

2004

THE RAPPAPORT REVIEW

An Anthology
On Topics of Interest
To Greater Boston

FEATURING

The Chelsea Experiment
Separate, Unequal, and Stigmatized
Development Through Transit
A Good Start
The Missing Link
The Politics of Rehabilitation
New Hope and New Politics
Correcting Corrections

AND MORE REPORTS ON TIMELY ISSUES

RESEARCH NOTES

BLACK AND WHITE APART

Boston has been called “two separate cities,” deeply segregated along racial lines. The city is statistically multicultural, with people of color constituting 41 percent of all residents, but neighborhoods do not reflect or benefit from this diversity. Patterns in housing and education show that, for the most part, white Bostonians live and learn separately from their minority counterparts. The city's poverty rate of nearly 18 percent is disproportionately composed of minorities.

Racial segregation, or the tendency of individuals of different racial backgrounds to inhabit certain areas in greater concentrations, is historically understood in black-and-white terms. But before the turn of the last century, urban blacks were no more segregated than their European immigrant counterparts, and economic class rather than race served as the primary determinant of where someone lived. In the early 1900s, many blacks left the segregationist South's sharecropper farms for the manufacturing jobs in northern cities.¹ Between 1916 and 1930 1 million southern blacks moved north. As blacks established themselves in northern industrial cities, segregation took hold. By 1940, the foundation for the northern black ghetto was in place.²

Boston's black population showed its sharpest increases after 1940. The minority population tripled between 1950 and 1970, though certain neighborhoods remained largely white.³ Within the city, as the percentage of blacks in the total population grew, so did the degree of segregation between white and black residents.⁴ Segregation was not a natural or merely self-selecting process. As in other cities, minority ghettos resulted from conscious actions and policies of the federal, state and local governments, housing authorities, and the private sector.⁵

In 1933, the federal government created the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) to provide funds for long-term mortgages.⁶ But HOLC's practices only made home ownership a reality for certain populations – at the exclusion of others. HOLC “redlining” to assess loan risk for neighborhoods in four categories. HOLC reinforced existing racial biases, marking neighborhoods as red and “hazardous” if they contained even a small percentage of black residents.⁷ The government sanctioned racial segregation; to get the high “green” rating, a neighborhood had to be almost all white.⁸

Private banking institutions, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) all used HOLC's Residential Security Maps.⁹ FHA underwriting of home loans during the 1940s and 1950s made home ownership more accessible for white Americans and provided incentives for suburban dwelling

This set the stage for the past 50 years of “white flight” and the formation of segregated “doughnut cities” in which a minority urban core is left behind while jobs, resources, transportation, and good schools move with whites to the suburbs. The effect of these trends on Boston's population are seen in the striking decline of Boston's white population between 1950 and 1990 and the simultaneous increase of blacks and other minorities over the same period.¹⁰

Residential segregation provides a way to understand how the intersection of race, class, and circumstances produce contemporary urban poverty. In a city in which poverty levels vary by racial groups, residential segregation by race guarantees that the poverty will be concentrated. Poor people of color are concentrated in a small number of neighborhoods, and are therefore exposed to a higher poverty rate than whites, whose residential habits and poverty are less concentrated.¹¹ It is a self-perpetuating cycle.

Racial segregation explains a great deal about poverty in Boston. Not only is the black population living in stark isolation from other ethnic groups, it is also tightly clustered together in one enclave-like distribution. In Boston, 75 percent of the black population lives in Census tracts that are more than 50 percent black.¹²

Segregation in Boston and other cities shifts the problems associated with poverty away from the city as a whole, concentrating them in minority neighborhoods. The fact that poverty is concentrated rather than evenly diffused throughout Boston's neighborhoods affects the housing, education and employment of minorities living in poor neighborhoods.

