

Chapter 3

Comparing parties

During the post-war era, party systems in established democracies enjoyed considerable stability. The standard explanation for this phenomenon was provided by Lipset and Rokken's seminal work, which suggested that patterns of party competition in Western Europe were 'frozen' from the 1920s until the mid-1960s between the block of Social Democratic, Labour and Communist parties on the left and the block of Christian Democratic, Liberal, and Conservative parties on the right, in a mold established with the expansion of the working class franchise decades earlier¹. Yet from the late-1960s or early-1970s onwards, challenges to established party systems emerged sporadically at intervals in some Western democracies, with occasional electoral successes catalyzed by diverse issues, movements, and parties. One of the first indicators occurred with the sudden success of the radical right *Fremskridtspartiet* (FrP - Danish Progress Party), becoming Denmark's second largest party in 1973. This led observers such as Mogens Pedersen to detect evidence of greater electoral volatility in some European democracies, notably in France, Germany, Denmark and Norway, although stability continued elsewhere, such as in Austria, Switzerland and Sweden, where the relative strength of parties hardly changed from one election to the next². Since the mid-1980s, many indicators have confirmed observations of growing party fragmentation and electoral volatility following the rise of new challenger parties, including those on the radical right.

[Tables 3.1]

The chapter compares legislative elections results for radical right parties in established democracies in Western Europe and Anglo-American societies since 1945, and similar patterns in selected newer democracies in post-Communist Europe and in Latin America since 1990. Leaving aside the ultra-marginal extra-parliamentary parties and social movements, as well beyond the scope of this study, Table 3.1 summarizes the contemporary electoral parties of the radical right in the nations under comparison. Parties are identified as falling within this family if located at or above 8.0 on the 'expert' 10-point combined ideological scales described in the previous chapter, or (if not included in the Lubbers comparison) from other standard expert judgments and reference sources³. In total, forty-three parties meet this criterion. These are then further subdivided according to their contemporary electoral strength into the categories of 'relevant' and 'fringe' parties (relevant parties are defined as those with an average of 3.0% or more of the vote in national legislative elections held during the 1990s).

In older democracies, the relevant parties on the radical right that are the focus of this study include the Italian MSI/AN, the Italian LN, the Austrian FPÖ, the Dutch LPF, the Swiss SVP, the Danish FP, the Danish DF, the Norwegian FrP, the Belgian VIB, the French FN, Pauline Hanson's One Nation, New Zealand First, and the Canadian Reform/Alliance/Conservative party. Similar parties in selected post-Communist European nations under comparison include the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, the Slovene National party, the Greater Romanian party, the Romanian National Unity Party and the Liberal Democratic party in Russia and the Ukraine. Comparisons also include the Independent Democratic Union and National Renewal in Chile, and the National Religious Party and National Union in Israel. The heart of this book focuses upon explaining the popular success of these parties – and yet the failure of any equivalent breakthroughs in other established democracies where any similar sister parties remain marginalized in terms of winning popular support, exemplified by the German NDP, the British BNP, and the Belgian *Front National*. It should be acknowledged that the distinction between 'relevant' and 'fringe' becomes less clear-cut where smaller parties display strength within particular local communities or regional assemblies, or where their candidates are elected to the European Parliament, even if failing to break through successfully as effective players over a sustained series of national contests. Yet the basic contrast remains between relevant parties playing an important role in national legislatures and the public policy process, with all the legitimacy, status, resources, and media publicity which flow from elected office, and fringe parties which fail to breakthrough this critical barrier even if fighting national or European elections. Another category includes the ultra-fringe radical right parties, factions, and

organizations which prioritize direct action and extra-parliamentary organization over contesting national elections, as well as the extreme right social movements, but these groups fall well beyond the scope of this study.

To provide a brief overview of support for these parties, Figure 3.1 illustrates trends in the share of the radical right vote in national parliamentary elections during the postwar era in older democracies. The graphs show how these parties have moved from margin to mainstream in recent decades, although marked contrasts are apparent in the patterns of electoral support among these nations. The illustrations highlight the erratic fluctuations in their electoral fortunes in Denmark and Norway, for example, by contrast to their strong surge in popularity experienced in Canada, Switzerland, and Austria. Figure 3.2 maps voting support for radical right parties in Europe in the most recent national legislative election, showing the patchwork quilt of popularity rather than any simple geographic concentration in any one region. A brief summary description of the main players and their electoral fortunes during the postwar era in each major region (including (i) continental Western Europe, (ii) Anglo-American democracies, (iii) post-Communist Europe, and (iv) Latin America) familiarizes us with their basic features before we go on to analyze the main factors driving their support in subsequent chapters.

[Figure 3.1 and 3.2 about here]

(i) The radical right in continental Western Europe

France

In France, a dramatic seismic political tremor occurred in January 1956 when the established parties were rocked by the success of Poujade's party, the Union for the Defense of Merchants and Artisans (UDCA), which gained 58 Deputies and 12.3% of the vote at their first national election. Under Pierre Poujade, a grocer, the party represented a coalition of petty bourgeoisie, independent artisans, shop-keepers, entrepreneurs, and peasant farmers attracted by populist rhetoric directed against taxes, big business, and big government⁴. Their aim was to preserve the economic viability of the independent self-employed petty bourgeoisie, threatened by large corporations and government regulations, but under assault from the government and established parties, their rebellion proved short-lived. Perhaps the best known of the contemporary radical right parties in Western Europe is the *Front National* (FN), a persistent presence in French politics since it was founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen⁵. For years, the party could not make a decisive breakthrough at national level; in 1981, for example, Le Pen failed to scrape together the minimum 500 signatures needed to contest the presidential election. Yet in April 2002, Le Pen shocked commentators by coming second with 17% of the vote, gaining over six million ballots, in the first round of the French Presidential elections. The *Partie Socialist* Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, was knocked out of the race. Millions of French citizens were jolted out of electoral apathy, and massive protests erupted spontaneously in many cities, before the final round ballot two weeks later eventually assured President Chirac's Gaullist defeat of Le Pen⁶.

The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, Koekoek's Farmer's Party (BP) came closest to French Poujadism, opposing European integration and development aid. The BP support peaked in the 1960s, winning seven seats in the Tweede Kamer in 1967. In 1971, it lost much of that support, and never really regained it, losing its last remaining seat in 1981. The main Dutch radical right parties were the *Nederlanden Volksunie* (Netherlands People's Union) which was succeeded by the *Centrum Partij* (Center Party - CP) and the splinter *Centrum Partij '86* (Center Party '86). The *Centrumdemocraten* (Center Democrats - CD) was formed in 1986, gaining marginal support throughout the 1990s (peaking with 2.5% of the vote in 1994). In May 2002, the assassination of Pim Fortuyn just before the Dutch general election led to a sudden surge of support for his party,

the anti-immigrant *Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF)*. Founded just three months earlier, the LPF entered parliament as the second largest party in their first attempt, entering into coalition government led by the Christian Democrats. Their initial success caused shockwaves in the Dutch political system although, lacking experienced leaders or clear policies, and with scandal and divisions destabilizing the coalition, the government proved short-lived. In the subsequent January 2003 general election, the LPF vote faded from 17% to 5.7%, causing the loss of two-thirds of their elected members. The party achieved a marginal share of the vote and had no members elected in the 2004 elections to the European parliament⁷. The May 2002 election exemplified a 'deviating' election, providing a radical jolt to the party system, but one that ultimately proved short-lived.

