

**Educated Preferences:
Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration In Europe**

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**Supplement II:
Detailed Results from Additional Analysis and Sensitivity Tests**

A. Introduction

This supplement to our paper reports the detailed results obtained from additional analysis and from the various tests we performed to check whether our core results were robust to changes in various methodological assumptions and techniques. These results were excluded from the paper itself in order to economize on space. All the data and program files needed to replicate these results are available now from the authors, and will soon be posted on a publicly accessible web page.

Below we simply present the additional results in the order in which they are referenced in our paper. The idea here is to make it easier to refer to the supplement while reading the paper itself. Section references (provided in parentheses below) indicate the location of the reference to these results in the paper. Since all variables and specifications are discussed in the paper itself, we provide few additional comments here.

B. Country-Specific Estimations Using the Skill345 Measure (Section IV. C)

Table 1 reports the results from the single country estimations of the effect of skill level (measured by *skill345*) on immigration preferences, using our “benchmark” model. As noted in the paper, here the results are almost identical substantively to those obtained when the measures of education are used: in all but two cases (Portugal and Greece, in the case of immigration from richer non-European countries) the high skill variable has a positive effect on support for *all* types of immigration (78 of 80 coefficients are positive) and in most countries this effect is highly statistically significant despite the decreased number of observations (74 % of the coefficients are significant) The two coefficients with a negative sign are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Once we estimate this skill effect after replacing the standard income variable with the alternative measure of household income (see fn. 27 in the paper), increasing the sample size markedly for these country-specific models, the skill variable has a positive impact in all countries (80 of 80 estimated coefficients are positive) and in 85% of cases the effect is statistically significant (see the right panel of Table 1).

[Table 1]

C. Amended Benchmark Model with Skill345 and Years of Schooling (Section IV.C)

Table 2 presents the results from the estimations of the amended form of the benchmark model in which *skill345* is included along with *years of schooling*. Again, both the *skill345* and the *years of schooling* seem to pick up different (positive) effects on support for immigration, as both variables are highly significant predictors across all models. Including the skill variable leaves the positive effect of education substantively unaffected, as the standard errors of estimated effects of years of schooling do not increase dramatically (compare to Table 3 in the paper). In comparison with the results from models without *skill345*, the magnitude of the education effects in these combined models is only slightly reduced. That is, very little of the more general education effect appears to be accounted for by skill differences. These findings suggest again that the vast bulk of the education effect on attitudes toward immigration is reflecting other causal factors and not skill effects.

[Table 2]

The same holds true if individual skill dummies are included instead of *skill345*. Again, all except one of the skill dummies have positive and highly significant effects across all models. Most importantly here it is clear that, when we include the more fine-grained indicators of skills, the effect of *years of schooling* on attitudes is not substantively different than when we employed the dichotomous *skill345* measure.

D. Employment Status and Sub-Samples of Respondents (Section IV.D)

Table 3 reports results from various sub-samples of respondents reporting that they were not in paid work for comparison with results from the sub-sample of those currently in paid work. Recall that if concerns about labor market competition drive immigration preferences, and the link between those preferences and education or skill levels, the results for the out of labor force sub-samples should differ substantially from the benchmark estimates for the sub-sample of those currently in paid work. We estimated our benchmark model, incorporating *educational attainment* and *skill345* for all the different sub-samples (only the estimated education and skills effects in the different sub-samples are shown in order to economize on space).

[Table 3]

Comparing the results across sub-samples we find the estimated effects of education are very similar, both in terms of magnitude and level of statistical significance, for all models. It does not matter whether we compare those in paid work with those who are unemployed and currently not in paid work (and may be seeking work or plan to return to work soon), with those who are currently students (who presumably intend to enter the labor force in the future), or with those who are retired. The only noticeable differences across sub-samples concern the reduced magnitude and significance of the skill effect in one or two cases involving immigration from poorer countries (where the labor market model suggests the effect should actually be strongest) and for students (for whom current occupational codes, which indicate that these students are mostly employed in low-skilled service sector jobs, probably provide the least accurate guide to skill levels).

E. Education, Cultural Values, and Economic Literacy: All Models (Section V)

Table 4 shows the results from when we re-estimate our benchmark model for all of our dependent variables, incorporating all the cultural values variables and the measure of economic literacy. We are interested here in examining both the effects that these types of variables have on preferences regarding different types of immigration and the degree to which adding these variables reduces the residual effect of education levels on attitudes. Each of the cultural value variables is a significant predictor of attitudes toward immigration in all models and has large substantive effects in the anticipated direction. Whether individuals believe that immigration implies welfare gains for the *economy* as a whole also has a significant positive effect on support for immigration in all models. This economic literacy effect is larger for the case of immigration from poorer countries compared with immigration from richer countries. This is in line with the notion that, due to greater complementarities, a potential aggregate “immigration surplus” should be larger the more immigrants differ from natives in their skill endowments. The residual education effect is quite small (compared with the estimated effect in models that exclude cultural and economic literacy variables) in all cases.

[Table 4]

F. Education and Racism: Tests by Employment Status Sub-Samples (Section VI)

Table 5 presents the results from our tests of whether the connection between education and cultural variables measuring racism and tolerance are driven primarily by labor market concerns. If concerns about job competition generate racism, the estimated effects of education/skills on the variables for the out of labor force sub-samples should differ substantially from the effects for the sub-sample of those currently in paid work. We estimated models for levels of the *racist*, *antihate*, and *multiculturalism* variables, incorporating *educational attainment* and *skill345* for all the different sub-samples (only the estimated education and skills effects in the different sub-samples are shown in order to save space; each model includes a full set of country fixed effects and the covariates age and native born).

[Table 5]

Comparing the results across sub-samples, the estimated effects of education are very similar, both in terms of magnitude and level of statistical significance, for all models. This is true when we compare those in paid work with those who are not, and even when we compare effects across smaller subsets of those not currently in the labor force (including the unemployed, students, and retirees). In fact, comparing the estimated effects of education across all these sub-samples, there is not a single pair of confidence intervals that do not overlap. The same is true when comparing the estimated effects of skill levels across sub-samples. Here the only minor deviations are the slightly lower estimated effects of *skill345* in the models of *antihate* and *multiculturalism* in the student sample (again, the current occupational codes are almost certainly a poor guide the skill levels of students, as noted above, so this is unsurprising).

G. Allowing for Location-Specific Labor-Market Effects (Section VI)

Table 6 shows the results from our tests of the so-called “area” model of immigration effects. The aim here is to relax the restriction that the economic threat posed by immigration will be felt equally by respondents regardless of *where* they live in their home country. If we allow

that the labor market can be segmented geographically into local markets, the wage effects of immigration (and fears about labor-market competition) may be concentrated in immigrant “gateway communities.” To allow for this possibility, we interacted each of the education variables with the *minority area* variable, which reflects the concentration of ethnic and racial minorities in the area in which the respondent resides. The results are inconclusive. We found no significant interaction effects along these lines for the cases of immigration from poorer countries. In the cases of immigration from richer countries, we found that the impact of education on support for immigration is significantly *weaker* in minority areas than in other locations (though the substantive differences are very small). In these latter cases, the effects of education remain positive and substantively large in all areas, which is inconsistent with the expectations from the simple labour market competition account.

