

Chapter 9

Activists: Civic engagement

The logic of cultural convergence theory is that in open societies, the flow of mass communication will gradually spread Western ideas about democratic practices and principles around the world. Information conveyed by international news agencies and transnational broadcasters – such as coverage about the American presidential election, images of monks protesting on the streets of Rangoon, or reports highlighting human rights abuses in Zimbabwe or DRC, will thereby strengthen reform movements, grassroots activists, and public support for democratic values. At the same time, in closed societies where the news media are controlled by powerful governing elites, whether through state ownership of broadcasting, overt censorship, intimidation of independent journalists, or by other related mechanisms, and where information from abroad is heavily filtered or restricted, then mass communications can be expected to function as a mechanism of state control and propaganda. The impact of the news media on the process of democratization has attracted a substantial research literature, but nevertheless many key questions remain unresolved. To examine these issues, in this chapter we first consider theoretical debates about the role of the news media in democracy, including reviewing the literature based on societal-level econometric studies and individual-level behavioral survey analysis of media users. Building upon this foundation, this chapter then examines evidence derived from the 5th wave of the World Values Survey concerning multiple dimensions of civic engagement, including institutional confidence, membership in voluntary associations, protest politics, citizen interest, support for democratic values, and evaluations of democratic performance. The results of the multilevel regression models indicate two main findings. First, individual use of the news media is consistently related to stronger patterns of civic engagement, even with a battery of prior controls for the typical characteristics of the media audience. There is no support here for the ‘media malaise’ thesis; instead democratic participation is likely to be strengthened by the press. Moreover further exploration, at national-level, suggests that this pattern is usually (although not always) reinforced by media use within cosmopolitan societies. The conclusion reflects on the implications of these findings.

Theories and evidence linking wealth, media access, and democracy at societal level

The start of the third wave of democracy during the early-1970s renewed interest in understanding the factors contributing towards processes of regime transition and consolidation. Most attention has focused upon the role of economic development, state institutions, and political culture. ¹

The proposition that wealthy societies are usually also more democratic has a long lineage and the role of the mass media has often been regarded as one of the central drivers underlying this relationship. The political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset laid the groundwork for this thesis in 1959, claiming: *“The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.”*² This process operates, Lipset theorized, where development expands levels of literacy, schooling and media access, seen as essential preconditions for mass participation. Economic growth also broadened the middle classes, reduced extreme poverty, facilitated intermediary organizations in civic society, and promoted democratic values. During the early 1970s, Dankwart Rustow reinforced the argument that the transition to democracy could be attributed to economic development and societal modernization, as predicted by measures such as newspaper circulation, radio and television ownership, as well as per capita energy consumption, literacy, school enrollments, urbanization, life expectancy, infant mortality, and the size of the industrial workforce.³

Following in their footsteps, the societal-level relationship between wealth and democracy has been subject to rigorous empirical inquiry. For more than half a century the association has withstood empirical tests under a variety of different conditions, using cross-sectional and time-series data with a large sample of countries and years, and with increasingly sophisticated statistical tests, as well as with historical case-studies of regime transitions within particular nations. Studies have repeatedly confirmed that a nation’s wealth is associated with the standard indicators of democratization, although the precise estimates of effects are sensitive to the choice of time-period, the selection of control variables specified in causal models, and the basic measurement of both democracy and economic growth.⁴ The Lipset hypothesis has been replicated in research conducted by Jackman (1973), Bollen (1979, 1983), Bollen and Jackman (1985), Brunk, Caldeira and Lewis-Beck (1987), Buckhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Vanhanen (1997), Barro (1999), and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000), among others.⁵ Recently Norris also confirmed this relationship, using cross-sectional time-series analysis, establishing that between one half to two-thirds of the variance in democratization found worldwide during the third wave era would be attributed to a range of structural conditions, including per capita level of GDP (in PPP), controlling for colonial legacies, regional diffusion, ethnic heterogeneity, and population size.⁶

At the same time, although often replicated, certain issues remain unresolved in the research literature. In particular, the relationship between wealth and democracy is probabilistic and even a casual glance at the standard indicators reveals many important contemporary outliers. Affluent autocracies are exemplified by Singapore, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, with high per capita GDP, and today

there are also many poorer democracies such as Benin, Ghana, Mali, Costa Rica, and Nepal, plus the classic case of India. These outliers suggest that economic development is neither necessary nor sufficient for democratization.

