

***RECENT ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN GREECE:  
ATTEMPTS TOWARDS DECENTRALIZATION, DEMOCRATIC  
CONSOLIDATION AND EFFICIENCY***

Policy Review Paper

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## 1. GEOPOLITICAL BACKGROUND

Greece was the first National State that emanated from the Ottoman Empire, in the early 18<sup>th</sup> century. The adventurous Revolutionary War of Independence that begun in 1821 and ended, after multiple regressions, with the establishment of the Greek State in 1831, was in fact the first arena where the centrifugal forces that later tantalized the young State's first years of existence were manifested. The first Governor of independent Greece, Ioannis Capodistrias (Capo d' Istria) attempted to administratively reorganize the liberated areas (the Peloponnese and some of the Islands) on the basis of a strong and centralized government that would function independently from the influential notables of the Peloponnese and Continental Greece (Sterea Ellada), that during the Ottoman domination were ruling in the provinces. Prior attempts made by revolutionary assemblies to set up a provincial administrative system had failed because of personal rivalries between notables. Capodistrias, overlooking the resistance on the part of the notables that were jealous with their power, proceeded firmly to organize the provinces in territorial units. The Peloponnese was divided into seven departments and the islands into six. These departments were then subdivided into provinces and, in turn, into towns and villages.

Extraordinary commissions, representing the government and substituting the local notables were appointed to govern the departments. Local leaders were thus placed, to their detriment, under the jurisdiction of state officials. The extraordinary commissioners were the intermediaries between the central administration and the people, and finally

responsible for all state acts and decrees.<sup>1</sup> The local notables were thus officially – although not really- deprived of any influence over their previous protégées. Their natural resentment to the new situation escalated when Capodistrias fell assassinated by two members of the Mavromichalis clan, notables of Peloponnese that chose this bloody way to regain political influence.<sup>2</sup>

Ironically, Capodistrias was succeeded by Otto I, a Bavarian prince imposed on Greece by the “Protecting Forces” (England, France and Russia) as the first monarch of Greece, whose rule proved incomparably more authoritarian and centralizing than that of his predecessor<sup>3</sup>. The Bavarian administration that surrounded the young monarch, after first disarming the local chiefs of the Revolution, proceeded in abolishing the local administration structure altogether and established the new capital of the State in Athens, that until then was nothing but a small, semi-deserted town<sup>4</sup>. The local notables adjusted to the new situation by moving to Athens and –in exchange for their submission- participating in the central government, as intermediaries between the center and the rest of the country. It is in this way that a political culture of clientelism was established and consolidated for almost two centuries in the Greek political, economical and administrative life.

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<sup>1</sup> William P. Kaldis, *John Capodistrias and the Modern Greek State*, The State Historical Society, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1963 pp. 65-72.

<sup>2</sup> See Georges Prevelakis (University of Paris-IV, Sorbonne) “*L’ hellenisme*” (Hellenism) in *Les Balkans, Cultures et Geopolitique* (Cultures and Geopolitics) in a Collection by Jean-Robert PITTE, ed. © Nathan, pp. 107-123.

<sup>3</sup> William Kaldis sustains, however, that “*In spite of the accusations of his political opponents ... Capodistrias did not destroy the institutions of local and municipal self-government which had functioned so well until 1821; his reforms were intended to improve the former system.*” In *John Capodistrias and the Modern Greek State*, p. 72.

<sup>4</sup> See Georges Prevelakis “*Athenes et les espaces helleniques au XIXe siecle*” (*Athens and the Hellenic spaces in the 19<sup>th</sup> century*) in *La Grande ville, enjeu du XXIe siecle*, Paris ©PUF, 1991, pp. 37-38.

In less than a century, an increasingly centralized territory, with a transport network of roads and railroads constructed in a radio-centric form with Athens in its center was formed <sup>5</sup>. Every important decision for the whole territory, every policy that concerned even the smallest village, was to be taken at the center. Local authorities were taxed with insignificant tasks such as city planning, sanitation, management of water resources etc. Between Communities and Municipalities of up to 100.000 inhabitants and the central State, there was no intermediary level of regional district.

