

## Chapter 7

### Economic values

A central feature of globalization has been the integration of world markets, binding together the fortunes of Wall Street, the City of London and the Deutsche Börse; linking call centers in Bangalore with customers in Toronto; and shipping Asian-made goods to American shelves. Indeed contemporary commentators such as Martin Wolf regard the economics of globalization as the driving force for almost all other aspect of globalization.<sup>1</sup> Improvements in transport and communications have opened new opportunities for commerce; the railway, steamship, and transatlantic telegraph bound economies together in the nineteenth century, just as container ship, satellite, and internet led to faster trade in the twentieth. Debate continues about how to interpret economic globalization, including whether what is happening is growing segmentation into major regional trading blocs (principally the EU, APEC and NAFTA), rather than growing integration of the entire world. It is also questioned whether contemporary patterns of economic integration are unprecedented, or whether earlier historical eras had cycles of internationalization that went further than the current period.<sup>2</sup> We have examined rising levels of economic globalization during recent decades: trends in the KOF index illustrated in figure 4.3 suggest relatively slow growth in economic integration during the 1970s and 1980, followed by an accelerated spurt since the early 1990s. Chapter 4 also showed the persistent globalization gap between rich and poor nations, with the major OECD economies bound together most strongly through intensified flows of capital and trade across national borders, a process also affecting the leading emerging market economies in Europe, Latin America and East Asia. Yet many of the poorest economies, containing the bottom billion of the world's population, remain largely excluded from global markets of trade and capital flows, while experiencing the loss of their most-skilled workforce through migration.<sup>3</sup> Collier and Stiglitz emphasize that many of the world's least developed countries have failed to benefit substantially from trade liberalization and export-led growth.<sup>4</sup> The breakdown of the Doha negotiations over agricultural subsidies in July 2008 also illustrates the limits of further economic integration, constituting an important reversal.

How has economic globalization, and the globalization of mass communications, transformed economic values? This chapter outlines the theoretical debate over this issue, including claims that globalization has encouraged the triumph of the Washington consensus emphasizing free market economics, and the counter-argument that a backlash has occurred against neo-liberal ideas, led by oil-rich states such as Russia and Venezuela. Most of the political economy literature on this topic has

adopted an instrumental approach. Studies have examined the extent to which rational calculations of self-interest have influenced policy attitudes towards trade and economic integration, without considering the role of mass communication. If the cultural convergence thesis is correct, then exposure to globalized mass communications should gradually expand support for the neo-liberal free market values at the heart of capitalism: We should find trends toward increasing emphasis on achieving individual success and getting rich, and changing mass attitudes towards the role of the state, wealth-creation, and economic incentives. This process should also gradually erode support for the collective values crucial to socialism, such as those of solidarity and community, social protection, and economic equality. On the other hand, if the polarization argument is right, then greater news media exposure in developing societies should be expected to generate a backlash against the neo-liberal economic ideas central to the Washington consensus, leading towards a rejection of capitalist values.

As in the previous chapter, to test these questions using the World Values Survey data, we first select a wide range of indicators of economic values, understood as a multidimensional phenomena, and use factor analysis to identify and construct standardized scales. Focusing on any single attitudinal item can produce idiosyncratic results, reflecting contextual factors such as the debate about NAFTA in Mexico, specific trade agreements in Ireland, or controversies about Muslim migrant workers in Denmark. Scales based on a broader range of items enable one to generate more reliable and consistent measures for comparison. The images and messages of neo-liberalism are expected to penetrate societies most widely and deeply in cosmopolitan societies, with minimal barriers to foreign cultural imports and freedom of the press, and widespread access to mass communications. Countries that meet these conditions, such as South Africa, Chile, Taiwan, and Latvia, would be expected to be more strongly influenced by transborder information flows than provincial societies, such as Ethiopia and Malawi. We analyze whether economic values are related directly to the individual use of the mass media controlling for many other social characteristics, including age, education, and income, that we know to be important in predicting news media use. These multilevel regression models clarify whether there is an especially strong impact arising from use of the media in the most open societies, where information from abroad is most widely available.

### **The debate over economic globalization**

The convergence thesis holds that the expansion of multinational corporations into world markets, with their iconic brand images, mass advertizing, and high status products, has also encouraged the spread of American or Western economic values. The cultural imperialism thesis

proposed by Herbert Schiller during the early 1970s claimed that capitalist values conveyed in American news, advertising, and entertainment have spread to developing societies, a process designed to reinforce the market share of corporate capitalism.<sup>5</sup> For Schiller, the 'tidal flow' of American TV programs, films, music and other cultural products are the predominant transnational images and messages, with the capacity to shape the values and behavior of audiences everywhere, potentially "turning the world into one vast shopping mall" and opening new markets for American business.<sup>6</sup> Schiller's work was originally developed at the height of the decolonization era, when many newly-independent developing countries, with left-wing governments, were highly critical of the legacy of colonialism. So much has changed since then that it might be thought that this perspective has lost credibility, and now represents something of a straw-man. Nevertheless, during the early-1990s Schiller argued that his interpretation was more relevant than ever, as the capacity of the United States to reach previously closed markets expanded following the collapse of the Soviet Union as a rival super-power, the removal of trade barriers, and the deregulation of state and public service broadcasting in many parts of the world.<sup>7</sup>

