Spring 2006, Volume 1
Zimbabwe is a country in deep economic and political crisis, but also
one whose situation could change quickly. Waiting until the day after the
fall of Robert Mugabe could be too late, so the international community
should start preliminary planning now for responses to a transition in Zimbabwe.
Given the war-like trauma experienced by the country and acute conditions
today, any donor strategy cannot be limited to traditional development practice
but must be informed by recent post-conflict experiences. This paper lays
out a framework for an international effort and identifies priority actions
to support a political transition and economic recovery. It also suggests
some immediate steps that the US and other donors can take, including the
formation of a Commission for Assistance to a Free Zimbabwe. Beginning the
planning process now is not only prudent, but such a public effort could
also be catalytic: letting the Zimbabwean people know they have not been
forgotten and that the world stands ready to help once Robert Mugabe is
gone could perhaps help to bring about that day a little sooner.
1. Introduction
It is not too early to start planning for a post-Mugabe
Zimbabwe. The southern African country is in a perilous state of decline
and could face a major transition at any time. The government, led since
independence in 1980 by President Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), appears impervious to international
pressure to reform or even moderate political repression and disastrous
economic policies. Zimbabwe is now an international pariah, having quit
the Commonwealth, nearly been expelled from the International Monetary Fund,
and listed by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as an ‘outpost
of tyranny’ alongside the likes of Burma and North Korea. It is also
clear that the situation inside the country is both extremely fragile and
ultimately unsustainable: tensions are high, there are serious divisions
within the ruling party and the military, and the economy is dangerously
close to outright collapse. Importantly, this precarious state of affairs
is being held together mainly by Mugabe himself. Although resilient and
politically cunning, he is nonetheless 82 years old.
Once Mugabe is gone, the reality of his misrule will be immediately faced
by a new government. Several post-Mugabe scenarios are possible, including
a transition to a handpicked successor, the rise of a reformist faction
within ZANU-PF, a broad government of national unity, a military coup, or
even a descent into chaos. It is of course impossible to predict the outcome.
What is likely is that the change will come without much warning and that
a speedy and substantial international response will be necessary. Without
presuming any particular configuration, this paper assumes that the next
government is reform-minded enough that it seeks a genuine normalization
of external relations and that the new leadership is sufficiently distanced
from Mugabe and his cronies that the international community is willing
to respond in kind.
However the transition unfolds, the United States and the international
community should avoid getting caught flat-footed. As in post-conflict situations,
Mugabe’s departure will create a brief “golden hour,”
a fluid situation in which expectations are high and multiple possibilities
quickly emerge. The international community can exploit this window of opportunity
through targeted interventions to help set Zimbabwe on the right path to
sustainable peace and recovery. Once this window closes, the odds of making
a difference will become much longer.
Based on these assumptions, this paper argues that (1) the international community should start preliminary planning now for possible responses to a transition in Zimbabwe because (as with Cuba) waiting until the day after the fall of the dictator could be too late, and (2) given the acute conditions in Zimbabwe today, this response cannot be limited to traditional development practice but must be informed by recent post-conflict experiences. While Zimbabwe presents unique challenges of its own, the lessons learned from war-torn countries like Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor, El Salvador, Liberia, and Mozambique can be instructive in thinking about how to respond to a post-Mugabe era.
2. Why Treat Zimbabwe as a Post-Conflict Situation?
Zimbabwe has not been at war since 1979, so it may seem strange to treat its upcoming transition as a post-conflict one. Even the recent upsurge of political violence since 2000 has been fairly low-level and never approached a full blown civil war. But the country nonetheless exhibits many extreme characteristics of a society in violent conflict.
• The scale of economic collapse. Zimbabwe’s economy
has shrunk by a third since 1999, a far worse decline than was seen during
full-scale civil wars in other African countries (Figure 1). This compares
to an average GDP decline in civil wars of “only” 15%.1
Indeed, the purchasing power of the average Zimbabwean has fallen so far
in the past seven years that it has returned to 1953 levels2
(Figure 2). About 35% of the population lived below the poverty line in
1996, but this share grew to an estimated 80% by 2003.3
Inflation, which is under control in nearly every African country (the regional
average is in the single digits), reached 782% in Zimbabwe in February 2006.4
• Political violence and social trauma. Zimbabwean society has undergone intense stress stemming from organized violence and intimidation by the state. The security forces, intelligence services, and an array of government-backed militias have terrorized civilians, committed gross human rights violations, and been deployed to infiltrate and disrupt the opposition.5 In some cases, tactics from the guerilla war—including re-education camps, propaganda bombardment, and all-night pungwes—have been revived.6 Hundreds of thousands of citizens have been forcibly relocated. These conditions have produced high levels of suspicion, low levels of trust, and a steep deterioration of social capital.
