Policy Spotlight: Insights from Faculty

Jake Sullivan:

Hi, everybody, and welcome to the inaugural session of Policy Spotlight: Insights from Faculty. I'm Jake Sullivan, the Kissinger Professor of the Practice of Statecraft and World Order here at the Harvard Kennedy School. And it is a genuine pleasure, in fact, it is an honor to join you and to welcome my friend and colleague Kurt Campbell for this conversation. Many of you know Kurt who has had a distinguished career at the highest levels of US foreign policy, most recently as the Deputy Secretary of State, but decades of experience leading efforts on Indo-Pacific strategy, alliance coordination, and managing the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world, the relationship between the United States and China. So I can think of no one better for a conversation on the US-China relationship, where it is and where it's going than Kurt. And I'm just incredibly grateful to have him here with us.

We're also grateful to the Malcolm Hewitt Wiener Foundation for supporting these calls, and especially for Malcolm Wiener's role in proposing and supporting this Policy Spotlight series. As longtime supporters of the Kennedy School, the Wiener family has been absolutely instrumental in advancing the school's mission.

So today we're going to focus our discussion, as I said, on US-China, the strategic challenge that China presents, what it means for the future of the global order, and where the American strategy stands and where it's going. And Kurt, I thought I would start actually by just observing that 2026 is a very consequential year for US-China relations. We are sitting here in March of '26, this very month, at the end of the month, March 31st, President Trump will travel to Beijing for a very significant visit, the first of his second term to Beijing to meet with President Xi and the upper echelons of the Chinese government.

And then later this year, President Xi has committed to coming to the United States for a state visit, and there will also be opportunities for the two leaders to see each other at the Apex Summit, which China is hosting and the G20 Summit, which the United States is hosting. So a busy year of summitry of diplomacy at the highest levels. And I would love to kick this off by just having you reflect on where you think we are as we enter this very consequential period of top level diplomacy, what you're looking for and what you expect to unfold over the course of this year.

Kurt Campbell:

Well, great. First of all, it's wonderful to be back among the Harvard community. I really appreciate it. I've been looking forward to this, and it's great to be doing this in conversation with Jake Sullivan, absolutely the favorite person I've ever worked with in government. And it's really, Jake, an honor for me. So look, I think you put your finger on it. It is the most deeply consequential relationship for the United States into the 21st century. All indications have been that 2026 for US-China relations would be decisive. But I think the thing that we have to begin with, Jake, frankly, are the uncertainties. The first thing, it's probably correct to state with certainty that the President will go to-

Jake Sullivan:

China.

Kurt Campbell:

... at the end of the month, but I think we have to recognize the awkwardness of this. The United States has taken out two leaders that were frankly very close to the Chinese leadership. What's going on in Iran is deeply concerning to China for a variety of reasons, including energy security. And so I can imagine circumstances in the next couple of weeks, if the war expands, that both leaders might find it necessary to think about either delaying or postponing. But all that being said, the truth is for-

Jake Sullivan:

Well, can we pause there just for one sec, Kurt? So do you think President Trump and his team have talked about the Iran war going on for four to five weeks, they've used other amounts of time, but it could still be going on when the president is currently scheduled to go. So do you think if it is, there's a reasonable possibility that in fact the visit doesn't come off? Or how do you handicap that?

Kurt Campbell:

Yeah. I think it's a low probability actually, and I think the Chinese are debating it, but let me just give you an example. If it really starts to spike and there are larger disruptions of oil flow and there are concerns that the locality of strikes are not just in Iran, but in a broader region, President Trump might have reason to think about, "Gee, I've got to be here, not out gallivanting." And the Chinese also might find it in their interests. I would handicap it as still quite low.

Others place it higher, but the truth is that both countries have an interest right now for very different reasons to have this meeting, to stabilize. I think President Trump has made clear that this visit to Beijing is absolutely central. Yesterday and sort of off the cuff remarks in the oval, he indicated his two favorite countries and what he was looking most forward to is Germany and China. So I think for all those reasons, it's much more likely that it will proceed.

But I think we have to caveat, Jake, that it's a much more awkward visit now than probably it was before. I think the second thing that we have to acknowledge is that the group of people that make policy in the Trump administration is a very small and narrow group of folks. And frankly, they are starting now to be overwhelmed. They're overwhelmed by not just the aftermath of what's happened in Venezuela. They're overwhelmed by all the details, frankly, that they had not thought of as much in advance, how to get American citizens out of the Middle East with a Gulf War that continues to evolve in terms of what in fact we're seeking in Iran. But remember, the visit of President Trump to Beijing is preceded by what is also equally important. The Japanese Prime Minister is due in Washington in just a couple of weeks.

