

Chapter 8

Morality: Traditional values, sexuality, gender equality, and religiosity

Theories of powerful media effects assume that a wide range of social values and behavioral practices are learned from the ideas and images conveyed by popular television entertainment, glossy magazines, internet websites, music videos, consumer advertising, feature films, and news reports. Cultivation theory developed by Gerbner and his colleagues treat the mass media as one of the standard agencies of socialization, rivaling the role of parents and the family, peer-groups, teachers and religious authorities, and social norms operating within the local community and national culture.¹ Socialization is a multidimensional process involving the acquisition of knowledge, attitudes and values. In particular, cultivation theory suggests that frequency of exposure to the mass media, especially television viewing, leads towards the internalization of its messages. Through this process, the media are thought to be capable of influencing moral standards, including attitudes towards the family, marriage and divorce, orientations towards sex roles, support for gender equality, and tolerance of sexual diversity, and beliefs about appropriate ethical standards in public life, as well as shaping broader religious values, beliefs, and practices. Regular exposure to messages conveyed by mass communications is believed to have a cumulative effect upon moral values and behavior, with a particularly influential role upon impressionable young children and adolescents during their formative years as they transition to adulthood.²

There are several reasons why sexual socialization, in particular, might be influenced by mass communications, affecting everything learned about sexuality from the biology of reproduction and the risks of sexual behavior to attitudes towards love, romantic relationships, and marriage. First, sexuality is pervasive throughout the Western media.³ From prime time TV sitcoms and dramas to feature films and magazines, the media present countless verbal and visual examples of how dating, intimacy, sex, love, marriage, divorce, and romantic relationships are handled. Content analysis studies have shown that the explicit depiction of sexuality has become more common in popular American television entertainment over the years. For example, a longitudinal analysis of American broadcast and cable channels from 1997-2002 found that talk about sex was shown more often than sexual behavior, though both types of contents increased significantly during the period under review; for example the percentage of shows portraying sexual intercourse doubled from 7 to 14%.⁴ Content analysis of mainstream magazines has also documented increasingly graphic sexual images and messages; for example the discussion of intimate relationships makes the largest category of topics covered in

women's magazines, and references to sexual issues rose in recent decades.⁵ Hollywood feature films are also often sexualized; one study of the 50 top-grossing films of 1996 indicated that almost two-thirds contained at least one sex scene.⁶ Images in music videos also reflect these patterns; up to three-quarters of all music videos are estimated to contain implicit sexual imagery.⁷ Sexuality is pervasive in mass advertising, whether through images of explicit beauty products or else used as a mechanism to sell everything from cars to consumer durables, and this type of content has also been found to have grown over time.⁸ But the proportion and explicitness of sexually graphic contents available in the traditional mainstream media pales in comparison to the contents of online pornography on adult websites, which studies suggest are widely accessed by young people in America.⁹ It is difficult to determine the amount of sex on the internet with any degree of reliability but it is estimated that the pornography industry generated worldwide revenues of \$97 billion in 2006, with an estimated 4.2 million pornographic websites (representing 12% of all websites), attracting on average 75 million unique visitors per month.¹⁰ Sexual content in popular entertainment is clearly pervasive in the contemporary mass media. This material is also widely consumed, especially among the adolescent population; surveys suggest that young people in America spend more time engaged with the mass media than they typically spend either in school or interacting with their parents.¹¹

In addition to sexual socialization, mass communications may also affect the acquisition of many other broader moral, ethical and religious values. Investigative journalists report extensively about financial and sexual scandals, in their watch-dog role, such as headlining stories of corruption and bribery in public life.¹² This coverage may shape public perceptions about standards in public life, such as attitudes towards transparency and probity, as well as trust in political institutions and leaders. The news headlines also report stories about many contemporary issues surrounding the politics of sex and gender, such as controversial debates surrounding abortion and contraception, euthanasia, stem cell research, sexually transmitted diseases and HIV-AIDS, women's equality and the women's movement, homosexual rights, gay marriage, and the role of gays in the military.¹³ Again this coverage may be expected to influence public opinion, such as tolerance of homosexuality, abortion, and divorce, and attitudes towards the appropriate division of sex roles for women and men in the home, workplace and public sphere, and attitudes towards gender equality.¹⁴ A growing body of literature has also documented how the mass media often touch on broader aspects of religiosity, in the United States and elsewhere.¹⁵ This process occurs through explicit use of mass communications by religious groups and authorities, such as proselytizing radio and TV broadcasts, printed publications, cassette tapes, television talk-shows, internet social networking websites, soap operas, and documentary films. It also