[Table 6]

H. Ordered Probit Models of Immigration Preferences (Section VI)

Table 7 shows the results from estimations of ordered probit models to check whether our results are sensitive to the choice of the cut-off point specified for the dichotomous dependent variables. As we report in the paper, the results show that this possibility can be clearly rejected: the estimated effects of education remain positive, statistically significant, and substantively large in magnitude across all estimations of the benchmark model. We found the same results when we estimated ordered probit models for each ESS country separately: again, all 160 of the education coefficients were positive and the great majority (94 %) of these were (highly) statistically significant. In fact, when we increased the sample size for these country-specific models by replacing the standard income variable with the alternative, household income measure (for which more data are available – see fn. 27 in the paper), 100% of the education coefficients are positive and 99 % (all except two) of them are statistically significant.

[Table 7]

I. The “Kitchen Sink” Model with Additional Controls (Section VI)

Tables 8.A and 8.B report results from estimations of our most extensive models. Here we aimed to test whether the core substantive results were affected when we added a comprehensive set of additional control variables to the main benchmark variables and the measures of cultural values we incorporated in the estimations described in sections IV and V of the paper. All these additional variables are described in Table 9 below. We experimented with a variety of “belief” variables (including respondents’ concerns about refugees, free market attitudes, altruism, traditionalism, and the importance attached to equality). We controlled for indicators of trade union membership, religion, and various proxies of social capital and interpersonal trust. And finally we controlled for various measures of economic insecurity or risk, including skill specificity, occupational unemployment, past unemployment, current unemployment, and (an inverse measure of risk) job mobility. The latter measure of mobility, derived from answers to a question about how easy the respondent thought it would be to find another job with a different employer) has a very large percentage of missing values, presumably because only respondents currently in paid work saw it as relevant and many of them were unable to answer. We excluded the mobility measure from one set of estimations (shown in Table 8.A) to preserve the large sample size, and then just repeated the estimations (Table 8.B) with mobility included. None of the added controls affect the main findings: most importantly, all estimated

coefficients for the education variables retained their (positive) signs and their significance in all the estimations.

[Tables 8A, 8B, and 9]

Perhaps the most interesting inclusions in the “kitchen sink” model, from the point of view of the labor-market account, are the various controls for economic insecurity or risk (or its inverse). We conducted separate tests using the key measures and found that, while more educated respondents are less likely to be currently unemployed or to have experienced unemployment in the recent past, and they are also more mobile in the labor market as might be expected, the magnitude of these effects is actually very small. Table 10 reports the results from separate estimations of the measures of past unemployment, current unemployment, and mobility, incorporating *educational attainment* and *skill*³⁴⁵. For example in the full sample estimations, going from the lowest to the highest level of educational attainment (while holding all other covariates at their means) is estimated to decrease the probability of past (current) unemployment on average by only 0.08 (0.02) – a minuscule effect given the huge dimension of the counterfactual involved. The respective decrease when going from high to low skill is 0.07 (0.02). The picture is very similar with the mobility measure. Again in the full sample estimations for example, a maximum shift in educational attainment is associated with a average increase in stated mobility of about 0.9 on the 10 point mobility scale. The respective increase in mobility when going from low to high skill is only 0.35. Evaluated at the mean level of mobility of 4.2 this is equivalent to a mere 8 % increase. These effects are very similar for those currently in paid work only. Given that the size of these effects is so small, it is understandable that controlling for both variables in the kitchen sink model has a negligible impact on the results of our tests.

[Table 10]

J. Regional Fixed Effects in Country-Specific Models (Section VI)

Finally, we examined the impact of including regional fixed effects (where possible) in estimations of our benchmark model. The ESS provides an indicator for the region in which each respondent lives in each country. This region indicator is missing for many observations in certain countries, unfortunately, but for 11 countries it is available for at least 40% of respondents. Table 11 summarizes the data available on region of respondent for each ESS country.

[Table 11]

For each of these 11 countries for which we have a reasonable amount of data on the region of the respondent, we estimated ordered probits for the benchmark model including a full set of regional fixed effects and adjusting standard errors for potential clustering within regions. We use the categorical dependent variables here, and thus the ordered probit specification, just in order to maximize within-region variation in the dependent variables. The regional fixed effects will help control for a range of unobserved, time-invariant factors (e.g., being located near a border or in economically depressed area) that may affect immigration attitudes. Table 12 reports the results.

[Table 12]

All our substantive findings remain unaffected. All 88 of the estimated effects of education are positive, and 82 out of 88 (93%) of these effects are statistically significant (94% are significant if

we use the perceived income control rather than the standard measure of income which allows fewer observations). More importantly, the estimated effects of education here are very close in magnitude to the effects we estimated in the single country models without the regional fixed effects (see Table 7 in this supplement). All in all, this gives us a great deal of additional confidence to our core results.

Table 1: Effects of Skill on Immigration Preferences – Country Specific Estimates