Under federal programs that promoted racial segregation, minorities received fewer federally insured loans and less total mortgage money than white people with similar income levels. Discriminatory practices reinforce the historic legacy of discrimination in lending. Data gathered under the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act showed that as recently as 1999, black applicants for home loans were denied at 2.45 times the rate of white applicants. Hispanics were denied at a rate 1.82 times higher than whites.¹³ The effects are evident in relatively few black and Hispanic homeowners.¹⁴ These disparities, attributable in part to practices promoted and sustained through racial segregation, can help to explain the persistence of poverty. Homeowners can receive substantial tax breaks, and home ownership helps create wealth, and determine access to education.¹⁵

Access to education is also of primary importance when addressing poverty. Segregation not only concentrates within certain neighborhoods, but also in certain schools. In Boston the division is between public and private schools. White students have fled the Boston Public School (BPS) system. Over half of Boston's 20,000 white school-age children attend private schools. The students left in public schools are largely minorities and are often poor. Eighty-five percent of the 63,300 students served by BPS are racial minorities. Some 62 percent of BPS students are eligible for free lunch, a key indicator of poverty levels in a school. Minorities experience difficulties gaining access to quality education in Boston, where the public school system is "overwhelmingly impoverished, with low achievement levels."¹⁶

The employment opportunities that can lift a family out of poverty are also difficult to get for residents of segregated communities. The jobs that sustain urban workers are rapidly shifting from industry to service-based jobs, and jobs now tend to require higher levels of minimum education. Businesses are hesitant to locate in places with concentrated minority populations, and the realities of Boston's racially segregated landscape mean that employers are locating farther away from most people of color.¹⁷

Racial segregation in Boston is responsible for concentrating poverty within certain neighborhoods and certain public schools. These areas suffer from isolation and abandonment by the politically powerful white middle class. Segregation therefore acts on two levels in Boston: it concentrates poverty within minority neighborhoods, and serves as a powerful barrier to home ownership, quality education, and employment, leaving few potential "ways out" poverty for minorities caught in these areas.

- Marisa Castuera

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1. Douglass L. Anderton and Karla L. Egan, "Industrial and Residential Segregation: Employment Opportunities and Environmental Burdens in Metropolitan Areas," (Boston: University of Massachusetts, Social and Demographic Research Institute, 1996) p. 4.
2. Anderton and Egan.
3. Barry Bluestone and Mary Huff Stevenson, "The Boston Renaissance: Race, Space and Economic Change in an American Metropolis: The Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality" (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 2000), p. 25.
4. Nathan Kantrowitz, "Racial and Ethnic Segregation in Boston, 1830 – 1970" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 44, (January 1979) pp. 41-53.
5. Institute of Race and Poverty, "Examining the Relationship Between Housing, Education, and Persistent Segregation, Final Report," The McKnight Foundation, February 1998. Available at: <http://www1.umn.edu/irp/publications/final1.htm>
6. Nancy A. Denton and Douglass S. Massey, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) p. 51.
7. Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 201.
8. Jackson, p. 197.
9. Denton, p. 52.
10. Bluestone p. 26. See Table 2.2.
11. Denton p. 123.
12. Calculated from 1990 Census Data compiled by the Massachusetts Institute for Social and Economic Research.
13. "Mortgage Lending Shows Race Disparity," *The Boston Globe*, September 29, 2000: D1.
14. Whites comprise 59 percent of the population, but 78 percent of owner-occupied housing. Blacks comprise almost 24 percent of the population but only 16 percent of owner-occupied housing. Latinos comprise almost 11 percent of the population but less than 3 percent of owner-occupied housing. These race statistics are taken from 1990 Census information for Massachusetts from the Massachusetts Institute of Social and Economic Research. Available at: <http://www.umass.edu/miser>. The housing statistics, also from the 1990 Census, were found in the following source: Guy Stuart, "Segregation in the Boston Metropolitan Area at the end of the 20th Century," The Civil Rights Project (Cambridge: Harvard University, February. 2000), p. 7. Available at: <http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/publications/seg2000.html>.
15. Stuart, p. 2.
16. Stuart, p. 2.
17. Bluestone p. 350.