Other theorists have also echoed similar themes. One of the strongest contemporary arguments is developed by Hermann and McChesney who suggest that the problem with the growth of transnational media corporations is not that their products reflect U.S. culture per se, since they often diversify goods and services to meet the needs in local markets, but rather that they reflect the commercial interests of investors, advertisers, and affluent elites.<sup>8</sup> As a result, he argues, the values of consumerism and individualism have pervaded popular culture, television news and entertainment, recorded music, and publishing, as well as the more explicit advertising messages. Corporations marketing Levis, Marlboro, and Nike encourage popular consumerism from Beirut to Mumbai; along with the brand name products, they are also thought to sell dreams of personal success, affluence, and material gratification. Andersen also argues that consumer culture is not simply confined to mass advertising; it is an integral part of Western entertainment and information.<sup>9</sup> Business and financial news, in particular, is far from neutral; the streaming banners and headlines of CNN International, MSNBC and Sky News can be seen as cheer-leaders for Wall Street.<sup>10</sup> Commentators such as Joseph Nye celebrate the soft power and cultural predominance of the United States, as a way to spread the Washington consensus about the virtues of free market competition, privatization, and deregulation, without resorting to American military force.<sup>11</sup> Many others, referring to the 'Coca-colonization', 'McDisneyization', or 'McDonalization' of the world, fear that the cultural consequences of the global market economy led by American or Western-based multinational corporations.<sup>12</sup>

An alternative interpretation of contemporary developments is set forth by the theory of polarization, emphasizing the limits of the Washington consensus and a strong backlash occurring against economic globalization. Perhaps the best known argument has been developed by the economist, Joseph Stiglitz, who suggests that public discontent has been encouraged by persistent or growing inequalities between rich and poor societies, the loss of blue-collar jobs abroad, European worries about cuts in social protection programs and the shrinking welfare state, and concern about the hegemonic power of American-based corporations.<sup>13</sup> The global rise in oil and gas prices, expanding the economic fortunes and political power of autocratic regimes in Venezuela, Russia, Uzbekistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, has also encouraged a push-back against Washington's economic and political agenda, as has the rapidly growing economic power of China and India.<sup>14</sup> Under Chavez, Venezuela is in the process of renationalizing industries, while under Putin's leadership, Russia shows a resurgent willingness to use military force in neighboring countries. The breakdown of the Doha trade negotiations in July 2008 over agricultural protectionism, after seven years of talks, also indicates the growing chasm concerning trade between the major developing countries, represented by the G20, and the European Union/the United States. Backlash is not limited to political elites, as is evident from the mass anti-globalization demonstrations linked with meetings of the WTO, IMF, and related global agencies, and the active resistance of environmental and labor movements against the forces of economic integration and free trade.<sup>15</sup> Global warming and health food scares have also encouraged public awareness of the importance of local sustainability in food production and a public reaction against the ethos of conspicuous material consumption. The 2008 banking crisis, which rapidly spread from American sub-prime mortgages to destabilize credit throughout the financial world, also underlined the dangers of growing economic interdependence. Of course, rather than a simple either/or interpretation, complex developments could be interacting simultaneously in different parts of the world, providing support for both the convergence and polarization interpretations; as we saw in comparing patterns of economic globalization in Figure 4.5, Estonia, Poland, and Malaysia have followed export-led strategies to growth and become more open to global markets, while others such as North Korea and Burma maintain rigid protectionist economic policies and isolationist foreign policies.

Beyond speculation about historical and contemporary political developments, what systematic empirical evidence about public opinion is available to evaluate mass attitudes towards economic globalization? Understanding these issues is particularly important for monitoring the dynamics of public opinion and support for protectionist policies and market reforms in new democracies, particularly the former communist states and the Latin American economies that have followed the

policies of the Washington consensus most aggressively, through deregulating and privatizing the public sector, liberalizing trade, and shrinking the role of the state. A growing body of research has started to explore the factors associated with public support for free trade and economic integration.<sup>16</sup> The most extensive literature in political economy has adopted a rational actor model and examined the instrumental factors leading to policy attitudes most directly related to economic globalization.<sup>17</sup> Political economists have argued that professional workers with high skills are more likely to benefit from free trade, whereas low skill blue-collar workers face greater risks from imported goods. As a result, skill levels (measured by educational attainment) are expected to predict individual trade preferences.<sup>18</sup> Based on a similar logic of rational self-interest, others theorize that those employed in export-led sectors are more likely to favor free trade policies.<sup>19</sup> Those who are risk-averse are also expected to be more likely to prefer protectionist trade policies, although fears of these risks may be mitigated in strong welfare states.<sup>20</sup> Empirical studies have examined attitudes towards free trade and NAFTA in the United States, where direct experience with economic globalization has been found to encourage support for neo-liberal attitudes towards free trade, open labor markets and economic integration, especially in sectors that have most clearly benefitted from export-led growth and capital flows.<sup>21</sup> Comparative studies have examined public reactions to economic reform in selected Eastern European and East Asian countries.<sup>22</sup> Using longitudinal data, others have analyzed the dynamics of trends in approval of the single-market, European Monetary Union, and labor mobility within the European Union, reporting trendless fluctuations in public opinion, and marked contrasts among member states, rather than steadily growing public support for economic integration.<sup>23</sup>

