

Chapter 5

Particular Peacemaking: The Justice-Care Debate Revisited

The last chapter looked at the different models of peacemaking employed by the Israeli and Palestinian women. I argued that the different approaches embedded in the peace with care and the peace with justice models must be carefully negotiated to make possible the joint activism of the Jerusalem Link. This chapter turns to political and moral theory to reexamine the particular combination of care and justice that contribute to both Israeli and Palestinian peacemaking.

The first section of this chapter responds to the Kantian emphasis on an abstract, emotion-free duty shaping moral actions. I argue that although the Israeli women display a strong duty to engage in peacemaking, this duty is historically and religiously particular, rather than universal. It is derived from and inextricably intermingled with sympathetic feelings towards the Palestinians. And it is as collective as it is individual. Moreover, Bat Shalom activists attempt to intensify this duty by increasing their own sympathy and guilt and engendering these feelings in the Israeli public.

The second section responds to feminist theorists who have stressed the dichotomy between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice. I argue first that presumed gender differences in “care” and “justice” are not deeply relevant for the Israeli and Palestinian women I interviewed. I argue second that the peacemaking of both the Palestinians and the Israelis can be understood only by looking at the

convergence of care and justice in each model. “Peace with justice” turns out to involve a deep concern with care; “Peace with care” involves a deep concern with justice.

I. Duty and Israeli Peacemaking

“When I visited Hebron, Ramallah, Bir Zeit University, Bethlehem, Gaza City, and East Jerusalem, I saw things that Zionists just don't talk about. I understood where rage comes from.... When I was in the Occupied Territories, I felt hatred for Israelis. Now don't get me wrong, I would still defend Israel with my life, unhesitatingly. But I saw the occupation as a monster that I, and my people, were responsible for.”

-Jesse Prupas, Canadian Jewish college student.¹

“It is our duty, it is our obligation — it is an imperative — that we as Jews, as Zionists and as people don't ignore the current Palestinian situation.”

-Ronny Jaeger, Bat Shalom activist²

Jesse Prupas and Ronny Jaeger here articulate the collective sense of duty that motivates many Israeli peacemakers. The Israeli women peacemakers I interviewed revealed the central role of sentiments — such as sympathy, concern, relatedness, and understanding for the oppressed — in creating their sense of duty. In investigating this sense of duty in moral theory, it seemed obvious to turn first to the theory of Immanuel Kant. Yet Kantian moral theory and other theories that derive from it have long seen duty-driven morality as opposed to sentiment-driven morality.³ Kant himself, for example, said that:

¹ Jesse Prupas, personal e-mail, 9 April 1999.

² Ronny Jaeger, interview, 20 July 1999.

³ In this chapter, I rely on the interpretations of duty within Kantian ethics offered by Lawrence A. Blum, in *Friendship, Altruism and Morality* (London: Routledge and Kegan and Paul, 1980) and in “Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory,” *Ethics* 98 (1988): 472-49; Annette C. Baier, in “Hume: The Women's Moral Theorist?” in *Women and Moral Theory*, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987); Susan Moller Okin, in “Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice,” *Ethics* 99 (1989): 229-249; and Jane J. Mansbridge, in “Feminism and Democratic Community,” in *Democratic Community*, ed. John W. Chapman and Ian Shapiro (New York: New York University Press, 1993).

There are many minds so sympathetically constituted that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find pleasure in spreading joy around them, and can take delight in the satisfaction of others as far as it is their own work. But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind however, proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations.⁴

Contemporary feminist critics of Kant, by contrast, have rehabilitated a “Humean” morality that derives from human relationships, friendships, and sympathy.⁵ In this section I will argue that the “duty” that shapes the actions of the Israeli men and women peacemakers I interviewed differs from a classic, reason-derived Kantian universalistic understanding of duty. Understanding these differences, moreover, can help to illuminate the role of duty in the Israeli activism, which I have loosely called a “peace with care” vision of peacemaking. This Israeli duty is particular in its thrust, grounded in human emotions, and collective in scope.

Kantian Duty

Within the Kantian view of moral actions autonomously willed by rational human beings, duty is the reason for action. Deeds are morally worthy not for their eventual outcome but because they fulfil certain universalizable maxims. You choose not to cheat, lie, or steal because you would will these prohibitions to become universal law. An immoral act is an act that you would not want to universalize; a moral act is one you would want to universalize. Humans can use their naturally endowed capacity to reason in order to decide which acts fall within

⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), as quoted in Mansbridge (1993), 359.

⁵ See Baier’s (1987) explication of the gender implications in the philosophy of David Hume.

the boundaries of this categorical imperative to universalize one's act. The theory hinges on the motivating role of duty within the rational world: you have a duty to do morally good acts, irrespective of any outcome, payoff, or self-interest you may reap from doing good. Human reason is the sole author of these moral rules, which must be universal and impartial in regard to specific historical, political, or social circumstance.

In Kant's theory, human feelings are not morally significant and should not be taken into account when you rationally decide which duties you would will to be universal law. Emotions cannot be made an object of obligation. You cannot have a rational duty to feel angry, sympathetic, grateful, guilty or concerned. Indeed, such emotional precipitants or outcomes of moral acts are irrelevant when considering the act's moral worth. Neither the emotions of the doer or those of the recipient of moral actions can thus be taken into account.⁶ Kant claims that the origins of the duty, on which the rest of his moral framework depends, come from an individual legislating for himself and obeying certain laws or principles generated solely from within himself, from within his own reason.⁷ Our emotions and feelings do not reflect our moral worth. Only our ability to choose — our will — can reflect our moral value. According to Kant:

Man must, therefore, judge that he is able to stand up to [his inclinations] and subdue them by reason — not at some time in the future but at once (the moment he thinks of duty): he must judge that he can do what the law commands unconditionally that he ought to do.⁸

⁶ My brief summary of Kantian ethics in *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) is guided by James W. Ellington's introduction (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1981), v-xiii.

⁷ From Lawrence Blum's analysis of Kantian ethics in his "Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory" (1988), 475.

⁸ Kant, *The Doctrine of Virtue*, quoted in Blum (1980), 170.

Duty — doing what you “ought to do” — should not reflect underlying emotional inclinations or partialities.

A Particular Peacemaking Duty

Almost all of the Israeli peacemakers used the specific words “duty” or “obligation” to explain the belief system that underlies their peacemaking actions. Yet, I will argue, their understanding of duty differs from that of Kant. Frequently, they specified the following duties: helping Palestinians as individuals or as a people, creating a peaceful future for their children and for the Palestinian children, and changing the nature of the Jewish State to make it less militarized and more democratic.