Belgium

Next door in the Flanders region of Belgium, the xenophobic *Vlaams Blok* (Flemish Bloc – VB) began in 1978 as a split from the more moderate *Volksunie* (People's Union). VB support has been concentrated in the city of Antwerp, where they gradually expanded their vote, rising from the smallest party in 1982 to the largest in 1994. In October 2000 the party won a third of the vote, and almost half of the seats, in Antwerp city council elections, where support crumbled for the traditional Christian Democrats and Social Democrat who traditionally divided up power⁸. Building on this base, in parliamentary elections on May 2003, the party surged to 11.6% of the national vote, including 17.9% in their home region of Flanders. *Vlaams Blok* had campaigned under the slogan '*Our people first!*', demanding that Belgium close its borders to immigrants and prohibit multicultural education, as well as a radical platform advocating regional independence⁹. Although these are their defining issues, the party also stands for a broader range of right-wing positions, by defending traditional moral values, evoking hard-line anti-crime measures, and fostering free market economic policies¹⁰. By contrast, in the Francophone Wallonian region the *Front National* (FN) born in 1985 remains far weaker, based largely on groups of radical activists but suffering from ineffective leadership. Their peak of support was 7.9% of the Wallonian vote (2.9% Belgium-wide) achieved in the 1994 elections to the European parliament. The Belgian FN follows the model of Le Pen's *Front National*, with similar slogans and policy platforms, but with less success.

Austria

In Austria the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ, Freedom Party) was founded in 1956 by former Nazi, Anton Feithaller, with support from Nazi sympathizers. During the 1970s the party adopted more moderate policies, ejecting extremist elements, and in 1983 they joined a governing coalition with the Socialists. This collapsed in 1986 with the election of Jörg Haider as the new party chairman, who shifted the party towards the right. Jörg Haider was notorious for alleged Nazi sympathies and his plans to halt immigration, an issue particularly sensitive given Austria's past history. The party gained support from the early-1990s onwards until by the time of the 1999 election the FPÖ had become the second largest party in Austria with 26.9% of the vote and 55 seats in the Nationalrat¹¹. The entry of the FPÖ into government, in coalition with the conservative *Österreichische Volkspartei* (ÖVP, Austrian People's Party), triggered an international outcry and diplomatic sanctions mounted against Austria by the European Union and US. Haider was forced to resign as leader and the FPÖ subsequently lost ground in national elections in November 2002, although they remain in coalition government with the ÖVP, as well as holding pockets of electoral strength in local and regional politics¹².

Switzerland

In *Switzerland*, the most notable challenge to the mainstream right is the *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (SVP – Swiss People's Party). Support for the SVP, which had averaged about one in ten Swiss voters since the party was founded in 1965, suddenly jumped to 14.9% in 1995 and then to 23.3% in 1999. As in the Austrian case, the most plausible explanation for this rise is the outspoken views of their charismatic leader, Christoph Blocher's, shifting the SVP sharply rightwards in the mid-1990s by emphasizing a populist, anti-immigrant, and anti-EU platform. Nor was this election a deviating case; the gains registered by *Schweizerische Volkspartei* were consolidated in the October 2003 elections, when they became the largest party in the Swiss

parliament with 26.6% of the vote and 55 out of the 200 seats in the Nationalrat. Victory led to the inclusion of two SVP members of the Federal Council, not one, the first change to the 'magic formula' traditional division of cabinet spoils in Switzerland for over forty years¹³. The result stunned commentators, not least because it had occurred in one of the most affluent and stable democracies in Europe. Nor is the SVP alone; other smaller radical right parties on the fringe of Swiss politics include the *National Aktion* party which became the *Schweizer Demokraten* (SD-Swiss Democrats) in 1991, and the regional *Lega Dei Ticinesi* (Ticino League)¹⁴.

Germany

In Germany, extreme right parties have been subject to strong social sanction as well as legal regulation by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, due to the historical legacy of the breakdown of the Weimar Republic and the scar of National Socialism. The 1949 constitution banned parties and organizations that reject basic liberal-democratic principles, such as political pluralism, respect for human rights, and free elections. Nevertheless various radical right parties have enjoyed sporadic electoral success, although they are generally marginalized in national elections well below the 5% voting hurdle required for representation in the Bundestag. In West Germany about two dozen rightwing extremist parties fought elections after 1949, such as the *Sozialistische Reichspartei* and *Deutsche Reichspartei*, achieving limited support in the early years of the Federal Republic, but this waned with the stabilization of the party system and growing economic prosperity after 1952. The *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NDP), founded in 1964, represents the start of a second wave of the radical right, along with the *Deutsche Volksunion* (German People's Union or DVU, established in 1971). After several years of intermittent success in *Länder* elections, in 1969 the NDP peaked with 4.3% of the second (party list) votes in Bundestag elections, narrowly missing the 5% threshold for entry¹⁵. Since then the NDP appears to have declined in terms of popular support, down to an estimated 5,000 members, although in September 2004 the NDP achieved 9% of the vote in regional elections in Saxony, above the 5% exclusion threshold, gaining seats in the Lander assembly for the first time since 1968. In neighboring Brandenburg, the *Deutsche Volksunion* polled above 6% in simultaneous contests. Their success has been attributed to welfare cuts by the Schroeder government coupled with high levels of long-term unemployment, with almost one in five out of work in eastern Germany. Some observers have also identified a 'third wave' of the radical right with support for the hard-core *Republikaner*, founded in 1983, with their strongest organizational base in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. The *Republikaner* achieved only modest and sporadic bursts of support in second-order elections, achieving their best nation-wide result (7.1% of the vote) in the 1989 European Parliamentary elections, and subsequently gradually fading during the 1990s. Nevertheless estimates suggest that recruitment to militant neo-Nazi extreme right groups has expanded, particularly in the new *Länder* of unified Germany, and there are indications that racially-motivated violent offences have also increased¹⁶.

Italy

German radical right parties have enjoyed limited success. Until the 1990s, a similar pattern was evident across the border in Italy where the neo-fascist *Movimento Italiano Sociale* (MSI or Italian Social Movement, founded in 1946), achieving very modest electoral support, had long been isolated from other parties. For this reason, however, they were less afflicted by the charges of sleaze which engulfed many of its rivals in the early-1990s. The breakdown of the postwar party system, with the Christian Democrats and Socialist Party in disarray, expanded the opportunities for radical electoral change¹⁷. As a result in the March 1994 election, the MSI share of the vote more than doubled, from 5.4% to 13.5%, producing 109 deputies in the Lower Chamber¹⁸. A month later, the MSI entered coalition government with Silvio Berlusconi's *Forza Italia* – the first time a radical right party had served in government in Europe since the Second World War. The MSI reinvented itself officially in January 1995 as the *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN), based on a nationalist platform against immigration and multiculturalism, and they strengthened their vote to 15.7% in the 1996 elections. In 2001 they maintained their role in supporting the government coalition with Berlusconi, holding several cabinet posts, and their leader, Gianfranco Fini, served as Italy's deputy prime minister.

