

In-and-Outers: Up or Down?

John D. Donahue

Is *public* leadership—as something other than just plain leadership—losing its distinctiveness? Of course we still need people who accept responsibility for defining and pursuing the public good; few dispute the enduring relevance of this broad definition of the term. Three popular lines of argument, however, challenge the permanence of distinctly public leadership as a specialized and essential social asset. The first contention is that government is ceding much of its franchise for creating public value. Maturing markets get ever closer to the theoretical ideal of maximum welfare through private exchange, by this argument, while non-profits proliferate to cover a growing share of the tasks not yet within the market's reach. A proposition in line with this theme might be: *Larry Page has contributed vastly more to Americans' access to information since he co-founded Google in 1998 than has James H. Billington in his 15 years as Librarian of Congress.*

A second and related line of logic is that even for the missions that remain the responsibility of government, the actual work is increasingly delegated to outside organizations. The leaders of these organizations, accordingly, do a growing share of the heavy lifting on collective endeavors. A representative proposition here: *As states turn to companies like Lockheed Martin to deliver welfare services, Lockheed's chairman Norm Augustine exercises more leverage over efforts against poverty than do many government officials*

A third theme is that government itself is ever more likely to be led by people whose experience and orientation are cross-sectoral rather than anchored in the public sector. A proposition here: *Franklin D. Roosevelt entered the New York Senate in his twenties and never thereafter worked a day outside government. George W. Bush earned an MBA and worked in business for nearly two decades before entering public service. FDR exemplifies the past of government leadership; W. exemplifies the present and future.*

The implications, if this broad challenge to traditional ideas of public service turns out to be sound, are undeniably consequential. The trend, however, is widely accepted but weakly demonstrated. There is more debate over what to do about the transmutation of public leadership than over whether it is occurring. This chapter aims to back up a bit to test the facts of the case, by assembling and assessing evidence germane to the third and most specific theme of fading public leadership. Are "government leaders" less and less a breed apart, more and more drawn from and shaped by the private sector?

In-and-Outers

Public and private leadership has never been neatly segregated, especially in the United States, and "in-and-outers" have long shuttled from law firm to Cabinet post to foundation chair. In the mid-1980s (before the blurring line between public and private became quite so routine an observation) political scientist Hugh Heclo examined the peculiar way we populate high public offices. "Americans have created a unique approach to staffing the top of government," he wrote, "with an assortment of characters whose career stakes are tied neither to party politics nor to government administration."¹ Here is a reasonable working definition of the in-and-outer: An

individual, especially a highly-qualified individual, whose career includes both public and private positions and for whom business or non-profit work holds weight equal to or greater than that of government in his or her experience, professional orientation, and sense of self.

In-and-outers are indisputably a major presence in American government and one of the features distinguishing the United States from nations with traditions of specialized elite public service.² The issue is whether the public sector's reliance on in-and-outers is deepening, declining, or staying the same. If in-and-outers *are* becoming dominant in government's upper reaches we can (for example) worry a little less about the quality of "permanent" government employees; focus rather more on broad-spectrum professional training than on preparation for work in any single sector; and concentrate on easing the flow of talent across sectoral boundaries.

The broad question about in-and-outers can be parsed into two slightly different variants. First, are cross-sectoral career histories increasingly common among key public officials? Second, is experience outside government increasingly prominent in government leaders' backgrounds? The ideal way to answer these questions, of course, would be to identify a very large sample of senior officials from a wide range of public-sector organizations, over a very long period of time, and collect detailed information on their career histories. Determining that current or recent officials switched sectors more often and spent more time outside government than did their counterparts ten, fifty, or a hundred years ago would bolster the hypothesis of diminishingly distinctive public leadership.

A less daunting alternative to a comprehensive study of the public sector is to focus on a particular subset of American public leaders. And the most telling subset for this purpose is probably presidential appointees in the Federal executive branch. This group recommends itself for several reasons. First is its significance. There is room for honest disagreement about the importance of the executive branch relative to the legislature or judiciary, and of the Federal relative to state and local government, and of political appointees relative to career civil servants. But few would deny that presidential appointees are a reasonably interesting segment of the overall public workforce.

