Spring 2007, Volume 3

 

The Rwandan Judiciary

The constitution of Rwanda provides for an independent judiciary comprising a Supreme Court, the High Court of the Republic, and district, municipality, and town courts as well as the specialized Gacaca Courts (Republic of Rwanda n.d., Articles 140 and 143).  The Supreme Court is the highest court in the country.  The decisions of the Supreme Court are not subject to appeal, and all decisions are binding.  Judges appointed to the Supreme Court serve life tenure as career judges (Republic of Rwanda n.d., Article 144).  Below the Supreme Court is the High Court of the Republic whose jurisdiction extends over the entire country of Rwanda (Republic of Rwanda n.d., Article 149).  Within the High Court of the Republic are the Provincial Courts and the Court of the City of Kigali.  Below the High Court, each district, town, and municipality is served by its own court (Republic of Rwanda n.d., Articles 150 and 151).  These five levels of courts make up the ordinary courts in Rwanda.  In addition to the ordinary courts, there are the specialized courts for dealing with post-genocide justice: the Gacaca Courts.   

The Gacaca Courts

With the lack of justice and thousands of accused restless in jail, an alternative judicial system seemed necessary.  With this in mind, the Gacaca Court system was created (see Figure 2).  Gacaca, a Kinyarwanda term literally meaning “cut grass,” has a traditional meaning in Rwandan society as a place for community members to gather and sit and discuss community justice.  The revival of the Gacaca Courts was first proposed at a government symposium on genocide law in 1995 (Borland 2002, 2).  The Gacaca Court system was officially introduced in June 2002 as Rwanda embarked upon what Rwandan President Paul Kagame described as “the only way forward” (Borland 2002, 1).  The modern form of Gacaca adapted some of the core values of the traditional system, including community participation and the goal of promoting reconciliation and harmony.  The Gacaca Courts had the dual purposes of promoting social reconstruction and greatly expediting the trials of tens of thousands of accused (Gaparayi 2001, 80). 

Figure 2. Poster advertising Gacaca Courts.

And so, 12,102 (Umugwaneza 2005, 28) Gacaca Courts were set up throughout the country with four levels of jurisdiction: starting from the lowest political and administrative level of the cellule to those of the sector, district, and, at the highest, provincial levels (Gaparayi 2001, 82).  The implementation of the Gacaca Courts underwent four phases: the first dealt with raising awareness and increasing knowledge about the law; the second was concerned with election of judges from the community; the third addressed confession testimony and reconciliation; and the final phase involved the reintegration of some prisoners back into society through a work program. 

The operation of the Gacaca Courts was community-driven and participatory, with the accused standing trial before a group of judges selected by the community.  A unique feature of the system was the importance of witness testimony.  The accused stood before the judges and the community as the victims detailed the acts of the accused (Borland 2002, 3).  This testimony was used to assign the accused to one of four categories. Category one cases, involving people accused of planning, organizing, or supervising the genocide, were to be sent to and tried in the national judicial system.  The remaining three categories were tried in the Gacaca Courts.  Category two accused were those suspected of being perpetrators or accomplices to homicide.  Category three cases involved crimes of assault with intention to kill, and category four cases were those accused of looting and destruction of property (Borland 2002, 3).

Achievements of the Gacaca Courts

“The Gacaca Courts are not in a crisis, rather they are facing a lot of challenges…reconciliation is a process we cannot judge overnight.”

— Geraldine Umugwaneza[4]

Some, most notably the Rwandan government, argue that the accomplishments of the Gacaca Courts thus far have been impressive.  The Rwandan government intended that the Gacaca Courts would reduce the burden on national courts, reveal the truth about the events of the genocide, and apply justice where little was being served (Sarkin 2000, 118).  Many argue that the Gacaca Courts achieved this goal and also provided a suitable solution to a difficult problem of transitional justice post genocide (Sarkin 2000).