Econometric models also commonly fail to incorporate evidence about the role of the mass media as an intermediary condition in democratization. Lipset and Rustow theorized that one of the direct effects of economic development was to expand access to mass communications. This pattern was examined earlier in chapter 5, which found a strong correlation (.742) between levels of media access and economic development. Lipset and Rustow argued that, in turn, wider access to the mass media strengthened the process of democratization, primarily through enabling civic engagement and political participation. A growing series of selected case studies have described the roles of the news media in newer democracies, but this indirect link between economic development and democratization has attracted less systematic attention in the research literature.⁷ The available societal-level evidence lends partial support to the Lipset and Rustow thesis, however; cross-national time-series regression analysis confirms that freedom of the press was significantly related to national-level patterns of democratization during the third wave era.⁸ This relationship proved robust when replicated using two independent indicators of democracy, even after employing a battery of controls for related factors predicting democracy, including colonial legacies, regional diffusion, ethnic heterogeneity, and population size.

Equally important, previous econometric models are also commonly under-specified by failing to take account of the role of political institutions and political culture. For example, Przeworski et al provide the standard contemporary account of the relationship between wealth and democracy, but they do not control for the effects of the type of power-sharing arrangements in the electoral system or federalism.⁹ In addition, Inglehart and Welzel have shown that political culture has a significant impact upon the consolidation of democracy; in particular self-expression values, a syndrome of mass attitudes that tap a common underlying dimension reflecting emphasis on freedom, tolerance of diversity, and participation, are strongly related at aggregate level to patterns of liberal democracy, as measured by Freedom House.¹⁰ Self-expression values, reflecting human choices, tap a broader set of cultural attitudes and orientations than support for democratic values per se. Inglehart and Welzel also showed that self-expression values measured in the early-1990s had a strong effect on subsequent levels of liberal democracy. By contrast, prior levels of liberal democracy had only a weak and statistically insignificant effect on the strength of subsequent self-expression values. Inglehart and

Welzel demonstrate that culture (self-expression values) affect the performance of a country's democratic institutions.

Questions also remain about the most appropriate interpretation of the direction of causality in the complex relationship linking democracy with wealth, political institutions, and cultural attitudes. In the standard view, economic factors are usually regarded as endogenous, the foundation upon which democratic regimes and political culture arise as superstructure. But it is equally plausible to assume, as Perrson and Tabellini argue, that constitutional arrangements, such as electoral systems and the incidence of coalition government, have the capacity to influence economic policies and economic performance, for example patterns of government spending, budget deficits, and labor productivity, and thus patterns of socioeconomic development.¹¹ These arguments reverse the assumed direction of causality; Perrson and Tabellini suggest that democratic institutions may impact upon a country's stock of wealth.

Theories and evidence linking individual-level media use and civic engagement

What are the individual-level links between media use and civic engagement? An extensive literature has explored this issue, but interpretations remain divided between the 'media malaise' and the 'virtuous circle' perspectives.

Far from strengthening democracy, proponents of the media malaise thesis blame mass communications in the United States and Western Europe for growing public disengagement, ignorance of civic affairs, and mistrust of government. According to this viewpoint, common journalistic practices hinder civic engagement, including what the public learns about public affairs, whether they trust government, and how far they become involved in political activism.¹² The modern idea of 'media malaise' emerged in the political science literature in the 1960s; Kurt and Gladys Lang were the first to make the connection between the rise of network news and broader feelings of disenchantment with American politics. TV news broadcasts, they argued, fuelled public cynicism by over-emphasizing political conflict and downplaying routine policymaking.¹³ The idea gained currency in the mid-1970s, since media malaise seemed to provide a plausible reason for growing public alienation in America during the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate era. Michael Robinson popularized the term 'videomalaise' to describe the link between reliance upon American television journalism and feelings of political cynicism, social mistrust, and lack of political efficacy. Greater exposure to television news, he argued,

with its high 'negativism', conflictual frames, and anti-institutional themes, generated political disaffection, frustration, cynicism, self-doubt and malaise.¹⁴

