Robert L. Pfaltzgraff: I would like at this time to welcome everybody to the second and final luncheon of our program, of our conference. And as you finish lunch, to take the valuable time that we have available to introduce our speakers. I say "speakers," because we have a duo or a duet, however you wish to describe it--or double-header, I suppose you might say, if you used American sports terminology here.

Let me say something about our two speakers for luncheon today. The first is Dr. Kresimir Cosic. He is Deputy Minister of Defense of the Republic of Croatia. And he also holds the rank of Lieutenant General, a rank that he has held since assuming his duties in 1996 as Deputy Minister of Defense. He is a PhD. In fact, he has a PhD in electrical engineering, so that, as I mentioned to him, that if the lights go out here, he's able to help us get them back on. And we have had mishaps like that at conferences in the past--burglar alarms going off, fire alarms, and whatever.

He received his degree from the University of Zagreb and was a visiting researcher in the aerospace department at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. So, he is no stranger to American academia. He has been highly decorated by his country and comes to us in his present position, as I've said, Deputy Minister of Defense.

I would at this time also introduce our second speaker, also from Croatia, Dr. Miomir Zuzul, who is presently Ambassador of the Republica of Croatia to the United States. He holds a PhD in social psychology from the University of Zagreb, and, I'm sure, could give us a great detail of group analysis of the dynamics of this conference, based upon his academic profession.

After earning the doctorate, he proceeded to head the university's Department of Developmental Psychology, and later served as Vice Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. And I'm sure that's no mean accomplishment, to manage a group of academics, as I well know from my own experience as an academic.

He is not only no stranger to academia, he is of course also no stranger to diplomacy. Ambassador Zuzul is the President's special envoy, his President's special envoy for negotiations and work with the contact group. And he heads the Committee for Foreign Policy and International Relations of the Presidential Council of Croatia.

So, we have a rich agenda ahead of us with not just one, but two outstanding speakers to address us at this time. So, I will, first of all, turn to Deputy Minister of Defense, Dr. Cosic, for his presentation. [applause]

Kresimir Cosic: Ladies and gentlemen, the title of the paper or speech was, "Stabilization of Southeast Europe: Lessons Learned In the Period, '91-'99." With subtitle: "A case for better analysis"--"necessity for better analysis." Version two, subtitle: "An integrated approach to the security issue in the region."

This paper, or this speech, is the result of 40 years of living in former Yugoslavia. On the basis of this experience, I would like to stress, we have abilities and good feeling to understand the mentality which causes significant trouble in the region, even for the time being.

I spent more than 20 years at the university as an engineer, as it was mentioned. I spent four years in a real war, '91-'95, from soldier to the really high rank. I spent four years in politics as a Deputy Minister of Defense, four years in the process of establishing Croatian-American military cooperation. I spent four years working on the Dayton accords and its implementation. Significant experience in the mission of I-4, S-4, and some others like if we'd been trained.

Then you put all this together just in only two days, you have to be very careful when you listen to this speech.

I will start the presentation maybe with a series of questions. First one: What has happened in Kosovo? I would like to say exactly what no one expected, exactly what no one expected. Everyone is surprised--NATO, Milosevic, international community. What happened in Slovenia, summer '91? Same. No one expected war in Slovenia. What happened in Croatia, '91-'95? Twenty thousand killed, a couple of hundred refugees. What has happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Very similar. A real disaster. Two hundred thousand were killed. A couple of hundred thousand of refugees.

What's going on in Kosovo for the time being? Same processes last almost more than eight years. If you sum up all these results, more than 300,000 killed, dead, lost, approximately two million of refugees. A real surprise. But we had chance even at the beginning of '91 to recognize some movements and to prevent all what was going on later.

Who was, or who is still, main player of this game? There are many players, but crucial player is really Milosevic. Maybe it is not so easy to prove for someone, but definitely all these events and all these facts are so clear. I would like to quote President of Macedonia, who claimed a couple of days ago, at the meeting of North Atlantic Council, explaining the reason of the war in former Yugoslavia. He stressed very clearly: Milosevic and J&A (?) opposed to the democratic changes at the beginning of '90s. It is one of the best, according to my feeling, definition of the reasons of the war in former Yugoslavia.

