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Stephen Walt on American Foreign Policy

American foreign policy has changed drastically in recent decades as the U.S., with the peaceful end of the Cold War, has become the world's sole superpower. Washington has moved at times awkwardly, and at other times aggressively, to flex its diplomatic and military muscles to influence outcomes and affect change in other parts of the world. The hows and whys of American foreign policy are the focus of Stephen Walt's research. Walt is academic dean at the Kennedy School and author of the new book, 'Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy.'

Q: In your analysis, persuasion is as important as raw power on the world stage. Elaborate on how this plays out in U.S. foreign policy.

Walt: Today, America's power is unquestioned. The United States obviously wants to retain a position of primacy for as long as it can, but given that its power isn't going to wane at any point in the near future, American foreign policy should be emphasizing persuading as many countries as possible to participate in a positive way in our vision of a future world order. That doesn't mean we ought to impose it on others; rather we ought to be attempting to convince them that our core objectives are not only good for us, but also good for the rest of the world.

My concern in recent years is that the United States has thought its position of primacy would allow it to dictate to the rest of the world. Instead, what we have seen over the past 4-5 years is a number of countries distancing themselves from us and in a number of key cases, the United States really overreaching. The result, of course, is that America's global standing has been declining steadily, although we still have a number of friends and a number of countries that want good relations with us. There are more misgivings about American power than there have been in the past.

One way to see this might be to compare the first Gulf War in 1990-91 with the second Gulf War in 2003. During the first Gulf War, the United States had almost unmatched international support and legitimacy. We had the approval of the United Nations. We had a large and quite solid coalition. We had support from Russia. We had support from the major European powers. We had financial support from Japan, and virtually no one opposed helping oust Iraq from Kuwait. By contrast, in 2003, although we were able to compel a number of other countries into backing us, that support was not enthusiastic and there were a number of other countries that opposed it. The result? The U.S. had to bear the whole cost itself; its coalition has proved to be pretty fragile; and we took a big hit in terms of global public opinion. In both cases the United States had extraordinary power. It could accomplish a lot of things; it could set its own agenda, but doing it in partnership with others made a lot more sense than trying to do it ourselves.

Q: In what ways does American primacy make other nations uncomfortable? What are the ways in which various governments are responding to American primacy?

Walt: One of the more striking results of my research is the large gap between how Americans tend to view our global world role and how that world role is viewed by others. American leaders and American citizens tend to think that the American role in the world, and in particular our position of primacy, is good for us but also good for others too. Once you go outside the borders of the United States, however, you get a very different picture, where other countries are quite concerned about American power - in some cases deeply opposed to it, but in almost all cases somewhat worried.

This may be hard for Americans to understand, but it shouldn't be. American power makes others nervous simply because they can't be sure we will always use it in wise, farsighted, or benevolent ways. We like being number one because we realize that being number two, three, four, or five would make us uncomfortable. We would feel nervous if some other country were a lot stronger than we were, but that same logic applies to the rest of the world. They worry about American power because they know whatever actions we choose to take will have a big effect on their fates, and because they can't be sure that we will choose wisely or well.

Q: Should the U.S. be mindful of public opinion (both at home and abroad) in regards to the exercise of American power? If so, how should Washington respond?

Walt: The United States certainly has to worry more about global public opinion than it used to. Partly, this is because of good news - the spread of democracy around the world in a number of different places means that other governments now are much more sensitive to what their populations are actually thinking. But that means that even when governments might want to support American foreign policy, they have to be concerned if public opinion in their countries reflects real misgivings about what the United States is doing. That's true in the Middle East. That's true in Europe. That's true in Asia. It's really true around the world.

So if, for example, the United States wants genuinely enthusiastic 24/7 cooperation against terrorism or wants backing for some specific foreign policy initiative, like putting pressure on Iran, we have to be mindful of whether or not the governments we are trying to enlist are going to be able to get support from their own populations. And it is not good for the United States if other countries' politicians think they can actually get electoral mileage by opposing the United States, and that has been true in a number of cases.

There is one final reason we have to worry about global public opinion. If opinion around the world continues to shift in an anti-American direction - as it has over the past five years - that increases the overall population of true extremists who might be willing to join terrorist organizations and might be willing to use force against the United States. So one of the things we want to do is minimize the number of people who are really extremist anti-Americans, and make sure that they are isolated and discredited within their societies. In other words, the United States, despite its powers, still has a vested interest in ensuring that most people around the world think of the United States in positive ways and think American foreign policy is being conducted with larger aims in mind.

Q: How best should the U.S. craft its foreign policy for the long term - considering the new realities (and minefields) in the geopolitical landscape?

Walt: The United States has become accustomed to thinking it is our job to run the entire world. That's an artifact of the Cold War, which was really a global political competition with the Soviet Union. As soon as the Cold War was over, we felt that we were in a position where we could now start dictating change in a variety of places.

We are now learning that there are real limits to what the United States can do, even as the dominant global power. We have extraordinary influence; we can shape the future in a number of ways, but we can't go around and tell everyone around the world exactly how to live and exactly how to behave. What I think this means is the United States should gradually be moving towards a policy which I call 'off-shore balancing.' Instead of having large military forces in many parts of the world to provide regional stability or to try and dictate political outcomes in different places, the United States should in most cases adopt a much more detached position, using its military power only when there are immediate threats to key U.S. interests.