I think what we're seeing behind the scenes, among many of the interlocutors preparing for events with the United States, they find the planning is often late. It is challenging to figure out deliverables. And I think it would be fair to say for the US-China relationship, normally, as you know, Jake, you led these efforts, there's enormous amount of planning that goes on in advance, deliverables, agenda and the like. Much of that has lagged here. Secretary Bessent, who has been the dominant interlocutor with his Chinese counterparts to get ready for this visit, is now really only beginning to sort of finalize what are the things that might be on the table in technology and agricultural sales. And so there are actually more variables than constants with respect to the president's upcoming visit. And that's largely because the team is taxed so substantially.

The other thing I would just mention, and this is sort of wonky and institutional, but the dominant agency that normally plays the role to convene the approach for the US government when it comes to China is the National Security Council. And that's because there are so many disparate views across the US government when it comes to China. For all practical purposes, the NSC has essentially been demobilized. And so as a result, the practice of trying to get ready for an event like this brings a lot of disparate voices together.

And I'll just conclude by saying the fascinating thing about the Trump administration is that when it comes to China policy, it is a very big tent. You've got some folks that believe, "Look, we're just going to land deals, we're going to make money, we can work with these guys, and we're going to make a lot of money." And then there are other folks that represent, I would say, the legacy and the establishmentarian element of the Republican Party believe that China is the greatest challenge and threat to the United States. And so these two very disparate groups do battle inside the government bureaucratically on almost a daily basis on technology, on Taiwan, on how to think about investment in the United States. Most of those issues are still unresolved and they are waiting for the president really to focus on what he wants with respect to the relationship with Xi Jinping.

Jake Sullivan:

First of all, thank you for that. I think this point you made at the end about, it's very unsettled where the Trump administration's China policy is going is something I want to bear down on a little further with you. So back in 2017, you wrote a really important article on Foreign Affairs with our friend and colleague, Eli Ratner, basically describing the shift on a bipartisan basis in US policy towards China from one of engagement to one of strategic competition. And the Trump administration, Trump 1.0, very much embodied that strategic competition frame. And of course, we built on it with our own flavor in the Biden administration. What's been striking about Trump 2.0, and it goes to this point about the big tent and the disparate range of voices is first, China seems to have been deprioritized to a considerable extent vis-a-vis other issues. So the State of the Union last week, President Trump didn't mention China or had a brief allusion to it when he talked about blowing up Russian and Chinese equipment in Venezuela, but otherwise did not mention the country, which is the first time in a very long time that's happened.

Second, in the national security strategy, China appears like 15 pages into the document in a kind of passing way compared to other issues that were very much elevated. And third, it has struck me that President Trump really looks at China through the lens of economics and trade primarily not through a broader lens of geopolitics or strategic competition. So I guess my question for you is, looking beyond just this next summit or series of potential summits, where do you see the overall trajectory of the strategic community in the United States, and particularly the Trump administration's approach to China going? And for people around the world and here looking at this, what lessons have you drawn from what you have seen so far, both in the actions the administration has taken and in the documents that they put out reflecting their policy?

Kurt Campbell:

Thanks, Jake. It's an excellent question. And so I've always been fascinated by the domestic components of strategy when it comes to China. And I think what we've experienced essentially over the last 10 years is a general bipartisan agreement about the challenge posed by China, that it's largely competitive and that for us to be effective, we needed to invest domestically. We needed to work with our allies and partners, and we had to have a purposeful diplomacy. I don't want too much of your horn, but I would say you were the leading advocate and strategist that put that together. And I believe personally that that approach is durable and will continue. I do think some elements of that consensus are now being challenged. I think there is probably a group that would be described, not necessarily as the business community, Jake, because I think a lot of people in manufacturing and technology have a lot of reservations about China, but in the investment community, people that have invested in Chinese firms and want to figure out how to get money out and kind of continue, they're still pretty bullish on China and want to continue that role.

