

Chapter 2

Classifying the radical right

This chapter starts by clarifying the comparative framework and the primary sources of survey data employed in this study. The book is based upon the ‘most different’ research design, including 39 countries with contrasting democratic histories, patterns of industrial development, and political institutions, as well as divergent electoral fortunes for the radical right. Countries are compared if included in either of the primary survey data sources: the European Social Survey 2002 and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-2001. The national variations are important since they provide insights into the underlying conditions facilitating electoral support for these parties. The chapter then discusses the best way to conceptualize and define parties such as the French *Front National*, the Austrian FPÖ, and the Belgian *Vlaams Blok*, and explains the party typology used in this study. For a consistent classification, this book uses both ‘expert’ and ‘voter’ judgments to identify the location of parties across the ideological spectrum. This chapter draws upon the most recent expert survey conducted in 2000 by Marcel Lubbers, supplemented by those contained in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and by similar sources.¹ Careful classification is an important preliminary step before examining whether parties within the radical right family share certain similar social and ideological characteristics, as so often assumed. On this basis, the next chapter then goes on to briefly summarize the electoral fortunes of the most significant contemporary radical right parties studied in depth throughout the rest of the book.

The Comparative Framework and Data Sources

The most common approach adopted by comparative studies of the radical right is to adopt the ‘most similar’ framework². Edited volumes have often focused upon right-wing party fortunes within Western Europe, post-Communist Europe, or Latin America. Or they have sought to compare advanced industrial societies or established democracies. The virtues of the ‘most similar’ design is that these countries are believed to share certain similar historical traditions, levels of development, and cultural characteristics, as well as drawing upon the national expertise of area and regional specialists. By ‘controlling’ for certain common features, such as the length of experience of democracy, or the strength of Catholic or Protestant religious traditions, the analyst can thereby exclude these factors from the analysis and focus upon those conditions that *do* vary systematically within the selected universe, such as levels of unemployment or patterns of immigration. Given the common problem of ‘too many variables’ and insufficient cases, this research design is attractive yet it is also limited. In particular, the ‘most similar’ framework can overlook certain structural and institutional arrangements which may be critical in explaining the success of the radical right, simply because these do not vary within a specific region or type of democracy under comparison. For example, studies confined to Western Europe cannot easily compare the role of electoral systems because nearly all established democracies in the region use proportional representation. Older post-war dichotomies between Western and post-Communist Europe, based on the Cold War era, may overlook growing convergence and the emergence of striking similarities, such as those shared today by member states within the expanded 25-nation European Union, drawing upon centuries of shared cultures. Moreover it may be dangerous to expand generalizations beyond each region, for example to assume that the results of research analyzing the 15-existing members of the European union, or the 19 nations contained in Western Europe, can be applied to the broader range of contemporary democracies found today in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia.

By contrast, the diverse range of 39 nations included in this study requires the adoption of the ‘*most different*’ comparative framework. The advantage is that this approach allows us to examine systematic variations in patterns of voting support for radical right parties under many conditions, whether in terms of types of electoral systems (including majoritarian, combined or proportional systems), rates of economic development, levels of dissatisfaction with government performance, or societies with ethnic heterogeneity or homogeneity. A comparison covering many

(although not all) Western European nations, Anglo-American democracies, as well as some Latin American and post-communist states, expands the scope of the empirical generalizations that can be explored under a wide variety of contexts. Yet this approach also carries certain well-known limitations. In particular, due to the multiplicity of variables under comparison it remains difficult to establish whether the factors thought to explain the rise of the radical right in this study are indeed the key drivers. Taken in isolation, no single indicator, set of data, national case-study, or analytical technique can provide a comprehensive picture or definitive evidence. As with other controversies in the social sciences, the core concepts, definitions, and measures concerning electoral support for radical right parties can be understood and operationalized in many alternative ways. Any one piece of the puzzle can be reasonably challenged by skeptics and the results should be taken with a strong pinch of salt. But where alternative approaches using multiple indicators, social surveys, and methods of analysis produce patterns found consistently across a wide range of nations, and where a logical and parsimonious theory can account for the relationships, then their cumulative effect increases confidence in the reliability and robustness of the results and the conclusions become more compelling. In particular, rather than making up 'ad hoc' theories to account for the popularity of the radical right, it is far more satisfactory to relate explanations to what is already known more broadly from the established literature on patterns of voting behavior, party competition, and elections. The book provides a general theory, based on standard rational choice explanations of voting and parties, that remains open to further development. Area studies specialists can explore the theory further to see whether it fits by using more detailed qualitative case-studies or the rise of the radical right within specific nations, while regional experts can expand the scope of the inquiry to consider how far the explanation works equally well in other societies. This research is limited to examining the evidence from three main sources: (i) trends in national election results in many countries, including the percentage votes and seats won by the radical right during the post-war era; (ii) analysis of survey data in the thirty-nine countries included in the European Social Survey 2002 and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-2002; and lastly (iii) case-studies of party competition in selected elections and content analysis of party platforms collected by the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project. The cases illustrate 'secular dealigning elections', exemplified by the failure of the National Front and British National Party despite weakening partisan attachments in the UK, 'deviating elections', shown by the Reform Party's performance in the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections in the United States, and 'critical elections' with an enduring shift in party competition, indicated by the 1993 breakthrough for Reform in Canada and the 1984 European contests for Le Pen's *Front National*.