DEFINING SUCCESS

The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program is the nation's primary mechanism for encouraging the development of housing affordable to low and moderate-income families. Created as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the tax credit program is both a success and a failure.

The program was created to provide incentives for investing private money into affordable housing projects. Tax credits provide investors, primarily large financial institutions, with a dollar-for-dollar credit against their federal income taxes in return for providing the financing for low-income tenants.¹ The Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) implements the LIHTC program. The agency sets program goals, reviews projects, monitors costs, takes responsibility for compliance, and ensures that approved projects receive only the tax credits necessary to make the project work.

Changes were made to federal tax credit provisions in 1989 because of charges of failed projects and excessive investment risk. State allocating agencies were commissioned to “check development costs with care, ensuring that, when the credit proceeds were added to available financing, no more credits were awarded than were required to cover development costs.” Congress concluded “credits were not effectively applied toward the costs of developing housing for low-income households but were being squandered to the benefit of certain savvy developers.”² The agency has not lost a LIHTC project to foreclosure in over five years, DHCD must ensure that the program is viewed as a clear success. Strict standards could assure the program’s longevity.

Stakeholders in the Massachusetts tax-credit program hold divergent interests and different criteria for judging the program’s success.

The DHCD prefers to keep down per-unit development costs, developer fees, and construction costs. The agency also seeks to target “hard to serve” residents, such as extremely low-income families and special needs populations, while mixing with more moderate-income residents. Developers have a different set of preferences. Nonprofits have their own goals; but for-profit developers generally prefer high development fees, as low costs as possible, and high rents. Large institutional investors are primarily motivated by a consistent ten-year tax shelter and a safe return on their investment. In order to reduce risk, investors prefer high debt service and reserves and few or no units at market-rate rents.

Tenants are stakeholders who also have differing visions of a successful project. For low-income tenants, lower development, construction, and operating costs are preferable because they translate into lower rents. Affordable apartments should also be indistinguishable from the market-rate apartments in the same development. Market-rate tenants, on the other hand, typically need some incentives to move to a development with a significant low-income population. Amenities like resident services, and high-quality architecture, landscaping, and maintenance entice market-rate renters but discourage developers.

What is the real purpose of setting program standards? It is assumed that they will assure that projects have low vacancy rates, excellent maintenance, full compliance with all tax credit regulations, and fiscally stability. But criteria often compete with one another and project success can be very subjective, depending on who defines it.

The low-income housing tax credit was created because the outside real estate market will not build affordable housing. Developers typically do not build projects for “hard-to-serve” populations – such as extremely low income families, people with AIDS, and recovering addicts -- because projects such as these are often prohibitively expensive with high development costs, unlikely to make large profits for the developer or sponsor, and difficult to manage and maintain.

A more formalized DHCD approval criteria may nonetheless be useful. It would give the department greater influence by more clearly guiding developers in project proposals and being better able to approve projects that they truly want to be developed.

–Zoe Weinrobe

1. Alan Gonzalez, “A Review of Low Income Housing Tax Credits,” available at <http://www.spectrumcap.com/AlanDocs/LOWINCOM.html>
2. Kirk McClure, “The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit as an Aid to Housing Finance: How Well Has It Worked?” *Housing Policy Debate*, 11, (January 2000), p. 96.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE?

Utility-run programs mandated by Massachusetts law since the 1970s, direct millions of dollars in public funds to help residents, businesses, and local governments use less energy and save money on energy bills. Utility companies, whose profit directly depends on electricity sales, control ratepayer funding and administer the residential energy efficiency programs. The utilities face a conflict of interest between increasing their profits and effectively running programs to reduce energy sales.

The 1998 Electric Industry Restructuring Act instituted the semi-permanent systems benefit charge (SBC) to fund energy-efficiency programs. The SBC collects over \$100 million annually for efficiency programs. Resident who pay their electricity bill are eligible to receive assistance through the utility-run energy efficiency programs. To participate, residents can call the number provided on their monthly bills to set up an appointment for a free energy audit; a professional then visits the home to assess ways in which to save on electricity and heating fuel consumption.