And those people are very influential around the president. I will also say, so on the right, that's, I think, a dominant group that questions, gee, do we have to be so competitive with China? And then there is probably another group, less vocal, but quietly forming on the left that says, "Boy, you were really harsh on China and you're overestimating their global aspirations and we can get along with these guys. So let's go back to an approach that is more akin to engagements and high level meetings and working on global issues akin to the 1990s." And so that's an interesting dynamic. But I think what is largely hidden is that the elements of this bipartisan approach are still, I think, relatively strong. And I believe over time will, like a submarine resurface and we'll see them. The elements of the Trump approach I think are complicated.

And at the core of it, I don't think is actually just the economic and commercial issues. I think it's deeper than that, Jake. And it's hard to say, but it is undeniable that the president has, and in many respects, a unique attraction to authoritarian leaders. And so we saw that in the first term, we've seen it in his diplomacy with Russia. Jake and I, we were both involved in the transition. You would be shocked at how much time we spent trying to help the Trump team, how to figure out how to have communications with Kim Jong Un in North Korea. So these three leaders basically occupy a substantial part of what Trump wants with respect to engagement and respect on the global stage. I worry about that. I'm slightly troubled by it, but I think that sort of respect and engagement is at the core of what the president wants.

And then secondarily are the prospects of deals. And I will just say a couple of things if I can here, Jake. It's clear that the president, as he heads into a very difficult year, it's not only an important year for US-China relations, a very important year for domestic politics, and he understands that the threat he faces domestically. And if you look at the areas that are frankly reconsidering some of their very kind of bullish support of the president, they often fall in agricultural parts of the country. And so I think we have very clear indications that the president in the short term would love to bolster Chinese purchases of not just soybeans, but sorghum, rice, corn, wheat, exotic nuts, and walnuts from the San Joaquin Valley. If you look at sort of a lay down of these agricultural purchases, potential and sort of a voting map, there is a large overlap with the areas that frankly, the Republican Party has to secure if they have any chance of securing a majority that is increasingly elusive in the House.

The President would also love to sell more Boeing jets. We commend him on that. I think he wants to continue some of the work, Jake, that you led on seeking to prevent more fentanyl deaths in the United States. We support that completely. I think the challenge is that we are getting indications. What he really would like to explore with Chinese are very substantial Chinese investments in the United States, often in areas that we have thought to be controversial, things like UAVs that have some linkages with Chinese tech stacks, possibly in areas in technology and agriculture that frankly give China undue influence in elements of our country. There had been a bipartisan consensus to resist or very carefully look at some of those kinds of investments. I think the president is seeking to move full speed ahead. So those are the things on the US wishlist, but what's important is on the Chinese wishlist more than anything else, I think the Chinese want a degree of stability for the next year.

They have a plan for the US-China relations during the second term. One of the most interesting things, Jake, we saw during the first term is that no government was probably less prepared to deal with Trump than China. They were fully expecting Secretary Clinton to be elected. And so they were very much off balance for a large part of that first four-year term. The second time around, the Chinese are much better equipped intellectually and stylistically. They treat President Trump with enormous great respect in the way that kind of fellow authoritarians, but at the same time, every step that every blunder bus step that we've taken with respect to either sanctions or economic steps, they have responded and often with almost a scalpel-like precision to underscore our own vulnerability. So the Chinese are aware of the challenges that Trump represents. They believe engaging him is probably their best course of action.

We've seen President Xi become more comfortable in those encounters. So he's going to ask for, "Hey, if you want all these purchases from us, then you've got to yield on some of these economic steps that you've taken against us." And so he's going to ask for lifting a variety of steps, both in terms of sanctions and other economic steps that have been difficult for China. They're also going to ask that even though they don't want some chips from the United States, they want to be careful about not becoming overly reliant. They want access to US technology in a way, frankly, that I think will raise some bipartisan concerns, but the White House appears quite determined to move in this direction. So I think you're going to see some movement on chips, perhaps even lithography, things that we have been very carefully guarding, and so they're going to want to move both on economic things and on technology.

I think it is also the case, Jake, that in all likelihood, President Xi is going to ask President Trump to make some subtle adjustments to our Taiwan policy, and they want to do that to make Taiwan anxious more than anything else. Not a big fundamental reorganization, but enough signals so that an uncertain Democratic leadership in Taiwan has to question fundamentally where the US partnership and commitment to Taiwan goes. And so those are, I think, essentially the elements of what both countries want. Now, we will focus more on all the things that China will do, the pomp and circumstance to make President Trump look and feel powerful, but behind the scenes, those are the things that are being worked out. Now, I will say that if you compare those two things, I don't think that's a great deal for the United States. I think ours is very short term, and I think China is a bit more strategic, but in the end, what's fascinating is that there has never been a narrower group of people that make policy on China in the United States.