A major source of survey data for this book is drawn from the 23-nation European Social Survey 2002 (ESS-23)³. This study is designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of its diverse populations. The survey includes a wide range of items designed to monitor voting behavior, partisanship, and an extensive range of social and political attitudes, including multiple items which can be used to develop scales of attitudes towards immigration and refugees, as well as multiple indicators of political interest, efficacy, trust, subjective well-being, family and friendship bonds, and a rich array of detailed socio-demographic data including household composition, work status, dependence on state benefits, ethnicity, type of area, and occupational class. The size of the total pooled sample (with over 40,000 cases) allows us to monitor voting behavior among smaller population subgroups, such as ethnic minorities. The survey includes four nations in Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark), eight nations in Northern Europe (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), six from Mediterranean Europe (Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, and Israel), and four post-Communist societies in Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia). As shown in Table 2.1, all these countries fall within the category of electoral democracies, for example classified by Freedom House in 2001-2 as fully 'free' in their political rights and civil liberties, using the Gastil Index. Most can also be categorized as affluent post-industrial economies (with an average per capita GDP in 2002 ranging from \$16,000 (in Greece) to

\$30,000 (in Norway), although all of the post-Communist states except Slovenia fall below this level. The ESS facilitates comparison across a range of advanced industrialized societies in Western Europe sharing a broadly similar cultural heritage and level of development.

[Table 2.1 about here]

This survey is supplemented by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-2001 (CSES). This project is based on an international team of collaborators who have incorporated a special battery of survey questions into the national election studies, based on a representative sample of the electorate in each country. Data from each of the separate election studies was coordinated, integrated and cleaned by the Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, at the University of Michigan⁴. The dataset is designed to facilitate the comparison of macro and micro-level electoral data. Module 1 of the CSES (released in July 2002) used in this study allows us to compare surveys of a representative cross-section of the electorate in 37 legislative and presidential national elections in 32 countries. The geographic coverage includes countries containing in total over 1.2 million inhabitants, or one fifth of the world's population. The focus on voters' choices, the cross-national integration, and above all the timing of the data collection (within a year following each of the elections), provide a unique opportunity to compare voting behavior in a way that is not possible through other common sources of comparative data. Throughout the book, the national elections under comparison in the CSES are those held from 1996-2002 for the lower house of the national parliament and for presidential contests.

The 'most different' research design is particularly well-suited to the societies included in these surveys as they range from low or middle-income developing nations, such as Thailand, Mexico, Ukraine, Belarus, and Romania (all with a per capita PPP GDP of less than \$5000 in 1998), to some of the most affluent societies in the world, including Switzerland, the United States and Japan (with an equivalent per capita GDP of more than \$30,000). Table 2.1 illustrates some of the basic characteristics of these nations. The countries under comparison in the CSES have varied political institutions, rates of population migration, levels of democratization, and cultural historical traditions, all of which can be incorporated into comprehensive explanations of patterns of rightwing support. Ethnically-homogeneous societies such as Poland, Norway, and Britain are included, as well as plural societies with multiple social cleavages, exemplified by Israel and Belgium. The length of time that each country has experienced democratic institutions also varies considerably, as measured by the mean score 1972-2003 on the Gastil Index measured by Freedom House, which can be expected to have an important impact upon electoral behavior and patterns of party competition. While Australia and Sweden are long-established democracies, countries such as Spain and Portugal experienced their democratic revolutions in the early-1970s, while still others like the Ukraine, Russia and Belarus are characterized by unstable and fragmented opposition parties, ineffective legislatures, and limited checks on the executive, with a patchy record of civil liberties and political rights⁵.

This study therefore compares a wide range of older democracies, newer democracies and a few non-democratic states. To classify levels of democratization on a systematic and consistent basis, the book uses indices developed by Freedom House monitoring political rights and civil liberties since 1972. Recent years have seen increasingly sophisticated attempts to develop effective measures of democracy. These include minimalist definitions, such as the dichotomous classification of all political systems into democracies and autocracies developed by Przeworski et al., multidimensional scales used by the World Bank to rank national levels of corruption, stability, and rule of law, and immensely rich and detailed qualitative 'democratic audits' conducted in just a few countries⁶. Alternative summary indices emphasize different components. All suffer from certain conceptual or methodological limitations in their reliability, consistency, and validity. Nevertheless a comparison of nine major indices of democracy by Munck and Verkuilen concluded that, despite these methodological differences, in practice simple correlation tests showed that there was considerable similarity in how nations were ranked across different measures: *"For all the differences in conceptualization, measurement and aggregation,*