Second is its sensitivity to changes in both the demand for and the supply of in-and-outers. The career civil service is notorious resistant to lateral entry; senior officials generally started in the lower ranks and worked their way up to the higher reaches of the General Schedule or into the Senior Executive Service. The two largest categories of public workers--teachers and soldiers--both have technical and cultural barriers to entry that limit sudden surges in imported personnel. While the presidential appointments process is by no means unconstrained—the President must be mindful of Senate confirmation and political obligations—the impediments to matching tasks with talent are lower than they are in other parts of the public sector. So any trend toward in-and-outers should show up soonest and strongest among presidential appointees.

The third reason for focussing on this group is empirical clarity and convenience. Presidential appointees comprise a well-defined and bounded group. The *United States Government Manual* unambiguously identifies each position and its incumbent in each fiscal year.³ Biographical data on presidential appointees generally appears in the standard reference

*Who's Who in America*⁴; indeed presidential appointment appears to be one of the automatic triggers for inclusion in *Who's Who*. The basics on the career backgrounds of most presidential appointees are also covered in the *Federal Staff Directory* and in agency reports or websites.⁵ Compared to the hazards and burdens of tracking the careers of other categories of public leaders, examining presidential appointees is relatively straightforward.

Prior Empirical Work

The literature on the career backgrounds of presidential appointees is remarkably sparse and dated. The dustiness of one study is revealed by its title: *Men Who Govern*.⁶ This book examines the characteristics and career histories of around 1000 appointees from 1922 through 1965. Two decades later the National Academy of Public Administration built on the Brookings study, extending the data on political appointees into the Reagan administration.⁷ The career background information in these studies, however, is sadly thin. Both studies recorded the "primary occupation" of appointees, defined as the sector in which the official had spent the largest part of his or her prior career. The records thus have no information about the proportions of a career spent in each sector, or about the sequencing of jobs. The NAPA study, though not the Brookings study, also collected information about the job held by appointees just prior to joining the government. In both studies, prior experience is coded in a binary way as "public" or "private," with no separate category for non-profit work. Universities, foundations, political parties and labor unions are classed with law firms and lumber companies as "private-sector" employers.

The conclusions suggested by these studies are correspondingly rickety, but they offer only limited support for the claim that government increasingly relies on imported leaders. The share of appointees whose "primary occupation" was private rather than public was within a few points of 50 percent for most of the administrations from FDR to Reagan, with three exceptions: FDR himself, who drew about 60 percent of his top people from the private sector, and Eisenhower and Kennedy, who drew about 70 percent. Truman's mix was about half-and-half, and Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan returned to that rough balance.⁸ The data on the jobs appointees left to join the government--while covering a shorter period, since NAPA but not Brookings recorded this item--is somewhat more consistent with rising reliance on in-and-outers. The share of appointees hired away from private-sector jobs was about 30 percent for Johnson, rose to over 40 percent for Nixon, dropped back to around 30 percent for Ford, then rose to nearly half for Carter and over half for Reagan.⁹ So ignoring Ford--properly so, since he replaced Nixon mid-term and made few fresh high-level hires—we see a substantial climb in appointments from the private sector between the 1960s and the 1980s.

But these results are not very satisfying, both because of the coarse characterization of prior career experience and because the story ends in the mid-1980s. A more up-to-date and nuanced picture is needed. A fully-developed version of this picture would examine a large sample of appointees from each administration over the past half-century or so. I hope some enterprising doctoral student undertakes such an effort, but here again I retreat to the less grueling alternative of a strategically selected subset. What subset offers the biggest evidentiary bang for the data-collection buck? A defensible approach for some kinds of trend research is to sample at (say) 5-year intervals, but in this case that would be hazardous. The propensity for

hiring from within or outside government almost surely changes over the course of an administration, and may differ between Democratic and Republican administrations as well. So the accidents of interval sampling would likely lead to blurred or biased results.

A better sampling rule is to examine the first year's appointments for an administration marking a partisan shift. This offers the best odds for spotting an increase in in-and outers. In its first year after a period out of power an administration can call on the deepest bench of willing and able candidates outside government. Later years' appointments tend to be heavy with internal promotions—upgrades from Assistant Secretary to Undersecretary, for example, with the old job at Ford (whether the auto company or the foundation) falling further into the past. And excluding transitions between Presidents of the same party eliminates the dampening effect on external hiring of follow-on administrations' tendency to retain some holdovers (whether in the same or a different post within government.) Applying these screens to postwar administrations yields seven points of observation: Eisenhower (1953), Kennedy (1961), Nixon (1969), Carter (1977), Reagan (1981), Clinton (1993), and Bush (2001).