The act of peacemaking itself, the moral action deriving from these peacemakers’ duties, could be morally creditable under the Kantian criteria. A rational human being *would* will peace as a universal law. Yet in contrast to the Kantian conception, the Israeli women peacemakers in my study did not, I believe, derive their duties from the process of willing a universalizable law. Their duties may be thought of as, in a sense, “pre-Kantian.” They are given by the obligations into which the peacemakers were born and within which they have created their selves. Their strong sense of a duty to engage in peacemaking derives from the particular convergence of historical, biblical, and sociological values intrinsic to the Jewish faith, civilization, and the modern Zionist experience.⁹

⁹ Zionism, the over one hundred year old founding political ideology of the State of Israel, still plays a role in the moral psyche of Jews throughout the world and within Israel itself. For the purpose of clarity, we must distinguish “Jews” as a 2000-year-old religious group from the national group of “Israelis” that is a twentieth century creation. First, this clear separation between the two collective identities is important because many secular Israelis feel that Zionism (an ideological commitment to Israel) encompasses both their religious and national identity. They feel that

In both biblical and rabbinical sources, Jews are taught the centrality of *Tikkun Olam*, a fundamental component of Jewish practice that, literally, means, “healing the world.” *Tikkun Olam* is the broad umbrella commandment to help others in need through actions, charity, and general communal service. Like Kantian moral duty, this imperative is generalizable and impartial. No one is exempt from this commandment, which is reinforced by the Talmud and almost all Jewish traditional texts. Yet the derivation of this duty comes not from autonomous reason but from the biblical contract between man and god on which Jewish belief is founded. Thus, the value of helping the “orphan, the widow, and naked,” a phrase repeated many times throughout the Bible to indicate the commandment of social justice, is both a universalizable moral imperative and one specific to the Jewish people and their covenant with god.

Historically, the commandment to help others in need — both individuals and groups — dates back to the Exodus story and its lessons. Be generous and giving to strangers, the Bible repeatedly commands, because you yourselves were slaves in Egypt. There you were a foreign, persecuted people. Thus, the specific Jewish duty to help other oppressed groups derives from the collective historical memory of their experience with suffering.

identifying with Judaism, Jewish practice, or Jewish belief is superfluous. Second, Diasporan Jews have varying connections and affinities with Zionism and Israel. For example, some of the most religious ultra-orthodox Jews, within Israel and in the Diaspora, do not support Zionism or the creation of a Jewish State in the biblical Palestine because they believe that a Jewish return to the homeland must be preceded by the coming of the Messiah. Third, many of the Israeli peacemakers I interviewed were not natives (or Sabras), but rather Israeli Jewish immigrants from Canada and the US. Their commitment to peacemaking represents an individual distinct legacy, the convergence of their Zionist and Jewish identities. Thus, being a Zionist and a Jew are not necessarily consonant identities.

Kant assumes that every individual human actor, given the same faculties of reason, would derive the same set of duties. Thus Kantian is often called an “impartialist” moral theory. We would all rationally will an obligation to seek peace, for example, because peacefulness is generally of universal, impartial societal benefit. The Israeli peacemakers, however, have a deeper and more particular sense of duty. Their duty to treat other minority groups protectively derives not only from an impartial, generalizable situation but also from the specific experience of the Jewish people with persecution.

The historical memory of victimhood continues to play an important role in the Jewish duty to aid those who are now victims. Within the modern State of Israel, this traditional Jewish sensitivity to victimhood has been complicated by the past fifty years of Jewish history. The Israeli peacemakers I interviewed talked about Zionism as an ideology born of necessity — the dire situation of Jews in Eastern Europe in the late nineteenth century. European anti-Semitism led Zionists to see no other solution than to create a political Jewish homeland. The death of six million European Jews during World War II reaffirmed the urgency of building a separate state where Jews would be safe from future Hitlers. Yet the implementation of this ideology, in settling and establishing the modern State of Israel, led to the oppression of the Palestinians. Many of the Israeli peacemakers talked about this irony — that the actual Jewish experiment in escaping persecution, the Zionist “miracle,” came at the cost of other people’s lives. The Jewish people joyously celebrate May 14, 1948 as Israel’s birthday. This same day is a day of mourning among the Palestinians and the larger Arab World — marking

the beginning of “al-naqba,” the catastrophe. This irony unsettles the Israeli peacemakers. Their experience as members of a group that has oppressed another minority strongly motivates them to redress the wrongs of the 1948 catastrophe. Thus the Israeli sense of duty derives from their *particular* historical, religious, and political experiences.

A Feeling-Derived Duty

The role of historical memory in the Israeli peacemakers’ duty also challenges Kant’s dismissal of human emotions as irrelevant and capricious in the estimation of moral worth. Kant also calls emotions and feelings secondary (in estimation of moral worth) because they are useful only in the rational process of cognitive analysis.¹⁰ Feeling sympathy for a Palestinian woman abused in an Israeli prison, for example, is relevant only as a way to extract the underlying belief or imperative, that imprisonment, abuse, and occupation are all morally reprehensible. The rational conviction of reprehensibility, formulated as a general will, then creates the obligation to change these political conditions or to engage in peacemaking.

By contrast to this Kantian analysis, the role of emotions is essential to the duty prescribed by the historical memory of Jewish suffering. Individual and group feelings play a *primary* role in creating the duty in the first place. Thus, the pain of slavery — the backbreaking slave labor of building pyramids — is used in Jewish tradition to evoke a set of emotions that will create a sense of duty to act benevolently towards other impoverished or persecuted groups and individuals.

¹⁰ Blum, *Friendship, Altruism and Morality*, (1980), 201.

The sense of historical duty to treat with care minorities and those in need represents a Jewish legacy that often appears in the form of a specific feeling, which I will call “guilt.”¹¹ Although Kant specifically excludes human emotions from the construction of duty, particular feelings of guilt toward the Palestinians among the Israeli peacemakers are a major foundation of their sense of duty. Many of the Israeli women I interviewed said that by rebuilding Palestinian homes, by standing vigil on a street corner every week to protest the occupation, or even by befriending Palestinian counterparts, they feel that they can alleviate this personal sense of guilt. Kant attributes no moral worth to this process. Indeed, one might frame the process solely in psychological terms, casting the “guilt” as a “burden” to be relieved by taking certain psychological steps. I will argue, however, that this guilt has moral worth, and thus that a *feeling* has moral worth.

