

Chapter 3

Understanding Political Communications

Although there is an abundance of heated rhetoric and conjecture, and everyone who watches television seems to have a view about the issue, it is surprisingly difficult to find systematic evidence that proves the videomalaise hypothesis. There is a broad consensus that the process of political communications has changed, but whether this has had a major impact on the contents of election news, still less influenced public attitudes and behavior, remains questionable. Unfortunately often discussions of the perceived problems of the news media fail to distinguish criticism based on unsystematic observation from those based on more solid grounds. Many recent books on the news media, discussing phenomena such as trends towards 'soft' or 'infotainment' news, simply assume that the contents of coverage must influence the public, in a simple 'hypodermic-syringe' model, with no prior evidence. Yet this model has been largely abandoned in communication research as we have come to realize that the public actively reacts, deconstructs and interprets what they watch and read, rather than simply absorbing messages like a passive sponge¹. Understanding the political influence of the news media raises difficult theoretical and methodological challenges. What evidence shows whether political coverage in the news media contributes towards civic malaise? Previous studies have generally employed trend analysis, experimental designs, or cross-sectional surveys, each with certain pros and cons.

Trend Analysis: Diffuse Theories of Videomalaise

One approach has been to compare trends in the contents of news coverage with trends in public opinion. Popular accounts often assume a causal connection if negative news about government has grown in recent years along with public cynicism about political institutions. Content analysis provides a systematic description of the media landscape and monthly polls monitor the pulse of public opinion. The media is believed to exert a diffuse, long-term and cumulative influence on the political culture. It's the steady repetition of messages over and over again, not individual exposure, which is thought to entrench mainstream orientations for most viewers. The linkage between declining trust in American government institutions and the rise of television news was first suggested by Robinson and Sheeney². Austin Ranney neatly encapsulates this view: "*It is hard not to put two facts side by side: one is the fact that the age of television began in the 1950s and reached its presence dominances by the mid-1960s; the other is the fact that the rise in public cynicism has been continuous through the same period...These two facts do not prove that television portrayal of politics explains all the decline in confidence, but it is not unreasonable..to conclude that television has made a major contribution to that decline.*"³ Similar studies in Germany, Sweden and Japan have shown how increased coverage of scandals and negative news has accompanied falling confidence in political leaders⁴.

This approach is exemplified in an influential study in which Thomas Patterson argues that there was a shift in the culture and values of American television journalism in the post-Vietnam and post-

Watergate era that gradually infected the rest of the news media⁵. For evidence the study examined the evaluative tone of coverage of American presidential elections in *Time* and *Newsweek* since the 1960s. The research found increased negativity in election news: the proportion of 'bad news' was about one quarter of campaign coverage in 1960. It grew to about 40% in presidential elections from 1964-1976, and then rose to about 50 to 60% in elections from 1980 to 1992. The data displays a pattern of stepped plateaus, rather than a steady linear rise. Although we lack direct evidence monitoring the culture of journalism in this period, Patterson argues that Vietnam and Watergate were the seminal events that transformed American news, as the press turned against politicians.

While intuitively plausible, the time-series approach faces two main challenges before it can be accepted as fully convincing. First, can we assume that there has been a substantial change in the contents of news over time, with the growth of 'negative news' or 'infotainment'? The available evidence in the United States is limited and may be unrepresentative of the broad range of news media⁶, and we lack systematic content analysis allowing us to compare long-term trends in typical news coverage across many countries. The declineism thesis may be falling into the trap of assuming a 'golden age' of journalism, which, in fact, proves mythical. 'Tabloidization' refers simultaneously, and thereby ambiguously, both to news formats and subjects. As discussed in detail in the next two chapters, one possible interpretation of developments in recent decades is that perhaps the news may have diversified into both more popular and more serious formats, rather than simply moved down-market in terms of the type of stories covered.

Even if we accept the presumed changes in the contents of news, with the growth of tabloid or negative news in the US and Europe, as working assumptions, we still face large inferential leaps before we can establish the impact of news coverage on public opinion. The evidence in the macro-level studies is open to many alternative interpretations.

Any parallel trends over time may, in fact, be independent. There may be no systematic link between the type of coverage and the public's response. Studies have found that even where political news on American networks used a conflict frame, for example in covering the debate between the President and Congress over the issue of gays in the military, the public tended to discount such framing, instead interpreting the story in terms of the underlying events or the merits of particular policy proposals⁷. Even if news proves negative or conflictual, therefore, content analysis may provide a misleading picture of how the public responds, constructs, and creates their understanding from the messages they see.

Or the association may prove spurious, as the result of other causal factors. An increase in the incidents of government corruption, for example, may logically produce both more negative media coverage and more public cynicism about politicians. In the cultural account it is particularly important that the timing of events in Vietnam and Watergate should relate systematically to changes over time in political coverage since, of course, many factors may otherwise have driven trends in the news in recent decades⁸. The expansion in the strategic focus of American campaign news during the 1970s and 1980s, for example, could be plausibly explained by actual changes in

electioneering, such as the rising importance of primaries, the lengthening campaign, the decline in salience of many of the 1960's hot button issues or generational and cultural conflict, and above all the growth of professional political marketing. Campaign news may have changed to reflect the fact that election strategy has become more important, and substantive policy issues have become less important, in determining election outcomes.

Equally plausibly, the direction of causality might be reversed: if political news has become cynical this might be the result, rather than the cause, of the wider political culture. Robinson and Sheehan acknowledge that television journalists are part of a broader set of norms and values in society⁹: "*To some degree the entire process must be circular, with the networks affecting the public and the public affecting the networks in return.*" They argue that the media influences the public, because in several instances, such as civil rights, the networks have been ahead of the prevailing view¹⁰. Yet this argument fails to explain apparent major anomalies where, like the cavalry, the news media charged ahead but the poor bloody foot-soldiers failed to follow. We need to explain how the endless onslaught of 'scandal' coverage in the media frenzy that afflicted the second term of the Clinton presidency failed to damage his long-term public popularity, and indeed probably boosted it. As John Zaller suggests, we need to understand the conditionality of media effects, both when coverage of scandal matters for public opinion and when it does not¹¹. After a lengthy critique of the time-series data presented by Putnam, Bennett concludes that a circular process may be at work: "*The well documented political uses and abuses of television are as much a response to, as primary causes, of societal breakdown, individual isolation, and generalized discontent with politics.*"¹²

Given these potential problems, the best that can be said about trend analysis is that it provides interesting hypotheses deserving further examination but essentially the case remains unproven, more faith than fact.