Public opinion evidence also provides some support for the polarization argument that a backlash against the neo-liberal Washington consensus has occurred in many parts of the world. For example, a comparative survey conducted in 2007 in eighteen developed and developing countries by GlobeScan, on behalf of World Public Opinion, found that majorities in most countries continue to support the free market system, but in recent years support eroded in ten countries, and in several cases this drop was quite sharp.<sup>24</sup> Moreover a BBC World Service Poll of 34 countries around the world, conducted by GlobeScan in November 2007, found widespread public concern that the pace of economic globalization, including trade and investment, was growing too fast.<sup>25</sup> Interestingly, the strongest agreement with this sentiment was expressed in some of the most affluent post-industrial societies, such as Australia (73%), Spain (68%) and France (64%) By contrast, there was far less agreement with this view among people living in middle-income countries such as Russia (23%), the Philippines (24%), Turkey (15%) and Mexico (23%). Australian survey evidence suggests that the public

endorses the way that economic globalization expands opportunities to consume products and to have access to goods from around the world.<sup>26</sup> But the study also found that the Australian public shows widespread concern about the possible loss of jobs that could arise from open labor markets. Surveys among countries in the southern cone of Africa have also found complex attitudes towards different types of economic reform, rather than simple pro or anti-reactions.<sup>27</sup> Overall, therefore, the growing body of empirical evidence for the trends in public opinion towards economic globalization, and the drivers of support, provides a complex picture of developments, depending upon the particular survey, the issues examined, and the comparative framework analyzed by different studies, but it tends to suggest a skeptical interpretation, rather than ever-rising levels of public support for economic integration.

### **Evidence for economic values**

Previous political economy and public opinion research has not examined the role of cosmopolitan communication in shaping economic attitudes. Arguably, however, our perceptions of the possible benefits and threats to self-interest arising from economic globalization are largely derived from the news media, rather than from first-hand experience. Some Americans, for example, have directly experienced unemployment as a result of jobs moving to low-income countries, or the loss of their homes through mortgage foreclosure, but millions more have read news stories about rust-belt factory closures, recalls of dangerous imported Chinese toys, the credit crunch, or reports about salmonella scares from Mexican-grown produce, all of which may help shape American perceptions about the risks and benefits of more open economic borders.

Moreover previous studies have focused primarily on analyzing policy *attitudes*, for example towards free trade, open labor markets, economic integration, and economic globalization, in developed and developing nations. Public opinion polls commissioned by the media or policymakers are typically concerned with mass orientations towards specific policies or recent events, such as whether Europeans approve of the Maastricht agreement, and whether Americans favor the outcome of the Doha trade negotiations. But this approach has limited utility for understanding the more subtle ways that global communications may shape broader and more enduring economic *values*, for example through emphasizing the desirability of consumerism, individualism, and competition. Unlike policy attitudes, economic values transcend specific actions and particular situations; for example the values of competition, cooperation, hard work, or individual success can be applied to work or school, business or politics.<sup>28</sup> Values reflect desirable goals – for the individual, household, society and indeed the world.

People have a variety of goals and their relative importance determines value priorities. As such, values are understood to tap into relatively durable aspects of social psychology that orientate us towards specific attitudes and cognitive beliefs.<sup>29</sup> Americans who place a high value on both competition and consumption, for example, are expected to approve of free trade agreements such as NAFTA, believing that such policies will benefit economic growth. On the other hand, Americans who give greater importance to the values of nationalism and patriotism, and who regard NAFTA as threatening American-owned businesses and U.S. jobs, would be expected to oppose this policy. Hence Rankin argues that nationalist values often provide important cues about highly technical issues such as trade preferences, where the public lacks detailed information, so that people with strong patriotism are consistently found to prefer trade protectionism.<sup>30</sup>

The more diffuse nature of values also facilitates wide-ranging comparisons across diverse countries and cultures; it makes little sense to ask about people around the world whether they support the Doha round of trade agreements, the bailout of banks, or even the role and activities of the World Trade Organization, NAFTA, or the European Commission, when people have little or no detailed knowledge or awareness of these topics. 'Manufactured', 'top of the head' 'non-attitudes' can always be offered by survey respondents and recorded by polls, but such responses are unlikely to prove stable, deep-rooted, well-structured, or reliable indicators of public opinion.<sup>31</sup> Converse first noted that people often try to give some response to survey questions, when asked to do so, despite having no prior attitudes towards the issue.<sup>32</sup> And Zaller points out that people often try to generate opinions from the cues provided by the questions asked during the interview, especially when they lack information or prior experience concerning the issue. These responses are meaningful, but they should not be regarded as recording attitudes that existed prior to the start of the survey.<sup>33</sup> For example, if the survey question asks about whether Britain should adopt the euro, without detailed knowledge of the consequences for fiscal and monetary policy, people may offer a response based on their broader feelings about British national identities and the European Union, or based on partisan cues furnished by party elites. Relatively technical and abstract foreign and economic policy issues, about which the public has little cognitive knowledge or direct experience, are particularly vulnerable to these processes.