A Collective Duty

The peacemaker’s sense of duty differs from Kantian duty not only in its particularity and in its embeddedness in emotions, but also in its collectivity. Most Israelis would applaud, for example, an individual effort to help Kosovar refugees as a “good deed” — a morally good or right action — simply because it helped people in need. This estimation of moral worth could come either from the rational legislation of general duty, as Kant would suppose, or from a religiously transmitted sense of duty towards social justice. It would apply to every individual. By contrast, the guilt that motivates much of the work of Bat Shalom sees the duty

¹¹ I use the word “guilt” here cautiously because it has acquired many colloquial meanings and connotations far removed from my subject matter. Here I refer to the specific feelings by Israeli peacemakers that they collectively — as Jews, Zionists, or Israelis — have contributed to the suffering of the Palestinians.

to help Palestinians as one that should become a *collective* feeling of duty among all Jews and Israelis. One specific collective — the national group of Israelis plus the religious group of Jews — should feel emotionally as well as cognitively responsible for the suffering of another specific collective — the Palestinians.

Transforming Duty into Action

The *particularity* of the peacemaking imperative, the *feelings* of the participants, and the *collectivity* of this imperative influence the programs of Bat Shalom. The organization focuses on raising the cognitive awareness of the Israeli public about the condition of life in the Occupied Territories, specific Israeli government policies such as the revocation of the residency status of Palestinians in Jerusalem, and the plight of individual families like the Shawamreh family (whose house was demolished). Bat Shalom attempts to raise cognitive awareness of the effects of specific policies and to encourage a cognitive reassessment of those policies. At the same time, the organization's members hope to create certain feelings in the Israeli public. They tell the story of the Shawamreh family on the website in such a way as to elicit sympathy for the Palestinians. They expect support for the campaign against house demolitions to derive from a mixture of cognitive and emotional sources. In addition, Bat Shalom members are frank about their feelings of implication and responsibility in the plight of the Palestinian people, as well as their view that all Israelis should share this guilty conscience. The peacemakers see themselves at the forefront of publicizing the collective moral duty that they feel falls on all Israelis and Jews.

Beyond Israeli Peacemaking Duty: Increasing the Guilt

Kant acknowledges the role of feelings such as guilt, frustration, sadness, worry, and concern in producing what he calls the “act of beneficence.” Yet he attributes no moral worth or value to these feelings:

It is not possible that our heart should swell from fondness for every man’s interest and should swim in sadness at every stranger’s need; else the virtuous man, incessantly dissolving like Heraclitus in compassionate tears, nevertheless with all this goodheartedness would become nothing but a tenderhearted idler.¹²

In contrast, the women of Bat Shalom value highly the feelings of guilt that create a sense of responsibility towards the Palestinian situation. Provoking guilt is in fact a major objective of their peacemaking strategies.

Since the 1967 War, the populations of Israel and the acquired Occupied Territories have been strictly divided, with little cultural, education, or political overlap. Many Israelis have never crossed what is called the Green Line. They consider “Ramallah [a Palestinian town twenty minutes north of Jerusalem] farther than Taiwan.”¹³ The standard of living also varies dramatically between the two areas. While most parts of Israel seem like a modern western country, beyond the Green Line, unemployment, poverty, and over-population plague the Territories. Public works such as sanitation, road construction, and sewage systems are noticeably reduced beyond the 1967 border. Israelis often avoid interacting with Palestinians by not visiting Palestinian communities, even though these Palestinian communities are often only located less than a mile from Israeli towns. Many of

¹² Kant, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1763), as quoted in Blum (1980), 153.

¹³ Ronny Jaeger, interview, 20 July 1999.

the peacemakers within Israel talked of their “eye-opening experiences” visiting Palestinian communities and meeting with local leaders. They discussed the power of these actual experiences to evoke a sense of guilt and subsequently to foment a sense of duty to help the Palestinians. By ignoring the Palestinian population and the conditions in which they live, most of the Israeli public can avoid this potential feeling of guilt and the subsequent moral responsibility to help.

Because the Israeli peacemakers understand the role of feelings in driving moral beliefs and actions, many of the Bat Shalom projects attempt to bring Israelis into the Occupied Territories through their direct political action projects. They also hope that the dialogue groups bringing Israeli and Palestinian women together will provoke feelings of guilt and sympathy in the Israelis and will generate greater support among both the Israeli and Palestinian participants for more lenient political positions. They also hope that the dialogues will engender sympathy among the Palestinians, partly because such sympathy will foster cognitive understanding of the Israeli government’s positions, and partly because sympathy on one side tends to engender sympathy on the other.

Their concern with personal transformation based on guilt and care is why Bat Shalom directors felt so strongly that, among all Israelis, settlers are the most important potential members of dialogue groups. Provoking feelings of sympathy in Israeli settlers is morally good in itself. Moreover, provoking feelings of guilt and responsibility among these settlers could be instrumental to the ultimate peacemaking goals. Israelis who have witnessed the Palestinian lifestyle and conditions, have traveled to refugee camps, or have befriended Palestinian people

are more likely to develop a sense of duty in regard to them, which then fosters a desire to engage in peacemaking.

I have argued here that feelings of sympathy for the oppressed in general and the Palestinians in particular directly trigger the Israeli peacemakers' sense of duty. The position of the Israelis vis à vis the Palestinians is in great part non-voluntary or "given," as is the sense of duty to which that position gives rise. The political philosopher Michael Sandel describes such given attachments as:

[The] loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are — as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons and daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic.¹⁴

The particular loyalties and convictions given by Israeli nationality, Jewish religion, and modern Jewish history have shaped the moral beliefs and actions of the Israeli peacemakers. Their duties appear to be primarily non-voluntary, in contrast to Kant's conception of duties voluntarily chosen by rational actors. The peacemakers' specific feelings of sympathy and guilt towards the Palestinians also represent a non-voluntary "given" that constitutes their selves as they experience those selves.

The Israeli sense of guilt, a non-voluntary obligation, shapes their peacemaking actions. Michael Sandel argues that such embedded "non-voluntary

¹⁴ Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 178-179.

obligations” are not necessarily chosen but still have moral worth.¹⁵ He describes the constitutive duties that:

go beyond the obligations I voluntarily incur and the ‘natural duties’ I owe to human beings as such. They allow that to some I owe more than justice requires or even permits, not by reason of agreements I have made but instead in virtue of those more or less enduring attachments and commitments which taken together partly define the person I am.¹⁶

These given obligations and the feelings from which they derive are morally significant in the lives of the peacemakers I interviewed.

Given obligations are not, however, static or fully prescribed. A critical part of the moral behavior of a person with given obligations is her ability to reflect on moral questions and to change her actions. Recent political theorists have suggested, for example, that a given obligation, of greater and lesser importance, might be attached to certain social roles. We may try to be a good student, mother or bricklayer, for example, because “the morality of association includes a large number of ideals each defined in ways suitable for the respective status or role.”¹⁷

Yet we cannot take each of these roles simply as given. We must engage these roles, subjecting their constitutive obligations to deeper critical scrutiny.