Experimental Studies

Another way to try to unravel this issue is through experiments that monitor the process of short-term individual-level opinion change in response to specific media messages. The logic of the experimental approach is disarmingly simple: if some people are shown negative news high-lighting a political scandal, while others watch a clip about the success of a government program, how do both groups react? This method can potentially provide some of the most convincing and rigorous evidence to settle the videomalaise debate.

A series of experiments have been used to support the videomalaise perspective. In the mid-1970s Michael Robinson showed 212 subjects a single controversial documentary, "*The Selling of the Pentagon*", and he found differences in internal political efficacy after exposure to the program¹³. In an influential recent study, Ansolabehere and Iyengar demonstrated that watching negative or 'attack' television advertising discouraged voter turnout and decreased political efficacy in the U.S.¹⁴

This approach was exemplified in experiments by Cappella and Jamieson which concluded that American network news was guilty of sensationalizing and over-simplifying complex policy issues like health care, emphasizing the political game over substantive debate,

contributing towards a 'spiral of cynicism' among the public. Jamieson argues that strategic coverage shares certain characteristics, namely: winning and losing becomes the central concern; the language of wars, games and competition predominates; there is discussion of performers, critics and voters; there is much emphasis on the performance and style of candidates; and great weight is given to polls and position in evaluating candidates. Of course there is nothing new about this, after all elections are primarily about who wins and forms the government, not just a civics debate educating the public, but over the years Jamieson argues that this framing has come to predominate in election coverage¹⁵. The assumption is that this change has been driven by a shift within journalism, rather than a change in the nature of campaigning per se due to the growth of political marketing. To test the effects of this development, one group was exposed to campaign news in the print and broadcast media framed strategically, where winning or losing was the predominant way of characterizing the motivation of candidates. Another group was shown news framed in terms of issues, where stories concerned problems facing society and proposed solutions. Those who saw the strategic frame were more likely to provide a cynical response, meaning that they attributed self-interest to the motivation of politicians: *"A story can be framed in terms of the advantages and disadvantages for the candidate's chances of election or in terms of the advantages and disadvantages for the constituency. Mistrust of politicians and their campaigns arises when strategy framing dominates."*¹⁶.

These experiments certainly come closer to nailing down causal effects in a rigorous manner yet they face the common problem of how far we can generalize from the results to the real world. Experiments may involve a large number of participants who are allocated to stimuli and control groups wholly at random. Yet the results can be the product of the particular methodology that is used, including the message stimuli that are selected, the measurement of political attitudes like 'cynicism', and other artifacts about the design.

In contrast to the US results, for example, parallel experiments on the impact of television news conducted in the 1997 British general election campaign among 1,125 subjects, found that negative news failed to damage, while positive news served to boost, levels of party support¹⁷. As discussed further in the concluding chapter, this pattern proved significant despite a wide range of controls. The contrasting findings of the available experimental studies of the effects of negative television news in Britain, and Ansolabehere and Iyengar's study of negative TV ads in the US, may occur for any one of three reasons: because of the specific conditions under which they were conducted (such as the operationalization and measurement of negativity and party support); because repetitive 30-second TV ads and longer television news stories may plausibly influence viewers in different ways; or because people react differently within different media, electoral and political contexts. Experimental studies can provide precise answers that address the issues of causality in media effects, but it can be difficult to generalize from the necessarily artificial conditions of an experiment to the real world.

Surveys: Specific Theories of Videomalaise

Perhaps the most common approach has looked for individual-level evidence from cross-sectional national surveys. Behavioral research has focused on understanding the conditions of media exposure believed to

produce certain individual-level effects, including variations in the source, content, channel, receivers and destination. Studies have often compared the attitudes and behavior of regular users of different types of media, such as newspapers and television news, or viewers of television debates and campaign ads.

This approach was exemplified by Michael J. Robinson, who used American NES survey data from the sixties to show that those who relied on television news had lower political efficacy, greater social distrust and cynicism, and weaker party loyalties than those who relied upon newspapers, radio or magazines for their political news¹⁸. Experimental data with 212 subjects was used to confirm the direction of causality. For Robinson the videomalaise story runs as follows. In the 1950s and 1960s television news developed a mass audience, reaching an 'inadvertent audience' who watched the news although they were otherwise inattentive to political information. The inadvertent audience is theorized to be particularly vulnerable to the effects of what they watch and to believe in the credibility of the networks. American television journalism is thought to share certain characteristics, namely to present interpretive, negativist, and anti-institutional news. The result is that viewers, particularly the inattentive audience who lack other forms of political information, respond to the content by growing more cynical, frustrated and despairing about public affairs, and more disenchanted with social and political institutions. The main evidence Robinson presented, in addition to the experimental results already mentioned, were simple cross-tabulations of the 1968 NES data on internal political efficacy scores, sub-divided into those relying solely on TV for information, those relying mainly on TV, and those relying upon some other news medium. Robinson concluded that those who relied solely on TV had lower confidence that they could affect the political system: *"Those who rely upon television in following politics are more confused and more cynical than those who do not. And those who rely totally upon television are the most confused and cynical of all."*¹⁹

Robinson theorized that six factors explained this relationship: the size of the television news audience; public perceptions of the credibility of the networks; the interpretative character of television news; the emphasis on conflict and violence; and the anti-institutional theme in network news. In later work, he suggested that network television news was strongly influenced by the prestige press, notably the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* and *Wall Street Journal*, with a greater focus on 'inside-the-beltway' strategic analysis than traditional coverage of politics in the regional press and wire services²⁰. In the post-Watergate era, after the standard NES indicators of trust in American politicians experienced free-fall, the thesis that television news was responsible for civic malaise seemed plausible to many. Others broadened the critique; an early study, by Miller et al., linked content analysis of newspapers, particularly critical political coverage, with feelings of political disaffection experienced by their readers²¹.

