

Chapter 7

‘None of the above’: the politics of resentment

The demand-side ‘politics of resentment’ thesis regards rising support for the radical right as essentially expressing a negative protest against the status quo, and hence an indicator of rising political disaffection with democratic politics. This perspective is commonly used in the academic literature on new parties, for example to explain support for Ross Perot’s Reform Party in the United States, One Nation in Queensland, Canadian Reform, and New Zealand First¹. This argument is not necessarily antithetical to the ‘new cleavage’ thesis, as these explanations can be combined where it can be suggested that political disaffection is concentrated among disadvantaged social sectors. Nevertheless these explanations remain logically distinct. Betz articulates one of the strongest versions of this argument, suggesting that the rise of populist politics in Europe has been fuelled by resentment and alienation from the political institutions of representative government: *“A majority of citizens in most Western democracies no longer trust political institutions that they consider to be largely self-centered and self-serving, unresponsive to the ideas and wishes of the average person, and incapable of adopting viable solutions for society’s most pressing problems. ...It is within this context of growing public pessimism, anxiety and disaffection that the rise and success of radical right-wing populism in Western Europe finds at least a partial explanation”*² This claim is also commonly heard in popular commentary where the growth of widespread political cynicism, civic malaise, and social alienation, particularly disaffection with mainstream parties (*parteiverdrossenheit*), is believed to have provided a springboard for radical right anti-establishment appeals³. The language of party leaders from Glistrup and Haider to Le Pen and Bossi is richly flecked with vivid anti-party and anti-establishment sentiments and it is believed that this constitutes an essential part of their appeal⁴.

Despite the popularity of politics of resentment thesis, and its intuitive plausibility, systematic empirical studies that demonstrate the negative motivations of radical right voters remain scarce, and some research throws serious doubt on this thesis⁵. Evidence favoring the protest vote hypotheses has come from open-ended survey questions, where voters for anti-immigrant parties often mention that they were motivated by discontent with mainstream or governing parties. Nevertheless, as with other direct motivational questions, it remains difficult to know how much weight to put on these responses, whether regarded as reasons or rationalizations for support⁶. One of the most sophisticated comparative analysis of this question has been conducted by Wouter van der Brug and colleagues, who classified voting motivations into four categories: idealistic, pragmatic, clientalistic, and protest.⁷ Idealistic voters are seen as those who rationally cast a vote on the basis of ideological proximity. Pragmatic voters (who can also be regarded as ‘strategic’ or ‘tactical’) take account of ideological proximity plus the size of the party, on the grounds that it is perfectly rational to vote for a second-choice party which is

close to one's policy positions if this party stands a better chance of getting into power. Clientalistic voters rationally cast a ballot for concrete material benefits, such as the delivery of individual or public goods ('pork'). Protest voters are regarded as the default category in the analysis, understood as those whose objectives are to demonstrate a rejection of all other parties. Based on this classification, van der Brug and colleagues use party preferences, measured by probability to vote for a party, (not votes cast) as their dependent variable in the 1994 and 1999 European Election Studies. They concluded that in the 1994 elections, party preferences for seven radical right parties in the EU could be largely explained by the same mix of idealistic and pragmatic motivations that accounted for support for other parties. The propensity to vote for radical right parties in European Parliamentary elections could be accurately predicted by voters' ideological (left-right) proximity and their anti-immigrant attitudes, coupled with pragmatic considerations of party size. The only exception to this rule was found for one party (the Dutch *Centrumdemocraten*). Their replicated study in the 1999 European elections again confirmed a similar pattern concerning support for the *FPÖ*, *Alleanza Nazionale*, *Dansk Folkeparti*, and *Vlaams Blok*. Yet they also concluded that these factors could not satisfactorily explain party preferences for the Danish *Fremskridtspartiet*, the French *Front National*, the *Lega Nord*, the Germany *Republikaner*, the Wallonian *Front National*, and the Dutch *Centrumdemocraten*, who could therefore have attracted support based on protest votes.