In these circumstances, a more effective strategy for tapping public opinion towards economic globalization is to monitor values rather than attitudes. For example, it makes sense to ask people in Nigeria, Peru and Sweden whether they emphasize individual success and economic competition, the key ideas of capitalism, or whether they prefer the values of solidarity, community, and economic

equality. Unlike attitudes, values are applicable to multiple social contexts and life experiences. If mass communications instill an ideology of economic globalization, then support for values such as individualism, the pursuit of material affluence, and economic freedom should be stronger among media users than among non-users within each society. Studies suggest that the news media often reflects the ethos of consumer capitalism; for example, a longitudinal discourse analysis of the language used in the Norwegian news media since the mid-1980s demonstrated that globalised capitalist market ideology has increasingly permeated this long-established Scandinavian welfare state, with language increasingly reflecting individualism at the cost of communal values.<sup>34</sup> If this language gradually diffuses widely to many societies, exposure to the news media should help to spread these ideas and messages at the expense of traditional egalitarian values, such as feelings of solidarity and community, and support for the welfare state.

To start examining the WVS survey evidence, let us first ask whether economic values fall on a single dimension arrayed on the conventional left-right spectrum, -- ranging from those favoring the neo-liberal principles supporting free markets with a minimal role of the state, to others who prefer a more active role for government in the economy -- or whether public opinion is more complex and multidimensional. To assess this issue, factor analysis was used to examine the correlations among a battery of items included in 5<sup>th</sup> wave of the World Values Survey. Six items monitoring economic attitudes were each designed as 10-point scales, where respondents could place themselves anywhere across the left-right spectrum using a series of oppositional statements as pole anchor points.

*“Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. (Code one number for each issue):*

- *Incomes should be made more equal or we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort.*
- *Private ownership of business and industry should be increased or government ownership of business and industry should be increased.*

- *The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for or people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves.*
- *Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas or competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.*
- *In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life, or hard work doesn't generally bring success – it is more a matter of luck and connections.*
- *People can only get rich at the expense of others, or wealth can grow so there's enough for everyone."*

These were recoded so that a higher score consistently reflects relatively conservative pro-free-market orientations. To supplement this approach, one of the most common ways that left-right ideological responses are monitored is by asking where people place themselves as on a Left-Right scale. Accordingly the following scale was monitored from the WVS:

- *V114 "In political matters, people talk of the left and the right. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (Left) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Right)"*

In addition, five of the value orientation scales developed by Shalom Schwartz were also included in the survey, as listed in Table 7.1. These are designed to monitor the desirable goals that motivate people to action, serving as guiding principles in people's lives.<sup>35</sup> The questions briefly describe the characteristics of certain people and ask respondents to identify the extent to which they resemble each person, using 6-point scales ranging from 'Not at all like me' to 'Very much like me'. These items describe characteristics closely associated with the economic goals and motivations of consumer capitalism, for example, concerning the value of material acquisition (getting rich, having a lot of money and expensive things), individualism (being very successful and having one's achievements recognized), and entrepreneurship (willingness to take risks and to have an exciting life).

[Table 7.1 about here]

The results of the rotated factor analysis presented in Table 7.1 shows that these items fell into two clusters or dimensions. These are interpreted as representing the overall values of individual

success (reflecting the Schwartz value scales) and of conservative economic values. The Schwartz items fell into the expected dimensions, so that those who preferred individual success emphasized excitement and risk, material affluence and individual success, creativity and hedonism. A second value scale tapped attitudes towards the role of government protection versus personal responsibility, income and wealth inequality, economic opportunities, and the 10-point left-right ideological self-placement. Responses to these two separate dimensions were summed and converted into standardized 100-point scales, where higher scores reflect more conservative economic orientations on both dimensions. As with previous analysis, we will examine the direct association between these values and use of the news media in the pooled sample, including all societies using multilevel regression models with the controls identified earlier. If the convergence thesis is correct, then we would expect that individual success and conservative economic values should be positively and significantly associated with exposure to the news media. Moreover, especially strong and consistent relationships would be expected to be evident among news users living in cosmopolitan societies, who are most exposed to globalized mass communications. By contrast, if the polarization thesis is correct, then we would expect that the direction of these relationships would be reversed, so that people who are most exposed to the news media would reject the economic values conveyed by mass communications.