More recently, Robert Putnam analyzed the U.S. General Social Survey to demonstrate that the heaviest users of television were least socially trusting and least willing to join community groups²². These findings can be related to broader trends in civic engagement. Putnam argued that as television saturated American homes in the 1950s this produced a post-civic generation. This helped to explain the cohort

patterns of political mobilization and why citizens raised in this cultural environment were less likely than their parents to trust others, to join voluntary associations, and to vote. Three hypotheses are offered: time spent on television may displace other leisure activities and community involvement outside the home; watching primetime entertainment television with its emphasis on violence and crime may produce a 'mean world' syndrome²³; and, lastly, TV may have a particularly strong effect on childhood aggression. Television is thereby indicted for the dramatic erosion of civic engagement and social capital in America.

Analysts of cross-sectional surveys face four major challenges in interpreting the available evidence. The most important is that cross-section surveys carried out at one point in time make it difficult to resolve the classic chicken-and-egg direction of causality. Does political interest cause us to turn on 'Meet the Press' or 'Nightline', or does watching these programs make us more politically interested? Does watching television produce less social trust and community involvement? Or do people who don't trust others and are not engaged in their community prefer, as a matter of personal choice, to stay home and watch TV? We cannot tell. The 'uses and gratifications' approach argues that we select the programs to watch which are most in tune with our prior predispositions and tastes²⁴. In this view, the process of exposure to the new media may thereby reinforce (which is still an important effect), but it may not change, our political attitudes.

Secondly, claims often generalize about 'newspaper readers', 'television viewers', or even 'internet users', as though there is a single experience of these media. In practice, with the modern fragmentation of television channels, my TV experience (Nightline, C-SPAN and ER) is probably far removed from your TV experience (Monday Night Football, MTV and Oprah). Ideally we need to compare the effects of variance in the media messages, so that we can see whether people who consistently use one distinctive source (such as crime-focused local TV news) differ from those who use others (like right-wing chat radio). Unfortunately in practice it is often difficult to disentangle news sources through survey research: our measures of media habits are often diffuse and imprecise (how many hours do I usually watch the news?). There is often little variance in the contents of mainstream sources like television news on different channels, so we cannot contrast the effects of watching ABC or NBC. We usually have multiple and overlapping uses of different media, for example tabloid readers are often also fans of popular TV; broadsheet readers often listen to current affairs programs; people who watch TV news are often newspaper readers, and so on. One way to monitor media use is to ask the standard question long employed in American polls: "*Where do you get most of your news - from the newspapers or radio or television or magazines or talking to people, or where?*" Yet this item is poorly designed, since it is akin to asking electors what influenced their vote, rather than analyzing this process indirectly. The item assumes a trade-off where, given multiple uses, most of us are unable to provide a sensible answer. I get most of my news from Internet newspapers and online TV bulletins, from NPR and the BBC world service, and, depending upon the topic, from occasional programs like Nightline and Meet the Press: what reply should I give? The alternative is to ask about habitual reliance upon a series of different sources, such as how many days per week I usually listen to the radio, or watch the TV evening news, or read a paper. This self-reported media exposure is also unsatisfactory, since

it takes no account of attention, but it provides a more reliable indicator than a single trade-off question. Our case is strengthened if we can establish a significant and consistently positive relationship between this weak measure of media use and the indicators of civic engagement.

Moreover, there is no consensus in the literature as other studies based on survey analysis have challenged the videomalaise claims. Earlier studies by the author have confirmed that heavy use of television was associated with some indicators of political apathy, as Putnam suggested, in America and other post-industrial societies²⁵. But this was not a problem of television news per se: people who often watched TV news and current affairs were among the most involved in a wide range of civic activities, such as voting, campaigning and organizational membership²⁶. Recently Stephen Bennett has also challenged the pernicious effects of American TV news, concluding that media exposure variables are not significant predictors of trust in government²⁷. A series of studies have found that regular viewers of television news, and readers of broadsheet papers, have higher than average levels of political information, interest and engagement in many countries²⁸.

Lastly, individual-level survey analysis is concerned with monitoring the specific influence of videomalaise on particular groups of news media users. Yet this does not address the diffuse version of the videomalaise thesis. If the whole country have been affected by similar trends, for example if American journalists are collectively overtaken by Monica madness, then it becomes almost impossible to disentangle the effects of using different media sources on the public. Like the air we breathe, if daily news about political scandals or government failures is all around us, from *The New York Times* to *The New York Post*, and from *The Drudge Report* to *Larry King Live*, we cannot tell if the public is cynical because of this endless diet from the media, or whether journalists are simply feeding the voracious public appetite for such headline news. Or both. Only stringent comparative designs across countries allow us to explore cross-cultural differences.

Comparative Studies

This leads to the conclusion that the impact of the news media ideally needs to be studied within a cross-national setting. As Blumler, McLeod and Rosengren argue, comparative research allows us to overcome national and time-bound limitations on the generalizability of our theories, assumptions and propositions²⁹. At present the bulk of the existing research has been conducted within the United States but it remains unclear how far patterns found in these studies are evident in other countries³⁰. As discussed in chapter 13, many features of the news environment in the United States may be a product of 'American exceptionalism'. Despite the formidable problems facing comparative research, and the serious limitations of data, such a strategy is worthwhile because it can start to counteract both 'naïve universalism' (assuming everywhere is the same as us) and 'unwitting parochialism' (assuming everywhere is different to us)³¹.

Comparing Post-Industrial Societies

The comparative framework adopted for this book focuses on post-industrial societies, defined as the 29 member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This comparison

includes most of the major developed economies and established democracies in the world, including all G7 and European Union states. The advantages of this design is that it allows us to compare a wide range of advanced industrialized societies and democratic states which are reasonably similar in terms of their levels of economic, social and political development. This follows the classic logic of the 'most similar system' design which assumes that the factors common to relatively homogeneous societies are irrelevant to explaining their differences³². Common levels of literacy, education and affluence in post-industrial societies mean that we can discount these factors in searching for explanations of civic participation. At the same time there remain significant contrasts in the news environments, in the political systems, and in dependent variables concerning levels of political knowledge, interest and civic engagement among citizens in these states. At the broadest level, we are seeking to move from an analysis of nations towards an analysis of types of political communication systems. The analysis of 'newspaper-centric' and 'television-centric' media systems presented in Chapter 4 provides one such example of this approach³³.