*they seem to show that the reviewed indices are tapping into the same underlying realities.*⁷ Systematic biases may be generated from reliance by all the indices on similar sources of evidence, or from common data limitations, but the correlation of outcomes suggests that the adoption of one or another measure is unlikely to generate widely varying classifications of countries. The Gastil index, used by Freedom House, is adopted here from the range of alternatives, as in previous work by the author, because it provides comprehensive coverage worldwide, including all nation-states and independent territories around the globe⁸. The index also facilitates time-series analysis of trends in democratization, since an annual measurement for each country has been produced every year since the early-1970s. The index has become widely accepted as one of the standard measures providing a multidimensional classification of political rights and civil liberties. Table 2.1 shows the mean annual Freedom House ratings calculated from 1972-2003, as an indicator of democratic histories, and it also provides the most recent rating available (2003) for comparison⁹.

Based on this measure, '*older democracies*' are defined as the 39 states around the world with at least twenty years continuous experience of democracy from 1983-2003 and a Freedom House score of 1.0 to 1.5 in the 2002 rating. '*Newer democracies*' are classified as the 43 states with less than twenty years experience with democracy and the 2002 Freedom House rating of 1.0 to 1.5. Another 47 states were classified as *semi-democracies* (Freedom House describes them as 'partly-free;' others use the terms, 'transitional' or 'consolidating' democracies); these states have been democratic for less than twenty years and have a Freedom House ratings in 2002 of 2.0 to 3.5. *Non-democracies* are the remaining 62 states, with a (reversed) Freedom House score in 2002 from 4.0 to 7.0; they include military-backed dictatorships, authoritarian states, elitist oligarchies, and absolute monarchies. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are rated as more authoritarian today than the other countries under comparison, nevertheless they are included since they provide an opportunity to examine support for the radical right in a few of the societies with more restricted political rights and civil liberties. Appendix A lists the classifications of nations and the survey coverage used throughout the book, based on these measures.

Classifying Party Families

Within this comparative framework, how can parties on the radical right be defined and classified? Political scientists have developed numerous typologies based on perceived similarities in certain party characteristics, whether in terms of shared programmatic policies and doctrinal appeals, common formal organizational structures, similar social characteristics of their supporters, networks through transnational organizational links, or even party names¹⁰. Certain categories of party families are now well-established and clearly recognized in the literature, such as the 'greens', 'socialists' or 'communists'. Yet it remains unclear whether a single phenomenon labeled 'the radical right' exists, even as a loose category. Parties commonly seen as exemplifying the radical right, such as *Lega Nord*, the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, and the *Dansk Folkeparti*, can also be regarded as highly diverse in their ideological appeals, organizational structures, and leadership rhetoric¹¹. The classification process is relatively straightforward through membership of international party organizations. Most Social Democratic, Socialist and Labour parties, for example, recognize common affiliations through membership of the Socialist International, even when parties within this family diverge in their ideological positions and programmatic stances, such as contrasts over economic and foreign policy between Blair's Labour party and Schroeder's SPD. Radical right parties represented within the European Parliament have developed some common transnational party networks, notably affiliation with the Group of Independents for a Europe of the Nations, which includes the Austrian FPÖ, the Belgian VB and FN, the French FN, the Italian AN, among others¹². But not all parties within this family share this affiliation, even within the EU¹³.

Consistency in the literature is not helped by the transience of many fringe and splinter radical right parties where these organizations collapse, splinter, merge, or reinvent themselves

when fighting successive elections under new leadership and labels. In the Netherlands, for example, the extreme nationalist *Nederlanden Volksunie* fragmented and was succeeded by both the *Centrum Partij* and a splinter group *Centrum Partij '86*, eventually becoming the *Centrumdemocraten (CD)*. Under the leadership of Hans Janmaat, the CD campaigned on anti-immigrant sentiments, law-and-order issues, and populist anti-politics rhetoric, winning only one or two percent of the vote over successive elections, peaking with three seats in 1994 before suffering a dramatic decline in more recent elections. The rise of the more successful *Lijst Pym Fortuyn* tapped electoral support based on a similar appeal, becoming the major opposition party with 17% of the vote on their first attempt in 2002, before they subsequently fell by two-thirds in parliamentary elections the following year, then they crashed and burned in the 2004 elections to the European parliament. Another illustration comes from Canada, where the radical right fought successive elections as the Reform Party (in 1998, 1993 and 1997), the 'Canada Reform Conservative Alliance' (or Alliance for short) in the 2000 Canadian election, and then, after merged with the Progressive Conservatives, the 'Conservative Party of Canada' (in 2004).