happens through the mainstream media's implicit framing of wider issues of religion and spirituality, for example in the values conveyed through routine news reports about science and technology, the depiction of religious minorities, or coverage of international affairs.¹⁶ Mass communications can thereby potentially shape the strength of religious values, identities and beliefs in society.

The belief that moral values and social norms are shaped by media messages is not just academic; these assumptions underpin many of the fears about the impact of Western/American television on developing societies, encouraging government agencies to implement policies of cultural protectionism, as illustrated by the Bhutanese example. Societies often limit the import of certain types of cultural products that are considered offensive to public decency, such as laws against trafficking in child pornography.¹⁷ Many countries have official rating systems classifying the contents of movies, designed to inform parents and to protect young people. Even in relatively liberal countries with a strong tradition of free speech, such as the UK and US, broadcaster self-censorship, government regulation, viewer councils, and sometimes pressures from commercial sponsors also limit certain types of television programming from being shown if they are deemed to offend standards of 'decency' and 'good taste', for example in terms of language and offensive speech, violence, or obscenity.¹⁸ Many nations also attempt to ban pornography, including Iran, Syria, Bahrain, Egypt, UAE, Kuwait, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Kenya, India, Cuba, and China. The most conservative countries exercise the strictest limits on foreign imports, for example the Saudi state uses filters to prevent internet contents 'which breaches public decency' or 'which infringes the sanctity of Islam', and breaches of these standards are also subject to criminal law.¹⁹

Despite the pervasiveness of moral and social values in the media, systematic evidence establishing the relative impact of these messages on public opinion is far from conclusive. For example, much social psychological research about the acquisition of sexual attitudes and values has been based on experimental studies conducted among the American student population, although it is not clear to what extent it is possible to generalize from this group to other peoples and places. A comprehensive meta-analysis reviewing the empirical literature on this topic in the United States suggests that, compared with the thousands of studies about the influence of violence in the media, far less is known about the impact of mass communications on sexual socialization and the acquisition of broader moral values.²⁰ The literature review concluded that social science has failed to establish a direct connection between the total amount of TV viewing and subsequent patterns of sexual behavior and experiences. The use of more specific programming genres, such as viewing music videos or soaps, has reported

slightly stronger but still limited results on sexual attitudes, expectations and behaviors. The direct link between use of the media and any subsequent moral attitudes is difficult to establish through experimental or correlational research techniques, and it is even more problematic to trace the indirect consequences for behavior. Moreover, rather than assuming a simple 'hypodermic needle' effect from frequency of viewing to the absorption of messages, as cultivation theories suppose, research needs to take account of two-way interaction effects that arise from the selection of which materials to consume (soap operas or documentaries? Reality TV or news?), and also the ways that media messages interact with existing predispositions, cultural standards, and direct personal experiences.²¹ For example, religious predispositions and moral values affect media choices, such as listening to conservative talk radio stations or tuning in to religious TV broadcasts, as well as possibly being reinforced by this exposure.²² Most mass communications and social psychological research has focused on examining the media content and the audience effects of the media in the United States and Europe, but cross-national evidence about developing societies remains very scarce. If social, sexual, and moral values are indeed shaped by mass communications, then these effects should be most clearly evident where Western media, reflecting relatively liberal orientations, penetrate the most traditional conservative cultures. This chapter therefore examines the effects of media use on a wide range of social values, with particular attention to whether any effects arising from this process are especially powerful in societies that are most open to cosmopolitan information flows.

