

THE CHOICES THAT MINORITIES MAKE: STRATEGIES OF NEGOTIATION WITH THE MAJORITY IN POSTWAR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

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Abstract: Using intensive interviews, participant observation, and analysis of surveys, I investigate how urban minorities in chiefly Bosniak areas of Bosnia negotiate with members of the majority group. I also explore the factors that facilitate everyday interaction. I find that urban minorities tend to reach out to ordinary members of the majority in settings where they can engage in specific reciprocity, in which trust in others is based on personal experience and immediate exchange. Urban workplaces, for example, can provide minorities with the context necessary for engaging in mutual help and downplaying essentialist identifications, which helps build bridging links to "others." Once the venue moves toward the official public sphere, however, minorities become more cautious about inter-ethnic interaction. Minorities rarely approach local voluntary organizations, except in cases where they seek expert knowledge for mediated interaction with majority authorities. This exploratory study challenges the assumptions of some students of both civil society and consociationalism.

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*If I, or other minorities, stayed among ourselves, we wouldn't be able to survive.
Really, only Muslims can help me survive.¹*

THE PUZZLE.

Even in the wake of a war fought largely along ethnic lines and the continued rule of ethnonationalists, significant numbers of ethnic minorities continue to reside in the region of Bosnia that is now chiefly Bosniak. Using intensive interviews, participant observation, and analysis of surveys, I investigate the strategies these minorities use for negotiating their relationship with members of the majority group. I also explore the factors that facilitate everyday inter-ethnic interaction. Given the International Community's involvement in re-building plural post-conflict societies across the globe, sound strategies for assisting multiethnicity should be grounded in a thorough understanding of how ordinary, non-elite minorities negotiate with ethnic "others."

I find that urban minorities tend to reach out to ordinary members of the majority in settings where they can engage in *specific* reciprocity, in which trust in others is based on personal experience and immediate exchange. Urban workplaces, for example, provide minorities with the context necessary for engaging in mutual help and downplaying essentialist identifications, which helps build bridging links to "others." Once the venue moves toward the official public sphere, however, minorities become more cautious about inter-ethnic interaction. Ordinary minorities rarely approach local voluntary organizations, except in cases where they seek expert knowledge for mediated interaction with majority authorities. And minorities fail to see the practical benefits of participation in more mass-based civic associations.

My findings suggest that a fruitful pathway for re-building inter-ethnic trust in Bosnia is through support of heterogeneous workplaces. These are the urban sites, not the more removed voluntary organizations, that minorities use to locate members of the majority for building inclusive identifications and engaging in mutual reciprocity.

To set the stage for my paper, I first provide the context for minority choice and then discuss comparative literature on possible negotiation approaches for minorities and on factors facilitating inter-ethnic interaction. I then offer alternative hypotheses for pathways to assist inter-ethnic cooperation and sketch my multi-method investigation. Drawing on data from interviewing and participant observation, I describe the minority strategies I encountered in the field and demonstrate the usefulness of my findings on factors that bolster minorities' negotiation with ordinary Bosniaks.²

CONTEXT.

Political, economic, and demographic realities in Bosnia profoundly constrain inter-ethnic interaction. Bosnia's postwar political system is modeled on consociationalism. Students of

¹ Vera, Catholic respondent who stayed and continues to stay, in Sarajevo, December 1998. All names of respondents and informants are pseudonyms. See Appendix for background data on respondents and informants.

² Due to space constraints, I will limit my discussion to negotiation with ordinary members of the majority. My

consociationalism advocate that a state recognize its major ethnic groups,³ isolate them at the mass level, and constrain inter-ethnic contact to the elite level in order to transform ethnic groups into constructive elements of stable democracy (Lipjhart 1975, Nordlinger 1972, Burg and Berbaum 1989). Accordingly, the Bosnian political system institutionalizes ethnic cleavages -- Bosniak,⁴ Serb, and Croat -- in a grand coalition (tri-ethnic collective presidency), ethnic-based federalism, mutual veto, and proportional representation. The internationally recognized state of Bosnia names Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as constituent nations ("The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina" 1995). Of Bosnia's two political Entities, however, the Federation grants constituent nation status only to Bosniaks and Croats, while Republika Srpska confers constituent nation status only on Serbs. And in practice, the fact that the same nationalist leaders who conducted the war also negotiated the peace means that these wartime regimes remain largely intact, implementing policies aimed at ethnic separatism and thwarting multiethnic governance at the national level (Cox 1998, p. 7). Partly due to these politics and partly due to wartime destruction and socialist legacies, the estimates of the unemployment rate range from 33 percent in the Federation to 47 percent in the Republika Srpska (Bukic 1998).

For this paper, minorities are persons who belonged to ethnic groups that were smaller than the majority group in their original, *prewar* municipality.⁵ Thus, in chiefly Bosniak Bosnia, minorities are Serbs, Croats, and persons from mixed marriages. Roughly two-thirds of Serbs, Croats, and mixed persons, who lived in Bosniak-dominated areas before the war, fled or were forced to flee. Postwar estimates of minorities now residing in the Bosniak-majority area range from 10 (UNHCR 1997) to 22 percent (Medjunarodni Forum Bosna 1999).⁶ International authorities work to promote refugee return.

PREVIOUS LITERATURE.

MINORITY STRATEGIES. Based on theoretical literature on ethnic relations (McGarry and O'Leary 1993), migration (Hugo 1981, Wahlbeck 1999), regional literature (Woodward 1995, Laitin 1998) and my fieldwork, I suggest that Bosnian minority strategies are confined to consisting of one, or a combination, of several of the following options:

dissertation, however, also addresses strategies for negotiation with majority authorities.

³ Following Smith (1991, p. 21), I define an ethnic group as a group possessing: a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, at least one differentiating element of common culture, an association with a specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.

⁴ Peoples who before the war called themselves "Bosnian Muslims" now generally call themselves "Bosniaks," following a 1993 vote by the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals to return to what they termed the old name -- Bosniak -- for the Bosnian Muslim nation (Filandra 1998, p. 384). To respect my respondents and informants, I use the terms (Bosniak or Bosnian Muslim) which they themselves use. Otherwise, I use the term Bosniak in this paper. Thanks to Bob Donia for this advice.

⁵ Many of my respondents, informants, and colleagues in Bosnia found the term "minority" offensive. My use of this term is not an endorsement of it, but is a reflection of the very real social and political implications of belonging to an ethnic group that is smaller than others, particularly in the transitional countries of Eastern Europe.

⁶ I computed this estimate using population figures compiled by UNHCR (1997) and Medjunarodni Forum Bosna (1999). Population estimates vary because of the still large numbers of displaced and the lack of a post-war census.

←-----Continuum of Bosnian minorities' strategies-----→
 assimilation integration selective engagement manipulation of identifications anonymity voice circulation exit communalism violence

Students of ethnic relations dispute the conceptions of each of the minority strategies listed on the continuum. I take assimilation as a process in which minority individuals surrender their ethnic identities and ultimately become incorporated in the dominant society and cultural group (Barth 1969, p. 31). Assimilation rests heavily on the willingness of the majority group to accept full inclusion of minorities.⁷ In theory, those employing a strategy of civic integration do not surrender their ethnic identities, but seek to belong to a common civic, national, or patriotic identity (McGarry and O'Leary 1993, p. 17).⁸ In the case of Bosnia, integration would be a process in which each of the ethno-religious minorities would retain their cultural identities, but would accept the regional, supra-ethnic identity as "Bosnians," or citizens of Bosnia in the public sphere. I conceive of the third strategy of "selective engagement" to imply that minorities stay true to their sub or supra-national identities, yet refrain from full integration into society by using criteria to select only certain members of the majority-dominated society for cooperative relations. "Manipulating presentation of identifications" connotes some willingness to accommodate to the dominant culture, though the tailoring of different collective identifications – some ethnic and some not – to take advantage of particular contexts.⁹ This contrasts with the strategy of anonymity, a degree of withdrawal from society in which minority individuals attempt to go about their lives in the most inconspicuous way possible, remaining "quiet" about collective belonging and political views. On the other hand, voice involves minorities turning to the public sphere, through activism in voluntary organizations and/or politics, to advocate for change that improves their rights. Borrowing from Hugo, (1981, 194), I conceive of "circulation" between prewar homes in minority areas and postwar residences in majority areas as both an attempt to "get the best of both worlds," and to hedge one's bets by keeping a foothold in two communities and spreading the risk of failure. Exit simply means that minorities leave for their putative homelands, or perhaps beyond. And in using a strategy of communalism, minorities rely on kinship and communal ties. Violence is self-explanatory.