[Table 3.1 about here]

The basic economic and social indicators of the countries under comparison are summarized in Table 3.1. The OECD includes over one billion people in large and small states, ranging from the U.S., Japan, Mexico and Germany at one end of the spectrum down to Luxembourg and Iceland at the other. Many of the most highly affluent societies in the world, characterized by a GDP per capita of over \$30,000, are members of the OECD, such as Switzerland, Japan, the US and the Scandinavian states, although at the lower level of economic development the OECD has countries with per capita GDP below \$10,000 including member states in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Mexico³⁴. All these post-industrial economies are overwhelmingly based on the service sector, absorbing two-thirds of civilian employment and roughly the same proportion of contribution to GDP. Just over one quarter of jobs in the OECD remain in manufacturing industry while less than one tenth are in agriculture. The only countries with more than a fifth of their workforce in agriculture are Greece, Mexico, Poland and Turkey. The size of the public sector varies substantially between countries, whether measured by government expenditure as a percentage of GDP or by the size of public sector employment. The largest public sector remains in the countries of Scandinavia and Northern Europe, especially in small welfare states with a strong social democratic tradition such as Sweden and the Netherlands. In contrast, the level of public service spending was far lower in Japan and South Korea. Lastly, the indicators show that OECD societies are among the most highly literate and educated in the world, with on average over one fifth of their working-age population attaining some higher education. Comparison between OECD member states therefore allows us to explore significant differences in the news environment, for example between countries with predominately commercial or public sector television, or between those with high and low newspaper circulation, controlling for reasonably common levels of social and economic development.

[Table 3.2 about here]

The basic features of the political systems are listed in Table 3.2. The OECD contains most of the world's major established democracies as well as three newer democracies that joined the organization more recently, namely Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. The only exceptions to this generalization are Mexico and Turkey, which can best be classified as semi-democracies. In Mexico the PRI has held power at the federal level since 1929, although under increasing electoral challenge in recent years, and has certain authoritarian characteristics. Turkey currently lacks important political rights and civil liberties, and has had a mixed and unstable record of democratic development³⁵. The Gastil Index, provided by Freedom House every year since 1973, has monitored the levels of political rights and civil liberties on two scales, ranging from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). The results show that by the mid-1990s all the nations under comparison fall into the 'free' column, with the exception of Mexico and Turkey, which are classified as 'partly free'.

As shown in Table 3.2, the countries compared in this book include a wide range of different types of political institutions found in democracies. The electoral system is one of the most important aspects of any constitution and OECD countries range from proportional representation using national or regional party lists (such as in the Netherlands and Sweden), through mixed systems such as those in Germany and Italy, to plurality and majoritarian systems, like first past the post in the UK and US. Party systems also vary substantially, and these can be classified based on the effective number of parliamentary parties elected to the lower house (ENPP) in the early to mid-1990s. This allows us to distinguish between predominant one-party systems, (characteristic of Mexico and Japan), two or two-and-a-half party systems (found in Australia and the United States), moderate multiparty pluralism (with between 2.5 and 4.5 ENPP) common in many European systems, and fragmented multiparty pluralism (with an ENPP greater than 4.6)³⁶. The remaining columns in Table 3.2 indicate the opportunities for electoral participation within each system, including popular contests for the Upper House in bicameral legislatures, direct votes for the Presidency, and the frequency of national referendums. The comparison of OECD member nations contains important differences in the news environments within a wide range of advanced post-industrialized economies and democratic states.

Content Analysis of EU Newspapers and Television

For aggregate trends UNESCO provides the most authoritative and reliable source of official statistics worldwide, such as on the penetration of television sets and circulation of newspapers. When we turn to the content analysis of the news media, however, we focus on the available data in the fifteen member states of the European Union. The content analysis used in this book is derived from *Monitoring Euromedia*, a monthly report published by the European Commission from January 1995 to September 1997³⁷. The company who carried out the research, Report International, used quantitative and qualitative methods to study coverage of the European Union in newspapers in all 15 member states, and television in six member states. This source provides the most comprehensive cross-national content analysis dataset that is currently available. *Monitoring Euromedia* examined the contents of 189 newspapers every month, including all the national papers as well as the most important regional papers in all member states. The

detailed list of sources is provided in the technical appendix to the book. The survey included heavyweight broadsheets like *Le Monde*, the *Financial Times* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* as well as large-circulation tabloids like *Der Bild* and *The Sun*. The weekly magazine press was also included, like *The Economist* and *L'Express*, as well as dailies and Sundays. The average monthly report identified between 11,000-12,000 articles selected as containing information on the European Union (EU) and its policies. The study then selected a random sample of 50% of the articles to analyze every month, or around 5,000-6,000 articles. Over the whole 33-month period the study therefore analyzed the contents of just under 200,000 articles.

Each article was coded according to the source, country, date, and the type of information contained in the article (facts, opinions or comment).

Articles were also assigned two or three different '**topic**' codes since most covered more than one subject. These categorized topics such as foreign policy, monetary policy, EU institutions, and the enlargement of the EU.

A selection of stories was also coded on whether the topic was evaluated positively or negatively. This can be termed the '**directional**' code or tendency, which was scaled from 1 (very negative) through 2 (slightly negative), 3 (neutral), 4 (slightly positive) to 5 (very positive). When the positive and negative evaluations balanced then the stories were given a neutral code. Supervisors checked for inter-coder reliability and the consistency of coding practices.

Most research on balance has concentrated upon how far election news has proved even-handed in terms of partisanship or ideology, such as in the amount of coverage of different candidates or issues³⁸. But elections are special cases; practices in broadcasting are often strictly regulated by explicit 'fair treatment' regulations, for example allocating equal time to all sides in leadership debates or party broadcasts, and in contrast newspaper partisanship is often heightened during campaigns. While it is particularly important that campaign coverage should be balanced, it is difficult to generalize from patterns found within this context to the daily editorial practices in newsrooms. Other comparative research has usually focused upon how a particular dramatic event was reported in different countries, like a positive or negative frame when reporting the Gulf war or the downing of the Korean airliner³⁹. Only a couple of studies have attempted to compare typical daily news coverage across different countries⁴⁰. Analysis of routine coverage of the EU over a 33-month period provides a unique examination of how the concept of directional balance operates in newspapers and television outside of election campaigns. By comparing the amount and balance of EU coverage in different member states and over time we can analyze whether the news media provides an effective civic forum, as discussed in the previous chapter, encouraging public debate about the European Union.