Getting involved in the energy-efficiency program requires time, commitment, and initiative on the part of residents. Ratepayer funding provides significant rebates to help residents overcome the initial cost barriers. The problem is not that energy efficient appliances, lighting, heating, and cooling systems are unavailable. The issue is getting people to actively choose the energy efficient products. Energy efficient products are not necessarily more expensive, and most save money over the operating lifetime. Major appliances like refrigerators comprise a large share of a typical electricity bill, and replacing such older appliances can produce immediate and significant savings.

Some 13 percent of residents participate in energy-conservation programs, according to the 2001 Division of Energy Resources report; but the average bill savings are only 5 percent, about \$37.¹ The savings do not come cheap. Since residents put in several hours of time to qualify for the programs, the average savings are minimal. Given the abundance of older housing stock in Massachusetts, one would think the savings from efficiency measures might be higher than 5 percent. Several recent studies have predicted that between a quarter and one-third of energy use could be replaced with cost-effective technologies.² Why then, are the resulting energy savings so low for Massachusetts residents?

Not all the programs have such underwhelming performance. One-tenth of SBC funds are allocated to low-income customers through a highly successful program run through Community Action Programs (CAP). Community non-profit organizations typically get SBC funding to use for low-income housing. CAP localizes its service, with extensive outreach. Massachusetts has developed a national reputation for its success in these low-income energy efficiency programs.

The larger residential energy-efficiency program's ineffectiveness may owe to the geographic reach of large utility companies. Large companies often lack a specific interest in or connection to the communities they serve. Most people are unaware that these programs are available free of charge and of the financial incentives available. Many utilities use a single vendor for each implementation measure, a process that isolates initiatives from each other and from corporate managers. Recent efforts in the City of Newton to catalogue residential savings have encountered serious problems with accountability and effectiveness of efficiency implementation in homes.

Given the clear conflict of interest the utility companies have in helping their customers use less energy, the first option for improving residential energy efficiency is to create an entirely new program structure. Vermont has created a new non-profit entity, Efficiency Vermont to ensure that rate-

payer funds are used efficiently and effectively. A statewide agency to coordinate energy efficiency programs, however, would require legislation.

The alternative to creating a new bureaucracy is strengthening the existing programs. Funds could be administered to give more responsibility to local governments. Allowing community members to operate the programs could also help extensively with participation rates for residential customers.

An intermediate option is to create a Community Based Energy-Efficiency Program, as a pilot, to demonstrate the effectiveness of local funding control and implementation. Under such a program, a community would gain access to SBC funds, and work with the utility company, local organizations, and the political structure to implement efficiency measures across all sectors.³ The idea is based on the concept that “communities know themselves best” and could reach much higher levels of participation if given control of the ratepayer funding. This strategy could work well in a community such as Newton, which is in the process of creating a local energy action plan, has a good working relationship with the utility company, and benefits from both a committed constituency and exemplary leadership on energy issues.

– Amelia Ravin

1. Division of Energy Resources “DOER Report: 2001 Energy Efficiency Activities in Massachusetts” (Summer 2003); On the benefits of energy-efficiency programs see also Bernstein, et al., “The Public Benefit of Energy Efficiency to the State of Massachusetts,” RAND Science and Technology for the Energy Foundation (2002).
2. David Gilligan, “Energy Efficiency Program Planning Workbook,” National Association of Energy Service Companies, (December 2002).
3. Theo MacGregor, “Model for a Community Based Program,” working paper, used with permission from author; interview with Theo MacGregor, of MacGregor Energy Consultancy, also former Electric Division Director at Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy (July, 2003); see also Cape Light Compact. “The Cape Light Compacy Energy Efficiency Plan Phase II_2003-2007,” March 28, 2003.