FACILITATING NEGOTIATION. Beyond describing the negotiating strategies that minorities use, some students have explored the factors that facilitate inter-ethnic interaction. In discussing literature on social identity, civil society, and informal institutions, I offer alternative pathways to bolstering minority interaction with members of the majority.

⁷ Indeed, Laitin's lack of attention to the role of the majority group's acceptance of others in the process of assimilation has led to criticism of his proposition that Russians in Estonia and Latvia.

⁸ Many observers of racial and ethnic relations in the United States argue that integration in practice involves the assimilation of ethnic, racial, and religious minorities into the dominant Christian Anglo-Saxon culture.

⁹ For other examples, see Barth on Lapps (1964, p. 13) and Malkki on Hutu refugees (1995, pp. 105- 196.)

Social Identity.¹⁰ In their study of Arab-Jewish relations in pre-*intifada* Jerusalem, Romann and Weingrod conclude that the minority strategy of coping with members of the majority community is partly influenced by cultural factors (1991). More specifically, Israel's Palestinian citizens so strongly adhered to their cultural identity, that this exclusive identity interacted with political ideology to limit inter-ethnic interaction and result in communalism (1991, pp. 87-8). If high levels of ethnic consciousness contribute to high levels of ethnic distance (see Gibson 1998, Gitelman 1983, Romann and Weingrod 1991), then less passionate adherence to one social identification like ethnicity should facilitate tolerance and mixing.¹¹

Institutional context. Alternatively, the institutional environment available to minorities can facilitate everyday inter-ethnic interactions. Drawing on Putnam, I propose that groups for "bridging" social capital, in which social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trust that arise from them, encompass people across ethnic cleavages (2000, p. 22), assist inter-ethnic cooperation. Voluntary groups found in civil society¹² provide the location for iterated interaction that helps builds trust (Sigelman 1998). In fact, Cushman contends that even highly conflictual and initially very mistrustful interaction between individuals can be mitigated by the process of repeated interaction with one another (1998, p. 12). Such intermediate social units, like formal organizations and informal social networks, can facilitate identifications that may cut across ethnic ones (Bell 1965, p. 159).

Informal institutions like the neighborhood and workplace are also potential sites for iterated inter-ethnic interaction and for developing inter-ethnic social networks. Granovetter argues that neighborhood and work networks are a setting in which individuals develop the "weak" or "bridging" ties¹³ necessary to integrate them into communities (1973, p. 1378). Before the war, Bosnians often used the structure of the neighborhood network (*komsiluk*), which was ethnically mixed in urban areas, to engage in mutual help and to communicate multiple belongings. As one informant described, "you should be able to turn to your closest neighbor for help, before you turn to your own brother." Hospitality among neighbors is a form of social exchange "motivated by the returns..expected" (Vinogradov 1974). Bringa finds that inter-ethnic interaction in the venue of neighborhood coffee visiting provides a base for expression of multiple collective

¹⁰ Social identity is "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel 1978, p. 63). Following Turner, I propose that the self-concept is a relatively enduring multifaceted system which is carried about in the head from situation to situation (1982, p. 19).

¹¹ Inter-ethnic mixing should also be facilitated if members of the majority group do not vehemently adhere to their ethnic identity, as in the cases of Macedonians and Ukrainians.

¹² I use's White's definition that civil society "is an intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of the society to protect or extend their interests or values." (1994, p. 379).

¹³ According to Granovetter, "the strength of a ties is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie" (1973, p. 1361). However, Cramer (1998, p. 18) points out that some dimensions of the network may be *distinct*. For instance, she argues that the content of network interaction varies depending on the level of intimacy involved.

identifications, some of those being inclusive and others being exclusive (1995, p. 66).¹⁴

Yet as Bougarel describes, the neutral institutional structure of the neighborhood, which is based on *communal* belongings rather than on individualism, can easily be used in nefarious ways (1996). During the war, political elites demonized communal differences and appealed to the traditional aspect of good neighborly relations that recognizes and reinforces different communal identities of Bosnians, in order to pull people apart. Due to the damage the war inflicted on the neighborhood, minorities may seek alternative institutions, particularly those more focused on individualism, for help with negotiation. One such informal institution is the workplace. Most work relationships are instrumental: they are encounters of limited duration in which the participants are primarily focused on performing a task and receiving remuneration (Romann and Weingrod 1991, p 145). Furthermore, the contacts are personal, direct, and repeated, so that ordinary persons are able to gain immediate, first-hand knowledge of their colleagues of other ethnicities (1991 p. 144). Research conducted just before the war indicated that citizens of former Yugoslavia overwhelmingly viewed inter-ethnic relations in the workplace as good, even when they evaluated them as bad in other, more general contexts (Bacevic, et. al, 1991, pp. 144-9). To avoid institutions tainted by the war, however, minorities with access to local voluntary organizations that the Western democratization projects have helped sprout, may instead rely on them for facilitating inter-ethnic negotiation.

METHOD.

Addressing gaps in regional literature on ethnic politics that has focused on the essential role of elites and the institutions they use (Burg 1993, Cohen 1995, Donia and Fine 1994, Hayden 1993, Ramet 1992, Woodward 1995), I adopted an individual-level approach to examining the choices that ordinary minorities at the non-elite level make. This perspective allows for emphasis on agency and suits efforts to describe and explain how decisions are made and acted upon. For instance, Laitin focuses on how individuals develop strategies to cope with the constraints imposed by history and elites (1998, p. 366-7). Similarly, Rieder investigates how ordinary Whites in Brooklyn experienced racial integration (1985). In my case, despite the ethnically exclusive environment of Bosniak-majority Bosnia, minorities continue to live there and interact with "others." I used this individual-level approach to explore how ordinary minorities interact with ethnic "others," *given* existing political constraints. Due to the subjective dimension of ethnicity, understanding of inter-ethnic relations requires listening to popular voices as individuals interpret elite rhetoric, as well as contemplate their sense of belonging, their beliefs, and their future.

In investigating factors influencing minorities' migration choices, I used an intra-regional comparative case-study design focused around the Bosniak municipalities of Bihac and Novo Sarajevo.¹⁵

¹⁴ In fact, comparative investigations of inter-ethnic relations have found that nationally heterogeneous contexts enable individual minorities to shun exclusivist identities and instead consciously (Malkki 1995), partly consciously (Laitin 1998), or unconsciously (Pilkington 1998) inhabit multiple identifications or conglomerate ones.

¹⁵ These geographic constraints and sample selection mean that my findings cannot be generalized beyond these localities in Bosniak-majority areas.

This allows for deep investigation into my complex research questions (Ragin 1987, Yin 1994). It also facilitates generation of hypotheses on minority choices for later testing in other post ethnic-war areas. The use of multiple cases addresses a concern in the regional literature on investigators' over-reliance on Sarajevo, a city known for its uniquely vibrant inter-ethnic relations.

I used ethnographic participant observation to explore in-depth (Emerson, Fretz, Shaw 1995) the choices and attitudes of minorities. Specifically, I lived in apartment buildings in Sarajevo and Bihac that house a mix of ethnicities. I sought consent by announcing myself as a student interested in learning from Bosnian citizens about their concerns and how they cope with everyday problems in the difficult postwar period. Basing myself in apartment buildings afforded a close look at actual, rather than merely reported, minority-majority exchanges. Thus, it mitigates against over-dependence on attitudinal data, which can be problematic given the ambiguous relationship between attitudes and behavior.

Bosnian culture's expectations that neighbors interact frequently socially -- through coffee visits and by reliance on neighbor-based barter networks -- provided a unique opportunity to view inter-ethnic behavior and listen to perspectives in a near-natural setting. It also enabled me to explore the role of neighborhood networks in integration. I confined my investigation to urban neighborhoods in chiefly Bosniak areas, in order to focus on the living spaces where inter-ethnic interaction occurs.¹⁶

I conducted intensive interviews with minority neighbors toward the end of my three-month stay at each site. This combination of intensive interview and participant observation techniques is suited to the challenging research environment (Converse and Presser 1986), since it helps researchers build trust among their informants (Pilkington 1988, p. 114) and avoid "survey fatigue" common among marginal peoples (International Organization for Migration 1996, Cox 1997, Helms 1997).¹⁷ Intensive interviewing also facilitates theory generation, since it allows interviewees to offer explanations different than those conceived of by the investigator, and to explain motivations. The strategy of rooting myself in local communities helped me concentrate on the quiet sub-population of minorities. I then used minority neighbors, local gatekeepers (Sieber 1992, p. 128), and my volunteer activities at local civic organizations to gain access to other minorities. I also drew on survey data (Cushman 1998, Dani, et. al. 1999, IOM 1999, USIA 1998).