Nor is a common nomenclature and terminology shared among parties on the radical right, in part because deep-rooted social sanctions against the fascism indelibly associated with Hitler and Mussolini makes modern parties disown this historical tradition. Orwellian double-speak is also common, notably the adoption of 'democratic' and 'progressive' labels by parties which stand for neither of these things. Standard reference works use alternative typologies and diverse labels categorizing parties as 'far' or 'extreme' right, 'new right', 'anti-immigrant', 'neo-Nazi' or neo-fascist', 'anti-establishment', 'national populist', 'protest', 'ethnic', 'authoritarian', 'anti-government', 'anti-party', 'ultra-nationalist', or 'neo-liberal', 'libertarian', and so on. Some commentators suggest that it may prove misleading to categorize parties together conceptually, as is common, into a single family. Instead it might be more precise to discern two or three distinct 'subfamilies', for example 'neo-liberal', 'anti-immigrant', or 'populist' strands. In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, Ramet classifies radical right parties (seen as sharing organized intolerance) into five discrete strands: ultranationalists, fascist and crypto-fascist, clerical, ultraconservative, and radical-populist¹⁴. Each category carries certain distinct historical associations, ideological identities, and philosophical ideas.

The label '*new right*' is perhaps the most inappropriate since it has become closely associated with the pro-market economic ideas of privatization and rolling back the frontiers of the state, as propagated by Thatcherism and Reaganism¹⁵. *Neo-conservatism* falls into the same category; for example many of those at the heart of the Bush administration's interventionist foreign policy and tax-cutting economic agenda are popularly known as the 'neo-cons', including Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, James Woolsey, Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney. Kitschelt has argued persuasively that '*neo-fascist*' would be an inaccurate label, since parties such as the Austrian FPO, the French FN and the Swiss SD deny any links with historic fascism, they derive support from a different class base, and nor do they espouse many of the characteristic ideas traditionally associated with this ideology, such as the strong anti-capitalist populist appeal for the 'common man' against the forces of big business and corporatist economic policies: "*The fascist rhetoric was authoritarian, communitarian, and anti-capitalist, a rather different blend of appeals than that of the NRR.*"¹⁶ The nomenclature '*extreme-right*' is another common alternative but this can imply groups well beyond the legal boundaries of democratic politics that are willing to use violent direct actions, or even terrorist tactics. In Europe, incidents of racist violence by rightwing social movements and youth groups are monitored by organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Reports document direct acts of anti-Semitism (such as hate-mail and vandalizing synagogues), terrorist intimidation of immigrant communities, and neo-Nazi bombings against foreigners. In America, violent pro-Life groups employ acts of bombing and arson used against abortion clinics and physicians in the United States, while paramilitary groups in the Patriot or Militia movement also fall into the extreme right category¹⁷. Examples of genuinely extreme-right ultra-fringe parties include the Norwegian *Fedrelandspartiet* (The Fatherland party) and *Hvit valgallianse* (The White Electoral Alliance), the National Democratic

Party of Austria, and the *Partei Rechtstaatlicher Offensive* (Law and Order Party) in Hamburg, Germany. By contrast, the parties studied within this book compete using conventional electoral channels and disown the explicit adoption or use of violent tactics and terrorist practices.

Whereas many of these terms have various weaknesses, the term '*radical right*' presents certain advantages. The concept is well-established; it was first popularized by Daniel Bell in *The Radical Right*, published in 1963, and it became widely adopted by other American social scientists during this era¹⁸. The German literature also commonly used this term following the lead of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution that prohibited certain parties from standing for election. The value of this terminology is that it avoids prejudging the programmatic content or rhetorical appeal of these parties, for example by labeling these parties 'anti-immigrant', 'nationalist', 'anti-system', or 'populist', which can generate a circular logic in any empirical analysis. It remains to be seen whether or not parties actively espouse these policies and stances. The exercise of analytical classification and typologies for its own sake may be a somewhat arid pursuit, unless it tells us something more theoretically or empirically, for example in identifying the drivers of electoral support or in understanding the impact of these parties on public policy. At the same time, the label adopted in this study denotes that these parties are located towards one pole on the standard ideological left-right scale where parties are conventionally arrayed, and it remains to be determined if these parties do or do not share other important characteristics.

Classifying party ideology

The question arises whether diverse parties, conventionally classified as belonging to the radical right party family can, indeed, be regarded as having shared ideological goals, core identities, or social characteristics¹⁹. The study uses systematic evidence to classify contemporary parties based on 'expert judgment surveys'. This approach has been widely used in the literature on party politics, including a pioneering study in 1984 by Castle and Mair, replicated in 1992 by Laver and Hunt, and again in 1995 by Huber and Inglehart's study covering a broader range of nations.²⁰ Coppedge conducted a similar exercise covering Latin American parties²¹. The most recent expert survey in Western Europe, conducted by Marcel Lubbers in January 2000, sent a questionnaire to a random sample of 290 political scientists in all 15-member states of the European Union as well as to Norway and Switzerland. The survey achieved a satisfactory response rate (150 or 52% of the questionnaires were successfully completed and returned). The questionnaire asked respondents to place political parties in their country on scales ranging from 0 to 10. These scales represented (i) the current position of each party on an ideological scale ranging from 'left' (0) to 'right' (10); (ii) the current position of each party on an immigration scale ranging from 'Not very restrictive' (0) to 'very restrictive' (10); the past position of each party in 1990 on a similar immigration scale. Information was also gathered about party organizations and leadership. There was a high degree of inter-coder reliability and the results of the left-right Lubbers scale were compared with the 1995 Huber and Inglehart survey as an additional crosscheck on external validity. The scores on the two independent expert scales were highly correlated ($R=.99$).