Sandel’s political theory implies this necessary scrutiny. He suggests that our “enduring attachments and commitments” are “not chosen but discovered.”¹⁸

Such discovery is not always passive but often active. Active discovery reinforces

¹⁵ Mansbridge, 356 points out that these conclusions are also associated with a group of feminist philosophers including Nancy Hirschmann. See Nancy J. Hirschmann, “Freedom, Recognition, and Obligation: A Feminist Approach to Political Theory,” *American Political Science Review* 83 (1989): 1227-1244.

¹⁶ Sandel, 179.

¹⁷ Alistair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1981), 468.

¹⁸ Sandel, 179.

the role of the subject of moral actions and her ability for moral change. Upon discovering your attachments, you act upon the particular aims and beliefs prescribed by these attachments. Ultimately, says Sandel, this discovery allows individuals' the ability to "move in history," to exert agency over their moral actions. Sandel conceives of constitutive attachments in a way that allows for individual moral self-reflection:

As a self-interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my history and in this sense to distance myself from it, but the distance is always precarious and provisional, the point of reflection never finally secured outside the history itself. A person with character thus knows that he is implicated in various ways even as he reflects, and feels this moral weight of what he knows.¹⁹

The women of Bat Shalom both interpret their given obligations to help the Palestinians and seek to intensify these moral obligations. They actively try to increase their sense of guilt and the subsequent duty to engage in peacemaking. In one telling interview, Gila Svirsky told me how one peacemaking project contributed to the moral development of the peacemakers themselves:

We were very successful in organizing joint condolence calls to a Palestinian home of someone who was killed. It was very useful for Israeli women to go to a Palestinian home and just sit with the family. You can express grief and you can get bombarded with their anger and hatred, even towards other women. I feel educated every time I do one of these condolence calls. It is a useful consciousness raising technique. It is good for us [emphasis mine].²⁰

Svirsky's language is revealing. Being bombarded with the anger of the Palestinians will strengthen the Israeli peacemakers' moral conviction to help them. By exposing themselves to Palestinian anger, the Israeli women voluntarily

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Gila Svirsky, interview, 25 August 1999.

increase their non-voluntary obligations by intensifying the feelings bound up with these obligations. They are actively, consciously trying to increase their own sympathies and their guilt. Likewise, Bat Shalom attempts to “bombard” the Israeli public with Palestinian anger, hoping to provoke similar sympathies and thus help the public to discover what the peacemakers see as its given obligations.

II. Care Embraces Justice: Feminist Theory Illuminates the Role of Care in Palestinian Justice

This investigation of the models of peacemaking used by Bat Shalom and the JCW began with the hypothesis that the Jerusalem Link’s “feminist vision of peace” derived from a morality of care, shaped by responsibility and relationships and associated with women more than with men. I asked both the Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers whom I interviewed to respond to what I termed the “ethic of care question,” referring to a loose correlation between women and the morality of caring, with its related moral behaviors such as empathy, concern, relatedness, and understanding. As the responses revealed (see section II of Chapter Two and section II of Chapter Three), however, neither the Palestinian nor the Israeli peacemakers agreed that care is a necessarily feminine moral characteristic.

It turned out that the most important contribution of feminist theory to this analysis was not its deconstruction of the categories “male” and “female,” which were not, by and large, essentialized by the women (and men) I interviewed, but rather its challenge to the presumed dichotomy of the very categories “care” and

“justice.”²¹ Feminist theorists have challenged the tendency to dichotomize the two ethics, proposing instead methods of synthesis that I believe illuminate the convergence of care and justice shaping the actions of the Palestinian and Israeli women peacemakers.

As these synthesis models offered by the feminist theorists reveal, the limits of caring and the limits of justice are not rationally or autonomously derived, but are culturally, historically, and politically specific. Neither domain of care or justice is distinct but rather, as Seyla Benhabib and Susan Moller Okin have pointed out, a matter of entwined cultural interpretation.²² The moral ethics of the Palestinian peace with justice model exemplifies this particular synthesis. I argue that the Palestinian women’s concern with justice reveals a deep commitment to care—for their people, land, and collective dignity. Although in this section I particularly focus on the Palestinian case, the convergence of care and justice in both the Israeli and Palestinian visions of peacemaking highlights that the most useful resolution of the care–justice debate must come from a particular, partial, and situated characterization of moral thinking and action.

Dichotomizing Care and Justice

²¹ The dichotomy interests but also challenges feminist theorists in particular because of what I call the “gender appropriation problem,” that is, the prevalent correlation of the ethic of care with the female gender. Although bearing only tangential relevance to my point, this problem is the reason that feminist theorists in particular analyze this dichotomy, although anyone thinking about morality and its constitutive components should be equally interested.

²² In *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1992), Benhabib writes that “the line between matters of justice and those of the good life is not given by some moral dictionary but evolves as a result of the historical and cultural struggles,” 75. Benhabib’s recognition of the specificity of circumstance that influences moral decision-making is a fundamental component of my argument. This section will look at the specific convergence of care and justice in the peacemaking of the Israeli and Palestinian women I interviewed. See also Okin (1989).

Although her research has since been questioned on the grounds of its limited methodology and essentializing implications, Carol Gilligan's empirical work began the line of thinking that led eventually to challenges to the dichotomy between "justice" and "care." Gilligan's description of what I will call the ethic of care grew out of her critique of Lawrence Kohlberg's (Kantian influenced) delineation of eight stages of hierarchical moral development. For Kohlberg, the morally good person reasons and acts on the basis of the principles of "justice as fairness."²³ From studies based on interviews with American college students regarding their moral decision-making processes, Gilligan presented an alternative type of moral thinking, an ethic of care or responsibility:

In this conception, the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibility rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract. This conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care centers moral development around the understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights and roles.²⁴

In this passage, Gilligan identifies the differences between morality of care and the traditional Kantian-Kohlberg morality of justice. Responsibility and relationships replace rights and rules. A morality of care relies on concrete circumstances rather than on formal and abstract principles. The morality is not expressed as a set of principles of judgements but as an "activity of care."²⁵ In her work, Gilligan

²³ Owen Flanagan and Kathryn Jackson, "Justice, Care and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited," *Ethics* 97 (April 1987), 623. Kohlberg might have borrowed the phrase from John Rawls, who originally presented it in, "Justice as Fairness," *The Philosophical Review* 59, no.2 (April 1958): 164-194.

²⁴ Gilligan, 19.