FINDINGS.

STRATEGIES. To get a sense of where Bosnian minorities fell along the spectrum of minority strategies sketched above, I asked respondents, "what everyday steps do you take to increase your feeling of security and well being during such insecure and difficult times?" Given the legacy of the war and socialism, discrimination, ethnocentrism, and the departure of most nationalist minority groups to neighboring regions where they are in the majority, I expected minorities to retreat to anonymity.

¹⁶ In another section of my dissertation, where I investigate minorities' migration choices, I talk with Bosnian Serbs and Croats who left for regions where they now constitute a majority, in order to avoid selection bias (Geddes 1990).

¹⁷ Surveys in Bosnia are also vastly complicated by the lack of a postwar census.

Selective Engagement. What I found, however, was that many of my urban minority respondents expressed commitment to reaching out to selected ordinary "others" around them. In fact, some minority interviewees equated their sense of security with engagement with others. For instance, Serb returnee Dragan spoke of "communication with Serbs, Croats and Muslims" as bolstering his security. And Veljko, a Serb who stayed in Sarajevo, replied that he "constantly" contacted neighbors and acquaintances, rather than kin and close friends. Recognizing that wide social networks helped him both socially and financially, Croat Srecko endeavored to "sustain contact with people," particularly since he ran a private business. These minority respondents suggest that the everyday steps they take to increase their sense of security revolve around building and strengthening "bridging ties" to "others" located in the community around them. Following Putnam, they sought to build inclusive ties by developing networks that are "outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages" (2000, p. 22). Thus, rather seeking help from his fellow Serbs, Serb Goran maintained that he worked to "improve relations with his neighbors." Not surprisingly, those minorities most emphatic about engagement with "others" were activists in civic-oriented NGOs. For instance, Croat Dragica told me, "I stay active; I associate, and I don't contemplate things." She added that she worked to help others, like displaced Bosniak women, through her volunteering with a women's group.

Other respondents suggested that they cast their net more narrowly, seeking out "others" who shared their viewpoints. As one example, Serb returnee Dragan described how he attempted to overcome the fear that he experienced upon his return by reaching out to like-minded persons.

At first I was scared. ... because I was a Serb and I thought no one would help me. But then I came to believe that there must be other people who exist and think like me. That if I show others that I'm sincere, that I don't hate, then they will respond in the same way.

Mina told me that her interaction with members of her circle of professionally minded persons provides her with all the security she needs.

I don't feel insecure. It's normal. I have my own community. I have colleagues from the primary school, where I taught. We are all mixed. We meet once a month to share cakes and drink coffee.

To cope with the postwar environment, Croat Nina, who stayed in Sarajevo chose

a circle of people who think the same way..[she does]. People who are not nationalists. For example, my friends at work [are of all ethnicities.]¹⁸ One of the problems, however, is that these non-nationalists are always quiet and peaceful.

In contrast, Bosniaks tended to think of security in financial terms. They did not express a need to reach out to others in their surroundings. Instead, Bosniaks focused on work.

¹⁸ Nina never mentioned ethnicities in this conversation. In listing the names of her "circle" at work, two are Bosniaks, one is half Croat, half Serb, and one is a Bosniak married to a Serb. I know their ethnicities from previous contacts with these colleagues.

Munira: "I continue to strengthen the material security of my family, so that we can develop and move ahead."

Emina: "I work and I study."

Aida: "Well, I'm unemployed, but sometimes I work here and there as a hair stylist."

Being in the majority means they don't need to be so focused on physical security and community integration, which frees them to focus on bolstering the financial aspect of their security.

To supplement the rhetoric of minorities, I also observed the behavior of minorities¹⁹ toward Bosniaks, primarily in the neighborhood, but also in cafés, workplaces, markets, NGO meetings, schools, buses, courtrooms, conferences, gyms, book-signing gatherings, cultivated fields, and churches. The negotiation strategies I directly observed (Table 1) support analysis of my interview findings on the prevalence of selective engagement.²⁰

Table 1: Minority strategies of negotiation recorded through participant observation

Minority Strategy	number of instances	% of total strategies used
Selective Engagement	92	38.7%
(of which occur via the workplace)	53	
(of which occur via the neighborhood)	26	
(of which focus on seeking like-minded)	13	
Communalism	46	19.3%
Manipulation of identifications	28	11.8%
Circulation	14	5.9%
Anonymity ²¹	13	5.5%
Seek help from IO or NGO	10	4.2%
Seek exit	9	3.8%
Seek privatization	9	3.8%
Voice	7	2.9%
Integration	6	2.5%
Improve skills	4	1.7%
Violence	0	0.0%

Source: Participant observation.

n= 238 coded text units, out of a total of 6486 text units in my fieldnotes.²²

¹⁹ I observed nearly half (24 of 51) of my respondents in at least one natural setting. For example, during an unplanned visit to Dragica's NGO, I watched a leader of a group of displaced Bosniak women drop by to ask Dragica for advice. In this way, I corroborated her claim of a good working relationship with members of the displaced Bosniak women.

²⁰ Despite my effort to be an objective and keen observer, I expect that I tended to pay attention more to minority strategies that were "obvious" and had clear observable indicators, than to strategies that were "quiet" and/or did not involve inter-ethnic interaction despite the opportunity for it.

²¹ Anonymity includes mechanisms for escape, like reading, keeping busy so as not to think, taking sleeping pills.

²² Each text unit contains a separate thought or action. I have divided my field notes into text units in order to analyze

Responses to additional interview questions aimed at uncovering the prevailing strategies that minority respondents used in negotiation with "others" bolster the proposition that Bosnian minorities selectively reach out to members of the majority. One indicator of Bosnian minorities' selective engagement strategy is their attitude on the content of the educational program. Borrowing from Smooha,²³ I argue that minorities' views on education indicate their vision of how minority-majority relations should be. Most of my minority respondents argued that children of all nationalities should study from one, united curriculum, whereas less than a third advocated separate curricula for each ethnic group or free choice. Croat Marijan provided a typical response of those minorities favoring a unified curriculum. "There should be a common educational program that includes...an objective discussion of the history, culture, and traditions of all peoples in Bosnia." Others, like Serb returnee Katica, supported a unified curriculum in public schools along with private schooling as an alternative. "There should be one program, because otherwise education works toward ethnic division. If people want other options, there are private schools." In contrast, a recent poll of Croats and Serbs residing in neighboring areas where they are in the majority indicated their preference for communalism. Over 78 percent of Croats in Croat-majority areas of Bosnia preferred for children to learn from separate curricula, while 68 percent of Serbs in Serb majority areas even advocated separate schools for each ethnic group (USIA 1998, pp. 131-2). As Milan, one of my interviewees who relocated from Sarajevo to a Serb-majority area explained,

I believe each ethnic group should have its own program. My language is Serbian. My child does not want to go to a school where he will read that Serbs are Chetniks.

That most of my minority respondents prefer children of all ethnicities to be educated under a united program differs from Palestinian citizens of Israel, who overwhelmingly believe that Palestinians in Israel should control their own schooling (Smooha 1984, pp. 54-56). The willingness of Bosnian minorities to be educated under one educational program suggests their rejection of communalism.

The finding that minorities are more likely than individuals who now belong to the majority group to engage with the in the environment around them is not wholly surprising. Comparative literature notes that minorities, simply by virtue of their smaller numbers, are more likely to engage in at least casual contact with people belonging to the majority group than vice-versa. This is particularly the case if the minority group is politically and/or economically marginalized (Romann and Weingrod 1991, Sigelman, et. al., 1996), since a minority has more to gain from inter-ethnic contact than majority members, who may even stand to lose from such contacts (Smooha 1984, p. 52). Yet even so, Palestinian citizens of Israel opt for communalism.

them through the qualitative software NUD*IST (Scolari 1997). Given this coding scheme, it is possible for me to attempt to capture the reality of each of my informants using multiple strategies.

²³ As Smooha suggests, education in plural societies partly reflects the existing patterns of minority-majority relations in that society. Societies attempting to build a common culture employ a unitary education system, societies embracing consociationalism allow for minorities' education to be autonomous, and societies seeking to control their minorities use education for a means of dominance (1984; p. 66). I follow Smooha's logic, but take the perspective of the minority.