Many other commentators have echoed these claims over the years in the United States.¹⁵ Hence Neil Postman argued that the major American TV networks, driven by their hemorrhage of viewers to cable, substituted entertainment-oriented, crime, celebrity and consumer-obsessed, tabloid television for serious political coverage of national and world affairs.¹⁶ The result, he suggests, produced endless coverage of Hollywood, the 'health beat' and sports rather than the serious problems facing society, so that Americans are 'entertaining ourselves to death'. For Roderick Hart, television news charms the modern voter into an illusion of political participation and information, while encouraging couch potato passivity.¹⁷ Others suggest that the problem of civic disengagement is rooted primarily in mainstream TV popular entertainment, rather than TV journalism. Hence cultivation theorists argue that TV drama, with its focus upon violent crime, threats, and urban conflict, cultivates feelings of fear, alienation, and interpersonal mistrust among the audience.¹⁸ The theory of social capital developed by Robert Putnam claims that the amount of time which Americans devote to watching TV entertainment has been responsible for the substantial erosion of civic engagement among the younger generations during the post-war era, as people increasingly turned away from traditional forms of social and political activism in voluntary associations and community affairs.¹⁹

Similar arguments about media malaise have also been made in many other countries; according to a widely influential report for the Trilateral Commission published in the mid-1970s on *The Crisis of Democracy*, for example, the news media were to blame for eroding respect for government authority in many post-industrial societies.²⁰ Along related lines, two decades later Jay Blumler identified a 'crisis of civic communication' afflicting Western Europe.²¹ In increasingly complex societies, Blumler argues, governing has become more difficult, popular support more contingent, and mass communications more vital. Yet at the same time, structural failures in the news media reduced the capacity of journalists to function in a way that promotes civic communications and the public sphere. The core problem, for Blumler, lies in a more adversarial relationship between politicians and journalists.

Despite the popularity of the media malaise argument, a growing number of skeptics have questioned the empirical evidence supporting these claims. The 'virtuous circle' interpretation provides an alternative view of developments. If Lipset and Rustow are right, then expanding access to mass communications should have a positive, not a negative, impact upon attitudes at the heart of civic

engagement, exemplified by social tolerance and trust, confidence in political institutions, and political interest and knowledge, as well as involvement in practices such as voting turnout, political activism and protest politics. Research supporting these claims, based on cross-sectional surveys and experimental methods, have been found in many post-industrial nations, including America. In Britain, for example, reading a broadsheet newspaper, and watching a lot of television news, is found to be associated with greater political knowledge, interest, and understanding of politics.²² Similar patterns are associated with attention to the news media in Germany and the Netherlands.²³ In the United States, as well, research has found that trust in politics and trust in the news media go hand-in-hand, with no evidence that use of the news media encouraged political cynicism.²⁴ Comparison of a range of post-industrial societies, including the United States, found that, contrary to media malaise, although the total hours of watching television was indeed related to some signs of apathy, attention to the news media and current affairs programs was associated with positive indicators of civic engagement, including political knowledge, trust, and mobilization.²⁵ The growing body of individual-level research conducted in established democracies strongly indicates that media use is consistently linked with political activism. In interpreting this relationship, the 'virtuous circle' thesis suggests that prior interest in public affairs habitually motivates people to seek out news sources, such as to read political commentary in newspapers, to turn on the evening news, and to surf the Internet for political websites and blogs. The thesis suggests that habitual use of the news media, in turn, contributes towards greater awareness about current events and knowledge about public affairs, all of which, in turn, reduces the cognitive and informational barriers to political participation. During elections, for example, the attentive public reading about the campaign or watching the debates learns about the candidates, parties, and issues, facilitating casting an informed choice. Through an interactive cycle, news use and civic engagement are therefore regarded as complimentary processes.