²⁵ Joan C. Tronto, "Political Science and Caring: Or, The Perils of Balkanized Social Science," *Women and Politics* 7, no. 3 (Fall 1987), 88.

claimed empirical support for the existence of an alternative moral orientation to the one based on impartiality, impersonality, justice, formal rationality, and universal principle. Gilligan never contended that the two distinct moralities were determined by gender. She observed, however, that in contemporary American society for whatever reason, some women tend to display the morality of care more than some men.²⁶

Nel Noddings and Sara Ruddick followed up on Gilligan's work, proposing a reason for what Gilligan thought was an empirical correlation between gender and the ethic of care. In doing so, both theorists claimed the ethic of care as distinctly feminine, extending beyond the cautious correlation implied but not concluded by Gilligan's work. I will call this assumption — that the ethic of care represents a feminine ethic entirely or an aspect of female moral thinking — the “gender appropriation” of this ethic. This appropriation problematically reinforces the assumption that justice, with its constitutive principles of reason and rights, is a masculine ethic in a male domain.

Arguing that justice and reason have been overly emphasized as central to moral thinking and action, Nel Noddings calls for a “feminine” approach to ethics — an “ethics of the mother that values caring over reason.”²⁷ Her glorification of a virtuous feminist ethic dangerously misinterprets Gilligan's qualified (potential) correlation between care and female gender. Nodding's argument — that justice

²⁶ Gilligan, 87. The more systematic contention, that women in general display a morality of care more than men, has not been substantiated with representative samples of the U.S. population or with representative samples of professional-class populations (the populations in which one would expect this difference based on Kohlberg's and Gilligan's research). See Mansbridge (1993), Note 33, 382.

²⁷ Nel Noddings, *Caring: The Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 2.

must be supplemented by feminine caring — reinforces the traditional roles of women. Many of the peacemakers I interviewed, although not necessarily familiar with Noddings' work, responded vehemently and negatively to the suggestion that women might — for biological, cultural, or social reasons — bring a necessarily feminine ethic of care to their peacemaking activity. Both Israelis and Palestinians saw this prediction as potentially stereotyping women and neglecting the caring behavior displayed by men, echoing the critiques of Nodding expressed by recent feminist theorists.

Sara Ruddick's *Maternal Thinking* further exemplifies a feminist attempt to claim the ethic of care for women. Asking why and how women might be more caring, Ruddick points to skills learned and practiced in the act of mothering: "preserving the lives of children is the central constitutive invariant aim of maternal practice; the commitment to achieving that aim is the constitutive maternal act."²⁸ Ruddick's work is particularly pertinent to the Jerusalem Link because she specifically applies to the realm of international peacemaking the idea that maternal thinking may be implicit in the ethic of care's emphasis on relationships and responsibility. Ruddick contends that the "peacefulness latent in maternal practices and that transforms maternal thinking could make a distinctive contribution to peace politics."²⁹

In the second sections of both Chapter Two and Chapter Three, I discussed how a few Palestinian and Israeli women registered qualified support for Ruddick's suggestion that maternal thinking can be effectively and creatively applied to

²⁸ Ruddick, 19.

²⁹ Ibid., 137.

peacemaking. These women, usually members of the older generation, talked about women's patience, their ability to cultivate relationships, and their understanding of long-term benefits as typically female and maternal skills that enable them to be better peacemakers than, or at least different from, men. These responses, however, were far from unanimous. Other women peacemakers I interviewed pointed to women — both Israeli and Palestinian — who participated in right-wing political activism, displaying moral behavior that they considered lacking in care. Some of these right-wing women *also* justified their anti-peace activism on the grounds of maternal thinking.³⁰ Other women peacemakers rejected the idea that gender should predict distinct peacemaking skills since many men displayed the same care as women in grassroots activism. A few women pointed out that both Israeli and Palestinian fathers were equally concerned about the impact of violence and the protracted conflict on society. Echoing the protests of recent feminist critics, they objected to designating the ethic of care as typically female or seeing this ethic as learned through maternal practices. Feminist critics argue that appropriating Gilligan's different voice as an exclusively or predominantly female moral orientation will undermine the feminist aims of

³⁰ In "Giving Birth to a Settlement: Maternal Thinking and Political Action of Jewish Women on the West Bank," *Gender & Society* 9, no. 1 (February 1995), Tamar El-Or and Gideon Aran describe the varied uses of maternal narrative and maternal thinking in women's political actions within Israel and the West Bank that activists on the left would not consider "caring." They discuss particularly the appropriation of maternal thinking as a justification for both violent protest and eventual Jewish settlement in the occupied territories. They conclude that feminists must be careful "to examine the local context of each group of women." Such an examination, they argue, reveals that there is no automatic or evolutionary connection between the "standpoint of peacemaking and maternal thinking or feminist action," 75-76.

equality, further alienate women from justice-oriented moral philosophy, and marginalize women in political processes that have traditionally excluded them.³¹

Several of the Palestinian and Israeli women I interviewed expressed their fears of the essentializing effect of appropriating a gendered caring ethic to their roles as women peacemakers. These fears often meant that, over the course of an interview, an individual woman would first register support for the ethic of care question and then subsequently challenge her earlier opinion. The hesitancy I heard and saw over the course of the interviews reveals, I believe, that the women as individuals are personally grappling with the justice-care dichotomy. Both the Palestinian and the Israeli women in my study seemed to believe cognitively in principles of justice and to act morally through a framework of care, in ways neither predicted nor explained by the prevailing care-justice dichotomy.

Synthesizing Care and Justice

More current feminist critics of Gilligan, Noddings, and Ruddick call into question not only whether care is inherently female — a question that turned out not to be central to my investigation — but also, more importantly, whether care can be segregated so distinctly from justice in moral decision making. I will call such critics of the care-justice dichotomy “synthesizers” because they propose

³¹ Susan Okin makes this point in “Justice and Gender,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 16 (1987): 42-72. In “Political Science and Caring: Or, the Perils of Balkanized Social Science” (1987), Joan Tronto rightly questions whether Gilligan ever intended that the two moralities or voices in moral thinking be determined by gender. Tronto argues that we should ask why and how, within the current Kantian-influenced age of rational moral justice, an earlier moral emphasis on caring and sympathy became associated with women’s morality or women’s place in society. Such a caring-based moral theory had earlier been espoused by such Scottish Enlightenment philosophers as David Hume, Francis Hutcheson, and Adam Smith. This question, which examines why caring has been attributed to women, would look at the allocation and distribution of caring within a just society. Tronto says that this examination should be of central concern feminist theorists and feminist projects. Mansbridge (1993), citing Baier (1987) and others, shows that both Kant and Hegel explicitly allocated women to the realm of care and men to the realm of justice.

different models of reconciling what they see as two complementary and essential components of morality.³² I will discuss the models proposed by some of the major synthesizers, underlining their relevance to the particular synthesis of care and justice revealed in the work of the Israeli and the Palestinian women whom I interviewed. The gender appropriation of the caring morality is less central than these particular syntheses of care and justice.