The populist *Lega Nord* was founded by Umberto Bossi in 1991 based on a merger between the *Liga Veneta* and *Lega Lombarda*. The early campaigns of *Lega Nord* stressed an ethno-regional appeal in demanding a federal state and the creation of a new independent region in the North, 'Padania', breaking away from the poorer south. In the early years, the party also emphasized the appeal of 'clean government' in standing against *Tangentopoli* in Rome, and the widespread problems of corruption, clientelism, the mismanagement of public finances, and vote-rigging. The party subsequently focused upon attacking multiculturalism and presenting a populist 'anti-establishment' message, against immigrants, refugees, homosexuals, Communists, Roma, and poorer southern Italians, tapping into political disaffection. In recent years, the party has fuelled popular fear of immigration, globalization, crime, and social change. The *Lega Nord* won 8.4% of the vote and 117 seats in the 1994 Italian general election, benefiting from its concentration of support in the new system of single member districts, becoming the largest single party in parliament following the dramatic breakdown of Christian Democratic hegemony. *Lega Nord* was included in Berlusconi's coalition cabinet with *Forza Italia*. Within a decade, the *Lega* had risen to become the largest electoral force across much of northern Italy¹⁹. But LN broke suddenly with the coalition, by withdrawing over the planned pension reforms, and it brought down the government. In the 1996 general election, the LN share of the vote improved to 10.1% but they did less well by holding only 59 seats. Following the 2001 general election, support fell further to only 3.9% of the vote and 30 seats, although members were still appointed to three ministries in the new Berlusconi cabinet, with Umberto Bossi becoming the new Minister for Devolution. It can be argued that the *Lega Nord* is more populist in its anti-system appeal, and so it may not be strictly part of the radical right, based on the perceived ideological self-location of its voting supporters²⁰. The Lubbers 'expert' survey confirms that the LN is located at 7.55 on the 10-point left-right ideological scale, less extreme in this regard than the *Alleanza Nazionale* and the fringe *Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore*. This does make its classification more ambiguous than other parties in this comparison. Nevertheless, the Lubbers estimate of *Lega's* position on the anti-immigration scale placed it at 9.0 on the 10-point scale, making the party clearly within our scope.

Spain and Portugal

By contrast to the situation in Italy, during the last decade the radical right has attracted minimal popular support in Spain, where the Falange parties have divided into rival splinter factions, and these parties have been unable to shake off their association with their ultra-authoritarian and anti-democratic history, and the fascism of the Franco regime²¹. In Portugal, as well, the radical right remains marginalized, attracting negligible support in the electorate²². It seems likely that the authoritarian history of these countries produced a public reaction against radical rightwing parties in the new democracies.

Denmark

In Scandinavia, the strong liberal and egalitarian culture permeating the smaller welfare states of Northern Europe, along with the fact that these are some of the most prosperous countries around the world, might be expected to have immunized these countries against this phenomenon. Not so²³. Indeed their rise in Europe was sparked here in the early-1970s when Denmark witnessed the success of the *Fremskridtspartiet* (FP - Danish Progress Party), becoming Denmark's second largest party in 1973 under Mogens Glistrup's leadership on a neo-liberal, anti-tax, and anti-state platform²⁴. The *Fremskridtspartiet* generated a minor earthquake in this election, gaining 15.9% of the vote, and encouraging the development of a similar party in Norway. The party subsequently split into contending factions, due to leadership problems. The successor *Dansk Folkeparti* (DF, Danish People's Party), founded in 1995, rose to become the third most popular party in the November 2001 general elections. Under the leadership of Pia Kjaersgaard DF adopted a more extreme platform than FP, advocating radical tax cuts, law-and-order reforms, and the exclusion of immigrants. Favoring the preservation of a traditional Danish culture, including strong internal and external security, the party opposes the European Union. As the statement of principles on their website states: "*Denmark is not an immigrant-country and has never been so. Therefore, we will not accept a transformation to a multiethnic society. Denmark*

*belongs to the Danes and its citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of law, developing only along the lines of Danish culture.*²⁵

Norway

In Norway, following the wave of success for the Danish party, in 1973 Anders Lange founded the Party for the Substantial Reduction in Taxes, Duties, and Governmental Interference. The party achieved 5% of the vote and four seats in their first contest but the leadership was racked by dissent and for the next three elections they struggled to stay above the 4% legal threshold required for seats in the Storting, despite re-launching the party in 1977 as the *Fremskrittspartiet* (FrP). Under the leadership of Carl Hagen, the anti-immigrant wing of the party became more prominent and the fiscal conservatives deserted the party. In 1989 the party experienced a major breakthrough on this platform, when their share of the vote surged from 3.7% to 13.0%²⁶. The *Fremskrittspartiet* then stayed around this level (with a temporary dip in 1993) in the subsequent parliamentary elections in September 2001, making it the third-largest parliamentary party in Norway with about one sixth of all seats. Although excluded from ministerial office, due to an informal *cordon sanitaire* among the major players, the party has lent support to the center-right Høyre minority coalition consisting of the Christian People's Party and Liberals, and the *Fremskrittspartiet* may have sometimes exerted 'blackmail' influence over their immigration policies²⁷.

Sweden

In Sweden, *Ny Demokrati* (New Democracy - NyD) emerged in 1990 on a platform of cutbacks in state services and taxes, anti-EU membership, and anti-immigration and they won 6.7% of the national vote and 24 seats in their first parliamentary election the following year. Yet contrary to developments in Norway and Denmark, NyD failed to consolidate its support and it lost all its seats in the 1994 election, in part due to internal leadership squabbles, before practically disappearing in the 1998 contest. Another contender, the *Sverigedemokraterna* (SD, Sweden Democrats), have failed to achieve any significant success to date at national level, where they remain marginalized, although they are represented at local level in thirty municipalities. Moreover a growing range of anti-EU, anti-asylum, and anti-immigrant movements are active in Sweden, as well as neo-Nazi and skinhead groups, and it has been argued that the conditions are ripe in Sweden for the emergence of a radical right party²⁸. Elsewhere in the Nordic region, although the usual scattering of ultra-fringe radical right groups and organizations exists in Finland and Iceland, no contemporary party has managed to gain any substantial support in either country²⁹.

(ii) *The radical right in Anglo-American democracies*

One possible explanation for the rise of the radical right could lie in the expansion and deepening of the European Union as an agency of multinational governance, which could have triggered a public backlash against the loss of national autonomy compared with the fiat of Brussels bureaucrats. This might sound plausible if this phenomenon was confined to European Union member states. But it is not. Anglo-American democracies have also seen growing radical right challenges to the mainstream pattern of party competition in Canada, New Zealand and Australia (see Table 3.1). These parties have proved most successful where their votes are geographically concentrated, although they have faced stronger hurdles in gaining parliamentary seats under majoritarian electoral systems if their support is dispersed geographically.