This provides one of the most thorough cross-national comparisons of radical right party preferences in second-order European elections, but the analysis suffers from the critical weakness that protest voting is regarded as the default category, so that their conclusions rely upon circumstantial evidence. The study fails to consider any direct evidence for or against protest voting, such as indicators of political disaffection, trust, and alienation among radical right supporters. As a result, as the authors acknowledge, the study cannot prove that the default category is actually motivated by a protest rejection of 'all of the above' as they have no direct evidence of public attitudes towards the political system⁸. Their models might be misspecified by failing to consider other plausible explanations for supporting radical right parties, such as the attraction of charismatic leaders, the strength of party identification, the impact of other important demographic factors including gender or race (both commonly and consistently linked to radical right voting), and indeed any of the multiple salient policy issues in the European elections (such as attitudes towards the government's performance on education, health care, and crime) not included in their study. One of the well-known characteristics of elections to the European parliament is that these are widely regarded by the public as a mid-term referendum upon the performance of national governments in each country, rather than determined by European-wide issues such as the adoption of the euro or the role of the Commission. As such, their claims about protest voting should be regarded as an interesting thesis but essentially unproven.

Theories of protest politics

Moreover much previous analysis of this issue remains under-conceptualized as there are several distinct ways to interpret support for the radical right as an outlet for protest politics, each of which need carefully disentangling both analytically and empirically. Rather than seeing support for the political system all of one piece, ever since the classic work of David Easton it is widely recognized that different *levels* or '*objects*' of support can be distinguished⁹. These can be understood to range from the most specific level, including support for individual politicians and party leaders, through support for the performance and institutions of the regime, to the most abstract level representing support for the nation-state as a whole¹⁰. In the United States, for example, it is commonly found that people often trust particular politicians, such as the member of the House of Representatives elected from their district, and yet express cynicism about Congress as an institution¹¹. Or they might express confidence in the US Congress and yet still have little faith in the party controlling the White House. Or they might feel intensely patriotic about America and yet still mistrust most politicians in Washington DC. There is no logical inconsistency in distinguishing among these different components of the political system. People may also trust each other (social or interpersonal trust) and yet have little or no confidence in political institutions¹².

Any interpretation of how far support for the radical right reflects 'protest politics' depends upon how deeply any disaffection is thought to extend. The protest politics thesis implies that negative reasons are the primary drivers of support for the radical right, and these factors are expected to outweigh any positive motivations in electoral decisions, for example if supporters are attracted by radical right because they see themselves as ideologically close to their positions on salient issues such as immigration or taxes, or because they admire the charisma, rhetoric, and leadership of figures such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, Umberto Bossi, or Jörg Haider. Theories of protest politics assume that voters support the radical right primarily for negative reasons, but they differ in how they conceptualize the objects of such negativity. This could be because:

- i. Radical right voters may be deeply dissatisfied with the performance of the government over specific issues, such as unemployment rates, European integration, or immigration policies; or,
- ii. They may be alienated and socially intolerant citizens lacking inter-personal trust (the social capital argument associated with Putnam); or alternatively
- iii. They could be deeply unhappy with the general workings of the political system and lack confidence in representative democratic institutions in their country (the Betz view).

In other words, any disaffection tapped by the radical right could be directed mainly against the government's record, against society in general, or against the major institutions of representative government. Negative protest voting could be expressed at each level, but we need to distinguish among these in order to determine the significance and consequences of the rise of the radical right.

(i) Dissatisfaction with the government's record

The weakest version of this claim suggests that radical right support is generated primarily by retrospective evaluations of the record of the governing party or parties, most commonly triggered by general dissatisfaction with liberal policies about immigration following an influx of migrants and asylum seekers, perceived high rates of crime, or worsening levels of unemployment, or by dramatic government failures, such as headlines about sexual or financial scandals involving high-ranking officials. In this view, support for the radical right surges, especially in 'second-order' mid-term elections such as local, regional or European contests, to send a message of public protest directed against those in power. Support is expected to subside again once government popularity recovers, for example if economic growth resurges, if rates of immigration subside, or if there are distinct improvements in the delivery of public services.

We can examine whether electors who vote for radical right parties express exceptionally high levels of dissatisfaction with the state of the health service and education, the state of the economy, as well as with the performance of the national government and the way democracy works in each country, after controlling for the social structural factors such as age, gender, and class that we have already demonstrated help predict radical right support. If we establish a consistent relationship, however, it remains difficult to regard this as a matter of great public concern, since negative voting to express dissatisfaction with government policies and performance essentially represents the essence of normal democratic politics.

(ii) Social capital and interpersonal trust

In recent years theories of social capital have come into vogue, emphasizing that the United States has experienced a steep erosion of social capital during the postwar era, with a fall in *generalized reciprocity* (including social trust and social tolerance) and in *social connectedness* (including formal associational participation and informal socializing). Work by Robert Putnam suggests that the hemorrhaging of social capital has had important consequences for civic participation, and thus for the health and vitality of American democracy¹⁸. Putnam warns that multiple indicators display a consistent secular fall in America since the 1960s and 1970s, including membership of voluntary associations, indicators of traditional political participation, civic attitudes, the strength of informal social ties, and levels of social trust. The core claim of 'Toquevillian' theories of social capital is that typical face-to-face deliberative activities and horizontal collaboration within voluntary organizations far removed from the political sphere –

exemplified by sports clubs, social clubs, and philanthropic groups - promote interpersonal trust, social tolerance, and cooperative behavior¹⁹.