Joan Tronto presents a weak challenge to the care-justice dichotomy. Looking at the place of “caring” in a just society, she argues, is the most morally relevant and productive application of this dichotomy.³³ Such an exploration requires understanding that caring is a societal good of which there is never enough and, as such, should be distributed using the principles of justice. The provision of care (when, to whom, to what, in what dimensions) must rely on the same questions employed in the distribution of justice.³⁴ Moreover, a society based on the principles of justice will create the social conditions necessary to foster and act upon the ethic of care. Finally, the vocabulary of caring and its attendant values can be used to rethink what contributes to the institution of justice and its

³² In this section, I rely on the following works by feminist “synthesizers:” Joan Tronto, “Women and Caring: What Can Feminists Learn About Morality From Caring?” in *Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing*, ed. Alison M. Jaggar and Susan R. Bordo (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1986), “Political Science and Caring: Or, The Perils of Balkanized Social Science” (1987), and “The Question of Justice and the Nature of Caring in Politics” in *Gender, Care, and Justice in Feminist Political Theory, working papers compiled by S. Sevenhijzen*. (Utrecht: University of Utrecht, 1991); Grace Clement, *Care, Autonomy, and Justice: Feminism and the Ethic of care* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1996); Owen Flanagan and Kathryn Jackson, “Justice, Care and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited;” Susan Moller Okin “Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice” (1989); and Seyla Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other” in *Feminism as Critique*, ed. Seyla Behabib and Drucilla Cornell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). This list is by no means exhaustive.

³³ Tronto specifically uses the word “caring” to refer to a broader moral domain than that understood within the ethic of care discussion. See Tronto (1987) .

³⁴ Tronto (1991), 33.

boundaries among different spheres of life: “to use caring as a starting point for analysis may prove useful in helping us clarify our values and our sense of justice.”³⁵

The problem with Tronto’s analysis lies in her central assertion that the tools of justice can help us bring judgment and rational calculations to the process of caring. However, the activity of caring is not subject to the same universal and abstract processes that characterize the ethic of justice. The women of Bat Shalom do not feel sympathy for the Palestinians because they are the closest people in need, but rather because of the specific historical ties binding the Israeli women to the Palestinians. Tronto’s call to rethink “what constitutes good caring” grounds this act incongruously in a universal, abstract, and impartial ethic of justice.³⁶

Moreover, Tronto’s synthesis still problematically maintains a clear dichotomy between care and justice and the actions embedded in each moral realm. For example, she assumes that caring is always other-regarding and that rights are centered on the individual. Tronto’s theory also still relies moderately on a bipolar perspective that segregates caring *about* principles from caring *for* people.³⁷ These assumptions do not hold in the particular combination of care and justice underlying the peace activism of the Israeli and Palestinian women I interviewed. The Palestinian women, as we will see, embrace a collective ethic of justice and display caring that is not always other-regarding. Both the Israeli and Palestinian

³⁵ Ibid., 33-35.

³⁶ Tronto (1986), 184. Despite Tronto’s attempts to dismantle the traditional care and justice division, her description of justice as “universal, abstract, and impartial” reveals that she still relies heavily on the traditional Rawlsian and Kantian typology.

³⁷ Alluding to Nodding’s feminine ethic, Tronto says that, typically, “women care for and men care about” Tronto (1986), 184. In clinging to this generalization about the act of caring, Tronto maintains her vague attachment to the gender appropriation of the caring morality.

peacemakers care *about* principles of justice and *for* other people. Thus, although Tronto's synthesis provides useful insights, ultimately her use of each ethic to understand the other maintains and even strengthens the dichotomy, further polarizing the two components of moral thinking.

Feminist theorists such as Owen Flanagan, Kathryn Jackson, and Grace Clement agree with Tronto's assertion that the ethic of care and the ethic of justice can each be used to inform the other. As Flanagan and Jackson point out, "there is no logical reason why both care and justice considerations cannot be introduced where relevant into one and the same reasoning episode."³⁸ However, these theorists allow more room than Tronto for the possibility of particularity within the combination.³⁹ Flanagan and Jackson consider how the experiences and disposition that underlie each ethic can contribute to the morally good forms of the other. Their appreciation for the "rich diversity of unique disposition and capacities, attitudes and types of reasoning" makes specific and particular combinations of care and justice a feasible option for moral principles.⁴⁰ This synthesis allows for particularity in the process of combining the two ethics. It is unclear, however, whether the model also allows for particularity in the "morally good forms" of care and justice that result.

Susan Moller Okin's synthesis best illuminates the convergence between justice and care in the moral principles embraced by the peacemakers in this study. Like Tronto, Clement, and Flanagan and Jackson, Okin questions the wisdom of

³⁸ Flanagan and Jackson, 626.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 624.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 636.

distinguishing between the ethic of care and the ethic of justice. She also argues that the gender appropriation problem can be resolved by dissolving such a strict dichotomy. Her synthesis is appealing, for Okin, in a thought experiment, retraces the roots of justice principles to their construction in the original position, where, according to John Rawls, justice principles are created.⁴¹ For the original position to work as a thought experiment, Okin argues, we must “develop considerable capacities for empathy and powers of communicating with others about what different human lives are like.”⁴² Thinking about justice thus inevitably depends on moral feelings for others as well as for oneself. In addition, she argues, the Rawlsian difference principle specifically demands feelings of care and empathy for persons of “all kinds, in all the different positions in society.”⁴³ Okin’s synthesis not only disputes the dichotomy between care and justice presented by Gilligan and Noddings but also challenges the way moral theorists have thought about justice as a rational, Kantian, and emotion-free process. As Okin puts it, “to think in the original position is not to be a disembodied nobody.”⁴⁴

Okin’s formulation of the caring constitution of justice allows for particularity in the construction of the two groups of women’s political principles of justice.⁴⁵ Okin’s synthesis is especially useful in understanding the role of

⁴¹ John Rawls’, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) assumes an important place in any discussion of the care-justice dichotomy. His work is considered the seminal modern formulation of a Kantian-influenced, rationally derived system of justice.

⁴² Okin (1989), 244.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 247.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 246.