Australia

In Australia the most notable breakthrough was achieved by Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party. In 1996 Pauline Hanson first stood for the federal parliament as a Liberal candidate in Queensland. She was officially disowned by the party two weeks before polling day for racist comments although she won as an independent. Her maiden speech to the Federal Parliament later that year caused a sensation when she claimed that Australia was in danger of being swamped by Asians. She denounced the inequality of giving welfare money to Aborigines that was not available to other Australians. Many other groups came in for criticism during the speech, including government bureaucrats, fat cats, do-gooders, big business, foreign investors, and the

United Nations. The outrage following this speech made her a national figure and she founded the One Nation party with a few close associates in 1997. The party's positions on Aboriginal issues, multi-culturalism, and Asian immigration gained extensive media coverage, playing the 'race card', heightening the issue of immigration on the policy agenda. Hanson attempted to link Australian economic insecurities to the issues of globalization, proposing protectionist tariffs, economic nationalism, and other policies to reduce unemployment. The party gained support from other far-right groups, such as Australians Against Further Immigration, the League of Rights, and National Action.

In their first contest in the Queensland state election in 1998, the party won almost one quarter of the vote (23%), gaining 11 out of 78 seats, on a platform combining opposition to Asian migrants and aboriginal rights with support for gun ownership. After this result, Prime Minister John Howard moved his party sharply to the right by introducing a controversial but popular policy of turning away boatloads of asylum seekers before they could reach Australia's shores. In the November 1998 federal elections, One Nation won 8.4% of the first preference vote and no seats, and this share of the vote fell to just 4.3% in the 2001 election. This pattern was consistent with the high vote hurdles facing minor party challengers in the Australian preferential voting system used for the House of Representatives, where the major Labour-Liberal/Nationalist parties remain predominant³⁰. In January 2002 Hanson announced her retirement from politics as she was deeply damaged by legal charges of electoral irregularities in party registration and campaign finance. She was found guilty of illegally using the names of 500 members of a support group to register One Nation as a political party, as well as fraudulently obtaining almost A\$500,000 (US\$325,000) in electoral funds. She was discredited by a three-year jail term awarded in August 2003, although it was suspended on appeal three months later. Given the publicity, and lacking effective leadership, doubts surround whether One Nation represents a continuing serious presence in Australian party politics, given that they only achieved just over one percent of the vote in the October 2004 federal elections. In retrospect, their success in the 1998 Queensland contest can probably be best understood as a classic example of a 'deviating' election, or a 'flash' party phenomenon, rather than signaling any significant challenge to the status quo in Australian party politics³¹.

New Zealand

New Zealand had an entrenched two-party 'Westminster' system during most of the twentieth century. Government office rotated between the conservative National Party and the center-left Labour party, excluding minor party contenders from legislative and government office. Dealignment trends weakened party identification during the 1980s, and electoral volatility rose, but with little effect on parliamentary politics due to the use of the first-past-the-post single member electoral system³². The major shock to the system came from the introduction of the Mixed Member Proportional electoral system in 1993, which fragmented the party system. This produced opportunities for the rise of the anti-immigrant populist New Zealand First party, founded by Winston Peters in 1993. The party won 8.3% of the vote and two seats in their first general election, rising to 13.4% of the vote and 17 seats in 1996. Following this result, in conjunction with the National Party, New Zealand First unexpectedly formed the first coalition government in the country since the 1930s. The coalition fell apart in August 1988, producing some internal party divisions. Their support subsequently slumped to just 5 seats in the 1999 general election but it rebounded again in the 2002 election, where New Zealand First was the third most popular party, with 10% of the parliamentary vote and 13 MPs³³.

New Zealand First can be seen as more moderate than some of the others under comparison, for example in its policies on health care, unemployment, and the environment, and yet it can also be regarded as part of the radical right family through its strong emphasis on economic and cultural nationalism. The party currently remains protectionist in its economic policy, calling for New Zealand ownership of key assets and infrastructure, arguing against economic globalization, and favoring limits on the extent of foreign ownership in the country. In this regard, it is similar to One Nation. At the same time, the statement of party principles on its official website, and contained in leadership speeches, presents a strong defense of cultural nationalism, including criticism of the legal rights enjoyed by the Maori aboriginal population

under the Treaty of Waitangi. Winston Peter, for example, argued that: “The public has legitimate concerns over the influx of immigrants – the dramatic changes in the ethnic mix – culture – and the other aspects of national identity – and the mindless, unthinking way change is inflicted on our society. In their contempt for the past, Labour and National have swept away many of the old landmarks – often selling them off to overseas investors – and have dismantled much that was valued and cherished by New Zealanders. ... There are many apparent threats to our way of life from open door immigration policies, through to a growing obsession with the fundamentalism which has sprung up around the Treaty of Waitangi and to the disturbing increase in lawlessness in our society.” Their party website opens with a poster image of Winston Peters and the classic slogan that could be adopted by many of the parties under comparison: “*Immigration’s up. Treaty costs up. Crime’s up. Had enough?*”

Canada

In 1987 Canada experienced the rise of the Reform Party, formed with a base in Ontario by Preston Manning as a populist neo-conservative party reflecting alienation with the established party system.³⁴ The Reform party can be regarded as sharing concerns about the issues of multiculturalism and out-group threats to ‘nativism’ with many of the other parties under comparison, although it blended these issues with an anti-welfare, anti-tax, small-government, free-market philosophy where they were close to the ‘old-right’ Progressive Conservatives. While initially regarded as a temporary protest in 1993, where Reform benefited from the meltdown of the Progressive Conservatives, the party subsequently consolidated its position by becoming the largest opposition party in subsequent elections. It was repackaged under the label of the ‘Canada Reform Conservative Alliance’ to expand its regional western base, winning 25.5% of the vote in the November 2000 general election. It subsequently merged in October 15, 2003 to become the new Conservative Party of Canada, and today it remains unclear to most observers whether this party can be regarded as legitimately constituting part of the radical right³⁵. The declaration of principles issued on merger was fairly moderate, emphasizing the older conservative tradition in Canada, characterized by tolerance of multiculturalism combined with free market economics. Yet at the same time, tensions within their leadership, and certain remarks by parliamentary candidates on issues such as abortion rights and gay marriage during the June 2004 campaign, indicated a strong strain of social conservatism within the new party. Some Progressive Conservatives campaigned for Liberal candidates, although others remained within the new party. The 2004 federal election produced a Liberal minority government. The Conservatives became the main opposition, with 99 MPs and 29.6% of the vote, under Stephen Harper’s leadership, although not doing as well on polling day as opinion polls had predicted. A series of campaign gaffes, and the perception that the party’s position remained ambiguous and uncertain on many policies, appear to have caused some support to drain away during the final stages of the general election.

Britain

In Britain, the mid-1970s saw growing concern about the virulently anti-immigration National Front, achieving a very modest share of the vote where they contested local and general elections.³⁶ Their greatest support was located in urban working class areas with high immigrant populations, notably the East End of London, cities such as Wolverhampton and West Bromwich in the West Midlands, Leicester in the East Midlands, and Bradford in West Yorkshire. The National Front was replaced in the early-1980s by the British National Party (BNP), which broke away in 1983. The BNP has subsequently been marginalized in general elections; for example in 2001 the BNP contested only 34 parliamentary seats, achieving 3.7% of the vote in these constituencies³⁷. Their best result was 16% of the votes cast in both Oldham constituencies, after race-related riots in the area. But the BNP has registered more gains at local level but these still remain strictly limited; for example, the party fielded over 200 candidates on an anti-asylum seeker platform in the May 2003 English local council elections, becoming the official opposition party briefly in Burnley district council, and making seat gains in Oldham council, a traditional working class area in Northwest England with a high Asian population. Despite these gains, the BNP has regularly attracted national attention in the news media out of all proportion to their level of electoral popularity and their threat to the major parties.