Instead, selective engagement implies a willingness to invest in adapting to, and to working with at least elements of, the current community, rather than a focus on isolation or seeking exit to a nearby majority community.

The behavior of an individual who chooses, or is resigned, to stay in an area where he is in the minority is usually moderated by the multiethnic milieu. This is because, once a minority decides that he will not leave for majority areas, he realizes he will need to interact repeatedly with the ethnic "others" with whom he is apt to share neighborhoods and workplaces.²⁴

Recognition of this reality of having to interact with majority individuals is illustrated by Vera, a Catholic informant from Sarajevo, whom I realized through participant observation employed a multi-faceted strategy that varies according the context. She practiced anonymity in official public situations and careful engagement with individuals from her work and neighborhood surroundings. To illustrate this dynamic process in which individual minorities tailor their strategy to specific contexts, I need to go beyond discussing a single interview question and displaying summary figures of different strategies observed, to following informants--like Vera--through several different inter-ethnic situations. When I asked her how she coped in such insecure times, Vera replied:

I cope by tutoring [privately] and by being honest....
 You know, if I, or other minorities, stayed among ourselves, we wouldn't be able to survive. Really, only Muslims can help me survive. ,,,[For example,] I help my next door neighbor, a Muslim woman who has three children and whose husband left her. Once her children were locked out of the apartment while their mother was at work. I invited them into my apartment and fed them cakes and entertained them until their mom arrived. Then, when I went on vacation to the coast, the neighbor looked after my apartment.
 There's another woman. A Muslim woman who covers herself. She is a single mother. She used to work as a cleaning lady at my old school, but recently she was let go, as 'surplus.' I helped her get a job in this apartment complex cleaning the hallways and stairs. She receives 40 Deutsche Mark a month for this..... She also does some mending for me."

At the end of this story, Vera expressed embarrassment about the instrumental character of these relationships. "I help them and they help me. I'm forced to do this; I have no other choice."

On an individual level, she used the ethnically diverse social networks of her workplace and sometimes her neighborhood to recruit selected members of the majority group, with whom she believes she can develop relationships involving the exchange of very concrete, practical services. To her former work colleague, she offered her recommendation for employment in exchange for mending.

Her chief strategy for coping financially, was to use her professional expertise to offer services to internationals, in exchange for payment, and to former colleagues, in exchange for either payment or services. This strategy for addressing her financial insecurity largely excluded members of the majority group. But

²⁴ For example, Sudetic (1998, p. 63) tells the story of how a Bosniak returnee to now Serb-majority eastern Bosnia worked for moderation in his mixed village by attempting to intercept delivery of an inflammatory card that his relative sent to a Serb neighbor. In pleading with the postmaster to give the card to him, instead of delivering it to the Serb

once, Vera told me that she was offering her services to a woman – a Muslim married to a Jew, who had helped her obtain food from the Jewish humanitarian organization during the war. As a rule, however, she acknowledged that these relationships involved the exchange of services primarily with Christians, those of Catholic or Orthodox background. Thus, Vera increased her financial security by building "bonding" ties that were more exclusive than her bridging ties for integrating into her community and generally coping as a minority.

But her relationships with majority neighbors, most of whom were displaced Bosniaks, were limited largely by Vera's experiences with them. She told me that one night during the war, when they were huddled in the cellar together, some of her Bosniak neighbors accused her of being a traitor. Vera believed that her neighbors would like to see her leave Sarajevo. Despite all her fears of her neighbors, however, Vera realized that she has no choice but to live next to them. So she adapted accordingly, even with those from whom she feels the most distant – Bosniaks displaced from the countryside.²⁵

A month later, Vera revealed that she behaved differently in public contexts, where inter-ethnic interaction may involve, or ultimately spill into, the official public sphere. When international police came to check up on her, she "kept quiet," since she was sure that the Muslim translator with them would tell the authorities about her complaints. "This would only make things more difficult for me." In fact, Vera is convinced that ordinary Bosniaks would like an ethnically homogeneous region. "No one wants to be a minority." But because she blamed foremost political and security elites for espousing ethnic purification²⁶ and causing insecurity for minorities, Vera adopted a strategy of anonymity in contexts involving those foes.

As a Croat born in Sarajevo, I shut up. I can't speak my mind. I can't voice my opinion, as long as I value my head. I remain inconspicuous. Well, this land is mine, also, but in practice, I'm a 'last mohecan.'

Vera's behavior is consistent with Axelrod's game theoretical work that examines the conditions under which cooperation can emerge in a world of egoists without central authorities (1981).²⁷ As with players in the prisoner's dilemma game, Vera's actions in the "game" of inter-ethnic interaction were not motivated by friendship. Instead, they appear based on what Axelrod describes as an evolutionary approach: whatever is successful is likely to appear more often in the future (1981, p. 69). Like winners of the prisoner's dilemma game, Vera realized that she has a large enough stake in future interaction with at least selected Bosniaks to engage in cooperative behavior. She used the "Tit for Tat" strategy, in which she cooperated on the first move and then did whatever the other "player" did on the first "move." For instance,

addressee, he proclaimed, "That card will bring nothing but trouble... 'And I've got to live in this place!'"

²⁵ Acknowledging the fear that displaced Bosniaks, many of whom were violently forced from their homes, had of "others," Vera said "I started slowly with my new neighbor. I gave their family some chocolate, just to show them that I am not a criminal."






²⁶ In citing evidence, she claimed that a police officer threatened her Croat friend by promising "when the peacekeepers leave, we will get rid of you all [minorities]."

²⁷ Thanks to Zvi Gitelman for suggesting the applicability of Axelrod's theory to my puzzle of inter-ethnic cooperation.

she took the initiative in cooperating with two single Bosniak mothers by offering them necessary services. Each of these “players” responded reciprocally, through provision of necessary service.

These exchanges suggest that Vera’s varied strategy for negotiating relations with members of the majority is guided by ideas of reciprocity tailored to particular contexts (Table 2). In the public sphere, which usually requires generalized reciprocity,²⁸ Vera remained quiet given her low levels of trust in Bosniaks, particularly those she does not know. But when she encountered ethnic “others” in a venue like the neighborhood, which is closer to the private sphere, she used specific reciprocity to seek out Bosniaks for immediate mutual help. Her hesitancy about generalized reciprocity makes sense given fresh memories of war.

Table 2: Illustration of How Minorities Tailor Negotiating Strategies to Contexts

Sphere of inter-ethnic interaction	Venue		Type of reciprocity practiced		Negotiation Strategy
	State institution		Generalized	→	Anonymity
	NGO				
	Work		Specific	→	Selective engagement
	Neighborhood				
Private					

Other minorities revealed to me a similar belief in reciprocity when I queried them on the everyday steps they take to increase their sense of security. Serb returnee Nikola told me that he increased his sense of security by “approaching everyone with trust and certainty that [such] relations will be reciprocated.” Nikola strove to make clear his belief in reciprocity, in parallel to Axelrod’s advice to “clarify your behavior, so that others can adapt to your pattern” (1981, p. 20).

Communalism. Not all of the minorities with whom I interacted, however, chose selective engagement as their negotiation strategy. As reflected in Table 1, some limited their engagement with others and instead “got by” through relying on their co-ethnics. For instance, in the four months that I lived with Serb Borka, the only Bosniaks I saw enter her home were several neighborhood children and a relative. She repeatedly expressed disappointment in what she viewed was the unwillingness of her Bosniak neighbors displaced from rural areas to engage in reciprocity as urbanites did. Returning from the neighborhood store one morning, she announced,

my neighbor just greeted me with *merhaba!*²⁹ My old neighbors never did that! This is no kind of neighborhood...I will use a greeting that communicates with people regardless of their nationality!

²⁸ Putnam describes generalized reciprocity as “I’ll do this for you know, without expecting anything immediately in return and perhaps without even knowing you, confident that down the road, you or someone else will return the favor (2000, p. 134).

²⁹ “Hello” in Turkish.

For Borka, her neighbors' use of exclusive language symbolized their unwillingness to communicate with minorities, much less engage in mutual help.

Since she believed she could not negotiate with these Bosniaks, Borka confined her relationships of mutual help to a narrow group consisting of members of her ethnically mixed family³⁰ and selected co-ethnics from her pre-war neighborhood. One evening, I walked into a living room conversation between Borka and Serb Tamara, a former neighbor. They were discussing how Tamara would inform her husband, a jack-of-all-trades, to repair Borka's faucets and washing machine. This was a "pay back in kind," (*milo za drago*) Tamara told Borka, who was providing refugee Tamara with a temporary place to stay. Borka explained that "to pay back in kind meant that you do something for someone you like, and they later do something for you."³¹ When I asked if that is what happened when Borka's neighbor came down to fix her toilet, she responded,

well no, not exactly, because I asked if he needed anything and he said no. But he would know that sometime in the future, he could ask me for something. For example, I could mend some things for him or cook for him...