The president is the action officer. Secretary Bessent is the primary interlocutor and Ambassador Boddu and China is the person who helps handle some of the details in preparation. We are getting indications that Marco Rubio, after meeting with your former counterpart, Wongi, has decided that he's going to play a larger role. And I think we can basically safely say that his role is on the upswing in the formulation and execution of policymaking inside the Trump administration. And I think he probably is a bit more wary of China. And so I think you can expect a little to and fro on some of these issues as we head into the final stretch of preparations of the visit, Jake.

Jake Sullivan:

There's a huge number of items to pick up in that, but I think what we want to do at this point, Betsy, if I'm not wrong, is open it up for people to come in with questions, which will touch on a number of the elements that Kurt just laid out. I think just a fascinating and comprehensive lay down of the stakes and the context of what we are likely to see over the course of this year. But Betsy, why don't I turn it over to you?

Betsy:

Yes. Thanks everyone. I'm Betsy Viani, the school's managing director of engagement, and thanks to both Kurt and Jake for this fascinating conversation. What we're going to do right now is open it up to Q&A from call participants. If you have a question, use the raise your hand feature on the bottom ribbon of your Zoom screen. If I see a couple people calling on the phone, if you're on the phone, you can press star nine to raise your hand and star nine to unraise your hand. I think we're going to actually, while we wait for a couple questions to get in the queue, I think we're going to kick it off from a pre-submitted question from Bethan Sanders, MPP 2023. How will the new Trump NSS/NDS shift away from calling China the pacing threat affect US strategy and signaling?

Kurt Campbell:

Look, it's a great question. And I do want to just underscore Jake mentioned the documents that have been published to date. You can see last minute editing across almost all of them, and I think a lack of cohesion, a clear focus on Latin America and the Americas more generally, and I think a less careful and clear-eyed approach to the Indo-Pacific more generally. I would just highlight that under Jake's leadership, we had a series of documents that tried to lay out very clearly our China strategy, how we worked with our allies and partners, how we worked in the Pacific, how we worked on technology. And if you take them together, they provide sort of a strategic guide and a rationale for the things that we've done. I don't think it is an accident that most of the public statements and utterances of senior officials are deeply ambiguous about China.

And in fact, even the people who have the strongest views about China, when you ask them directly, "What is your position on X or Y?" They will come back with, frankly, bromides. Our policy, frankly, our policy is better than the Biden policy, and it's a policy of American strength and America first and America's power. But then you say, "Well, okay, that's fine, but can you give us any more in a more granular way what our policy is for China?" They will not frankly be able to articulate anything deeper. I think there are a variety of reasons for that, but I think the most clear reason is that many of the senior interlocutors are waiting for pronouncements from the president in terms of then following on. And because the president has yet to be clearly articulating a view of the directional indicator of US-China relations, many of these guys are seeking to keep their powder dry.

That is one of the benefits of having a clear sort of compendium of strategy documents in that you then know how to talk about these issues because they have been vetted through an interagency process and you have a larger purpose. What we really have now is a government on these issues that frankly, it's more authoritarian and we're waiting for views and actions from on high before actions can be taken. So a classic case here would be our undersector of policy, Bridge Colby, known to have very strong views on a variety of things. If you look at his testimony yesterday, it is a case study in trying to evade answering specific questions about the Indo-Pacific, about why the Indo-Pacific has in some ways been downgraded. Let's just remember that the challenge here has always been finding the necessary capacity in the US government to take on these hard challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

What we have seen today are very substantial actions, first in Latin America and South America, and now in and around Iran. So many of the capacities that have been carefully built up over the last 10 or 15 years in the Indo-Pacific have now seeped back to other theaters in preparing for urgent operations. And so I think what we really risk is in our actions and in our approach, de emphasizing the importance of the Indo-Pacific at a time, frankly, where China's power is surging.

Jake Sullivan:

I would just add two or three points to that. One, I think that Chinese leadership, political leadership, military leadership, strategic leadership read the US documents closely and follow the US announcements closely. And I think they view the picture that is being painted here as one in which the United States is giving them somewhat more freedom of maneuver in the Indo-Pacific than they had before, and they see that as a real strategic opportunity. I think they also believe that the elevated emphasis on the Western hemisphere is consistent with a broad trajectory of imperial decline, that the United States is declining a bit, a declining empire tends to consolidate, it's near abroad. So you see more conversation in Beijing about how the Trump approach is consistent with their overall view of the trajectory of the United States in the mid to long term. And then I think they're looking at what's happening in Iran right now and saying, "Look, through the period post nine eleven, we gained great strategic advantage from the fact that the United States was bogged down, tied down both in terms of its attention and resources."