The Data

For each of these inaugural years following a switch in party control, a reference group was defined to include around 50 top officials:

- The President and Vice-President¹⁰
- The chief-of-staff, budget director, and other top White House aides¹¹
- All Cabinet Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries¹²

- A random selection of Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries¹³

Only confirmed officials—for positions requiring Senate approval--were included in the reference group. If a position was vacant, or held by an "acting" official, the post was simply dropped from the group.¹⁴ We then sought biographical information for each of the officials identified. In most cases such information was available in the contemporary edition of *Who's Who in America*, or in one of the next two years' editions. If not, we turned to the *Congressional Quarterly Federal Staff Directory*. If neither of these standard references covered an official, we sought a biography from his or her current or prior employer. In the few cases where we could not obtain a sufficiently detailed biography, the official was dropped from the reference group. This procedure yielded biographical profiles on a total of 339 officials, with the size of the reference group for each administration ranging from a low of 46 to a high of 53. This is not a full census, since even under Eisenhower the number of senior Presidential appointees was well in excess of 50, and the share of an administration's senior officials included in the reference group falls over time as top positions proliferate. But the proportion of an administration's Cabinet, Sub-cabinet, and equivalent posts studied is always one-quarter or higher, making sampling bias a minor concern.¹⁵

For each official we recorded the starting year and ending year of every job held prior to the presidential appointment at issue. We coded each job as either

- public,
- private, or

- non-profit

thus refining a bit the dichotomous public/private breakdown employed in prior studies.

Measuring the length of tenure in each job also permits a more precise characterization of prior careers than "predominantly" in one sector or another, since we can track the actual share of a career spent in each category.

In the vast majority of cases the classification of a prior job was straightforward, but on occasion a degree of judgment was required. For example, we counted trade associations as "private" rather than "non-profit" employers, even if they are technically not-for-profit, and then judged that consistency required that labor unions be classed the same way. A professorship at a state university was coded as a "non-profit" job, since it seemed silly to treat Berkeley and Stanford differently when assessing appointees' prior careers. Managing a campaign or a political party was counted as "public," rather than the technically accurate "non-profit." Full-time military service was coded as "public" experience; reserve service concurrent with another job was not counted.

Findings

Is sector-switching becoming more common among top Federal officials? Yes, by and large, though the trend isn't a clean one. Appointees in the Eisenhower administration had crossed sector boundaries an average of less than one time in the course of their prior careers. About 40 percent had never changed sectors, and another third had moved just once. In the Clinton administration, the average number of sector switches prior to Presidential appointment exceeded

two. More than a third of the Clinton appointees had changed sectors three or more times; fewer than a fifth had stayed put in the public, private, or non-profit sector. Clinton's Deputy Labor Secretary Tom Glynn, for example, started as a VISTA volunteer when he finished college in 1968. In the 1970s Glynn became a junior policy advisor to a Republican governor of Massachusetts, took time off to earn his doctorate, then went to Washington for a series of increasingly responsible staff jobs in Cabinet agencies and the White House. In 1981 he was hired as a senior administrator at Brandeis University, moving on after two years for another stint in Massachusetts state government, though this time in a Democratic administration and as Deputy Commissioner for Welfare. He was lured to the private sector in 1988, managing Boston's World Trade Center, then spent two years as CEO of the sprawling Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority before Brown University recruited him as head of finance and administration, the post he held when called to Washington.

The increasing rate of cross-sectoral job-hopping is even more striking once differences in the amount of prior work experience is taken into account. In some Administrations (Eisenhower, Nixon) the typical appointee had around 28 years of work experience while in others (Kennedy, Carter, Reagan, Clinton) the norm was several years less.¹⁶ Factoring in the 5 years difference in average work experience for Eisenhower versus Clinton appointees, for example, reveals that Eisenhower officials averaged one sector switch for every three decades of work, while the Clinton-administration pace was close to a switch each decade. Officials in the Bush administration were somewhat less footloose across sectors than their Clinton counterparts, and even made slightly fewer switches than Reagan appointees. But the broad trend, from 1953

to 2001, seems generally upward, and is generally consistent with the story of increasingly broad-spectrum career backgrounds for public leaders.