	Skill345 Coefficients: restricted single country models (using income)					Skill345 Coefficients: extended single country models (using perceived income)				
Dependent Variable: ¹ Favor Immigration from ...	Richer Europe	Poorer Europe	Richer Outside	Poorer Outside		Richer Europe	Poorer Europe	Richer Outside	Poorer Outside	
Country					Obs. (avg)					Obs. (avg)
Luxembourg	0.184*** (0.061)	0.205*** (0.060)	0.178*** (0.063)	0.147** (0.062)	374	0.122** (0.054)	0.136** (0.054)	0.146*** (0.055)	0.097* (0.055)	501
Norway	0.182*** (0.032)	0.056* (0.031)	0.172*** (0.034)	0.088*** (0.033)	1273	0.202*** (0.031)	0.078*** (0.029)	0.192*** (0.032)	0.115*** (0.031)	1298
Switzerland	0.124*** (0.032)	0.100*** (0.030)	0.120*** (0.034)	0.113*** (0.033)	1020	0.157*** (0.029)	0.119*** (0.028)	0.120*** (0.031)	0.112*** (0.030)	1203
Ireland	0.086** (0.035)	0.119*** (0.036)	0.103*** (0.038)	0.114*** (0.037)	810	0.105*** (0.031)	0.100*** (0.033)	0.123*** (0.034)	0.111*** (0.034)	905
Denmark	0.133*** (0.033)	0.114*** (0.037)	0.153*** (0.036)	0.128*** (0.037)	784	0.140*** (0.031)	0.120*** (0.034)	0.157*** (0.033)	0.129*** (0.035)	856
Belgium	0.130*** (0.035)	0.125*** (0.035)	0.136*** (0.036)	0.111*** (0.036)	765	0.144*** (0.032)	0.152*** (0.033)	0.163*** (0.033)	0.154*** (0.034)	875
Netherlands	0.099*** (0.034)	0.138*** (0.033)	0.102*** (0.034)	0.158*** (0.034)	1142	0.106*** (0.032)	0.138*** (0.032)	0.109*** (0.032)	0.153*** (0.033)	1248
Germany	0.064** (0.031)	0.091*** (0.031)	0.072** (0.032)	0.083** (0.033)	1102	0.070** (0.028)	0.108*** (0.028)	0.075*** (0.029)	0.088*** (0.030)	1296.5
Finland	0.202*** (0.032)	0.132*** (0.033)	0.215*** (0.032)	0.149*** (0.033)	1104	0.193*** (0.031)	0.113*** (0.031)	0.199*** (0.031)	0.130*** (0.032)	1156
Sweden	0.154*** (0.022)	0.075*** (0.019)	0.171*** (0.024)	0.074*** (0.020)	1110	0.159*** (0.022)	0.065*** (0.018)	0.174*** (0.024)	0.060*** (0.019)	1129
Italy	0.151*** (0.057)	0.103* (0.057)	0.151*** (0.058)	0.196*** (0.060)	273	0.127*** (0.045)	0.088* (0.046)	0.099** (0.045)	0.148*** (0.048)	455
UK	0.213*** (0.037)	0.172*** (0.038)	0.159*** (0.038)	0.125*** (0.039)	905	0.240*** (0.034)	0.191*** (0.035)	0.184*** (0.035)	0.150*** (0.036)	991
Israel	0.025 (0.038)	0.074* (0.044)	0.012 (0.035)	0.014 (0.045)	833	0.032 (0.034)	0.092** (0.039)	0.040 (0.034)	0.031 (0.040)	1001
Spain	0.102 (0.064)	0.042 (0.066)	0.089 (0.064)	0.036 (0.066)	421	0.157*** (0.047)	0.097** (0.048)	0.122** (0.048)	0.078 (0.049)	626
Portugal	0.021 (0.071)	0.013 (0.070)	-0.020 (0.072)	0.008 (0.069)	483	0.069 (0.058)	0.063 (0.057)	0.024 (0.058)	0.058 (0.056)	646
Slovenia	0.041 (0.043)	0.074 (0.048)	0.046 (0.046)	0.080 (0.049)	525	0.059 (0.040)	0.099** (0.043)	0.068 (0.042)	0.094** (0.044)	577
Greece	0.034 (0.049)	0.052 (0.040)	-0.002 (0.045)	0.055 (0.035)	605	0.086** (0.043)	0.073** (0.035)	0.061 (0.040)	0.064** (0.031)	791
Czech Rep.	0.167*** (0.046)	0.156*** (0.052)	0.117** (0.047)	0.103* (0.054)	471	0.118*** (0.040)	0.132*** (0.044)	0.083** (0.041)	0.060 (0.046)	641
Hungary	0.105** (0.048)	0.034 (0.036)	0.083* (0.043)	0.054* (0.030)	588	0.137*** (0.042)	0.074** (0.033)	0.101*** (0.037)	0.062** (0.025)	665.25
Poland	0.049 (0.036)	0.137*** (0.039)	0.095*** (0.037)	0.140*** (0.040)	751	0.089*** (0.031)	0.144*** (0.035)	0.119*** (0.032)	0.157*** (0.035)	878
Total (of 20) Positive Coefficients	20	20	18	20		20	20	20	20	
Total sig. (p<.01)	14	15	15	15		17	19	16	16	

1. Probit estimations: marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x$) are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model is estimated using a full set of benchmark controls (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT.

**Table 2: Skill-level, Education, and Immigration Attitudes by Source:
Full ESS Sample**

Dependent variable: Favor Immigration from...	High/Low Skill Distinction and Educational Attainment				Disaggregated Skill Levels and Educational Attainment			
	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe
Model No. ¹	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
schooling	0.016*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.003)
skill345	0.086*** (0.014)	0.071*** (0.009)	0.081*** (0.009)	0.070*** (0.009)				
skill2					0.039 (0.025)	0.009 (0.023)	0.011 (0.017)	0.019 (0.020)
skill3					0.107*** (0.037)	0.067** (0.027)	0.077*** (0.025)	0.073*** (0.027)
skill4					0.148*** (0.024)	0.109*** (0.019)	0.123*** (0.020)	0.118*** (0.018)
skill5					0.101*** (0.022)	0.071*** (0.020)	0.079*** (0.019)	0.083*** (0.022)
age	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
gender	-0.031*** (0.008)	0.024** (0.010)	-0.010 (0.008)	0.029*** (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.009)	0.024** (0.010)	-0.010 (0.008)	0.029*** (0.009)
income	0.015*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)
native	-0.032 (0.028)	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.033** (0.015)	-0.008 (0.026)	-0.032 (0.028)	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.033** (0.016)	-0.008 (0.027)
immigrant friends	0.062*** (0.006)	0.098*** (0.011)	0.065*** (0.008)	0.100*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.006)	0.098*** (0.011)	0.064*** (0.008)	0.100*** (0.012)
minority area	-0.001 (0.007)	0.024*** (0.009)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.020** (0.008)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.024*** (0.009)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.020** (0.008)
partisan right	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.008)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.022*** (0.008)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.007)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.008)
Observations	25113	25248	25058	25150	25113	25248	25058	25150
Log likelihood	-15330.42	-15235.09	-15677.18	-15468.35	-15315.36	-15228.58	-15668.70	-15460.50
Pseudo R-squared	0.08	0.11	0.08	0.11	0.08	0.11	0.08	0.11

1. Probit estimations: marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x$) are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$. Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT. Standard errors clustered by country.

Table 3: Skill-level, Education, and Attitudes by Source: Employment Status Sub-Samples

	Dependent Variable ¹ : Favor Immigration from ...			
	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe
In Labor Force (Paid Work) Sample				
educational attainment	0.052*** (0.006)	0.050*** (0.010)	0.050*** (0.006)	0.048*** (0.008)
skill345	0.068*** (0.019)	0.066*** (0.008)	0.062*** (0.011)	0.067*** (0.013)
Observations	15263	15326	15239	15278
Pseudo R-squared	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.10
Unemployed Sample				
educational attainment	0.062** (0.031)	0.035 (0.024)	0.047* (0.026)	0.050** (0.024)
skill345	0.116** (0.047)	0.057 (0.043)	0.142*** (0.046)	0.101* (0.060)
Observations	1244	1250	1233	1241
Pseudo R-squared	0.11	0.14	0.13	0.14
Student Sample				
Educational attainment	0.059*** (0.018)	0.048** (0.019)	0.059*** (0.023)	0.063*** (0.022)
Skill345	0.081* (0.043)	0.032 (0.062)	0.064** (0.032)	-0.003 (0.051)
Observations	2212	2214	2198	2208
Pseudo R-squared	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.14
Retired Sample				
Educational attainment	0.030*** (0.012)	0.035** (0.016)	0.028*** (0.010)	0.038*** (0.014)
Skill345	0.067*** (0.022)	0.082* (0.048)	0.068** (0.030)	0.086** (0.038)
Observations	5602	5639	5582	5612
Pseudo R-squared	0.07	0.10	0.07	0.09

1. Probit estimations: marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x$) are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$
Each model includes a full set of benchmark controls and country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT. Standard errors clustered by country.