To Kurt's point earlier about how there's just not the mind share to focus on the summit with Xi later this month, because everyone's focused on drones and missiles and interceptors in the Iran context. And they're thinking, "Hey, this is the United States kind of making the same strategic call again of putting its ships in the Middle East, and that also opening greater space and greater operating room for China in the Indo-Pacific."

And then finally, I think when it comes to the critical question of Taiwan, China probably is looking at the pronouncements, the attitude, the mood music of President Trump and thinking they could actually probably move him on this issue. To Kurt's point, they will likely look whether it's in this summit or at some point this year to get President Trump to say something different about US policy towards Taiwan that injects a greater level of uncertainty and frankly, discomfort among the leadership on Taiwan.

So I think the sum total of this is not just to read it from the Washington perspective, but from the Beijing perspective, I think their view is that the shift in US strategy in these documents and in the way the US is operating in the world right now is to China's strategic advantage, and they are looking for ways to take advantage of that as we go forward.

Betsy:

Great. Thanks, Kurt and Jake so much. My pleasure to call on Xiang Chen, who has his hand raised. Please unmute yourself. I believe you are also a past senior fellow from our Rajawali Institute at our wonderful Ash Center.

Xiang Chen:

Yes. Yes. I was at Harvard 15 years ago. Right now, I'm a researcher at Beijing Foreign Studies University and my research focus on US-China relations. By the way, Professor Kurt Campbell, I have listened to one of your seminar lecture at Professor Nick Burns class. And Professor Jake Sullivan, I also listened to one of your lecture at Beijing, the Yale Center. And it's a great pleasure getting to listen to your views again.

And my question is, since today is the beginning of the two sessions in Beijing, and I would like to know what do you think of China's two sessions, especially the 15th five-year? Because I know Professor Jake Sullivan, you are architecture of Biden Economics and you have put a great emphasis on industry policy. So what's your comment on our 15th five-year plan? And do you think in the future US should focus more on a similar industry plan? Thank you.

Kurt Campbell:

Jake, why don't you start off and then-

Jake Sullivan:

I'll make just one comment on this and then turn it over to Kurt. There's a lot to say on this subject, but my reading of the most recent, the new five-year plan for the five years that lie ahead of us here, the thing that was most striking to me is the conviction that it reflects that China should not move from low-end manufacturing to high-end manufacturing, but frankly, should dominate both, should continue to sustain its massive market share in low end, even as it doubles and triples down on what Xi Jinping calls the new productive forces of being the leading player in advanced manufacturing high technology, the commanding heights, frankly, of the frontier technologies of the future.

I found that quite striking because it suggests the centrality of production at every level of sophistication from the very highest to the very lowest. And in that sense, it kind of reinforces a dual circulation strategy which says the rest of the world is going to be dependent on China as the world's foundry and China is going to be independent of the rest of the world through generating self-sufficiency, particularly when it comes to advanced technologies.

I have concern that this is not sustainable as an economic approach. It creates challenges just from an American policy perspective, Chinese overcapacity and the ways in which it's trying to dominate these sectors, but I think it's going to create challenges for countries around the world. And so I think I'm hopeful that part of the conversation Secretary Bessent will have with his counterparts is about not just American concerns, but more collective concerns on this issue.

Kurt Campbell:

[inaudible 00:33:36]-

Jake Sullivan:

Just flag one more thing, which is you asked, should we adopt a similar strategy? Obviously the US economic model and the Chinese economic model are totally different, so one can't just borrow a page from the other's playbook. But do I believe that the United States needs to go even further in investing in the sources of economic and technological dynamism through an advanced industrial strategy? I do. I think we put points on the board in the Biden administration. I actually think in this area, the Trump administration is doing some things that continue on that. And I think it has to be a central feature of how the United States delivers robust inclusive growth and continues to stay at the innovation edge.