The most recent rightwing challenge to mainstream politics has arisen with the UK Independence Party, (UKIP), founded in 1993 to seek Britain's withdrawal from the European Union. The official manifesto of the party claims that it is non-racist and moderate in orientation, thereby distancing themselves from the National Front and BNP, and its primary focus is to detach Britain from Brussels. The party also argues that it favors maintaining asylum for genuine refugees fleeing political persecution. Nevertheless the official party policy is against unlimited European immigration, or 'over-crowding' in their own words: "*With the fourth largest economy in world, the UK is the very attractive destination for people seeking a better life. The trouble is the UK is already full up.*"³⁸ Moreover survey analysis of the 2004 European elections found that many UKIP voting supporters shared many political attitudes, and also sympathized with, the BNP³⁹. The party won only 1.4% of the vote in the 1994 European elections, rising to 7% and three seats in 1999. The party failed to make much of a mark in the 2001 UK general election, however, with 428 candidates gaining only 1.5% of the UK vote, despite the fact that, with the demise of the Referendum party, UKIP were the sole vehicle for the anti-European cause⁴⁰. In the June 2004 elections, however, the party won 12 seats to the European parliament with 16% of the vote, more than doubling their share and thereby beating the Liberal Democrats into third place. In simultaneous elections, they also came fourth and won 10% of the second preference votes in the London Mayoral contests. It remains to be seen how UKIP develops in its euro-skeptic ideological location and the level of popular support for the party in subsequent elections.

The United States

In the *United States*, multiple extreme-right groups, social movements, and radical organizations have flourished on the fringes of America politics, from the Klu Klux Klan and neo-Nazi skinheads to the Militia movement⁴¹. Yet contemporary third parties of any ideological persuasion have had an exceptionally difficult time in gaining traction against the Democrats and Republicans, due, in part, to the structural barriers of single member plurality districts used for elections to Congress, the majoritarian Electoral College employed for presidential contests, and the implementation of restrictive state registration procedures determining ballot access in primary and general elections, described in the next chapter⁴². The distinctive history and traditional culture of the United States, founded upon successive waves of immigrants which continue today, but also one marked by the scar of African slavery, has left a deep and enduring imprint upon racial politics and discourse, which contrasts sharply with the colonial history and more recent experience of immigration in many European democracies.

Despite the steep institutional hurdles, during the postwar era, occasional rightwing challenges to the two-party system in America have proved effective. In 1948, the splinter-group 'States Rights' or 'Dixiecrat' Party broke away from the Democrats over the civil rights platform of President Harry Truman. The party, led by South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond, won 39 Electoral College votes from four southern states, gaining over one million ballots nation-wide (representing 2.4% of the popular vote). Although defined in terms of "states rights," the party's main goal was continued racial segregation and maintaining the Jim Crow laws which sustained it. In the 1968 election, a deep split over the 1964 Civil Rights Act, polarizing liberal and conservative wings within the Democratic Party, led to the formation of Governor George Wallace's pro-segregationist American Independent party, which gained 12.9% of the popular vote and 46 Electoral College votes. America was rocked by turbulent race riots and anti-Vietnam war protests during this era, and Wallace went on to contest the 1972 and 1976 presidential elections on a state's rights platform, but he never recovered fully from an attempted assassination in 1972 which left him permanently paralyzed.

In recent elections, the Libertarian party, although extremely marginalized, persists in fielding presidential candidates on an individualistic anti-state, anti-tax platform, yet one also tolerant of the rights of immigrants. Although clearly differing ideologically from contemporary radical right parties in Europe, arguably the strongest challenge from a populist party in recent years came from the billionaire Ross Perot's Reform Party, gaining almost one fifth of the popular vote (18.3%) in the 1992 Presidential election and 9% in 1996. As discussed further in chapter 10, the party subsequently fragmented into contending leadership factions and Pat Buchanan, who tacked further to the right, failed to sustain the momentum as their figurehead in the 2000

presidential elections. In 2004, the party officially endorsed consumer advocate Ralph Nader as their candidate, gaining him ballot access in Florida, thereby leading Reform in a very different direction.

(iii) *The radical right in post-Communist Europe*

In post-Communist Europe, complex and fluid patterns of party competition are evident during the transition and consolidation stages experienced by newer democracies. In most of the newer democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, the process of party formation is by no means complete, although parties have increasingly developed characteristics which allow them to be compared with West European counterparts. In these nations, the basic concept of ranging parties across the left-right ideological scale is widely familiar although there are commonly greater difficulties in classifying parties consistently into a single category called the 'radical right', or even identifying parties using the 'left-right' ideological continuum that is conventional in conventional Western Europe⁴³. For example, the traditional 'conservative' appeal of maintaining familiar social values and a nostalgic return to the past has often been most strongly associated with orthodox Communist parties or their successor movements on the left which have not reconstructed themselves into social democratic organizations⁴⁴. The most suitable equivalent to the 'radical right' in Western Europe is probably the more extreme ultra-nationalist parties, which have established a presence although often achieving marginal electoral success in most countries in the region. These parties have played a critical role in the politics of the Balkans, however; well after conflict subsided, the *Serbia Radical Party* (SRS) became the largest party with over one quarter of the vote (28%) in the December 2003 legislative elections.

A comprehensive comparative overview provided by Paul Lewis identified a range of radical right 'nationalist' parliamentary parties in Central and Eastern Europe.⁴⁵ Subsequent detailed case studies, by Ramet and by others, serve to confirm this basic classification⁴⁶. Based on these sources, the most important parties in this category in the countries under comparison include the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, the Slovene National party, the Greater Romanian party, and the Romanian National Unity Party. To this list should be added, in Russia, the xenophobic and ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic party of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and the sister party in Belarus. Table 3.1 provides a summary of voting support for these parties, both during the 1990s and in the latest national legislative election⁴⁷.

The Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) was launched in 1993 on an explicitly anti-Semitic platform. Its growing influence was apparent through organizing anti-government rallies before it secured 14 seats in the 1998 legislative elections. In the subsequent 2002 Hungarian general election, however, the MIEP won only 4.4% of the vote, dropping below the minimum legal threshold. The Slovene National Party (SNS) stands for a militarily strong and sovereign Slovenia, and the preservation of the country's cultural heritage. The SNS won 9.9% of the vote and 12 seats in December 1992, before slipping in support after experiencing leadership divisions. In the last two general elections, four members were elected to parliament, qualifying as a relevant party with about 3 to 4% of the vote. In Romania, the extreme nationalist *Partidul Romania Mare* (Greater Romania Party – PRM) achieved a modest share of the vote during the 1990s until the November 2000 elections, when its legislative representation jumped to 84 seats in the lower house and 37 in the upper, with a fifth of the vote, second only to the Social Democrats. The Romanian National Unity Party (*Partidul Unitatii Nationale Romane* – PUNR) adopted a hard-right platform. After enjoying some initial success in the 1992 election, internal tensions developed during the mid-1990s, and the party subsequently achieved poor showings at the polls. In Russia, the Liberal Democratic Party (*Liberalno-Demokratischeskaya Partiya Rossii* – LDPR) was founded in March 1990. Its controversial leader, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy won over six million votes (7.8%) in the 1991 presidential poll on a series of extravagant promises. The party ran even more strongly in the 1993 legislative contest, coming second with more than a fifth of the national vote. In subsequent contests, however, support slipped so that the party came third in the 1995 legislative ballot, and only fifth in the 1996 and 2000 presidential contests. The Liberal-Democratic Party of Belarus (*Liberalna-Demokratischeskaya Partiya Belarusi*, LDPB) is an extremist party, dedicated to restoring the USSR. It opposes NATO and what it calls 'international monopolies'. The party has no democratic structure, but is run by its leader, Sergey Haidukevich.