In turn, these norms are regarded as cementing the bonds of social life, creating the foundation for building local communities, civil society, and democratic governance. In a 'win-win' situation, participation in associational life is thought to generate individual rewards, such as career opportunities and personal support networks, as well as facilitating community goods, by fostering the capacity of people to work together on local problems. The causes of this phenomenon are complex but are argued by Putnam to include the modern pressures of time and money, the movement of women into the paid work-force and stresses in the two-career family, geographic mobility and suburban sprawl, and the role of technology and the mass media. The ubiquity of television entertainment, in particular, is thought to play a critical role in privatizing leisure hours for 'coach potatoes'.²⁰ If any erosion of social trust has occurred more generally across postindustrial societies, due to common social trends, then this could have reduced social tolerance, generated social alienation, and indirectly encouraged support for extreme political movements, groups, and parties²¹. Accordingly in this chapter we can explore whether there is a significant link at individual-level between lack of social or inter-personal trust and voting support for radical right parties.

(iii) Or deep-rooted alienation with democratic institutions?

The strongest version of the protest politics argument, expressed by Betz, interprets support for radical right parties as a deep-seated rejection of the core institutions of democracy, particular an erosion of confidence in political parties and parliaments, representing a crisis in the political system as a whole. *"It is within this context of growing public pessimism, anxiety, and disaffection that the rise and success of radical rightwing populism in Western Europe finds at least a partial explanation."*²² Betz supports this claim by the response of *Lega Nord*, *French Front National*, and *FPÖ* voters in open-ended questions when they reported casting their vote as a protest act, as well as by the cross-class composition of their support, suggesting that they gained protest votes by appealing to different social groups. Some limited survey evidence has been found for this view, for example Lubbers et al. observed that, even with a battery of prior social controls, people dissatisfied with the workings of democracy were significantly more likely to vote for extreme right parties²³. Yet, despite the popularity of the politics of resentment claim, and its important implications, the thesis needs further exploration as the available systematic evidence remains limited. We can examine whether radical right voters express less confidence and trust in a range of political institutions such as parliaments and the courts. In this argument, the rise of the radical right reflects a profound lack of confidence in core institutions of representative democracy, not just a rejection of the electoral choices offered by mainstream parties at the ballot box. If the ascendance of the radical right does represent a rejection of these

institutions, as well as a lack of social tolerance for minority groups, then this could lead to serious consequences, especially in more fragile transitional and consolidating democracies, such as Russia and the Ukraine.

Evidence

Before accepting or rejecting the protest thesis, it is important to examine direct evidence. We need to establish whether support for radical right parties can be accurately predicted by attitudes such as satisfaction with government performance, confidence in political institutions, and social or interpersonal trust. The European Social Survey 2002 contains a battery of items monitoring political and social attitudes. Factor analysis (shown in Table 7.1) confirmed that a series of selected items fell into three dimensions: social trust, satisfaction with government, and trust in political institutions. Scales were constructed based on these items. *Trust in institutions* (with each item measured on 10-point scales) included both international organizations such as the European Parliament and United Nations as well as national parliaments, politicians, the legal system and the police, all of which formed one dimension. *Satisfaction with government* included evaluations of the state of education and the performance of the health service, the national government, the present state of the national economy, the way democracy works in each country, and satisfaction with life as a whole. There is some controversy about the most appropriate way to conceptualize the question about 'how democracy works', in terms of whether it relates primarily to assessments of democracy as an abstract ideal or whether it taps a sense of how well the government is performing in each country²⁴. In this scale, evaluations were clearly related to the latter interpretation. Lastly *social or inter-personal trust* was gauged by three measures, again using 10-point scales, about how far people take advantage of you, how far most people can be trusted most of the time, and how helpful people are.