Kurt Campbell:

Look, I completely agree with what Jake has offered to that excellent question. I would just offer a couple of other things if I can. If you basically look carefully at the draft documents and the discussion around them, there is very little questioning of the general practices of exporting over capacity along the lines that Jake indicated. And if you look historically, basically in the early 2000s, once China joined the WTO, the country that was the primary target of overcapacity was the United States, and you can track quite clearly changes in American domestic politics, attitudes towards trade, beginning from that point. Now, the steps that have taken more recently makes it much more difficult for China to basically continue those practices in the United States. And so what we've seen instead, as Jake points out, is substantial exports of a variety of capacities into Europe. And frankly, I've been surprised, I don't know if Jake is, that many of these countries have decided to accept capacities that will go very much against their national champions and wreak a degree of economic chaos in places where manufacturing like in Germany is so central.

And so I think we're likely heading into a period of more debate in Europe about China policy, largely because of practices that have been put in place that allow for the kind of unhindered Chinese access to European markets and let the consequences be damned. I think those will be dangerous politically for China and Europe. And I also believe, I agree with Jake, that this overall approach is not sustainable. It is designed to create vulnerabilities in other places and somehow secure China that it is operating independently of certain aspects of the global economy.

Betsy:

Great. Thank you both. I'm going to go ahead and ask a little bit of, in interest of time, because we don't have that much time left, I'm going to combine a few of the questions that were in the chat. There were a lot of questions about Iran as it pertains to US and Israel motivations as they protect China, the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, and then is China using this as an opportunity to showcase itself as the peace advocate? So there's a lot there to kind of unpack, but a lot of people asking questions about Iran. So if you can talk about the current events, I think our callers would be grateful.

Kurt Campbell:

I'll just start, but Jake has thought deeply about Iran. I would simply say that I'm not as clear that China has been effectively positioning itself as sort of a voice for peace or process during this period. I think if anything, it appears that they are less active and less significant in the actions that are taking place. And the truth is they have to be deeply concerned, not only the fact that we've taken out their key ally in Latin America, but relations between China and Iran have improved rather substantially in the last five to seven years. And this is a big setback for them and it has also accentuated their key element of vulnerability. They are the most reliant on the energy that comes through the Strait of Hormuz.

This reminds them of how vulnerable indeed that they are and that the country that is most able to control the flow through the Persian Gulf is not China clearly, and really not even Iran. It's probably the United States in terms of the steps that we can take to protect that flow. So they are probably feeling acutely vulnerable right now and concerned about what the message this all sends and worries about where this plays out over time. But I think at the real core is they do not seek global turmoil at this time. They want a degree of predictability and stability. And they see some of the actions that the president has taken as frankly, undermining global stability and creating questions about global markets that is not in their strategic interests. And frankly, while there will be those who will say this very model actually validates the kind of things that China might think about with respect to Taiwan, I think there are larger issues that provide more anxiety than reassurance here. Jake?

Jake Sullivan:

I would just pick up on this last point on Taiwan. I do think I'm not so much sure they will see this as a model, but I do think there's got to be conversation in Beijing right now where they're thinking, "Wait a second. If the order of the day in 2026 is that powerful countries who have kind of longstanding problems, whether it's in a place like Iran or Venezuela or Taiwan can solve those problems through military force, and the rest of the world will basically not push back in a significant way against it," they may view that as creating greater strategic opportunity in the years ahead to move on Taiwan, should they choose to do so operationally. So I think the knock-on effects of this for them in terms of their calculus on Taiwan, I don't want to overstate them, but I also think we should be watching that factor because I think that factor is real.

In terms of the direct impact on China's strategic and economic position, I agree with Kurt, the loss of control over the flow of Venezuelan oil and now the potential loss of control over the flow of Iranian oil, both forms of oil, they were getting at steep discounts. So this was a big advantage to them. And this is not a trickle. This was a real part of their import mix. That's a negative for them. I don't think it's a catastrophic negative because they will find other ways to make up the difference and if it costs them a little more, so be it. They also have very good relations across the Gulf with the Saudis and the Emiratis. Of course, they have Russia to kind of lean back on in terms of oil imports, but it's a negative. This one, two punch of two key sources of their energy now coming under attack from the United States and the US playing a larger role in dictating how that oil will flow in the future is something that they're not going to like.

And one thing that we've already seen underway, even before this action took place, is a massive expansion of China's strategic petroleum reserve. They're trying to figure out, "How do we build resilience over time to disruptions in energy flows given that we are so dependent on imports?" I think you're going to see that kind of thing continue at pace. But otherwise, they're going to play this very carefully because they don't want to go all in with the losers and also because they have a variety of relationships in that region that mean they can't just be pro Iran. They have to be a bit more mixed in their strategy, particularly given their relationships with the Gulf.

