In the News

Paul TuckerPaul Tucker's book Unelected Power featured as an HKS Virtual Book Tour

Orit Farkash-HacohenNew associate working paper from Orit Farkash-Hacohen, Facing A Gas Monopoly: The Power Game

Read the Center's Fall 2018 newsletter here (PDF)

After the financial crisis, countries around the world significantly expanded the objectives and powers of central banks. As central banks have acquired more powers, the trade-off between independence and accountability has become more complex and as a result, the pre-crisis academic consensus around central bank independence has broken down and popular discontent towards central banks is growing. Ed Balls, James Howat and Anna Stansbury have co-authored a working paper, Central Bank Independence Revisited: After the financial crisis, what should a model central bank look like?

Paul Tucker, M-RCBG research fellow and chair of the Systemic Risk Council, spoke on this topic at the Annual Robert Glauber Lecture on October 24, 2018: Reinforcing Financial Stability in a Crumbling International Order. Watch the video here.

Quote

"It is often said that the chair of the Federal Reserve is the second most important person in Washington. I'm not sure the statement is exactly right, but that it is plausible is, in a sense, remarkable. Why should the second most important person in Washington not be elected by the people or at least directly accountable to and subject to dismissal by elected officials?"

Content

Lawrence H. Summers
Charles W. Eliot University Professor
Director, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government

Read more

summers_headshot.jpg

Related: Washington may bluster but cannot stifle the Chinese economy

 


Join the conversation

Sign up for M-RCBG's mailing list to receive periodic newsletters and weekly event listings. Follow us on Twitter or like us on Facebook.

You can also listen to our seminar podcasts on SoundCloud or iTunes and read new posts on M-RCBG director Larry Summer's blog.