Excerpt
Excerpt
Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments. Eric Maskin, May 31, 2019, Paper, "The aim of the present paper is to analyze the problem of assuring the feasibility of a mechanism (game form), implementing in Nash equilibrium a given social choice rule abbreviated as (SCR) when the mechanism is constrained as to the way in which it is permitted to depend on endowments. A social choice rule is a correspondence specifying outcomes considered to be desirable in a given economy (environment). A mechanism is defined by (a) an outcome function and (b) a strategy domain prescribed for each player. Our outcome functions are not permitted to depend at all on the initial endowments. As to strategy domains, the with agent’s strategy domain Si is only permitted to depend on that agent’s endowment, but not on the endowments, other agents. (For earlier results concerning endowment manipulation, see Postlewaite (1979) and Sertel (1990).)" Link