[Table 7.1 about here]

These scales were entered into the pooled 8-nation weighted sample with the logit regression model developed in the previous chapter, to see whether these attitudes contributed towards explaining voting support for the radical right after controlling for the other demographic and social characteristics that we have already found to be important. The results in Table 7.2 show that in the pooled sample, after introducing all the prior controls, the indicators of institutional trust and social trust proved significantly related to radical right support, in the expected negative direction. This suggests that people who voted for the radical right usually expressed lower confidence in institutions such as national and the European parliaments, politicians, and the legal system, and they also had less trust in people around them. By contrast, contrary to expectations, the measure of government satisfaction proved significant and positive, indicating that radical right voters had higher than average evaluations of government performance, not lower.

[Table 7.2 about here]

Alienation with political institutions?

In order to make more sense of these findings we need to see how far these attitudes vary across the nine countries in the survey which contain relevant radical right parties. The results in Table 7.3 describe the mean difference between the position of radical right voters on these scales and the average position of all other citizens in these nations, without any controls. Institutional confidence provides the clearest picture: overall, radical right voters were consistently more negative across all societies, displaying lower than average trust in a range of political institutions. The size of this trust gap on the 60-point scale was not large overall and it varied among nations (see Figure 7.1), displaying the greatest gap in Belgium (8.7 points), France (-6.4), Denmark (6.2 points) and the Netherlands (5.4 points), but it proved significant in every country except two (Israel and Italy), despite the limited number of radical right voters included in the national samples. This finding provides the most convincing evidence for the protest vote thesis: people supporting parties such as the *Vlaams Blok*, Danish *Fremskridtspartiet*, and *Lijst Pym Fortuyn* were consistently more cynical about some of the core institution of representative democracy, such as parliament and the legal system. As many suggest, there is a significant link between disenchantment with politics and radical right support. But does this prove causality? Not necessarily. What this evidence cannot resolve is (i) whether citizens were attracted towards these parties because these voters already held more cynical attitudes towards the workings of representative institutions, as many assume, or (ii) whether the populist rhetoric and anti-establishment language of these parties encourages greater suspicion of the state among their supporters, or alternatively (iii) whether supporters of radical right minor parties became more cynical because these parties sometimes fail to be elected or, if entering parliament, rarely tread the corridors of ministerial office.

[Table 7.3 and Figure 7.1 about here]

Dissatisfaction with the government's record

Disentangling the direction of causality in this relationship is a complex matter but the results of the comparison of satisfaction with government in each country throw some additional light on this matter (see Figure 7.2). In Italy and Israel, supporters of radical right parties were strongly and significantly more positive in their evaluations of government, and a fainter positive pattern was also detected in Austria (although this did not prove significant). By contrast, in the other six countries radical right voters were more negative in their assessment of the government, such as the performance of the education system, the health service, the state of the economy, and the performance of democracy.

[Figure 7.2 about here]

Further exploration suggests that this pattern was not simply the result of the particular survey questions asked in the ESS-2002 and/or the limited number of cases of radical right voters in each country. The results could not be replicated exactly in the CSES survey, as in the previous chapter, as this dataset contained alternative questions monitoring satisfaction with government as well as a different range of countries. Nevertheless the specific items and nations contained in the CSES facilitate some comparison of the general principle that supporters of minor parties included in governing coalitions expressed more positive orientations towards the political system than those excluded from power. The CSES survey monitored satisfaction with democracy, how far people felt that the last election was fairly conducted, and whether people felt that political parties care what ordinary people think. The dataset covered seven democracies containing relevant radical right parties in legislative elections (Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Israel, and Switzerland), and in the last two nations these parties are in government. Again in most countries, compared with the general public, supporters of the radical right were consistently more negative in their evaluations across all three items. But in Israel and Switzerland, by contrast, radical right voters were more positive than average in their satisfaction with the performance of democracy, the fairness of the electoral process, and their sense of party responsiveness.

The results of both surveys therefore indicate that mistrust of government is not necessarily an inevitable feature of radical right support in every nation. Instead this evidence strongly suggests a more instrumental interpretation; where radical right leaders either hold ministerial office (as in Israel and Italy), or where rightwing governments in power are broadly sympathetic to their aims and values, then radical right followers hold more positive attitudes towards government and display related indicators of satisfaction with the political system. Where these parties are systematically persistently excluded from power, then, not surprisingly, radical right voters hold more critical attitudes towards the performance of the government. The exclusion or inclusion of minor parties in legislative and governmental office seems to influence approval of the government's record. In Italy, for example, where *Lega Nord* shares ministerial office with *Forza Italia*, their supporters display far greater satisfaction with government than radical right supporters in France, where the *Front National* is persistently excluded from office due to the majoritarian 2nd ballot electoral system, despite gaining about one-fifth of the vote in recent legislative contests.