The Gacaca Courts have successfully filled a gap that the existing judicial system was incapable of handling and have helped to eradicate the culture of impunity.  Consider that of the 785 previously practicing judges, only 20 to 50 remained after the genocide (Borland 2002, 1).  The Gacaca Courts have allowed some modicum of justice to exist despite these unbelievably limited judicial resources.  Furthermore, the Gacaca Courts facilitated an expedited process that brought more than one-hundred thousand accused, waiting in jail, to trial.  A government survey of 751 Gacaca Courts found that from 2002 to 2004, 68,447 cases had been put on lists by Gacaca jurisdiction; of those cases, 38,896 had files that had been concluded, and, even more positive, 2,883 confessions had been delivered (Umugwaneza 2005, 44).  In both its ability to increase the number of accused tried and to bring quick justice to a nation in desperate need of healing, Gacaca has been successful.   

The Gacaca Courts have also increased the level of accountability to the public since the community courts are operated by an institution external to government control process.  The national government, despite what its detractors say, does allow for the autonomy of decisions made within the Gacaca Courts.  Gacaca has also increased accountability because the accused stand before the community and tell their story before witnesses who can correct accounts that are inaccurate.   

The Gacaca Courts were designed to avoid the colonial systems many Rwandans believe were the true cause of the genocide.  There is a lot of distrust among Rwandans today regarding the French and Belgian colonizers, whom the Rwandans blame for originally making the cultural classification of Hutu and Tutsi.[5]  The Gacaca Courts are culturally rooted and communally sensitive, providing a modern take on an ancient form of African tribal justice.  Moreover, in the eyes of some, the courts have proven that Rwandan society has the capacity to settle its problems through a self-initiated system of justice and dispute settlement based on Rwandan traditions and customs.[6]

Finally, the most notable achievement of the Gacaca Courts is the perception that the courts have relieved the pressures placed on society and on those who remained in Rwanda after the genocide.  The Gacaca Courts have begun to unite and establish reconciliation among the Rwandan people.[7]  More important than the actual punishment of the accused is the restoration of peace to a nation that has suffered some of the most appalling violence of the modern era.

Shortcomings of the Gacaca Courts

“The Gacaca system of community tribunals may represent an opportunity for genocide survivors, defendants and witnesses to present their cases in an open and participatory environment…. However, the extrajudicial nature of Gacaca and the inadequate preparation for its start, coupled with present government’s intolerance of dissent and unwillingness to address its own poor human rights record, risk subverting the new system.”[8]

— Amnesty International (2002)

Despite the achievements mentioned above, there is a lot of international criticism directed at the Gacaca Courts.  Most of the criticism emerged over concerns regarding the fairness of trials and potential human rights violations.  Alison Des Forges of the Human Rights Watch Africa bureau and author of Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda believes the Gacaca Courts do not even fulfill the crucial need of relieving social pressure post genocide.  Des Forges offers a telling example: “In field observations, we have seen that at the start of the Gacaca Courts, survivors and others (whether accused or not) sat randomly at the sessions; now these groups sit apart.”[9]  This implicitly shows that the central aim of the courts — bringing people together peacefully — is not working.  As time has progressed, Rwanda continues to be a polarized country, one still not ready to overcome the tragedy of the 1994 genocide.  Some of the courts even had trouble bringing in enough community members (the minimum required is 100) to hold court sessions.[10]

Another telling story of the limitations of the Gacaca Courts in the period from 2002 to 2005 was a survey by Penal Reform International (PRI) that found that penalties imposed on the convicted were far harsher in the Eastern region of Rwanda than in the Western region (Penal Reform International 2006).  This is largely due to the fact that in the West there has arguably been far more tolerance in the post-genocide era, as many of the communities are still largely intact, with many survivors of the genocide.  This stands in contrast to the Eastern part of the country, which has many returning refugees apart from other Tutsis, and there are far fewer sociocultural linkages with past communities to temper the severity of punishment.  These realities raise concerns over the uniformity of justice the Gacaca Courts provide.