Why? J&A, it means Federal Army established Milosevic at end of '80s as a guy who had very clear task and mission--to protect the interest of the Federal Army. What were the interests of the Federal Army? The interest was to preserve the privileges, to protect Communistic regime, to protect their rights, and I would like to quote one of the statements of the Minister, if you may call him so, of the former Federal Army, who stated, "There is no change that J&A will accept democratic changes, which have objectives to remove Communistic regime from power."

It was the real reason of the war. So, for the time being, we have very often stressed civil-military relations, civil society, but J&A Federal Army were not ready to accept any civil society. It was very similar as it was in former USSR. They had unlimited budget. There were no discussions regarding budget transparency, democratic defense management, and all these issues really caused the beginning of the war--the beginning of the war in Slovenia and, later on, later months, war started in Croatia.

In this spirit of time, former Secretary of State, James Baker, claimed, "J&A is so powerful that Croatia will be defeated for two weeks." There were many reasons for such assessment, because, really, on the basis of the budget, on the numbers of tanks, heavy weapons, former J&A was one of the most powerful army of the Europe, according to some assessment ... (inaudible).

Summer, war in Croatia, at the end of year, we had more than 15,000 killed, a couple of hundred refugees. I hope that you can remind yourself some pictures from Rukorar (?) and Dubrovnik (?). At the end of '91, cease fire has been established. Almost 30 percent of Croatia were occupied. Communications, railroads, highways were blocked by Serbs in this region, which were supported by Federal Army.

One additional event which we have to stress, because lessons which are coming from this decision are extremely important. Beginning of '92, cease fire in Croatia, European Union was decided to enable withdrawing of the heavy weapons from Croatia and Slovenia to the Bosnia-Herzegovina. More than a couple of hundred tanks, Howitzer guns were moved from Croatia to the Bosnia. Months later, first democratic election in Bosnia. Results were well-known. Bosnia decided to be independent state. It was reason for the beginning of the war in Bosnia. Consequences well-known.

In the beginning of '91--or excuse me, in '92--first communication between the former President of the United States, George Bush, and Milosevic coming. In this period of time, American administration warning Milosevic that the attack on the UN forces will cause the war and intervention of NATO. A year later, a very similar letter from President Clinton. It means, five years ago, NATO will be ready to protect UN mission in Bosnia.

In '92, Serbs occupied almost 70 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Enclaves have been established, Brichaz, Serbrinitza (?). ... (inaudible) Serbrinitza, thousands were killed. It was a result of the behavior and mentality which was very similar to Milosevic, Kardic (?) and Mladjinic (?), who are still acting, for the time being, at the Kosovo. Now is '98. Very similar situation in Kosovo.

I believe that this short chronology of the events clearly prove that all these decisions have been done in one place, by one big leader, Mr. Milosevic. What are the characteristics of this person? ... (inaudible) He always felt that he has the most powerful army, always same aspirations to dominate, even for a time being. Strong mythological nationalism. And, finally, very impressive history in these nine years of provoking conflicts.

I believe that, from this short overview of the events, very important lessons can be learned, which are important for international community, which are important for NATO to properly develop its strategy for the future.

Where we are for the time being? We are searching altogether, first for international community and especially NATO, solutions. Solutions which have to have two strategic goals, I have to say. First one, to prevent similar disasters in the future. And to develop feasible and self-sustained and cost-effective solutions for the region, for Southeast Europe.

What are the characteristics of the problem which we have on the agenda for the time being? The problem is very complex, chronic and recurring. The problem exist long enough to have very clear history. There were many attempts by the international community, even UN, to resolve problem. But there were also many failures. And, finally, roots of the problems were not sufficiently understood by the international community in the past.

In searching for solution, we have to take into account the following, that potential simplification of the problem can cause same events in the future. When we are searching for solution, we have to take into account short-term versus long-term solution. They have to be consistent. On the basis of some experience from Bosnia-Herzegovina, from Dayton, Dayton was extremely successful, especially in the implementation of the military part of the project.

But on the civilian side, there are significant lagging. So, important lectures (?): Bosnia is not yet self-sustained. When we are trying to resolve problems, we have to have, as we say, usually, systematic, synergistic approach. We have to take into account political, economic, social, cultural, educational, religious, legislative, demographic and historical facts.