Anonymity. While minorities who used selective engagement and communalism applied notions of reciprocity, those minorities who chose anonymity lacked belief in reciprocity. Minorities adopted this strategy most often in public spaces, where there existed the greatest risk of running up against nationalists. Not surprisingly, most steered clear of political discussion. Ana complained, "Croats can criticize the government but Serbs must stay quiet. If we say anything against the government, we are immediately condemned immediately as traitors." For some, a strategy of silence was rooted at least partly in the experience of being shunned or threatened by majority members. But other observers suggest that passivity is based in the belief that fate and the powerful, not ordinary individuals, make a difference. Those who fully embraced this view, like Nada, sought to immigrate: "I think I can't do anything to change [the situation], therefore I think about leaving."

Voice. In contrast, Ivanka felt it was her duty to "speak out." She realized that achieving her personal goal of protecting her family's ability to decide freely where to live was tied to achieving her larger goal of imbuing civic attitudes in Bosnian citizens.

I work in [an alternative intellectual group, a human rights NGO, and an opposition political party]. We want to be transparent. We want people to recognize that they can fight openly. I fight for my son to decide freely whether he wants to return or not. I fight to do everything to give my family the opportunity to decide. I have a responsibility to be active. I say that even breathing is political in Bosnia. Therefore, even if you don't want to be involved in politics, it's involved with you. We had 50 years of a situation

³⁰ Borka's son-in-law is Croat and daughter-in-law is Bosniak.

³¹ Borka also told me that "to pay back in kind" could be used for negative purposes. "When the Partisans killed my brother in WWII, my mother said about those that killed him that 'they will be paid back in kind.'" I frequently heard Bosniaks discuss reciprocity in this vein to punish those people they held responsible for war, often Serbs who left Bosniak areas. "What comes around, goes around."

where being against the leader was being against the state. We need to implant civic responsibility.

In another example, Predrag, one of the only Serb mayors in the Federation, described his activism as a responsibility to his community.

I [used to be] an educational specialist in middle school. From my work in education, I had good experiences with Serbs and Muslims... In exile, people turned to me to ask, "what now?" I told them to prepare for return. These people turned to me, because they had come to their senses and they knew that I was correct in the views that I had expressed during the war...I am not a Serbian nationalist... That's why in 1990, I announced at a large [public] meeting...that I was against the nationalist plan.

Ivanka and Predrag shared with some other minority activists membership in the Socialist Party and high levels of efficacy.

Circulation. Consistent with Hugo (1981), I found that some migrants circulated between prewar homes in minority areas and postwar homes in the majority area in order to spread their risk of failure. When I first asked Ana about her husband, Jovan, she told me he was "back and forth," between Novi Sad and Sarajevo. Though he lived for months at a time in the Sarajevo apartment that he had purchased with his wife before the war, Jovan spent most of his time at a weekend house in Serbia and did not seek to move back to Sarajevo permanently.³² The fact that he was a Yugoslav military officer, albeit one that retired just prior to the war, and that he was imprisoned at the beginning of the war after a neighbor accused him of spying for Serb nationalists, created personal security concerns in Sarajevo. Jovan, however, did spend time interacting with ethnic "others" when he was living in Sarajevo, hosting former military colleagues (including several Bosniaks) and playing chess at a mixed club. Jovan's strategic crossing of cultural and territorial boundaries was facilitated by his "rootlessness." Because he was an orphan from Serbia and spent 35 years working in different areas of Bosnia, Jovan told me, "I don't feel close to any one place." Guided by economic opportunity, he described himself as "a realist. I told my children to leave [former] Yugoslavia. There are no conditions for security and prosperity here." As evidence that his strategy of circulation reaped benefits, Jovan left Serbia for his wife's in Sarajevo when NATO began bombing Serbia in mid 1999.

FACILITATING NEGOTIATION.

Social Identity. I sought to gauge the influence of cultural factors on the negotiating strategies of minorities largely through participant observation. Thus, living with minority families gave me the chance to monitor inter- and intra-ethnic interaction in everyday life. On the one hand, my observation confirmed common knowledge of the pervasiveness of ethnic divisions that inhibited inter-ethnic interaction. In times of practical need – for fixing a television or toilet, for interpreting a property law, for borrowing the telephone, for getting advice, and for obtaining information, my three minority hostesses turned first to

³² Additional indicators of his primary base in Serbia were his references to Bosnia as "their [Bosniaks'] country," his Yugoslav passport, that Belgrade distributed his pension, his general pessimism about minority return, and his wife's

selected co-ethnics in their immediate environment, and sometimes their fellow Christians, the Croats, as well as mixed Serb-Croats individuals. As in the case of Palestinian citizens of Jerusalem (Romann and Weingrod 1984), ethnocentrism and the nationalist political system interacted to favor narrowing "bonding networks" of mutual help. Nationalist rule meant that the experiences of minorities during and after the war began to converge. Urban minorities shared battles against discriminatory property legislation and an outsideness from an increasingly Muslim and decreasingly Cosmopolitan culture that affected their children's education, their ability to become and remain employed, whom they could trust, and their opportunities for the future.

On the other hand, my interviews and observation revealed multiple social cleavages and contestation of cultural identities, a reality I believe helps minorities to reach out to members of the majority. For example, my interviews provided support for minorities' tendency to identify with inclusive groups. Nearly one third of my minority respondents reported feeling closest to a group of persons who shared their political ideals – for example, ideals of non-nationalism, individualism, or progressivism,³³ rather than to a group whose members share communal affiliation.

In addition, respondents suggested a dissonance between official categories of nationality and personal conceptions of belonging. I asked respondents to specify their "nationality according to the census" and if they "declared themselves differently before the war than now?" Nearly half of my minority respondents declared their census-defined nationality differently in the pre-war period than after the war. The disintegration of Yugoslavia compelled a segment of the population to reconsider their conceptions of nationality. Some respondents simply discarded pre-war categories, especially "Yugoslav," and chose narrow ethnically defined nationality categories, such as Serb or Muslim. But just as many of my respondents who before the war chose Yugoslav, again shunned ethnic labels and opted for regional classifications, such as Bosnian, or for multiple classifications.³⁴ For instance, returnee Dragan told me first that his census nationality now was Serb, but that he declared himself as a Yugoslav before the war. After a pause, however, he added a set of increasingly inclusive, nested identifications, "I am a Sarajevan,³⁵ a Bosnian, a European, and a member of planet Earth, in that order." Ethnically mixed persons expressed

hope that she will shift her base from Sarajevo to the weekend house in Serbia when she retires.

³³ In a separate chapter of my dissertation, I argue that those minorities who do not define themselves primarily ethnically are more likely to stay in areas where they are in the minority. These people report higher levels of ethnic tolerance and better inter-ethnic relations than minorities who fled.

³⁴ Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson found that those individuals who considered themselves the most modern – urban residents, youth, and individuals from mixed marriages were among those most likely to identify themselves non-nationally as Yugoslavs before the war. Communist supporters and individuals that were ethnic minorities in their republics were also likely to identify as Yugoslavs. The authors argue that ethnic minorities chose Yugoslavs, not to indicate their rejection of ethno-national categories, but as a neutral and defensive posture (p. 95). Further research is needed to determine postwar motivations for choosing supra-ethnic labels.

³⁵ As an expression of his strong identification as a Sarajevan, Dragan told me "People didn't like me at the beginning of the war. Here in 1992, when I would cross the barricades into the center of Sarajevo to see my friends there, they [Serb soldiers] would tell me, "don't go with those *bajlije* [derogatory term for Muslim]." When I would return to Ilidza [suburb of Sarajevo], then they [my friends in the center of Sarajevo] would say, "Don't go with the *Chetniks*. I fled ... when the Serb paramilitary members came and told me I needed to fight."

particular frustration with national categories, claiming that they could not fit themselves into narrow boxes. Novka exclaimed, "these categories are not adequate for the way I feel." When I asked returnee Sofia about her census nationality, she knitted her brows and told me, "I don't feel a great national belonging. I'm from a mixed marriage. My father is Montegnegrin and my mother is Croat. But I feel closer to my mother, who is a Croat..." While she sought to avoid choosing a census nationality, she felt compelled to do so.

