Failed Intelligence to Blame

FORUM l David Kay, former Chief U.S. Weapons Inspector in Iraq, told a Forum audience that even though the United States didn’t really know what was going on in Iraq, it “connected the dots” to conclude that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. The reasons such mistaken conclusions were made, said Kay, were because the United States failed to develop a reliable intelligence network within Iraq and was unable to see Iraq realistically in the decade since the Gulf War. Iraq had descended in the last 10 years, said Kay, into a “vortex of corruption, terror, and fear” that was unable to organize itself effectively to carry out major programs. “If we had understood how bad Iraq had become, we wouldn’t have credibly argued that they had recreated large programs of mass destruction.” Instead, said Kay, the “dots for 1991 behavior were connected to 2000 behavior and 2003 behavior. They became an explanation and picture of Iraq that didn’t exist.”