PREVENTING YOUTH VIOLENCE

Youth violence is a complicated problem. Even the basics are not easily defined. Does youth range from age 10 to 18, or 10 to 21, or perhaps 12-25? Does violence include harmful physical contact only, or does it also include harmful emotional, verbal, and neglectful behavior? Similarly, is youth violence just violence between youth, or does youth violence include any violence in which a youth is involved?

Despite these questions, available data make clear the urgency of the problem. Two large surveys each demonstrate that youth in Massachusetts and the United States are plagued by violence – physically, sexually, and emotionally.¹ (National data are presented here only where they differ from Massachusetts numbers by one percentage point or more.)

The Massachusetts Youth Risk Behavior Survey found that in Massachusetts, 13 percent of students (and 17.4 percent nationally) carried a weapon such as a gun, knife, or club in the 30 days preceding the survey.² Six percent of students carried a weapon on school property in the 30 days before the survey.³ In Massachusetts, one-third of all students were in a physical fight in the 12 months

before the survey,⁴ and just under 12 percent of all students were in a physical fight on school property during this time.⁵ Eight percent of students skipped school at least once in the 30 days before the survey because they felt unsafe either at school or on their way to or from school (as opposed to 6.6 percent nationally).⁶ Eight percent of students were threatened or injured with a weapon on school property in the 12 months before the survey.⁷ In Massachusetts, 11 percent of all high school students (16 percent of females and 6 percent of males) had experienced violence in a dating relationship. Ten percent of students reported having ever experienced sexual contact against their will.⁸

One-fifth of all students in 2001 seriously considered attempting suicide in the 12 months before the survey.⁹ Fifteen percent of students made a plan about how they would attempt suicide in the 12 months before the survey.¹⁰ Ten percent of youth reported actually attempting suicide in the 12 months before the survey.¹¹

A dispersion of responsibility across government agencies and a lack of funding have stymied policy aimed at youth violence. A comprehensive approach would focus on the ways in which youth violence can be prevented, rather than solely address rehabilitation and the consequences of violence. Thus, the strengths of a public-health approach are: the impetus to remove root causes; and the idea that personal lifestyle is largely socially conditioned by the activities and experiences in which individuals are directly involved.¹²

—Lindsay Rosenfeld

1. The Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) is a national survey conducted to collect information from national, state, territorial, and local school-based surveys of students in grades 9-12. Data reported apply only to youth who attend school and, therefore, are not representative of all persons in this age group. Similarly, the 2001 Massachusetts Youth Risk Behavior Survey (MYRBS) was conducted in the spring of 2001 in 64 randomly selected public high schools across the Commonwealth. In total, 4,204 students in grades 9-12 participated in this voluntary and anonymous survey.
2. "2001 Massachusetts Youth Risk Behavior Survey Results," Massachusetts Department of Education (September 2002), p. 45, available at <http://www.doe.mass.edu/hssss/yrbs/01/results.pdf>.
3. Massachusetts Department of Education, p. 45.
4. Massachusetts Department of Education, p. 45.
5. Massachusetts Department of Education, p. 45.
6. Massachusetts Department of Education, p. 45.
7. Massachusetts Department of Education, p. 50. Nationwide, 9.5 percent of students had been hit, slapped, or physically hurt on purpose by their boyfriend or girlfriend 1 or more times during the 12 months before the survey ("Surveillance Summaries," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, June 28, 2002. MMWR 2002: 51 (No. ss-4), p. 1. Available at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/ss/ss5104.pdf>, page 5.
8. Massachusetts Department of Education, p. 50. Although the number is not comparable, 7.7 percent of students nationwide had ever been forced to have sexual intercourse when they did not want to (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, p. 5).
9. Massachusetts Department of Education, p. 55.
10. Massachusetts Department of Education, p. 55.
11. Massachusetts Department of Education, p. 55.
12. G. Rose. "The population strategy of prevention," *The Strategy of Preventive Medicine*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 100-102.