Social and moral values

To estimate the effects of media exposure on a wide range of social and moral values, we first need to establish suitable measures. Principle components factor analysis with varimax rotation was used to examine the underlying attitudinal dimensions of 21 items included in the 5th wave of the World Values Survey. The items are listed in Table 8.1, which also shows the five attitudinal dimensions that emerged. The first concerns sexual and moral values, based on where respondents placed themselves on 10 point scales ranging from 'never justified' to 'always justifiable' concerning abortion, divorce, homosexuality, prostitution, euthanasia, and suicide. The second dimension used a similar set of items to monitor attitudes towards ethical standards in public life, including the justifiability of cheating on taxes, avoiding paying a fare on public transport, falsely claiming government benefits, and accepting a bribe. The third dimension concerned religious values (the importance of God, the importance of religion), religious practices (including whether the person prayed or meditated, and the frequency of attendance at religious services), and whether people identified themselves as religious. In previous

research, these items emerged as some of the most important aspects of religiosity, applicable in many different types of societies and faiths, and they have been widely used as standard measures in the literature on the sociology of religion.²³ The fourth concerned attitudes towards gender equality, in work, politics, and education. These items have also been used to tap orientations towards sex roles for women and men in many different cultures.²⁴ Lastly three items formed the final dimension concerning attitudes towards family and marriage. Since the responses in each of these dimensions were highly inter-correlated, these items were combined and the resulting scales were standardized to 100-point scales for ease of comparison.

[Table 8.1 about here]

We can start by comparing the mean distribution of responses on these scales for low, moderate, and high news media users living in both parochial and cosmopolitan societies. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to assess the significance and strength of the difference among groups. As shown in Table 8.2, moderately strong and significant differences were found for those living in parochial and cosmopolitan societies for all the value scales except for those concerning family values. These values also varied among types of media users. As shown in Figure 8.1, the heaviest news media users proved the most liberal towards homosexuality, abortion, divorce, etc., in both types of society, but the gap by media use was largest (17 percentage points) within cosmopolitan nations. This mirrors the pattern found in terms of religiosity, as illustrated in Figure 8.2, where media users were generally the most secular, and again the largest gap (19 points) was in cosmopolitan societies. Similar results can be seen for responses towards gender equality in Figure 8.3, with media users in cosmopolitan societies the most egalitarian in their perceptions of the appropriate roles for men and women and also expressed more liberal family values. Again, similar patterns are evident in disapproval of cheating on taxes, falsely claiming government benefits, or accepting bribery, although heavier media users in cosmopolitan standards reject these practices by only a modest margin over lower media users.

[Figure 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 about here]

Let us apply multilevel regression analysis to see whether these findings are confirmed after controlling for the social characteristics of media users. Table 8.3 presents the results of separate models run for each value scale, including the individual level demographic characteristics and socioeconomic resources, plus news media use, as well as the national-level Cosmopolitan index, and the cross-level interaction effect combining using the media with living in a more cosmopolitan society. The individual-level results largely confirm the findings from the descriptive means; even after

controlling for education, age and income, individual use of the news media was significantly linked to more tolerant and liberal orientations towards sexual and moral values, to disapproval of unethical standards in public life, to more secular orientations, to supporting gender equality, and to liberal family values. The strength of the coefficients for media use varied across the different value scales, but in all cases the results were statistically significant. As previous studies have found, younger people and the better educated also proved consistently more liberal towards sexual and moral values, family values, and gender equality, less tolerant of low ethical standards in public life, and more secular in their values and practices.

At the national-level, living in a more cosmopolitan society was also significantly linked to more liberal sexual and moral values, to support for gender equality, and to more secular values and practices. Previous studies have reported that the people of more affluent post-industrial societies tend to be both more egalitarian in their beliefs about the most appropriate roles for women and men, and less religious than those of developing societies, with a few notable exceptions.²⁵ In terms of cross-level interaction effects, use of the media in cosmopolitan societies was also significantly linked to stronger liberal sexual and moral values but, unexpectedly, the interactive relationship also proved less egalitarian, not more, towards equality between women and men.

[Table 8.4 about here]

To explore whether the national-level relationships were driven mainly by levels of economic development, or by broader characteristics of more open media systems, models were re-run for the sexual and moral value scale specifying, alternatively, national-levels of globalization, economic development, media freedom and societal-level media use. The results in Table 8.4 show that each of these national-level contextual variables proved strong and significant. The results could not simply be reduced to levels of per capita GDP, however, since both the Globalization index and the Media Freedom index were slightly stronger predictors of social values than was per capita GDP. The strong correlations that exist among these societal-level variables makes it difficult to disentangle this further, as economic development is closely linked to patterns of media access, levels of integration into global markets, and levels of media freedom. But the analysis suggests that any comprehensive explanation should take account of more than the impact of economic development.