Table 4-1: Average Number of Sector Switches of First-Year Appointees Prior to Appointment		
Administration	Total	Per decade of career
Eisenhower (1953)	0.9	0.33
Kennedy (1961)	1.5	0.62
Nixon (1969)	1.3	0.46
Carter (1977)	1.4	0.60
Reagan (1981)	1.7	0.71
Clinton (1993)	2.1	0.90
Bush (2001)	1.6	0.62

It is not enough to establish that top officials change jobs and switch sectors more often than their counterparts of a generation ago, however. Support for the "fading public leadership" account requires non-governmental experience to be growingly important in public leaders' backgrounds. And here the evidence from Presidential appointees' biographies is surprisingly at odds with the idea that distinct categories of leadership are giving way to an undifferentiated pool. Table 2 tracks the average proportion of appointees' prior careers that had been spent in each sector. It shows a wrenching shift between Eisenhower's first year (with government work accounting for an average of just 26 percent of pre-appointment work experience) and Kennedy's first year (double the average proportion, at 52 percent.) The striking point, though, is that the weight of public-sector experience in top officials' careers consistently *rose* from the Carter administration on, reaching a peak of 55 percent in 2001 under George W. Bush. Business experience generally trends downward, with an uptick under Reagan. The average career share in the non-profit sector displays no simple pattern, other than a spike in the Carter administration.

Administration	Public	Private	Non-Profit
Eisenhower (1953)	26	64	10
Kennedy (1961)	52	39	9
Nixon (1969)	41	47	12
Carter (1977)	42	38	21
Reagan (1981)	47	44	9
Clinton (1993)	49	33	17
Bush (2001)	55	32	14

Slicing the data different ways provides more nuance to the story, revealing, for example:¹⁷

- **Sit-and-Stayers** What might be called "sit-and-stayers"—people who spent more than 90% of their prior careers in a single sector--have indeed becoming less common, which fits the conventional wisdom. Sit-and-stayers accounted for about 65 percent of Eisenhower's appointees, less than 20 percent of Clinton's, and between 30 and 40 percent for the other five administrations. But for every administration after Eisenhower--including the three Republican administrations—the largest share of the sit-and-stayers were those anchored in *government*. In the George W. Bush administration, for example, 23 percent of appointees had overwhelmingly (90 percent or more) public-sector resumes, compared to 6 percent dominated by non-profit and just 4 percent dominated by business experience.
- **Mostly-Inners** Only around one-quarter of Eisenhower's appointees had spent half or more of their prior career in the public sector. But in every subsequent

administration sampled, the share of "mostly-inners" exceeded 40 percent. Over 55 percent of President Bush's appointees had spent the majority of their prior careers in government, the highest share of mostly-inners of the seven administrations studied.

- **Never-Inners and Barely-Inners** Appointees with no public-sector work history, or with government experience summing to less than a tenth of their careers were common under Eisenhower (53 percent of appointees) but otherwise accounted for fewer than one-fifth of appointees. For every group from the Reagan administration onward, these two categories have collectively claimed 15 percent of top appointees.

A cautious summary of these findings can be phrased like this: The relative importance of business and non-profit work in the backgrounds of first-term Presidential appointees displays no consistent pattern over the past half-century, so that (at least for this sample, within this segment of the public sector) the hypothesis of growing reliance on non-governmental expertise is not supported. A less cautious interpretation: For the past thirty years—since the Nixon administration--at the points in time and for the kinds of positions most open to the flow of talent from outside government, the relative importance of public-sector experience is *rising*, not falling.

These findings can be interpreted in several ways, of course, including ways that are consistent with the claim that distinctly public leadership is losing ground. But the simplest account may be the strongest: Public leadership is different. It requires a portfolio of instincts,

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skills, and habits of mind distinguishable from the business or non-profit leader's toolkit. Some people have a special taste and talent for this kind of work. It follows that reinforcing that taste and refining that talent endures as an eminently worthwhile enterprise.

APPENDIX

Readers who harbor doubts about the validity of these data, or who enjoy pondering the timeless treachery of numbers, are invited to read the appendix on potential sources of bias and alternative explanations.