[Figure 2.1 about here]

Figure 2.1 shows the pattern of party competition in each country according to the ideological placement of each party, with the left-right scale plotted on the vertical axis and the restriction of immigration scale shown on the horizontal axis. The size of each party is also illustrated in terms of their share of the vote in the most recent national legislative elections. The results show that parties scored by experts as most rightwing on the left-right Lubbers scale were also usually scored as most restrictive on the immigration Lubbers scale. For example, according to these scales, the Austrian FPÖ, Belgian VB, French FN, and UK BNP are all consistently

located in the top right corner of the scatter-gram for each country. By contrast, European green and communist parties are usually located in the bottom-left position. Only one case (Norway) shows a more divergent pattern among parties on the right. Accordingly these two scores were combined for analysis. Parties were classified in this book as part of the radical right if their mean score on the combined left-right and immigration 10-point scales in the Lubbers survey were rated at greater than 8.0. This list was cross-checked against the literature and found to be consistent with most previous classifications, although there is dispute about borderline cases and the appropriate 'cut-off' point on any measures²².

Yet unfortunately the Lubbers expert survey covers only seventeen European nations. To supplement this resource with comparisons from a wider range of countries, where appropriate this study also draws upon expert judgments made in the 1995 study by Huber and Inglehart, by Coppedge for parties in Latin America, as well as studies by Ramet and by Lewis of party systems in Central and Eastern Europe, and by the principle investigators in the 32-nation Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996-2001 who were asked to classify the parties included in this study along a 10-point left-right scale²³. These judgments were supplemented in a few cases where such evaluations are not available by careful judgments based on a review of the existing research and standard references sources²⁴.

Classifying party strength

As well as their ideological position, the electoral strength of radical right parties also needs to be classified systematically based on their share of votes or seats. Some fringe parties in this family struggle to contest local, regional or national parliamentary elections, but without gaining more than a handful of seats, if that, in one or two contests before simply fading away. Indeed some extra-parliamentary parties, which function more like interest groups or social movements, never contend national elections. Other parties on the radical right gradually develop a substantial base of supporters in the electorate allowing members of parliament to be returned to office consistently over a series of elections, with all the legitimacy and credibility that this process entails. Within each election, parties can have a sudden breakthrough in support, or they may experience an equally rapid decline in their fortunes. By definition, 'flash' parties are particularly prone to this volatility, for example the sudden wave of sympathy for *Lijst Pym Fortyna* triggered by the assassination of their leader and their subsequent fall from popularity. Party fragmentation also complicates estimates of party strength, where parties split into contending fractions, or where they re-launch themselves under new labels, because it makes it difficult to establish whether there is genuine continuity in any one party organization. In Italy, for example, there is an identifiable continuity when the MSI, which had operated throughout the postwar era, dissolved and re-launched their party in January 1995 as the *Alleanza Nazionale*. In Denmark, however, the older *Fremskridtsparti* (FP), founded by Mogens Glistrup in 1972, suffered a leadership split in 1995 and it was gradually displaced in subsequent elections by the more radical *Dansk Folkeparti* (DF), founded by Pia Kjaersgaard.

To exclude some of these volatile fluctuations, and to develop a more reliable and consistent classification, contemporary party strength is measured here as the mean share of votes or seats won over the series of national legislative elections held since 1990. This historical watershed is selected because of the major discontinuities in party systems brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Communist party hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe. Party systems in some established democracies (notably Italy and New Zealand) were also transformed in the early-1990s, following major reforms to the electoral system producing the disintegration of older patterns of party competition. '*Electoral*' parties are defined in this study as those parties contesting seats in the lower house of the national legislature (excluding purely regional parties fighting only local contests).

Electoral parties can be further subdivided based on their share of the vote in elections to the national legislature since 1990. '*Relevant*' electoral parties are defined as those achieving at least 3.0 percent the mean share of the vote. By contrast, '*fringe*' electoral parties achieve 2.9

percent or less of the vote²⁵. The relevant parties are also the most politically influential, through winning the greatest share of parliamentary seats and exercising the strongest impact upon public policy and the political system, although their legislative representation depends on the electoral system. Elections results are derived from Mackie and Rose *The International Almanac of Electoral History* and subsequent publications in this series, supplemented in the most recent contests by results from *Elections around the World*²⁶. The study compares more than forty parties, of which about half can be classified as 'relevant' with the remainder 'fringe'.