The party gathers its main support from ex-servicemen and those bent on restoring the Soviet Union, and it is especially strong in Minsk, Vitchsk and some regional cities. The LDPB's main domestic ally is the Patriotic Party, and it has links to vague business circles.

This classification of contemporary radical right parties in the selected post-Communist nations under comparison is far from comprehensive. The definition remains less clear-cut than the situation in established democracies, given only partial democratization in Eastern Europe, and the fluidity of many party systems in this region. But this identification can be used to explore whether supporters of these parties can indeed be consistently related to their radical right counterparts in Western Europe and elsewhere, whether in terms of their social characteristics or their ideological orientations.

(iv) *Radical Right Parties in Latin America*

The diverse range of consolidating democracies in Latin America also displays complex patterns of party competition and there have been a number of attempts to develop typologies categorizing these patterns.⁴⁸ It is particularly difficult to array contemporary parties across the familiar left-right socio-economic spectrum in Latin American nations where party leaders usually gather temporary factions around personalistic and clientalistic electoral appeals, especially in presidential contests, rather than developing cohesive party organizations and policy platforms with distinctive ideological positions, ideas, or interests. In Brazilian politics, for example, modern presidential campaigns often revolve primarily around the personalities of alternative leaders, rather than involving serious and sustained debate about substantive policy issues and each party's collective programmatic platform⁴⁹. Catchall, fluid, and personalistic Congressional parties in Brazil support popular presidents in temporary alliances, but these coalitions often disintegrate when leaders fall from public esteem in difficult times⁵⁰. Weak party discipline in the Brazilian Congress, and minimal accountability of elected members to grassroots party members or local constituents, generates few effective sanctions if politicians cast legislative votes contrary to the party line, or if they switch party affiliations and cross the floor⁵¹. Moreover, throughout Latin America, a retreat from radical ideological politics occurred during the 1990s, as countries consolidated political rights and civil liberties, and moved towards neo-liberal markets with economic restructuring. The history of military-backed juntas and rightwing dictators abusing human rights in the region had discredited support for older parties expressing a fascist or neo-fascist discourse, such as the *Chilean Parti Nacista*. The revolutionary left was also in retreat following the downfall of the Soviet Union and the growth of democracy.

Despite these difficulties, some 'populist' relevant right-wing parties can be identified in Chile, which includes parties from the extreme right to the revolutionary left, although not in Peru and Mexico, the other Latin American nations under comparison.⁵² Coppedge also used the methodology of an 'expert survey' to distinguish ideological competition among Latin American parties existing in the region until the mid-1990s, comparable to the approach already discussed. The study identified a range of Latin American parties that could be regarded as either on the 'secular' or 'Christian' right, distinguished from the center-right⁵³. In Chile this procedure identified the *Union Democrata Independiente* (Independent Democratic Union – UDI) and *Renovacion Nacional* (National Renewal- RN) as relevant opposition parties, fighting in coalition after 1997 as the Union for Chile, located on the radical right of the political spectrum. In the 2001 elections, the Union for Chile held 57 out of 120 seats in the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress, and a slim majority in the Senate. Other far-right ultra-marginal Chilean parties include the National Advance Guard (AN), with links to the state intelligence operation under Pinochet. Again, it remains to be determined whether the background and ideas of voters for these parties are similar or distinctive to supporters of radical right parties in Western Europe.

(v) *Middle East and East Asia*

Lastly, the comparative framework in this book includes a few other party systems from other world regions. In East Asia, the study includes Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea. Although these countries contain a variety of small right-extremist groups, most intensely nationalist, and also moderate conservative and neo-liberal parties, no relevant radical right parties were identified from standard reference sources⁵⁴. As in Latin America, political

parties in the newer democracies of East Asian often tended to consist of elected legislators grouped around leadership factions and splinter groups, usually poorly-institutionalized, with centrist competition, rather than presenting a clearly-defined ideological profile, stable organization, and party program. In the contemporary Korean Republic, for example, political parties are described as fluid, dominated by personalities, and all centrist or conservative in parliament⁵⁵. In Taiwan, the primary cleavage revolves around issues of national identity and divergent views towards relationship with mainland China, rather than socioeconomic left-right issues such as social welfare⁵⁶.

In the Middle East *Israel* represents a special and particularly complex case. In most European countries, contemporary radical right parties have been largely secular in orientation, reflecting the predominant social values in this region. In Israel, however, the extreme right has been sharply defined by the role of ultra-orthodox religious factions within the Knesset and by attitudes towards the primary cleavage revolving around Zionism and the Palestinian question.⁵⁷ The extreme fragmentation of the party system, the existence of multiple splinter ultranationalist organizations, the depth of violent conflict in Middle East politics, and the existence of many shifting electoral alliances, also complicates the analysis⁵⁸. The main contemporary contenders which can be identified as relevant parties on the radical right today include the National Religious Party (*Mafdal*), dedicated to the principles of religious Zionism and evolving into a militantly nationalist group calling for the outright annexation of the West Bank, and the National Union formed as an electoral alliance including the Homeland party (*Moledet*), an ultra-Zionist secular party also calling for the annexation of the occupied territories. Both parties formed part of the coalition government headed by prime minister Ariel Sharon.

Exaggerating their rise?

This brief review can only sketch out thumb-nail portraits giving the basic characteristics of the most important parties in the countries under comparison. Yet in summarizing their electoral fortunes, critical skeptics could point out that the contemporary success of the radical right may have been exaggerated, in this account, for a series of reasons.

First, some electoral breakthroughs have proved extremely short-lived. This pattern might be expected to prove common if anti-establishment parties encounter problems in maintaining their image as 'outsiders' when they enter governing coalitions⁵⁹. Temporary extremist 'flash' parties, notably the *Poujadists* in France, have suddenly surged and then faded away in the past, leaving only a faint enduring imprint upon the body politic⁶⁰. Other radical right parties, however, have now maintained a significant presence over a succession of national parliamentary elections for more than two decades, notably the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* in Austria (which shifted right-wards during the mid-1980s), the *Front National* in France, and the *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (which became more radical in 1999). Measuring support for radical right parties according to their average share of the vote in successive elections held for the lower house of parliament during the 1990s should avoid some of the problems of electoral volatility encountered in studies of smaller parties by evening out peaks and troughs.