Regional disparities and demographic and administrative “hydrocephalism” have ever since been the principal plagues for the country. The urbanization that started in the 1930s and has resulted today in a problematic capital of almost four million inhabitants (40% of the total Greek population live in Athens) while the massive emigration of the 1930’s, 1950’s and 1960’s of Greek labor mainly from rural areas to foreign countries left behind a semi-deserted, both demographically and economically, countryside. Although multiple attempts for administrative decentralization have taken place in the last century, the centralization imposed by the Bavarian sovereigns was never really contested, mainly by fear of the eventual geopolitical consequences that a larger local or regional autonomies would entail for national coherence, in view of the political and social disparities caused by industrialization and urbanism <sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid. Prevelakis “*L’ hellenisme*”, pp. 109-111

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p. 119

## 2. ATTEMPTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION

Although local self-administration at the level of Communities and Municipalities was established very early in Greece, there was no intermediary level of an elected administration established at a regional district level.

The Constitution of 1927 (article 107) prescribes that:

*“The State is divided in regional districts wherein the citizens administer directly the local affairs, as prescribed by law”* but no such law was ever passed.

The Constitution of 1952 (article 99) modifies substantially this sentence as such:

*“ The Administrative organization of the State rests on the decentralization and local self-administration, as prescribed by law. The election of municipal and local authorities is done by universal suffrage.”* The Chapter on State Administration establishes thus the fundamental principle of administrative decentralization and local self-government. The idea dividing the country in regional districts is, however, abandoned.

In the 1968 Constitution, also referred to as “pseudo-Constitution”, because it was introduced by the military dictatorship, the regional district concept is surprisingly reiterated:

*“1. The Administrative organization of the State rests on a system of decentralization, as prescribed by law (same as in the 1952 Constitution, art. 99) and 2. The State is divided in regional districts (same as in the 1927 Constitution, art.108) according to geo-economical, demographic and transportation circumstances.”* The organizational specifics of the administrative decentralization of the State relies thus on a law that -by

the way- was never issued. In his analysis of the 1968 constitution, J. Varvaretos claims that *“This provision aims at making State authority as accessible as possible to the citizens, so that administrative issues are resolved as fast as possible, based on the direct knowledge of the [local] affairs, whereas the central administration will be contained in the general direction and overview.”*<sup>7</sup> It is most remarkable, although difficult to believe, that an authoritarian government had the genuine intention to diffuse powers in such a way that it could be fatal for its own existence, a stance that democratically elected governments in the past had not dared to take.

The first, after the restoration of democracy, Constitution of 1975 (article 101) repeats the first paragraph of the article 99 of the 1968 Constitution, and alters the second paragraph by removing the first sentence, as to the State’s division in regional districts. A third paragraph is added, providing that:

*“(3.) The regional state authorities have a general competency of deciding over the affairs of their district, whereas the central administration, to the exception of specific competencies, have the general direction, coordination and control of the regional institutions, as prescribed by law.”*

The next article (102) confirms the establishment of local autonomous administration units to the first level, that of Communities and Municipalities and vaguely provides for other levels. The idea of establishing autonomous regional districts with directly elected representatives is, again, abandoned. The Constitution confirms the clear intention of the legislator to keep the regional authorities under state control and the law provides a

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<sup>7</sup> John Varvaretos, *The Constitution of 1968*, Sakkoulas, Athens 1972, pp. 122-123.

minimal level of competencies. Article n. 120, par. (3) provides that *“specific competencies can be conferred to the periphery from the central administrations”*. The local organizations of self-administration are endowed with financial means deriving from State taxes, although the local administration does not have a taxing authority. On this point, the Constitution of 1975 as lastly amended in 1986 provides in its article n. 106 that *“the State plans and coordinates the country’s economic activity ... by taking the necessary measures ... to promote regional development”*

This is more or less the way in which decentralization, although not regionalization as such, was attempted –with many oscillations- in the Greek territory. In the meanwhile, on a European level, a progressive strengthening of regionalism is taking place. The Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 that is modifying the founding treaties of the European Economic Community, hence European Union, establishes a new institution, the Committee of Regions. This newly formed assembly was intended to have a consultative capacity to the legislative and decision making bodies of the Union (the Parliament and Council of Ministers) regarding issues that affect the European regions, that are thus recognized as “the third partner” (the member-states and the European citizens being the first two) in the European edifice. This remarkable evolution was achieved under pressure from those strong regional entities within multi-national European states, such as Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain, Scotland in the UK, Flanders in Belgium and the regions of Northern Italy, that in the post-world era were economically booming, but were not accordingly conferred the political powers needed to pursue their interests in the decision-making processes on a national level. Moreover, by the way in which the