[Figure 7.1 and 7.2 about here]

For an initial overview of the data, Figure 7.1 illustrates support for individual success values, by category of media user and type of society (cosmopolitan or parochial). The graph shows clear and consistent contrasts; the heaviest users of the news media are the most individualistic in their values, giving higher priority to such goals as being rich and having an exciting life. This suggests that those who are most attentive to the news media are indeed more individualistic in their social values. But it is the parochial societies that are most individualistic, not the cosmopolitan societies. This pattern is consistent with previous research which has found that the people of developing societies tend to be more materialistic in their values; their emphasis on individual success, financial affluence, and the pursuit of self-gratification are part of this broader ethos. By contrast post-industrial societies, that have achieved a minimal standard of economic security, have been found to have an increasingly post-materialistic culture, placing growing emphasis on self-actualization and aesthetic values. To check how robust these results are, we compare support for conservative economic attitudes, constructed from the items listed in Table 7.1 concerning the need for self-reliance, belief in the non-zero-sum view of wealth, approval of income differences, and the left-right ideology scale. Support for these attitudes, illustrated

in Figure 7.2, shows a very similar pattern to that found with economic values. Again, conservative economic attitudes are far stronger in parochial than in cosmopolitan societies—and again, within each type of society, support is strongest among those most attentive to the news media.

[Figure 7.3 about here]

To examine the societal level comparisons in more detail, Figure 7.3 shows the patterns by country and level of cosmopolitanism. The results confirm the negative relationship already observed: the poorest and most isolated countries such as Mali and Ghana, with endemic poverty and hardship, place the heaviest emphasis on the material values of individual economic success. By contrast, the people of more affluent and cosmopolitan societies, such as Sweden, Japan and the United States place far less emphasis on these values.

[Table 7.2 about here]

Nevertheless, these initial findings could be spurious, for example if the social characteristics of those who favor material success values, such as income and education, also predict access to the news media. We have already noted the substantial socioeconomic and cognitive bias in who typically has regular access to the news, with an especially strong bias towards the affluent and well-educated groups in developing societies. Accordingly, multilevel analysis is essential; utilizing the social and attitudinal controls that chapter 5 established helped to predict access to the news media. These include individual-level demographic characteristics and socio-economic resources, as well as the contextual variable of the cosmopolitan society index, and the interaction effect between the type of society and media use. As before, alternative models were run with the range of contextual variables, to test these separate effects. Table 7.2 presents the multilevel models where individual success values are the dependent variable. The individual-level results of Model A show that, as predicted, a statistically significant and positive association exists between regular use of the news media and success values. In general, news media users are likelier than non-users to favor the values of individual success. This pattern suggests that use of the news media does encourage the development of individualistic values associated with a capitalist consumer culture. . Moreover, a comparison of the standardized coefficients, summarizing the strength of the relationships, shows that, after age, the news media are the second most important individual-level factor associated with the values of individual economic success, having a stronger impact than education, income or gender. The age gap was also particularly marked, with the young placing far less emphasis on the values of individual success. Nevertheless the national level analysis

confirms the initial descriptive findings: individualistic values are significantly weaker in cosmopolitan societies, not stronger. And the cross-level interaction between the type of society and use of the media proved significantly negative. This suggests that use of the news media is generally associated with individualism, but this relationship is reversed with use of the news media in the more cosmopolitan societies. The alternative models B through E replicate the findings with the separate national-level indicators, including the globalization index, economic development, and societal-level media access, (with the exception of media freedom, with a coefficient that just fails [ $P=.06$ ] to reach a conventional level of significance).

[Table 7.3 about here]

To check whether these results are the product of the specific items included in the individual success values scale, or whether they are robust, the same analyses were replicated using the conservative economic attitudes scale as the dependent variable. This measure incorporates attitudes towards the role of government protection versus personal responsibility, income and wealth inequality, economic opportunities, and the 10-point left-right ideological self-placement. The results in Table 7.3 provide strikingly similar results concerning the national-level and cross-level interactive effects. Overall in Model A, in general individual-level media use again emerges as a strong factor associated with conservative attitudes, but these effects are reversed in more cosmopolitan societies. The replication generates confidence that the findings are not simply due to specific items contained in either scale, or to the construction of the cosmopolitanism index, but are robust against successive tests. Though many commentators, such as Herman and McChesney, have speculated that the globalization of mass communications encourages the spread of capitalist consumer culture, in fact the picture that emerges is more complex. In general, users of the news media are more supportive of individualistic values and conservative economic attitudes; nevertheless as illustrated in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 support is far stronger in parochial than in cosmopolitan societies.