It can also be argued that, rather than discerning a consistent shift in patterns of party competition across postindustrial societies, the specific factors leading towards the breakthrough of radical right parties in each country can be regarded as almost 'accidental', or at least highly contingent upon particular historical factors, events, or circumstances, which differ from place to place. It remains extremely difficult to generalize systematically about the role of party leadership, for example Ross Perot's millions bankrolling his idiosyncratic and quixotic 1992 presidential campaign for the Reform Party, Pauline Hanson's populist rhetoric in Queensland, Australia, or Jörg Haider's charismatic appeal in Austria. For this reason, detailed case studies of the development of specific parties, and the processes of building electoral support over many years, need to be used to supplement cross-national comparisons across a wide range of countries.

Another difficulty is that scholars often unintentionally over-emphasize the strength of the radical right by 'selecting cases on the dependent variable', that is, by focusing attention exclusively upon the 'success' stories, and thereby neglecting countries and regions where the radical right remains peripheral⁶¹. Yet the characteristic features which generate cross-national


variations can only be distinguished by comparing levels of party support consistently and systematically across the universe of postindustrial societies, or among a wide range of electoral democracies. This error is common in the literature, for example Van der Brug and Fennema caution against this tendency, yet their own study focuses upon the seven West European nations with the largest parties of the radical right, rather than comparing all fifteen countries contained in their dataset, the 1999 European Election Study⁶². The macro conditions underlying cross-national variations in party support, for example, the role of electoral systems or political culture, can only be fully grasped if studies systematically compare countries where the radical right has, and has not, advanced. Focusing attention exclusively upon the most successful parties, such as the French *Front National* or the Italian *Alleanza Nazionale*, neglects the way that elsewhere equivalent parties failed to achieve equivalent breakthroughs, for example in Britain, Finland, Greece, Spain, Sweden, and Ireland. Another tendency common in the literature is to exaggerate support by citing the peak vote achieved by radical right parties at any level, whether in sub-national, national, Presidential, or European elections.⁶³ It makes more sense to compare their average share of votes or seats won consistently over a series of equivalent contests.

Any exaggeration is not simply a matter for scholars; the popular press often overplays the success of the radical right in banner headlines, even when parties win only modest support or a handful of seats in local elections. Journalists, commentators, and politicians commonly express alarm about any gains by the radical right and the implications of such gains, whether for political and social instability, for race relations, asylum and immigration policy, as well as for what this signifies about the rejection of mainstream parties, the legitimacy of the radical right, and public attitudes towards democracy. Support for these parties is often associated in popular accounts with public sympathy for more extreme right groups, organizations, and social movements who use violence, such as skinheads, neo-Nazi sympathizers, and terrorist organizations, including racist attacks, anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim incidents, and aggressive acts of brutality directed against asylum-seekers, guest-workers, and immigrant populations. Post 9/11, this issue has become of growing concern⁶⁴. Yet although they are commonly assumed to be related, with the radical right legitimizing racist and anti-minority rhetoric, in fact there may also be little association between voting for radical right parties and active support for violent manifestations of racism or ethnic hatred. Indeed some commentators have suggested that a trade-off exists between these phenomena, if radical right parties provide an outlet for social pressures that might otherwise be channeled into anti-minority violence⁶⁵.

All of these reasons can often lead towards overstating the level of support for radical right parties; nevertheless, even acknowledging these tendencies, this does not mean that nothing important is going on here. During the last decade there have been just too many electoral gains for parties which can be loosely regarded as coexisting within the extended family of the radical right, occurring in too many different countries, to dismiss this development as simply a passing short-lived phase, or the coincidental conflux of specific causes within each specific nation.

Based on these definitions and sources of evidence we can now proceed to examine some of the structural explanations for the rise of the radical right, in particular how far the electoral fortunes of radical right parties are shaped by the institutional context set by nomination and campaign regulations (Chapter 4), the electoral system and vote thresholds (in Chapters 5), and by 'new' social cleavages (in Chapter 6). All these factors are regarded as part of the puzzle, representing necessary but not sufficient structural conditions helping to explain their success.


Figure 3.1: Percentage vote for relevant radical right parties in established democracies, 1950-2004



Note: This summarizes the percentage share of the vote in nation elections to the lower house of parliament from 1950-2004 for the following parties in established democracies: Australian One Nation, Austrian Freedom Party, Canadian Reform Party, Danish Progress Party, Danish People’s Party, Dutch Lijst Pim Fortyna, Flemish Vlaams Blok, French Front National, Italian Lega Nord, Italian MSI/AN, New Zealand First, Norwegian Progress Party, and the Swiss People’s Party.

Source: Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1991. *The International Almanac of Electoral History*. Washington, DC: CQ Press; Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1997. *A decade of election results: Updating the International Almanac*. Studies in Public Policy 295. Strathclyde: CSPP; recent elections from *Elections around the World*. www.electionsworld.org.

Figure 3.2: Percentage of votes cast for radical right parties in Europe, latest national legislative elections



Note: For the classification of parties see table 3.1. The % share of the vote is for the most recent national legislative elections for the lower house (held between 2000-2004).

Source: Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1991. *The International Almanac of Electoral History*. Washington, DC: CQ Press; Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1997. *A decade of election results: Updating the International Almanac*. Studies in Public Policy 295. Strathclyde: CSPP; recent elections from *Elections around the World*. www.electionsworld.org.

Table 3.1: Classification of contemporary radical right electoral parties, 39 nations