The monthly content analysis for television was based on daily news and current affairs programmes in six countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK). The study recorded the main news programmes in each of these countries, with details given in the technical appendix, analyzing 500-600 programmes per month. During the course of the 33-month period the study therefore analyzed around 16,000-20,000 programmes in total. *Monitoring Euromedia* included the

main news bulletins in each country, such as the 6 O'clock and 9 O'clock news on BBC1 and *Newsnight* on BBC2 in Britain, the 6.30am, 8pm and midnight *Telegiornale* on Rai Uno in Italy, and the *Desayunos de RN* and *Telediario* on TVE in Spain. The study examined how far news stories in these programmes contained information on the European Union and its policies, and around 300 EU-related stories were coded every month following the same process as that used for newspaper articles. Monitoring Euromedia also compared coverage of EU special events, notably the Turin IGC and the Florence and Dublin Councils in all member states, allowing the comparison across all member states of coverage in 73 public and commercial television stations. These sources therefore allow us to compare the topic and direction of coverage of the EU in a wide range of newspaper and television outlets every month. We can monitor how news coverage changed during these years in response to political developments, such as the 1996 Turin Intergovernmental Conference, the process of moving towards Economic and Monetary Union, and events like the British beef crisis caused by 'mad cow' disease. Using this dataset we can examine the amount and tone of the news about the EU, making comparisons between countries and over time. If coverage of the EU policies and institutions becomes more negative in some member states than in others, for example with European policy on the ban on British beef generating splash Euro skeptic headlines in the British tabloids, while generating more popular support in the French press, we can see whether this leads to changes in public opinion towards Europe which differ across member states.

Inevitably reliance upon secondary data limits our ability to examine certain important questions raised by theories of videomalaise. Most importantly, we lack any direct evidence whether there has been a long-term change in the news culture since the 1970s, as some suggest, for example whether there has been increased negativity, the growth of 'disdaining' commentary by reporters, or a shift from a substantive to a strategic frame in news stories. Nor can we use this dataset to examine many of the subtle nuances of news coverage of the EU, such as how far national political leaders, EU officials and MEPs are allowed to speak for themselves versus how far journalists provide an interpretation of events, or how far a national frame, as one would expect, dominate stories about Europe. Such attributes of news stories may well play a key role in shaping the contents of news coverage about Europe.

What we can do in this study, however, is to examine long-term effects. If we assume that the typical content of news has changed over time, increasing public disenchantment with the political process, as videomalaise theories hypothesize, then this should be evident in public opinion monitored in the long-term series of surveys we examine. This study analyzes the American public in the series of National Election Surveys from 1948 to 1998, and the European public in the EuroBarometer series from 1970 to 1998. Videomalaise theories suggest two alternative hypotheses that we will discuss in detail and test in subsequent chapters. One possibility is that if changes in news coverage increasingly turn off all, or a major segment, of the public then this should be evident in a shrinkage in the size of the news audience. In this scenario, many people, disgusted with negative journalism, can be expected to turn to other channels or to abandon buying a newspaper. Another possibility is that people continue to watch TV news and read a paper, perhaps due to habitual leisure patterns, but that over time those who pay most attention to the news

will become increasingly cynical and disenchanted with government institutions and political leaders. If we assume that news did become more negative in the US in the 1960s and early 1970s, as many assert, and this fuelled public disenchantment with politics then we should see a changed relationship between attention to the American news media and a range of indicators of civic malaise.

A second potential criticism is that coverage of European affairs, involving distant, complex and low-salience issues, may differ in certain important regards from news about domestic politics. The latter may well provide more coverage of the drama, personalities and salient issues more relevant and immediate to the lives of citizens. This is true, but in principle it can be argued that these conditions should maximize the potential impact of the news media's coverage. In domestic politics, the public have multiple sources of information, for example people can evaluate the economic performance of the government based on their own 'pocket-books', the conditions of their friends, colleagues and neighbours, and reports of the trade gap, official rate of inflation, or the growth of jobs reported in the news media. Given all these sources, people may choose to discount information provided by the news media. In contrast in European affairs, while some EU policies may have a direct and visible impact, most are conducted as such an abstract and technical level that citizens have to rely almost wholly on the news media for their information, along with cues from opinion-leaders and personal discussions. In this regard, coverage of the EU can be regarded as comparable to how public opinion is shaped towards other foreign policy issues, like conflict in Kosovo, trade with China, or the Gulf War. Plausibly, if we find few systematic effects upon public opinion from coverage of the EU, then we might expect to find even weaker effects from news coverage of domestic politics.

Lastly, the content analysis provides no direct evidence of coverage in the 'new' news, meaning television magazines, live discussion programmes, or talk radio, let alone the flourishing sources of news on the Internet. This is a valid criticism up to a point. The content analysis we use draws heavily on the mainstream evening news programs on television. But it does also include leading current affairs magazines like the BBC's Sunday *'Breakfast with Frost'* and BBC2's *Newsnight*, as well as German ARD's *Europa-magazin* and *Presseclub*, and France 2's Sunday *Revue de Presse*. These can be seen as roughly equivalent to American television magazine programs like *'Meet the Press'*, *'Nightline'*, *'20/20'* or *'Dateline'*. If the 'new' news has infected traditional standards of mainstream journalism, as some suggest, then this should be picked up by our analysis. In addition, it remains unclear whether there is a distinct 'new' news sector in Europe. In Britain, for example, one of the oldest BBC radio programmes, *Any Questions*, now forty years old, and the direct descendent of television's *Question Time*, has always involved live public questions and debate between political leaders. News magazines, in different formats, have been popular since the 1960s. Certainly there are some equivalents to the American 'new' news in Europe, such as the Spanish 'tertulias', 24-hour radio talk channels, and Internet magazines, but their audience currently remains limited. The content analysis of television and newspapers used in this study, while less than ideal in terms of long-term time-series data, and while limited to the 15 European OECD countries, therefore does provide a suitable basis

for a comparative study of typical news coverage of European affairs across the EU.