On the reliability of the data

Do the data summarized here offer a reasonably representative picture of trends in in-and-outers, or might they be biased? This is a legitimate question to pose regarding any attempt to extract inferences about a half-century of experience from 336 resumes. The data are certainly biased in one sense--the reference years (the first year of an administration marking a change in party control) are selected to be especially hospitable to the selection of top officials from outside government. This, though, is deliberate; some accidental biases are worth considering.

1. *Changing rates of military service* I counted a stint in the military as a "public job," which some might argue is technically correct but distorts the story. Could shifts in the prevalence of military service bias the trends? This probably has something to do with the spike in average government experience under Kennedy--the bulk of Kennedy appointees had "public jobs" during World War II—but can't explain the high levels under Clinton and Bush. Indeed, when Clinton and Bush appointees were young men, military service was no longer routine for the kind of people who become Cabinet secretaries, so this factor somewhat suppresses the rising share of public-sector experience.

2. *Inaccurate resumes* My sources of biographical data--usually *Who's Who in America*--rely on self-reported information. Could Presidential appointees have been lying about or otherwise distorting their prior careers in ways that generate a false impression of increasing public-sector weight in the average appointee's career history? Distortion is always a risk with self-reported data. But note that *Who's Who* and the *Federal Staff Directory* are highly public references, making it hazardous for a public official to misrepresent his or her history. More to the point, in light of trends in the cultural status of government during this period, it seems improbable that officials' tendency to pare private-sector experience from their resumes and exaggerate public-sector experience would *rise* over time and peak in the Bush administration.

3. *Increasing confirmation problems for "outsider" appointments* The Senate confirmation process has become slower and more troublesome over time. It could be that snags and lags in confirmation have become *differentially* problematic for nominees who have a lot of private-sector experience, while government insiders (relatively speaking) sail through. Thus the design of the research--examining appointees in place during an administration's first year--would miss many "outsider" appointees who will eventually show up. (This is related to, but different from, the possibility discussed shortly that business-oriented candidates will refuse to serve or fail to be confirmed; here, the arrival of outsiders is delayed but not blocked.) This is plausible, though it isn't obvious that confirmation delays have more to do with nominees' private-sector than governmental backgrounds. The only way to exclude this possible source of bias, though, is to replicate the analysis to cover later stages of each administration.

4. *The shifting weight of government economy-wide* The public-sector share of American employment has fluctuated over the postwar era. It climbed from a demobilization trough of under 15 percent to exceed 20 percent in the late 1960s and early 1970s, then slid gradually back to around 15 percent.¹⁸ Perhaps we are just seeing the echo of this surge. That is, in 1993 or 2001 Cabinet secretaries (just like all the other fifty-somethings in America) were more likely to have government experience than people who hadn't been in the workforce during the uptick in public employment. There may be something to this; the proportion of public work in top officials' career histories has a decent correlation (0.68) with the 5-year average share of public employment economy-wide 20 years earlier. But most of the variation in overall public employment is accounted for by the military (which expanded in Vietnam and contracted thereafter) and education (public school payrolls swelled to accommodate the baby boomers, then ebbed as the demographic bulge moved onward.) Federal civilian employment has been a more or less steadily declining share of overall American employment since around the early 1950s. The ranks of top appointees include relatively few ex-teachers nor, as noted, can military service explain the pattern. So it isn't likely that a cohort effect is masking some growing propensity for non-governmental experience among Presidential appointees.

5. *The changing Cabinet/Sub-cabinet proportion* The rising number of Cabinet and Cabinet-equivalent positions over time, coupled with a roughly constant size for the reference groups studied, means that the proportion of Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries is higher for earlier than for later administrations. If the very top officials are more likely than less senior appointees to have extensive government experience, this could distort the analysis and lead to an erroneous conclusion that public experience is rising among Presidential appointees. As a

prophylactic against this possibility, I analyzed each year's Cabinet and Sub-cabinet populations separately, and then applied a constant weight to each sub-population (41 percent Cabinet, 49 percent Sub-Cabinet) that eliminates the effect of the changing mix across administrations. This alternative method yields a picture that differs only slightly from that painted by the raw data. The main effect is to smooth out the trend of government experience growing in importance from 1969 to 2001.