The Gacaca Courts are subject to few procedural safeguards against error or abuse in the justice process.  There is concern over the low level of participation by community members, the hesitancy and fear of witnesses to testify, and questionable attempts for impartiality.  Human Rights Watch reports that there is limited or no testimony against members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the ruling political party.  This raises an important question: Is it possible to have even restorative justice in a system in which only one side receives justice?  Is it possible that a system supposedly built on popular legitimacy does not in fact have popular legitimacy?[11] 

A more serious indicator of the lack of faith in the system is the recent outflow of some twenty thousand refugees to Burundi and other neighboring countries in 2005.  Many of these people claim that they fear Gacaca justice.  Some of these people are likely guilty, but certainly not all; for example, some of the accused are too young to have been involved in 1994.[12]  And while the government statistics indicate a steady increase in the number of trials to be brought under the Gacaca Courts, human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and PRI suggest that from 2002 to 2005, 90 percent of the country did not hold any Gacaca trials. 

Furthermore, the Gacaca Courts are subject to enormous logistical and economic problems as a result of Rwanda’s weak economy, which was poor before the genocide and decimated afterward.  Judges are inexperienced and have limited training; the selection criteria requires that they be honest, at least 21 years of age, and a Rwandan national (Gaparayi 2001, 92).  This is troublesome because judges are expected to hand down judgments in extremely complex and sensitive cases, with sentences as heavy as life imprisonment.  They are also responsible for determining the categorization of the defendants, which sets the framework for sentences.  Even if these individuals are conscientious and strive to act in good faith, it is likely that they will be subjected to considerable pressure from both the accused and the complainants (Gaparayi 2001, 90).  And because of limited economic resources and the high cost of reconstruction courts, the Rwandan National Service of Gacaca Courts — the agency mandated to provide judge training — has almost no ability to do so (Umugwaneza 2005, 57). 

From an international perspective, maybe the most troubling concerns arise from the extrajudicial nature of Gacaca justice.  Concerns about the absence of fair trial guarantees pervade the entire system (Bolocan 2004, 389).  The Gacaca Courts do not grant any explicit rights to the accused (Gaparayi 2001, 96).  The accused do not have lawyers and have no right to a defense.  The Gacaca Courts fail to meet due process obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  There is no guarantee that the Gacaca Courts allow open and free-flowing information during the hearings, whether all parties will be heard impartially, and whether the presumption of innocence until proven guilty will be respected (Amnesty International 2002).  Any good lawyer trembles at the thought of a justice system without the individual rights that are so central to the Western understanding of justice.[13] 

Should Gacaca Courts Provide Restorative or Retributive Justice?

The challenge for the Gacaca Courts lies in the tension between the intended goals of justice the courts are meant to provide.  The courts are charged with the dual challenge of retributive justice — the punishment of the perpetrators of horrendous crimes — and restorative justice — the restoration of durable peace, cooperation, and order to a nation that wishes to acknowledge its past while struggling to move forward in a positive direction.   

Retributive justice, the dominant paradigm for dealing with human rights abuses since World War II and the Nuremberg trials, reinforces the belief that the primary road to justice is through criminal prosecution (Bolocan 2004, 357).  Retributive justice deters future human rights abusers and fosters respect for the rule of law and new democratic order (Bolocan 2004, 358).  Moreover, retributive justice, by dispensing justice through criminal trials, may also favor reconciliation between victims and offenders.  If dispensed through international forums, post-genocide retributive justice would likely have a broader, more powerful impact than domestic processes (Bolocan 2004, 359). 

A good example of retributive justice is the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which attempts to bring justice to thousands of victims of the genocide in the former Yugoslavia through an international forum.  As previously discussed, a similar such court — the ICTR — was set up for Rwanda by the United Nations.  But such criminal trials may be incapable of producing a comprehensive version of the truth because of both the circumscribed scope of each trial’s inquiry with respect to specific facts and events and the manipulation and misuse of rules of evidence.  Thus, retributive justice, which focuses on prosecution of every single perpetrator, may be “politically destabilizing, socially divisive and logistically and economically untenable” (Kritz 1996, 138).  Indeed, retributive justice will have difficulty succeeding in producing reconciliation, or at least stability, in Rwanda.   