We can theorize that patterns of winners and losers from the political system are structured by the constitutional arrangements and, over a long period of time, this accumulated experience can be expected to shape general orientations towards the political regime²⁵. At the simplest level, if people feel that the rules of the game allow the party leaders that they endorse to be elected to power, they are more likely to feel that policymaking processes are responsive to their needs and to approve of the government's performance. If they feel that the party they prefer

persistently loses, over successive elections, they are more likely to feel that their voice is excluded from the decision-making process, producing dissatisfaction with government. Over time, where constitutional arrangements succeed in channeling popular demands into government outcomes, then we would expect this to be reflected, not just in specific support for particular government coalitions, but also in more diffuse support for the public policy process in general. In a series of studies, Christopher Anderson has demonstrated that system support is consistently influenced by whether people are among the winners or losers in electoral contests, defined by whether the party they endorsed was returned to government²⁶. Following the same logic, the cross-national evidence suggests that dissatisfaction with government among radical right supporters does not seem to be an inherent characteristic of these supporters; instead attitudes depend upon the rational calculation of the exclusion of their party from power.

Social trust

Explanations based on theories of social capital suggest that extremist parties may flourish under conditions of social intolerance and alienation; societies lacking interpersonal trust may provide suitable conditions nurturing the radical right. This taps into traditional images of radical right supporters as alienated individuals, isolated from the broader integrative bonds of family, community and workplace. We tested the available survey evidence at individual level where social trust proved to be significantly more negative among radical right voters in five out of nine nations (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark). In the remainder, either radical right voters did not differ significantly from the general population (in three nations), or else (as in Israel) they proved more trusting. The mixed pattern found in different societies suggests that although social trust is associated with radical right support in a many countries, this fails to provide a consistent explanation for this phenomenon. The fact that attitudes are significantly more negative than average across the available indicators of institutional trust, satisfaction with government, and social trust in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Norway suggests that the radical right tap into the reservoir of disaffected citizens most strongly in these nations. But this pattern fails to hold consistently in the other five countries containing relevant radical right parties. As predicted earlier, theoretically demand-side factors do help provide part of the explanations of why the radical right succeeds more in some countries rather than others, but the key concerns how far parties manage to tap into reservoirs of popular disaffection, and hence the role of protest politics alone is not sufficient to account for variations in their share of votes and seats.

Conclusions

On the basis of this evidence, three main conclusions can be drawn. First, the overall results suggest that there is some systematic support for the protest politics thesis, but commentators should be careful not to exaggerate either the strength or the consistency of the indicators. Popular explanations common in journalism often claim that the ascendancy of the

radical right in Europe since the mid-1980s has been fuelled by various modern developments, including popular disillusionment with government due to their perceived failure to deliver public services; the growth of public cynicism with politics or deep disaffection with public affairs; and/or by a widespread and pervasive erosion of social trust and social capital. The evidence suggests that the more lurid claims about the role of protest politics fuelling radical right votes appear to be greatly over-stated and over-simplified, and a more cautious judgment would be more appropriate.

Even where radical right voters express above-average political disaffection, there remain reasons to hesitate before concluding that growing cynicism automatically spurs their support. The results presented in this chapter throw doubt on the argument that radical right voters are exceptionally critical of government; instead the cross-national evidence suggests that evaluations of government performance, on matters such as the delivery of public services or the performance of the economy, are strongly shaped by whether parties are included or excluded from power. Where radical right parties become part of governing coalitions, or where conservative governments rise to power which are closely sympathetic to the aims of the radical right, then radical right supporters are more positive in their orientations towards government. Where parties are consistently excluded from power, then, not surprisingly, this may well encourage their supporters to mistrust the responsiveness and performance of government. Far from a deeply-irrational rejection of democratic politics, as 'the authoritarian personality' thesis implied, instead less positive orientations towards the political system may be the rational product of the persistent exclusion of their preferred party from power, or the more general lack of responsiveness of the political system to the particular concerns and policy priorities of radical right supporters.