⁴⁵ By “political principles of justice,” I refer to the fact that, while Okin (1989) deals with the general moral principles of justice, the specific moral action addressed in this essay, “peacemaking,” entails narrower, political principles of justice and care regarding the “enemy” and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These narrower political principles are held by both groups of women peacemakers.

caring in the Palestinian approach to peacemaking. I will argue that caring *does* play a role in the political justice principles employed by the Palestinian women I interviewed. There are limits, however, to the Palestinian synthesis of the two ethics that reveal the particular nature of this caring.

Caring for Justice: The Palestinian Case

This thesis has argued that the Palestinian peacemakers I interviewed rely primarily on a peace with justice model in their activism, shaped by the current political context of pre-state Palestine and its dominant collective national discourse. Caring, however, seems to be a critical component of Palestinian notions of justice, both in what I call “self-regarding” care for the Palestinian nation — including the territory itself — and in what I call “internal other-regarding” care for other Palestinians.

The women of the JCW put the collective principles of justice — defined as Palestinian rights — at the core of Palestinian nationalism. Yet caring, relatedness, and a sense of responsibility — for their nation, their sons, daughters, husbands, and brothers — deeply inform these convictions. The integrity of their collective identity as Palestinians, therefore, becomes the object of care motivating their actions.⁴⁶ Hanan Awad poetically described her people’s self-regarding care, speaking of the dignity of Palestine as if it were a human being,

Palestine is a beautiful democratic lady, always the gathering place
of peace and freedom. I work for it with my life and give my

⁴⁶ In, “The Role of National Identity in Conflict Resolution: Experiences from the Israeli – Palestinian Problem-Solving Workshops, “ in R.D. Ashmore, L. Jussim, and D. Wilder, eds., *Social Identity, Inter-group Conflict, and Conflict Resolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), Herbert C. Kelman explains the importance of the integrity of both Israeli and Palestinian identity to each group. He argues that this integrity creates a source of distinctiveness and unity and a sense of belonging, justifies the claim of both groups to the land, and provides a focus for developing the group’s distinctive culture, religion, and way of life, 8-9.

efforts...to see Palestine flourishing, as a center for human dignity, a protection from human suffering, and a defense of the values of love and friendship.⁴⁷

Concern for justice, therefore — in the form of specific rights such as Palestinian statehood — derives from an emotional regard for the collective identity, a regard that supersedes conventional nationalism. Palestinian peacemakers act with care and concern for the dignity of Palestine.

The Palestinian peacemakers whom I interviewed also frequently expressed concern for and responsibility to other members of their collectivity. This “internal other-regarding” care manifests itself in many different ways. Palestinians often valorize others who have died for the national struggle, for example. Palestinians also show deep concern for strangers, reflective of the solidarity engendered by their nationalism. I saw one example of this other-regarding empathy for fellow Palestinians on the route from Jerusalem to Ramallah, the West Bank commercial metropolis twenty minutes north of Jerusalem, which requires passing through an Israeli military checkpoint. Depending on the mood of the Israeli soldier on duty, one must either explain the purpose of one’s travel or merely show an identification card. During one such checkpoint crossing, an Israeli soldier began to question the Palestinian driver about the information on his identification card. I saw the other Palestinian passengers flinch, their pained faces revealing their empathy and care for a driver they did not know. They considered the affront to his dignity an attack on their own.

⁴⁷ Hanan Awad., interview, 29 July 1999.

In another instance, acclaimed Palestinian poet and human rights activist Hanan Awad spent the greater part of her interview relating the situation facing her secretary, an East Jerusalem native whose official residency rights have recently been revoked by the Israeli government, forcing her to leave the city. The concern for both the dignity and living conditions of others — friends and even strangers — reflects the morality of responsibility and relatedness integral to the ethic of care as first envisioned by Gilligan.

Often, this internal other-regarding care focuses on a specific group within the Palestinian collectivity. As Chapter Two argued, the Palestinian women peacemakers are now focusing their efforts on women's rights. When the Palestinian women I interviewed described this current emphasis, an overwhelming number said that they felt a "responsibility to other Palestinian women."⁴⁸ While utilizing the programmatic strategies of justice learned in the national struggle, the Palestinian women peacemakers' current focus on women's rights depends on an emotionally based caring for others within Palestine. In my interviews with the Palestinian peacemakers, I often sensed that they were balancing (and sometimes struggling with) the dual goals of national and women's rights. Recognizing their own individual syntheses of care and justice in the internal care that I have discussed could help the Palestinian women peacemakers personally and theoretically come to terms with their activist objectives.

One thing rarely noticed in Gilligan's writings on care is that the trajectories followed in the self-development of the women she interviewed included coming to

⁴⁸ Sama Aweidah-Liftawi, interview, 24 July 1999.

care for oneself. Gilligan interviewed young American women who had recently made the decision to abort an unwanted pregnancy. One twenty-five year-old woman named Sarah, for example, in describing her recent decision to have an abortion, spoke of combining a consideration for “what is right for myself” with “what is right for others.” Gilligan extended to self-interested obligations a place in the moral self-development trajectory. This extension dissolves the presumed disparity between selfishness and responsibility to others.⁴⁹ The informal self-regarding care of Palestinians deserves respect in this regard. It takes forms far removed from mere self-interest or selfishness. When a woman speaks of her grief from separation from her husband (resulting from Jerusalem residency revocation policies) or her son’s arrest or detainment, the care for herself as a being with dignity is intertwined with care for her kin and her nation. This relatedness is very emotional. Many times I left the interviews with the Palestinian peacemakers in tears, overwhelmed by the care, idealism, pride, and sense of dignity with which they regard the Palestinian State and its people.

A few of the top leaders of the JCW also expressed “external other-regarding care” towards Israelis. They said that their individual relationship and attitudes towards Israelis had changed as a result of their experiences in the joint work of the Jerusalem Link. As JCW director Sumaya Farhat-Naser put it, “we are constantly developing our capacity to see the other as partners rather than

⁴⁹ See Gilligan, 94. While Gilligan’s more general gendered conclusions about care should be scrutinized for the socio-economic, racial, and cultural bias of her population sample, I believe that the individual analyses of the moral choices made by the women she interviewed do help illuminate some of the ethics of peacemaking explored in this thesis, despite the cultural and social differences between the women I interviewed and Gilligan’s subjects.

occupiers or enemies.”⁵⁰ Zahira Kamal said that, through ten years of participating in dialogues with Israelis,

I have come to see Israel not as a rigid block, but as a society of people who differ in their way of life.... We have learned to listen to each other, which provided us with sources of information outside the media. Moreover, we learned to ask the right questions at the right time, using amended and precise terminology.⁵¹

Many of the Palestinian women told me that other-regarding external care — coexistence, understanding, and empathy for the Israelis and their national identity — could come only after the Palestinians have secured their rights. However, those Palestinian women peacemakers who have worked the most closely and extensively with the Israeli activists, like Farhat-Naser and Kamal, identified a recently developed caring regard for the Israeli women peace activists engendered by the Jerusalem Link partnership.