Some suggestion: In searching for solution from military point of view, from the aspect of prevention, it is very important to develop better analytical support, better intelligence, which will support decision-making on the highest level. This system has to be focused on a region. Second: On the basis of some research in Croatian Institute for Strategic Studies, which were related with some security problem in the region, we discovered that some methods might be very useful to resolve some problems, as a starting point for decision-making. Some very interesting results were reached by the methods like phasologic (?) assumption-based planning, modeling and simulation, and, in the case of such very complex and very uncertain problems, we have to have analytical decision support.

Finally, instead of conclusion, I would like to make some general observations, or a proposal-- I would like to say general principles which have to be taken into account when we try to resolve the problem in Southeastern Europe on the basis of the experience from the former Yugoslavian period, '91-'99.

First proposal: Improved understanding of regional conflicts is priority number one by NATO, European Union, United Nations. In recent activities, NATO has been more capable of responding militarily than responding to security and political challenges and uncertainties in the region. Definitely, my feeling is, our feeling is, that the majority of the analysts' stuff were created on the issue which related to the Cold War--Russia didn't have Southeast Europe as a priority, in a sense, to understand mentality, to understand the problems, and, definitely, Southeast Europe was the weakest part of the NATO.

Second: In such situation, we believe that analytical tools in analysis of regional conflict may add significant contribution. But data-gathering, as I mentioned before, is a crucial step to identify "soft" factors. It means behavior and characteristics of leaders who are in charge for the decisions in the region.

Additionally, when we introduce international community in resolving such problems, we have to take into account between three (?) significantly number of factors or players. We have local players, directors, regional, and, finally, global. All of them had the power, the influence. What is very important to avoid? To avoid a solution which will be dictated, which are later on characterized by chance, by minimum chance to survive.

One of the very important principles which I would like to stress is decisive and timely reaction to the crisis. United Nations intervened in '92 in Kosovo, excuse me, in Macedonia, only with 600 soldiers. According to our feeling, it was one of the most successful missions, because potential for war between Serbia and Macedonia in this period of time was significant. Only with 600 soldiers, this risk was avoided. Later on, in Bosnia, '96, 60,000 soldiers of NATO couldn't resolve a problem which was consequence of the war.

Time dynamics of the ... (inaudible). We are not fully aware what it means when NATO entered by I-4 Bosnia, it was stated that NATO will stay in Bosnia six months. Later on, prolonging of the mission for a year. After I-4, S-4, first mission of S-4 was planned for a year. Later on, two years, and definitely, without S-4 permanent pre-positioning in Bosnia, the war in Bosnia, ... (inaudible) turn back what we really don't want to see in the situation which we are.

As I mentioned, in solution, we are proposing short-term versus long-term solution must be analyzed carefully, they must be consistent, but definitely some evolution and flexibility and other ... (inaudible) of the solution is necessary. Enrollment of regional countries in understanding, analysis, and resolving problem is very important. Maybe a regional conference. And different activities may add better understanding of the problem. Regional countries have better insight in the crisis, they have better feeling what was causing the crisis, and our feeling that regional country were not involved enough in resolving all these problems.

And, finally, I would like to stress the final suggestion--training, education and tools for decision-makers in preventive diplomacy and preventive defense is extremely important. If we really want to prevent such disaster as we had in the past, in the period of '91-'99, we have to organize ourselves, all the institutions, think tanks, government and non-government agencies, to start to develop education, to increase the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and preventive defense.

There are many institutions around the globe which deals with peacekeeping, peace-making operations, but, definitely, our feeling that the priority is really prevention.

And at the end of the speech, I would like to invite you, all of you, maybe, to the first world conference on preventive diplomacy and preventive defense. Where? In Dubrovnik. Why in Dubrovnik? Dubrovnik is one of the most attractive old cities in the world. Dubrovnik is a place where we failed to use timely preventive diplomacy and preventive defense to protect city from the J&A in '91. Dubrovnik diplomacy is one of the oldest in the world.