The most accurate interpretation of the evidence presented here confirms that those who cast their ballots for the radical right are indeed less trusting of a range of political and legal institutions. This does indeed provide partial support for one aspect of the protest politics thesis. Research also suggests that a gradual erosion of institutional trust and confidence has occurred among the public during recent decades in many established democracies, especially concerning trust in the core institutions of political parties and parliaments²⁸. This process is likely to have swelled the potential constituency among the electorate who would be generally sympathetic towards radical parties emphasizing anti-establishment sentiments. But certain important points need to be born in mind before jumping to the conclusion that the erosion of institutional trust has necessarily *caused* the rise of the radical right, or even contributed substantially to their success. Firstly, evidence suggests that mistrust of representative institutions has grown in many advanced industrialized democracies, so it becomes difficult to use this explanation to account for the substantial *variations* in the electoral fortunes of the radical right found in these countries, such as the dissimilarity noted earlier in the Nordic region between Norway and Sweden, or in the

Mediterranean area between Italy and Spain, or even within countries such as between Francophone or Wallonian Belgian regions, or Francophone and Anglophone Canada. Moreover, even though Belgian, Norwegian and Dutch supporters for radical right parties were found to consistently express more negative attitudes across all the indicators, it remains difficult to disentangle the direction of causality here. It might be that those who are more disenchanting with mainstream parties, and more alienated from the political system, tend to gravitate towards the radical right who articulate these concerns. Alternatively, the exclusion of these parties from power, coupled with the populist anti-establishment rhetoric of radical right leaders, could plausibly encourage greater mistrust of political institutions amongst their followers²⁹.

To go further, we need to turn towards the specific issues which are thought to be most conducive to generating mass demand among the electorate, including the distribution of public opinion on matters such as immigration and cultural protectionism. As shall see in the next chapter whether these attitudes and values more strongly determine variations in the electoral success of radical right parties, and hence the major contrasts evident between the fortunes of these parties in Austria and Germany, Belgium and Portugal, Norway and Sweden, and Canada and the United States,

Table 7.1: Dimensions of trust and satisfaction

| | <i>Component</i> | | |
|--|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|
| | Institutional trust | Satisfaction with government | Social trust |
| Trust in the European Parliament | .794 | | |
| Trust in the United Nations | .740 | | |
| Trust in country's parliament | .732 | | |
| Trust in politicians | .715 | | |
| Trust in the legal system | .677 | | |
| Trust in the police | .582 | | |
| State of education in country nowadays | | .687 | |
| State of health services in country nowadays | | .663 | |
| How satisfied with the national government | | .648 | |
| How satisfied with present state of economy in country | | .647 | |
| How satisfied with the way democracy works in country | | .627 | |
| How satisfied with life as a whole | | .474 | |
| Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair | | | .819 |
| Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful | | | .797 |
| Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves | | | .726 |
| Percentage of variance | 22.9 | 17.8 | 15.05 |

Notes: The coefficient represent the results of principal component factor analysis rotated by varimax with Kaiser normalization, in the pooled 8-nation European sample weighted by design and population size. The nations were selected from all those in the ESS-2002 based on whether they contained a relevant party on the radical right (including Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway). The pooled sample contained 13,768 respondents in total, including 932 voters for the radical right (6.8%).

Source: Pooled sample 9-nations, European Social Survey 2002 (ESS-2002)

Table 7.2: Trust, satisfaction, and radical right vote

| | <i>Predictors of voting for the radical right, pooled 8-nation European sample</i> | | |
|--|--|------------|------|
| | B | Std. Error | Sig. |
| (Constant) | -3.48 | | |
| DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND | | | |
| Age (In years) | .008 | .003 | *** |
| Sex (Male=1, Female=0) | .322 | .097 | *** |
| Ethnic minority (Ethnic minority=1, else=0) | -.376 | .336 | N/s |
| SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS | | | |
| Education (Highest level attained on a 6-point scale from low to high) | .059 | .040 | N/s |
| Salariat (professional and managerial employees) | -.231 | .165 | N/s |
| Petit bourgeoisie (self-employed) | .597 | .114 | *** |
| Skilled manual working class | .038 | .186 | N/s |
| Unskilled manual working class | .072 | .148 | N/s |
| Ever been unemployed (for more than 3 months) | .387 | .115 | ** |
| Religiosity (Self-identified as religious on a 7-pt scale) | -.042 | .017 | ** |
| INDICATORS OF TRUST AND SATISFACTION | | | |
| Institutional trust (60-pt scale) | -.035 | .005 | *** |
| Satisfaction with government (60-pt scale) | .035 | .006 | *** |
| Social trust (30-pt scale) | -.025 | .008 | ** |
| Nagelkerke R ² | .056 | | |
| Percentage correctly predicted | 92.4 | | |

Notes: The model presents the results of a binary logistic (logit) regression model including the unstandardized beta coefficients (B), the standard errors, and their significance, in the pooled 8-nation European sample weighted by design and population size. For the construction of the scales for trust and satisfaction see Table 7.1. Note that France is excluded in this model because it lacked the classification of occupational class.