Public Opinion

Content analysis, no matter how comprehensive, remains silent about the effects of coverage. To understand the impact of attention to the news media on the public, we draw on two decades of Eurobarometer surveys ranging from the first European Community Study in 1970 to the most recently available survey in March-April 1999. Surveys are conducted two to five times a year, with about 1000 face-to-face interviews in each member state, with reports published on a biannual basis for the European Commission. These studies have been supplemented since January 1996 by Euroinion, (European Continuous Tracking Surveys) which have sought to monitor public opinion towards key issues and institutions with telephone interviews each week and the results released on a monthly basis. These rich datasets allow us to monitor whether people who are most attentive to newspapers, television and the Internet differ in any significant ways in their political attitudes, opinions and behaviour towards the European Union, in terms of its institutions and its policies in the fifteen member states. Where there are key events - such as the Maastricht agreement, the introduction of the Euro, and the resignation of the Santer European Commission, these sources allow us to compare coverage in the news media with public opinion. Since European policies often involve fairly complex and technical issues, where people lack direct experience, this provides a strong test of the learning effects of the news media. It is difficult for European citizens to know much about these issues except via the news media, and as such if journalism fails in its informational role, then this may have important implications for European Union governance and widespread concerns about a 'democratic deficit'. Within this context we can explore the role of the news media as a mobilizing agent, and the effects of media use on political knowledge, interest and activism, in different European member states.

One potential criticism of using European data is the 'American exceptionalism' argument. Much of the videomalaise literature originated in the United States, and many of the claims about changes in news journalism may relate to specific historical and cultural factors peculiar to America. As we shall see, the news environment in the United States is more television-centric (and with far more commercially-oriented TV) than in most European countries. The predominant liberal political culture in America may also be more mistrustful of government than the more social democratic tradition in the smaller European welfare states. To test whether patterns found in European public opinion were also evident in the US we drew on half a century of survey data from the series of American National Election Studies (NES) from 1948-98. Obviously there are some important differences between the NES and the Eurobarometer, including the specific questions monitoring media use and civic engagement, as well as the electoral context of the NES. Nevertheless by matching functionally equivalent, if not identical, measures we can examine the impact of attention to the American news media on similar indicators of political knowledge, trust and participation. As mentioned earlier, the NES also has the advantage of allowing us to monitor trends from 1952, before the television age became established, until 1998, representing the early years of the Internet age.

The next chapter goes on to use official statistics from UNESCO and other international bodies to examine some of the most important structural trends in the news environment in post-industrialized societies since the end of the Second World War⁴¹, including: **press diversity** due to the number of national daily newspapers being published, changes in circulation and sales figures, and concentration of ownership; **television diversity** including the structure of competition between public service and commercial channels, regulations of broadcasting, and the availability and penetration of cable, satellite and new communication technology; and lastly **internet** usage, a development which has proceeded far faster in some countries than in others. Given this understanding we can then start to consider what impact these differences might have upon the contents of the news and its potential effects upon the public.

Chapter from Pippa Norris "A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies." (New York: Norton Press, Fall 2000)

Table 3.1: Social and Economic Indicators OECD Countries, mid-1990s

Country	Area	Pop. (1000's)	GDP	Service Sector	Size of Public Sector		% Pop leas secon (2
			GDP per capita 1996	Contribution to GDP 1996	General Government Expenditure % of GDP mid-1990s	Government Employment % of total employment 1996	
Australia	7687	18,289	21,375	69.5	35.6	16.0	
Austria	84	8,060	28,384	67.9	48.6	22.8	
Belgium	31	10,127	25,409	70.2	51.7	19.0	
Canada	9976	29,964	19,330	72.1	45.8	19.6	
Czech Rep	79	10,316	5,445	58.4	40.5		
Denmark	43	5,262	33,230	72.1	59.6	30.7	
Finland	338	5,125	24,420	64.9	55.9	25.2	
France	549	58,380	26,323	71.7	51.6	24.9	
Germany	357	81,877	28,738	68.4	46.6	15.4	
Greece	132	10,465	11,684	67.9	52.1		
Hungary	93	10,195					
Iceland	103	270	27,076	68.5	35.1	19.9	
Ireland	70	3,621	19,525	54.7	36.9	13.4	
Italy	301	57,473	21,127	65.5	49.5	16.1	
Japan	378	125,864	36,509	60.0	28.5	6.0	

Chapter from Pippa Norris "A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies." (New York: Norton Press, Fall 2000)

Korea, S.	98	45,545	10,644	50.9	15.7	
Luxembourg	3	418	40,791	74.9	45.0	12.0
Mexico	1973	96,582	3,411	69.5		
Netherlands	41	15,494	25,511	69.8	50.0	11.9
NZ	269	3,640	18,093	66.6		22.1
Norway	324	4,370	36,020	65.5	45.8	30.8
Poland	313	38,618				
Portugal	92	9,935	10,425	62.9	42.5	15.3
Spain	505	39,270	14,894	64.8	41.2	15.7
Sweden	450	8,901	28,283	70.5	63.8	31.2
Switzerland	41	7,085	41,411	63.5	47.7	14.0
Turkey	781	62,695	2,894	52.5		
UK	245	58,782	19,621	70.8	42.3	14.1
US	9373	265,557	27,821	71.9	34.3	13.4
G7	21178	677,897				
EU15	3240	373,220				
OECD Total	34727	1,092,208				

Source: OECD

Chapter from Pippa Norris "A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies." (New York: Russell Sage Press, Fall 2000)