And, finally, Dubrovnik is a place where famous Croat, Dr. Sampar (?), one of the founders of the World Health Organization, wrote his strategy of preventive medicine. I hope that you agree that preventive medicine is one of the most successful and most effective parts of the medicine. We hope that preventive diplomacy and preventive defense, on a long run, will be one of the most effective parts of the security strategy in 21st century. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. [applause]

Miomir Zuzul: Ladies and gentlemen, I am Croatian ambassador, so when my colleague and friend, Dr. Cosic and I, when we were preparing how to present, as somebody said before, Croatian case to you, we divided that he would speak about chronology of events and to give us some line of thinking how we could maybe conclude something to come to the prevention. And he gave to me, you know, being soldier, he wants to be concrete, and, since I was the first, as you heard before, psychologist and then diplomat, then believe, you know, a little bit abstract part, for me, what to do next and how to approach it in the future.

But I want certainly to thank to him, because he already did a psychological analysis of some character, so you are not expecting me to do, because that's only not something very easy. Also, thinking, you know, if I can have a little bit freedom not to speak only about ... (inaudible) issues as NATO future and NATO intervention, I had privilege this morning to have breakfast with one of not very many Croatian former diplomats who serve in Yugoslav diplomacy, and he was, sometime in the early '60s, the deputy chief of mission. And Yugoslavia, in that time, was hosting big dinner in honor of non-aligned countries.

And so, when he was about to give a speech, he decided to make surprise. Since it happened in that time that we had three Croatian diva, but he presented them as Yugoslav divas singing in Metropolitan, he said, "Now, I have big surprise. Instead of my speech, I present to you three divas to sing." I couldn't do today, but you had to, alas, to talk a little bit, although I guess sometimes it would be nice to have, during conferences like this, something like that.

But I personally, I personally admire the idea to organize conference like this. We are certainly supporting to have something similar in Dubrovnik. We hope to send you information very soon. And I agree not only because I am from Croatia, that Dubrovnik is probably the best possible place to have something like that, being the place that witnessed different changes in history and different prospects. Unfortunately, the last one also.

But to come to what was my part to the deliver to you as a kind of our message that we want to tell you and to allow you to ask us some question. So, what we believe should be the near future and, the last thing, a way to stabilize that part of Europe, Southeast Europe. Although--

[END SIDE A; BEGIN SIDE B]

MZ: --want to say that there is, I truly believe, although I was never too good student of history and I don't have any doubts there are many of you who are much better in knowledge than I am, but I think that it is very big mistake and it is very often mentioned that Southeast of Europe was always an area of troubles of the wars between different tribes, different nations, different countries. This is simply not truth. Or it is as much truth as it is for any other part of the Europe, take Western Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, you will come to the same conclusion. Only it is a different period of the history.

For example, for 500 years, we were divided in that part of the world, but not bigger wars. For example, Croatia and Slovenia, we are living for 12 centuries at the same territory, never being involved in a war. But that is true for actually many countries. But it is the fact that the end of this millennium and the end of this century, and, primarily because of the reasons that General Cosic was explaining before, this region is involved in something that probably nobody believed only 20 years ago that it can happen in that part of Europe.

So, what we think how to prevent that and how to stabilize that region. First of all, speaking about immediate solutions, we truly believe that, without clear military victory by NATO, there is no solution. If there is a feeling on the side primarily on Mr. Milosevic that he is the one who win military victory, I believe that what we conclude, based on the now almost 10 years of experience, that there is only one question--and that is, what is the next address? Is that Montenegro or Macedonia or any other countries in the neighborhood?

So, we truly believe that, based on everything that we could learn from Mr. Milosevic and extreme nationalistic positions of some Serbian leaders, that it is time that they should be militarily defeated. And by that, the idea of creation of one country or that one nation expand the territory on the account of other nations living in the neighborhood, it's finally come to an end.

And speaking about lasting solution, I personally have a strong tendency to believe, and that is what we hope, that now it is time when Western world, United States or NATO, can do what was done 50 years ago in Western Europe. When we think about the situation now, for example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was so particularly, but in Macedonia, Albania and in some other countries in the neighborhood, yes, we are really facing a number of problems--economical problems, problems of development of democracy, and, of course, not to mention humanitarian problems.

But if we go a little bit back in history, because 50 years is not so long a period of time in history of Europe, then we can imagine how Western Europe looked in that time. I personally believe that the situation looked much worse than it is now in Southeast Europe, and maybe not so many perspectives as we can now realize that happened.

