



# MARKET POWER AND MARKET MAKERS

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# Trading in Forward Markets

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- Framework:
  - OTC broker market
  - Exchanges: e.g. Enron Online; ICE
- Markets
  - Energy market
  - Capacity market
  - FTR market
- Term
  - Daily
  - Longer term
- Participants
  - Sellers of energy from assets
  - Buyers of energy for load
  - Traders

# Market Power

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- Definition: Raise market price above competitive level
  - Profitability
  - Duration/Sustainability
- Method 1: Physical withholding
- Method 2: Economic withholding
  - Offer price  $>$  Competitive price
  - Export when export price  $<$  internal price
- Method 3: Transmission related
  - Create congestion

# Competitive Price

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- Competitive price in day ahead and real time spot markets is a function of:
  - marginal cost
  - opportunity cost (including optionality)
  - risk
  - scarcity
- Competitive price in forward markets is a function of:
  - Expected spot price
  - Expected fundamentals (including risk)
- Competitive price
  - Testable in day ahead and real time markets
  - Difficult to test in forward markets



# Trading and Market Power Examples

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- Capacity market
- Day ahead energy market and FTR market
- FTR market and information
- Bilateral OTC energy markets



# Trading and Market Power in Capacity

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- Trading can enhance/create pivotal position in market
- Use of pivotal position to exercise market power
- Exercise of market power in PJM daily markets
- Relationship between market power in capacity credit markets and market power in bilateral OTC capacity credit markets
- Relationship between price expectations derived from market power in PJM daily markets and market power in bilateral forward markets
- Role of physical position
- Capacity market subject to exercise of market power via trading strategies
  - Actual exercise of market power a function of incentives
- PJM made changes to market rules to reduce incentives to exercise market power in PJM daily capacity credit markets



# Capacity Market Dynamics


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- Daily and monthly markets
- Penalty payment if LSE is deficient
- Capacity can be sold within or outside PJM
  - Firm energy
  - Relative prices
- Marginal cost of capacity
  - Direct costs close to zero for daily capacity
  - Opportunity cost: external energy markets (firm, LD)
- Inelastic demand
  - Function of forecast load




# Supply and Demand

Figure 2: PJM Unforced Capacity, Total LSE Obligation, Net PJM Position



# One Supplier and Residual Demand


Figure 8: Entity1 Supply and Residual Demand





# Daily Capacity Prices


Figure 1: Daily Capacity Credit Market Clearing Price






# Prices and Market Comparison

Figure 4: Daily Capacity Credit Market Prices and Value of Exporting Firm Energy From Daily Forwards  
October 2000 through April 2001



# Daily and Monthly Prices

**Figure 11: January 2000 Through September 20, 2001  
Daily vs Monthly Capacity Credit Market Performance**





# Trading and Market Power in Energy


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- Trading in PJM day ahead energy market:
  - Financial offers/bids: increment/decrement bids.
- Trading in PJM monthly FTR market
- Combination used to exercise market power
- FTR position taken on a radial path
- Financial offers and bids in day ahead market used to create congestion on the path
- Congestion makes FTR position valuable
- Typically in radial portion of transmission system
- No physical positions
- PJM introduced rule which eliminates incentive to engage in this behavior

# Incs/Decs/FTRs

**A**

Thermal rating 60 MW



**B**

**40 MW FTR**

LMPDA = \$25  
**10 MW INC**

INC VALUE -\$0

LMPDA = \$25  
**10 MW DEC**

DEC VALUE -\$250

LMPDA = \$25  
LMPRT = \$25

FTR VALUE \$1,000

NET VALUE \$750

LMPDA = \$50  
LMPRT = \$25



# Trading and Market Power in FTRs

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- Transmission outage/derating posted after close of monthly FTR market: reduced flow on a path(s)
- Asymmetric access to information possible
- Incentives to gain access to information
- Purchase of FTR in PJM monthly FTR market on path(s)
- Congestion makes FTR position valuable
- No physical positions
- PJM made rule changes to remove the incentives to engage in this behavior

# Transmission Outage/FTRs

**A**

Thermal rating 60 MW

Thermal rating 50 MW

50 MW

**B**

**40 MW FTR**

LMPDA = \$25

LMPDA = \$25

LMPDA = \$25

LMPDA = \$50

FTR VALUE \$1,000




# Trading and Market Power in Energy

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- Trading in OTC bilateral energy market
- Liquidity
  - Number of trades
  - Number of participants
  - Relative size of participants
- Potential size of positions
  - Credit
  - Assets
- PJM West Hub is relatively liquid
- Into Cinergy, Entergy are relatively liquid
- Other trading points less liquid
- Impact of active balancing market as constraint
- Test: compare day ahead prices with daily forwards




# Trading Volumes: PJM and North





# Trading Volumes: PJM and West

Daily Trading Volumes for Selected Hubs 2001





# Results of Trading

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- Arbitrage between DA and RT markets
- Arbitrage between short term and long term markets
- Potentially value FTRs based on expected congestion
- Potentially value energy based on expected spot market/fundamentals including market power
- Leverage existing asset-based market power
- New opportunities for market power
- Hedging/risk transfer
- Development of more efficient forward markets
- More liquid: more players; more trades
- Less ability to game
- More reflective of expected fundamentals



## ***IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS***

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Contact the PJM Market Monitoring Unit

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