THE POLITICAL USES OF 'NEIGHBORHOOD'

The South Boston Waterfront has been called the city's "next growth frontier"¹ and "the most attractive development opportunity in the United States."² Politicians, planners, and citizens have intensified efforts to redevelop this 1,000-acre tract of property southeast of Boston's Financial District. Despite a consensus that massive redevelopment should occur, controversy has dominated public deliberations about how this area should look.

Economic and political resources provide the starting point for understanding the contests over visions for the waterfront district. Private interests and the municipal government hold privileged positions that stem from their control of material and political resources and their organizational stability. Community organizations muster fewer economic resources and face coordination problems.

The symbolic uses of "neighborhood" and "community" also shape the public debate. The idea of the neighborhood has shaped the redevelopment process by aligning actors in ways that do not necessarily fit the city's economic and political alignments. Neighborhood has been conceived as a collection of residences, as a place of unique character and vitality, as a base of consumers, and as an enclave that must be protected.

The Seaport Alliance for a Neighborhood Design (SAND), a grassroots organization serving residents of the Fort Point Channel community, advocates "the planning of the waterfront as a vibrant, diverse community with a distinctive character and sense of place."³ SAND attends public hearings, writes letters to public officials, and holds occasional community meetings. SAND has called for the waterfront district to include a significant amount of housing, as well as amenities like open space, supermarkets, schools, and libraries.⁴ Steve Hollinger, a Fort Point resident and founding member of SAND, contrasts the vitality of a neighborhood with the blandness of a standard corporate development: "The outcome of projects that are based on profit is that they end up being very sanitized and lacking character. The waterfront is something that potentially could have character. But how do you get that point when you are developing offices and hotels?"⁵ SAND is not a well endowed lobby or political coalition. That it has been able to help ensure the inclusion of neighborhood principles in the 1999 Public Realm Plan reflects how the use of neighborhood can help bolster the power of actors like SAND.

The political leaders of South Boston reflect a conception of a neighborhood as an enclave, a source of common identity for an isolated segment of the population. This group, led by City Councilor James Kelly, sees the community not as an organic part of an inclusive whole but as a separate place with separate interests. After the release of the 1999 plan, Kelly argued the proposal to create 5,000 to 8,000 housing units threatened the fabric of South Boston by inviting an influx of new residents unfamiliar with the area. Kelly insisted on no more than 4,000 units: "I and the people of South Boston have been shown a tremendous amount of disrespect...I'll do anything to stop them from destroying South Boston."⁶

Kelly's use of "neighborhood" is an expression of localism and isolated interests. Kelly's actions and rhetoric have dominated the headlines and have served to define the public's understanding of South Boston's defense of the neighborhood.

The City of Boston and major waterfront developers share a distinct understanding of neighborhood. This viewpoint, which can be labeled "corporate" or "pro-growth," sees the waterfront district as a source of political and economic capital.⁷

“Neighborhood” is a politically potent term that can alter economic and institutional power balances. It offers an opportunity to coordinate diffuse sources of power, such as an otherwise-unorganized mass of citizens and community. It can also serve as a motivating ideal for the municipal government and the developers, affording them a common ground.

- Jonathan L. Lee

1. Boston Redevelopment Authority, “The Seaport Public Realm Plan,” (Boston: Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1999), inside cover. Quotation from Mayor Thomas Menino.
2. Timothy Leland and Thomas J. Piper, “Plotting the Course: A vision of Boston’s Revitalized Waterfront,” *The Boston Globe*, October 25, 1998, Special Section 4. Quotation from Stephen Coyle, former director of the BRA.
3. Seaport Alliance for a Neighborhood Design, “About Boston SAND.” Available at: <http://www.bostonseaport.com/SAND/about.html>.
4. Interview with Steve Hollinger, January 16, 2000.
5. Hollinger.
6. Cosmo Macero, Jr., “City Council Chief Slams Seaport Housing Plan,” *Boston Herald*, March 2, 1999, p. 25.
7. See, for instance, Thomas Menino, State of the City speech, John Hancock Hall, Boston, MA. January 11, 2000.