Table 4: Education, Cultural Tolerance, and Economic Literacy

	Dependent Variable: Favor Immigration from:							
	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe
Model No. ¹	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
educational attainment	0.029*** (0.008)	0.018* (0.009)	0.025*** (0.008)	0.021** (0.009)				
schooling					0.010*** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.002)
racism	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.003)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.004)
crime	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.030*** (0.007)
antihate	0.010*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.002)
culture	0.011*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.008** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.005)	0.010*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.008** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.005)
multiculturalism	0.040*** (0.005)	0.066*** (0.005)	0.053*** (0.006)	0.071*** (0.008)	0.041*** (0.005)	0.066*** (0.005)	0.054*** (0.006)	0.071*** (0.007)
economy	0.038*** (0.003)	0.050*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.049*** (0.009)	0.038*** (0.003)	0.050*** (0.007)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.049*** (0.009)
skill345	0.055*** (0.013)	0.033*** (0.012)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.032 (0.021)	0.060*** (0.016)	0.035*** (0.006)	0.052*** (0.011)	0.030** (0.015)
age	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
gender	-0.031*** (0.008)	0.024*** (0.007)	-0.015*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.007)	0.026*** (0.007)	-0.013** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.008)
income	0.012*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)
native	-0.000 (0.020)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.035 (0.028)	-0.003 (0.018)	0.040* (0.022)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.033 (0.027)
immigrant friends	0.029*** (0.010)	0.053*** (0.011)	0.030*** (0.010)	0.054*** (0.012)	0.028*** (0.009)	0.052*** (0.010)	0.028*** (0.009)	0.052*** (0.011)
minority area	-0.000 (0.006)	0.024** (0.010)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.020** (0.009)	0.001 (0.006)	0.025*** (0.010)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.021** (0.009)
partisan right	0.003 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.006)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.009* (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.006)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.009* (0.005)
Observations	22399	22491	22367	22437	22366	22459	22335	22405
Log likelihood	-12876.08	-12066.05	-13027.05	-12242.76	-12855.16	-12035.35	-13004.82	-12206.67
Pseudo R-squared	0.13	0.20	0.14	0.21	0.12	0.20	0.14	0.21

1. Probit estimations: marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x$) are shown; robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$. Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT. Standard errors clustered by country.

Table 5: Education and Racism: Tests by Employment Status Sub-Samples

Dependent variable:	How stable is the link between education and racism across subgroups? ¹						How stable is the link between skills and racism across subgroups? ¹						
	racism		antihate		multiculturalism		racism		antihate		multiculturalism		
Question:	Qualification for immigration: be white?		Law against promoting racial or ethnic hatred good/bad for a country?		Better for a country if almost everyone share customs and traditions?		Qualification for immigration: be white?		Law against promoting racial or ethnic hatred good/bad for a country?		Better for a country if almost everyone share customs and traditions?		
Coded:	0= Extremely Unimportant 10= Extremely Important		0=Extremely bad 10=Extremely Good		1= Agree strongly 5= Disagree Strongly		0= Extremely Unimportant 10= Extremely Important		0=Extremely bad 10=Extremely Good		1= Agree strongly 5= Disagree Strongly		
Mean:	2.34		7.13		2.63		2.34		7.13		2.63		
SD:	2.83		3.01		1.08		2.83		3.01		1.08		
	Point Estimate	95% Conf. Interval	Point Estimate	95% Conf. Interval	Point Estimate	95% Conf. Interval	Point Estimate	95% Conf. Interval	Point Estimate	95% Conf. Interval	Point Estimate	95% Conf. Interval	
Full Sample													
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.308***	-0.386 -0.230	0.181***	0.067 0.294	0.149***	0.129 0.168	<i>skill345</i>	-0.707***	-0.894 -0.520	0.466***	0.226 0.705	0.333	0.293 0.374
Observations	(0.037)		(0.054)		(0.009)			(0.089)		(0.114)		(0.019)***	
R-squared	39322		37929		39512			34369		33307		34536	
	0.12		0.05		0.13			0.11		0.05		0.12	
In Labor Force Sample													
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.283***	-0.384 -0.182	0.204***	0.075 0.333	0.163***	0.134 0.193	<i>skill345</i>	-0.685***	-0.929 -0.441	0.493***	0.228 0.758	0.351***	0.286 0.417
Observations	(0.048)		(0.062)		(0.014)			(0.117)		(0.126)		(0.031)	
R-squared	20674		20280		20717			20249		19869		20288	
	0.09		0.06		0.11			0.09		0.06		0.10	
Out of Labor Force Sample													
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.313***	-0.388 -0.237	0.157***	0.075 0.239	0.118***	0.101 0.135	<i>skill345</i>	-0.678***	-0.892 -0.465	0.413***	0.217 0.609	0.256***	0.123 0.389
Observations	(0.036)		(0.039)		(0.008)			(0.102)		(0.094)		(0.063)	
R-squared	18648		17649		18795			14120		13438		14248	
	0.12		0.04		0.12			0.11		0.04		0.12	
Unemployed sample													
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.333***	-0.473 -0.192	0.215**	0.014 0.415	0.163***	0.085 0.240	<i>skill345</i>	-0.619**	-1.176 -0.062	0.672***	0.304 1.041	0.259*	-0.035 0.554
Observations	(0.067)		(0.096)		(0.037)			(0.266)		(0.176)		(0.141)	
R-squared	1994		1931		2012			1720		1671		1734	
	0.07		0.08		0.11			0.06		0.06		0.10	
Students													
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.285***	-0.443 -0.127	0.244***	0.154 0.333	0.132***	0.106 0.158	<i>skill345</i>	-0.623**	-1.199 -0.047	0.198	-0.201 0.597	0.197**	0.042 0.353
Observations	(0.075)		(0.043)		(0.013)			(0.275)		(0.190)		(0.074)	
R-squared	4375		4270		4396			3118		3048		3133	
	0.13		0.06		0.14			0.15		0.05		0.16	
Retired													
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.324***	-0.440 -0.209	0.157***	0.062 0.252	0.114***	0.090 0.139	<i>skill345</i>	-0.681***	-0.983 -0.378	0.228**	0.002 0.453	0.218***	0.069 0.368
Observations	(0.055)		(0.046)		(0.012)			(0.144)		(0.108)		(0.071)	
R-squared	8705		8228		8784			7718		7340		7791	
	0.09		0.04		0.10			0.08		0.04		0.10	

¹ OLS Regressions: Regression coefficients shown; robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model includes a full set of country dummies and the covariates age and native born (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT. Standard errors clustered by country.