It should be recognized that these distinctions remain imprecise. There is room for debate borderline cases, such as the Belgian *Front National* (falling just below the threshold) or the Danish *Fremskridtspartiet* (just above). Nevertheless the criteria adopted here is the conventional cut-off point for monitoring party strength and counting the effective number of parties adopted by many other studies²⁷. The results are also sensitive to marginal differences in periodization, for example if the mean share of the vote is estimated from a slightly earlier or later year. Moreover these measures do not take account of other indicators of party popularity, such as vote or seat gains in local councils, regional assemblies, or the European parliament, support for parties monitored in regularly opinion polls, or other indicators of party membership, finances, or organizational strength. Often minor parties can be excluded from national parliaments while demonstrating pockets of strong support in local areas or municipalities, especially in federal systems, for example the share of the vote for the *Front National* is far greater if measured in the Francophone region of Wallonia rather than across the whole of Belgium. Despite these limitations, the selected indicators do provide a consistent and reliable nation-wide yardstick that can be used to compare party strength across different countries and political systems. Alternative measures were tested and it is doubtful if the inclusion or exclusion of any particular borderline case would cause fundamental revisions to the main conclusions drawn from the study. The distinction is an important one; in contrast to fringe parties, relevant parties are more likely to be in a position to consolidate support over a series of elections, for example building up a grassroots network of local volunteers and activists, institutionalizing internal party bodies, creating official rules of candidate nomination and leadership succession, formalizing decision-making processes in the party organization, establishing party discipline and coordination within parliament, developing a body of experienced and well-known legislators at local, regional and national levels, and accumulating organizational and financial resources which can lead to further electoral success. In short, there are no guarantees that minor parties will succeed in institutionalizing their organization, but they are closer to power and, even with sporadic successes, fringe parties are more likely to prove transient. Indeed the occasional election which symbolizes the shift from fringe to minor party status, discussed in chapter 10, a critical one for new challengers to party systems.

Given this approach, how far are the electoral fortunes of radical right parties determined by their broader institutional context? Where have they succeeded in establishing a beachhead in elected office and where have they failed to gather any substantial popular support? Before analyzing the causes of this phenomenon, the next chapter first describes the main parties that are then analyzed throughout the rest of the book.

Table 2.1: The comparative framework

	<i>Nation</i>	<i>Abrv.</i>	<i>HDI rank 2001 (UNDP 2003)</i>	<i>GDP per capita PPP 2000 (World Bank 2002)</i>	<i>Total pop. 2002 (World Bank 2002)</i>	<i>Freedom House Mean Political Rights & Civil Liberties 1972-2003</i>	<i>Freedom House Rating Political Rights & Civil Liberties 2002</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Type of electoral system (IDEA 1997)</i>	<i>% Vote radical right 2000- 2004</i>
1	Australia	AUS	4	25,693	18,880,000	1.0	1.0	Asia-Pacific	AV	4.3
2	Austria	AUT	16	26,765	7,705,000	1.0	1.0	W. Europe	List PR	10.0
3	Belarus	BLR	53	7,544	10,236,000	5.9	6.0	C&E Europe	Two round	.
4	Belgium	BEL	6	27,178	10,161,000	1.1	1.0	W. Europe	List PR	13.6
5	Canada	CAN	8	27,840	31,147,000	1.0	1.0	N. America	FPTP	25.5
6	Chile	CHL	43	9,417	15,211,000	3.9	1.5	S. America	List PR	44.2
7	Czech Rep	CZE	32	13,991	10,244,000	4.6	1.5	C&E Europe	List PR	1.0
8	Denmark	DNK	11	27,627	5,293,000	1.0	1.0	Scandinavia	List PR	12.6
9	Finland	FIN	14	24,996	5,176,000	1.5	1.0	Scandinavia	List PR	0.0
10	France	FRA	17	24,223	59,080,000	1.5	1.0	W. Europe	Two round	13.2
11	Germany	DEU	18	25,103	82,220,000	1.4	1.0	W. Europe	CD	.3
12	Greece	GRC	24	16,501	10,645,000	2.1	1.5	W. Europe	List PR	2.2
13	Hungary	HUN	38	12,416	10,036,000	3.8	1.5	C&E Europe	CD	4.4
14	Iceland	ISL	2	29,581	281,000	1.0	1.0	Scandinavia	List PR	.0
15	Ireland	IRL	12	29,866	3,730,000	1.1	1.0	W. Europe	STV	.0
16	Israel	ISR	22	20,131	5,122,000	2.1	2.0	Middle East	List PR	9.7
17	Italy	ITA	21	23,626	57,298,000	1.4	1.0	W. Europe	CD	16.3
18	Japan	JPN	9	26,755	126,714,000	1.4	1.5	Asia-Pacific	CI	0.0
19	Korea, Rep	KOR	30	15,054	46,844,000	3.7	2.0	Asia-Pacific	CI	0.0
20	Lithuania	LTU	45	7,106	3,670,000	4.5	1.5	C&E Europe	CI	1.3
21	Luxembourg	LUX	15	46,833	431,000	1.1	1.0	W. Europe	List PR	0.0
22	Mexico	MEX	55	9,023	98,881,000	3.6	2.0	N. America	CD	0.0
23	Netherlands	NLD	5	25,657	15,786,000	1.0	1.0	W. Europe	List PR	5.7
24	New Zealand	NZL	20	20,070	3,862,000	1.0	1.0	Asia-Pacific	CD	10.4
25	Norway	NOR	1	29,918	4,461,000	1.0	1.0	Scandinavia	List PR	14.5
26	Peru	PER	82	4,799	25,662,000	3.8	2.5	S. America	List PR	0.0