Several limitations with the existing body of research, however, make it difficult to resolve the dispute between media malaise and virtuous circle theories. First, most of the media malaise literature is based upon structural developments in journalism and the news media industry, such as growing commercial pressures on TV ratings and newspaper sales, without examining direct survey evidence for the impact of these processes on public opinion. Analysis of Individual-level survey data is more appropriate to understand the impact of media use on attitudes, values and behaviors, but cross-sectional surveys (taken as a snapshot at one point in time) cannot conclusively establish the direction of causality underlying the relationship. Correlation analysis suggests a consistent linkage between media

use and political activism, a pattern reported now in many post-industrial societies, but extended longitudinal time-series panel surveys and experimental designs are required to disentangle causality.

In addition, further research is needed to broaden the comparative framework. A series of studies have now examined these relationships within established democracies, such as America, Britain and the Netherlands, but it has still not been established whether use of the news media has positive or negative effects on civic engagement in a wider range of countries and contexts, including under different types of regimes, as well as in many poorer developing societies. Arguably, significant contrasts in journalistic cultures, such as practices of more partisan reporting, or closer state-media relations, could effect the public's civic engagement. In rigid autocracies such as Syria, for example, state control of the primary channels of broadcasting and lack of freedom of expression could plausibly mean that the public comes to mistrust the news media as a source of independent information. Practices of official censorship and state control in places such as Burma, Zimbabwe, and North Korea are designed to suppress opposition movements and dissident organizations, potentially dampening political activism. In addition, it is not clear whether any positive effects of media use on civic engagement are reinforced by societies with more open borders and greater freedom of expression. This is a plausible proposition, for example if the ideas and images about democracy diffuse most widely within the most cosmopolitan societies. Where people have access to mass communications, greater familiarity with democratic practices and human rights derived from the Western news media may gradually spread these ideas across national borders, thereby encouraging reform movements and human rights activists in previously-closed societies and autocratic regimes. For example, in Africa, news about free and fair elections held in Ghana, Benin, and South Africa may encourage opposition forces to demand similar rights in Zimbabwe. By contrast, autocracies which restrict freedom of expression and cross-border information flows, such as China and Saudi Arabia, are most likely to suppress news and information flowing from abroad about democracy and human rights around the world. For all these reasons, we need to use multilevel modeling, as in previous chapters, to unpack the complex relationships linking habitual media use with democratic values and practices in a wide range of societies.

Measuring civic engagement

As in previous chapters, principle components factor analysis with varimax rotation can be used to establish the underlying dimensions in civic engagement. The results in Table 9.1 show the 33 items relating to civic engagement which were selected from the 5th wave of the World Values Survey and these fell into six dimensions. The first reflected confidence in political institutions, including parliament,

the judiciary and the executive. This represents the core institutions of state, as well as confidence in newspapers and television. Institutional confidence is important as an indicator of public perceptions of the legitimacy of the state, representing the middle-level of David Easton's concept of systems support.²⁶ Comparative studies have documented the erosion of confidence in these institutions which has occurred in recent decades in many post-industrial societies, as well as the low levels of trust which exist in many new democracies in Central Europe and Latin America.²⁷ The causes of this trend have been attributed, on the supply-side, to problems of performance, if the erosion of national sovereignty in a globalized world means that traditional democratic institutions can no longer function effectively to connect citizen and the state.²⁸ Alternatively explanations based on the growth of more critical citizens, on the demand-side, emphasize that growing cognitive skills, knowledge, and education in the mass public has generated an erosion of deferential loyalties and rising public expectations about democracy and government.²⁹

[Table 9.1 about here]