The alternative is to have a system focused on restorative justice that includes reparations for victims, shaming of bystanders who watched the crimes, apologies from aggressors, and giving a voice to the victims (Bolocan 2004, 362).  A restorative justice system would view the Rwandan genocide as an extreme violation of the relationships between Rwandan citizens and would promote reintegration and reconciliation among the survivors while reducing the strain of having to try thousands of individual criminal cases.  Restorative justice would focus on revealing and condemning the crimes of the genocide, restoring dignity and legitimacy to the survivors, promoting human rights, and ensuring that the injustices of the past should never happen again (Bolocan 2004, 365).  This type of justice would be judged based on its ability to reveal the truth about crimes that occurred during the genocide and its ability to restore order and cooperation to Rwandan society, not on the quantity of accused put in prison.   

The Gacaca Courts’ purpose is more in keeping with the values of healing, closure, and justice than fairness or traditional concepts of due process.  Thus, Rwanda is willing to sacrifice certain elements of criminal justice in order to address the horrendous events that involved overwhelming numbers of people, both as victims and perpetrators of the genocide and violence.   

The setup of the Gacaca Courts is modeled after the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission — a semi-judicial body established in 1995 to investigate apartheid era crimes that expressly emphasized restoration of peace and order in its mandate (Bolocan 2004, 364).  The commission was not a traditional Western court and had its failings, but it did effectively address an overwhelming problem without an easy solution.  However, it should be noted that the commission dealt with apartheid crimes rather than genocide, which somewhat dilutes the analogy.  The problems created by the Rwandan genocide may be even more complex than those resulting from South African apartheid.  Nevertheless, South Africa’s experience proves that countries may need to take shortcuts in order to respond to the ramifications of devastating national experiences like apartheid or genocide.  In Rwanda the goal should be achieving restorative justice.  This will lay the foundation for a society built on respect for human rights and dignity in the future.  Classic forms of criminal or retributive justice do not suit the needs of Rwanda for reconciliation after a horrific genocide. 

Fair Trials and the Importance of Judicial Review

The Gacaca Courts exhibit many shortcomings in the way of due process and fair trials.  The two most important features of any just court system are judicial independence and judicial review.  Judicial independence means that the courts are independent of other branches of government, political parties, prior beliefs, peer pressure, and other parts of the judiciary.[14]  Judicial review is founded on the inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts to ensure that inferior courts comply with the law (Joseph 2003, 1).  It is the power of a higher court to review a law, an official act of a government employee, or a court decision for violations of the constitution or, in the absence of a constitution, the basic principles of justice.[15]  For the purposes of this article I will focus on the importance of judicial review in relation to the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda.

There are two fundamental ways in which courts can be reviewed: by their outcomes or by their processes.  Judicial review of outcomes makes inquiries into the legality of the actual outcome; it assesses whether the decision made was legal but not how the decision was made.  Judicial review of processes is concerned with the legality of the decision-making process, whether it was reached in “accordance with the law, fairly and reasonably.”[16]  A review of process means that superior courts cannot review the lower court’s decisions unless the lower court’s procedure is shown to be fundamentally flawed (Joseph 2003, 33).  Finally a process review asks whether the court’s decision should be allowed to stand and not whether the review should substitute its own decision.   

While the outcomes of a court’s decision can certainly be invalid constitutionally, review of process is purportedly more important than review of outcomes because good process is essential for producing appropriate outcomes.  And while court systems can err, the notion of due process is predicated on the idea that a fair system based on good processes will minimize human error and arrive at “just” outcomes as often as possible. 