	<i>Nation</i>	<i>Abrv.</i>	<i>HDI rank 2001 (UNDP 2003)</i>	<i>GDP per capita PPP 2000 (World Bank 2002)</i>	<i>Total pop. 2002 (World Bank 2002)</i>	<i>Freedom House Mean Political Rights & Civil Liberties 1972-2003</i>	<i>Freedom House Rating Political Rights & Civil Liberties 2002</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Type of electoral system (IDEA 1997)</i>	<i>% Vote radical right 2000-2004</i>
27	Poland	POL	35	9,051	38,765,000	3.8	1.5	C&E Europe	List PR	0.0
28	Portugal	PRT	23	17,290	9,875,000	1.8	1.0	W. Europe	List PR	0.0
29	Romania	ROM	72	6,423	22,327,000	5.2	2.0	C&E Europe	List PR	21.0
30	Russia	RUS	63	8,377	146,934,000	5.4	5.0	C&E Europe	CI	11.5
31	Slovenia	SVN	29	17,367	1,986,000	4.5	1.0	C&E Europe	List PR	4.4
32	Spain	ESP	19	19,472	39,630,000	2.1	1.0	W. Europe	List PR	0.1
33	Sweden	SWE	3	24,277	8,910,000	1.0	1.0	Scandinavia	List PR	1.4
34	Switzerland	CHE	10	28,769	7,386,000	1.0	1.0	W. Europe	List PR	29.5
35	Taiwan	TWN	.	.	22,401,000	4.0	2.0	Asia-Pacific	CI	0.0
36	Thailand	THA	74	6,402	61,399,000	3.6	2.5	Asia-Pacific	CD	0.0
37	Ukraine	UKR	75	3,816	50,456,000	5.2	4.0	C&E Europe	CI	0.1
38	UK	GBR	13	24,455	58,830,000	1.2	1.0	W. Europe	FPTP	0.2
39	US	USA	7	34,142	278,357,000	1.0	1.0	N. America	FPTP	0.0
Total		39	38	38	39	39	39	39	39	28

Notes:

HDI rank 2001: The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) ranking of all nations worldwide according to the Human Development Index in 2001. The HDI is based on longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational achievement; and standard of living, as measured by per capita GDP (PPP \$US). A high rank represents greater development. Human Development Report, 2003.


GDP per capita: Gross Domestic Product (2000) measured in \$US in Purchasing Power Parity. World Bank Development Indicators, 2002.

Type of electoral system: International IDEA.

Freedom House Gastil index: A 7-point scale used by Freedom House, measuring political rights and civil liberties every year, where high equals most democratic. www.Freedomhouse.com.

Sources:

Figure 2.1: ‘Expert’ location of party competition in Western Europe



Note: The location of parties on 10-point scales measuring left-right economic positions (vertical axis) and tolerance of immigration (horizontal axis). Source: Lubbers, Marcel. 2000. [principal investigator] *Expert Judgment Survey of Western-European Political Parties 2000* NWO, Department of Sociology, University of Nijmegen.

¹ This book draws mainly upon the most recent expert survey conducted in 2000 by Marcel Lubbers, for which we are much indebted. Details of the data, methodology, and codebook are available from Marcel Lubbers. 2000. [Principal investigator] *Expert Judgment Survey of Western-European Political Parties 2000* [machine readable data set]. Nijmegen, the Netherlands: NWO, Department of Sociology, University of Nijmegen.

² For a discussion of the most different and most similar approaches to comparative politics, see Todd Landman. 2000. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics*. London: Routledge. Chapter 2.

³ For more details of the European Social Survey, including the questionnaire and methodology, see <http://naticent02.uuhost.uu.net/index.htm>. Data for an initial twenty countries, along with comprehensive documentation, is accessible at <http://ess.nsd.uib.no>. It is anticipated that subsequent releases will include data from 2 more countries which participated in Round I, namely France and Turkey. The survey is funded via the European Commission's 5th Framework Program, with supplementary funds from the European Science Foundation which also sponsored the development of the study over a number of years. I am most grateful to the European Commission and the ESF for their support for this project, and to the work of the ESS Central Coordinating Team, led by Roger Jowell, for making this survey data available.