Table 3: Average Percent of Prior Career in Government, Corrected for Differences Between Most-Senior and Less-Senior Appointees, and Unadjusted		
	Constant-weight	Unadjusted
Eisenhower (1953)	27.4	25.9
Kennedy (1961)	52.5	51.8
Nixon (1969)	41.3	41.1
Carter (1977)	43.9	41.5
Reagan (1981)	49.1	46.8
Clinton (1993)	50.8	49.4
Bush (2001)	53.6	54.7

(Insert Table 3)

In short, while this topic may benefit from a more comprehensive empirical examination, with a larger data set and more sophisticated methods, the simple approach employed here seems to be a reasonably robust rough cut.

Alternative explanations

Even if the data's soundness is conceded there may be accounts of these findings that save the story of growingly cross-sectoral leadership. For example, the results could reflect a deeply dysfunctional Presidential appointments process, rather than a diminishing preference for leaders geared to the private sector. By this argument, the best picks for Cabinet and Sub-cabinet posts are indeed people with plenty of experience outside government. But an increasingly excruciating appointments process--intrusive background checks; onerous financial disclosure requirements; rancorous Senate confirmation hearings--means that the best picks refuse to serve. So to a growing degree Presidents have to settle for their second or third choices. These tend to be people with prior government experience, who know the ropes and can better navigate the process, or who simply have a demonstrated tolerance for its burdens and indignities. If and when the system gets fixed, we will see a surge of beyond-the-Beltway appointments.

It is hard to dispute that the tortuous process repels some potential appointees, and it is quite plausible that business-oriented candidates are differentially deterred. This factor probably does exert some downward pressure on the supply of appointees from the business and non-

profit worlds, but whether the effect is trivial or profound remains unclear. The only ways to know for sure are either to conduct detailed and candid interviews with the last several Presidential personnel directors to see how many CEO's and foundation heads turned them down, or to fix the appointments process and see what happens. In the meantime, the weight to accord this factor is a matter of judgement. My own instinct is that differential filtering of business-oriented candidates has a real but minor impact on an administration's composition.¹⁹

Another alternative account could focus on the surprising result that the first MBA president seems to have the most insider-heavy of the seven administrations, and to declare the George W. Bush presidency an anomaly. By this argument 2001 is improperly classified as the first year of a fresh party in power; it is better thought of as the 13th year, albeit after a hiatus, of the Reagan-Bush regime. It is not surprising to find a surfeit of government experience in what is essentially a restoration, but this is an idiosyncrasy with no implications for the broader shift toward business-oriented in-and-outers. There may be something to this. All of the public-sector experience for four of the 47 Bush officials studied took place between 1980 and 1992.²⁰ On the other hand, 18 of the 47 had worked for government *outside* this 12-year period. Nor can the restoration hypothesis explain the slow but steady growth in prevailing levels of government experience from Nixon to Carter to Reagan to Clinton.

Anne-Marie Slaughter has offered an elegant explanation for the apparent increase over time in appointees with a preponderance of government experience: two-career couples.²¹ The exigencies of a spouse's career may not have dissuaded a Detroit auto executive from heeding Ike's call to service in 1953. But today many, perhaps most, potential appointees can be

expected to have a working spouse, and the intimate negotiations sparked by a prospective move to Washington could culminate in candidates declining to serve. Families already established inside the Beltway face no such complexities. This, too, could account for some of the pattern, though it would be surprising if were the only factor.²² Another partial explanation may be the vertiginous rise in private-sector versus public-sector compensation. Fifty years ago the pay of Presidential appointees was, if less than princely, in the same general league as what a successful professional could expect in private life. Today's salary for a Cabinet member--while several multiples of the average family income—is roughly equivalent to starting pay for graduates of top law or business schools and a small fraction of a law partner's or CEO's compensation. The prospect of moderating a family's consumption levels, or drawing down savings, probably deters some prospective appointees.²³

Another interpretation of these findings that preserves the fading-public-leadership story would argue that the Federal government's prominence within the public sector is eroding as resources, authority, and popular legitimacy shift to the states and cities. The post-9/11 resurgence of national security concerns may undercut this assertion, but it has been a valid generalization for most of the past generation or so.²⁴ While the advertised transformation of leadership may not be apparent at the *national* level, the argument continues, it *is* occurring at the increasingly important state and local level. I have little information and hence no strong position on whether state and local leaders (unlike Presidential appointees) are increasingly drawn from business and non-profits. The claim is entirely plausible—but then, the corresponding claim about top Federal officials was plausible, too.