The second dimension reflects activism with civic organizations and voluntary associations, one part of the concept social capital which has received a lot of attention in recent years.³⁰ Theorists from de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill to Durkheim, Simmel, and Kornhauser have long emphasized the importance of civic society and voluntary associations as vital to the lifeblood of democracy. The face-to-face interactions promoted through dense networks of voluntary associations in the local community are theorized by Putnam to promote social trust among members, especially 'bridging' groups attracting diverse participants and sectors, with beneficial spill-over effects for solving collective action problems and making democracy work.³¹ The eight groups which are included in this study range from the traditional, such as membership of labor unions, professional organizations, and political parties, to being active within newer social movements concerned with the environment and consumers' rights. The third dimension monitors protest politics, measured by engagement in joining consumer boycotts, attending demonstrations, and signing petitions. These are all part of 'protest politics', which Barnes and Kasse used in the late-1970s to examine the potential willingness or actual experience of citizen dissent.³² The fourth dimension reflects citizen interest, including interest in politics, the importance of politics, and reported voting turnout in national elections. The fact that voting participation is closely related to interest rather than other types of activism, such as party membership or protest politics, suggests that although widespread, this is one of the least demanding forms of civic engagement. The fifth dimension concerns support for democratic values and rejection of autocratic alternatives,

including military rule, having experts decide, or simply having a strong leader. Lastly two items emerged in the final dimension, including 10-point scales measuring how respondents rated the importance of democracy and the performance of democracy in their own country. As in previous chapters, for comparison across these dimensions, a series of standardized 100-point scales were constructed by combining the items listed for each dimension in Table 9.1 with the exception of the assessment of democratic performance and the importance of democracy, which were kept as two separate items for analysis.

The link between individual media use and indicators of civic engagement

For an initial description of the contrasts in political values and practices we can compare the distribution of the mean scales by type of media user and by type of society, without any controls. The strength and significance of the difference between groups is summarized by ANOVA. As Table 9.2 shows, the strongest contrasts emerged in the protest politics and the democratic values scales, although there were significant differences between types of societies across all the scales except for citizen interest. In addition, media use made no significant difference for evaluations of the performance of democracy, or for the importance of democracy, which were both dropped from further analysis.

[Table 9.2 about here]

[Figure 9.1 and 9.2 about here]

Figure 9.1 shows the main contrasts in levels of protest politics, including activist through boycott, demonstrations and petitions. In both types of societies, there are marked media effects, with more than twice as many people reporting protest activism among the heavier users of the news media compared with the low users. But the levels of protest politics – and the contrasts between high and low media users, are both far greater in the cosmopolitan societies. The pattern concerning support for democratic values, illustrated in Figure 9.2, shows a similar but more modest media gap exists in cosmopolitan societies, although media use did not distinguish support for democratic ideals in the parochial nations.

[Table 9.3 about here]

To explore these general patterns in more detail, again we can use multilevel regression models across all the scales of political values and practices, as in previous chapters, controlling for individual-level demographic characteristics, socio-economic resources, and media use. The results show a familiar

pattern for the age profile of activists; across all dimensions of civic engagement, the older generation was significantly more engaged than the young. Even by the measures of protest politics, which was once thought to be the province of young student radicals, it now appears that the typical activist is now middle-aged or older, with a 'normalization' of participation.³³ The gender profile is more mixed, with voluntary membership of civic associations skewed towards women, a pattern which has also been reported elsewhere, although this depends in part upon the particular mix of organizations which are included in the comparison.³⁴ By contrast, protest politics and interest in politics are skewed towards men, again a long-standing finding in the literature.³⁵ The socioeconomic bias in political participation, highlighted in the early-1970s by Verba, Nie, and Kim, has proved a persistent pattern in civic engagement in many countries.³⁶ Our results confirm that the more affluent are more likely to express confidence and trust in political institutions, as well as being more active in voluntary associations, protest politics, and reporting more interest in politics, although it is striking that there is no socioeconomic skew in adherence to democratic values. Education provides cognitive skills and knowledge which help to circumnavigate public affairs, usually representing one of the most reliable indicators of civic engagement. So it proved here for membership in voluntary organizations, protest politics, interest and support for democratic values, but the more educated also proved to have less confidence in political institutions, not more. The phenomenon of critical citizen has been widely noted, where the cognitive skills and awareness derived from education raises expectations about democratic governance, reducing deferential loyalties towards traditional institutions, and encouraging challenges to forms of authority represented by parliaments, the police and the judiciary.³⁷