Table 3.2: Political System OECD Countries, mid-1990s

<i>Country</i>	<i>Electoral System for Lower House</i>	<i>Number of Members Lower House</i>	<i>Number of Effective Parliamentary Parties</i>	<i>Type of Party System</i>	<i>Popular Election for Upper House</i>	<i>Popular Election for President</i>	<i>National Referendums</i>	<i>Political Rights Index</i>
	1996	1996	1991-95	1991-95	1996	1996	N. 1945-95	1996
Australia	AV	148	2.42	Two party	Yes	No	23	
Austria	PR	183	3.40	Moderate pluralism	No	Majority-runoff	1	
Belgium	PR	150	7.95	Fragmented pluralism	Indirect	No	1	
Canada	Plurality	295	2.35	Two party	No	No	1	
Czech Rep	PR	200	4.85	Fragmented pluralism	Yes	No		
Denmark	PR	179	4.70	Fragmented pluralism	Unicameral	No	13	
Finland	PR	200	4.88	Fragmented pluralism	Unicameral	Majority-runoff	1	
France	Majority-runoff	577	2.96	Moderate pluralism	Indirect	Majority-runoff	12	
Germany	Mixed	656	2.78	Moderate pluralism	No	No	0	
Greece	PR	300	2.17	Two party	Unicameral	No	4	

Chapter from Pippa Norris "A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies." (New York: Norton Press, Fall 2000)

Hungary	Mixed	386	2.89	Moderate pluralism	Unicameral	No	5
Iceland	PR						
Ireland	STV	166	3.48	Moderate pluralism	Mixed	AV	20
Italy	Mixed	630	7.45	Fragmented pluralism	Yes	No	29
Japan	Mixed	500	3.95	Moderate pluralism	Yes	No	
Korea, S.	Plurality	299	2.70	Moderate pluralism	Unicameral	Plurality	6
Luxembourg	PR						
Mexico	Mixed	500	2.28	One party predominant	Yes	Plurality	0
Netherlands	PR	150	5.38	Fragmented pluralism	No	No	
NZ	Mixed	120	2.16	Two party	Unicameral	No	10
Norway	PR	165	4.15	Moderate pluralism	Unicameral	No	1
Poland	PR	460	3.85	Moderate pluralism	Yes	Majority-runoff	5
Portugal	PR	230	2.55	Moderate pluralism	Unicameral	Majority-runoff	
Spain	PR	350	2.67	Moderate pluralism	Yes	No	4
Sweden	PR	349	3.51	Moderate pluralism	Unicameral	No	3

Chapter from Pippa Norris "A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies." (New York: Russell Sage Press, Fall 2000)

Switzerland	PR	200	5.60	Polarised pluralism	Yes	No	275
Turkey	PR	550	4.40	Moderate pluralism	Unicameral	No	4
UK	Plurality	659	2.26	Two party	No	No	1
US	Plurality	435	2.00	Two party	Yes	Elec. college/ plurality	0
G7							
EU15							
OECD Total							

Sources: Political Rights, Civil Liberties and Type of Democracy: Freedom Review 'Index of Freedom' January 1996

Electoral system: '*Comparing Democracies*' Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Niemi and Pippa Norris.1996. London: Sage.

Plurality systems = First Past the Post, AV=Alternative Vote, STV=Single Transferable Vote, PR=Party List Mixed Proportional and Party List systems. Effective number of parliamentary parties defined as those with at least 3% of the vote in the most recent election. Type of party system based on ENPP in the latest election available: 0 -2.5 =Two party, 2.5-4.5=Moderate pluralism, 4.6+=Fragmented pluralism.

¹ See, for example, the discussion in Jack McLeod, Gerald Kosicki and Douglas M. McLeod. 1994. 'The Expanding Boundaries of Political Communication Effects'. In Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillmann *Media Effects*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

² Michael Robinson and Margaret Sheehan. 1983. *Over the Wire and on TV*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation p.270-285.

³ Austin Ranney. 1983. *Channels of Power: The Impact of Television on American Politics*. Washington, DC: AEI Press.

⁴ Jorgen Westerstahl and Folke Johansson. 1986. 'News Ideologies as Moulders of Domestic News.' *European Journal of Communication*. 1: 133-49; Susan J. Pharr. 2000. 'XXXX.' In *What's Troubling the Trilateral Democracies*, eds. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

⁵ Thomas E. Patterson. 1993. *Out of Order*. New York: Vintage. P.23.

⁶ Herbert Gans, for example, suggests that *Time* and *Newsweek* magazines focus on evaluative features, rather than 'who did what, where and when', so trends in news magazines may well be unrepresentative of changes in the newspapers, let alone network television news (Herbert Gans. 1979. *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time*. New York: Pantheon Books. Table 4. P.16). The *New York Times*, also used by *Out of Order*, is also untypical of a broader range of regional newspapers because Robinson and Sheehan suggest that it functions as an 'agenda-setter' as the paper of record (Michael J. Robinson, Michael and Margaret Sheehan. 1983. *Over the Wire and on TV*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.)

⁷ David L. Swanson, Ann N. Crigler, Michael Gurevitch and W. Russell Neuman. 1998. 'The United States'. In *News of the World: World Cultures look at Television News*. Edited by Klaus Bruhn Jensen. London: Routledge.

⁸ The timing of Vietnam and Watergate also provides a poor fit for the trends in negative campaign coverage presented in Patterson's study, even assuming a lagged effect. In mid-1965 media coverage of Vietnam rapidly expanded and this process swelled still further on the eve of the Tet offensive in 1968 (Daniel Hallin. 1986. *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press). If Vietnam changed changing the predominant news culture then we would expect an increase in negativity to be evident by 1968, when in fact Patterson shows a slight fall in 'bad' news in coverage of the presidential candidates. Even if the effects were lagged, the proportion of 'bad news' coverage of candidates in the 1972 campaign was very similar to that evident in 1964. In the same way, negative news falls slightly in 1976, after Watergate, and only increases again in 1980. An events-driven approach seems to provide a poor prima facia match to the Patterson data.

⁹ Michael J. Robinson, Michael and Margaret Sheehan. 1983. *Over the Wire and on TV*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. P.282.

¹⁰ Michael J. Robinson, Michael and Margaret Sheehan. 1983. *Over the Wire and on TV*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. P. 282.

¹¹ John Zaller. 1998. 'Monica Lewinsky's Contribution to Political Science.' *PS: Political Science and Politics*.

¹² W. Lance Bennett. 1998. 'The Uncivic Culture: Communication, Identity and the Rise of Lifestyle Politics.' *PS: Political Science and Politics*. XXXI (4): 741-761.

¹³ Michael J. Robinson. 1976. 'Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of The Selling of the President.' *The American Political Science Review*. 70(2): 409-432.

¹⁴ Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar. 1995. *Going Negative*. New York: Free Press.