Observation of minorities also revealed a different dimension of identity contestation -- that between generations. Several families helped me realize that young people, particularly those of mixed background, consciously embraced ethnic identifications in a way that their parents did not. I stumbled on this discovery during lunch with 20-something Croat returnee Danica and her family. Discussions about my language training, local wine, and hometowns revealed that Danica and her younger brother embraced the Croatian identity, while her parents expressed disapproval of ethnic labelling. At one point, Danica's father interjected "I am a Bosnian, as are all people who live in Bosnia." In response, Danica explained to me "this is a typically mixed family. Here you have a Bosnian [her dad], a Pole [her mom], and two Croats [Danica and her brother]!" The willingness of the oldest and youngest minorities in Bosnia to express themselves in ethnic terms and the hesitancy of the middle aged to accept ethnic labels, dovetails with research on Jews in Russia and Ukraine and points to the influence of socialization (Gitelman 2000).³⁶

Furthermore, my fieldwork supported survey results detailing the multiplicity of social cleavages in Bosnian society. The most recurring social division I witnessed beyond the ethnic one was the rural-urban chasm. Indeed, long-term urbanites frequently crossed ethnic lines to agree about placing blame for the decline in cosmopolitanism on an influx of displaced persons from the countryside. In fact, Cushman suggests that inter-ethnic co-operation could come at the expense of exacerbating class differences" (1998, p. 10).³⁷ A closer look at majority -- Bosniak -- opinions helps isolate the impact of migration status and its overlapping urban-rural cleavage by controlling for ethnicity. Bosniak respondents in both Sarajevo and Bihac made frequent distinctions between old-time city residents and their co-ethnic newcomers from rural areas of Bosnia. One Bosniak couple who stayed in Sarajevo told me, "we don't associate with the displaced persons; they don't have our upbringing." Bosniak Ahmet provides an illustration of the fears of long-term urbanites of all ethnicities that rural newcomers do not uphold what Rundell (1998) describes as the mutual recognition of, and the reciprocity between different individuals that characterizes cosmopolitanism.

Officially our relations are good with the displaced persons, but we aren't close... We say hello, but that's it. There are two kinds of people, and the displaced persons are peasants who want you to live as they do, according to their traditions. For example, they say

³⁶ Gitelman found the oldest and the youngest Jews the least opposed to having their nationality listed in their passport, while middle-aged Jews preferred to be simply citizens of the Russian Federation (2000). In both circumstances, such opinions make sense given the socialization of middle-aged persons under socialist regimes that largely sought to discourage ethnic labels. For more on generations and political socialization, see Jennings and Niemi 1981.

³⁷ Of course for all the time that long-term urban residents devote to professing their tolerant cosmopolitanism, their collective denigration of the rural persons reveals their intolerance.

merhaba and they observe religious holidays. They dress differently; [women] cover their heads in scarves. They don't like urban life or [styles]. I believe that if we were to do things together, that this would create an opportunity for conflict.

In my interviews, Serb, Croats, and mixed persons most often characterized their relations with these new neighbors as superficial, strained or distant. Serb Ivanka complained of the "ruralization" of Sarajevo. "In the shop, people shove in front... In the villages, they were used to walking on a dirt path to the shop where they were the only ones. But in the city, you need to take others into consideration"

World Bank research on social distance suggests that Bosnians of all nationalities see the greatest social distance between categories of class; between nationalities, and between refugees who fled and persons that stayed in Bosnia during the war (see Table 3). Follow-up focus group research reveals more intense distance between displaced and domiciles than the survey conveys (Dani 1999, para. 71), findings that dovetail with those that I gleaned from participant observation and opinion polling (USIA 1998, p. 15).³⁸

Table 3: Social Distance between different social categories (expressed in percentages of people reporting high social distance)

Categories listed for Social Distance	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Average
Rich vs. Poor	58%	43%	12%	38%
Between Different Nationalities	57%	12%	29%	32%
Refugees from abroad vs. Persons Who Stayed	38%	29%	15%	27%
Between Members of Different Political Parties	37%	21%	11%	23%
Rural vs. Urban	12%	21%	5%	13%
Elderly vs. Youth	11%	10%	4%	8%
Male vs. Female	2%	3%	1%	2%

Source: Dani et. al., 1999, Table 5.

N= 3,120 persons in a nationally representative sample covering all of Bosnia.

As an illustration, Croat informant Franjo, who stayed in Sarajevo, talked about the difficulty that stayers have in communicating with returnees.

One day, I ran into a friend of mine from school. He was in Germany during the war and had just returned. He called me and we went out one evening. But all he would talk about was how he would go out drinking every night and how he would spend his money on stupid things like drugs and whatever in Germany. I just couldn't listen to it. I just didn't have anything to say to this person. We didn't call each other again. And he is *Croat*.

Franjo's wartime experiences were so different than his schoolmate's, that disparate experience trumped shared ethnicity. At another time when I visited Franjo and his wife Anica, they had invited a small group of friends over to celebrate New Years. What the friends shared, was not their ethnicity – one couple was

³⁸ USIA found that 50 percent of Bosnian Muslims, 32 percent of Bosnian Croats, and 26 percent of Bosnian Serbs felt that returnees were given greater opportunities than those that stayed in Bosnia (1998, p. 51).

Bosniak and one friend was Serb – but their wartime experiences of fighting together in the same unit defending Sarajevo. In another example, Predrag told me that his experience of being displaced helped him overcome ethnic tensions with the town's Bosniak displaced persons.

At the beginning, I was called a Chetnik. But I didn't react. Instead, I showed patience. Now, Bosniak displaced persons come to tell me about their complaints. They know I understand their problems [since I myself was displaced.]

In another example, Serb Rajko, who stayed in the capital, told me that he felt closest to "those that stayed in Sarajevo."

In sum, interviewing and observation suggest that minorities' weak adherence to ethnic identity, their contestation of cultural labels, and the existence of multiple social cleavages provide them with varied bases for crossing ethnic boundaries to connect with ethnic "others."

Informal institutional environment.

My analysis of participant observation of minority host families at the neighborhood level and of interview responses revealed that workplace networks, rather than neighborhood networks, facilitated inter-ethnic interaction. The mixed experiences that urban minorities had with their ethnic "other" neighbors during the war resulted in uneasiness about re-forging neighborhood ties. In contrast, minorities viewed the workplace's less intimate nature of ties, opportunities for repeated interaction with others as professionals, and allowance for individualism, as creating opportunities for establishing inclusive identifications and cross-ethnic co-operative networks.

Ambivalence about the neighborhood. Even in urban areas, wartime experiences, propaganda, the influx of rural Bosniaks, and the outflow of intellectuals helped poison the ability of the neighborhood to serve as a site for rebuilding inter-ethnic ties. Hosts Ana and Jovan, for example, did not use their neighborhood to forge close ties with Bosniaks, though they counted as a friend one long-term Bosniak neighbor who was married to a Serb. The war changed the demographics of their apartment building. While Ana's closest friend was a long-term neighbor of mixed Serb and Croat background, Bosniak neighbors who had arrived at varying points during the war now occupied many other apartments. My minority hosts believed that their new next door neighbors, who boasted a Mercedes *and* a BMW, received their apartment through political connections. The neighbors' political connections were not conducive to inter-ethnic co-operation. "We don't associate with them," my hosts told me. It was another neighbor, who still lived in the building, that accused Jovan of spying during the war. These circumstances constrained Ana and Jovan's neighborhood network around some Serbs, Croats, and mixed minorities.

Wartime experiences and even more massive demographic change made my second hostess, Borka, fearful of most of her neighbors, including some co-ethnics. First, after the war, an outflow of Serbs and an inflow of displaced Bosniaks into her suburb resulted in rural Bosniaks outnumbering Serb residents. As mentioned earlier, Borka interpreted the overtly Muslim behavior of her new neighbors as preventing

establishment of mutual reciprocity. Secondly, Borka also distrusted some Serbs, particularly the one living a floor below, a woman who looted Borka's apartment down to her dentures during the war.³⁹ As a result, Borka's tiny neighborhood network consisted of no Bosniaks, only a few Serbs,⁴⁰ and a Croat. Her ability to rely on her multiethnic family decreased her need to appeal to the neighborhood for persons willing to engage in mutual help. And finally, her intention to exit removed incentives for inter-ethnic co-operation.

I am here to settle [ownership of] the apartment. Then I will sell it and buy a house in my birthplace, to be with my husband who is buried there. Here, I'm visited only by my friend from my hometown and by my daughters' family. ..I know that my neighbors don't want to have contact with me.