European Community's Regional Funds were set up, Community financial aid to the European regions was always channeled through the national state level in order to be distributed. It is therefore not surprising that these Regions would sooner or later demand to be given the prerogative to manage directly the funds that were destined to them, according to their own needs. On the other hand, every member state of the Union had different levels of regional and local integration, whereas the EU treaties were referring to the vague notion of "regions". In many cases, such as for Greece, there were no delimited regions as such. For the sake of better programming and development, it was imperative that an intermediary level of administration that would ensure the interests of the region were established, in order to balance centrifuge-secessionist forces and promote democracy within the Union.

In this context, the Greek law n.2218 of 1994 established a 2<sup>nd</sup> level of local government at the level of prefecture -but not at the level of region- and set out to reform, and eventually strengthen, the status of the 1<sup>st</sup> level of local government. On October 16, 1994 the first prefectural elections were conducted and on January 1, 1995 the first directly elected prefects assumed office. One of the most important competencies conferred to the prefects was the management of prefectural funds, a large part of which came from the European Union, and were destined to cover for the cost of public constructions. Moreover, the prefecture is endowed with a limited taxing competency. During the past five years (1995-1999), approximately 250 new competencies were gradually transferred with Presidential decrees from the state administration towards the prefectures. During this time, however, the institution was seriously put to the test as

phenomena of clientelism and abuse of power by newly elected prefects, as well as instances of corruption occurred in the prefectures, proving once more that legitimization cannot be applied by force –it can only derive from the sensible practice of public governance and the citizens’ control upon it.

By the same law, the Greek territory was administratively organized into thirteen conventionally circumscribed regions that correspond to the target-regions of the European structural funds. Some of these transcend the natural geographic territorial fragmentations, as for instance, the division of the Peloponnesian peninsula into two parts, one of which, the area of Patras (Achaia) together with the former “Continental Greece” form a separate region. Although consecutive governments have often tried to sustain so, this fragmentation does not constitute a third level of regional self-administration. These regions are administered by non-elected officials that are directly appointed by the government and represent the state authority.

Despite their ambitious declarations to promote decentralization, the clear intention of almost all governments so far has been to maintain as many powers as possible at the center. Speaking of the second major attempt of administrative reform in the 1990’s, the Capodistrias plan that will be analyzed in the third section, Minister of Interior, Mr. Alekos Papadopoulos bluntly states: “Our aim is not to transfer competencies from the state to the regions. Enough competencies have been transferred already. The remaining belong exclusively to the state. We are not ‘cantonizing’ the country.”<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Interview of Minister Alekos Papadopoulos to Paul Klaudianos, published in “*Economicos Taxydromos*”, October 8, 1998.

### 3. THE IOANNIS CAPODISTRIAS PLAN

The "Ioannis Capodistrias" plan, named after the first governor of independent Greece, calls for structural changes in local administration that confer jurisdiction of certain state services from the central government to local powers. The relative bill of the plan was prepared within three months (December 1996-February 1997) and was submitted to Cabinet of Ministers for approval in February 26, 1997. It was thereafter put to public debate at national level from March until September 1997.

According to the government, the plan's aims can be summarized in principle into the following <sup>9</sup>:

- To modernize the administrative system by providing sufficient and high quality services to the citizens of urban and rural areas;
- To promote the role of Local Authorities and of their elected representatives by broadening the political leverage of local government;
- To establish basic requirements for the administrative and financial independence of local authorities and coordinate the local public investment for public works and technical infrastructure;
- To strengthen the internal resources of Greek regions, as a necessary precondition for continuous and sustainable development at a regional and local level and favor economies of scale in operating costs and human resources development;

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<sup>9</sup> Hellenic Ministry of Interior, Administration and Decentralization, official website.

- To promote transparency in the management of financial resources and to guarantee legitimacy by enforcing political responsibility of local authorities vis-a-vis the citizens.