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¹ Hugh Hecló, "The In-and-Outer System: A Critical Assessment," in Calvin MacKenzie, eds., *The In-and-Outers* (Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1987) page TK

² See Derek Bok, "Government Personnel Policy in Competitive Perspective," in this volume.

³ The *U.S. Government Manual* is published annually by the Office of the Federal Register of the National Archives and Records Administration and distributed in print form by the U.S. Government Printing Office as well as electronically.

⁴ *Who's Who in America* (Marquis Who's Who/Reed Elsevier: New Providence, New Jersey, annual editions)

⁵ *Federal Staff Directory* (Congressional Quarterly Press: Washington DC, multiple editions each year)

⁶ David T. Stanley, Dean E. Mann, and Jameson Doig, *Men Who Govern: A Biographical Profile of Federal Political Executives* (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 1967)

⁷ The NAPA study is described, and its results summarized, in MacKenzie, op. cit.

⁸ These data are from MacKenzie, Table 1.8.

⁹ MacKenzie, Table 1.7.

¹⁰ One could argue that these officials are elected, not appointed, and hence should be excluded. But the career trajectories of the people at the top of the team seem highly relevant to the search for a shifting definition of public leadership.

¹¹ The difference in the number of individuals studied across reference years is mainly a function of the changing size of the senior White House staff as new organizations (such as the National Economic Council) are established.

¹² In the results presented below, Deputy Secretaries are included with Secretaries and top White House staff in the subgroup of senior appointees labeled—not quite accurately—as the "Cabinet" group.

¹³ The selection process involved randomly choosing a starting agency for each reference year, randomly choosing a letter of the alphabet by which to choose the name of the first Assistant Secretary or Undersecretary for that year's reference group, then going through the list of Sub-cabinet officials in the administration and selecting each n th official, with n being the number of Sub-cabinet officials in the administration divided by the number needed for the reference group, or 50 minus the number of Cabinet and Cabinet-equivalent officials.

¹⁴ In the case of Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries, we replaced the missing position with a substitute, using the same random selection procedure. In the case of Cabinet positions (where we included all, not just a sample, in the reference group) a vacancy meant a smaller reference group. This caused a relatively minor loss in information; only seven out of 140 Cabinet-and-equivalent positions over the period could not be examined.

¹⁵ I am grateful to Richard Light for advice on this point. Note that the total of Senate-approved Presidential appointees is much higher—roughly 2000—but includes a large number of

commission and board members, diplomats, U.S. attorneys, and other officials beyond the White House staff, Cabinet, and Sub-cabinet members at issue here.

¹⁶ To some extent the variation in the length of prior career reflected differences in age, but another major factor is the broad increase in professional training prior to the start of a career.

¹⁷ Readers who harbor doubts about the validity of these data, or who enjoy pondering the timeless treachery of numbers, are invited to read the appendix on potential sources of bias and alternative explanations

¹⁸ These percentages are calculated from data in U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Survey of Current Business*, National Income and Product Account Tables 605B and 605C, various issues.

¹⁹ This judgment is based in part on the admittedly casual empiricism of my brief experience in Presidential personnel during the Clinton transition, where I found little evidence of a general reluctance to serve. Never before or since have my phone calls been so promptly returned. That said, other administrations, drawing on different pools of potential personnel, may encounter more systematic resistance.

²⁰ These four are Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao, Deputy Secretary of Transportation Michael P. Jackson, and two Treasury officials, Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy Richard Clarida, and Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Sheila Bair.

²¹ Dr. Slaughter made this observation at a Visions of Governance seminar at the Kennedy School, January 28, 2002.

²² The simplest test for this account would be to track officials by prior address, not prior career, to see if geographic inertia is increasing.

²³ This effect is likely exacerbated by rising living costs in the Washington area. Today, to a far greater degree than in Eisenhower's time, housing prices in DC and its suburbs are bid up both by lawyers, lobbyists, and other professionals who orbit the Federal government and by prosperous employees of the region's growing high-tech industry.

²⁴ I have discussed this trend in *Disunited States: What's at Stake as Washington Fades and the States Take the Lead* (Basic Books: New York, 1997).