A mixed neighborhood did appear to facilitate the contacts of my minority hostess, Kristina, who stayed in Bihac during the war. She had good relations with her long-term Bosniak neighbors, with whom she exchanged visits and household items. But overall she was a "loner" and highly self-sufficient, for example supporting herself financially and growing much of her own food. To the small extent that she sought help, she relied first on colleagues from her mixed workplace and her family. Finally, of all my host families, my Bosniak hostess in Bihac, Mirsada and her husband had the worst inter-ethnic relations. Despite receiving guests for coffee nearly every day for three months, Mirsada entertained no Serb in her home. Traumatized by the war and well connected to the Bosniak community, Mirsada saw no reason to engage with ethnic "others."

Forging cross-ethnic networks in the workplace. Within the constraints of my limited vantagepoints,⁴¹ I found that mixed workplace networks helped assist minority interaction with others in several ways. First, they served as a context within which to interact with ethnic others and gather first-hand information about their beliefs and behavior. Secondly, mixed places of employment provided a relatively individualist-oriented context to seek out ethnic "others" for practical assistance and like-minded persons for comradery. The stories of several informants convey a better understanding of the importance of workplace networks for minorities.

In a fundamental sense, workplaces provide contexts in which minorities can view the realities of multiple identifications through the official rhetoric of ethnic homogeneity. For example, in response to a question from Zorica about who in her workplace observed the contested holiday of "Bosnia's Independence Day," Ana talked about the divergence between some ordinary Croat colleagues and the Croat political appointees at her Institution.

³⁹ She told me, "if we [her husband and her] would have stayed in Grbavica during the war, we would have suffered the most from that Serb neighbor!"

⁴⁰ Borka also distrusted some Serbs, particularly the one living a floor below, who looted Borka's apartment down to Borka's dentures during the war.

⁴¹ My participant observation focusing on minority families at the neighborhood level obviously constrained the extent to which I could investigate the nature of work-related networks. However, other activities that provided for a better window onto workplace networks included my volunteering at local civic organizations and my travels with

Ana: Well, my deputy director – a Croat – ordered, by word of mouth, that Croats work on Independence day. But one of my colleagues didn't work. So the Deputy asked her today, "where were you yesterday?" She said, "it was a state holiday."

Zorica: Is she Croat?

Ana: Her mom is Catholic and she is married to a Muslim, but she declared herself a Croat for work.⁴²

In this conversation, Ana revealed her frustration over the intrusion of politics into her workplace. But at the same time, she noted that her "ordinary" minority colleague defied instructions of nationalists.

I found that Ana tended to socialize and depend more on "others" from her multiethnic workplace than on those from neighborhood. Ana used acquaintances from both the neighborhood and the workplace to seek out sub-letters. In addition, she sold textiles that she obtained cheaply on the black market during her visits to family in the Serb entity to co-workers and neighbors. But Ana's relationships with her work colleagues went beyond using them to help earn additional income. Reciprocity governed most of Ana's interactions with members of her work network. During religious holidays, she exchanged cakes with them and invitations into homes for celebrations. She frequently socialized with colleagues of different backgrounds, both during and beyond work hours. After running into her and her colleagues, I realized that Ana even took afternoon coffee breaks in public cafes where townspeople would acknowledge and sometimes join them. At other times, Ana would see movies with work colleagues and she and her Bosniak colleague Anisa confided in each other about family concerns.

Several visits to Ana at her workplace suggested that ethnic identification did not disappear in the workplace, rather it was only one of several collective identifications expressed and it did not prevent communication or the forging of constructive work relationships that sometimes delved deeper. For example, the different ethnicities of Ana and Anisa did not prevent them from establishing inclusive identities based on professionalism and on mothering. As an expression of solidarity with her colleagues, Ana proudly displayed on her office wall a 1994 newspaper picture of her and Anisa peering out from their pocked-marked office during the height of the war.⁴³

In another example, Croat informant Maja described dynamics in the multiethnic hospital where she worked as a nurse. In response to my query about co-operation among hospital colleagues during the war, she related that she got along by emphasizing the inclusive identification of a professional.

Good. I experienced no problems. I worked as a professional. And I didn't get involved in politics.....I work with a Muslim, whose son died in a Croatian [prison] camp. And we get along fine.

humanitarian organizations to reach minority returnees. I simply did not anticipate the importance of workplace ties.

⁴² This statement implies that the colleague declared herself a Croat in order to take advantage of the quota system practiced in Federation Institutions.

⁴³ I am confident that Ana and her colleagues were not inventing good inter-ethnic relations for my benefit since one of my visits was unannounced, Ana frequently updated me on work gossip, and she brought colleagues into her home.

Again, World Bank research corroborates my findings, this time, on the importance of informal institutions in supporting inter-ethnic interaction. Focus group research strongly suggests that Bosnians turn to informal institutions, such as the family, friends, and neighbors, for support, while they hold negative views about official institutions, such as the local government, the judiciary, police, and army (Djipa, et. al., 1999, pp. 8-9). In addition, surveys indicate that Bosnians of all ethnicities express the greatest support for inter-ethnic co-operation in the venue of the workplace.⁴⁴ And, a separate study reveals nearly identically divergent views toward informal and formal institutions (Cushman 1998).

But many of my minority contacts expressed distress over the declining heterogeneity and increasing politicization of the workplace.⁴⁵ And several informants and interviewees sought out employment with international voluntary organizations and International Organizations due to the relative economic security and ethnic neutrality that they could offer. When I asked Bosniak Ahmet, whose public opposition to nationalist parties drew threats, what steps he took to increase his sense of security, he replied:

Work. I'm very lucky because of my work. I'm happy because I'm employed by an International Organization. First, I receive a better salary and this increases my psychological peace. And secondly, I don't have to work with people with whom I don't want to work. With small people [who blindly embrace nationalism].

It is in such international NGO workplace environments that Bosnians of all ethnicities, even those that live in increasingly homogeneous neighborhoods, can find common ground based on their professionalism and sometimes on shared experiences.

Nikola and Selma, displaced persons of Serb-Bosniak and Croat backgrounds, respectively, are good examples. I joined these two humanitarians as they worked in the field implementing a project that reconstructed homes for returnees, many of whom were minorities. During a break for coffee, a cigarette, and heat, Selma turned to me and said, "We [Nikola. and I] are united by the fact that we are not in our original homes." My multiple observations of these two provided additional evidence supporting Selma's claim of her and Nikola's common identification and good working relations. Whether they were working in an office dealing with local applicants and international colleagues, or in the field, collecting information from local beneficiaries, or in a café with me, they communicated freely, based on what appeared to be shared professional standards and a common understanding of displacement. During discussions, they expressed differences of opinion but supported opposing views with evidence. They chose to take their breaks together and they emphasized commonalities, discussing previous humanitarian work and colleagues. Furthermore, Selma had intervened personally to assist Nikola in his quest for the return of his home, an act demonstrating that their trust went beyond superficial working collaboration. In short, their workplace and

⁴⁴ A representative survey found that the majority of Bosniaks and roughly half the Serbs and Croats express willingness to share the workplace with members of other national groups. Furthermore, focus groups revealed that participants expect to be working in ethnically mixed environments (Dani et. al., 1999, para. 69).

⁴⁵ Several of my respondents and informants were fired during the war because of their ethnicity or political views.

profession, which focused on their mutual interest in return provided them with a neutral context in which they could collaborate and move beyond the fact that they resided in different Entities and possessed different ethnic backgrounds.

VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS. Given that the concerns of Bosnians, particularly those belonging to marginalized groups like minorities, focused on material, legal, physical, and social-psychological dimensions of security (UN Development Programme 1994, p. 23),⁴⁶ I targeted my examination of how minorities used voluntary organizations to whether such groups addressed these concerns. My volunteering for several ethnically mixed local civic groups, however, also provided me with an opportunity to get an idea of whether voluntary organizations assisted inter-ethnic interaction.

On the one hand, statistics show that minorities seeking assistance with violations of human rights have become more willing since the end of the war to approach local voluntary organizations. Minorities appear emboldened just enough to use such organizations as "middle men" between them and majority authorities. As Jelena, a lawyer for one local human rights organization described,⁴⁷

Initially, ordinary people were afraid to approach us. Between 1996 and October 1998, our office received around 2,000 cases. But between October 1998 and February 1999, our office received 500 cases...