The bill that –according to the government- has only been the beginning of far-reaching administrative reform, calls for a compulsory merger of small local government entities around the country (towns and communities) to the leadership of the Central Union of Municipalities and Communities (KEDKE). The bill provides for the creation of 804 new municipal councils, which together with existing ones in the Attica and Thessalonica prefectures, and the 133 community councils which remain intact, lowers the total number of local government organizations (OTA) to less than one-fifth, thus to 1,033, from 5,775 today. By doing the math, roughly 25,000 elected city and village councilors and mayors went out of office.

The bill, however, ensures the representation in the new municipal councils of communities whose autonomous administration is abolished, by stipulating the presence of at least one councilor for communities of more than 300 residents, which are renamed “municipal departments”. Each department will continue electing local councils, numbering three councilors for populations up to 300, five for more than 300 and seven for more than 2,500.

The reform was financially endowed with 1.025 trillion drachmas (\$300 billion) until 2002. The bill retains all tax privileges for the residents of small villages and the existing definition of mountainous and disadvantaged areas.

According to the government's proclamations, the Program is based on the principles of democracy and efficiency that can be enhanced by the decentralization of powers, the establishment of larger local communities, and the coordination of local and regional development measures. Moreover, the government pledged to be seeking broader transparency in its distribution of grants to the local government. The very choice, however, of naming the plan after Capodistrias is somewhat controversial. Capodistrias indeed attempted to make substantial reforms towards state efficiency and democratization –for which he paid with his life- but not exactly through decentralization. As we saw in section 1, Capodistrias' choice of governance, at least for the few years that he served as head of the state, was a strong, centralized administration, whose powers would be diffused in –but not transferred to- the provinces through state-appointed commissioners. Capodistrias has been, in fact, criticized by his contemporary - and later historians- for autocracy and lack of capacity to delegate powers, as he insisted to maintain personal control over all state affairs. This centralizing trend ran throughout his organization of the state. The Governor's intension was to give equal representation to every Greek province, but in a way that would diminish the influence of local loyalties<sup>10</sup>. It is in fact this version of his governance that the present Greek government is trying to accomplish by the homonymous plan: to eliminate local loyalties and clientelism by dramatically diminishing the number of local officials. The goal of the plan that was named after Capodistrias was noting close to political decentralization. It was rather an attempt to concentrate smaller communities into larger local entities that would be easier to control. The promised –or suggested- broadening of the political leverage of local

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<sup>10</sup> C. M. Woodhouse, *Capodistria, The Founder of Greek Independence*, Oxford University Press 1973, Chapters 17-18.

communities is clearly not followed-up by the necessary shift of powers and financial means to ensure a proper decentralization process. The government may have misused Capodistrias as a symbol of decentralization, but was fortunate in that the opposition and the public opinion did not capture the parallelism and did not turn the argument against it.

The government considers the Capodistrias Plan to be “a necessary step towards the modernization of local government”. To this end, the government proclaimed committed to the necessary changes “regardless of the political cost”. Campaigning throughout the country in favor of the Plan, Prime Minister Costas Simitis illustrated his arguments, by sustaining that “European countries with a population similar to that of Greece, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, have 800 and 600 local administration bodies, respectively”. His reference to Belgium however, is somewhat inaccurate, for Belgium is a federal state that has multiple levels of local and regional governance. As for the Netherlands, it is well known that their local government bodies are endowed with substantial powers and financial means to enjoy a remarkable level of autonomy. Moreover, the Premier pledged that “the government would proceed along with its choices regardless of any political cost”, stressing that “Greek citizens were demanding modernization and an economy, which would improve their standard of living”. However true, this general assumption does not refer to a coherent political dialog with concerned citizens and interest groups that would empower them to influence such important reforms. The Premier’s “slip of the tongue” confirms that these changes were based on the government’s choices and only. Moreover, the information campaign that was launched when the plan was already well under way did not contribute substantially to

illuminating on behalf of the citizens the benefits and drawbacks of the proposed changes.