Conclusions and discussion

Strong accounts of media effects, including the cultivation theory developed by Gerbner and colleagues, claim that the frequency of exposure to the mass media, especially habitually watching many hours of television, leads towards the gradual internalization of the messages communicated by the media.²⁶ Through lifetime socialization, the media are thought capable of influencing moral standards, especially through the presentation of powerful images of sexuality, love, the family and marriage, the roles of women and men, and the broader treatment of religion and spirituality. Concern about the potential threat to traditional cultures arising from the values contained in Western media, such as the explicit treatment of sexuality in movies and entertainment TV, have led towards protectionist measures by regulatory agencies. In extreme cases, this has led some states to ban or censor the contents, and even in democracies with a long tradition protecting freedom of expression, this concern has encouraged policies restricting access to certain types of media contents, designed to protect children and adolescents. But the media are only one agency of socialization and deep-rooted moral values and behavioral norms are acquired through many other sources, such as the influence arising from parents and the family, as well as other role models and experience of growing up in the local community. In highly conservative societies, these agencies may outweigh the images and ideas conveyed by imported cultural products, so that the meaning of more liberal or secular messages can be reinterpreted, or simply rejected, by the audience.

The survey evidence presented in this chapter suggests a consistent relationship linking patterns of media use with moral values; even after introducing controls, the heaviest users of the mass media are generally more liberal towards sexual and moral values, less tolerant of unethical standards of public life, less religious, more liberal in family values, and more egalitarian towards the roles of women and men. Moreover, these relationships are strongest in the more cosmopolitan societies, which are most open to information flows across national borders, while having only limited impact in the more parochial societies. The strongest interaction concerns sexual and moral values, where greater media use within cosmopolitan societies was associated with more liberal and tolerant orientations towards issues such as homosexuality, divorce, and abortion.

The data we have examined, while comparing a comprehensive range of social values using multilevel models in many more societies than any previous research, remains limited in certain regards. Most importantly, the cross-national comparisons cannot conclusively establish the direction of causality implied in this relationship; it may be that exposure to the mass media generates more liberal

and less traditional value orientations, but self-selection bias is also likely to operate in what people are predisposed to watch or read. As the 'uses and gratification' theory suggests, people actively choose how to spend their leisure time and how the media can best meet their prior interests and needs, such as for information, entertainment, escape or social interaction.²⁷ In fact, we believe that a two-way reciprocal interactive process is probably at work here, where prior motivation determines information exposure and then, in turn, media use reinforces cultural values. Without experimental studies, or panel survey data interviewing the same respondents over time, it is impossible to determine how this process works. In addition, to establish more conclusive findings, further research is required to provide more specific information about particular genres and contents of the mass media that people in the survey regularly accessed, including analyzing cross-cultural variations in the moral and social values reflected in television, newspapers, online websites, and magazines in different countries. We need to know what people are typically watching or reading in far more detail – and over a long-term period to establish cumulative effects. These challenges remain for future research.

Nevertheless the survey evidence analyzed here establishes the general pattern linked with using a wide range of media sources in a diverse range of societies. In keeping with our overall argument, exposure to the news media is consistently linked with more liberal and egalitarian moral and social values. In this regard, use of mass communications seems to have an impact similar to that of education and age, reinforcing modern values and more tolerant attitudes. These patterns are also found in the more parochial societies, but the strength of these correlations remains more limited. In these places, the combined effects of lack of economic development, lack of integration into global communication markets and networks, lack of media freedom, and lack of media access all limit the degree of cultural change linked with cross-border information flows.