There are realistic political limits, however, to the development of greater external other-regarding care among Palestinians peace activists. Currently, the Palestinian public is skeptical about joint peace work with Israeli activists. Popular support for normalizing relationships with Israelis — the political outcome of peace with care — has decreased in the past four years, reflecting disappointment among Palestinians with the outcome of the Oslo Accords and a sense that the Israeli government “continues to break promises.”⁵² As Chapter Four pointed out, the JCW is often under attack for their daring partnership with Bat Shalom. According

⁵⁰ Sumaya Farhat-Naser, “About the Jerusalem Link: A Palestinian Perspective,” in *Sharing Jerusalem*, 11.

⁵¹ Zahira Kamal, “The Commitment to Peace,” in *Sharing Jerusalem*, 48.

⁵² Hanan Aruri, interview, 29 July 1999.

to program director May Kasem, the JCW must frequently defend its partnership with Bat Shalom to its constituents and other Palestinian NGOs.⁵³

Moreover, other-regarding care is in one classic type directional, when a moral action is undertaken by the more powerful for the less powerful.⁵⁴ Caring for children, elders, refugees, and victims reveal this in-built asymmetry. The power imbalance between occupier and occupied in this model of care would predict a greater capacity and tendency for external other-regarding care among the Israelis than among the Palestinians. Caring for the victim is a privilege enjoyed by the oppressor, or at least the more powerful. Therefore, to the Palestinian women I interviewed, attaining political rights through peace with justice must precede building caring relationships with Israelis.⁵⁵

Towards a Greater Synthesis of Justice and Care

Even the most “synthetic” feminist theorist does not realize the full potential of a possible synthesis of justice and care. Although Okin’s synthesis provides a good starting point for understanding the particular convergence of

⁵³ May Kasem, interview, 19 July 1999.

⁵⁴ In *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*, Noddings finds that “our motivation in caring is directed toward the welfare, protection, or enhancement of the cared-for,” 23. In *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace*, Ruddick finds that maternal thinking is rooted in “power relations that are shifting and complex...[for] mothers are not equal to their children, siblings and childhood friends are not equal to each other.” She argues that the differences in strength and power of maternal actions, though changing, cannot be equalized. Likewise, “rather than depending on an illusory state of equality...peacemaking [occurs] within communities that attend to and survive shifting differences in power,” 180.

⁵⁵ In *A Different Voice*, Gilligan charts a three-stage process in the development of women’s care, based primarily on her respondents’ differing moral understanding of abortion. Each sequential stage involves a more complex understanding of the relationship between self and other and a reinterpretation of the conflict between selfishness and responsibility. According to Gilligan, women’s moral judgement proceeds from an initial concern for survival, to a focus on universal goodness, to a reflective understanding of caring for the “other.” The final stage is the “adequate guide to the resolution of conflicts in human relationships,” 105. Although Gilligan suggests that these moral stages change as women mature, the same sequential construct can be applied to the political/moral perspective of the Palestinian women, who are not yet able to fully embrace other -regarding care towards the Israelis.

justice and care in the moral work of the peacemakers I interviewed, her own argument leans toward the Kantian-based, impartial original position. Applying the Rawlsian difference principle to her conception of the caring that occurs in the original position, Okin specifies that, in her concept of the original position, we would “engage in caring about each and every other as much as ourselves,” with particular attention to those who are the least well off. Okin emphasizes the impartiality of the caring in the original position: “to think as a person in the original position...is to think from the point of view of *everybody*, of every ‘concrete other’ whom one might turn out to be” [emphasis mine].⁵⁶ The particular attention to the worst off (derived from Rawlsian universal principles) could justify particular attention on the part of the Israelis to the Palestinians. The causal role the Israelis played in bringing about Palestinian oppression could also, on universal principles, justify the requirement to redress the previous wrong. But neither of these universalistic principles fully captures the kind of particular relatedness and care in the Israeli women peacemakers’ sense of justice for the Palestinians.

Nor do the peacemakers on the ground realize the potential of their own syntheses of justice and care.⁵⁷ The Israeli peacemakers might better understand the fundamental role of justice principles in the work of their Palestinian

⁵⁶ Okin (1989), 246, quoting the phrase “concrete other” from Seyla Benhabib, “The Generalized and Concrete Other,” in *Feminism as Critique* (1987).

⁵⁷ In encouraging the Israeli and Palestinian women at the grassroots to explore the other’s synthesis of care and justice, I rely on the theoretical discussion of the concrete, particular “other” as envisioned by Susan Moller Okin and Seyla Benhabib. Okin (1989) points out that the person thinking about justice in the original position is not a “disembodied *nobody*,” but rather a situated person with given and partial ties, 240. In “The Generalized and the Concrete Other,” Benhabib also criticizes Kohlberg’s and Rawls’ conception of justice for “ignoring the standpoint of the

counterparts if they saw that these principles are grounded in various forms of care. The Israeli women might identify with the deep emotions of self-regarding care for the Palestinian collective — including land, history, and people — and the internal other-regarding care with which the Palestinians relate to each other. The Israelis must understand that to their Palestinian counterparts focusing on internal state building goals represents caring for justice. The Palestinian women’s peace with justice model is based on a care of protectiveness, pride, devotion, and relatedness in the same way one might care for a human being.

The Israeli women must recognize that a particular caring — based on historical and national experiences — has generated the Palestinians’ justice principles. They might then be more sympathetic to what they now perceive as Palestinian rigidity and unwillingness to compromise on these principles.

Likewise, the Palestinian women peacemakers might value the other-regarding care extended to them by the Israeli women peacemakers if they better understood the feelings such as guilt and sympathy that underlie the peace with care model. If the Palestinian women recognize the role of Israeli and Jewish duties motivating Israeli peacemaking, they might embrace the Israeli activists’ attempts to raise the consciousness and intensify these duties in the Israeli public. Instead, they often dismiss the peace with care model as a superficial gesture with little if any potential political impact or effective results in securing Palestinian rights.

concrete other,” which, she says, “leads to epistemic incoherence.” With only a “generalized other... what we are left with is an empty mask that is everyone and that is no one,” 89.

To begin the process of negotiating their political disputes, the Israeli and the Palestinian women peacemakers might reexamine the particular synthesis of care and justice in the other group's approach to peacemaking. Such a reexamination will inevitably require each peacemaker to explore the given, particular syntheses embedded in her own model.