With reference to the second main goal of the plan, that is to promote administrative efficiency and better quality of services to the citizen, the Capodistrias plan has in principle captured the idea of re-shaping the administrative landscape of the country according to the new demographic and economic patterns of critical mass in order to better exploit economies of scale. Indeed, it can be sustained that this new arrangement will eventually cut down administrative costs that derived from the maintenance of such a big number of local councils and municipalities and their respective services. On the other hand, the trade-offs as to the proximity of municipal services to citizens seem to be substantial, as –in several cases- citizens in remote areas have to go many extra miles in order to access these services. The government has attempted to simplify bureaucratic procedures in remote areas by introducing measures to facilitate transactions by phone, mail etc., but it will certainly take some adjustment time, effort and additional expense on the part of the state in order to install the necessary information technology and educate citizens into using these new facilities. There is no need to stress how essential it is for these modernization attempts to succeed, otherwise the plan may very easily bring about the exact reverse outcomes than the ones anticipated and result to the total desertification of the country, instead of its revitalization.

As it was to be expected, the debate over The "Capodistrias" plan sparked massive protests by local government officials that concluded in marches and sit-ins. The bill was,

regardless of the protests, forwarded for discussion in Parliamentary Committee, the majority of which voted to officially open the debate to members of three local government bodies, including the Central Union of Greek Municipalities (KEDKE) in order to re-frame the bill. At that point, Minister of Interior, Alekos Papadopoulos, openly proclaimed against inviting members of coordinating committees saying that “the plan had already been discussed for eight months” (from March until September 1997) and that “KEDKE was already represented at the debate”.

During the debate of the bill in Parliament, reactions from opposition parties were diverse, sometimes contradictory and in many cases fierce. The main opposition New Democracy (ND) party reacted to the Capodistrias plan by reproaching the government for a blatant “display of despotism by the prime minister, who -without first presenting the bill- banned dialogue, thus showing contempt to the citizens, abolishing in practice the Parliament and revealing a dangerous mentality”. In addition, the ND leadership warned the government that it would “defend by all means the institutions and democratic legal order,” by focusing on Greece's regional and agricultural development, as well as “strong local government based on economic self-sufficiency.” The protest reached its peak when ND withdrew its deputies from the Parliamentary Committee where the plan was being discussed and accused the government of “serving only petty party purposes” while “trying to impose the plan in an authoritarian and undemocratic way, without first ensuring proper dialogue with concerned parties”.

The ND opposition's main counter-arguments can be summarized to that:

- The merger was compulsory and therefore ineffective and unconstitutional and
- Mergers would be more effective if promoted on the basis of incentives, specific plans and local referendums, thus more to the direction of voluntary mergers.

Despite its intentions, the ND opposition front proved, however to be inconsistent, when Athens Mayor and President of the KEDKE, Dimitris Avramopoulos, that had been officially supported by the party, saluted the bill as “a most important milestone in the life of a new institution and a mature demand of local government.”

Conducting a more structured opposition, the leftist coalition party of “Synaspismos” agreed in principle to the necessity of mergers, recognizing that the bill would be a major step towards stronger and more functional local government, although expressed their disagreement over the way in which the government was scheduling these changes. The party leadership called on the government to promote a substantive debate in Parliament in order to achieve a broader consensus on the issue and considered submitting a series of proposals and amendments to articles in the draft law, providing that if the specific proposals are not accepted then the specific articles in the draft law will be opposed. Synaspismos leadership also proposed amendments to the town planning plan, the electoral law and local administration finances. Very few, if any, of these were, however, accepted by the government.

The sad conclusion to be drawn from this incomplete and ineffective debate is that the Greek state has not yet established channels of interchange with the citizens that it is

supposed to serve. The political dialogue is restricted to parliamentary verbalism, whereas the inability of local and regional interest groups to construct a consistent reaction and exercise a powerful influence on high-level decision-making reveals an alarming democratic deficit. This study can only suggest some of the sources of this deficit that can be attributed to historical-traditional forces (see section 1) and to the much broader problem of social capital deficit in the Greek society.

#### 4. THE GREEK OMBUDSMAN

The Ombudsman is a fairly new institution, originally established in the Nordic Countries (Sweden and Denmark) and therefrom induced in the European legal system. This institution is unquestionably promoting the quality of democracy and the process of democratic consolidation and administrative transparency by allowing the citizen to hold the state accountable for its actions or omissions.