Table 6: The AREA Model

	Dependent Variable: Favor Immigration from:							
	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe
Model No. ¹	1	2	3	4				
educational attainment	0.076*** (0.013)	0.062*** (0.010)	0.069*** (0.010)	0.048*** (0.008)				
schooling					0.028*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.004)
age	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
gender	-0.031*** (0.009)	0.024** (0.012)	-0.013* (0.008)	0.025** (0.010)	-0.030*** (0.008)	0.027*** (0.010)	-0.011* (0.006)	0.028*** (0.009)
income	0.017*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.003)
native	-0.029 (0.031)	-0.023 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.035)	-0.033 (0.028)	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.034** (0.016)	-0.008 (0.030)
immigrant friends	0.071*** (0.008)	0.107*** (0.012)	0.073*** (0.007)	0.111*** (0.014)	0.069*** (0.006)	0.106*** (0.011)	0.071*** (0.006)	0.109*** (0.012)
minority area	0.034* (0.017)	0.037** (0.017)	0.018 (0.013)	0.002 (0.015)	0.060** (0.027)	0.039 (0.026)	0.048** (0.022)	-0.001 (0.025)
partisan right	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.020** (0.008)
educational attainment * minority area	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.008** (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)				
schooling * minority area					-0.005** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Observations	27741	27892	27686	27786	27688	27841	27633	27735
Log likelihood	-16995.48	-16932.51	-17361.29	-17175.54	-16958.71	-16888.98	-17319.06	-17112.55
Pseudo R-squared	0.07	0.10	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10	0.08	0.10

1. Probit estimations: marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x$) are shown; robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$. Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT. Standard errors clustered by country.

**Table 7: Effects of Education on Immigration Preferences:
Country-Specific Estimates from Ordered-Probit Models**

Dependent Variable: ¹ Favor Immigration from ...	Educational attainment				Obs. (avg)	Years of schooling				Obs. (avg)
	Richer Europe	Poorer Europe	Richer Outside	Poorer Outside		Richer Europe	Poorer Europe	Richer Outside	Poorer Outside	
Country					Obs. (avg)					Obs. (avg)
Luxembourg	0.133*** (0.028)	0.112*** (0.026)	0.115*** (0.026)	0.101*** (0.026)	803	0.057*** (0.013)	0.048*** (0.012)	0.049*** (0.012)	0.049*** (0.012)	799
Norway	0.244*** (0.025)	0.149*** (0.025)	0.259*** (0.025)	0.191*** (0.025)	2113	0.077*** (0.009)	0.049*** (0.009)	0.091*** (0.009)	0.064*** (0.009)	2137
Switzerland	0.182*** (0.033)	0.120*** (0.031)	0.178*** (0.037)	0.160*** (0.035)	1544	0.075*** (0.010)	0.055*** (0.011)	0.087*** (0.010)	0.060*** (0.012)	1543
Ireland	0.120*** (0.023)	0.115*** (0.024)	0.108*** (0.023)	0.102*** (0.023)	1392	0.060*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.011)	0.056*** (0.011)	0.045*** (0.010)	1363
Denmark	0.217*** (0.033)	0.198*** (0.032)	0.232*** (0.032)	0.193*** (0.034)	1185	0.075*** (0.010)	0.068*** (0.010)	0.080*** (0.010)	0.065*** (0.010)	1185
Belgium	0.155*** (0.022)	0.170*** (0.023)	0.172*** (0.022)	0.171*** (0.022)	1357	0.063*** (0.010)	0.069*** (0.010)	0.066*** (0.010)	0.075*** (0.010)	1363
Netherlands	0.143*** (0.023)	0.128*** (0.023)	0.138*** (0.023)	0.138*** (0.024)	1933	0.039*** (0.008)	0.050*** (0.008)	0.046*** (0.007)	0.048*** (0.008)	1920
Germany	0.142*** (0.026)	0.160*** (0.027)	0.175*** (0.026)	0.171*** (0.026)	2151	0.047*** (0.009)	0.058*** (0.009)	0.057*** (0.009)	0.063*** (0.009)	2148
Finland	0.131*** (0.020)	0.110*** (0.021)	0.126*** (0.020)	0.124*** (0.021)	1902	0.058*** (0.007)	0.047*** (0.008)	0.063*** (0.008)	0.052*** (0.008)	1906
Sweden	0.185*** (0.016)	0.128*** (0.016)	0.162*** (0.016)	0.126*** (0.016)	1709	0.106*** (0.009)	0.074*** (0.009)	0.094*** (0.009)	0.074*** (0.009)	1708
Italy	0.146*** (0.046)	0.113*** (0.045)	0.164*** (0.045)	0.156*** (0.048)	511	0.055*** (0.013)	0.042*** (0.013)	0.056*** (0.013)	0.049*** (0.014)	511
UK	0.175*** (0.025)	0.212*** (0.026)	0.195*** (0.024)	0.203*** (0.025)	1611	0.072*** (0.010)	0.074*** (0.011)	0.070*** (0.010)	0.069*** (0.010)	1604
Israel	0.039 (0.026)	0.071*** (0.025)	0.044* (0.026)	0.082*** (0.025)	1562	0.013 (0.011)	0.026** (0.011)	0.017 (0.011)	0.029*** (0.010)	1524
Spain	0.064** (0.032)	0.045 (0.035)	0.062* (0.034)	0.062* (0.033)	900	0.029*** (0.010)	0.018* (0.010)	0.023** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	860
Portugal	0.071 (0.043)	0.051 (0.045)	0.051 (0.044)	0.050 (0.043)	878	0.026** (0.013)	0.021* (0.013)	0.021* (0.013)	0.022* (0.013)	878
Slovenia	0.094*** (0.029)	0.145*** (0.032)	0.148*** (0.031)	0.104*** (0.032)	1042	0.031*** (0.011)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.037*** (0.012)	1056
Greece	0.043* (0.026)	0.118*** (0.026)	0.056** (0.026)	0.107*** (0.025)	1427	0.013 (0.009)	0.042*** (0.009)	0.018** (0.009)	0.041*** (0.009)	1427
Czech Rep.	0.133*** (0.042)	0.162*** (0.044)	0.159*** (0.041)	0.190*** (0.043)	928	0.056*** (0.013)	0.076*** (0.013)	0.066*** (0.013)	0.076*** (0.014)	917
Hungary	0.107*** (0.023)	0.076*** (0.023)	0.097*** (0.023)	0.095*** (0.023)	1228	0.050*** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.010)	0.050*** (0.010)	0.040*** (0.010)	1273
Poland	0.158*** (0.020)	0.118*** (0.021)	0.147*** (0.021)	0.128*** (0.021)	1602	0.077*** (0.010)	0.055*** (0.010)	0.068*** (0.010)	0.060*** (0.010)	1604
Total (of 20) Positive Coefficients	20	20	20	20		20	20	20	20	
Total sig. (p<.01)	18	18	19	19		18	19	19	20	
Total sig. if drop (p<.01)	20	20	20	20		19	20	19	20	

1. Ordered Probit estimations: probit coefficients are shown; robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model is estimated using a full set of benchmark controls (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT.

