** (.106)	1.54*** (.112)
NATIONAL-LEVEL					
Cosmopolitanism index (Globalization+Development+Freedom)	5.489*** (1.221)				
Globalization index		2.870* (1.382)			
Economic development			5.621*** (1.166)		
Media Freedom				6.103*** (1.213)	
Societal-level media access					3.186** (1.284)
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS					
Cosmopolitanism*media use scale	.793*** (.100)	.793*** (.101)	.790*** (.101)	.797*** (.101)	.794*** (.101)
Constant (intercept)	56.3	56.7	56.6	56.1	57.6
Schwartz BIC	493,505	493,518	493,503	493,554	493,567
N. respondents	55,108	55,073	55,112	55,113	55,113
N. nations	44	44	44	44	44


Note: All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML multilevel regression models (for details, see Appendix C). The 100-point 'trust in outsiders' scale, from the items listed in Table 6.1, is the dependent variable. The 100-point media use scale combined use of newspapers, radio/TV, the internet, books, and magazines. Models report the beta coefficient slopes (b), standard errors (in parenthesis), and their significance. P. *=.05 **=.01 ***=.001 See appendix A for details about the measurement, coding, and construction of all variables. Significant coefficients are highlighted in **bold**. **Source:** World Values Survey 2005-7.

Table 6.3: Multilevel regression models explaining nationalism

	A Cosmopolitan Index	B Globalization index	C Economic development	D Media Freedom	E Media Access
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL					
Demographic characteristics					
Age (years)	1.11*** (.060)	1.11*** (.060)	1.11*** (.060)	1.11*** (.060)	1.11*** (.060)
Gender (male=1)	.505*** (.054)	.505*** (.054)	.505*** (.054)	.505*** (.054)	.505*** (.054)
Socio-economic resources					
Household Income 10-pt scale	.189*** (.060)	.189*** (.060)	.189*** (.060)	.189*** (.060)	.189*** (.060)
Education 9-pt scale	-.289*** (.071)	-.289*** (.071)	-.289*** (.071)	-.289*** (.071)	-.289*** (.071)
Media use					
News media use scale	.382*** (.066)	.382*** (.066)	.382*** (.066)	.382*** (.066)	.382*** (.066)
NATIONAL-LEVEL					
Cosmopolitanism index (Globalization+Development+Freedom)	-2.822*** (.818)				
Globalization index		-2.986*** (.805)			
Economic development			-2.555** (.766)		
Media Freedom				-1.664 (.928)	
Societal-level media access					-2.857** (.720)
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS					
Cosmopolitanism*media use scale	-.180** (.062)	-.182** (.061)	-.182** (.061)	-.182** (.061)	-.181 (.061)
Constant (intercept)	84.8	84.7	84.7	84.7	84.7
Schwartz BIC	332,921	332,920	332,922	332,922	332,922
N. respondents	43,883	43,407	43,407	43,407	43,407
N. nations	39	39	39	39	39

Note: All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML multilevel regression models (for details, see Appendix C). The 100-point 'trust in outsiders' scale, from the items listed in Table 6.1, is the dependent variable. The 100-point media use scale combined use of newspapers, radio/TV, the internet, books, and magazines. Models report the beta coefficient slopes (b), standard errors (in parenthesis), and their significance. P. *=.05 **=.01 ***=.001 See appendix A for details about the measurement, coding, and construction of all variables. Significant coefficients are highlighted in **bold**. **Source:** World Values Survey 2005-7.


Figure 6.1: Trust outsiders scale by type of society and media use



Note: Q130 “I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups ...People of another nationality/ People of another religion. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely (coded 4), somewhat (3), not very much (2), or not at all (1)?” The responses were combined into a 100-point ‘trust outsiders’ scale. The chart shows the mean level of trust in outsiders for each type of society and category of media use, without any prior controls.

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

Figure 6.2: Trust in outsiders, nationalism, and cosmopolitan societies



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- ¹² Paul Hirst and G. Thompson. 1996. *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*. Cambridge: Polity.
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¹⁷ See Takashi Inoguchi and Ian Marsh. Eds. 2007. *Globalisation, Public Opinion and the State: Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia*. London: Routledge. For previous work by one of the authors, see Pippa Norris. 2001. 'Global Governance and Cosmopolitan Citizens.' In *Governance in a Globalizing World*. Eds. Joseph S. Nye and John Donahue. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Pp.155-177; Pippa Norris. 2008. 'Confidence in the United Nations: Cosmopolitan and nationalistic attitudes.' In *The Global System, Democracy and Values*. Ed. Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson. Uppsala: Uppsala University Press.

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<http://www.worldpublicopinion.org> See also Benjamin I. Page and Jason Barabas. 2000. 'Foreign policy gaps between citizens and leaders.' *International Studies Quarterly* 44: 339-364.

⁴³ See, for example, Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes. 2006. *America against the World*. New York: Times Books; see also <http://www.americans-world.org/index.cfm>

⁴⁴ For studies based on the ISSP module on nationalism, see, for example, Pippa Norris. 1999. 'Global communications and cultural identities.' *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*. 4(4):1-7; S. Svallfors. 1999. 'National Differences in National Identities? An Introduction to the International Social Survey Program.' In N. Tos, P. P. Mohler and B. Malnar (eds). *Modern Society and Values: A Comparative Analysis Based on ISSP Project*, pp. 3–14. Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana.

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⁵¹ It should be noted that the 2005-7 wave of the WVS modified the coding scheme (see Appendix A), providing multiple choices rather than trade-off items, so that the results are not directly comparable with previous versions of the questionnaire.

⁵² Exploratory models also included levels of urbanization and motivational attitudes, but these were removed from the final version of the analysis presented in this chapter on the grounds of parsimony, and also because of problems of missing values for some variables sharply reduced the sample size.

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⁶¹ Benjamin I. Page and Jason Barabas. 2000. 'Foreign policy gaps between citizens and leaders.' *International Studies Quarterly* 44: 339-364.

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