Gacaca Courts and Judicial Review

The Gacaca Courts do have an extremely limited judicial review in the form of the right to appeal by the defendants in a small number of cases.  However, the court system in general suffers from a serious deficiency of any form of functional judicial review of outcomes and certainly no formal review of process.  The Gacaca Court system plan does not include review by regular Rwandan courts at any level.[17]

The Gacaca Courts draft laws from 2002 outlined some limited guarantees of judicial review through the right to appeal.  The right to appeal court decisions is determined by the category in which the defendant is classified and by the level at which the verdict is made (Bolocan 2004, 389).  Defendants tried at the level of the cellule can appeal to the Gacaca jurisdiction at the sector level — the next level up.  Likewise, those tried at the sector level can appeal to the level of the district, and those tried at the district can appeal to the level of the province.[18] 

Only category-two defendants[19] have the right to appeal their sentence to official Gacaca Courts of appeal.  Review of judgments pronounced by Gacaca Courts are allowed in the following cases: (1) when an individual was acquitted in a judgment passed in the last resort by an ordinary court but is later found guilty by a Gacaca Court; (2) when an individual was convicted by an ordinary court but is later found innocent by a Gacaca Court; and (3) when the sentence pronounced against a defendant contradicts the legal provisions of the offenses for which he or she was convicted (Bolocan 2004, 389).  No defendant is permitted to appeal a verdict to an ordinary criminal court.  This is particularly problematic in the case of category-two defendants, some of whom are subject to severe sentences involving long prison terms (Bolocan 2004, 389). 

Even if the Gacaca Courts were set up as outlined in the draft law, the trials would hardly meet basic international standards for a fair trial (Gaparayi 2001, 98).  In reality, the Gacaca appeals court, which was supposed to function at the sector level, does not.  There is a lack of trained judges and resources to make the courts functional.  While there have been a few cases of appeals by category-two defendants, these are the exception, and the appeals process is by no means working at the level at which it was designed to function.  To be fair, many of the defects in Rwandan justice are attributable to the country’s low level of economic development (Gaparayi 2001, 98).  Since the courts cannot even meet standards deemed below international minimums, one wonders what success a court system like Gacaca can achieve in enforcing positive social welfare rights.[20]  Should the Gacaca Courts be involved in guaranteeing the positive rights of fair trials in the post-genocide transition, given the restraints imposed by low levels of economic development?  Is there a potential for “unfair” trials to undermine the legitimacy of the entire process?

A Case Against Judicial Review for Gacaca Courts

In light of the dismal performance of the appellate courts, the poor economic development of Rwanda, and the emphasis on restorative rather than retributive justice, one must ask if any form of judicial review actually makes sense for the Gacaca Courts.  There is no question that the Gacaca Court system — with its absence of lawyers to defend the accused and the unsuccessful appeals system — violates international human rights norms (Gaparayi 2001).  It does, however, fulfill a social necessity for Rwandan society by providing a practical and sensitive means of dealing with the immediate demands of one-hundred thousand accused in jail and an entire country in mourning.[21]  In this context, judicial review is neither plausible nor advisable.  The Gacaca Courts are not perfect institutions; in fact, they aren’t even particularly good institutions.  But the Gacaca Courts are a means to deal with an overwhelming problem of justice in a post-genocide state.   

First, consider that the basic structure of the Gacaca Courts, as a matter of institutional design, is unique.[22]  It may not be necessary to have a formal system of judicial review for such distinctive courts.  Indeed, in some western European countries there is no right to appeal, so it is clearly not a necessary feature of a functional court system.  While appeals are enjoyed in the American judicial system, they are not necessarily a “component” of a country that enjoys rule of law.  Thus, if Rwanda establishes a sound rule of law, it need not include a more formal system of judicial review as practiced in America.   

Also, consider that judicial review may require that judges undertake additional tasks for which they may not have been trained or for which they may have received insufficient training.  Judges generally are also not particularly adept at monitoring the process by which decisions are made.[23]  Judges are trained to make decisions based on the law, not to assess the process by which decisions are made.  These points are particularly important in Rwanda’s case since judges receive minimal training and have no formal legal training.  Placing the burden of judicial review upon an already strained judiciary is undesirable and impractical.

Judicial review could also be troublesome from the perspective that judges and other branches of government are supposed to be separate and courts lack the competency to engage in politics or law making.[24]  Judicial review could create a system by which judges act as agents of law creation and not just law interpretation.  Judicial review could encourage judges to take on tasks outside the important duty of protecting the nation’s citizens by upholding and defending the law in court.  In Rwanda, with the heavy burden of post-genocide justice, this may have additional negative consequences.