### **Conclusions and discussion**

Has the experience of the denser exchange of goods, services, capital and labor flowing across national borders shaped public opinion directly, and has the globalization of mass communications also played a major role in either encouraging support for the values of consumer capitalism or a popular backlash against these ideas? The previous literature concerning these issues has focused mainly on examining trends in public opinion towards economic integration, and also the impact of instrumental

factors on policy attitudes within particular societies. By contrast, the analysis presented in this chapter examined the impact of news media exposure on a broader range of economic values and attitudes, within various types of societies. The initial descriptive statistics suggested that the type of society and the use of the news media were associated with individualistic values and conservative attitudes. When analyzed with the multilevel models, including a battery of controls, the results suggest that the impact of the news media is conditioned by the type of society. News users are more individualistic than average in the more parochial societies, and in poorer countries, and countries with less free media systems. News users are *less* individualistic than average in the more cosmopolitan societies, and in post-industrial economies. By focusing on the news media we have not directly examined evidence concerning the impact of popular culture, such as movies, music and entertainment, and these could conceivably generate stronger effects than attention to the news media, an issue that is examined later in Chapter 10. But the extensive range of data that we have analyzed concerning news users in multiple countries and contexts provides good reason to be highly skeptical of the argument that the globalization of mass communications is converting people to capitalist values, at least in the economic sphere. We will next examine social mores, including traditional standards of sexuality, morality and religiosity, to understand the impact of the media in this realm.

**Table 7.1: Factor analysis of economic values and attitudes**

	<b>Individual success values</b>	<b>Conservative economic attitudes</b>
V85 Importance of being very successful; to have people recognize personal achievements	.718	
V86 Importance of adventure and taking risks; to have an exciting life	.698	
V81 importance of being rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things	.697	
V83 Importance of having a good time; to spoil oneself	.577	
V80 Importance of thinking up new ideas and being creative; to do things one's own way	.603	
V118 People should take responsibility to provide for themselves		.679
V121 Wealth can grow so there's enough for everyone		.500
V116 We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort		.648
V114 Left-right ideological self-placement scale		.523
Proportion of variance	24.5	15.7

Note: The coefficients are the result of Principle Component Factor Analysis with Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization, with pair-wise substitution for missing values. Coefficients below .450 are excluded.

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

**Table 7.2: Multilevel regression models explaining individual success values**

	A Cosmopolitan Index	B Globalization index	C Economic development	D Media Freedom	E Media Access
<b>INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL</b>					
<b>Demographic characteristics</b>					
Age (years)	<b>-3.336***</b> (.066)	<b>-3.336***</b> (.066)	<b>-3.336***</b> (.066)	<b>-3.336***</b> (.066)	<b>-3.336***</b> (.066)
Gender (male=1)	<b>1.489***</b> (.060)	<b>1.489***</b> (.060)	<b>1.489***</b> (.060)	<b>1.489***</b> (.060)	<b>1.489***</b> (.060)
<b>Socio-economic resources</b>					
Household Income 10-pt scale	<b>1.021***</b> (.067)	<b>1.021***</b> (.067)	<b>1.021***</b> (.067)	<b>1.021***</b> (.067)	<b>1.021***</b> (.067)
Education 9-pt scale	.105 (.079)	.105 (.079)	.105 (.079)	.105 (.079)	.105 (.079)
<b>Media use</b>					
News media use scale	<b>1.904***</b> (.074)	<b>1.904***</b> (.074)	<b>1.904***</b> (.074)	<b>1.902***</b> (.074)	<b>1.906***</b> (.074)
<b>NATIONAL-LEVEL</b>					
Cosmopolitanism index (Globalization+Development+Freedom)	<b>-2.987***</b> (.813)				
Globalization index		<b>-2.653**</b> (.833)			
Economic development			<b>-3.137***</b> (.728)		
Media Freedom				-1.787 (.927)	
Societal-level media access					<b>-3.279***</b> (.709)
<b>CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS</b>					
Cosmopolitanism*media use scale	<b>-.203**</b> (.066)	<b>-.204**</b> (.066)	<b>-.203**</b> (.066)	<b>-.205**</b> (.066)	<b>-.203**</b> (.066)
Constant (intercept)	59.6	59.4	59.5	59.3	58.6
Schwartz BIC	441,747	441,749	441,743	441,755	441,741
N. respondents	54,402	54,402	54,402	54,402	54,402
N. nations	43	43	43	43	43


**Note:** All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML multilevel regression models (for details, see Appendix C). The 100-point 'trust in outsiders' scale, from the items listed in Table 7.1, is the dependent variable. The 100-point media use scale combined use of newspapers, radio/TV, the internet, books, and magazines. Models report the beta coefficient slopes (b), standard errors (in parenthesis), and their significance. P. \*=.05 \*\*=.01 \*\*\*=.001 See appendix A for details about the measurement, coding, and construction of all variables. Significant coefficients are highlighted in **bold**. **Source:** World Values Survey 2005-7.