Most importantly for this study, after including all these controls, in Table 9.3 use of the news media was significantly and positively related to institutional confidence, voluntary membership, protest politics, and citizen interest, although not to support for democratic values. Although the media malaise suggests many reasons why attention to journalism may turn off citizens, for example through negative campaign coverage or through focusing upon frothy celebrities rather than serious reporting about current affairs, parliamentary debates, and public policy issues, in fact exposure to the news media is linked to more civic engagement, not less. The results extend the pattern which has now been widely reported in established democracies by confirming that these generalizations also hold in a wide range of developing societies around the world. Admittedly this evidence does not allow us to claim that there is a one-way direction of causality from media use to civic engagement, as a reciprocal relationship could also be at work (since interest in politics could plausibly cause people to pay attention to reporting about current events in newspapers and TV). Other types of longitudinal panel surveys or experimental

evidence, which are unavailable on a cross-national basis, are required to establish this more conclusively. Nevertheless we can certainly rule out the malaise hypothesis with more confidence: across all the dimensions, there is no evidence here for any negative process at work, linking media use with significantly greater civic disengagement. No matter how many commentators blame the messenger for political apathy, disenchantment, and cynicism, there is no support for these claims in the data.

[Table 9.4 about here]

What of the national-level effects of living in a more cosmopolitan society? Here the results are more mixed; protest politics and support for democratic values are significantly higher in cosmopolitan societies, but interest appears to be depressed, and there is no significant difference in the other indicators. The analysis of cross-level interactions show that, where there is a significant effect, media use in cosmopolitan societies had a positive impact upon democracy, by reinforcing protest activism, interest, and democratic values. To test which national-level component of the cosmopolitanism index was most clearly linked to patterns of civic engagement, whether economic wealth, the globalization index, media freedom, or media access, alternative models were run where the democratic values 100-point scale was the dependent variable, with the results summarized in Table 9.4. The national-level coefficients all proved significant, with the composite cosmopolitanism index the strongest predictor of democratic values, closely followed by economic development and media freedom. By contrast media access, emphasized in the original Lipset hypothesis, although significant, proved a slightly weaker predictor of democratic values. The results confirm that democratic values flourish in affluent post industrial nations, as many previous studies have commonly reported, but economic development is not the only driver at work here. Democratic cultures are strongest in open societies which combine affluence with media freedom and borders open to information flows from abroad.

Conclusions and discussion

The earliest sociological theories by Lipset argued that democracy is strengthened by economic development, particularly where rising affluence widened public access to the mass media within each country. Through learning news about government and current affairs from the radio, television and newspapers, Lipset thought that citizens could participate more effectively in democratic processes, thereby sustaining and strengthening democratic consolidation. There are many reasons why, if journalism works well, democracy should benefit.³⁸ Through independent scrutiny by media watchdogs,

the public policymaking process can become more transparent, encouraging government accountability. Through strengthening the public sphere, journalism can enrich civic society and encourage public deliberation. Through inclusive and impartial reporting of major challenges facing society, multiple voices can be heard in public discussions. Balanced campaign coverage enlightens the public about the choices and allows citizens to cast informed votes. Moreover governing elites can also be more responsive to social needs where the news media highlight social concerns and public preferences, with reporters acting as a channel connecting citizens and the state. Serious questions are raised about how well journalism lives up to these ideals in practice, particularly in societies with severe limits on freedom of expression and publication. Moreover malaise theories cast serious doubts about the capacity of the mass media to achieve these objectives, suggesting that reporting commonly erodes trust in government institutions and generates civic apathy rather than activism.

