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Editors: STEPHEN M. WALT
Academic Dean, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University
Mailto:STEPHEN_WALT@KSG.HARVARD.EDU

MATTHEW ALPER
Associate Dean for Research, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University
Mailto:matthew_alper@harvard.edu

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Harvard University
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JEFFREY A. FRANKEL
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

"Decentralization in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes"

ALI CHEEMA
Lahore University of Management Sciences
ASIM IJAZ KHAWAJA
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
ADNAN QADIR
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Sloan School of Management

"The Catholic Puzzle: Parishes and Civic Life"

MARY JO BANE
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John F. Kennedy School of Government

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W O R K I N G P A P E R Abstracts

"Allophilia and Intergroup Leadership"

BY: TODD L. PITTINSKY
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government

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Paper ID: KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-038
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Contact: TODD L. PITTINSKY
Email: [Mailto:todd_pittinsky@ksg.harvard.edu](mailto:todd_pittinsky@ksg.harvard.edu)
Postal: Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138 UNITED STATES
Phone: 617-384-7283
Fax: 617-384-5490

ABSTRACT:

One of the most pressing concerns confronting leaders is intergroup conflict, often inspired or facilitated by prejudice. Not only might leaders inherit conflicts between political, religious, or organizational groups, but they may unwittingly contribute to them. Foundations of strong intragroup leadership, such as fostering strong group identification and cohesion, are often stepping stones to intergroup conflict. I refer to this as the "ingroup/outgroup leadership tradeoff." While the reduction of prejudice is essential to the reduction of intergroup conflict, I argue that the necessary approach is not to replace prejudice with the neutral stance of tolerance. Something critical lies beyond the reduction of prejudice and the promotion of tolerance: positive intergroup attitudes, allophilia. While the academic and applied literature on intergroup relations is well supplied with terms for negative intergroup attitudes (e.g., xenophobia, sexism, racism, anti-Americanism, classism, ageism, homophobia), there are surprisingly few terms for positive intergroup attitudes. Allophilia is a term I coin, derived from the Greek words meaning "liking, or love, of the other." The concept of allophilia provides a powerful anchor for a new framework for

understanding intergroup leadership. To initiate the development of a framework of allophilia and leadership, I address three interrelated questions in this article: (1) What is allophilia in the context of intergroup relations?; (2) What role does-and might-allophilia play in intergroup leadership?; and (3) What are the keys to further developing allophilia as a framework for intergroup leadership theory and practice? The framework prompts leaders to push their societies and the world community away from the natural direction in which individuals and social system might otherwise unfold, leading them instead on a trajectory of positive intergroup relations.

"Contractionary Currency Crashes in Developing Countries"

BY: JEFFREY A. FRANKEL
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Contact: JEFFREY A. FRANKEL
Email: [Mailto:jeffrey_frankel@harvard.edu](mailto:jeffrey_frankel@harvard.edu)
Postal: Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138 UNITED STATES
Phone: 617-496-3834
Fax: 617-496-5747

ABSTRACT:

To update a famous old statistic: a political leader in a developing country is twice as likely to lose office in the 6 months following a currency crash as otherwise. This difference, which is highly significant statistically, holds regardless whether the devaluation takes place in the context of an IMF program. Why are devaluations so costly? Many of the currency crises of the last ten years have been associated with output loss. Is this, as alleged, because of excessive reliance on raising the interest rate as a policy response? More likely it is because of contractionary effects of devaluation. There are various possible contractionary effects of devaluation, but it is appropriate that the balance sheet effect receives the most emphasis. Passthrough from exchange rate changes to import prices in developing countries is not the problem: this coefficient fell in the 1990s, as a look at some narrowly defined products shows. Rather, balance sheets are the problem. How can countries mitigate the fall in output resulting from the

balance sheet effect in crises? In the shorter term, adjusting promptly after inflows cease is better than procrastinating by shifting to short-term dollar debt, which raises the costliness of the devaluation when it finally comes. In the longer term, greater openness to trade reduces vulnerability to both sudden stops and currency crashes.

"Decentralization in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes"

BY: ALI CHEEMA
Lahore University of Management Sciences
ASIM IJAZ KHWAJA
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
ADNAN QADIR
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Sloan School of Management

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Contact: ASIM IJAZ KHWAJA
Email: [Mailto:ASIM_IJAZ_KHWAJA@HARVARD.EDU](mailto:ASIM_IJAZ_KHWAJA@HARVARD.EDU)
Postal: Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138 UNITED STATES
Phone: 617-384-7790
Fax: 617-496-5960
Co-Auth: ALI CHEEMA
Email: [Mailto:cheema@lums.edu.pk](mailto:cheema@lums.edu.pk)
Postal: Lahore University of Management Sciences
Lahore, PAKISTAN
Co-Auth: ADNAN QADIR
Email: [Mailto:a-qadir@mit.edu](mailto:a-qadir@mit.edu)
Postal: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Sloan School of Management
Cambridge, MA 02142 UNITED STATES

ABSTRACT:

This paper provides a description of the recent decentralization reforms in Pakistan under General Musharraf. In the process, we hope to not only highlight major aspects of this reform, but also to analyze the evolution of this reform in historical context in order to better understand the potential causes behind the current decentralization. Analyzing the evolution of local government reforms in Pakistan is interesting because each of the reform experiments has been instituted at the behest of a non-representative centre using a 'top down' approach. The

Pakistani experience shows that each of the reform experiments is a complementary change to a wider constitutional reengineering strategy devised to further centralization of political power in the hands of the non-representative centre. We argue here that the design of the local government reforms in these contexts becomes endogenous to the centralization objectives of the non-representative centre. It is hoped that analyzing the Pakistani experience will help shed light on the positive political economy question of why non-representative regimes have been willing proponents of decentralization to the local level.

"The Catholic Puzzle: Parishes and Civic Life"

BY: MARY JO BANE
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government

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Contact: MARY JO BANE
Email: [Mailto:mary_jo_bane@harvard.edu](mailto:mary_jo_bane@harvard.edu)
Postal: Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138 UNITED STATES
Phone: 617-496-9703
Fax: 617-496-9053

ABSTRACT:

This paper is one of a number of case studies prepared for an interdisciplinary seminar on religion in American civic life which examined the roles and functions of religion in congregations and communities. "The Catholic Puzzle" is the apparent discrepancy between the Catholic church's official social teachings and what actually goes on in Catholic parishes and the everyday lives of Catholics. This paper combines theology and social science to examine the question of why Catholics seem to be less involved than members of other religions in volunteer and civic life.

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