Sig.001=***; Sig .01=**; Sig .05 =*

Source: Pooled sample 8-nations, European Social Survey 2002 (ESS-2002)

Table 7.3: Trust, satisfaction, and radical right vote


| <i>Nation</i> | <i>Party</i> | <i>Institutional trust (60-point scale)</i> | <i>Satisfaction with government (60-point scale)</i> | <i>Social trust (30-point scale)</i> |
|---------------|------------------------|---|--|--|
| Austria | FPÖ | -2.8 * | +0.7 N/s | -1.3 N/s |
| Belgium | VB, FN | -8.7 *** | -3.6 *** | -2.8 *** |
| Denmark | DF, FP | -6.2 *** | -0.7 N/s | -2.1 *** |
| France | FN | -6.4 *** | -6.8 *** | -1.9 *** |
| Israel | Mafdal, IL | -2.9 N/s | +4.8 *** | +2.6 *** |
| Italy | AN, LN, MsFt | -0.5 N/s | +3.6 *** | -0.5 N/s |
| Netherlands | PF, CD | -5.4 *** | -2.5 *** | -1.8 *** |
| Norway | FrP, FLP | -4.4 *** | -3.3 *** | -2.4 *** |
| Switzerland | SVP, EDU, SD, LdT, FPS | -2.4 *** | -1.3 * | 0.0 N/s |
| TOTAL | | -3.4 *** | -0.5 N/s | -0.5 *** |

Note: For the construction of the scales see Table 7.1. The coefficients represent the mean difference between the position of voters for radical right parties and all other citizens on these scales. The significance of the mean difference between groups is measured by ANOVA. The sample was weighted by design and population size.

Sig.001=***; Sig .01=**; Sig .05 =*

Source: European Social Survey 2002 (ESS-2002)


Figure 7.1: Institutional trust and radical right voters



Note: For the institutional trust 60-point scale, see Table 7.1. For the significance of the difference between groups see Table 7.3.

Source: European Social Survey 2002 (ESS-2002) weighted by design and population size.

Figure 7.2: Satisfaction with government



Note: For the satisfaction with government 60-point scale, see Table 7.1. For the significance of the difference between groups see Table 7.3.

Source: European Social Survey 2002 (ESS-2002) weighted by design and population size.

¹ D. Denmark and Shaun Bowler. 2002. 'Minor parties and protest votes in Australia and New Zealand: locating populist politics.' *Electoral Studies* 21 (1): 47-67; Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. 'Personality politics and protest voting: The first elections to the Greater London Authority.' *Parliamentary Affairs* 53 (4): 753-764; P.L. Southwell and M.J. Everest. 1998. 'The electoral consequences of alienation: Non-voting and protest voting in the 1992 Presidential race.' *Social Science Journal* 35 (1): 43-51. For an American interpretative monograph, see Jean Hardisty. 1999. *Mobilizing Resentment: Conservative Resurgence from the John Birch Society to the Promise Keepers*. Boston: Beacon Press.

² Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St Martin's Press. P.37-38.

³ For an overview of the evidence of disaffection with political institutions and with mainstream parties in advanced industrialized democracies see Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Eds. 2000. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Russell J. Dalton. 2004. *Democratic Challenges: Democratic Choices*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁴ Piero Ignazi. 2003. *Extreme right parties in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press. P.215.

⁵ Some support is found at aggregate-level by Pia Knigge. 1998. 'The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe.' *European Journal of Political Research* 34:249-79. On the other hand a more skeptical perspective is provided at individual-level by Jack Billiet and H. de Witte. 1995. 'Attitudinal dispositions to vote for a 'new' extreme rightwing party: the case of Vlaams Blok.' *European Journal of Political Research*. 27(2): 181-202.

⁶ Richard Rose. 2000. 'The end of consensus in Austria and Switzerland.' *Journal of Democracy* 11(2): 26-40.

⁷ Wouter Van der Brug, Meidert Fennema, and Jean Tillie. 2000. 'Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote?' *European Journal of Political Research*. 37(1): 77-102; Wouter Van der Brug and Meidert Fennema. 2003. 'Protest or mainstream? How the European anti-immigrant parties developed into two separate groups by 1999.' *European Journal of Political Research*.42: 55-76.