Table 8.1: Dimensions of social and moral values

| | Liberal sexual and moral values | Tolerate low ethical standards in public life | Religious values and practices | Egalitarian gender equality values | Liberal family values |
|---|--|--|---|---|--------------------------------------|
| Justifiable: abortion | .806 | | | | |
| Justifiable: divorce | .782 | | | | |
| Justifiable: homosexuality | .767 | | | | |
| Justifiable: prostitution | .735 | | | | |
| Justifiable: euthanasia | .704 | | | | |
| Justifiable: suicide | .625 | | | | |
| Justifiable: cheating on taxes | | .818 | | | |
| Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport | | .803 | | | |
| Justifiable: claiming government benefits | | .783 | | | |
| Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe | | .769 | | | |
| Importance of God | | | .819 | | |
| Religious identity | | | .782 | | |
| Takes moments of prayer, meditation... | | | .770 | | |
| Religion important in life | | | .752 | | |
| Often attend religious services | | | .682 | | |
| Men make better business executives than women do (disagree) | | | | .865 | |
| Men make better political leaders than women (disagree) | | | | .828 | |
| University more important for a boy than a girl (disagree) | | | | .779 | |
| Woman as a single parent (approve) | | | | | .741 |
| Family important in life (disagree) | | | | | .588 |
| Marriage is an out-dated institution (agree) | | | | | .488 |
| <i>Proportion of variance</i> | <i>17.8</i> | <i>13.2</i> | <i>14.9</i> | <i>10.7</i> | <i>5.8</i> |

Notes: Factor analysis extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Coefficients of .40 or less were dropped from the analysis. See Appendix A for the specific items and the construction of the scales.

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

Table 8.2: Values by type of society and media use

| Type of society | Media use 3-pt categorized | Liberal sexual and moral values | Tolerate low ethical standards in public life | Religious values and practices | Egalitarian gender equality values | Liberal family values |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Parochial | Low | 27 | 25 | 86 | 66 | 67 |
| | Moderate | 33 | 28 | 81 | 70 | 70 |
| | High | 34 | 26 | 80 | 70 | 70 |
| | Total | 31 | 27 | 83 | 68 | 69 |
| Cosmopolitan | Low | 32 | 25 | 79 | 64 | 63 |
| | Moderate | 43 | 22 | 65 | 73 | 69 |
| | High | 49 | 21 | 60 | 78 | 72 |
| | Total | 43 | 22 | 66 | 73 | 69 |
| Total | Low | 29 | 25 | 84 | 65 | 66 |
| | Moderate | 38 | 25 | 75 | 71 | 69 |
| | High | 43 | 23 | 69 | 75 | 71 |
| | Total | 37 | 25 | 76 | 70 | 69 |
| Strength of Association | | .269*** | .116*** | .327*** | .110*** | .003 |

Note: The mean position of categories of media users on the 100-point value scales by type of society, no controls. See Table 8.1 for the items used in the construction of the scales. Anova was used to assess the strength of association (eta) and the statistical significance of the difference between types of society. P.=.001 ****

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

Table 8.3: Multilevel regression models explaining social values

| | <i>Liberal sexual and moral values</i> | <i>Tolerate low ethical standards in public life</i> | <i>Religious values and practices</i> | <i>Egalitarian gender equality values</i> | <i>Liberal family values</i> |
|--|--|--|---|---|--------------------------------------|
| INDIVIDUAL LEVEL | | | | | |
| Demographic characteristics | | | | | |
| Age (years) | -2.17*** (.099) | -2.34*** (.083) | 3.46*** (.113) | -.951*** (.081) | -1.52*** (.075) |
| Gender (male=1) | .064 (.090) | .725*** (.075) | -3.05*** (.103) | -3.60*** (.074) | -.679*** (.068) |
| Socioeconomic resources | | | | | |
| Household income 10-pt scale | 1.25*** (.107) | .481*** (.090) | -.507*** (.124) | .351*** (.088) | .721*** (.082) |
| Education 9-pt scale | 1.66*** (.115) | -.850*** (.097) | -.495*** (.134) | 2.283*** (.094) | .291*** (.088) |
| Media use | | | | | |
| News media use scale | .936*** (.112) | -.443*** (.094) | -.277* (.131) | .867*** (.092) | .780*** (.086) |
| NATIONAL-LEVEL | | | | | |
| Cosmopolitanism index (Globalization+Development+Freedom) | 8.84*** (1.47) | -1.40 (1.77) | -9.39** (2.42) | 4.64*** (1.14) | 1.70 (1.18) |
| CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS | | | | | |
| Cosmopolitanism*media use scale | .569*** (.109) | -.055 (.092) | .158 (.123) | -.190* (.090) | .021 (.085) |
| Constant (intercept) | 38.5 | 25.4 | 72.8 | 71.0 | 69.4 |
| Schwartz BIC | 380,457 | 379,100 | 319,932 | 387,905 | 328,937 |
| N. respondents | 43,088 | 44,565 | 35,826 | 45,755 | 40,198 |
| N. nations | 37 | 37 | 30 | 38 | 33 |