<i>Nation</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Year founded</i>	<i>Abrv.</i>	<i>Lubbers expert scale</i>	<i>Type of party</i>	<i>Mean % vote in elections since 1990</i>	<i>Latest Year</i>	<i>% votes</i>	<i>% seats</i>
Australia	<i>Pauline Hanson's One Nation</i>	One Nation	1997	ON		Relevant	6.4	2001	4.3	0.0
Austria	<i>Freiheitliche Partei Österreich</i>	Freedom	1956	FPO	8.8	Relevant	19.6	2002	10.0	9.8
Belarus	<i>Liberalna-Demokratyčnaja Partija</i>	Liberal Democrat	1994	BPP		Fringe		2001		0.9
Belgium	<i>Vlaams Blok</i>	Flemish Block	1978	VB	9.6	Relevant	9.0	2003	11.6	12.0
Belgium	<i>Front National</i>	National Front	1983	FN	9.7	Fringe	1.7	2003	2.0	0.7
Canada	<i>Reform</i>	Reform	1988	RP		Relevant	21.2	2000	25.5	21.9
Chile	<i>Unión Demócrata Independiente</i>	Independent Democratic Union	1988	UDI		Relevant	18.2	2001	22.0	29.1
Chile	<i>Renovación Nacional</i>	National Renewal	1987	RN		Relevant	14.4	2001	12.0	18.3
Czech Rep	<i>Republikanska Strana Česká</i>	Republican Party	1990	RSC		Relevant	4.0	2002	1.0	0.0
Denmark	<i>Dansk Folkeparti</i>	People's Party	1995	DF	9.2	Relevant	9.7	2001	12.0	12.3
Denmark	<i>Fremskridtspartiet</i>	Progress Party	1973	FP	8.9	Relevant	4.0	1001	0.6	0.0
Finland	<i>Isanmaallinen Kansallis-Liitto</i>	Patriotic National Alliance	1993	IKL	9.1	Fringe	0.0	2003	0.0	0.0
France	<i>Front National</i>	National Front	1972	FN	9.6	Relevant	13.0	2002	11.3	0.0
France	<i>Movement pour la France</i>	Movement for France		MPF	8.5	Fringe	0.8	2002	0.8	0.2
France	<i>Mouvement National Republicain</i>	National Republican Movement	1999	MNR		Fringe	1.1	2002	1.1	0.0
Germany	<i>Die Republikaner</i>	Republican Party	1983	Rep	9.1	Fringe	1.5	2002	0.3	0.0
Germany	<i>Deutsche Volksunion</i>	German People's Union	1987	DVU	9.6	Fringe	0.9	2002	0.0	0.0
Germany	<i>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i>	National Democratic Party	1964	NPD		Fringe	0.2	2002	0.0	0.0
Greece	<i>Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos</i>	Populist Orthodox Rally	2003	LAOS		Fringe	2.2	2003	2.2	0.0
Greece	<i>Eliniko Metopon</i>	Greek Front	1994	EM	9.7	Fringe	0.1	2003	0.0	0.0
Hungary	<i>Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja</i>	Hungarian Justice & Life Party	1993	MIEP		Relevant	3.8	2002	4.4	0.0
Iceland	<i>None</i>	None	---			<i>None</i>	0.0		0.0	0.0
Ireland	<i>None</i>	None	---			<i>None</i>	0.0		0.0	0.0
Israel	<i>Mifleget Datit Leumit</i>	National Religious Party	1956	Mafdal		Relevant	5.7	2003	4.2	5.0
Israel	<i>Ha-Lkhud Ha-Leumi</i>	National Union	1999	IL		Relevant	3.3	2003	5.5	5.8
Italy	<i>Alleanza Nazionale</i>	National Alliance	1995	AN	8.0	Relevant	12.0	2001	12.0	3.8
Italy	<i>Lega Nord</i>	Northern League	1989	LN	8.3	Relevant	7.5	2001	3.9	4.9
Italy	<i>Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore</i>	Social Movement 3 Color Flames	1995	MsFt	9.4	Fringe	0.7	2001	0.4	0.0
Japan	<i>None</i>	None	---			<i>None</i>	0.0		0.0	0.0
Korea, Rep	<i>None</i>	None	---			<i>None</i>	0.0		0.0	0.0
Lithuania	<i>Lietuvos Laisves Sajunga</i>	Lithuanian Freedom Union	1992	LLaS		Fringe	1.1	2000	1.3	0.7
Luxembourg	<i>None</i>	None	---			<i>None</i>	0.0		0.0	0.0
Mexico	<i>None</i>	None	---			<i>None</i>	0.0		0.0	0.0
Netherlands	<i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i>	List Pym Fortuyn	2002	PF		Relevant	11.4	2003	5.7	5.3
Netherlands	<i>Centrumdemocraten</i>	Center Democrats	1986	CD	9.3	Fringe	0.8	2003	0.0	0.0
New Zealand	<i>New Zealand First</i>	New Zealand First	1993	NZFP		Relevant	9.1	2002	10.4	10.8
Norway	<i>Fremskrittspartiet</i>	Progress Party	1973	FrP	8.7	Relevant	12.1	2001	14.7	15.8
Norway	<i>Fedrelandspartiet</i>	Fatherland Party	1991	FLP		Fringe	0.3	2001	0.1	0.0
Peru	<i>None</i>	None	---			<i>None</i>	0.0		0.0	0.0
Poland	<i>None</i>	None	---			<i>None</i>	0.0		0.0	0.0
Portugal	<i>None</i>	None	---			<i>None</i>	0.0		0.0	0.0
Romania	<i>Partidul Romănia Măre</i>	Greater Romania Party	1992	PRM		Relevant	9.9	2000	19.5	24.2
Romania	<i>Partidul Unității Naționale Române</i>	Romanian National Unity Party	1992	PUNR		Relevant	5.2	2000	1.5	0.0
Russia	<i>Liberal'no-Demokraticeskaja Partija</i>	Liberal Democrat Party	1988	LDPR		Relevant	15.5	2003	11.5	8.0
Slovenia	<i>Sovenska Nacional Stranka</i>	Slovene National Party	1991	SNS		Relevant	5.9	2000	4.4	5.7
Spain	<i>Falangistas</i>	Falange		Fal		Fringe	0.1	2000	0.1	0.0

<i>Nation</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Year founded</i>	<i>Abrv.</i>	<i>Lubbers expert scale</i>	<i>Type of party</i>	<i>Mean % vote in elections since 1990</i>	<i>Latest Year</i>	<i>% votes</i>	<i>% seats</i>
Sweden	<i>Sverigedemokraterna</i>	Swedish Democrats	1988	SD	9.6	Fringe	0.5	2002	1.4	0.0
Sweden	<i>Ny Demokrati</i>	New Democracy	1990	NyD	9.1	Fringe	2.0	2002	0.0	0.0
Switzerland	<i>Schweizerische Volkspartei</i>	Swiss People's Party	1971	SVP	8.7	Relevant	19.2	2003	26.6	55.0
Switzerland	<i>Eidgenossische Demokratische Union</i>	Union of Federal Democrats		EDU	9.0	Fringe	1.2	2003	1.3	2.0
Switzerland	<i>Schweizer Demokraten</i>	Swiss Democrats	1961	SD	9.4	Fringe	2.3	2003	1.0	1.0
Switzerland	<i>Lega dei Ticinesi</i>	Ticino League		LdT	9.3	Fringe	1.3	2003	0.4	1.0
Switzerland	<i>Freiheits Partei der Schweiz</i>	Freedom Party	1985	FPS	9.2	Fringe	2.6	2003	0.2	0.0
Taiwan	<i>None</i>	<i>None</i>	---			<i>None</i>	0.0		0.0	0.0
Thailand	<i>None</i>	<i>None</i>	---			<i>None</i>	0.0		0.0	0.0
Ukraine	<i>Ukrainska Natsionalna Asambleya</i>	Ukrainian National Assembly	1990	UNA		Fringe		2002	0.1	0.0
UK	<i>British National Party</i>	British National Party	1983	BNP	9.7	Fringe	0.2	2001	0.2	0.0
UK	<i>National Front</i>	National Front	1967	NF		Fringe	0.1	2001	0.0	0.0
UK	<i>Independence Party</i>	Independence Party	1993	UKIP		Fringe	0.2	2001	1.5	0.0
US	<i>None</i>	<i>None</i>	---			<i>None</i>	0.0	2004	0.0	0.0

Notes: *Elections since 1990:* Mean share of the vote in national parliamentary elections held from 1990 onwards.

Latest election results: The share of the vote and seats for each party in the latest parliamentary elections (date specified), held from 2000-2004.

Relevant electoral parties are defined as those winning at least 3% of the mean vote in national parliamentary elections held since 1990.

'Radical right parties' are defined as those scoring 8.0 or more on the combined 10-point Lubbers expert judgment scale or, where not included, from other reference sources. (--- Not available). Only *contemporary parties* are listed, defined as those contesting the most recent national legislative elections, excluding historical parties which have subsequently declined in national elections.

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