Figure 1: The Economic Impact of War
Sources: World Bank, IMF
Figure 2: Zimbabwean income, 1950-2005
Source: Clemens and Moss (2005) 7
• Breakdown of basic services. Although the party structure
of ZANU-PF remains intact, state social services—which had once been
among the best in Africa—no longer effectively function. This erosion
of state services has contributed to a deterioration in already low human
development indicators, dropping Zimbabwe in the UN rankings from the 64th
percentile in 1990 to the 82nd percentile by 2003.8
The number of health professionals fleeing the country has escalated while
resources for the health sector have collapsed.9
• Erosion of economic foundations. Agriculture, the mainstay of the pre-crisis economy, is a shell of its former self. Commercial production of maize, the national staple, has dropped 86% between 2000 and 2005.10 The volume of tobacco exports, once the country’s leading foreign exchange earner, is down by more than 60% since 2000.11 Industry, and to a lesser degree mining, have also suffered tremendously. Indicative of the scale and tragedy of the decline, Zimbabwe had once been a food exporter, but it is now food insecure with more than one-third the population reliant on imported food aid.12 This is mostly the result of chaotic land seizures and the departure of at least 80% of the country’s commercial farmers (not drought or donor withdrawal, as the government claims).13 Violence on the farms has also led to widespread destruction of infrastructure. Just a few years ago Zimbabwe had Africa’s most extensive system of dams and irrigation; today that is nearly all gone.
• De-formalization of the economy. As in war situations, most people in Zimbabwe now operate in the informal sector. The decimation of a once-considerable middle class has forced even more people to turn to the black market to survive. As in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the industries that have endured best are mostly enclave projects like platinum mining that are physically isolated from the wider economy. Much of the remaining formal economy has been effectively captured by Mugabe’s cronies, ZANU-PF leaders, and the military elite.
• Mass flight of people and capital. Officially, there were 3.4 million Zimbabweans, or nearly 30% of the population, living outside the country in 2002.14 The true number today is surely higher, with more people leaving every day. In addition, there are hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people, the result of the dislocation of some 800,000 farm workers and their families since 2000 and of the May-June 2005 Operation Murambatsvina, which forced another 700,000 people from their homes.15 No precise figures on capital flight are available, but the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar—losing 99.94% of its value against the US dollar in the past five years16 — reflects the extent of the financial bleeding.
There are of course differences between other countries’ wars and
Zimbabwe’s collapse. No large scale demobilization is required, for
instance. But there will be an urgent need for reintegration of thousands
of youths indoctrinated into the ‘green bombers’ and other government-sponsored
militias implicated in intimidation and human rights violations against
civilians. Perhaps most importantly, unlike many other African post-conflict
situations, Zimbabwe does have recent experience with mostly functional
and capable government (and arguably democracy). It also has an ample stock
of highly capable people, even if most are now abroad. Thus the foundations
for rapid institutional recovery are available, a much easier prospect than
trying to build from scratch, as was the case in Cambodia or Mozambique,
for example.
3. Framework for International Support of Zimbabwe’s Recovery
The extreme conditions nevertheless suggest that the revitalization of
Zimbabwe’s society and economy will require many elements typically
associated with a strategy for post-conflict reconstruction. The main impetus
for recovery will of course have to come from within Zimbabwe itself. Any
revival will depend on domestic groups willing to reconcile and organize
to rebuild and, fortuitously, the country has a wealth of capable people
(many of which are abroad) who can contribute to a rebound.
Zimbabwe is also fortunate to have South Africa, a large and relatively
wealthy neighbor with a strong interest in fostering a rebound. South Africa
and other regional players such as the African Union, the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), and Nigeria should, however, be urged by the
international community to more vigorously pursue diplomatic engagement.
Just as importantly, the major international donors—the World Bank,
the IMF, UN agencies, the British and American governments, and other key
players—will need to play an active role in shepherding and supporting
the locally-owned recovery strategy.