Betsy:

Great. We have one more minute. So if you have time to maybe take one more question, Jake and Kurt-

Kurt Campbell:

Sure.

Jake Sullivan:

Let's do it. [inaudible 00:42:24]

Betsy:

Does that sound okay?

Jake Sullivan:

Great.

Betsy:

Abolsutely.

Kurt Campbell:

So I think we have a question in the queue from our own beloved Marty Linsky. Marty Linsky, please, we're going to unmute you so you can ask your question. Professor Linsky, go ahead.

Marty Linsky:

Hi, I didn't want to change the subject, but it seems to me connected. I'm curious about how the evolution of the China, America, China-US relationship is playing itself out in the competition in Africa, where there was a lot of quiet competition for a long period of time. And I'm just wondering what you see going forward.

Kurt Campbell:

I'll just say a word, and then I think Jake would have a lot to offer here more generally. So we often think of the competition with China to be focused regionally in Asia and maybe the Pacific and then maybe on technology. But the truth is this really is a global competition and China is maneuvering for access and engagement economically in terms of their technology across Latin America and Africa. I worked with Jake closely and often visited countries in Africa, both when I worked at the White House and when I worked at the State Department. I'd worked in Africa before. I had the great, good fortune to work with Marty and a lot of issues when I was up at Harvard. We touched sometimes on Africa. I found on these most recent trips everywhere I went, whether it was in technology, investments, in critical minerals, variety of new opportunities in health, I found Chinese interlocutors in almost all of these countries.

I don't think we should be necessarily viewing this as negative. I think there are lots of things that we can support. Africa needs investment, needs capacity, but the truth is it is a reminder of our need to step up our game in the global South. I think one of the things that we struggle with of late has been putting together a consequential strategy that allows us to sort of lead with investments, open markets, the confidence in our own system. I think China senses that and has sought to activate its own engagements in these countries. But I will say, I also found across Africa concerns about some of the approaches of our Chinese friends. In many places, they imported their own workers, they didn't build capacity in local places, and they were less focused on some of the actual nascent needs of the people and were more focused on their own specific interests.

But ultimately, China's goals and ambitions are global. I think some of this has to be looked at carefully. It's not by nature just competitive. There are a lot of areas where investment can be consistent with our own approach. My own view is, as we look into the future, the potential in Africa is such an enormous and important place. Finding an ability to do more in the United States and with allies and partners is critical. I'll just conclude with one thing and then turn over Jake. The biggest difference between the approach that Jake and President Biden championed was this idea that we were more effective on the global stage if we partnered with key countries that shared our values. And that is what President Biden... This has been lost, obscured. I don't think we've made the point good enough, but working with allies and partners in Europe, in Asia and parts of the global South is the hallmark of Bidenism.

And frankly, the president, President Trump, has basically turned his back on a lot of this and has sought a go it-alone strategy. I do not believe with the complexities that we're facing, with the size of challenge, the multiplicity of regional pursuits that we are going to be able to do this America alone. That is my biggest concern with Trump's strategy and approach on the global stage. He seeks to do it all by himself, and it will be very clear very soon that we do not have the capacity to sustain that. Jake?

Jake Sullivan:

I could not have said it better myself. So I will only reinforce one point, which is that dismantling USAID and a lot of the other elements of our capacity to provide a value proposition to the people in countries of Africa is just basically a huge gift to China who has moved fast to fill in that vacuum. And I think for the US to be serious about Africa, it can't just be about competing with China. It has to be about directly addressing the needs of those countries, but it is also the case that to effectively compete with China, we have to actually be able to offer something real in the way of resources, investment, and capacity building. And right now we are just not doing so.

Betsy:

Thank you both so much. Thank you again to our esteemed panelists and apologies to those that we didn't get to your question, but I'd like to thank all our callers who joined us from all around the world. Good morning, good afternoon and evening. Save the date for our next policy spotlight call on March 23rd with Professor Julia Minsen on the equally timely topic of how to disagree better. Watch your inboxes for the invite. Thanks to everyone. Wonderful call. Have a great day everybody.

Kurt Campbell:

Thanks, Betsy. Thank you, Jake.

Jake Sullivan:

Thank you guys. Thanks, Kurt. Take care.