How Sectarian Political Groups in Lebanon Use Welfare Services to Gain Support: CID Faculty Research Insights

How do sectarian political organizations in Lebanon, such as Hezbollah and the Future Movement, use social services as tools of clientelism, governance, and electoral competition?

Key Findings:

• Electoral strategies promote broader outreach: The Future Movement, which has depended heavily on electoral mobilization, tends to locate more of its schools, clinics, and hospitals in mixed-sectarian areas and frequently targets non-Sunni populations. This pattern reflects both short-term vote-maximizing objectives and longer-term efforts to build a national image of “good governance.”
• Nonelectoral strategies reinforce in-group targeting: Hezbollah, which combines electoral participation with grassroots organizing and militia-based competition, focuses its welfare provision primarily within Shiite communities. Its service infrastructure is largely in-group concentrated, reinforcing loyalty among core supporters, who tend to be from the in-group.
• Clientelism is embedded in physical space: Drawing on a novel geographic dataset of over 2,000 welfare institutions, the study shows that the spatial distribution of services is not solely driven by poverty levels or demographic need, but is a strategic political decision. The siting of service infrastructure (“bricks and mortar clientelism”) conveys long-term political commitments.
• Common alternative explanations fall short: Ideological commitments, religious doctrine, or differences in resource availability do not fully explain the observed variation. Instead, the nature of political competition (whether parties rely more on electoral or nonelectoral strategies) better predicts patterns of welfare delivery. 

Impact and Relevance:

This study reframes how identity-based organizations in fragile states provide social services—not simply as mechanisms of ethnic or sectarian favoritism, but as dynamic responses to specific political incentives. By demonstrating how groups like Hezbollah and the Future Movement adapt their welfare provision strategies based on competitive contexts, the paper challenges the assumption that sectarian clientelism is uniformly exclusionary. It shows instead that political strategy, particularly the mode of mobilization, plays a critical role in shaping cross-sectarian outreach.

The findings have important implications for understanding clientelism, governance, and service provision in plural societies. In environments where formal state institutions are weak and public service delivery is inconsistent, non-state actors often assume core welfare functions. The study highlights how electoral incentives and local political geography influence which communities receive services and how those services are distributed. Its integration of geospatial and interview-based methods offers a replicable framework for analyzing welfare politics in other settings across the Global South.

More broadly, the paper contributes to the comparative political economy of development by showing that welfare services are not only about addressing basic needs but also function as instruments of political coalition-building. It encourages researchers to pay attention to the physical infrastructure and institutional presence behind clientelistic politics, the “bricks and mortar” that signal strategic intent. As identity politics and welfare distribution continue to intersect in many developing countries, this research provides valuable insights into the practical logic of political competition, emphasizing the distinction between ideological exclusion and strategic allocation shaped by different visions of power and statehood.