The survey evidence we have analyzed here extends previous empirical studies about the relationship between use of the news media and political orientations in established democracies and affluent societies. The results of the analysis demonstrates that use of the news media is positively associated with many types of civic engagement, including strengthening confidence in institutions such as parliaments and parties, membership of voluntary organizations and civic associations such as charitable groups, unions and parties, interest in politics, and support for democratic values. Although we cannot establish conclusive proof, these results are certainly consistent with the 'virtuous circle' thesis, where media use and civic engagement are complimentary.³⁹

In addition to internal processes, we theorized that in open societies, the flow of mass communications from the global North to South will also gradually encourage the adoption of ideas about democratic practices and principles around the world. The results here are less clear-cut, but nevertheless we established an important national-level effect; living in a more cosmopolitan society was positively associated with protest politics and support for democratic values, and use the news media within cosmopolitan societies reinforced these effects. Cosmopolitan societies are more affluent, but they also have more freedom of the press and more open borders, and each of these factors can be understood to play a role in this relationship. The results lend some support to the theory of cultural convergence, around the values and practices of democracy, but with the important proviso that the type of society also conditions or moderates the link between the media and democracy.

Table 9.1: Dimensions of civic engagement

	Institutional Confidence	Civic membership	Protest politics	Citizen interest	Democratic values	Democratic performance
V140 Confidence: Parliament	.782					
V138 Confidence: The Government	.770					
V137 Confidence: Justice System	.765					
V136 Confidence: The Police	.744					
V141 Confidence: The Civil Services	.736					
V139 Confidence: The Political Parties	.709					
V132 Confidence: Armed Forces	.605					
V142 Confidence: Major Companies	.604					
V135 Confidence: Labor Unions	.597					
V134 Confidence: Television	.571					
V133 Confidence: The Press	.557					
V29 Member of environmental group		.729				
V32 Member of consumer organization		.694				
V31 Member of charitable organization		.686				
V30 Member of professional organization		.674				
V26 Member of art, music, educational		.645				
V28 Member of political party		.568				
V27 Member of labor unions		.547				
V25 Member of sports /recreational group		.522				
V98 Attended demonstrations			.793			
V97 Joined in boycotts			.784			
V102 Recently attended demonstrations			.673			
V101 Recently joined in boycotts			.673			
V96 Signed a petition			.667			
V100 Recently signed a petition			.603			
V95 Interest in politics				.789		
V7 Politics important in life				.787		
V234 Voted in recent parliament elections				.457		
V148 Approve having a strong leader					.787	
V149 Approve having experts decide					.772	
V150 Approve having the army rule					.610	
V162 Importance of democracy						.854
V163 Democratic performance of country						.823

Notes: Principal Component Factor Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

Table 9.2: Political values and practices by type of society and media use

Type of society	Media use	Institutional confidence	Membership voluntary organizations	Protest politics	Citizen interest	Democratic values	Democratic performance of own country	Importance of democracy
Parochial	Low	62	6	13	59	65	60	80
	Moderate	61	9	19	62	65	60	80
	High	62	12	24	67	64	60	90
	Total	62	8	17	62	65	60	80
Cosmopolitan	Low	56	5	19	50	72	70	80
	Moderate	59	8	34	61	76	70	90
	High	61	12	45	67	79	70	90
	Total	59	10	37	62	76	70	90
Total	Low	61	6	14	57	66	60	80
	Moderate	60	9	27	61	70	60	90
	High	61	12	38	67	73	70	90
	Total	61	9	27	62	70	60	90
Strength of association		.086***	.059***	.356***	.006	.330***	.121***	.112***

Note: The mean position of categories of media users on the 100-point value scales by type of society, no controls. See Table 9.1 for the items used in the construction of the scales. Anova was used to assess the strength of association (eta) and the statistical significance of the difference between types of society. P=.001 ****

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

Table 9.3: Multilevel regression models explaining political values and practices