⁸ Wouter Van der Brug and Meidert Fennema. 2003. 'Protest or mainstream? How the European anti-immigrant parties developed into two separate groups by 1999.' *European Journal of Political Research*.42: 55-76. "In the absence of direct indicators of protest voting, our conceptualization of protest voting is necessarily based on circumstantial evidence. The consequence of this is that some conceivable results may not be interpretable without ambiguity. If votes for anti-immigrant

parties are largely protest votes, we must find a weaker effect of ideology and party size than for other parties. However, in case we do find such a weaker effect, other explanations may conceivable exist." P.83. Moreover reliance of the study upon party preferences as the dependent variable (measured by probability to vote scales), rather than voting intentions or reported votes cast, provides another important limitation, as this procedure is likely to underestimate the extent of actual pragmatic voting due to a systematic bias.

⁹ David Easton. 1975. 'A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support.' *British Journal of Political Science*, 5:435-57.

¹⁰ For a fuller discussion, see Pippa Norris. 1998. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Russell J. Dalton. 2004. *Democratic Challenges: Democratic Choices*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹¹ Joseph Cooper. Ed. 1999. *Congress and the Decline of Public Trust*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

¹² For a discussion see Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris. 2000. 'Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture or Performance?' In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Eds. Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Kenneth Newton. 2001. 'Trust, Social Capital, Civic Society, and Democracy.' *International Political Science Review* 22(2): 201-214.

¹⁸ The seminal works are Robert D. Putnam. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Robert D. Putnam. 1996. 'The Strange Disappearance of Civic America.' *The American Prospect*, 24; Robert D. Putnam. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. NY: Simon and Schuster. More recent comparative research is presented in Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam. Eds. 2000. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Robert D. Putnam. Ed. 2002 *Democracies in Flux*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁹ For alternative conceptualizations of this concept see Pierre Bourdieu. 1970. *Reproduction in Education, Culture and Society*. London: Sage; James S. Coleman. 1988. 'Social capital in the creation of human capital.' *American Journal of Sociology* 94: 95-120; James S. Coleman. 1990. *Foundations of Social Theory*. Cambridge: Belknap.

²⁰ Robert D. Putnam. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. NY: Simon and Schuster.

²¹ For comparative work see Jan Willem Van Deth. Ed. 1997. *Private Groups and Public Life: Social Participation, Voluntary Associations and Political Involvement in Representative Democracies*. London: Routledge; Jan Willem van Deth and F. Kreuter. 1998. 'Membership of

Voluntary Associations.’ In *Comparative Politics: The Problem of Equivalence*. Ed. Jan.W. van Deth, London: Routledge. Pp. 135-155; Kees Aarts. 1995. ‘Intermediate organizations and interest representation.’ In *Citizens and the State*, Ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Peter Hall. 1999. ‘Social Capital in Britain.’ *British Journal of Political Science*. 29(3): 417-61. See also William L. Maloney, Graham Smith, and Gerry Stoker. 2000. ‘Social Capital and Associational Life.’ In *Social Capital: Critical Perspectives*. Eds. Stephen Baron, John Field, and Tom Schuller. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Michael Johnston and Roger Jowell. 2001. ‘How robust is British civil society?’ In *British Social Attitudes: the 18th Report* Eds. Alison Park et al. London: Sage; Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²² Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St Martin’s Press. P. 41.

²³ Marcel Lubbers, Mérove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers, 2002. ‘Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe.’ *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (3): 345-378.

²⁴ J. Linde and J. Ekman. 2003. ‘Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics.’ *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (3): 391-408; D. Canache, J.J. Mondak and Mitch A. Seligson. 2001. ‘Meaning and measurement in cross-national research on satisfaction with democracy.’ *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65 (4): 506-528. Jeffrey A. Karp, Susan A. Banducci and Shaun Bowler. 2003. ‘To know it is to love it? Satisfaction with democracy in the European Union.’ *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (3): 271-292.

²⁵ Pippa Norris. 1999. ‘Institutional explanations for political support.’ Chapter 11. In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic governance*. Ed. Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

²⁶ Christopher J. Anderson. 1995. *Blaming the Government: Citizens and the Economy in Five European Democracies*. New York: M.E. Sharpe; Christopher J. Anderson. 1996. ‘Economics, politics, and foreigners: Populist party support in Denmark and Norway.’ *Electoral Studies* 15 (4): 497-511; Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. ‘Political institutions and satisfaction with democracy.’ *American Political Science Review* 91(1): 66-81.

²⁸ Pippa Norris. 1998. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Russell J. Dalton. 2004. *Democratic Challenges: Democratic Choices*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

²⁹ See, for example, J. W. Koch. 2003. ‘Political cynicism and third party support in American presidential elections.’ *American Politics Research* 31 (1): 48-65.