Note: All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML multilevel regression models (for details, see Appendix C) including the beta coefficient, (the standard error below in parenthesis), and the significance. The 100 point scales are constructed from the items listed in Table 8.1. The 100-point media use scale combined use of newspapers, radio/TV news, the internet, books, and magazines. P.*=.05 **=.01 ***=.001. See appendix A for details about the measurement, coding and construction of all variables. Significant coefficients are highlighted in **bold**.


Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

Table 8.4: Multilevel regression models explaining liberal sexual and moral values

| | <i>Cosmopolita nism index</i> | <i>Globalization index</i> | <i>Economic development</i> | <i>Media Freedom</i> | Media access |
|---|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| INDIVIDUAL LEVEL | | | | | |
| Demographic characteristics | | | | | |
| Age (years) | -2.17*** (.099) | -2.17*** (.099) | -2.17*** (.099) | -2.17*** (.099) | -2.17*** (.099) |
| Gender (male=1) | .064 (.090) | .064 (.090) | .064 (.090) | .064 (.090) | .064 (.090) |
| Socioeconomic resources | | | | | |
| Household income 10-pt scale | 1.25*** (.107) | 1.25*** (.107) | 1.25*** (.107) | 1.25*** (.107) | 1.25*** (.107) |
| Education 9-pt scale | 1.66*** (.115) | 1.66*** (.115) | 1.66*** (.115) | 1.66*** (.115) | 1.66*** (.115) |
| Media use | | | | | |
| News media use scale | .936*** (.112) | .936*** (.112) | .936*** (.112) | .936*** (.112) | .936*** (.112) |
| NATIONAL-LEVEL | | | | | |
| Cosmopolitanism index (Globalization+ Development+ Freedom) | 8.84*** (1.47) | | | | |
| Globalization index | | 10.01*** (1.61) | | | |
| Economic development | | | 9.14*** (1.52) | | |
| Media freedom | | | | 10.64*** (1.60) | |
| Societal-level media access | | | | | 6.65*** (1.64) |
| CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS | | | | | |
| Cosmopolitanism*media use | .569*** (.109) | .579*** (.109) | .547*** (.123) | .583*** (.109) | .649*** (.085) |
| Constant (intercept) | 38.5 | 33.4 | 38.0 | 37.0 | |
| Schwartz BIC | 380,457 | 380,455 | 380,457 | 380,453 | 380,457 |
| N. respondents | 43,088 | 43,088 | 43,088 | 43,088 | 43,088 |
| N. nations | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 |

Note: All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML multilevel regression models (for details, see Appendix C) including the beta coefficient, (the standard error below in parenthesis), and the significance. The 100 point scales are constructed from the items listed in Table 8.1. The 100-point media use scale combined use of newspapers, radio/TV news, the internet, books, and magazines. P.*=.05 **=.01 ***=.001. See appendix A for details about the measurement, coding and construction of all variables. Significant coefficients are highlighted in **bold**. **Source:** World Values Survey 2005-7


Figure 8.1: Social and moral values by media use and type of society



Note: The mean position of categories of media users on the 100-point value scales by type of society, no controls. See Table 8.1 for the items used in the construction of the scales.

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7


Figure 8.2: Religiosity by media use and type of society



Note: The mean position of categories of media users on the 100-point value scales by type of society, no controls. See Table 8.1 for the items used in the construction of the scales.

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

Figure 8.3: Support for gender equality by media use and type of society



Note: The mean position of categories of media users on the 100-point value scales by type of society, no controls. See Table 8.1 for the items used in the construction of the scales.

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

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