In Rwanda, a court of appeals would face an incredibly high volume of cases with minimal resources.  The pressure of the workload would impede the appellate courts from carrying out the legal development and clarification functions that are necessary to a court of final appeal.  With the implementation of a system of judicial review, Rwanda would face the same problem of overtaxed resources that led to the creation of the Gacaca Courts in the first place.   

A Case for Better Judicial Review in the Gacaca Courts

Rather than ignore the issue of judicial review, perhaps it would be better to reform the courts to provide for better control of process, which would include a more formal judicial review.  While judicial review in the traditional sense, which holds the courts to a standard that they cannot possibly meet, is at odds with their purpose, some form of judicial review could be desirable.  Specifically, judicial review with a more formal review of the courts’ process and operations could be useful to help them achieve their goal of restoring peace and prosperity to a troubled nation.

Judicial review is necessary because it provides for individual rights that are not going to be protected against the majority or the beliefs of the majority.  Courts ruled by the majority such as the Gacaca Courts might be resigned to favor the opinions of the majority over the non-majority in making decisions (Schauer 2004, 1,063).  Courts should not only protect the rights of the victims but also protect those who are accused, regardless of the opinions of the majority.  This is especially important because many of the trials are of nontrivial crimes such as rape and murder.  Without judicial review, courts may limit the individual rights of the accused; but in a fair system, courts must provide the right to appeal if a person’s life is at stake.

Consider judicial review in terms of game theory.  Judicial review could constrain the courts from the political pursuit of self-interest or of majority decisions simply by having a system to monitor the process by which judges come to their decisions.  Without judicial review, judges would be inclined to pursue selfish gains by appeasing the desires of the majority even if it meant making an unjust decision.  On the other hand, if a system of monitoring were introduced and a review agent had the choice to review or not review the process by which the decision of the court was made, the mere fact of imposing a credible threat on the decision makers in the Gacaca Courts could induce the courts to produce more just, socially optimal decisions for all. 

Finally, judicial review might be necessary for the Gacaca Courts simply to prevent the failure of the entire process of justice itself in Rwanda.  Courts of appeal are critical to the functioning of an effective democratic process (Ely 1980, 105).  Constitutions and courts appropriately exist for those situations where private interests and representative government cannot be trusted (Ely 1980, 183).  Judicial review therefore is a necessary buffer to ensure that the individual liberties that allow for a functioning judicial system are properly implemented.   

Recommendations

The arguments for and against a better system of judicial review of the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda are both strong.  It would be impossible to draw clear policy conclusions or recommendations about how the Rwandan justice system should adapt in the future.  However the following is a list of some recommendations that those concerned with the future of justice in Rwanda should consider in order to improve the system of judicial review.   

·        The Gacaca Courts should focus on their restorative potential, seeking truth, order, and cooperation in a shattered society, and not on retribution against the accused.   

·        There should be a greater focus on controls at every level of the system, which, among other things, would include a review of judge’s decisions.

·        Judges should receive better training.  If the Rwandan government has limited human and financial resources to do so, this could be an appropriate area for intervention by the international community.   

·        There should be workable mechanisms for monitoring at the community level that allow the public, local, and international nongovernmental organizations to attend trials.

·        Both citizens of Rwanda and observers should reserve the right to comment on trials.

·        The courts should introduce record-keeping of the trials; judges’ handwritten records are insufficient sources by which a proper system of judicial review can function.

Conclusion

With the administrative re-mapping of Rwanda in early 2006, the Gacaca Courts were thrown into crisis, a circumstance that has given the international community a chance to reflect on the first three years of their existence.  It is clear that the courts have not achieved the success that was publicly desired for them.  But it is possible that their mediocre performance is part of the evolution of a healing society.  The minimal success can be attributed to the inadequate human and financial resources with which Rwanda was left to deal with the problem of post-genocide justice.  These traumatic circumstances make it extremely difficult for the Rwandan justice system to uphold international standards of fair trial including strong judicial review.  Perhaps justice systems with international standards of fair trials and judicial review are not intended to cope with such destructive phenomena as genocide.  Maybe they shouldn’t be. 