Table 8.A: The “Kitchen Sink” Model

	Dependent Variable: Favor Immigration from:							
	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe
Model No. ¹	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
educational attainment	0.024*** (0.006)	0.019** (0.008)	0.025*** (0.007)	0.025*** (0.008)				
schooling					0.010*** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)
racism	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.006)
crime	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.024*** (0.002)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.004)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.025*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.004)
antihate	0.012*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.002)
culture	0.008* (0.004)	0.014** (0.007)	0.005 (0.004)	0.012 (0.008)	0.008** (0.004)	0.014** (0.007)	0.005 (0.004)	0.012 (0.008)
multiculturalism	0.042*** (0.004)	0.059*** (0.005)	0.045*** (0.006)	0.059*** (0.008)	0.042*** (0.004)	0.060*** (0.004)	0.045*** (0.006)	0.059*** (0.007)
economy	0.034*** (0.004)	0.044*** (0.008)	0.038*** (0.007)	0.042*** (0.013)	0.034*** (0.004)	0.044*** (0.008)	0.038*** (0.007)	0.042*** (0.013)
skill345	0.060*** (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.051*** (0.014)	0.010 (0.019)	0.060*** (0.019)	0.019 (0.017)	0.054*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.011)
age	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
gender	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.022* (0.013)	-0.017 (0.011)	0.023 (0.016)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.023* (0.014)	-0.016 (0.011)	0.025 (0.016)
income	0.013*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)
native	-0.002 (0.025)	0.050** (0.022)	0.009 (0.019)	0.066*** (0.018)	-0.003 (0.021)	0.049** (0.022)	0.008 (0.022)	0.066*** (0.020)
immigrant_friends	0.037*** (0.010)	0.046*** (0.013)	0.033*** (0.011)	0.059*** (0.013)	0.034*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.012)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.057*** (0.012)
minority_area	0.004 (0.008)	0.030*** (0.009)	0.002 (0.008)	0.021 (0.013)	0.005 (0.008)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.003 (0.007)	0.022* (0.012)
partisan_right	0.014*** (0.004)	0.002 (0.006)	0.010*** (0.004)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.002 (0.006)	0.010*** (0.004)	-0.005 (0.006)
social trust	-0.001 (0.004)	0.005** (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.005)
pro free market attitude	0.006** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)
equality	0.006* (0.004)	0.022** (0.009)	0.002 (0.010)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.005 (0.004)	0.021** (0.010)	0.001 (0.011)	0.029*** (0.007)
altruism	-0.010 (0.009)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.011* (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.009)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.003)
traditionalism	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.006* (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.006 (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.010 (0.008)
religious	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.007* (0.004)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006* (0.004)
Social capital	0.000 (0.003)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.014 (0.011)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.014 (0.011)
refugee1 (applications generous)	0.031** (0.012)	0.057*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.013)	0.068*** (0.013)	0.031** (0.012)	0.057*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.013)	0.068*** (0.013)
refugee2 (fairs hare)	0.035*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.016)	0.031*** (0.009)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.033*** (0.010)	0.046*** (0.015)	0.030*** (0.008)	0.060*** (0.015)
trade union membership	0.011 (0.034)	0.012 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.035)	0.011 (0.033)	0.014 (0.034)	0.016 (0.026)	-0.011 (0.036)	0.016 (0.034)
skill specificity 2 (TI&DS)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)
Unemployment rate (97-03), by ISCO88-3digit level	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Comparative disadvantage	-0.012 (0.038)	0.017 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.030)	0.017 (0.044)	-0.008 (0.037)	0.020 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.022 (0.044)
comparative advantage	-0.010 (0.043)	-0.015 (0.043)	0.003 (0.027)	-0.010 (0.042)	-0.004 (0.045)	-0.009 (0.046)	0.004 (0.026)	-0.002 (0.047)
non-tradeable sector	0.010 (0.040)	0.045 (0.035)	0.017 (0.026)	0.044 (0.040)	0.014 (0.041)	0.049 (0.036)	0.016 (0.025)	0.049 (0.042)
Labor Market Risk 1 (Past Unemployment)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.027** (0.014)	-0.016 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.028** (0.012)	-0.018 (0.017)
Labor Market Risk 2 (Current Unemployment)	0.009 (0.060)	-0.028 (0.031)	0.006 (0.050)	-0.021 (0.039)	0.012 (0.060)	-0.025 (0.032)	0.008 (0.050)	-0.016 (0.039)
Observations	11757	11800	11743	11769	11743	11787	11729	11756
Log likelihood	-6647.31	-6084.73	-6771.61	-6092.85	-6636.88	-6067.45	-6763.23	-6070.44
Pseudo R-squared	0.15	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.15	0.24	0.16	0.25

1. Probit estimations: marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x$) are shown; robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT. Standard errors clustered by country.