**Table 7.3: Multilevel regression models explaining support for right-wing economic attitudes**

	A Cosmopolitan Index	B Globalization index	C Economic develop	D Media Freedom	E Media Access
<b>INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL</b>					
<b>Demographic characteristics</b>					
Age (years)	<b>.797***</b> (.080)	<b>.797***</b> (.080)	<b>.797***</b> (.080)	<b>.797***</b> (.080)	<b>.797***</b> (.080)
Gender (male=1)	<b>.237***</b> (.001)	<b>.237***</b> (.001)	<b>.237***</b> (.001)	<b>.237***</b> (.001)	<b>.237***</b> (.001)
<b>Socio-economic resources</b>					
Household Income 10-pt scale	<b>1.885***</b> (.079)	<b>1.885***</b> (.079)	<b>1.885***</b> (.079)	<b>1.885***</b> (.079)	<b>1.885***</b> (.079)
Education 9-pt scale	<b>.324***</b> (.096)	<b>.324***</b> (.096)	<b>.324***</b> (.096)	<b>.324***</b> (.096)	<b>.324***</b> (.096)
<b>Media use</b>					
News media use scale	<b>.596***</b> (.089)	<b>.596***</b> (.089)	<b>.596***</b> (.089)	<b>.596***</b> (.089)	<b>.596***</b> (.089)
<b>NATIONAL-LEVEL</b>					
Cosmopolitanism index (Globalization+Development+Freedom)	<b>-2.113**</b> (.660)				
Globalization index		<b>-2.217***</b> (.632)			
Economic development			<b>-1.311*</b> (.659)		
Media Freedom				<b>-2.284**</b> (.750)	
Societal-level media access					-.937 (.678)
<b>CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS</b>					
Cosmopolitanism*media use scale	<b>-.259***</b> (.077)	<b>-.260***</b> (.077)	<b>-.261***</b> (.077)	<b>-.262***</b> (.077)	<b>-.263***</b> (.077)
Constant (intercept)	57.7	57.5	57.5	57.9	57.2
Schwartz BIC	342,190		342,195		
N. respondents	41,586	41,586	41,586	41,586	41,586
N. nations	42	42	42	42	42

**Note:** All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML multilevel regression models (for details, see Appendix C). The 100-point 'trust in outsiders' scale, from the items listed in Table 7.1, is the dependent variable. The 100-point media use scale combined use of newspapers, radio/TV, the internet, books, and magazines. Models report the beta coefficient slopes (b), standard errors (in parenthesis), and their significance. P. \*=.05 \*\*=.01 \*\*\*=.001 See appendix A for details about the measurement, coding, and construction of all variables. Significant coefficients are highlighted in **bold**. **Source:** World Values Survey 2005-7.


Figure 7.1: Individual success values by type of society and media use



**Note:** The items included in the 100-point individual success value scale are listed in Table 7.1.

**Source:** The World Values Survey 2005-7


Figure 7.2: Conservative economic attitudes by type of society and media use



**Note:** The items included in the 100-point conservative economic attitudes scale are listed in Table 7.1.

**Source:** The World Values Survey 2005-7

Figure 7.3: Individualistic values by type of society



**Note:** The items included in the 100-point individual success value scale are listed in Table 7.1.

**Source:** The World Values Survey 2005-7

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<sup>1</sup> Martin Wolf. 2005. *Why Globalization Works*. Princeton, NJ: Yale University Press.

<sup>2</sup> See David Held and Anthony McGrew. 2007. *Globalization/Anti-globalization: Beyond the Great Divide*. Cambridge: Polity. Chapter 5; M. Lang. 2006. 'Globalization and its history.' *Journal of Modern History* 78(4): 899-931.

<sup>3</sup> Paul Collier 2007. *The Bottom Billion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 6; Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2003. *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton; Dani Rodrik. 2007. *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>4</sup> Paul Collier 2007. *The Bottom Billion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 6; Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2003. *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton; Roumeen Islam and Gianni Zanini. 2008. *World Trade Indicators 2008: Benchmarking Policy and Performance*. Washington DC: The World Bank.

<sup>5</sup> Herbert J. Schiller. 1971. *Mass communication and American empire*. Boston: Beacon; Herbert J. Schiller. 1992. *Mass communication and American empire*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition Boulder: Westview Press; Herbert J. Schiller. 1973. *Communication and Cultural Domination*. White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press. For a critical account, see John Tomlinson. 1991. *Cultural imperialism*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

<sup>6</sup> Herbert J. Schiller. 1992. *Mass communication and American empire*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition Boulder: Westview Press . P36.

<sup>7</sup> Herbert J. Schiller. 1992. *Mass communication and American empire*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition Boulder: Westview Press .

<sup>8</sup> Robert W. McChesney. 1999. *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Chapter 2. See also Edward S. Herman and Robert W. McChesney. 1998. *The Global Media: The Missionaries of Global Capitalism*. Cassell; Edward S. Herman. 1999. *Triumph of the Market: Essays on Economics, Politics, and the Media*. South End Press.

<sup>9</sup> Robin Andersen. 1995. *Consumer Culture*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

<sup>10</sup> Ingrid Volkmer. 1999. *News in the global sphere: a study of CNN and its impact on global communication*. Luton : University of Luton Press.