What is clear is that the Gacaca Courts, despite their shortcomings, could still be the appropriate solution to post-genocide justice in Rwanda.  The Gacaca Courts function as a pressure relief valve for a society facing an impossible task.  What is less clear is what form the courts should take and whether they should have any judicial review of process.  Anyone who has a commitment for ensuring a better future for Rwanda should take the question of judicial review seriously.  This article outlined some of the arguments for and against implementing a more formal judicial review of process of the Gacaca Courts.  No conclusions were definitively drawn, but it is undeniable that while a better system of judicial review including review of the processes may not be possible, it would certainly be desirable. 

Acknowledgments

The idea for the paper that inspired this article came from a trip I took in the spring of 2005.  I went to Rwanda for a work assignment, but while I was there had the opportunity to learn more about the Rwandan genocide and post-genocide justice.  During that trip I visited some of the genocide memorial sites, witnessed a Gacaca Court trial, had some wonderful conversations with Socrate Mwege, a lawyer with the United Nations, and spent a very emotional afternoon with Henriete Mut, a guide at the Rwandan Genocide Memorial Centre.  I want to thank them for the inspiration to learn more about the troubled justice system in Rwanda and the very difficult task of dealing with a society after a horrific genocide.  I would also like to thank Frederick Schauer, my professor at the Kennedy School of Government, for encouraging and allowing me to write my final paper on the Gacaca justice system and for helping me to identify and clarify issues related to judicial review.  Finally I would like to thank: Drew White, a lawyer at the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, for his assistance with finding contacts to help me on my journey; Alison Des Forges from Human Rights Watch for taking the time to let me interview her, and last but not least my fellow Kennedy School classmate Geraldine Umugwaneza for providing documents and insights from her experiences as a Supreme Court justice and advisor to the Gacaca Courts.

References

Amnesty International. 2002. Rwanda: Gacaca — Gambling with justice. Amnesty International press release, 19 June.

Bolocan, Maya. 2004. Rwandan Gacaca: An experiment in transitional justice. Journal of Dispute Resolution, No. 355.

Borland, Rosilyne. 2002. The Gacaca tribunals and Rwanda after genocide: Effective restorative community justice or further abuse of human rights? Swords & Ploughshares Journal of International Affairs (School of International Service, American University) 13(2).

Ely, John Hart. 1980. Democracy and distrust. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gaparayi, Idi. 2001. Justice and social reconstruction in the aftermath of genocide in Rwanda: An evaluation of the possible role of the Gacaca tribunals. African Human Rights Law Journal 78. 

Gourevitch, Philip. 1998. We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families. New York, NY: Picador USA.

Human Rights Watch. 2002. Rwanda: Human rights developments. Human Rights Watch World Report. Available online at http://hrw.org/wr2k2/africa9.html.

Joseph, Philip A. 2003. Constitutional law. New Zealand Law Review, pp. 395-415.

Kritz, Neil. 1996. Coming to terms with atrocities: A review of accountability mechanisms for mass violations of human rights. Law and Contemporary Problems 59(4).

Penal Reform International. 2006. Monitoring and research report on Gacaca: Information gathering during the national phase. Available online at www.penalreform.org/monitoring-and-research-report-on-gacaca-information-gathering-during-the-national.html.

Republic of Rwanda. N.d. Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Articles 140-151.

Sarkin, Jeremy. 2000. Promoting justice, truth and reconciliation in transitional societies: Evaluating Rwanda’s approach in the new millennium of using community based Gacaca tribunals to deal with the past. International Law Forum 2: 112-121.

Schauer, Frederick. 2004. Judicial supremacy and the modest constitution. California Law Review 92(4), July.

Umugwaneza, Geraldine. 2005. Gacaca courts in Rwanda: Avenues for justice and reconciliation? Harvard University Law School, LLM Thesis.

World Bank. 2007. Poverty alleviation and economic growth in Rwanda through S&T. Development Outreach, January.

 

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