¹⁵ Kathleen H. Jamieson. 1992. *Dirty Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp.159-69.

¹⁶ Joseph N. Capella and Kathleen H. Jamieson. 1996. 'News Frames, Political Cynicism and Media Cynicism'. In *The Media and Politics*, edited by Kathleen Hall Jamieson. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Volume 546. p.79; Joseph N. Capella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. 1997. *Spiral of Cynicism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

¹⁷ Pippa Norris, John Curtice, Savid Sanders, Margaret Scammell and Holli A. Semetko *On Message: Communicating the Campaign*. London: Sage.

¹⁸ Michael J. Robinson. 1974. 'The Impact of Televised Watergate Hearings.' *Journal of Communication*. 24(2): 17-30; Michael J. Robinson. 1975. 'American Political Legitimacy in an Era of Electronic Journalism: Reflections on the Evening News.' In *Television as a Social Force: New Approaches to TV Criticism*. Edited by Douglas Cater and R. Adler. New York: Praeger; Michael Robinson. 1976. 'Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "the Selling of the President".' *American Political Science Review*. 70(3):409-32.

¹⁹ Michael J. Robinson. 1974. 'The Impact of Televised Watergate Hearings.' *Journal of Communication*. 24(2): 17-30; Michael J. Robinson. 1975. 'American Political Legitimacy in an Era of Electronic Journalism: Reflections on the Evening News.' In *Television as a Social Force: New Approaches to TV Criticism*. Edited by Douglas Cater and R. Adler. New York: Praeger; Michael Robinson. 1976. 'Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "the Selling of the President".' *American Political Science Review*. 70(3): 409-32.

²⁰ Michael J. Robinson, Michael and Margaret Sheehan. 1983. *Over the Wire and on TV*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. P.286-7.

²¹ Arthur Miller, Edie H. Goldenberg, and Lutz Erbring. 1979. 'Set-type Politics: The Impact of Newspapers on Public Confidence.' *American Political Science Review*. 73: 67-84.

²² Robert Putnam. 1995. 'Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America.' *P.S.: Political Science and Politics* XXVIII(4):664-83; Robert Putnam. 1996. 'The Strange Disappearance of Civic America.' *The American Prospect*, 24.

²³ Gerbner, George, Larry Gross, Michael Morgan and Nancy Signorielli. 1994. 'Growing Up With Television: The Cultivation Perspective'. In Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillmann. 1994. *Media Effects*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

²⁴ Jay Blumler and Katz. 1974.

²⁵ Pippa Norris. 2000. 'Television and Civic Malaise.' In *What's Troubling the Trilateral Democracies*, eds. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

²⁶ Pippa Norris. 1996. 'Did Television Erode Social Capital? A Reply to Putnam' *PS: Political Science and Politics*. September 29(3):474-80.

²⁷ See Stephen Bennett. 1999. 'Trust in Government, Trust in the Media.' *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*. Forthcoming. See also Suzanne L. Parker. 1999. 'The Media and Cynicism: The Survey Side of the Question' *Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting Chicago*, April; Timothy Vercelloti, Marco Steenbergen, Philip Meyer and Deborah Potter. 1999. 'Help or Hindrance: How Civic Journalism Transforms Public Perceptions of the Media's Role in Politics.' *Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting Chicago*, April.

²⁸ Kenneth Newton. 1997. 'Politics and the News Media: Mobilisation or Videomalaise?' In *British Social Attitudes: the 14th Report, 1997/8*, eds. Roger Jowell, John Curtice, Alison Park, Katarina Thomson and Lindsay Brook. Aldershot: Ashgate; Kenneth Newton. Forthcoming. '*Mass Media Effects: Political Mobilisation, Mediamalaise, and Social Capital.*'; Pippa Norris. 1997. *Electoral Change since 1945*. Oxford: Blackwell; Christina Holtz-Bacha. 1990. 'Videomalaise Revisited: Media Exposure and Political Alientation in West Germany.' *European Journal of Communication*. 5: 73-85; John Curtice, Schmitt-Beck and Schrott. 1998.

²⁹ Jay G. Blumler, Jack M. McLeod and Karl Erik Rosengren. 1992. *Comparatively Speaking: Communication and Culture Across Space and Time*. London: Sage. P.3

³⁰ See Jay Blumler. 1985. 'European-American Differences in Communication Research.' In *The Media Revolution in America and in Western Europe* edited by Everett M. Rodgers and Francis Balle. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation; also Jay G. Blumler, Daniel Dayan and Dominique Wolton. 1990. 'West European Perspectives on Political Communication: Structures and Dynamics.' *European Journal of Communication*. 5: 261-284.

³¹ Michael Gurevitch and Jay Blumler. 1990. 'Comparative Research: The Extending Frontier.' In *New Directions of Political Communication: A Resource Book*, eds. David L. Swanson and Dan Nimmo. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

³² Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy. 1984. *How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House; see also Giovanni Sartori. 1994. 'Comparing Why and How'. In *Comparing Nations* edited by Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil. Oxford: Blackwell.

³³ The logic conforms to Przeworski and Teune's recommendations to convert countries names into variables. See A. Przeworski and H. Teune. 1970. *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. New York: John Wiley.

³⁴ Gross Domestic Product per capita in 1996 is measured by the OECD in US dollars using current exchange rates. If measured according to Purchasing Power Parities this provides a slightly flatter distribution of national differences in per capita GDP.

³⁵ See Daniel C. Levy and Kathleen Bruhn. 1995. 'Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule without Democracy' and also Ergun Ozbudun. 1995. 'Turkey: Crisis, Interruptions and Reequilibrations.' Both in *Politics in Developing Countries* edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

³⁶ For a useful discussion of the classification of party systems adopted in this book see Alan Ware. 1996. *Political Parties and Party Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

³⁷ I am most grateful in particular to Anna Melich and Agnes Hubert, as well as to the work of the European Commission's DG10 for Information, Communication, Culture and Audiovisual -Unit Public Opinion Monitoring (X.A.2) for release of this dataset, without which this book would not have been possible.

³⁸ For a discussion see Denis McQuail. 1992. *Media Performance*. London: Sage.

³⁹ See, for example,...

⁴⁰ See One Day in..

⁴¹ Peter Humphreys. 1996. *Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.