But the fear sets in when it comes necessary for them to take steps to try to gain authorities' implementation of decisions. For example, when people come to me with favorable court decisions regarding the occupancy right to their apartments, and I offer to go with them to the police or to take their case to the TV station, they aren't willing to do so. They are still afraid.

Furthermore, a survey by an NGO, the Serb Civic Council (SGV), shows that 60 percent (418 individuals) of the respondents knew about its human rights bureau and that nearly one quarter (172 persons) had turned to the bureau for assistance with alleged violations of human rights (Srpsko Gradjansko Vijece 1998). Minorities' fear of directly taking on majority authorities helped limit the extent to which such voluntary groups could help empower minorities. Furthermore, while these advocacy groups also provided aid, they offered limited possibilities of building bridging relationships with "others." This is because they are not civic associations (like neighborhood associations, choral societies, cooperatives, and sports clubs) that provide the opportunities for intense horizontal interaction that generate "mutual reciprocity...and the broadening of social identities" (Putnam 1995, p. 76). Instead, the specialized knowledge that legal assistance groups provide and the individualized nature of each case meant that ordinary minorities merely turned to, rather than participated in, such local organizations.

⁴⁶ A mass survey of refugees who just returned from Germany found that minorities' concerns focused on concrete issues of employment (nearly 37 percent), living expenditures (25 percent), and housing (24 percent) (IOM 1999). Similarly, a different study of minorities who returned to rural areas of Republika Srpska found that their primary concerns were employment (39 percent), public services (21 percent), pensions (19 percent), education (18 percent) and security (14 percent) (Alfaro 2000).

⁴⁷ Interview, Sarajevo February 1999.

In answer to the question, "Do the activities of international or local organizations help you in everyday survival and/or help increase your sense of security?" most respondents expressed confidence in the work of international organizations. And while minorities were more likely than other respondents to turn to voluntary groups, almost none viewed that non-governmental organizations addressed everyday survival and security needs. Even when voluntary organizations offered both assistance to, and activities for, ordinary persons, minorities tended to accept the aid but turn down participation. After confiding in me about depression stemming from her three-year long legal battle over reclaiming her Sarajevo apartment, I asked Nela if she was aware of a voluntary women's group that offered programs to help women returnees.

Nela: Yes, I know about them, they provided me with 300 DM when I first returned. Without them, I wouldn't have been able to survive. This is because I started working in August, but I didn't receive my salary until October.

Participant observer: They also provide group psychological services.

Nela: Yeah, I know. But I talk to myself. Only I can solve my own problems. In groups, it is exhausting to hear about person after person with their own pile of problems. I heard this in the collective center where we were staying in Serbia.

Only one respondent, Serb returnee Sladjana, told me she felt that a local voluntary organization – the same one that Nela approached -- helped integrate her.

Aside from my family, at the beginning of my return, X women's organization was the number one thing that helped me feel included in life. There were computer exercises and workshops to meet people with the same problems, people who think the same, people who can help others find work. There was also a psycho-social group of seven or eight. I used to volunteer. But now I don't have time. It's very important to meet people. And not to fear them.

A host of my Bosnian contacts indicated "time" as inhibiting their involvement in local groups. Some were focused on scraping together money to make ends meet, and did not feel that adjusting their schedule to make time for participation in local groups was worth it. Others appeared to fear that some of the local groups, particularly those aimed at minorities and marginalized persons, ended up exacerbating social divisions. For instance, Serb Dragan told me that he regretted the exclusive nature of an NGO designed to assist Serbs from the Sarajevo suburbs. "X group must exist now, because we are a minority. But I hope that it will soon change and grow out of this narrow national focus." In another example, some young women were hesitant to join women's organizations because they felt that gender was a particularly divisive issue in Bosnia and they didn't believe that their society needed any more division.

Still other minorities limited involvement in voluntary groups because of faults they found in them, which is not surprising given the youth of civic organizations. Serb Mira told me that she stopped her involvement in one local group because of its "undemocratic decision-making structure." And several minority informants who had been active in associations of displaced persons told me they now limited their contact because of concerns that leaders were using the groups for personal gain. Informants echoed

concerns about the opportunism of the leaders of some organizations, particularly religious institutions.⁴⁸ Activist Sofia believed that "voluntary organizations in general..[were] helping take responsibility for initiating change in their environment," particularly those that provided practical services. But she also felt some had initiated only shortsighted projects, and had become over-dependent on, and over-critical of, the International Community. Echoing common perceptions of internationally financed NGOs in other parts of the world (Carothers 1999, p. 219), some of my minority respondents viewed NGO workers as arrogant, overpaid and self-interested. Those who did not participate in local voluntary organizations appeared even more suspicious of their motives, partly because the most visible associations were nationalist ones.⁴⁹

But perhaps the biggest obstacle to minorities' participation in voluntary organizations was their belief that such organizations were not capable of making an impact in the face of concerted opposition from majority authorities. An OSCE official in Bihac told me, "Serb returnees, if they mention SGV, say, 'I've been there,' and they roll their eyes [indicating that it is not effective]. Generally, minority returnees put their faith in International Organizations." As Lazar told me, voluntary organizations and Ombudsmen work only in societies where the rule-of-law is present. "But, here, in the 'Wild West,' you need cowboys to get things done!"

Finally, some observers argued that the low efficacy of ordinary people presented a formidable obstacle to minority participation in, and the ultimate influence of, voluntary groups. Minority activist Olivera blamed the general lack of civic engagement in Bosnia on the fact that "citizens here don't realize that they have the power to organize, just as the nationalists do." Activist Munira placed the blame partly on political obstacles and partly on the Bosnian "propensity toward collectivism."

I personally work for change. I believe that each person must give his or her own proposal for change. [However,] voluntary organizations are making only slow progress, [because:]
1) People are conscious that you can't bring about change overnight, and 2) People accept [the proposition] that they feel better in a group rather than as individuals with freedom.

As a result of minority concerns and the political environment that limits the impact of civic-oriented voluntary associations, the social network that voluntary organizations -- particularly advocacy groups -- built primarily linked those already committed to civic activism.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ For example, Vera called her priest "the red priest," because she believed that he focused mainly on keeping his job, rather than on providing services to his community. "If his people leave, then he loses everything. He lives at the church office and his church is here." She also expressed concern about his involvement in politics. Thus, she went to church to "pray to God..and to show the community that I am one of them," since they gave out humanitarian aid during the war and she anticipated that they would do so again, if necessary. Cushman finds that many members of his focus groups participated in religious life, but did so with a pronounced detachment from formal religious authorities (1998, p. 4).

⁴⁹ Zorica's opinion of women's groups was, "They're only for Muslims! These Muslim women wearing scarves are only a reaction to the war. They are looking for something simple. Over time, things will go back to normal. They do nothing; they sit around and drink coffee among themselves. During the war, individual women were working hard; they had direction." And Ahmet believed that "most [local organizations] were formed by the government."

⁵⁰ Activist Olivera admitted that activists in civic organizations spent "too much time talking with each other."

TENTATIVE IMPLICATIONS.

In sum, my exploratory investigation suggests that Bosniak minorities reach out to ethnic "others" in order to engage in mutual help and embed themselves in their heterogeneous society. But as a result of the legacy of the war and perhaps socialism, trust appears to reside in interpersonal relationships. Minorities are most willing to seek out others if they can engage in specific reciprocity. Factors that facilitate inter-ethnic cooperation include less-than-passionate adherence to cultural identifications, as well as contested notions of collective identifications. Minorities turn to the indigenous informal institution of the workplace, which allows for individualism, as a micro-level site for engaging in the iterated interaction among peoples of different backgrounds that lubricates trust. While minorities seek expert assistance from human rights advocacy groups, they are skeptical of the impact of these organizations and do not generally seek out involvement in more broad-based civic associations that could help build bringing ties to others.

The behavior of Bosnian minorities appears to contradict the assertions of some scholars of civil society who focus on the sprouting of formal, voluntary organizations as the key to building diverse and democratic post-conflict societies. Bosnian minorities also challenge proponents of consociationalism, who argue that ethnic identities are so significant and fixed that one ethno-national political group is capable of representing each group and forging political stability with the elites of other groups. I find that minorities' selective engagement of majority individuals and their willingness to stay, rather than to exit, rely partly on the maintenance of indigenous, heterogeneous informal social institutions, like the workplace. Thus, one way the international community can assist the reconstruction of inter-ethnic trust is by promoting mixed work environments through financing and otherwise rewarding non-discriminatory employers. Trust in civic groups requires additional civic education, political reform, and reform of local voluntary organizations so that minorities see them as useful.

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