Recent post-conflict experiences in poor countries provide important lessons
about the priority tasks for promoting peace, stability and economic reconstruction
in failed states, and about the principles that should guide donor engagement
in those countries.17
The broad priority tasks especially relevant for Zimbabwe are:
- Establishing security and the rule of law;
- Fostering political reconciliation and legitimate institutions of government;
- Rebuilding the institutional capacities of the state;18
- Encouraging a comprehensive and inclusive economic
recovery, including
timely normalization of relations with the international community and rapid
support comprised of aid, debt relief, and private finance.19
3.1 Crucial Political Support
Since Zimbabwe’s troubles are at root political, getting the politics
right is a necessary precondition for recovery. The key interventions where
the international community can support Zimbabwean efforts to improve governance
include:
1. Be ready to provide assistance to smooth the political transition. The
post-Mugabe political configuration is impossible to predict, but there
is a reasonable chance that some kind of transitional or caretaker government
may become desirable. The international community must be prepared to help
provide the political neutrality required for such an arrangement, including
the facilitation of either a government of national unity or temporary third-party
management (perhaps headed by a non-partisan Zimbabwean). Over the past
decade and a half, the international community has frequently created ad
hoc arrangements to support countries emerging from conflict or crisis,
with a select group of countries serving in effect as shepherds of the political
transition. After Mugabe departs the scene, the leading international donors
might need to create a “Contact Group,” as was successfully
employed in Bosnia, or a regional framework similar to the “6 plus
2” formula for Afghanistan, to help nurture the internal political
process and focus international attention. This arrangement would be tasked
to normalize relations with the international community, manage the inflow
of assistance, and lay the groundwork for credible elections and possibly
a new constitution-writing effort. If security deteriorates, there might
also be scope for an international observer-mission, perhaps led by South
Africa but under the auspices of SADC or the African Union (AU) and backed
by the major powers
2. Help to reform the security sector. Politicization and corruption of
the police, military, intelligence services, and judiciary have undermined
what were once professional and highly regarded institutions. International
donors must be prepared to move quickly to persuade and assist the successor
government in moving from a culture of violence and impunity to one of the
rule of law. They should support a thorough reform of the security sector,
including restructuring the “power” institutions (especially
the Zimbabwe National Army, the Central Intelligence Organization, and the
Zimbabwe Republic Police), vetting officials for past abuses, training officials
in civilian policing and criminal justice, mainstreaming human rights, and
disbanding paramilitaries.20
In the immediate term, the abrupt demise of the Mugabe regime could paradoxically
increase human insecurity by removing an unpalatable but effective system
of repression. This possibility means that the international community,
probably led by South Africa, should make contingency plans for temporary
military intervention to ensure physical safety and public order if necessary.
3. Promote justice and reconciliation. A critical dimension in recovering
from crisis is coming to terms with the past and seeking accountability
for past crimes and abuses. Presumably, any such effort would not only cover
recent violence, but also the gukurahundi killings of some 20,000 people
in Matabeleland in the early 1980s21
and perhaps atrocities committed by both sides during the liberation war.
The people of Zimbabwe will need to decide for themselves between pursuing
a truth and reconciliation commission, as has been adopted in countries
from El Salvador to South Africa, or a more punitive approach like a war
crimes tribunal.22
Whichever option they choose, the donor community should provide legal and
technical assistance.
3.2 Necessary economic support
Parallel with political reform steps will be necessary to revive the economy.
To promote economic recovery, the international community should focus on
the following areas, derived from lessons learned in other ‘post-conflict’
situations:
1. Meet essential humanitarian needs. With a large share of Zimbabwe’s
population currently relying on emergency assistance, many people will continue
to depend on relief during the political transition. The focus of humanitarian
action must be on ensuring protection, food and shelter for internally displaces
people, while seeking durable solutions that provide livelihoods and permit
their orderly return and reintegration into communities. Although donors
once spoke of a linear “relief to development continuum,” they
have discovered that in practice relief, reconstruction and development
proceed simultaneously in different parts of a post-crisis country.23
One challenge for international donors will be to continue meeting immediate
food requirements without undercutting the revival of local agricultural
markets.24 Donors
must also continue to support efforts to address the HIV/AIDS crisis, which
is slowly showing improvements through declining infection rates.25
2. Facilitate an orderly return of migrants from the diaspora.
Perhaps a third of Zimbabweans currently live abroad. If post-conflict situations
like Afghanistan are any guide, regime change in Zimbabwe may lead many
of those living in neighboring countries to vote with their feet and return
in large numbers, overwhelming any rudimentary public services that remain.