⁴ The CSES dataset also includes an election survey in Hong Kong, but this was dropped to facilitate consistent comparison across independent nation-states. The dataset used in this study is based on the 31 July 2002 release of Module 1, with the exception of France which was derived from the early release of Module II of the CSES. Full details are available at www.umich.edu/~nes/cses. I am most grateful to the CSES secretariat, and all the partner national election survey organizations, for making this dataset available.

⁵ Although use of the term 'transitional democracies' may be misleading. See Thomas Carothers. 2002. 'The End of the Transition Paradigm.' *Journal of Democracy* 13(1): 5-21.

⁶ See Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press. For the World Bank indicators of good governance see Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. May 2003. 'Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 1996-2002.' <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html>

For the 'democratic audit' approach, see International IDEA www.IDEA.int.

⁷ See also Geraldo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. 'Conceptualizing and measuring democracy - Evaluating alternative indices.' *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (1): 5-34.

⁸ See, in particular, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁹ Societies are defined based on the annual ratings provided by Freedom House since 1972. *The level of freedom* is classified according to the combined mean score for political rights and civil liberties in Freedom House's 1972-2000 annual surveys *Freedom of the World*. www.freedomhouse.org

¹⁰ For a discussion see, for example, Peter Mair and Cas Mudde. 1998. 'The party family and its study.' *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 211-229; Meindert Fennema. 1997. 'Some conceptual issues and problems in the comparison of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe.' *Party Politics* 3:473-92.

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- ¹¹ Cas Mudde. 2000. *The ideology of the extreme right*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- ¹² Simon Hix. 2002. 'Parties at the European level.' Table 10.5. In *Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Edited by Paul Webb, David Farrell and Ian Holliday. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ¹³ For example, in the EP *Lega Nord* is affiliated with the Regionalist parties and European Radical Alliance Group.
- ¹⁴ Sabrina P. Ramet. Ed. 1999. *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*. Pennsylvania: The University of Pennsylvania Press. P.24.
- ¹⁵ See, for example, Kenneth Hoover and Raymond Plant. 1989. *Conservative capitalism in Britain and the United States*. New York: Routledge; Desmond S. King. 1987. *The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship*. Chicago: Dorsey Press.
- ¹⁶ Herbert Kitschelt, with Anthony J. McGann. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan p.27-42.
- ¹⁷ Michael Cox and Martin Durham. 'The politics of anger: the extreme right in the United States.' In *The Politics of the Extreme Right*. Edited by Paul Hainsworth. London: Pinter.
- ¹⁸ Daniel Bell. Ed. 2001 [1963]. *The Radical Right*. New York: Transaction Books. See also Seymour Martin Lipset. 1978. *The Politics of Unreason: Rightwing extremism in America 1790-1977*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Richard Hofstadter. 1967. *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*. New York: Vintage Books.
- ¹⁹ Peter Mair and Cas Mudde. 1998. 'The party family and its study.' *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 211-229.
- ²⁰ For previous expert surveys, see Francis G. Castles, and Peter Mair. 1984. 'Left-Right Political Scales: Some 'Expert' Judgments.' *European Journal of Political Research* 12 (1):73-88; Michael Laver and W. Ben Hunt. 1992. *Policy and Party Competition*. New York: Routledge; John Huber and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. 'Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies.' *Party Politics* 1 (January): 73–111. For a discussion of the pros and cons of this approach, see Myunghye Kim and Michael D. McDonald. 2002. 'Cross-national comparability of party left-right positions.' *Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting*, November, Savannah, Georgia; Ian Budge. 2000. 'Expert judgments of party policy positions: Uses and limitations in political research.' *European Journal of Political Research* 37 (1): 103-113.
- ²¹ Michael Coppedge. 'A classification of Latin American political parties.' Kellogg Institute University of Notre Dame Working Paper 244 November 1997.
- ²² The *Alleanza Nazionale*, in particular, is not always consistently classified as part of the radical right family in all studies.
- ²³ Sabrina P. Ramet. Ed. 1999. *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvanian State University Press; Michael Coppedge. 'A classification of Latin American political parties.' Kellogg Institute University of Notre Dame Working Paper 244 November 1997.
- ²⁴ Notably by Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Mueller and William R. Overstreet. 2003. *Political Handbook of the World, 2000-2002*. Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications, and also Jan-Erik Lane, David McKay, and Kenneth Newton. Eds. 1997. *Political Data Handbook*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

²⁵ 'Parliamentary' parties are defined in a similar way as those that win seats in the lower house of the national legislature. 'Fringe parliamentary parties' win less than 2.9% of seats while by contrast 'relevant parliamentary parties' gain 3.0 per cent or more.

²⁶ Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1991. *The International Almanac of Electoral History*. Washington DC: CQ Press; Tom Mackie and Richard Rose. 1997. *A Decade of Election Results: Updating the international Almanac*. Studies in Public Policy. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde; Richard Rose, Neil Munro and Tom Mackie. 1998. *Elections in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990*. Studies in Public Policy 300. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde; Elections around the World www.electionworld.org.

²⁷ Giovanni Sartori. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.