So, when we ask the question, what was that that decided the destiny and the feature of Europe in the way that now Western Europe is one of the most prosperous parts of the world, nobody certainly doubts about that, what is what's so important to, made the path of history for such countries like Germany, Italy, Belgium--almost all countries who became part of the NATO or Western world in that time? If you ask me for a simple answer, I think that that is the idea of some people born, the idea born here, to create NATO and to start with a specific program known as a master plan.

I believe that if we approach it that way, that [tape glitch] and the Southeast Europe, not even 50 years from now, but maybe 10 years from now, can be much closer to what is now Western Europe than what is now the area known by the name of the Balkan.

Is that difficult? Yes, certainly it is, primarily because there is that first time of the job, and that is to finish the situation, to come to an end to war, and what's happening in Kosovo now. And that is, I admit, different from comparing with the situation 50 years ago in the Western Europe. But is that impossible? I certainly believe that it is not. From many aspects, I believe that it is easier and it should be easier than it was at that time.

And, but, another lesson that we can learn from Western Europe, I believe that that is certainly a perspective and process which pays back. I believe that it can pay back not in the period of 50 years, but, as I said, much, much shorter period of time. And because of that, we from Croatia, although we were not formally included in the celebration and everything what was happening during NATO summit, but we certainly welcome that summit, we welcome the opportunity, even informally, to be in position to express our views on that. And we are only hoping that, very soon, Croatia will be in a position to express our position also formally and to work together with NATO countries on that perspectives that we are hoping that we are sharing.

We certainly support the future enlargement of NATO. I listened this morning to the presentation of our colleague from Slovenia, and we, from the side of Croatia, we are very supportive to the idea that Slovenia should be in a first role to be invited to become a member of NATO. We do believe that Croatia should be considered very, very soon also in that capacity, but we also, with full knowledge and full heart, we believe that we deserve something that, in this moment, believe me or not, Croatia is the only country in Europe or in the world which is actually almost, it's not allowed to be in the association that we want to be. We are the only country who applied for Partnership for Peace and still are not in a position to be in that.

I believe that that is a mistake, not going into reasons why and how it happened. I believe that we can contribute to that perspective of Southeastern Europe that I was talking and that we are all, I believe, hoping and dreaming. Thank you very much. And both of us, we will be very much prepared to answer--to try to answer--any question that you might have. [applause]

RP: Our time is, of course, limited, but we have a few minutes ... (inaudible). Yes?

__: I'd like to call ... (inaudible) I was in Yugoslavia in 1981, in Croatia ... (inaudible). I detected nothing that would lead me to believe that a war of such savagery would erupt ... (inaudible). How could a war ... (inaudible)?

KC: Definitely, no one expected such evolution of the events. I returned back somewhere at the beginning of the summer from the States, and someone told me, when this military action started, to return back and to come for months--that everything will be peaceful. When the conflicts start, it is very hard to control them. They are wide-spreading. And especially if one side have capabilities and have feelings that they can reach their goals and objectives very soon. Who dictated the territory and the area of the conflicts? All of those who had armed. We didn't have armed, Croatia didn't have armed forces in '91. What we received in '91 was embargo. So, this is the evolution of the war.

Permanently, very similar; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, very similar; in Kosovo, war is something what is very hard to control, if you don't have power which is much more capable than the power of the enemies in the region.

Yesterday, former state secretary clearly stated, "NATO was not ready in '91 and '92 to intervene." Even in military and political sense, NATO were focused on the integration of East Europe. Southeast Europe and former Yugoslavia was not priority of NATO in the sense of finalities (?), in the sense of security issues, because the situation in Russia in this period of time was definitely very uncertain. So, if you couldn't control this process in the early stages, they will widespread.

__: ... (inaudible) I personally don't feel that ... (inaudible) truly at the heart of a lot of policy about how we deal with ... (inaudible). We're talking about children ... (inaudible). This is not ... (inaudible). It's just not a question of ... (inaudible) military power ... (inaudible) of a savagery that many of us thought disappeared from Europe this century. ... (inaudible) What do you do then? You tell them, ... (inaudible), where is this coming from?