Donors, especially the UN refugee agency UNHCR, USAID, and the South African
government, can start thinking ahead for plans to help smoothly reintegrate
exiles and refugees in the region. Although many of those abroad will have
means to manage their own return, particular attention should be paid to
the poorest unskilled workers who may be prematurely and haphazardly forced
back by neighboring authorities without the means to resettle and rebuild.
At the same time, many of the high-skill Zimbabweans are now in Europe,
North America, and South Africa and may want to contribute to a recovery
by either returning or investing. The donor community should ensure that
its own immigration and asylum laws are not creating barriers or disincentives
to potential returnees or Diaspora investors.26
3. Help formulate and implement a multidimensional economic recovery
strategy. Although a number of external donors maintain “watching
briefs” to permit modest engagement with Zimbabwe, baseline data on
socioeconomic conditions in the country are rudimentary. Prior to developing
a comprehensive response plan, the transitional authorities and representatives
of the World Bank, the IMF, UN agencies, and select bilateral donors should
undertake a joint assessment of Zimbabwe’s priority needs, including
evaluations of the infrastructure deficit and other areas that might be
privately financed. On the basis of this assessment, international donors
? probably under the auspices of the World Bank ? should assist the Zimbabwean
transitional authorities in developing a comprehensive National Reconstruction
and Development Framework, setting out the priorities and sequence for the
first five years. Any economic strategy for recovery will need to stabilize
the macro-economy, try to restore basic public services, and generate jobs.
Reviving the agricultural sector (see below) and the country’s HIV/AIDS
control program will also be priority areas. Private investment in banking,
mining, industry, and telecommunications is likely to return on its own
once the business environment can be improved (especially if private property
rights are restored and foreign exchange constraints are lifted), but public-private
cooperation could catalyze much-needed infrastructure investment.
4. Provide coordinated assistance. The international community must help the transitional government to establish a strong national coordinating body to manage inflows and projects from multiple sources. The donors should then:
• Pledge early. A World Bank-chaired consultative group meeting
could quickly mobilize official financial pledges with multi-year commitments.
Particularly during the first years of the post-Mugabe era, international
donors will need to provide a large proportion of the funds to meet Zimbabwe’s
reconstruction needs. Whereas traditional donor practice for most developing
countries is to set levels of support based on performance, post-conflict
countries are exceptional cases that merit “early and sustained engagement”
upfront to encourage a recovering country down the right path.27
This logic also applies in the case of Zimbabwe, where the British, American,
and South African governments will be strongly disposed to provide resources
after Mugabe is gone.
• Create a Trust Fund. While Zimbabwe’s upfront financing
needs will be considerable, its immediate absorptive capacity will be fairly
modest. Recent findings from the post-conflict literature suggests that
external assistance following crisis should taper in gradually, peaking
about four years after the beginning of the transition, when in fact the
reverse is the more general donor pattern (due to incentives in donor capitals).28
In order to facilitate aid coordination, to ensure that recovery is driven
by host rather than donor priorities, and that absorption constraints are
mitigated, the international community should work with the transitional
government to create a Zimbabwe Reconstruction Trust Fund (ZRTF). Two precedents
for this are the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the Holst Fund for
the Palestinian Territories in the 1990s.29
• Quickly normalize Bretton Woods relations. Any successor
government will immediately find a number of obstacles in the way of rejoining
the international financial community, so steps will have to be taken to
facilitate their re-entry. The IMF will have to re-open its office in Harare
and prepare for an interim stand-by arrangement. The World Bank may need
to reclassify Zimbabwe as ‘IDA only’ to qualify the country
for greater assistance, grants, and possible debt relief. The government
will also have to deal with an inherited external debt of some $5 billion.