KEEPING BUSY AFTER SCHOOL

Out-of-School Time (OST) programs provide special educational and recreational programs for students before and after school and during vacations and summer holidays. OST programs not only provide a safe space for children to go to avoid the streets; they can also offer extended services for academic support and other enrichment activities.

The Boston Community Learning Centers (BCLC) program, begun in 1997, provides students from low-income neighborhoods the opportunity to explore nature and participate in activities both inside and outside of the community. The program has produced positive effects. Participants score higher on statewide standardized tests – and, perhaps more important, they learn how to interact respectfully with others. As with many public service initiatives, funding consistently remains a barrier to the program’s growth.

Locating new money to support fresh ideas is often difficult and highly competitive. Along with funding problems comes the inability to find and retain a large number of qualified staff.

National studies show that during the school day, administrators and teachers keep students relatively safe within school walls. Once the school bell rings to end the day, however, many children are left to go home to empty places, often without proper supervision. According to the U.S. Department of Education, some 28 million young people have parents who work outside the home. Of those, from 7 to 15 million young people are “latch-key kids” – that is, they come home daily to an empty home.¹ Without proper parental or guardian supervision, these children are at a higher chance of engaging in high-risk activities like drug use, violence, and/or sexual promiscuity.

Historically, OST programs aimed to offer a safe place to keep children supervised and off the streets. The National Institute for Out-of-School Time (NIOST) found that the majority of crime-related activities involving juveniles happen in the hours between 2 and 6 p.m. Without supervision, children are more likely to turn to their peers for decision-making advice. OST programs have served as a way to lessen these situations where children make poor decisions from peer pressure.

OST programs have expanded the scope of services, taking on the responsibility of “academic enrichment” to complement the lessons learned during the school day. Though OST programs have traditionally served as places for extra homework help and some tutoring services, many are now writing an academic component directly into their curricula. As students learn about specific subjects in the classroom, OST programs are in a unique position to follow up on classroom lessons. Dishon Mills and Corbett Coutts, director and assistant director of After School Programs for the Boston Public School (BPS), have proposed a scenario where students learning about fractions and addition in school could complement their studies by following a recipe at an OST program to see how theory can be brought to real life. The BPS is creating a comprehensive academic support plan to offer more enrichment services to their programs.

Aside from academic enrichment, students may receive more specialized attention in OST programs. English Language Learners (formerly English as Second Language, E.S.L.) students can both learn English and use their native tongues. Children diagnosed with behavioral problems or other special needs can often get attention and interaction with adults and peers that may have been absent during the day.

BCLC sites are housed in school buildings since the schools themselves have always been the natural epicenter of a neighborhood. For many families, generations of their children may have attended the same school and are often familiar with the building, culture, and leadership of a school. Also, hosting the program in schools means children do not have to leave the building to participate.

The Boston Public Schools reports that 110 of Boston’s 130 schools—84.6 percent—have some form of after-school program. Thirty-seven schools offer both before- and after-school programs and 66 schools have community partners. Even though the majority of schools have some type of before and/or after school program, not all of those schools are part of the BCLC initiative.

The 43 sites chosen for the BCLC initiative in the 2000 school year were “targeted” neighborhoods in need of special attention. The first round of BCLC sites were elementary and middle schools located in Dorchester, Roxbury, and the South End. Each of these largely-minority areas suffered from low-achieving schools, high crime, and poverty.

The programs grew rapidly after the first year. The second round of sites included Allston, Mattapan, and Roslindale, and the initiative also looked to more agencies for partnerships. READBoston, a literacy help program, and Dimock Community Health Center lent services to some BCLC sites. A third wave added 15 more sites, bringing the total to 30. The last selection process created the first high school program in West Roxbury.

