fbpx Borrowing Requirements, Credit Access, and Adverse Selection: Evidence from Kenya | Harvard Kennedy School

Additional Authors:

  • Michael Kremer


Borrowing Requirements, Credit Access, and Adverse Selection: Evidence from Kenya. Michael Kremer, July 18, 2016, Paper, "We examine the potential of asset-collateralized loans in low-income country credit markets. When a Kenyan dairy cooperative exogenously replaced high down payments and joint liability requirements with loans collateralized by the asset itself - a large water tank- loan take-up increased from 2.4% to 41.9%. In contrast, substituting joint liability requirements for deposit requirements had no impact on loan take up. There were no repossessions among farmers allowed to collateralize 75% of their loans, and a 0.7% repossession rate among those offered 96% asset collateralization. A Karlan-Zinman test based on waiving borrowing requirements ex post finds evidence of adverse selection with very low deposit requirements, but not of moral hazard." Link