	Institutional confidence	Voluntary membership	Protest politics	Citizen interest	Democratic values
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL					
Demographic characteristics					
Age (years)	.439*** (.065)	.418*** (.042)	.351*** (.118)	3.59*** (.089)	.855*** (.077)
Gender (male=1)	-.106 (.059)	-.211*** (.038)	1.41*** (.107)	1.91*** (.081)	.058 (.070)
Socioeconomic resources					
Household income 10-pt scale	.530*** (.065)	.521*** (.042)	.537*** (.119)	.536*** (.089)	-.086 (.078)
Education 9-pt scale	-.661*** (.077)	1.26*** (.050)	4.89*** (.141)	2.81*** (.108)	2.23*** (.092)
Media use					
News media use scale	.522*** (.183)	1.68*** (.171)	3.60*** (.406)	2.78*** (.317)	-.046 (.154)
NATIONAL-LEVEL					
Cosmopolitanism index (Globalization+Development+Freedom)	-2.18 (1.17)	-.854 (.771)	6.42* (2.93)	-3.38** (1.13)	4.54*** (.934)
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS					
Cosmopolitanism*media use scale	.116 (.189)	-.064 (.171)	1.20** (.395)	1.12*** (.317)	.894*** (.154)
Constant (intercept)	61.3	8.75	29.4	61.3	68.8
Schwartz BIC	395,597	445,475	406,244	441,188	428,499
N. respondents	49,484	60,7509	44,583	50,907	51,171
N. nations	49	48	41	41	49

Note: All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML multilevel regression models (for details, see Appendix C) including the beta coefficient, (the standard error below in parenthesis), and the significance. The 100 point scales are constructed from the items listed in Table 9.1. The 100-point media use scale combined use of newspapers, radio/TV news, the internet, books, and magazines. P.*=.05 **=.01 ***=.001. See appendix A for details about the measurement, coding and construction of all variables. Significant coefficients are highlighted in **bold**.


Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

Table 9.4: Multilevel regression models explaining support for democratic values

	Cosmopolitanism index	Globalization index	Economic development	Media Freedom	Media access
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL					
Demographic characteristics					
Age (years)	.855*** (.077)	.855*** (.077)	.855*** (.077)	.855*** (.077)	.855*** (.077)
Gender (male=1)	.058 (.070)	.058 (.070)	.058 (.070)	.058 (.070)	.058 (.070)
Socioeconomic resources					
Household income 10-pt scale	-.086 (.078)	-.086 (.078)	-.086 (.078)	-.086 (.078)	-.086 (.078)
Education 9-pt scale	2.23*** (.092)	2.23*** (.092)	2.23*** (.092)	2.23*** (.092)	2.23*** (.092)
Media use					
News media use scale	-.046 (.154)	-.046 (.154)	-.046 (.154)	-.046 (.154)	-.046 (.154)
NATIONAL-LEVEL					
Cosmopolitanism index (Globalization+ Development+ Freedom)	4.54*** (.934)				
Globalization index		2.91** (1.08)			
Economic development			4.40*** (.804)		
Media freedom				4.06*** (1.03)	
Societal-level media access					3.29*** (.934)
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS					
Cosmopolitanism*media use	.894*** (.154)	.860*** (.155)	.889*** (.154)	.869*** (.154)	.858*** (.156)
Constant (intercept)	68.8	69.2	69.1	69.1	70.2
Schwartz BIC	428,499	428511	428495	428495	41,703
N. respondents	51,171	50,374	50,966	50,966	49,378
N. nations	49	49	49	49	47

Note: All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML multilevel regression models (for details, see Appendix C) including the beta coefficient, (the standard error below in parenthesis), and the significance. The 100 point scales are constructed from the items listed in Table 9.1. The 100-point media use scale combined use of newspapers, radio/TV news, the internet, books, and magazines. P.*=.05 **=.01 ***=.001. See appendix A for details about the measurement, coding and construction of all variables. Significant coefficients are highlighted in **bold**. **Source:** World Values Survey 2005-7


Figure 9.1: Protest politics by media use and type of society



Note: The mean position of categories of media users on the 100-point value scales by type of society, no controls. Protest politics was measured by willingness or recent experience of joining in boycotts, demonstrations, or signing a petition. See Table 9.1 for the items used in the construction of the scales. Anova was used to assess the strength of association (eta) and the statistical significance of the difference between types of society. $P=.001$ ****

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

Figure 9.2: Democratic values by media use and type of society



Note: The mean position of categories of media users on the 100-point value scales by type of society, no controls. Democratic values were measured rejection of rule by the army, experts or strong leaders. See Table 9.1 for the items used in the construction of the scales. Anova was used to assess the strength of association (eta) and the statistical significance of the difference between types of society. P=.001

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

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