<sup>11</sup> Joseph Nye. 2005. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

<sup>12</sup> D. Howes. Ed. 1996. *Cross-cultural Consumption: Global markets, local realities*. London: Routledge; George Ritzer. 1993. *The McDonaldisation of Society*. Newbury Park, CA: Pine Forge Press; George Ritzer.

1996. 'Cultures and consumers: The McDonalization thesis- Is expansion inevitable?' *International Sociology* 11: 291-308; George Ritzer and A. Liska. 1997. 'McDisneyization'. In *Touring Cultures: Transformation of travel and theory*. Eds. C.Rojek and John Urry. London: Routledge; Benjamin Barber. 1996. *Jihad vs McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World*. New York: Ballantine Books.

<sup>13</sup> Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2003. *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton.

<sup>14</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Barry K. Gills. 2002. *Globalization and the Politics of Resistance*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>16</sup> K.C. Kaltenthaler, R.D. Gelleny and S.J. Ceccoli. 2004. 'Explaining citizen support for trade liberalization.' *International Studies Quarterly* 48(4): 829-851; Martin S. Edwards, 2006. 2006. 'Public opinion regarding economic and cultural globalization: evidence from a cross-national survey.' *Review of International Political Economy* 13 (4):587-608.

<sup>17</sup> K.C. Kaltenthaler, R.D. Gelleny and S.J. Ceccoli. 2004. 'Explaining citizen support for trade liberalization.' *International Studies Quarterly* 48(4): 829-851; Martin S. Edwards, 2006. 2006. 'Public opinion regarding economic and cultural globalization: evidence from a cross-national survey.' *Review of International Political Economy* 13 (4):587-608.

<sup>18</sup> Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. *Globalization and the Perceptions of American Workers*. Washington: Institute for International Economics

<sup>19</sup> Anna Maria Mayda and Dani Rodrik. 2005. 'Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?' *European Economic Review*. 49: 1393-430

<sup>20</sup> Anna Maria Mayda, Kevin H. O'Rourke, and Richard Sinnott. 2007. 'Risk, Government and Globalization: International Survey Evidence.' NBER Working Paper No. 13037.

<http://www.nber.org/papers/w13037>

<sup>21</sup> B.O. Fordham. 2008. 'Economic interests and public support for American global activism.' *International Organization* 62: 163-182.

<sup>22</sup> Jan Duckett and William L. Miller. 2007. *The Open Economy and its Enemies Public Attitudes in East Asia and Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, respectively, Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. *Globalization and the Perceptions of American Workers*. Washington: Institute for International Economics; Anna Maria Mayda and Dani Rodrik. 2005. 'Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?' *European Economic Review*. 49: 1393-430; Susan Stokes. 2001. *Public support for market reforms in new*

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<sup>24</sup> World Public Opinion. April 15 2008. *Erosion of Support for Free Market System: Global Poll*.  
<http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/btglobalizationtradera/471.php?lb=btgl&pnt=471&nid=&id=>

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[http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb08/BBCEcon\\_Feb08\\_rpt.pdf](http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb08/BBCEcon_Feb08_rpt.pdf)

<sup>26</sup> Ian Woodward, Zlato Skrbis and Clive Bean. 2008. 'Attitudes towards globalization and cosmopolitanism: cultural diversity, personal consumption and the national economy.' *British Journal of Sociology* 59(2): 207-226.

<sup>27</sup> Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes. 2003. 'Support for economic reform? Popular attitudes in Southern Africa.' *World Development* 31(2): 303-323.

<sup>28</sup> Ronald Inglehart. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Shalom Schwartz. 2007. 'Value orientations: measurement, antecedents and consequences across nations.' In *Measuring Attitudes Cross-nationally: lessons from the European Social Survey* eds. Roger Jowell, Caroline Roberts, Rory Fitzgerald and Gillian Eva. London: Sage.

<sup>29</sup>

<sup>30</sup> David M. Rankin. 2001. 'Identities, interests and imports.' *Political Behavior* 23:351-76; see also Kevin H. O'Rourke and Richard Sinnott. 2001.

<sup>31</sup> Richard Sinnott. 2000. 'Knowledge and the position of attitudes to a European foreign policy on the real-to-random continuum.' *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 12(2): 113-137.

<sup>32</sup> Philip Converse. 1970. 'Attitudes and non-attitudes.' E.R. Tufté (ed). *Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*. New York: Addison-Wesley.

<sup>33</sup> John Zaller. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Public Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>34</sup> H.E. Nafstad, R.M. Blakar and E. Carlquist, et al. 2007. 'Ideology and power: The influence of current neo-liberalism in society.' *Journal Of Community & Applied Social Psychology* 17(4): 313-327.

<sup>35</sup> Shalom Schwartz. 2007. 'Value orientations: measurement, antecedents and consequences across nations.' In *Measuring Attitudes Cross-nationally: lessons from the European Social Survey* eds. Roger

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Jowell, Caroline Roberts, Rory Fitzgerald and Gillian Eva. London: Sage. The question asks: *“Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you.”* The Schwartz items then present a series of ten brief descriptions.