The institution of the Greek Ombudsman was recently established by law n.2477 in 1997. The mission of the Ombudsman as an independent administrative entity is the mediation between the citizens and the public administration, the Local Government Organizations and other Bodies functioning under Public Law<sup>11</sup>. His (or her) mission is the protection of the citizens' rights, the combat against mal-administration and the maintenance of legitimacy and rule of law. The Ombudsman is not a substitute of any other law enforcing institution, as it cannot take action for cases that are being processed in court. The Ombudsman jurisprudence is divided in four thematic topics:

1. Human Rights
2. Social Protection and Health
3. Land use, quality of life and urban planning and
4. State-citizen relations

So far the Greek Ombudsman has received almost 6.500 cases, of which 75% are within his jurisdiction and 60% have concluded in favor of the petitioning citizen. The

importance of the Ombudsman as a factor for the consolidation of Democracy and political Accountability is in the “new attitude towards the citizen” that is introduced.

The Ombudsman’s yearly reports and specific written suggestions to state administrative bodies and services aim at calling their attention to elements of administrative deficiency that have a detrimental effect on the citizen, as well as on the administration’s credibility in general, and demand their restorative action. In most cases so far, these interventions have had a positive effect on individuals and on the quality of administrative services overall.

Professor N. Diamantouros, the first Greek Ombudsman comments on the need for a “better quality of democracy”, in terms of democratization and democratic consolidation. “The State should create self restraining mechanisms that hold it accountable to the citizen. It is only in this way that the citizen can feel secure, able to control the deeds of the State and thus exercise political control.”<sup>12</sup>

The Ombudsman institution promotes horizontal accountability, which resides on autonomous structures and institutions within the state, in contrast with vertical accountability, that resides on the citizens’ control on their elected government by exercising the right of vote. Horizontal accountability is a *conditio sine qua non* for ensuring the citizen’s confidence vis-à-vis the civil service and the state administration.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Hellenic Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization, Official Website.

<sup>12</sup> Oral presentation by the Greek Ombudsman, Professor N. Diamantouros at the J. F. Kennedy School of Government, 11/1/1999.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.



## 5. CONCLUSION AND CRITIQUES

Greece can be indisputably categorized as a unitary state, that operates largely on the basis of a centralized bureaucracy and that has until now conferred a minimum level of powers to its periphery. The legal reforms of 1994 and 1997 that are examined here reveal the co-existence of two opposite, and therefore canceling each other, forces: the first was centrifuge and decentralizing and the second was centripetal and concentrating. The first was imposed more by evolutions on a European level, rather than by local sociopolitical dynamics and resulted in a conventional -and questionably operational- form of regional organization with restricted competencies. The second, imposed by the center, the government, attempted to re-organize the country according to new demographic parameters into economically viable units of local government, but to the detriment of local institutions of self-government.

It is still very soon to determine whether these reforms have been successful and whether they have fulfilled their objectives. Certainly, a more functional organization of peripheral administration, if sustained, would in the long run benefit regional economic development. It is even sooner for us to observe the impact of the above reforms on the social tissue of the country. But in terms of its contribution to the democratization of public procedures, we can state with confidence that a mere representation of state agencies at the local level does neither constitute a genuine administrative decentralization, nor a deconcentration of powers, if the will to decentralize political powers is not present.

The main conclusion that can be inferred from the formulation process of these legislative reforms and the political debate that preceded their adoption is that the country's social and political structures have proved inefficient in handling a constructive debate that can foster any reform of any kind. It is a regrettable role for a democratic state to be "announcing" measures and imposing legislations that are detached from its societal platform. On the other hand, it is a severe handicap for a society to be unable to produce the necessary mechanisms that will channel its demands, concerns, suggestions and criticisms to the government that it has elected.

The Ombudsman institution was on the other hand a very positive progress. It relies, however, very much on the person of the Ombudsman to make the best out of it. It can be said that the so far evolution of the institution is quite satisfactory. In any case, it is the level of accessibility of the institution to the citizens and the extent to which the latter make use of it that can guarantee its success.

Finally, it has to be underscored that is a loss for the quality of the legislation and the administrative measures produced in such undemocratic ways, if they do make part of a long-term, seriously planned policy. The costs imposed on the society by alternating, mutually canceling reforms is immeasurable, as legislative measures that do not repose on broad political consensus are bound to fail in practice or to be cancelled by successive governments. In this way, even the most resourceful legislative measure can have no lasting results and administrative continuity cannot be achieved.

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