Holding onto staff members who are able to work well with children daily and provide a strong vision for the future is extremely difficult for OST programs. Dishon Mills of the BPS argues that a lack of professional status undermines the program. Though OST providers may design curricula and teach, they often do not receive recognition for their skills. Also, because many OST providers do not possess specific teacher training or credentials, it sometimes becomes difficult for them to advance in the education field. Pay for OST workers is usually lower than most teachers’ salaries.

Many OST programs recruit young public servants and volunteers from organizations like AmeriCorps and City Year. But once their contracts are exhausted, many of these young people leave the field to gain more education or pursue other volunteer or job opportunities.

Increased training opportunities may be a way to improve staff turnover rates. The BPS already offers a training series for OST professionals called Bridging the Gap (BTG). A series of lectures and activity sessions, BTG broaches topics ranging from English Language Arts to Working with Stu-

dents with Behavioral Issues. Currently, OST sites can also receive statewide curriculum frameworks and strategies, to connect their own activities with other programs. If the skills of OST workers were better recognized, or if they received college credit for their experience, they might be more likely to stay with the programs.

1. USDOE Website.

– Allen Smith

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS

The Rappaport Review is an occasional collection of writings about public affairs in the Greater Boston region. The review is written for a general audience – anyone with an interest in the politics, policy, history, and culture of the region. Submissions should strike a balance between the readability of a journalistic article and the detailed explanation and analysis of an academic article. Articles should take the form of an essay, not a policy memo or other piece designed for a specialized or “insider” audience.

The basic structure of an article is simple:

Part 1: A telling vignette: It is always nice to open with a story or narrative that provides a revealing glimpse of the many issues at stake in the article.

Part 2: Overview of the article’s argument and content: Then, once you have grabbed the reader’s attention, you can give the reader an overview of the article’s major points.

Part 3: Elaboration, with detailed information, of the article’s major points: Here is the meat of the story. You break the article into its three or four key components, then provide the specific information needed to illustrate those points.

Part 4: Conclusion: Summarize the article, with perhaps some closing comments on the subject’s importance and some open questions or challenges.

Beyond that basic framework, here are some rules of the road:

- (1) Use between 5,000 and 7,000 words.
- (2) Avoid the use of bullets and outline format. Remember: *It is an essay.*
- (3) Avoid ideological language. Be fair minded and balanced, explaining all sides of the issue or topic with due respect.
- (4) Use the active voice. Avoid the overused “to be” and “to have” verbs.
- (5) Use short sentences. A bunch of sentences is usually better than a few meandering, straggling sentences.
- (6) Stay on the subject. When you are writing about a particular topic in a paragraph, do not allow yourself to go off on tangents (even interesting ones).
- (7) Citations should appear as endnotes. The formatting style can be found online at www.ksg.harvard.edu/rappaport/guidelines.
- (8) Helpful resources include William Strunk, Jr., and E.B. White, *Elements of Style* (New York: Macmillan, 1999) and William Zinsser, *On Writing Well: The Classic Guide to Writing Nonfiction* (New York: Harper Collins, 2001).

RAPPAPORT INSTITUTE FOR GREATER BOSTON

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The Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston, based at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, works to improve the governance of Greater Boston. The Institute offers five critical resources to pursue this mission:

Research: The Rappaport Institute coordinates a wide range of research projects for practitioners as well as scholars. In addition to *The Rappaport Review*, the Institute publishes major reports, applied research, working papers, and case studies.

Service: Reaching out to graduate and professional students throughout Greater Boston, the Rappaport Institute coordinates fellowship programs that place the "best and the brightest" in meaningful positions in government.

Forums: The Rappaport Institute convenes forums to engage the community in open-ended conversations about the region's public policy challenges. The forums spotlight high-level officials and leading experts of critical issues facing the region.

Information: The Rappaport Institute web site provides the foundation of a comprehensive information resource for public policy in Greater Boston. The site can be found at www.rappaportinstitute.org.

Training: Building on the Kennedy School's tradition of executive training, the Rappaport Institute offers workshops and other programs for public officials, stakeholder groups, journalists, and others.

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