Table 8.B: The “Kitchen Sink” Model

	Dependent Variable: Favor Immigration from:							
	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe
Model No. ¹	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
educational attainment	0.024*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.028*** (0.010)	0.014*** (0.003)				
schooling					0.012*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.004)
racism	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.029*** (0.004)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.028*** (0.004)
crime	-0.010*** (0.004)	-0.028*** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.036*** (0.006)	-0.010*** (0.004)	-0.028*** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.037*** (0.006)
antihate	0.012*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.001)
culture	0.001 (0.006)	0.011* (0.006)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.013* (0.008)	0.002 (0.006)	0.011* (0.006)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.013* (0.008)
multiculturalism	0.038*** (0.008)	0.054*** (0.003)	0.045*** (0.007)	0.057*** (0.004)	0.038*** (0.008)	0.055*** (0.003)	0.045*** (0.008)	0.057*** (0.004)
economy	0.036*** (0.006)	0.040*** (0.006)	0.036*** (0.006)	0.034*** (0.013)	0.035*** (0.005)	0.039*** (0.006)	0.036*** (0.006)	0.033** (0.013)
skill345	0.038 (0.027)	0.014 (0.018)	0.020 (0.023)	0.015 (0.015)	0.033 (0.030)	0.009 (0.020)	0.018 (0.022)	0.003 (0.015)
age	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
gender	-0.015 (0.016)	0.044*** (0.013)	-0.007 (0.016)	0.020 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.015)	0.046*** (0.012)	-0.005 (0.015)	0.023* (0.012)
income	0.018*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.018*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)
native	0.037* (0.019)	0.063*** (0.020)	0.038* (0.021)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.035* (0.018)	0.062*** (0.020)	0.035 (0.025)	0.052*** (0.016)
immigrant_friends	0.030*** (0.011)	0.031* (0.017)	0.022* (0.012)	0.054*** (0.021)	0.029** (0.012)	0.030* (0.017)	0.021 (0.013)	0.053*** (0.021)
minority_area	0.001 (0.007)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.003 (0.008)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)
partisan_right	0.007 (0.007)	0.002 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.007 (0.007)	0.002 (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.010)
social trust	-0.001 (0.003)	0.009*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.006)
pro free market attitude	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.007* (0.004)
equality	0.008 (0.006)	0.016*** (0.006)	0.011* (0.006)	0.037*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)	0.015** (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)	0.036*** (0.005)
altruism	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.015)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.015)	0.004 (0.007)
traditionalism	-0.018*** (0.006)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.020*** (0.007)	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.017*** (0.006)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.017*** (0.007)	-0.006 (0.014)
religious	0.005** (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003* (0.001)	0.001 (0.005)	0.005** (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.005)
Social capital	0.010* (0.006)	0.008 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.018 (0.015)	0.009 (0.006)	0.007 (0.008)	0.005 (0.007)	0.017 (0.016)
refugee1 (applications generous)	0.035*** (0.011)	0.062*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.075*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	0.062*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.075*** (0.011)
refugee2 (fairs hare)	0.027** (0.011)	0.055** (0.023)	0.035*** (0.013)	0.075*** (0.026)	0.025** (0.011)	0.055** (0.023)	0.033** (0.013)	0.075*** (0.026)
trade union membership	0.033 (0.048)	0.011 (0.030)	-0.006 (0.041)	0.029 (0.027)	0.035 (0.047)	0.015 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.040)	0.033 (0.025)
skill specificity 2 (TI&DS)	-0.016 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.017)	0.002 (0.012)	0.001 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.014)	0.003 (0.014)
Unemployment rate (97-03), by ISCO88-3digit level	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
Comparative disadvantage	0.007 (0.064)	0.019 (0.069)	-0.013 (0.063)	0.003 (0.066)	0.014 (0.065)	0.027 (0.070)	-0.005 (0.063)	0.010 (0.068)
comparative advantage	-0.003 (0.062)	0.000 (0.050)	-0.012 (0.060)	-0.031 (0.050)	0.006 (0.064)	0.010 (0.053)	-0.004 (0.061)	-0.020 (0.055)
non-tradeable sector	0.027 (0.073)	0.064 (0.052)	0.037 (0.065)	0.041 (0.047)	0.033 (0.073)	0.071 (0.055)	0.042 (0.066)	0.049 (0.051)
Labor Market Risk 1 (Past Unemployment)	-0.038*** (0.010)	-0.024 (0.028)	-0.050*** (0.018)	-0.028 (0.027)	-0.040*** (0.009)	-0.025 (0.028)	-0.051*** (0.017)	-0.030 (0.027)
Labor Market Risk 2 (Current Unemployment)	0.048 (0.129)	-0.053 (0.090)	-0.023 (0.066)	-0.080 (0.065)	0.043 (0.127)	-0.056 (0.089)	-0.028 (0.063)	-0.083 (0.064)
Labor Market Risk 3 (Mobility)	0.008 (0.005)	0.007** (0.003)	0.007* (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.008 (0.005)	0.006* (0.003)	0.007 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)
Observations	5803	5817	5796	5805	5793	5808	5786	5795
Log likelihood	-3211.24	-2934.40	-3309.46	-2920.75	-3200.36	-2921.21	-3299.29	-2903.99
Pseudo R-squared	0.15	0.24	0.15	0.26	0.15	0.24	0.15	0.26

1. Probit estimations: marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x$) are shown; robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT. Standard errors clustered by country.

Table 9: The Additional Control Variables used in the “Kitchen Sink” Model

Name	Concept	Measured
social trust	Social Trust	“Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.”
pro free market attitude	Free Market Attitude	“Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. The less that government intervenes in the economy, the better it is for [country].” Answers are coded on a scale from 1 [Agree strongly] to 5 [Disagree Strongly]. We have recoded this variable along more intuitive lines.
equality	Equality Values	To what extent does the following statement describe your values: “It is important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities.” Answers are coded from 1 [Very much like me] to 5 [not like me at all]. We have recoded this variable along more intuitive lines.
altruism	Altruistic Values	To what extent does the following statement describe your values: “It is important to help people and care for others well-being.” Answers are coded from 1 [Very much like me] to 5 [not like me at all]. We have recoded this variable along more intuitive lines.
traditionalism	Traditional Values	To what extent does the following statement describe your values: “It is important to follow traditions and customs.” Answers are coded from 1 [Very much like me] to 5 [not like me at all]. We have recoded this variable along more intuitive lines.
religious	Religious Beliefs	“Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?” Answers are coded on a scale from 0 [Not at all religious] to 10 [Very Religious].
social capital	Social Capital	“Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in social activities?” Answers are coded from 1 [Much less than most] to 5 [Much more than most].
refugee1	Concern for Refugees I	“Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: The government should be generous in judging people’s applications for refugee status.” Answers are coded from 1 [Agree strongly] to 5 [Disagree Strongly]. We have recoded this variable along more intuitive lines.
refugee2	Concern for Refugees II	“Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: [country] has more than its fair share of people applying for refugee status.” Answers are coded from 1 [Agree strongly] to 5 [Disagree Strongly].
trade union membership	Trade Union Membership	“Are you currently member of a trade union?” Coded 1 [Yes] and 0 [No]
skill specificity 2 (TI&DS)	Skill Specificity – Iversen and Soskice Index	Skill specificity indicator operationalized as suggested by Torben Iversen & David Soskice in their <i>APSR</i> article “An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences” (Iversen & Soskice 2001). This indicator exploits the skill-based hierarchical structure of the “International Standard Classifications of Occupations (ISCO-88)”, i.e. it compare the share of unit groups in any higher level class to the share of the workforce in that class (see their appendix for details).
unemployment rate (97-03), by ISCO88-3digit level	Personal Unemployment Rate	Unemployment rates at the 3-digit ISCO-88 level (average 1997-2002). Calculations based on OECD data. This variable was generously provided to us by Philipp Rehm (Duke University).
comparative disadvantage	Employment in sector that has a comparative disadvantage	Coded 1 [Yes] and 0 [No]. This variable is based on matching of NACE codes in dataset with ‘International Trade by Commodity Statistics’ (OECD) (average 1999-2002). Adjusting for a countries’ overall trade-imbalance, sectors that export more than they import are said to have a comparative advantage. Calculations based on logic described in Mayda & Rodrik 2002. This variable was generously provided to us by Philipp Rehm (Duke University).
comparative advantage	Employment in sectors that has a comparative advantage	Coded 1 [Yes] and 0 [No]. This variable is based on matching of NACE codes in dataset with ‘International Trade by Commodity Statistics’ (OECD) (average 1999-2002). Adjusting for a countries’ overall trade-imbalance, sectors that export more than they import are said to have a comparative advantage. Calculations based on logic described in Mayda & Rodrik 2002. This variable was generously provided to us by Philipp Rehm (Duke University).
non-tradeable sector	Employment in non-tradeable sector	Coded 1 [Yes] and 0 [No]. This variable is based on matching of NACE codes in dataset with ‘International Trade by Commodity Statistics’ (OECD) (average 1999-2002). Adjusting for a countries’ overall trade-imbalance, sectors that export more than they import are said to have a comparative advantage. Calculations based on logic described in Mayda & Rodrik 2002. NACE codes 37, and 41 + (but not 74) are coded as non-tradeable. This variable was generously provided to us by Philipp Rehm (Duke University).
Labor Market Risk 1 (Past Unemployment)	Past Unemployment	“Ever unemployed and seeking work for a period more than three months?” Coded 1=Yes; 0=No
Labor Market Risk 2 (Current Unemployment)	Current Unemployment	“Currently unemployed and looking for a job” Coded 1=Yes; 0=No
Labor Market Risk 3 (Mobility)	Mobility	How easy or difficult is it for you to get a similar or better job with another employer? 10=Extremely Easy; 0=Extremely Difficult

