In this hybrid seminar, Nancy Rose and Jonathan Sallet presented ongoing research that explores how the concept of “tipping” in digital markets has shaped competition policy. They asked whether the assumption that “tipped” markets are invulnerable to competition has led enforcement authorities to put too little emphasis on bringing direct competition to bear against Big Tech monopolies in their “core” markets.
Is competition policy too accepting of entrenched incumbent power, while focusing mainly on preventing monopoly extension into complementary and adjacent markets? The answer matters crucially for the creation and enforcement of new sectoral regulation. If a market has permanently tipped, efforts to restore competition there waste enforcement attention and resources. But regulations that restrict enforcers to tools that constrain monopoly extension -- while neglecting policies that lower barriers to entry and expansion in core markets-may entrench current monopolies even where tipping is reversible. Getting the balance wrong weakens protection of both core and adjacent markets from competitive harm.
This seminar was given on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 and was moderated by John Haigh, Director, M-RCBG.
Nancy Rose, is a Visiting Scholar at M-RCBG and the Charles P Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics, MIT Economics.
Jonathan Sallet is a Senior Research Fellow at M-RCBG and Special Assistant Attorney General for the State of Colorado.