Clearing arrears will be the first step, but the arrears accrued within
the past few years account for nearly half the current debt stock, suggesting
that some special dispensation may need to be found with the multilateral
institutions and the Paris Club of creditors. The US and EU may need to
review their sanctions legislation to ensure that it does not create a legal
problem or disincentive for re-engagement or private investment.30
Zimbabwe should also be considered for preferential trade access, such as
the African Growth of Opportunity Act (AGOA) in the US or the Everything
But Arms (EBA) initiative for the EU.
• Convene an investment conference. The donors can play a
facilitator role in marshalling both public and private investment in infrastructure
and raising awareness among potential investors. There are numerous investors,
particularly in South Africa, awaiting a turnaround in Zimbabwe, and the
donor community can spur inflows by helping to identify projects, assisting
the national authorities in making policies that will encourage private
investment, and, in some cases, using public funds or guarantees to catalyze
certain kinds of investments.
5. Promote a new approach to land use. Land has been a central
political and economic issue for Zimbabwe for several generations. However
haphazard and destructive the manner in which it unfolded, land redistribution
in Zimbabwe has occurred. The goal for any transitional government will
now be to find a way forward to improve land use by reinvigorating the agricultural
sector in a manner that provides increased employment and productivity.
Priority needs will likely include a comprehensive system of land titling
and the rebuilding of the farm extension and credit system. The donor community
can play an important role in assisting with the stock-taking of land use
and ownership, formulation of a new agricultural strategy, and consideration
(and financing) of options for further distribution. External agencies can
also provide independent oversight to some kind of transparent arbitration
process that is almost certainly going to be necessary as disputes over
land ownership and compensation arise.
4. Steps for the United States: A Commission for Assistance to a Free Zimbabwe?
There has been growing donor interest in ways to better engage “fragile”
or weak states.31
At the same time, the international community is still struggling with how
to engage with “difficult” performers, which lack the will and/or
capacity to deliver effective governance.32
Zimbabwe has been one of the hardest such cases, with many of the major
players deferring to South Africa. In addition, all too often the US and
the international community have been reactive rather than proactive toward
countries emerging from conflict or transition from political crisis. Given
the possibility of a quick change in Harare and the substantial agenda outlined
above, planning for an international response to Zimbabwe should begin now.
The challenge for US policy is to arrive at a comprehensive but flexible
strategy that can integrate all relevant agencies and instruments of influence
to support a peaceful transition from authoritarian rule and sustainable
reconstruction. Within the United States government, the locus of contingency
planning for a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe could be the newly established Office
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the
State Department, which was created in August 2004 with the explicit mandate
to plan and assist the recovery of failed states and countries emerging
from civil strife. S/CRS has already taken the lead in planning for a response
to Sudan and has held roundtables on Haiti, Nepal, Cuba, and the Great Lakes
region of central Africa. There might also be bipartisan congressional interest
in creating a Zimbabwe version of the Commission for Assistance to a Free
Cuba, which provided both a planning and a propaganda function.33
Liaising with other partners can also start now. The UK government has a
similar post-conflict reconstruction unit that can play a parallel role
to S/CRS. Great Britain, as the former colonial power, has a strong historical
interest in helping the country turn around and can play an important role.
The World Bank, while unable to participate in actual contingency planning
for diplomatic reasons, should continue to maintain its analytical and low-income
country under stress (LICUS) work on the country. This will be critical
to enable the Bank and other donors to spring into action once the transition
occurs. Nevertheless, information sharing and beginning the multilateral
discussions and contingency planning now can help to ensure a more nimble
and effective international response to support a post-Mugabe transition
in Zimbabwe.
5. Conclusion
Zimbabwe is a country on the edge. It may technically be at peace, but
it is suffering war-like trauma to its polity and economy. In the not-distant
future, the international community will likely confront the challenge of
assisting the country’s difficult transition from a bleak period of
economic collapse and authoritarian rule. Fortunately, the world has learned
lessons from post-conflict interventions in other countries, many of which
it can apply to Zimbabwe ? once a new leadership is in place. No donor should
provide assistance to the government at the present time since a recovery
is impossible with the current leadership. But there is no time to waste
in developing a multilateral framework to respond to the transition that
is unavoidably coming to Harare.
There is also no reason to keep this contingency planning effort secret.
Diplomatic etiquette notwithstanding, there would be considerable benefit
to making this an open and consultative exercise. Letting Zimbabwe’s
people know that they have not been forgotten and that the world stands
ready to help once Robert Mugabe is gone could even help to bring about
that day a little sooner.
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