MZ: Thank you for your question. If I may start the psychology, I would hardly use the term "grassroots hostilities" for any part of the earth (?). Frankly, I do not believe too much in that. But I see your point and I do share a very similar opinion. Again, I wouldn't say that we expected that that ceased to exist in Europe 200 years ago, because the Second World War was much closer to our period. But, nevertheless, I see, and I agree with your point.

I truly believe that behind what was happening in the drought (?) period of the last 10 years and what is happening right now on Kosovo, it is not only this balance in military forces, but it is basically one idea which shouldn't exist in Europe or anywhere in the world, and that is the idea of creation of Great Serbia. And it was not--

And this is not a big secret what I'm telling now. Everyone could check that and everyone could know about it. That is the idea which was created by-- It existed, you know, in almost any nation in the world, particularly in Europe--certainly not in the United States, which is organized differently. There is group, usually a very small group of people dreaming how to create territory for their nation, for their ethnical group to be bigger than the other. And certainly Europe and the Balkan is not an exception in that regard.

That idea was particularly strong among Serbs throughout this century. And, in part, Yugoslavia was a result of that idea. And so, that group of people, and I'm sorry to say that some of them were really not only intellectuals, but members of Yugoslav or Serbian Academy of Sciences, came with something which now we can see as a real script, as a scenario of the happenings in the former Yugoslavia. Everything that we are all witnessing at CNN or different places was already written. And, believe me, I'm not trying to create story from something that was not existing. Anyone can check that.

You mentioned, for example, knife and killing by slaughtering by the knife. I will tell you something which might surprise you. And I don't want to sound as any kind of that we are trying to give you any kind of propaganda. I read today that one of the Serbian leaders, now deputy prime minister, Mr. Drascovic (?), that he seems to start to oppose to Milosevic today. To remind you, he was really in a position, until very recently, and he was even imprisoned by Mr. Milosevic, he was brutally treated, but when crisis in Kosovo started, the new crisis, or war now in Kosovo, started, he accepted the invitation of Mr. Milosevic to serve in Milosevic's government, at the surprise of everyone in the West who thought, because there was, the image was created that maybe Drascovic is one of those democratic leaders that Serbia certainly needs.

But something what might surprise you: The same gentleman, Mr. Drascovic, now 20 years ago, published a book. The title of the book is "Knife." (?) I'm really surprised that that book was never translated in any other languages, so it's only in Serbian language now, because what is that book describing? It is describing conflict between, primarily between Serbs and Muslims, Bosnians in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And what he's advocating in that book, he's advocating aggression and violence to solve the problem of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, he's taking "knife" as a symbol how to solve that problem.

So, why am I telling that? To agree with you that there is a deeper problem, and that there is no easy solution. And, I agree, to now replace Mr. Milosevic will not immediately solve-- But that should be the beginning of the problem, as long as Mr. Milosevic is the one who is ... (inaudible). And that is also true: Milosevic was elected by the Serbian people. He didn't come into power by the help of the army. He was elected. But as long as he's present, as long as he's accepted by international community as a somebody who can, by the end of the day, be a peace builder, and that is the way how he was accepted so far.

Until very recently, all international mediators were going to Belgrade to meet with Mr. Milosevic and to come to the peace, and all the time he was obviously showing that he's actually much more oriented toward the war. I think that that is the beginning of the solution.

Finally, to realize that he is not the one to solve, to come to the peace. After that, I believe that that will be also the beginning of the process in which Serbian people will have enough strength to come to the solution, to come to the decision, that, really, at the end of this century, at the beginning of a new, such a kind of the ideology cannot exist in Europe.

I know that maybe it's very difficult to say and to give clear answer how to deal with that and how to solve it. Again, I believe that to work on the one triangle which has, as the base of that triangle, security institution, and that is, if you ask me, NATO--and only NATO. And then, based on that foundation of the triangle, to have democracy as a process which necessarily has to be developed particularly in Serbia. And then, based on that development, which will prove to the people that actually that is not the only way, but, really, the way which is for benefit of them. And I truly believe that without clear, clear reactional (?) international community, we will be witnessing the situation so far with clear intervention, the one that is happening right now, I believe that we can come to the solution.

RP: Thank you very much. We really are out of time, because we're going to begin to run behind time. As always, there are more questions and much more to discuss than we have time to discuss. My apologies, but we should stop at this time. I would like to express our collective thanks to both of our speakers. [applause]