The United States does not have to control other parts of the world; it just has to make sure that hostile powers don't control certain key areas, such as the Persian Gulf. And that means that we can play hard to get. It doesn't mean we go isolationist or withdraw from world affairs. It rather means that we are more selective in where we engage. We only engage when vital U.S. interests are at stake, and we rely more heavily on diplomacy than on large-scale permanent military deployments in places like Europe and the Persian Gulf. That's no longer necessary in either case, and it's not in America's vital interest.

Finally, the United States does need to spend more time thinking about its own legitimacy and its conduct in international affairs. This means devoting more attention to public diplomacy and keeping our borders open to foreign visitors and foreign students. It means adopting a less hypocritical policy around nuclear weapons so that other countries are willing to accept tighter controls on proliferation in exchange for reductions in America's own nuclear arsenal. And it means a whole series of other policies designed to demonstrate to the rest of the world that although we intend to be a global leader we are not going to do so without paying close attention to the objectives of other states, without giving them lots of incentives to want to be close to us.

There is a paradox in American primacy now. The paradox is that although the United States is extraordinarily powerful, in a position of power really unseen since the Roman Empire, that doesn't allow the United States to dictate all the global outcomes. In fact, because we are so strong, we tend to make others nervous even when we think we are acting in a benevolent fashion. That means, in fact, our position of primacy means we have to work extra hard not to alienate others; we need to work extra hard to make sure that they are not just convinced of American power, but confident about American wisdom and about American objectives. To put it in crude terms, it's not that being the number one power means never having to say you're sorry. In fact being the number one power means you have to act with greater deftness, greater wisdom, and greater self-restraint than when we were somewhat weaker, or when other countries were naturally aligned with us because they were fearful of the Soviet Union. Our diplomatic challenge today is in fact greater than it was then, precisely because the tendency to want to oppose the United States is much greater.

Reporters:

Please contact 617-495-1115 to arrange an interview with Stephen Walt.

Answers to questions submitted via e-mail:

Questions submitted via e-mail for Stephen Walt:

Q: How do you think U.S. foreign policy could be changed in order to both keep its superpower responsibility role in the global arena paired with a more sensitive and humble approach to differences whether social, cultural or ethnic? I used to think Democracy was the answer, but although the U.S. has one of the most solid democratic regimes (if not the most) sometimes it seems to me that the majority of U.S. people have 'bought' or understood their role in the world merely as an undisputed license to do what their will says they ought to.

- Carlo L.
Monterrey TEC Public Administration Master Program
Mexico City

Walt: Thanks very much for your question. At the most general level, I believe the United States needs to adopt a more restrained approach towards other countries. We should not try to 'convert' other governments - especially not through the use of military force - and should instead act like an 'offshore balancer.' The United States does not need to control other regions of the world; it merely needs to make sure that hostile powers do not control the few 'vital areas' that do exist. We can usually rely on local actors to uphold the balance of power, and intervene with our own forces only when the balance of power breaks down.

The United States should also use its influence to maintain an open global economy (even if this undermines certain U.S. industries), and help preserve international 'collective goods' such as freedom of the seas. It is also important for us to use our power to end the long conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and to create more reliable ways to control the spread of nuclear technology (and other sources of weapons of mass destruction). To achieve the latter, we should be willing to trade off a large percentage of our own nuclear arsenal, in exchange for other nations' support for a more robust and reliable nuclear control regime.

In all likelihood, the United States will be the most powerful country in the world for several decades. During that time, our primary task is to make that position of primacy acceptable to the rest of the world. To do that, the United States must be aware of how its power appears to others, and display great wisdom and maturity in its foreign policy. If we are careful, wise, and restrained, other states will be willing to follow our lead. If we are not, they will be looking for ways to undermine and contain us. As an American, but also as someone who cares about the overall fate of the planet, I hope that the United States will learn to work with most other countries, instead of insisting that we are the only country that knows what's right.

Sincerely,

Stephen M. Walt



Q: Could it be that the root cause of growing questioning of United States supremacy by others is their doubt about the desirability, replicability and sustainability of the top-down, corporatised approach
to development that has evolved since the Industrial Revolution and been honed and spread widely in recent years by the United States?

Kind regards,

- Graham D.
Ipswich, Australia

Walt: I believe that resistance to American 'corporate culture' plays at most a modest role in resistance to U.S. power. Many people around the world admire America's economic achievements, and especially our achievements in science and technology. They have some concerns about the specific nature of America's laissez-faire approach (and especially the lack of well-developed 'safety nets') and are somewhat worried that the U.S. business model might spread to their own societies. There is also some tendency to equate 'globalization' with 'Americanization,' even though the two phenomena are in fact quite distinct. In the end, however, most of the concern about U.S. power is based on what the United States government chooses to do with the power at its disposal, not the basic nature of U.S. society or business. It's 'what we do,' not 'what we are.'

Thanks very much for responding to my article.