Q & A with Nicholas Burns on the Iranian Election and Protests

The recent Iranian election and subsequent protests have garnered much attention from the international community. More than two weeks after the election there are still many questions surrounding the future of Iran and any potential negotiations with the U.S.

Nicholas Burns, professor of the practice of diplomacy and international politics and former top U.S. negotiator in talks aimed at Iran's nuclear program for George W. Bush, offers his thoughts on the situation in Iran.

Q. Opinions are divided about whether or not the U.S. should be entering the situation in Iran. What can the U.S. do to reach out diplomatically and how much should U.S. officials get involved?

I believe President Obama's reaction to the demonstrations in Iran was sophisticated and effective. He displayed clear sympathy for the protesters and his rhetoric escalated appropriately as the regime took increasingly brutal measures in the streets. Had he launched a shrill rhetorical attack from the start of the crisis, it very likely would have given Ahmadinejad and other hardliners greater credibility to charge the U.S. with interference. That would have harmed the reformers. When Ahamadinejad made that predictable accusation late last week, no one believed him. Obama knows the U.S. has had a poisonous thirty-year relationship with Iran. His smart instincts kept the focus where it should have been--on the struggle for freedom and reform in the streets of Tehran.

The crisis revealed a lot about President Obama. He could have played it very differently. A more cynical President might have used the White House soapbox to launch harsh verbal attacks against the Iranian regime from the first day. In other words, he could have used the crisis for short-term domestic political gain by matching his critics in their public attacks on the Iranian government. That would have protected him from the predictable partisan charge that he is insufficiently tough in his rhetoric and excessively enamored of diplomacy. Instead, by taking a more nuanced approach, he has given the U.S. greater credibility to lead the international response in the coming months--whether through increased sanctions or an eventual attempt to negotiate with Iran's notoriously difficult government.

Q.  How can Iran recover from the fallout of the elections? Indeed, can Iran recover?

I fear the brutality and effectiveness of the regime's security forces are overwhelming the reformers in the streets. In the short term, we will very likely witness the victory of the Ahmadinejad forces in consolidating their electoral theft.

But, in the long-term, the regime will be severely weakened. The energy and passion of the reformers will not disappear entirely. This protest effort was fundamentally different than most in the past because it encompassed nearly all age groups and classes. I suspect the anger and resentment of the regime will not disappear. We may see months and years of struggle in Iran given the wide divisions about fundamental issues of democratic liberties, the role of the clergy in politics and governance that will not go away.

Q. What do you perceive to the long-term effects of the protests and violence?

I expect that the Iranian government will see its international credibility severely diminished. The prominent role that women played in the protests illuminates the repression and denial of rights that women face there on a continual basis. The killings, brutal measures in the streets and arrests of leading reformers exposed the base and ugly nature of the leadership. The Iranian government was already viewed as a major international human rights violator. This crisis will only add to its lamentable reputation.

Q. Do the U.S. and UK hold some responsibility for the actions of the Iranian people? How should America and the UK react to this?

This was an Iranian drama caused by the pent-up emotion, disappointment and anger of ordinary people when their government tried to steal the election. Its causes were largely a product of the deep, internal divisions in Iran's society and government.

Obama and other world leaders will find Iran to be a difficult challenge in coming months as a result. It would be wrong and a mistake for the U.S., Europe and others to agree to negotiations with Iran in the short-term. That would be an insult to the brave Iranians who risked everything by taking to the streets. But, we also cannot ignore Iran forever given its drive for a nuclear weapons capability and its leading support of major terrorist groups in the Middle East. This is going to be a difficult balancing act for the Obama Administration.

At some point, we may have to test the proposition that negotiations might serve to both pressure Iran and to avoid a war with it over its nuclear ambitions. Should negotiations fail, Obama and the international coalition will have to turn to much tougher economic sanctions. Ultimately, should isolation, negotiations and sanctions all fail, which I believe is very possible, President Obama would then face a terrible choice--go to war to retard and delay the nuclear program with all of its risks or adopt a containment strategy of the type the U.S. used effectively after World War Two in limiting the power and ambition of the Soviet Union and Mao's China. I am afraid there will be many more dramatic days to come in America's difficult relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.