Table 10: Education, Skills, Mobility and Job Insecurity

Dependent variable:	Labour Market Risk 1 (Past Unemployment)				Labour Market Risk 2 (Current Unemployment)				Labour Market Risk 3 (Mobility)						
Question:	Ever unemployed and seeking work for a period more than three months				Currently unemployed and looking for work				How easy or difficult is it for you to get a similar or better job with another employer?						
Coded:	1=YES 0=NO				1=YES 0=NO				10=Extremely Easy; 0=Extremely Difficult						
Mean:	0.249				.0392				4.112						
SD:	0.432				0.194				3.037						
Models No. ¹	1				2				3						
	Point Estimate	Shift in Pr(Y=1) associated with Min-Max Shift in Covar.		Point Estimate	Shift in Pr(Y=1) associated with Min-Max Shift in Covar.		Point Estimate	Shift in Pr(Y=1) associated with Min-Max Shift in Covar.		Point Estimate	Shift in mobility scale associated with Min-Max Shift in Covar.		Point Estimate	Shift in mobility scale associated with Min-Max Shift in Covar.	
Full Sample															
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.046*** (0.013)	-0.083	<i>skill345</i>	-0.219*** (0.040)	-0.067	-0.062*** (0.016)	-0.023	<i>skill345</i>	-0.274*** (0.082)	-0.018	0.151*** (0.049)	0.909	<i>skill345</i>	0.351*** (0.073)	(see left)
Observations	39959			34886		40185			35023		17302			16197	
R-squared	0.03			0.03		0.05			0.05		0.10			0.11	
In Paid Work															
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.053*** (0.010)	-0.100	<i>skill345</i>	-0.206*** (0.033)	-0.0639						0.185*** (0.051)	1.108	<i>skill345</i>	0.397*** (0.060)	(see left)
Observations	20831			20412							13505			13302	
R-squared	0.02			0.02							0.13			0.13	

¹ Models no 1 & 2 Probit Estimations and Models 3 OLS Regressions: Probit or regression coefficients shown; robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model includes a full set of country dummies and the covariates age, age squared, and native born (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT. Standard errors clustered by country.

Table 11: Data on Region of Respondent by ESS Country

Country	Region Code: % Observations Missing
Luxembourg	76.16
Norway	78.03
Switzerland	52.27
Ireland	19.42
Denmark	3.19
Belgium	82.16
Netherlands	0.08
Germany	1.68
Finland	71.73
Sweden	2.95
Italy	0
UK	4.43
Israel	0
Spain	77.9
Portugal	82.59
Slovenia	82.67
Greece	1.09
Czech Rep.	76.8
Hungary	81.32
Poland	59.09

**Table 12: Effects of Education on Immigration Preferences:
Country-Specific Estimates from Ordered-Probit Fixed Effects Models**

Dependent Variable: ¹ Favor Immigration from ...	Educational attainment				Obs. (avg)	Years of schooling				Obs. (avg)
	Richer Europe	Poorer Europe	Richer Outside	Poorer Outside		Richer Europe	Poorer Europe	Richer Outside	Poorer Outside	
Country					Obs. (avg)					Obs. (avg)
Switzerland	0.252*** (0.031)	0.162*** (0.031)	0.228*** (0.063)	0.196*** (0.035)	728	0.092*** (0.007)	0.055*** (0.009)	0.087*** (0.020)	0.073*** (0.015)	728
Ireland	0.131*** (0.024)	0.127*** (0.023)	0.126*** (0.027)	0.113*** (0.015)	1157	0.065*** (0.013)	0.047*** (0.012)	0.063*** (0.013)	0.048*** (0.009)	1133.8
Denmark	0.209*** (0.027)	0.197*** (0.030)	0.227*** (0.028)	0.191*** (0.032)	1146	0.073*** (0.008)	0.068*** (0.012)	0.080*** (0.012)	0.066*** (0.014)	1145.5
Netherlands	0.151*** (0.021)	0.136*** (0.021)	0.150*** (0.018)	0.149*** (0.022)	1932	0.042*** (0.008)	0.053*** (0.009)	0.050*** (0.008)	0.051*** (0.008)	1919
Germany	0.154*** (0.019)	0.170*** (0.024)	0.187*** (0.020)	0.179*** (0.024)	2118	0.053*** (0.008)	0.065*** (0.009)	0.064*** (0.012)	0.068*** (0.009)	2114.5
Sweden	0.182*** (0.022)	0.129*** (0.014)	0.161*** (0.019)	0.126*** (0.014)	1663	0.103*** (0.012)	0.073*** (0.010)	0.093*** (0.010)	0.073*** (0.010)	1661.8
Italy	0.125*** (0.043)	0.118** (0.048)	0.155*** (0.044)	0.169*** (0.038)	511.3	0.048*** (0.010)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.052*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.009)	511.25
UK	0.175*** (0.017)	0.209*** (0.019)	0.192*** (0.020)	0.198*** (0.025)	1535	0.075*** (0.009)	0.074*** (0.008)	0.071*** (0.009)	0.069*** (0.007)	1528
Israel	0.040 (0.033)	0.073** (0.034)	0.048 (0.032)	0.082* (0.046)	1562	0.012 (0.018)	0.028* (0.015)	0.018 (0.017)	0.029* (0.017)	1523.8
Greece	0.044 (0.031)	0.135*** (0.026)	0.053* (0.032)	0.120*** (0.019)	1411	0.013* (0.008)	0.047*** (0.006)	0.017* (0.009)	0.046*** (0.006)	1411.3
Poland	0.160*** (0.043)	0.079* (0.042)	0.126*** (0.042)	0.090* (0.053)	632.8	0.079*** (0.019)	0.035* (0.019)	0.067*** (0.016)	0.039* (0.022)	633.75
Total (of 11) Positive Coefficients	11	11	11	11		11	11	11	11	
Total sig. (p<.01)	9	11	10	11		10	10	10	11	
Total sig. if drop (p<.01)	10	11	11	10		10	10	11	10	

Ordered Probit estimations: probit coefficients are shown; robust standard errors (adjusted for potential clustering within regions) in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model is estimated using a full set of benchmark controls and a full set of regional fixed effects (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT.